Principia Logico-Metaphysica
(Draft/Excerpt)

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To my wife, Susanne Z. Riehemann
NOTE: This is an excerpt from an incomplete draft of the monograph *Principia Logico-Metaphysica*. The monograph currently has four parts:

- Part I: Prophilosophy
- Part II: Philosophy
- Part III: Metaphilosophy
- Part IV: Technical Appendices, Bibliography, Index

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Consequently, this excerpt omits the Preface, Acknowledgments, Part I/Chapters 1–6 (which need revision), Part II/Chapter 15 (which is being written), Part III (which is mostly unwritten), and some Appendices in Part IV. The present excerpt sometimes contains references to the omitted content and *active links in the Table of Contents to omitted content won’t work.*

*The work is ongoing and so the monograph changes constantly.* Any citations to this material should explicitly reference this version of December 23, 2020, since page numbers, chapter numbers, section numbers, item (definition, theorem) numbers, etc., may all change in future versions.
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Part I

Prophilosophy
Part II

Philosophy
Chapter 7

The Language

Throughout most of Part II, we prove theorems that are formulated in a second-order modal language. This will be the language used in Chapters 7 – 14. However this language is just a fragment of a more general, type-theoretic modal language. We postpone the definition of the type-theoretic language until Chapter 15, where we investigate typed object theory and its applications.

In the present and subsequent chapters, our metalanguage makes use of some basic notions and principles of number theory and set theory, so as to more precisely articulate certain definitions. But none of these notions and principles are used in the object language defined in this chapter. Ultimately, the philosophical system sketched over the next few chapters will offer us an analysis of the basic notions and principles of number theory and set theory used in the metalanguage, but we won’t be in a position to see this until Chapter 10 (where we define and prove facts about natural classes) and Chapter 14 (where we define and prove facts about natural cardinals and natural numbers).

7.1 Metatheoretical Definitions

The definitions that generate a particular second-order language are given over the next several items.

(1) Metadefinitions: Simple Terms. A simple term of our second-order language is any expression that is a simple individual term or a simple n-place relation term \((n \geq 0)\), where these are listed as follows:

(.1) Simple Individual Terms: (Less Formal)

Individual Constants (Names):

\(a_1, a_2, \ldots\)

\((a, b, c, b_1, b_2, \ldots, c_1, c_2, \ldots)\)
CHAPTER 7. THE LANGUAGE

Individual Variables:
\[ x_1, x_2, \ldots \]
\[ y_1, y_2, \ldots \]
\[ z_1, z_2, \ldots \]

(2) Simple \( n \)-place Relation Terms \((n \geq 0)\):

- \( n \)-place Relation Constants (Names)
  \[ P_1^n, P_2^n, \ldots \]
  \[ (P^n, Q^n, R^n, S^n, T^n) \]

- \( n \)-place Relation Variables:
  \[ F_1^n, F_2^n, \ldots \]
  \[ (F^n, G^n, H^n, I^n, J^n) \]

(3) Distinguished 1-place Relation Constant:

\[ E! \] (read: ‘being concrete’ or ‘concreteness’)

where \( E! \) is just a rewritten version of the 1-place relation constant \( P_1^1 \)

In what follows, we shall use the technical term \textit{primitive constant} as follows:

(4) A \textit{primitive constant} is any simple individual constant or simple \( n \)-place relation constant (for some \( n \geq 0 \)) that occurs in the lists in (1), (2), and (3) above.

This helps us to distinguish primitive constants from \textit{new} constants introduced by definition. No similar distinction is needed for variables, since we won’t introduce new variables into the language by definition. To facilitate readability, we often use the expressions listed in the column labeled ‘Less Formal’ as replacements for the official expressions of the language.

(2) \textbf{Metadefinitions}: Syncategorematic Expressions. A syncategorematic expression represents a primitive notion of the language but is neither a term (i.e., the kind of expression that may have a denotation) nor a formula (i.e., the kind of expression that has truth conditions). To list the syncategorematic expressions of our language, we use \( \alpha \) as a metavariable that ranges over all variables and use \( \nu \) (Greek nu), sometimes decorated with a numerical subscript, as a metavariable that ranges just over individual variables:

(1) Unary Formula-Forming Operators:

- \( \neg \) (‘it is not the case that’ or ‘it is false that’)
- \( \Box \) (‘necessarily’ or ‘it is necessary that’)
- \( \mathcal{I} \) (‘actually’ or ‘it is actually the case that’)

(2) Binary Formula-Forming Operator:

\( \rightarrow \) (‘if . . . , then . . . ’)

(3) Variable-Binding Formula-Forming Operator:

\[ \forall \alpha \] (‘every \( \alpha \) is such that’)

for every variable \( \alpha \)
7.1. METATHEORETICAL DEFINITIONS

(4.1) Variable-Binding Individual-Term-Forming Operator:
\[ \nu \] ('the \( \nu \) such that')
for every individual variable \( \nu \)

(4.2) Variable-Binding \( n \)-place Relation-Term-Forming Operators (\( n \geq 0 \)):
\[ \lambda \nu_1 \ldots \nu_n \] ('being \( \nu_1, \ldots, \nu_n \) such that')
for any distinct variables \( \nu_1, \ldots, \nu_n \), and
\[ \lambda \] ('that . . . ')
where no variables follow the \( \lambda \).

These primitive, syncategorematic expressions are referenced in the definition of the syntax of our language and are used to define complex formulas and complex terms. In what follows, we sometimes call:

- \( \neg \) the negation operator
- \( \Box \) the necessity operator
- \( \diamond \) the actuality operator
- \( \rightarrow \) the conditional operator
- \( \forall \) the universal quantifier
- \( \iota \) the definite description operator
- \( \lambda \) the relation abstraction, or \( \lambda \), operator

By convention, in any conditional formula of the form \( \phi \rightarrow \psi \), we say \( \phi \) is the antecedent and \( \psi \) the consequent of the conditional.

(3) Metadefinitions: Syntax of the ‘Second-order’ Language. We present the syntax of our second-order language by a simultaneous recursive definition of the following four kinds of expressions: individual term, \( n \)-place relation term, formula, and term.

(1) Every simple individual term (i.e., every individual constant and individual variable) is an individual term and every simple \( n \)-place relation term (i.e., every \( n \)-place relation constant and \( n \)-place relation variable, is an \( n \)-place relation term (\( n \geq 0 \)).

(2) Every 0-place relation constant and 0-place relation variable is a formula

(3) If \( \Pi^n \) is any \( n \)-place relation term (\( n \geq 1 \)) and \( \kappa_1, \ldots, \kappa_n \) are any individual terms, then

(a) \( \Pi^n \kappa_1 \ldots \kappa_n \) is a formula ('\( \kappa_1, \ldots, \kappa_n \) exemplify \( \Pi^n \)')

(b) \( \kappa_1 \ldots \kappa_n \Pi^n \) is a formula ('\( \kappa_1, \ldots, \kappa_n \) encode \( \Pi^n \)')

(4) If \( \phi \) and \( \psi \) are formulas and \( \alpha \) any variable, then

\[ [\lambda \phi], (\neg \phi), (\phi \rightarrow \psi), \forall \alpha \phi, (\Box \phi), \text{and } (\mid \phi) \] are formulas.
(5) If $\varphi$ is any formula and $\nu$ any individual variable, then
   $\nu \varphi$ is an individual term

(6) If $\varphi$ is any formula and $\nu_1, \ldots, \nu_n$ are any distinct individual variables
   ($n \geq 0$), then
   (a) $[\lambda \nu_1 \ldots \nu_n \varphi]$ is an $n$-place relation term, and
   (b) $\varphi$ itself is a 0-place relation term.

