Reflections on the Logic of the Ontological Argument
Paul E. Oppenheimer and Edward N. Zalta
Studia Neoaristotelica, 4/1 (2007): 28–35.
In this paper, the authors evaluate the ontological argument they
developed in their 1991 paper as to soundness. They focus on Anselm's
first premise, which asserts: there is a conceivable thing than which
nothing greater is conceivable. After suggesting reasons why this
premise is false, the authors show that there is a reading of this
premise on which it is true. Such a premise can be used in a valid and
sound reconstruction of the ontological argument. This argument is
developed in precise detail, but the authors show that the conclusion,
the formal version of which is a reading of the claim that "God
exists", doesn't quite achieve the end Anselm desired.
[Preprint available online in PDF]