Mally's Determinates and Husserl's Noemata*

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In this paper I compare passages from two philosophically important texts and conclude that they have fundamental ideas in common. What makes this comparison and conclusion interesting is that the texts come from two different traditions in philosophy, the analytic and the phenomenological. In 1912, Ernst Mally published *Gegenstandstheoretische Grundlagen der Logik und Logistik*, an analytic work containing a combination of formal logic and metaphysics. In 1913, Edmund Husserl published *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*, a seminal work in phenomenology in which *noemata* are defined and given a crucial role in directing our mental states. In the passages from these two texts reproduced below, I show that the abstract 'determinates' postulated by Mally in [1912] are assigned much the same role that Husserl assigned to noemata in [1913]. Though Mally's determinates are not as highly structured as Husserl's noemata, they have a feature that explains how they manage to play the role assigned to them. The corresponding feature is missing, or at least, not emphasized in Husserl's account of noemata. Therefore, insights from both philosophers, and thus from both the analytic and phenomenological traditions, are needed to give a more complete account of directed mental states.

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Mally's ideas were highly influenced by those of his teacher Alexius Meinong. It is traditionally thought that Meinong and Husserl developed opposing solutions to a problem that Brentano encountered during the course of his research on directed mental states. The problem is how experiences can be about or directed towards objects that do not exist. In response to this problem, Meinong postulated nonexistent objects that are directly experienced, whereas Husserl postulated noemata which organize such experiences 'as if' they were 'of' such objects. In [1988] (pp. 105–112), I argued that there is a way to resolve the differences between the Meinongian and Husserlian solutions to the problems of intentionality. This resolution involved a new interpretation of Meinongian objects, one that reconceived them along the lines of Mally's abstract determinates. In this paper, however, I shall put aside the question of whether my interpretation of Meinong is a good one so that we may investigate the more direct relationship between the ideas of Mally and Husserl. These latter two philosophers, within a year of one another, but apparently in ignorance of each other, seem to have articulated similar concepts and similar analyses of intentional states. It is important, therefore, not only for historians of philosophy to examine the similarities, but also for philosophers in general to see how the ideas they offer complement each other to yield a more complete picture of intentionality.

In past work I have examined the ideas of Husserl and Mally only in an indirect way, through secondary sources in English. I relied principally upon Findlay's [1963] description of Mally's work[1], and Føllesdal's [1969] interpretation of Husserl's notion of a noema. The primary sources themselves are even more revealing, however. To avoid biasing the reader with interpretive suggestions, we turn directly to these texts, without giving them any further introduction.

Mally's Determinates

§33 of Mally [1912] is entitled "Zur Theorie des Begriffes" ("On The Theory of the Concept"), and in it we find the following:[2]

[1]See Findlay [1963], pp. 110–12, and pp. 182–84.

[2]In the following passage, it might be useful to suppose that Mally's use of the German 'Objective' includes what we would nowadays call 'properties'. Also, is it

> ... Im Gedanken "geschlossene ebene Kurve, deren Punkte von *einem* Punkte gleichen Abstand haben" ist etwas gemeint, das die angenommenen Objektive erfüllt, irgendein Individuum oder Ding aus der Klasse der Kreise ... Was aber im Begriffe unmittelbar gedacht ist, das ist der Gegenstand "geschlossene ebene Kurve, u.s.w." Dieses begriffliche Abstraktum ist im Begriffe bloß gedacht, nicht auch gemeint. Von ihm ist die Erfüllung der konstitutiven Objektive nicht vorausgesetzt, ... "*der Kreis*" (in abstracto) *erfüllt* die im Kreisbegriffe angenommenen Objektive *nicht*, ... er ist nicht ein Kreis; er fällt deshalb auch nicht unter den Umfang des Kreisbegriffes, gehört der Klasse der Kreise nicht an, sondern bestimmt sie nur irgendwie und vertritt sie unserem Erfassen gegenüber: als der *Begriffsgegenstand*, nicht als Zielgegenstand des Begriffes. (p. 63)

Here is a translation into English:[3]

> ... In the thought "closed plane curve, every point of which lies equidistant from *a single* point," something is meant which satisfies these hypothesized objectives, some individual or thing from the class of circles ... But what is directly conceived in this concept is the object "closed plane curve, etc." This conceptual abstractum is only conceived in this concept but not meant. That it satisfies the constitutive objectives is not presupposed ... "*the circle*" (in abstraction) *does not satisfy* the hypothesized objectives in the circle-concept, ... it is not a circle; therefore it isn't in the extension of the circle-concept, it doesn't belong to the class of circles, but determines them in some sense and represents them when we grasp them: as the *concept-object*, not as the intended object of the concept.