(7) A term is any individual term or $n$-place relation term ($n \geq 0$).

Though it should be clear how to read the formulas and terms of this language, there are two interesting facts to note about reading certain expressions, namely, 0-place $\lambda$-expressions of the form $[\lambda \varphi]$ are both formulas and terms, and every formula $\varphi$ is a 0-place relation term. We discuss these in turn.

By (4), expressions of the form $[\lambda \varphi]$ are formulas and, by (6.a), they are also 0-place relation terms. So expressions of the form $[\lambda \varphi]$ should be read in one of two ways, depending on the context. On the one hand, when $[\lambda \varphi]$ stands by itself or occurs in formula position, it asserts *that $\varphi$ is true*, since truth is the 0-place case of predication. So, we read the formula $[\lambda \varphi] \equiv \varphi$ as: *that-$\varphi$ is true if and only if $\varphi$*. On the other hand, there will be contexts in which $[\lambda \varphi]$ functions as a term, and in those contexts, we read $[\lambda \varphi]$ simply as ‘that-$\varphi$’. So, for example, when we define the notion $\tau$ exists (where $\tau$ is any term) and represent it as $\tau \downarrow$, then $[\lambda \varphi] \downarrow$ would be read as: *that-$\varphi$ exists*. And when we define the notion $\tau$ is identical to $\sigma$ and represent it as $\tau = \sigma$, then the formula $p = [\lambda \varphi]$ would be read: $p$ is identical to that-$\varphi$. And when we define the notion Contingent($p$), where $p$ can be instantiated by any 0-place relation term, the formula Contingent([$\lambda \varphi$]) would be read: *that-$\varphi$ is contingent*. If it helps, one can always preface ‘the proposition’ to the reading of [$\lambda \varphi$] when the latter is being used as a term. For instance, one could read our last example, Contingent([$\lambda \varphi$]), as: *the proposition that-$\varphi$ is contingent*.

The second interesting fact about reading the language is that (6.b) stipulates that every formula is a 0-place relation term. This feature allows us to regard formulas of the form $\varphi \equiv \varphi$ as substitution instances of the universal claim $\forall p (p \equiv p)$. But it also means that formulas can occur in contexts where they are simply naming rather than asserting propositions. For example, in the previous paragraph, we noted that $\tau \downarrow$ is defined for every term. So when a 0-place relation term such as $Fx$ is substituted for $\tau$, the resulting formula, $Fx\downarrow$, is well-formed. This claim asserts existence of the proposition $Fx$. So in the claim $Fx\downarrow$, the formula $Fx$ is not asserting that $x$ exemplifies $F$, but rather naming the proposition $x$-exemplifies-$F$. Again, if it helps, one can add ‘the proposition’ to the reading of a formula being used as term, so that $Fx\downarrow$ may be read: *the proposition $Fx$ exists*. Similarly, identity is defined for all terms,
including 0-place relation terms. So a claim of the form \( \varphi = \psi \) is well-formed. In claims of this form, the instances of \( \varphi \) and \( \psi \) are not making assertions. If it helps, read such claims as: the proposition \( \varphi \) is identical to the proposition \( \psi \). For example, \( Fx = [\lambda z Fz]x \) would be read: the proposition \( x \) exemplifies \( F \) is identical to the proposition \( x \) exemplifies being an object \( z \) that exemplifies \( F \). It should always be clear, in what follows, when a formula is being used, and is to be read, as a term denoting a proposition instead of as an expression making an assertion.

When \( n \geq 1 \), we call formulas of the form \( \Pi^n \kappa_1 \ldots \kappa_n \) (atomic) exemplification formulas and formulas of the form \( \kappa_1 \ldots \kappa_n \Pi^n \) (atomic) encoding formulas. In what follows, we say:

\[(.8) \ \varphi \text{ is the matrix of } \forall \alpha \varphi, \ i\nu \varphi, \text{ and } [\lambda \nu_1 \ldots \nu_n \varphi] \ (n \geq 0).\]

Once we define \( \exists \alpha \varphi \), then we assume that the above definition counts \( \varphi \) as its matrix.

According to clause (.6.a), any formula \( \varphi \) can serve as the matrix of a relation term of the form \([\lambda \nu_1 \ldots \nu_n \varphi]\), where \( n \geq 0 \). If we allow ourselves to speak informally about the denotation of a term, then it is important to alert the reader to the following facts about the system we shall be developing:

- Not every \( \lambda \)-expression is guaranteed to have a denotation (indeed, some \( \lambda \)-expressions will provably fail to have denotations).
- Every 0-place \( \lambda \)-expression \([\lambda \varphi]\) is guaranteed to have a denotation, by axiom (39.2), and every formula \( \varphi \) is guaranteed to have a denotation, by theorem (105.2).
- It will be provable that \([\lambda \varphi]\) and \( \varphi \) always denote the same 0-place relation, by theorem (112.1).

In general, \( \lambda \)-expressions are not to be interpreted as terms that denote functions, but rather as terms that denote relations. Thus, when we introduce axioms and rules of inference governing \( \lambda \)-expressions in the next two chapters, the resulting \( \lambda \)-calculus is to be understood as a calculus of relations.

Finally, in what follows, we use \( \tau \) to range over terms. The simple terms listed in (1) are terms in virtue of clause (.1). We say:

\[(.9) \ \text{A term } \tau \text{ is complex if and only if } \tau \text{ is not a simple term.}\]

So the constants and variables listed in (1) are not complex terms. Clauses (.5), and (3.6) define kinds of complex terms:

- definite descriptions are complex individual terms, by (.5) and (.9)
- \( \lambda \)-expressions are complex relation terms, by (.6.a) and (.9)
formulas other than 0-place relation constants and 0-place variables are complex 0-place relation terms, by (.6.b) and (.9).

We sometimes also use $\sigma$ and $\rho$ in addition to $\tau$ to range over terms.

(4) Metadefinition: A BNF Definition of the Syntax. We may succinctly summarize the essential definitions of the context-free grammar of our language using Backus-Naur Form (BNF). In the BNF definition, we repurpose our Greek metavariables as the names of grammatical categories, as follows:

- $\delta$ primitive individual constants
- $\nu$ individual variables
- $\Sigma^n$ primitive $n$-place relation constants ($n \geq 0$)
- $\Omega^n$ $n$-place relation variables ($n \geq 0$)
- $\alpha$ variables
- $\kappa$ individual terms
- $\Pi^n$ $n$-place relation terms ($n \geq 0$)
- $\varphi$ formulas
- $\tau$ terms

