## On the Structural Similarities Between Worlds and Times

### Author

Edward N. Zalta
### Reference

*Philosophical Studies,***
51/2**, March 1987, 213-239
### Abstract

In the debate about the nature and identity of possible worlds,
philosophers have neglected the parallel questions about the nature
and identity of moments of time. These are not questions about the
structure of time in general, but rather about the internal structure
of each individual time. Times and worlds share the following
structural similarities: both are maximal with respect to propositions
(at every world and time, either *p* or *not-p* is true,
for every *p*); both are consistent; both are closed (every
modal consequence of a proposition true at a world is also true at
that world, and every tense-theoretic consequence of a proposition
true at a time is also true at that time); just as there is a unique
actual world, there is a unique present moment; and just as a
proposition is necessarily true iff true at all possible worlds, a
proposition is eternally true iff true at all times. In this paper,
the author shows that a simple extension of his theory of worlds
yields a theory of times in which the above structural similarities
between the two are consequences.

Copies of this paper can be obtained by writing to the author
at

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