Note that if we consider the example "the round square," then Mally's position is that the concept-object the round square is neither round nor square, that it isn't in the extension of the concept *round square*, and that it doesn't belong to the class of round squares. This understanding

important to point out that there may be a distinction being marked by Mally's phrase "Im Gedanken ist etwas gemeint" and his phrase "Im Begriffe ist etwas gedacht"; i.e., that there may be a distinction between "In the thought, something is meant (or intended)" and "In the concept, something is thought".

[3]The translations of these passages from Mally's work are all by Alfons Süßbauer and Edward N. Zalta.

of the round square is immune to Russell's [1905] and [1907] objections to such an object.[4] *Contra* Russell, the round square is not both round and nonround, nor would the existent round square both exist and not exist.[5] More generally, on Mally's understanding, the round square does not violate the geometrical law asserting that everything round fails to be square. The reason for this is given in the passages we consider next.

§33 continues as follows:

> Nun ist aber "der Kreis" in abstracto doch ein anderer Gegenstand als etwa "das Dreieck" in abstracto. Was die beiden voneinander unterscheidet, sind die Objektive, die wir als ihre konstitutiven oder definierenden Bestimmungen bezeichnen. Also müssen diese Bestimmungen den Begriffsgegenständen doch in irgendeiner Weise zukommen. Wir sagen: der (abstrakte) Gegenstand "Kreis" ist definiert oder determiniert durch die Objektive "eine geschlossene Linie zu sein", "in der Ebene zu liegen", und "nur Punkte zu enthalten, die von *einem* Punkte gleichen Abstand haben"; er ist als *Determinat* dieser Objektive zu bezeichnen, aber nicht als "implizites" (vgl. §30), da er ja die Objektive nicht erfüllt, sondern, wie man vielleicht sagen könnte, als bloß explizites oder als "Formdeterminat" dieser Objektive. (p. 64)

Here is an English translation:

> "The circle" in abstraction is a different object, as for example, from "the triangle" in abstraction. What distinguishes one from the other are the objectives which we call their constitutive or defining determinations. Therefore, these determinations have to belong to the concept-object in some sense. We say: the (abstract) object

[4]See Russell [1905], p. 45; and [1907], p. 93.

[5]On Mally's conception, the round square would neither satisfy roundness nor squareness. So it would not be round, and thus wouldn't be round and not round, *contra* Russell. It might be thought, however, that Russell could argue that the object the non-square square would, on this conception, fail to satisfy both non-squareness and squareness. By failing to satisfy the former, it would satisfy squareness, and this conflicts with the hypothesis that it does not do so. But Mally could point out that it is not a matter of definition that the non-square square fails to satisfy non-squareness, but rather that this object is not required, as a matter of definition, to satisfy non-squareness. However, as a matter of theory, Mally would suggest that the non-square square *does* satisfy non-squareness. His theory is that abstract determinates are not spatiotemporal and have no shape. They would, therefore, satisfy the negations of shape properties. See the passage from p. 76 of Mally [1912], reproduced below.

> "circle" is defined or determined by the objectives "to be a closed line", "to lie in a plane", and "to contain only points which are equidistant from *a single* point"; we call it the *determinate* of these objectives, but not as an "implicit" one, because it does not satisfy the objectives, but, as one might say, only as an explicit one or as a "formdeterminate" of these objectives.

Mally here introduces some terminology to discuss things like "the circle" or "the round square" as abstractions. He calls such things 'determinates', and says that they are 'constituted' by their defining 'determinations'. He says that the defining determinations 'define' or 'determine' these determinates. This is to be distinguished from saying that a determinate 'satisfies' a determination.