The BNF grammar for our second-order language can now be stated as follows:\textsuperscript{75}

\[
\begin{align*}
\delta & := a_1, a_2, \ldots \\
\nu & := x_1, x_2, \ldots \\
(0 \geq n) & \Sigma^n := P^n_1, P^n_2, \ldots \quad \text{(with $P^n_1$ distinguished and written as $E$!)} \\
(0 \geq n) & \Omega^n := F^n_1, F^n_2, \ldots \\
\alpha & := \nu \mid \Omega^n \ (n \geq 0) \\
\kappa & := \delta \mid \nu \mid 1\nu\varphi \\
(1 \geq n) & \Pi^n := \Sigma^n \mid \Omega^n \mid [\lambda \nu_1 \ldots \nu_n \varphi] \quad (\nu_1, \ldots, \nu_n \text{ are pairwise distinct}) \\
\varphi & := \Sigma^0 \mid \Omega^0 \mid \Pi^n \kappa_1 \ldots \kappa_n \ (n \geq 1) \mid \kappa_1 \ldots \kappa_n \Pi^n \ (n \geq 1) \mid \\
& \quad [\lambda \varphi] \mid (\neg \varphi) \mid (\varphi \rightarrow \varphi) \mid \forall \alpha \varphi \mid (\Box \varphi) \mid (\Box \varphi) \\
\Pi^0 & := \varphi \\
\tau & := \kappa \mid \Pi^n \ (n \geq 0)
\end{align*}
\]

It is insightful to recognize that one could, in the above BNF, replace $\varphi$ everywhere by $\Pi^0$, except on the last line, which would then be reversed to read $\varphi := \Pi^0$. This alternative BNF would first introduce the individual and relation terms of every arity and then define the formulas as 0-place relation terms of the form $[\lambda \nu_1 \ldots \nu_n \varphi]$ from any formula $\varphi$, though not all such terms are guaranteed to have a denotation.

\textsuperscript{75}I’m indebted to Uri Nodelman and Daniel Kirchner, each of whom suggested a different way of simplifying the original BNF definition. Nodelman’s suggestion yielded a BNF that could be more efficiently parsed. Kirchner’s suggestion led to the elimination of the syntactic category propositional formula, i.e., formulas that have encoding subformulas. We may now build well-formed complex $n$-place relation terms ($n \geq 1$) of the form $[\lambda \nu_1 \ldots \nu_n \varphi]$ from any formula $\varphi$, though not all such terms are guaranteed to have a denotation.
terms. However, we’ve made a considered choice to write the BNF as in the above display, not only for ease of readability and understanding, but also because historically, when defining a formal language, the notion of a formula (i.e., expressions that make assertions and that have truth conditions) are at least as important as terms. The logic that we shall develop will not be a term logic, but rather one that governs inferences among formulas.

Since the penultimate line implies that the 0-place relation terms are precisely the formulas, the metavariables \( \varphi \) and \( \Pi^0 \) range over the same expressions. Usually, it will be more natural to use one metavariable rather than the other to describe some feature of our system. For example, the notion of subformula will be defined with respect to formulas \( \varphi \) rather than with respect to 0-place relation terms \( \Pi^0 \). Thus, we’ll say that \( \varphi \) and \( \psi \) are subformulas of the formula \( \varphi \rightarrow \psi \). But the formula \( p = q \), which is defined in (23.4), will be an instance of the form \( \Pi = \Pi' \) (where \( \Pi \) and \( \Pi' \) are 0-place relation metavariables), since both \( p \) and \( q \) are being used as 0-place relation terms. In general, we’ll use \( \varphi \) to represent expressions being used to make assertions (and so have truth conditions) and \( \Pi^0 \) to represent expressions being used to denote propositions.

If one defines a finite instance of our language by giving a limiting value to \( n \) and listing a finite vocabulary of simple terms, the formulas and terms of the resulting grammar can be parsed by any appropriately-configured off-the-shelf parsing engine using the above BNF.

(5) **Remark:** Notational Conventions. We adopt the following conventions to facilitate readability:

1. We often use the less formal expressions listed in (1) instead of their more formal counterparts, and we often drop the superscript indicating the arity of a simple relation term when such terms appear in a formula, since their arity can always be inferred from the number of individual terms in the formula. Thus, instead of writing \( P_1^1 a_1 \) and \( a_2 P^2 \), we might write \( Pa \) and \( bQ \), respectively; instead of \( F_1^1 x_1 \) and \( x_2 F_1^1 \), we might write \( Fx \) and \( yG \), respectively; instead of \( F_1^1 a_2 x_3 \) and \( a_3 x_5 F_2^2 \), we might write \( Rbz \) and \( cyS \); etc. Indeed, we may sometimes use a mixture of formal and less formal expressions in the same formula.

2. We substitute \( p, q, r, \ldots \) for the 0-place relation variables, \( F_1^0, F_2^0, \ldots \). If we need 0-place relation constants, we use \( p_1, q_2, \ldots \) instead of \( p_1^0, p_2^0, \ldots \).

3. We omit parentheses in formulas whenever we possibly can, i.e., whenever we can do so without ambiguity. Thus, we almost always drop outer parentheses and assume \( \rightarrow, \lor, \land, \Box \) apply to as little as possible. Also, we assume that \( \rightarrow \) dominates \( \neg \). These conventions yield the following examples:
• \(\neg Pa \rightarrow bQ\) should be parsed as \(((\neg Pa) \rightarrow bQ)\), not \(\neg(Pa \rightarrow bQ)\).

• \(\forall xPx \rightarrow Qx\) should be parsed as \((\forall xPx) \rightarrow Qx\), not \(\forall x(Px \rightarrow Qx)\).

• \(\Box Pa \rightarrow bQ\) should be parsed as \((\Box Pa) \rightarrow bQ\), not \(\Box(Pa \rightarrow bQ)\).

• \(\forall aP \rightarrow Qb\) should be parsed as \((\forall aP) \rightarrow Qb\), not \(\forall a(P \rightarrow Qb)\).

(.4) We sometimes add parentheses and square brackets to assist in parsing certain formulas and terms.

(6) Metadefinition: Subformulas. Where \(\varphi\) is any formula, we define a subformula of \(\varphi\) recursively as follows:

(1) \(\varphi\) is a subformula of \(\varphi\).

(2) If \([\lambda \psi], \neg \psi, \forall \alpha \psi, \Box \psi\), or \(\forall \psi\) is a subformula of \(\varphi\), then \(\psi\) is a subformula of \(\varphi\).

(3) If \(\psi \rightarrow \chi\) is a subformula of \(\varphi\), then \(\psi\) is a subformula of \(\varphi\) and \(\chi\) is a subformula of \(\varphi\).\(^{76}\)

(4) Nothing else is a subformula of \(\varphi\).

Given this definition, we may say that \(\psi\) is a proper subformula of \(\varphi\) just in case \(\psi\) is a subformula of \(\varphi\) but not identical to \(\varphi\). The above definition of subformula of has an important consequence:

**Metatheorem** \((7.1)\)

If \(\psi\) is a subformula of \(\chi\) and \(\chi\) is a subformula of \(\varphi\), then \(\psi\) is a subformula of \(\varphi\).

There is a proof in the appendix to this chapter.

One other interesting feature of the definition of subformula of is that this notion is not defined for terms generally; if \(\tau\) is not a 0-place relation term, then \(\tau\) has no subformulas.\(^{77}\) For example, the formula \(\varphi\) is not a subformula of either the term \(\nu \psi\) or the term \([\lambda v_1 \ldots v_n \varphi]\), for \(n \geq 1\). So (a) neither \(\varphi\) nor any of the proper subformulas of \(\varphi\) are subformulas of \(\nu \psi\) or \([\lambda v_1 \ldots v_n \varphi]\), and (b) if \(\nu \psi\) or \([\lambda v_1 \ldots v_n \varphi]\) occur somewhere within a formula \(\psi\), those occurrences of \(\varphi\) and its subformulas are not subformulas of \(\psi\). Thus, the formulas \(\nu \psi\) and \([\lambda x \varphi][b\) have no subformulas!\(^{76}\)

\(^{76}\)We later extend our language with definitions that introduce formulas of the form \(\psi \& \chi\), \(\psi \vee \chi\), and \(\psi \equiv \chi\). When these formulas are subformulas of \(\varphi\), so are \(\psi\) and \(\chi\). See fact (a) in the final paragraph of (18) below.

