As imaginative and fascinating as it is, however, guise theory has come up against a wide range of criticisms. One of the most challenging critiques was offered by Plantinga. Plantinga puts his finger squarely on some fundamental intuitions that guise theory gives up, and develops several objections to the guise-theoretic world view as a whole. In this paper, the author uses Plantinga's criticisms as a guide in order to compare the theory of abstract objects with Castañneda's guise theory. The two thheories can be fruitfully compared because they share a common intellectual heritage---both follow Ernst Mally  in postulating a special realm of objects distinguished by their `internal' or `encoded' properties. Despite this common heritage, however, the theories organize, develop, and apply these special objects in distinctive ways. The two metaphysical systems, therefore, differ significantly, and these differences become important when one considers Plantinga's critique of guise theory. In this essay, the author shows that the theory of abstract objects anticipates and addresses most of Plantinga's concerns about guise theory, by preserving intuitions guise theory has abandoned.
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