In previous work, I have substituted more familiar terminology for Mally's notions: 'properties' for Mally's 'determinations', and 'abstract objects' for his 'determinates', and 'exemplification' for Mally's notion of 'satisfaction'. To capture Mally's idea that the property F *determines* or defines an abstract object x, I say that abstract object x *encodes* property F. Thus, where Mally would say that the determinations *roundness* and *squareness* determine the determinate "the round square", I would say that the abstract object the round square encodes the properties of being round and being square. Encoding is a form of predication, and it should be such if it is to capture Mally's idea that the "determinations have to belong to the concept-object in some sense."[6] So the properties that an object encodes characterize that object in an important new sense. However, the new mode of predication is not the same as exemplification. Using our more familiar terminology, we may say that the the round square fails to exemplify the properties of being round or being square.

§33 concludes with the following lines:

> Das Meinen geht gleichsam durch den abstrakten Begriffsgegenstand hindurch auf die Zielgegenstände des Begriffes, durch das Formdeterminat hindurch... auf ein implizites Determinat des angenommenen Objektivs, auf etwas, was das Objektiv erfüllt oder erfülle. (p. 64)

In translation:

[6] To emphasize that encoding is to be analyzed as a mode of predication, I introduce atomic formulas of the form xF and contrast these with atomic formulas of the form Fx. Both are ways of predicating F of x. See Zalta [1988] and [1983].

> The intention goes through the abstract concept-object towards the intended objects of the concept, through the formdeterminate... towards an implicit determinate of the assumed objective, towards something which satisfies or might satisfy the objective.

Mally here is outlining his view about intentionality. He believes that a mental state, in the ordinary case, has both a content and (intended) objects. However, he objectifies the content, calling it a 'concept-object' or 'formdeterminate', and thus we should be careful to distinguish two different objects in connection with mental states. On the one hand, we have the objectified contents, which are the 'determinates' described earlier. These abstract objects give the state its content, direct us towards the world, and mediate our intentions. On the other hand, the 'intended object' of the mental state should be something that satisfies (exemplifies) the determinations (properties) that define the determinate. If there is no object that exemplifies these properties, then the mental state still has a content and direction, since there is still an abstract determinate that encodes properties and that directs us to expect an object of a certain sort. However, in such a case, nothing serves as the 'intended object' of the state.

The final passage from Mally [1912] relating to our present concerns is from §39, which is entitled "Abgeleitete Mannigfaltigkeit. Tatsächliche Vollständigkeit bei formaler Unvollständigkeit eines Gegenstandes" ("Derived Variety. Factual Completeness and Formal Incompleteness of an Object"):

> Es ["das Quadrat"] erfüllt ja nicht das Objektiv, vier gleiche Seiten zu haben, sondern es ist bloß Formdeterminat dieses Objektivs, und das, was "*das* Quadrat" (in abstracto) tatsächlich erfüllt, ist nichts anderes als eben das Objektiv, Formdeterminat des Quadratseins zu sein, und alles, was darin, daß der Gegenstand eben dieses Formdeterminat ist, impliziert ist. Dazu gehört zum Beispiel, daß dieser Gegenstand in der Tat nicht ein Quadrat ist, daß er überhaupt kein konkreter Gegenstand ist, also insbesondere, daß er keine tatsächliche Ausdehnung, keinen Ort, keine Gestalt, keine Winkel und Seiten besitzt u.s.w. (p. 76)

In translation:

> It ["the square"] does not satisfy the objective "to have four equal sides", but it is only a formdeterminate of this objective, and that

> which "*the* square" (in abstraction) actually satisfies is nothing other than just the objective "to be the formdeterminate of being a square", and everything which is implied by the fact that the object is this formdeterminate. This includes, for example, that this object actually is not a square, that it is not a concrete object at all, and especially that it has no actual extension, no spatial location, no shape, no angles or sides, etc.

Here Mally gives us a further characterization of his determinates—they have the usual characteristics of abstract objects. Using our more familiar terminology, we may say that while "the square" encodes squareness, it does not exemplify squareness. Nor does it exemplify the properties of being concrete, having an extension, having a location in space, having a shape, etc. Indeed, given that it is an abstract object, we may suppose that "the square" exemplifies the negations of all of these properties, and in particular, that it exemplifies the property of being non-square!