\(^{77}\)Complex, 0-place relation terms of the form \([\lambda \varphi]\) do have subformulas. By (6.1), \([\lambda \varphi]\) is a subformula of itself. So by (6.2), \(\varphi\) is a subformula of \([\lambda \varphi]\). And any subformulas of \(\varphi\) thereby become subformulas of \([\lambda \varphi]\).
7.1. Metatheoretical Definitions

(7) Metadefinition: Subterms and Primary Terms. Recall that both \( \tau \) and \( \sigma \) are metavariables ranging over terms, and that formulas are 0-place relation terms and so fall in the range of these metavariables. Then let us define \( \tau \) is a subterm of \( \sigma \) as follows:

(1) If \( \tau \) is \( \sigma \), then \( \tau \) is a subterm of \( \sigma \), i.e., every term \( \tau \) is a subterm of itself.

(2) If \( \tau \) is subterm of any of \( \kappa_1, \ldots, \kappa_n \), or \( \Pi^n \) \((n \geq 1)\), and \( \sigma \) is either the formula \( \Pi^n \kappa_1 \cdots \kappa_n \) or the formula \( \kappa_1 \cdots \kappa_n \Pi^n \), then \( \tau \) is a subterm of \( \sigma \).

(3) If \( \tau \) is a subterm of the formula \( \varphi \), and \( \sigma \) is any of the formulas \( \neg \varphi \), \( \forall \alpha \varphi \), \( \Box \varphi \), or \( \exists \varphi \), then \( \tau \) is a subterm of \( \sigma \).

(4) If \( \tau \) is a subterm of the formula \( \varphi \) or the formula \( \psi \), and \( \sigma \) is the formula, \( \varphi \rightarrow \psi \), then \( \tau \) is a subterm of \( \sigma \).

(5) If \( \tau \) is a subterm of the formula \( \varphi \), and \( \sigma \) is a \( \lambda \)-expression of the form \( [\lambda \nu_1 \cdots \nu_n \varphi] \) \((n \geq 0)\), then \( \tau \) is a subterm of \( \sigma \).

(6) If \( \tau \) is a subterm of the formula \( \varphi \), and \( \sigma \) is a description of the form \( \check{\nu} \varphi \), then \( \tau \) is a subterm of \( \sigma \).

Given this definition, we may say that \( \tau \) is a proper subterm of term \( \sigma \) just in case \( \tau \) is a subterm of \( \sigma \) but not identical to \( \sigma \). Thus, the terms \( \check{x} (p \rightarrow Gx) \) and \( [\lambda x Rxa]y \) have the same proper subterms, namely, \( p, Gx, \) and \( p \rightarrow Gx \). Clearly, constants and variables are the only terms that have no proper subterms.

Using the definition of subterm, let us say:

(7) A formula \( \varphi \) contains a term \( \tau \) just in case \( \tau \) is a subterm of \( \varphi \).

So, for example, the formula \( R\check{y}xQx \) contains the terms \( R\check{y}xQx, R, y, \check{x}Qx, Qx, Q, \) and \( x \). However, \( R\check{y}xQx \) contains no \( \lambda \)-expressions, since no \( \lambda \)-expression is a subterm of \( R\check{y}xQx \). Moreover, the formula \( [\lambda x Rxa]y \) contains the terms \( [\lambda x Rxa]y, [\lambda x Rxa], Rxa, R, x, a, \) and \( y \) (exercise). Neither the \( \lambda \)-expression \( [\lambda x Rxa] \) nor its matrix \( Rxa \) contains a description.

It is also helpful, on occasion, to refer to the primary terms of \( n \)-place exemplification and encoding formulas \((n \geq 1)\) as follows:

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78This can be established by considering 4 cases: (A) Since \( R\check{y}xQx \) is a 0-place term, it follows by (.1) that \( R\check{y}xQx \) is a subterm of itself. So it contains itself. (B) By (.1), \( R, \check{y}, \) and \( \check{x}Qx \) are all subterms of themselves and so by (.2), they are all subterms of \( R\check{y}xQx \). So \( R\check{y}xQx \) contains \( R, y, \) and \( \check{x}Qx \). (C) By (.1), \( Qx \) is a subterm of itself, and so by (.6), it is a subterm of \( \check{x}Qx \). So by (.2), \( Qx \) is also a subterm of \( R\check{y}xQx \). Hence \( R\check{y}xQx \) contains \( Qx \). (D) By (.1), both \( Q \) and \( x \) are subterms of themselves, and so by (.2), they are subterms of \( Qx \). By (.6), therefore, \( Q \) and \( x \) are subterms of \( \check{x}Qx \). So by (.2) they are subterms of \( R\check{y}xQx \). Hence, \( R\check{y}xQx \) contains the terms \( Q \) and \( x \).
(8) When $n \geq 1$ and $\varphi$ is an exemplification formula of the form $\Pi^n \kappa_1 \ldots \kappa_n$ or an encoding formula of the form $\kappa_1 \ldots \kappa_n \Pi^n$, then $\Pi^n$, $\kappa_1$, $\ldots$, and $\kappa_n$ are the primary terms of $\varphi$.

This definition helps us to pick out the terms exhibiting relation-argument structure in an $n$-place predication when $n \geq 1$. None of the proper subterms of the primary terms in such formulas are primary.

(8) **Remark:** Encoding Formula Subterms. Given the preceding definition, we can talk about the encoding formulas that are subterms of some formula or term. We call them encoding formula subterms. The reader should confirm that the following accurately describe cases where encoding formulas are subterms but not subformulas:

- The formulas $xG$, $p$, and $xG \rightarrow p$ are not subformulas of $[\lambda x \neg (xG \rightarrow p)]$. But $xG$, $p$, and $xG \rightarrow p$ are subterms of $[\lambda x \neg (xG \rightarrow p)]$, as are $x$, $G$, $p$, and $[\lambda x \neg (xG \rightarrow p)]$. Consequently, $xG$ is an encoding formula subterm of the formulas $xG$ and $xG \rightarrow p$, and an encoding formula subterm of the term $[\lambda x \neg (xG \rightarrow p)]$.

- The formulas $Rxa$, $xF$, and $Rxa \rightarrow Fx$ are not subformulas of the term $\text{i}x(Rxa \rightarrow xF)$. But $Rxa$, $xF$, and $Rxa \rightarrow xF$ are subterms of $\text{i}x(Rxa \rightarrow xF)$, as are $R$, $x$, $a$, $F$, $x$, and $\text{i}x(Rxa \rightarrow xF)$. Consequently, $xF$ is an encoding formula subterm of the formulas $xF$ and $Rxa \rightarrow xF$, and $xF$ is an encoding formula subterm of the term $\text{i}x(Rxa \rightarrow xF)$.

- $xF$ is an encoding formula subterm of the formula $aG \rightarrow P\text{i}z(Rzb \rightarrow xF)$ and of the term $[\lambda x aG \rightarrow P\text{i}z(Rzb \rightarrow xF)]$

The notion of an encoding formula subterm proves crucial in what follows and plays an important role in the statement of axiom (39.2).

