Singular Propositions, Abstract Constituents, and Propositional Attitudes

Author

Edward N. Zalta

Reference

Themes from Kaplan, J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989, 455-478

Abstract

The author resolves a conflict between Frege's view that the cognitive significance of coreferential names may be distinct and Kaplan's view that since coreferential names have the same `character', they have the same cognitive significance. A distinction is drawn between an expression's `character' and its `cognitive character'. The former yields the denotation of an expression relative to a context (and individual); the latter yields the abstract sense of an expression relative to a context (and individual). Though coreferential names have the same character, they may have distinct cognitive characters. Propositions involving these abstract senses play an important role in explaining de dicto belief contexts.

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