There is an interesting passage, in fact, a footnote, that Mally wrote late in life, in which he reflects on his earlier work in 1912. This footnote occurs in a fragment which Mally never completed nor published, but which he referred to as "Opus Magnum" in a letter of 1941. The fragment was published as "Großes Logikfragment", in Wolf and Weingartner [1971], though we shall refer to this work in the Bibliography as Mally [1941]. The following footnote 14 is appended to a discussion of impossible objects ('unmögliche Gegenstände') on p. 58, but the footnote itself appears on p. 181:

> Diese Unzuträglichkeiten [bzgl. unmöglicher Gegenstände, Anm. der Übersetzer] habe ich schon in meiner gegenstandstheoretischen Zeit zu vermeiden gesucht durch die Erklärung, "das Dreieck" sei nicht ein Dreieck, es erfülle seine definierenden Bestimmungen nicht, sondern "habe" sie in einer anderen, eigentümlichen Weise, etwa als "konstitutive Bestimmungen"; ein sog. "unvollständiger Gegenstand" sei nicht Träger (d.h. Erfüller oder Erfüllung) seiner Konstitutiven (definierenden) Bestimmungen, sondern ihr "Determinat"....

Here is a translation:

> These problems [with impossible objects] I have already tried to avoid in my "object-theoretic" days, with the explanation that "the triangle" is not a triangle, it does not satisfy its defining determinations, but "has" them in a different, peculiar sense, namely as "constitutive determinations"; a so-called "incomplete object" is not a bearer (i.e., satisfier or satisfaction) of its constitutive or defining determinations, but their "determinate"....

This passage clearly justifies extending the remarks Mally made in the above passages to impossible objects, and presumably, to other nonexistent objects. It also shows that Mally regarded the constitutive properties encoded by an object to be *predicated* of that object in a sense that differs from the standard exemplification (satisfaction) form of predication.

Husserl's Noemata

So that we don't have to examine too many introductory passages from the *Ideen*, I shall assume some basic facts about Husserl's philosophy. It is well established that Husserl associated a noema with each intentional mental state, which gives the state its content and direction. The noema is not the object towards which the mental act is directed. Husserl's investigation into the structure of the noema begins by 'bracketing' the world. Husserl assumes that there are ordinary objects of perception, including tables, trees, planets, etc., and even mental states. However, in order to focus solely on the essence of our *experience* of these things, he puts these objects of perception aside. When dealing with mental states that appear to be about nonexistent objects, such as dreams and hallucinations, there is nothing to bracket. Husserl does not believe in nonexistent objects. In cases where we seem to be thinking about such things, Husserl suggests that the noema of such mental states organizes the experience in such a way 'as if' they were 'of' such objects.

To get a better idea of what the noema is and how it operates, let us look at a passage in §89 of Husserl [1913], which is entitled "Noematische Aussagen und Wirklichkeitsaussagen. Das Noema in der psychologischen Sphäre" ("Noematic Statements and Statements About Actuality. The Noema in the Psychological Sphere"). Here we find:

> "In" der reduzierten Wahrnehmung (im phänomenologisch reinen Erlebnis) finden wir, als zu ihrem Wesen unaufhebbar gehörig, das Wahrgenommene als solches, auszudrücken als "materielles Ding", "Pflanze", "Baum", "blühend" usw. Die *Anführungszeichen* sind

> offenbar bedeutsam, sie drücken jene Vorzeichenänderung, die entsprechende radikale Bedeutungsmodifikation der Worte aus. Der Baum *schlechthin*, das Ding in der Natur, ist nichts weniger als dieses *Baumwahrgenommene als solches*, das als Wahrnehmungssinn zur Wahrnehmung und unabtrennbar gehört. Der Baum schlechthin kann abbrennen, sich in seine chemischen Elemente auflösen usw. Der Sinn aber—Sinn *dieser* Wahrnehmung, ein notwendig zu ihrem Wesen Gehöriges—kann nicht abbrennen, er hat keine chemischen Elemente, keine Kräfte, keine realen Eigenschaften. (p. 184)

Here is F. Kersten's [1982] English translation:[7]

> "In" the reduced perception (in the phenomenologically pure mental process), we find, as indefeasibly belonging to its essence, the perceived as perceived, to be expressed as "material thing," "plant," "tree," "blossoming," and so forth. Obviously, the *inverted commas* are significant in that they express that change in sign, the corresponding radical significational modification of the words. The *tree simpliciter*, the physical thing belonging to Nature, is nothing less than this *perceived tree as perceived* which, as perceptual sense, inseparably belongs to the perception. The tree simpliciter can burn up, be resolved into its chemical elements, etc. But the sense—the sense *of this* perception, something belonging necessarily to its essence—cannot burn up; it has no chemical elements, no forces, no real properties. (p. 216)