(9) **Metadefinitions:** Operator Scope and Free (Bound) Occurrences of Variables. Let us use $\beta$ as an additional metavariable ranging over any simple object-language variable. We then define the scope of an occurrence of the formula- and term-building operators as follows:

(1) The formulas $\neg \psi$, $\Box \psi$, and $\dagger \psi$ are, respectively, the scope of the occurrence of the operators $\neg$, $\Box$ and $\dagger$. The formula $\psi \rightarrow \chi$ is the scope of the occurrence of the operator $\rightarrow$.

(2) The formula $\forall \beta \psi$ is the scope of the left-most occurrence of the operator $\forall \beta$ in that formula. (The matrix $\psi$ is the proper scope of $\forall \beta$ in $\forall \beta \psi$.)

(3) The term $\text{i} \nu \psi$ is the scope of the left-most occurrence of the operator $\text{i} \nu$ in that term. (The matrix $\psi$ is the proper scope of $\text{i} \nu$ in $\text{i} \nu \psi$.)
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(.4) The term \([\lambda v_1 \ldots v_n \psi]\) \((n \geq 0)\) is the scope of the left-most occurrence of the operator \(\lambda v_1 \ldots v_n\) in that term. (The matrix \(\psi\) is the proper scope of \(\lambda v_1 \ldots v_n\) in \([\lambda v_1 \ldots v_n \psi]\).)

Now to define free and bound occurrences of a variable within a formula or term, we first say that \(\forall \beta\) is a variable-binding operator for \(\beta\), that \(iv\) is a variable-binding operator for \(v\), and that \(\lambda v_1 \ldots v_n\) is a variable-binding operator for \(v_1, \ldots, v_n\). We then say, for any variable \(\alpha\) and any formula \(\phi\) (or any complex term \(\tau\)):

(.5) An occurrence of \(\alpha\) in \(\phi\) (or \(\tau\)) within the scope of an occurrence of a variable-binding operator for \(\alpha\) is bound; otherwise, the occurrence is free.

Finally, we say:

(.6) Those occurrences of \(\beta\) that are free in \(\psi\) are bound by the left-most occurrence of \(\forall \beta\) in \(\forall \beta \psi\), as is the occurrence of \(\beta\) in that occurrence of \(\forall \beta\); those occurrences of \(v\) that are free in \(\psi\) are bound by the left-most occurrence of \(iv\) in \(iv \psi\), as is the occurrence of \(v\) in that occurrence of \(iv\); and those occurrences of \(v_i\) \((1 \leq i \leq n)\) that are free in \(\psi\) are bound by the left-most occurrence of \(\lambda v_1 \ldots v_n\) in \([\lambda v_1 \ldots v_n \psi]\), as are the occurrences of \(v_1, \ldots, v_n\) in that occurrence of \(\lambda v_1 \ldots v_n\).

We henceforth say that:

(.7) A variable \(\alpha\) occurs free or is free in formula \(\phi\) or term \(\tau\) if and only if at least one occurrence of \(\alpha\) in \(\phi\) or \(\tau\) is free, i.e., if and only if \(\phi\) or \(\tau\) contains at least one free occurrence of \(\alpha\).

(10) Metadefinitions: Open/Closed Formulas/Terms.

(.1) A formula \(\phi\) is closed if no variable occurs free in \(\phi\); otherwise \(\phi\) is open.

(.2) A formula \(\phi\) is a sentence if and only if \(\phi\) is a closed formula.

(.3) A term \(\tau\) is closed if no variable occurs free in \(\tau\); otherwise, \(\tau\) is open.

Since it is obvious that constants are closed terms and variables are open terms, we typically use ‘open’ and ‘closed’ with respect to formulas and other complex terms. If \(R\) is a 2-place relation constant, \(F\) a 2-place relation variable, \(a\) an individual constant, and \(y\) an individual variable, then \(ixRxy\) and \(ixFxza\) are complex individual terms that are open, while \(ixRxa\) is a complex individual term that is closed. The \(\lambda\)-expressions \([\lambda x Rxy]\) and \([\lambda x Fxz]\) are complex 1-place relation terms that are open, while \([\lambda x Rxa]\) is a complex, 1-place relation term that is closed. Furthermore, if \(P\) is a 1-place relation constant, then
$PixRxy$ and $PixFxa$ are open formulas, while $PixRxa$ is a closed formula; and $a[\lambda x Fxz]$ is an open formula, while $a[\lambda x Rxy]$ is closed.

It sometimes helps to think of open complex terms that aren’t formulas, such as $ixRxy$ and $[\lambda x Rxy]$, as functional terms whose value is, intuitively, a function of the value of the variable $y$. Alternatively we may regard such open complex terms as a kind of complex variable; for each choice of $y$, $ixRxy$ may denote a different individual and $[\lambda x Rxy]$ may denote a different 1-place relation. To forestall ambiguity, we always use variable in what follows to refer to the simple variables listed in (1).

(11) Metadefinitions: Closures. We say that:

(1) $\varphi$ is a universal closure or universal generalization of $\psi$ whenever $\varphi$ is the result of prefacing any a string of zero of more universal quantifiers to $\psi$, i.e., if and only if for some variables $\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n$ ($n \geq 0$), $\varphi$ is $\forall \alpha_1 \ldots \forall \alpha_n \psi$.

(2) $\varphi$ is an actualization of $\psi$ whenever $\varphi$ is the result of prefacing a string of zero or more occurrences of the actuality operator $\mathcal{A}$ to $\psi$.

(3) $\varphi$ is a necessitation or modal closure of $\psi$ whenever $\varphi$ is the result of prefacing any a string of zero or more occurrences of the necessity operator $\Box$ to $\psi$.

Furthermore, we say:

(4) $\varphi$ is a closure of $\psi$ if and only if for some variables $\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n$ ($n \geq 0$), $\varphi$ is the result of prefacing any string of zero or more occurrences of universal quantifiers, $\mathcal{A}$ operators, and $\Box$ operators $\psi$.

Finally, we say:

(5) $\varphi$ is a $\Box$-free closure of $\psi$ if and only if $\varphi$ is the result of prefacing any string of zero or more occurrences of actuality operators and universal quantifiers to $\psi$.

Since we’re counting the empty string as a string, the definitions yield that every formula is a closure of itself.

(12) Metadefinition: Terms of the Same Type. We say that $\tau$ and $\sigma$ are terms of the same type iff $\tau$ and $\sigma$ are both individual terms or are, for some $n \geq 0$, both $n$-place relation terms.

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We have taken care to call these expressions functional terms instead of function terms. The reason is that, strictly speaking, they don’t denote functions. A function is, strictly speaking, a 2-place relation $R$ such that $\forall x \exists y (Rxy \land \forall z (Rxz \rightarrow z = y))$. The expression $[\lambda x Rxy]$ doesn’t denote such an $R$. Instead, for each value that $y$ takes, $[\lambda x Rxy]$ denotes a 1-place relation. We therefore refrain from calling $[\lambda x Rxy]$ a ‘function term’; rather, ‘functional term’ is more appropriate.
7.1. METATHEORETICAL DEFINITIONS

(13) **Remark:** The Symbol ‘=’ in Both Object Language and Metalanguage. Though some texts use different symbols for object-theoretic and metatheoretic identity, we shall use the symbol = for both. Object-theoretic identity is not taken as a primitive; we instead define this notion by cases in item (23) below. In the next two items (14) and (15), however, we formulate metadefinitions in which the symbol ‘=’ represents a primitive metatheoretic notion of identity. Metatheoretic identity helps us to describe facts about our system, as opposed to asserting facts within our system. We’ve already used it to define proper subformulas and proper subterms, though in those definitions, we didn’t use the formal symbol =. However, we’ll now use = metatheoretically to help us define $q^\tau_a$, i.e., the result of substituting a term $\tau$ for the free occurrences of the variable $a$ in $\phi$. The syntactic notion $q^\tau_a$ helps us to state various principles (i.e., definitions, axioms, rules of inference, and theorems).

