Intensional Logic and the Metaphysics of Intentionality

Author

Reference

Table of Contents

Preface

Part One: Introduction

Chapter 1: Intensionality and Intentionality

• 1.1 Intensional Logic
• 1.2 Intentional States

Chapter 2: An Overview of the Theory

• 2.1 The Insight Behind the Theory
• 2.2 The Presentation of the Theory
• 2.3 The Explanation of the Theory
• 2.4 Some Observations

Part Two: Strong Extensionality

Chapter 3: The Basic Theory of Relations

• 3.1 Taking Relations as Primitive
• 3.2 The Semantic Conception of the Language of Encoding
• 3.3 Conditions Under Which There Are Relations
• 3.4 Identity Conditions for Relations

Chapter 4: Propositions, Situations, Worlds, and Times

• 4.1 The Basic Theory of Propositions
• 4.2 Situations, Worlds, and Times
• 4.3 Other Theories of Worlds and Times
• 4.4 The Challenge for Other Logics

Chapter 5: Definite Descriptions

• 5.1 A Simple View of Descriptions
• 5.2 The Semantics of Rigid Descriptions
• 5.3 Descriptions, Propositions, and Relations
• 5.4 The Logic of Descriptions
• 5.5 Non-rigid Descriptions
• 5.6 Final Comments

Part Three: Existential Generalization

Chapter 6: The Turn-of-the-Century Debate About Intentionality

• 6.1 Two Kinds of Existence
• 6.2 Brentano, Meinong, and Husserl
• 6.3 Mally, A-Objects, and Noemata
• 6.4 A-Objects and Meinong

Chapter 7: The Analysis of Existential Generalization

• 7.1 Russell's Objections to Meinong's Views
• 7.2 A Clear Response to Russell's Objections
• 7.3 Names, Descriptions, and Fiction
• 7.4 The Principles of Generalization

Chapter 8: Meinong's Recent Resurrection

• 8.1 Parsons' Theory of Meinongian Objects
• 8.2 A Strict Understanding of Meinong}
• 8.3 Did Meinong Have to Commit Himself to Principle (G)?
• 8.4 The Principle of Independence

Part Four: Substitutivity and Existential Generalization

Chapter 9: Direct Reference, Fregean Senses, and The Propositional Attitudes

• 9.1 Roles Senses Play in the Philosophy of Language
• 9.2 A-Objects as Senses: The General Picture
• 9.3 Sense_1, Sense_4, and Sense_7
• 9.4 Sense_2, Sense_5, and Direct Reference
• 9.5 Sense_3, Sense_6, and the Propositional Attitudes
• 9.6 Summary

Chapter 10: Further Issues Concerning the Attitudes

• 10.1 Possible Objections to the Theory
• 10.2 The Triadic Theory of Belief
• 10.3 Existential Generalization

Chapter 11: Other Substitutivity Puzzles

• 11.1 Russell's Puzzle About George IV
• 11.2 Kripke's Puzzles
• 11.3 Indexical Belief

Part Five: Conclusion

Chapter 12: A Comparison with Montague's Intensional Logic

• 12.1 General Comparison
• 12.2 Montague and Nonexistence
• 12.3 Propositional Attitudes
• 12.4 Modality, Descriptions, and Intensionality

Appendix: The Formal Intensional Logic

• A.1 The Language
• A.2 The Semantics
• A.3 The Logic
• A.4 The Proper Axioms

Bibliography

Index