In this passage, Husserl phenomenologically reduces perceptions and finds that they essentially have a sense. He distinguishes the sense of a perception from the thing that is perceived, and he refers to this sense as the 'perceived as perceived'. For example, the 'perceived tree as perceived' is *not* the tree in the external world that we perceive but rather the sense of the perception of that tree. For the purposes of this paper, it doesn't matter whether Husserl thought that the object of perception (i.e., the thing perceived) is the individual tree itself or rather a situation or state of the tree together with one of its aspects or properties. Whichever the case, the sense of the perception is something distinct from the thing perceived, and moreover, it is something abstract and nonconcrete.

[7] Page references are to Kersten's text.

To ensure that there is no doubt about when he is referring to the thing perceived and when he is referring to the sense of a perception, Husserl uses the device of quotation marks (*Anführungszeichen*), which Karsten translates as 'inverted commas'. When these quotation marks are placed around an expression, the resulting new expression describes the sense of a perception and not the perceived thing itself. Husserl is emphatic that the new expression has a meaning that differs from the meaning of the original expression. There is no doubt that whereas the original expression is used to described the perceived things themselves, the new expression is used to describe senses. However, we shall later raise the question of whether Husserl was well-advised to think that the resulting expression indeed has a different meaning or whether the mode of description is what has changed.

Let us next consider an important passage from §90, which is entitled "Der 'noematische Sinn' und die Unterscheidung von 'immanenten' und 'wirklichen Objekten'" ("The 'Noematic Sense' and the Distinction between 'Immanental' and 'Actual Objects'"). In the last paragraph there we find:

> Und so fragen wir denn überhaupt, diese Ausschaltungen in ihrem klaren Sinn innehaltend, was in dem ganzen "reduzierten" Phänomen evidenterweise "liegt". Nun dann liegt eben in der Wahrnehmung auch dies, daß sie ihren noematischen Sinn, ihr "Wahrgenommenes als solches" hat, "diesen blühenden Baum dort im Raume"—mit den Anführungszeichen verstanden—eben das zum Wesen der phänomenologisch reduzierten Wahrnehmung gehörige *Korrelat*. (p. 187)

In Kersten's translation:

> And, keeping these excludings in their clear sense, we therefore ask quite universally, then, about what is evidentially "inherent" in the whole "reduced" phenomenon. Now, inherent too precisely in perception is this: that it has its noematic sense, its "perceived as perceived," "this blossoming tree there, in space"—understood with inverted commas—precisely the *correlate* belonging to the essence of the phenomenologically reduced perception. (p. 220)

Here Husserl reiterates not only that every reduced perception has a sense (which he now refers to as the 'noematic sense'), but also that the way

to describe the noematic sense is to use the expressions with quotation marks.

This is taken a step further in the following passage from §130, which is entitled "Umgrenzung des Wesens 'noematischer Sinn'" ("Delimitation of the Essence 'Noematic Sense'"):

> Offenbar ist hiermit ein ganz *fester Gehalt in jedem Noema* abgegrenzt. Jedes Bewußtsein hat sein *Was* und jedes vermeint "sein" Gegenständliches; es ist evident, daß wir bei jedem Bewußtsein eine solche noematische Beschreibung desselben, "genau so, wie es vermeintes ist", prinzipiell gesprochen, müssen vollziehen können; wir gewinnen durch Explikation und begriffliche Fassung einen geschlossenen Inbegriff von formalen oder materialen, sachhaltig bestimmten oder auch "unbestimmten" ("leer" vermeinten[8]) "*Prädikaten*", und diese in ihrer *modifizierten Bedeutung* bestimmen den "*Inhalt*" des in Rede stehenden Gegenstandskernes des Noema. (p. 270)

In Kersten's translation:

> With this, obviously, a quite *fixed content in each noema* is delimited. Each consciousness has its *What* and means "its" objective something; it is evident that, in the case of each consciousness, we must, essentially speaking, be able to make such a noematic description [of "its" objective something] "precisely as it is meant"; we acquire by explication and conceptual comprehension a closed set of formal or material, materially determined or "undetermined" ("emptily meant"[9]) "predicates" and these in their *modified signification* determine that [the] "*content*" of the object-core of the noema which is spoken of. (pp. 312–13)

By saying that a system of predicates determine the content of the noema's core, Husserl is saying that the predicates determine the content of the noematic sense. This seems to parallel to Mally's view that abstract determinates are determined by the properties we use to identify and describe them.