Once object-theoretic identity is defined, it should always be clear when = is being used object-theoretically to assert something in the object language and when it is being used metatheoretically to assert or describe something in the metalanguage. Of course, if our philosophical project is correct, the theory of identity developed in the object language ultimately provides an analysis of the primitive metatheoretic notion of identity.

(14) **Metadefinition:** Substitutions. The definitions in this item and the next are required to state, for example, the axioms of quantification in item (39), the axioms of identity in item (41), and the axioms for complex relation terms in item (48). In what follows, we use $\sigma$ as an additional metavariable ranging over any term whatsoever.

- Where $a$ is any variable and $\tau$ is any term of the same type as $a$, we use the notation $q^\tau_a$ and $\sigma^\tau_a$, respectively, to stand for the result of substituting the term $\tau$ for every free occurrence of the variable $a$ in formula $\phi$ and in term $\sigma$.

This notion may be defined more precisely by recursion, based on the syntactic complexity of $\sigma$ and $\phi$ as follows, where the parentheses serve only to eliminate ambiguity and we suppress the obvious superscript indicating arity on the metalinguistic relation variable $\Pi$:

- If $\sigma$ is the variable $a$ and $\tau$ is a term of the same type as $a$, $\sigma^\tau_a = \tau$.
- If $\sigma$ is a constant or variable other than $a$ and $\tau$ is a term of the same type as $a$, $\sigma^\tau_a = \sigma$.
- If $\phi$ is $\Pi_{\kappa_1 \ldots \kappa_n}$, then $q^\tau_a = \Pi^\tau_{a\kappa_1 \ldots \kappa_n}$.
- If $\phi$ is $\kappa_1 \Pi$, then $q^\tau_a = \kappa_1^\tau \Pi^\tau_a$.
- If $\phi$ is $\lnot \psi$, $\Box \psi$ or $\forall \alpha \phi$, then $q^\tau_a = \lnot(q^\tau_a)$ or $(q^\tau_a)$, or $\forall \alpha (q^\tau_a)$, respectively. If $\phi$ is $\psi \rightarrow \chi$, then $q^\tau_a = q^\tau_a \rightarrow q^\tau_a$. 


• If $\phi$ is $\forall \beta \psi$, then $\phi^\tau_\alpha = \begin{cases} \forall \beta \psi, & \text{if } \alpha = \beta \\ \forall (\psi^\tau_\alpha), & \text{if } \alpha \neq \beta \end{cases}$

• If $\sigma$ is $\iota v \psi$, then $\sigma^\tau_\alpha = \begin{cases} \iota v \psi, & \text{if } \alpha = v \\ \iota v (\psi^\tau_\alpha), & \text{if } \alpha \neq v \end{cases}$

• If $\sigma$ is $[\lambda v_1 \ldots v_n \psi]$, then $\sigma^\tau_\alpha = \begin{cases} [\lambda v_1 \ldots v_n \psi^\tau_\alpha], & \text{if } \alpha \text{ is one of } v_1, \ldots, v_n \\ [\lambda v_1 \ldots v_n \psi^\sigma_\alpha], & \text{if } \alpha \text{ is none of } v_1, \ldots, v_n \end{cases}$

Note both that (a) $\sigma^\tau_\alpha$ is not defined if $\alpha$ and $\tau$ are terms of a different type, and (b) if $\alpha$ doesn’t occur free in $\sigma$, then $\sigma^\tau_\alpha = \sigma$, and if $\alpha$ doesn’t occur free in $\phi$, then $\phi^\tau_\alpha = \phi$. The reader should also verify that:

**Metatheorems (7.2):** $\sigma^\alpha_\alpha = \sigma$ and $\phi^\alpha_\alpha = \phi$.

We shall also want to define multiple simultaneous substitutions of terms for variables in $\phi$ and $\sigma$, but since such a recursive definition would be extremely difficult to read, we simply rest with the following definition: where $\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_m$ are any distinct variables and $\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_m$ are any terms of the same types, respectively, as $\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_m$, we let $\phi^{\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_m}_{\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_m}$ stand for the result of simultaneously substituting the term $\tau_i$ for each free occurrence of the corresponding variable $\alpha_i$ in $\phi_i$ for each $i$ such that $1 \leq i \leq m$. In other words, $\phi^{\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_m}_{\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_m}$ is the result of making all of the following substitutions simultaneously: (a) substituting $\tau_1$ for every free occurrence of $\alpha_1$ in $\phi$, (b) substituting $\tau_2$ for every free occurrence of $\alpha_2$ in $\phi$, etc. Similarly, where $\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_m$ are any terms and $\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_m$ are any distinct variables, we let $\sigma^{\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_m}_{\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_m}$ stand for the result of simultaneously substituting the term $\tau_i$ for each free occurrence of the corresponding variable $\alpha_i$ in $\sigma$, for each $i$ such that $1 \leq i \leq m$.

If, for any $i$, $\tau_i$ does not have the same type as $\alpha_i$, then $\phi^{\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_m}_{\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_m}$ and $\sigma^{\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_m}_{\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_m}$ are not well-formed. The reader should verify that:

**Metatheorems (7.3):** $\sigma^{\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_m}_{\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_m} = \sigma$ and $\phi^{\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_m}_{\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_m} = \phi$.

(15) Metadefinitions: Substitutable at an Occurrence and Substitutable For. We say:

• Term $\tau$ is *substitutable at an occurrence* of $\alpha$ in formula $\phi$ or term $\sigma$ just in case (a) $\tau$ is a term of the same type as $\alpha$, and (b) that occurrence of $\alpha$ does not appear within the scope of any operator binding a variable that has a free occurrence in $\tau$.

In other words, $\tau$ is substitutable at an occurrence of $\alpha$ in $\phi$ or $\sigma$ just in case every occurrence of any variable $\beta$ free in $\tau$ remains an occurrence that is free when $\tau$ is substituted for that occurrence of $\alpha$ in $\phi$ or $\sigma$. Then we say:
• \( \tau \) is substitutable for \( \alpha \) in \( \varphi \) or \( \sigma \) just in case \( \tau \) is substitutable at every free occurrence of \( \alpha \) in \( \varphi \) or \( \sigma \).

In other words, \( \tau \) is substitutable for \( \alpha \) in \( \varphi \) or \( \sigma \) just in case every occurrence of any variable \( \beta \) free in \( \tau \) remains an occurrence that is free in \( \varphi^\tau_\alpha \) or \( \sigma^\tau_\alpha \), i.e., remains an occurrence that is free when \( \tau \) is substituted for every free occurrence of \( \alpha \) in \( \varphi \) or \( \sigma \).

The following are consequences of this definition:

**Metatheorems (7.4):**

- Every term \( \tau \) is trivially substitutable for \( \alpha \) in \( \varphi \) if there are no free occurrences of \( \alpha \) in \( \varphi \).
- \( \alpha \) is substitutable for \( \alpha \) in \( \varphi \) or \( \sigma \).
- If \( \tau \) contains no free variables, then \( \tau \) is substitutable for any variable \( \alpha \) in any formula \( \varphi \) or complex term \( \sigma \).
- If none of the free variables in \( \tau \) occur bound in \( \varphi \) or \( \sigma \), then \( \tau \) is substitutable for any \( \alpha \) in \( \varphi \) or \( \sigma \).

