The Jonathan Barnes Translation of Anselm's Proslogion II

[The following translation was presented in J. Barnes, The Ontological Argument, London: Macmillan, 1972.]

1. Therefore, Lord, who grant understanding to faith, grant me that, in so far as you know it beneficial, I understand that you are as we believe and you are that which we believe. (Ergo, Domine, qui das fidei intellectum, da mihi, ut, quantum scis expedire, intelligam quia es, sicut credimus; et hoc es, quod credimus.)

2. Now we believe that you are something than which nothing greater can be imagined. (Et quidem credimus te esse aliquid, quo nihil majus cogitari possit.)

3. Then is there no such nature, since the fool has said in his heart: God is not? (An ergo non est aliqua talis natura, quia\/ dixit insipiens in corde suo: Non est Deus?)

4. But certainly this same fool, when he hears this very thing that I am saying — something than which none greater can be imagined — understands what he hears; and what he understands is in his understanding, even if he does not understand that it is. (Sed certe idem ipse insipiens, cum audit hoc ipsum quod dico, aliquid quo majus nihil cogitari potest; intelligit quod audit, et quod intelligit in intellectu ejus est; etiamsi non intelligat illud esse.)

5. For it is one thing for a thing to be in the understanding and another to understand that a thing is. (Aliud est enim rem esse in intellectu; aliud intelligere rem esse.)

6. For when a painter imagines beforehand what he is going to make, he has in his understanding what he has not yet made but he does not yet understand that it is. (Nam cum pictor præ cogitat quæ facturus est, habet quidem in intellectu; sed nondum esse intelligit quod nondum fecit.)

7. But when he has already painted it, he both has in his understanding what he has already painted and understands that it is. (Cum vero jam pinxit, et habet in intellectu, et intelligit esse quod jam fecit.)

8. Therefore even the fool is bound to agree that there is at least in the understanding something than which nothing greater can be imagined, because when he hears this he understands it, and whatever is understood is in the understanding. (Convincitur ergo etiam insipiens esse vel in intellectu aliquid, quo nihil majus cogitari potest; quia hoc cum audit, intelligit; et quidquid intelligitur, in intellectu est.)

9. And certainly that than which a greater cannot be imagined cannot be in the understanding alone. (Et certe id, quo majus cogitari nequit, non potest esse in intellectu solo.)

10. For if it is at least in the understanding alone, it can be imagined to be in reality too, which is greater. (Si enim vel in solo intellectu est, potest cogitari esse et in re; quod majus est.)

11. Therefore, if that than which a greater cannot be imagined is in the understanding alone, that very thing than which a greater cannot be imagined is something than which a greater can be imagined. But certainly, this cannot be. (Si ergo id, quo majus cogitari non potest, est in solo intellectu, id ipsum, quo majus cogitari non potest, est quo majus cogitari potest: Sed certe hoc esse non potest\/.)

12. There exists, therefore, beyond doubt something than which a greater cannot be imagined, both in the understanding and in reality. (Existit ergo procul dubio aliquid quo majus cogitari non valet, et intellectu, et in re.)