There is a difference, however, in that Husserl claims that the predicates undergo a change of meaning when determining the content of the object-core. If such predicates undergo a change of meaning, if they signify a different property when characterizing the 'perceived as perceived', then why, for example, would the noema with the content characterized by the transformed meaning of "tree" direct us towards such things as *trees* (now using this word in its ordinary meaning)? It might have been better to suggest that the words mean the same (i.e., signify the same property) when used to characterize both ordinary things and the pure experience of them, but that the mode of predication or application of (the meaning of) these words differs in the two cases. This, of course, would bring Husserl in line with Mally's position. However, Husserl could insist that strictly speaking, the predicate doesn't change meaning; rather, the expression consisting of the predicate in inverted commas is simply a new expression which denotes the sense of the original, unquoted predicate. He could argue, in the case of non-indexical experiences, that since the noematic sense determines reference, there is an explanation of why a noema characterized by the predicate expression "tree" in inverted commas would direct us towards *trees*: the predicate in inverted commas denotes a noematic sense which directs us towards things that exemplify the ordinary property fixed by the sense, namely, the ordinary property of *being a tree*.[10] But even if Husserl insists that the senses of predicates determine the content of the noema, the logic of encoding is still appropriate for modeling Husserl's ideas. In the typed version of the theory of encoding, abstract objects can not only encode ordinary properties, but also *abstract* properties. Abstract properties encode properties of ordinary properties. By encoding properties of ordinary properties, they can direct us toward the ordinary properties that exemplify the encoded properties. We may think of abstract properties as modes of presentation for ordinary properties, and as such, they can serve as the sense of a predicate.[11] Thus, the formal development of Mally's idea leads to an understanding of the way in which predicate senses can determine the content of a noematic sense.

There is one final passage from Husserl which should be considered in

[8] There is a footnote to Husserl's text here which reads:

> Diese Leere der Unbestimmtheit darf nicht mit der Anschauungsleere, der dunkeln Vorstellung vermengt werden.

[9] Kersten's translation of the footnote that occurs in the text at this point reads:

> This emptiness of undeterminedness should not be confused with being devoid of intuition, the emptiness of the obscure objectivation. (p. 313)

[10] I am indebted to Christian Beyer for making this suggestion.

[11] See Zalta [1988], Chapters 9 – 12, and Zalta [1983], Chapters V annd VI.

the present context. Consider the first few lines of the opening paragraph of §131, which is entitled "Der 'Gegenstand', das 'bestimmbare X im noematischen Sinn'" ("The 'Object'. The 'Determinable X in the Noematic Sense'"):

> Die Prädikate sind aber Prädikate von "*etwas*", und dieses "etwas" gehört auch mit, und offenbar unabtrennbar, zu dem fraglichen Kern: es ist der zentrale Einheitspunkt, von dem wir oben gesprochen haben. Es ist der Verknüpfungspunkt oder "Träger" der Prädikate, aber keineswegs Einheit derselben in dem Sinne, in dem irgendein Komplex, irgendwelche Verbindung der Prädikate Einheit zu nennen wäre. Es ist von ihnen notwendig zu unterscheiden, obschon nicht neben sie zu stellen und von ihnen zu trennen, so wie umgekehrt sie selbst *seine* Prädikate sind: ohne ihn undenkbar und doch von ihm unterscheidbar. (pp. 270–71)

In Kersten's translation:

> The predicates are, however, predicates of "*something*," and this "something" also belongs, and obviously inseparably, to the core in question: it is the central point of unity of which we spoke above. It is the central point of connexion or the "bearer" of the predicates, but in no way is it a unity of them in the sense in which any complex, any combination of the predicates would be called a unity. It is necessarily to be distinguished from them, although not to be placed alongside and separated from them; just as, conversely, they are *its* predicates: unthinkable without it and yet distinguishable from it. (p. 313)