**Note:** The prime symbol ‘ is used to avoid overspecificity. When we attach a prime symbol to a metavariable, the resulting metavariable stands for an object-language expression that may be distinct from, and not necessarily related to, the expression signified by the metavariable without the prime. In the next item, we shall use \( \varphi^\prime \) to stand for an alphabetical-variant of the formula \( \varphi \), and use \( \tau^\prime \) to stand for an alphabetical-variant of the term \( \tau \). In the next chapter, the axiom for the substitution of identicals (41) will use \( \varphi^\prime \) to indicate the result of replacing zero or more free occurrences of the variable \( \alpha \) in \( \varphi \) with occurrences of the variable \( \beta \). (So in the case where zero occurrences are replaced, \( \varphi^\prime \) is \( \varphi \).) Later we shall use the metavariable \( \rho^\prime \) to denote any \( \eta \)-variant of the relation term \( \rho \). Sometimes we shall place primes on expressions in the object language; for example, in a later chapter, \( c \) is introduced as a restricted variable in the object-language that ranges over classes, and we let \( c^\prime, c^\prime\prime, \ldots \) be distinct restricted variables for classes (and so on for other restricted variables). The context should always make it clear how the prime symbol ‘ is being used.

**Metadefinitions:** Alphabetic Variants. For basic examples of alphabetic variants, some readers may wish to check the opening of explanatory Remark
To precisely define the general notion of *alphabetic variant*, i.e., for formulas and terms of arbitrary complexity, we first define *linked* and *independent* occurrences of a variable.

(.1) Let \( \alpha_1 \) and \( \alpha_2 \) be occurrences of the variable \( \alpha \) in the formula \( \phi \) or in term \( \tau \). Then we say that \( \alpha_1 \) is *linked to* \( \alpha_2 \) in \( \phi \) or \( \tau \) (or say that \( \alpha_1 \) and \( \alpha_2 \) are *linked* in \( \phi \) or \( \tau \)) just in case:

(a) either both \( \alpha_1 \) and \( \alpha_2 \) are free, or

(b) both \( \alpha_1 \) and \( \alpha_2 \) are bound by the same occurrence of a variable-binding operator.

Otherwise, we say that \( \alpha_1 \) and \( \alpha_2 \) are *independent* in \( \phi \) or \( \tau \).

Examples of *linked* and *independent* variables are given in Remark (26). (.1) gives rise to:

**Metatheorem (7.5)**

*Linked* is an equivalence condition on variable occurrences in a formula (or term).

(A proof is given in the Appendix to this chapter.) Thus, the occurrences of each variable in a formula (or term) can be partitioned into *linkage groups*. Each linkage group is a cell of the partition; in a linkage group for a variable \( \alpha \) in \( \phi \) or \( \tau \), each occurrence of \( \alpha \) in the group is linked to every other occurrence, while occurrences of \( \alpha \) in different linkage groups are independent of one another.

We now introduce some notation (‘BV-notation’) that makes explicit the occurrences of *bound* variables in formulas and terms:

(.2) When \( \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n \) is the list of all the variable occurrences bound in formula \( \phi \) or complex term \( \tau \), in order of occurrence and including repetitions of the same variable, the BV-notation for \( \phi \) is \( \phi[\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n] \), and the BV-notation for \( \tau \) is \( \tau[\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n] \), respectively.

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80Traditionally, two formulas or complex terms are defined to be *alphabetic variants* just in case some sequence of uniform permutations of the bound variables (in which no variable is captured during a permutation) transforms one expression into the other. So, for example, \( \forall F(Fx \equiv Fy) \) and \( \forall G(Gx \equiv Gy) \) would be alphabetically-variant formulas because the permutation sequence \( F \rightarrow G \) transforms the first formula into the second. Similarly, \( \forall x \forall y Mxy \) and \( \forall y \forall z Mzy \) would be alphabetically-variant terms because the permutation sequence \( y \rightarrow z, x \rightarrow y \) transforms the first description into the second. And \( [\lambda y RyzQz] \) and \( [\lambda z RzixQx] \) are variant \( \lambda \)-expressions because the permutation sequence \( z \rightarrow x, y \rightarrow z \) transforms the first \( \lambda \)-predicate into the second. However, we shall not follow the traditional definition but rather develop a definition that identifies alphabetic variants by way of symmetries among bound variable occurrences.
The reader is encouraged to examine the examples of BV-notation given in Remark (26).

Next we introduce notation for replacing bound variables:

(.3) We write $\varphi[\beta_1/\alpha_1, \ldots, \beta_n/\alpha_n]$ to refer to the result of replacing $\alpha_i$ by $\beta_i$ in $\varphi[\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n]$, for $1 \leq i \leq n$. Analogously, we write $\tau[\beta_1/\alpha_1, \ldots, \beta_n/\alpha_n]$ to refer to the result of replacing $\alpha_i$ by $\beta_i$ in term $\tau[\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n]$.

Finally, we may define:

(.4) $\varphi'$ is an alphabetic variant of $\varphi$ just in case, for some $n$:

- $\varphi' = \varphi[\beta_1/\alpha_1, \ldots, \beta_n/\alpha_n]$, and
- for $1 \leq i, j \leq n$, $\alpha_i$ and $\alpha_j$ are linked in $\varphi[\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n]$ if and only if $\beta_i$ and $\beta_j$ are linked in $\varphi'[\beta_1, \ldots, \beta_n]$.

(.5) $\tau'$ is an alphabetic variant of $\tau$ just in case, for some $n$:

- $\tau' = \tau[\beta_1/\alpha_1, \ldots, \beta_n/\alpha_n]$, and
- for $1 \leq i, j \leq n$, $\alpha_i$ and $\alpha_j$ are linked in $\tau[\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n]$ if and only if $\beta_i$ and $\beta_j$ are linked in $\tau'[\beta_1, \ldots, \beta_n]$.

Additional examples of alphabetic variants that illustrate the above definitions are given in Remark (26).

Note that our definitions require that if $\beta$ is to replace $\alpha$ to produce an alphabetic variant of a formula $\varphi$ (or term $\tau$), then $\beta$ must not occur free within the scope of a variable-binding operator that binds an occurrence of $\alpha$ in $\varphi$ (or $\tau$). For example, in the formula $\forall xRx(y = \varphi)$, $y$ occurs free within the scope of $\forall x$. We don’t obtain an alphabetic variant of $\varphi$ by substituting occurrences of $y$ for the occurrences of $x$ in the linkage group of bound occurrences of $x$. The formula that results from such a replacement, $\forall yRyy (= \varphi')$, is very different in meaning from the original. In this example, the single occurrence of $y$ in $\varphi$ gets captured when occurrences of $y$ replace the bound occurrences of $x$. Thus, $\varphi$ in BV-notation is $\varphi[x, x]$ and $\varphi'$ in BV-notation is $\varphi'[y, y, y]$, and so the first condition in the definition of alphabetic variant fails because the number of bound variables, counting multiple occurrences, is different for $\varphi$ and $\varphi'$. There are a number of observations about alphabetic variants at the end of Remark (26) that might prove helpful.

