Lambert, Mally, and the Principle of Independence
Author
Edward N. Zalta
Reference
Grazer Philosophische Studien,
25/26, 1985/1986, 447-459
Abstract
In this paper, the author analyzes critically some of the ideas
found in Karel Lambert's recent book, Meinong and the Principle
of Independence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
Lambert attempts to forge a link between the ideas of Meinong and the
free logicians. The link comes in the form of a principle which,
Lambert says, these philosophers adopt, namely, Mally's Principle of
Independence, which Mally himself later abandoned. Instead of following
Mally and attempting to formulate the principle in the material mode
as the claim that an object can have properties without having any
sort of being, Lambert formulates the principle in the formal mode, as
(something equivalent to) the rejection of the traditional constraint
on the principle of predication. The principle of predication is that
a formula of the form `Fa' is true iff the general term
`F' is true of the object denoted by the object term
`a'. The traditional constraint on this predication
principle is that for the sentence `Fa' to be true, not only
must the object term have a denotation, but it must also denote an
object that has being. According to Lambert, the free logicians
violate this constraint by suggesting that `Fa' can be true
even if the object term has no denotation, whereas Meinong violates
this constraint by proposing `Fa' can be true even when the
object term denotes an object that has no being. Lambert then tries
to `vindicate' the Principle of Independence, thereby justifying both
the work of the free logicians and Meinong.
By way of criticism, the author points out that there is an
alternative framework from which one may deny most of Lambert's
conclusions. The alternative is based on the work of Ernst Mally, and
though it employs a second form and principle of predication, it is
nevertheless traditional in the sense that the traditional constraint
on predication is preserved. Moreover, the framework is Meinongian in
spirit. In this framework, (1) one need not commit one to `beingless
objects' to explain intentional phenomena, (2) one need not suppose
that the Principle of Independence is true or that Mally was wrong to
have abandoned it, (3) one may retain the traditional constraint on
predication, and (4) one may retain the most important principle
governing complex properties, which Lambert says should be given up.
Copies of this paper can be obtained by writing to the author
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