In this passage, Husserl has introduced a new entity, the determinable X. The exact interpretation of the determinable X is a matter of debate among Husserl scholars. Husserl says it 'belongs to' the noematic sense. Husserl seems to suggest that the determinable X *bears*, in a modified sense, the predicates in the noematic sense. By placing the word 'Träger' ('bearer') in quotation marks, Husserl alerts the reader that he is using the word in a special sense. He therefore seems to be proposing that there is a modified *form of predication* (signified by the modified sense of 'bear') by which the predicates apply to the determinable X. This form of predication could be the analog of Mally's notion of determination and our notion of encoding. However, Husserl is now connecting the idea

that properties determine the content of the noematic sense with the idea that these properties determine the determinable X. Strictly speaking, he seems to talk about the determinable X as being the subject of a kind of predication.

So should we say that it is the noematic sense which encodes properties or the determinable X that encodes properties? Given the way Husserl speaks in the quotation from §130, a case could be made out for thinking that the noematic sense encodes the properties that 'determine' its content. Moreover, Husserl seems to suggest later on in §131 (second paragraph) that we can identify the same determinable X across experiences even though the noematic sense changes in those experiences. This suggests that Mally's abstract determinates are a better model of noematic senses than of the determinable X. On the theory we have developed, abstract objects that encode distinct properties are themselves distinct. An abstract object cannot 'change its (encoded) properties and yet remain the same'. So for the purposes of building a logic of noematic senses, the suggestion that noematic senses encode properties may be the best way to proceed. Interpreted as an abstract object that encodes properties, the noematic sense unifies the encoded properties into a focal point or whole. By encoding properties, the noematic sense provides a mechanism by which the noema directs us towards the world, towards objects that may exemplify the properties that are encoded in the noematic sense. Of course, in the cases of dreams, hallucinations, and presentations of 'impossible' objects, there are no objects that exemplify the properties encoded in the noematic sense.

Conclusion

These passages from the basic texts of Mally and Husserl establish that they developed similar solutions to the problems of intentionality. Both men argued that mental states typically have both a content and an 'intended object'. They agreed, in cases of dreams, hallucinations, presentations of 'impossible' objects, and the like, that such mental states may have no object, though they still have content. This content was objectified by both men—Mally objectified the content as a determinate and Husserl objectified the content as a noematic sense. Determinates and noematic senses are abstract objects of some sort, for both men explicitly say, of their respective objects, that they are not concrete, that they are

not the kind of thing to have spatiotemporal locations, that they have no shape, cannot burn, etc. These abstract, objectified contents direct our mental states towards the world. But not only *are* such intermediate objects the contents of mental states, they also *have* content (in some sense) as well. Mally and Husserl identified the content of these intermediate objects in terms of the properties that defined them. But these intermediate objects don't exemplify their defining properties in the usual way. Rather, some new mode of predication relates them to their defining properties. Mally explicitly identifies this mode of predication, and coins a technical term 'determine' to refer to it. Husserl also talks as if the properties 'determine' the content of the noematic sense. And depending on how the determinable X is to be interpreted, he also seems to signal that there must be some new mode of predication involved, for he uses the word 'bear' inside quotation marks and this may mean that he is using it in a modified sense.

It is crucial, however, for this new form of predication to be incorporated into Husserl's philosophy. For if we ask, how exactly do noematic senses direct us towards the world, there is no obvious answer, other than this is a task that has been stipulated for them. That is, Husserl does not develop his notion of determination. But Mally's notion of determination is developed to a somewhat fuller extent. Using Mally's notion, one could say that a noematic sense is determined by, or encodes, the properties that give it content. By encoding such properties, the noematic sense is characterized by those properties in such a way that whenever we entertain such a sense, we are led to expect and anticipate an object that exemplifies the same properties. A noematic sense that encodes properties F, G, ... , can direct our attention to objects that exemplify F, G, ... In particular acts of perception, a particular noematic sense that encodes the properties involved in the perceptual experience of an object y can serve to represent y in future mental acts directed specifically towards y. Finally, if the notion of determination, or encoding, is made formally precise, as I have attempted to do in [1983] and [1988], one can even begin to build a logic of noematic senses.

Thus, even though Husserl's noematic senses have a richer theoretical structure than Mally's determinations, the explicit new form of predication that Mally distinguished serves as an important new conceptual tool for describing and characterizing the nature and operation of such senses. In this way, then, insights from both philosophers give us a more complete understanding of the nature of intentionality.

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