### 7.2 Definitions Extending the Object Language

In what follows, we regularly state definitions that extend our object language. These introduce new expressions into our language. Some of the axioms and
The axiom schemas of object theory will be stated in terms of these new expressions. In a definition extending the object language, a new expression, the *definiendum*, is introduced by way of a *definiens* that contains only primitive expressions or previously defined expressions. We shall not regard definitions as metalinguistic abbreviations of the object language but rather as conventions for (a) extending the object language with new syncategorematic expressions, formulas, and terms, and (b) conservatively extending our deductive system with new and *safe* axioms. As such, theorems stated in terms of defined notions become genuine philosophical statements of the object language rather than metaphilosophical statements of the metalanguage. In this section, we restrict our attention to how definitions achieve (a), though on occasion, we’ll have to make reference to how they achieve (b). This latter is discussed in Section 9.4, where we carefully characterize the inferential role that such definitions play within our deductive system.

(17) Remark: Definitions by Equivalence and Definitions by Identity. In a system such as the present one, in which identity is defined rather than primitive and in which there are both individual and relation terms that may fail to have a denotation, definitions have to be formulated carefully so as to avoid misunderstanding. So it is important to begin by laying out at least some of the requirements for formulating definitions in the object language and at least some of the conventions that govern them. We’ll postpone discussion of the inferential role of definitions until Chapter 9, in items (73) and (74).

There will be two types of definition in our system: Definition by Equivalence and Definition by Identity. We’ll refer to them as definitions-*by-≡* and definitions-*by-→=*, respectively. As a rough, initial characterization of the distinction, we can say that the former stipulates an equivalence between formulas, whereas the latter stipulates an identity between terms. Thus, a definition-*by-≡* has the form:

\[ \phi \equiv_{df} \psi \]

In the general case, where there are \( n \)-free variables \( \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n \) in the definiens and definiendum, a definition-*by-≡* has the form:

\[ \phi(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n) \equiv_{df} \psi(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n) \]

Though Frege’s insightful discussion of definitions informed his second-order system, most discussions of the theory of formal definitions have been framed with respect to the language of the first-order predicate calculus with identity, sometimes extended by function terms. In thinking about the theory of definitions, I consulted Frege 1879, §24; Padoa 1900; Frege 1903a, §§55–67, §§139–144, and §§146–147; Frege 1903b, Part I; Frege 1914, 224–225; Suppes 1957; Mates 1972; Dudman 1973; Belnap 1993; Hodges 2008; Urbaniak & Hájek 2012; and Gupta 2014. Hodges 2008 and Urbaniak & Hájek 2012 provide insightful discussions of the contributions by Kotarbiński, Łukasiewicz, Leśniewski, Ajdukiewicz and Tarski to the elementary theory of definitions.
7.2. DEFINITIONS EXTENDING THE OBJECT LANGUAGE

By contrast a definition-by-\(\equiv\) has the form:

\[ \tau =_{df} \sigma \]

provided \(\tau\) and \(\sigma\) are terms of the same type, neither of which is a variable. In the general case, where there are \(n\)-free variables \(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n\) in the definiens and definiendum, a definition-by-\(\equiv\) has the form:

\[ \tau(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n) =_{df} \sigma(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n) \]

provided \(\tau\) and \(\sigma\) are terms of the same type.

Note that it would be incorrect to distinguish definitions-by-\(\equiv\) and definitions-by-\(=\) by saying that the former introduce new formulas and the latter introduce new terms. This oversimplification is undermined by the fact that all and only formulas are 0-place relation terms, a fact which has the following consequences. First, the definiendum \(\varphi\) and definiens \(\psi\) in a definition-by-\(\equiv\) are 0-place relation terms as well as formulas – so in every case, these definitions introduce equivalences between 0-place relation terms. Second, the definiendum \(\tau\) and definiens \(\sigma\) in a definition-by-\(=\) may be formulas if \(\tau\) and \(\sigma\) are 0-place relation terms – so in some cases, these definitions introduce an identity between formulas.

In light of these observations, we emphasize that the distinction between definitions-by-\(\equiv\) and definitions-by-\(=\) concerns their inferential role in the deductive system. The inferential role of both kinds of definition has to be carefully formulated and this will be done in Chapter 9, as part of the development of the deductive system. For now, we can describe their role pre-theoretically as follows: (a) a definition-by-\(\equiv\) implicitly introduces necessary biconditionals (and their closures) as axioms,\(^{82}\) and (b) a definition-by-\(=\) implicitly introduces conditional identities (and their closures) as axioms, where the identities are conditioned on the claim that the definiens has a denotation. Since biconditionals and (conditional) identities have very different inferential roles, the inferences one can draw from the two forms of definition will be very different. Further discussion of this point, however, is premature, for we can’t even state the inferential role of definitions-by-\(=\) until we define formulas of the form \(\tau \equiv \sigma\).

As noted above, both types of definition may contain free variables, and so the first requirement for formulating definitions is that the definiendum and definiens should have matching free variables:

(1) **Matching Free Variables Requirement:**

In any definition, all and only the variables that occur free in a definiens should also occur free in the definiendum.

\(^{82}\)In the first instance, such definitions implicitly introduce the closures of conditionals, and it will be derivable, from the fact that the definition \(\varphi \equiv_{df} \psi\) introduces the closures of \(\varphi \rightarrow \psi\) and \(\psi \rightarrow \varphi\), that the definition yields \(\Box (\varphi \equiv \psi)\) and its closures as theorems.
For some purposes, it proves useful to relax this requirement by allowing the definiendum to contain free variables that aren’t free in the definiens. But there are well-known reasons for not allowing the definiens to contain free variables that aren’t free in the definiendum.

Next we adopt a convention that assumes familiarity with the various reasons why one might want to cast definitions as schemata involving metavariables. Readers unfamiliar with those reasons are encouraged to jump ahead to Section 7.3 (Explanatory Remarks) and read Remarks (27) and (28). Remark (27) explains why, in a system containing complex terms that might fail to have a denotation, any free variables in a definition should be cast as metavariables instead of object-language variables. Remark (28) explains why, in the case of bound variables, metavariables should be used (subject to certain restrictions) instead of object-language variables.

However, definition schemata involving free and bound Greek metavariables are often much more difficult to read and grasp. So although definitions should, strictly speaking, be stated as schemata using metavariables, we shall use metavariables in definitions only when it is clearer to do so, i.e., only when doing so lightens cognitive load. For the cases where it doesn’t, we state and adopt the following convention that will help mitigate the problem and make definitions in the object language much more readable and user-friendly:

(2) Convention for Variables in Definitions:
When it increases clarity and facilitates readability, we formulate definitions with both free and bound object-language variables that function as metavariables, with the understanding that they give rise to instances of the definition as follows:

(a) if object-language variables \( a_1, \ldots, a_n \) \((n \geq 0)\) occur free in a definition of the form \( \varphi \equiv_{df} \psi \) or \( \tau =_{df} \sigma \), then where \( \tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n \) are any terms substitutable, respectively, for \( a_1, \ldots, a_n \) in \( \psi \) or \( \sigma \):

\[
\varphi_{\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n} \equiv_{df} \psi_{\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n}
\]

is an instance of a definition-by-\(=\) that extends the language with new formulas of the form \( \varphi_{\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n} \) and \( \tau_{\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n} =_{df} \sigma_{\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n} \).

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83Suppes (1957) explains why one can allow definitions in which variables occur free in the definiendum but not in the definiens; one can trivially get the variables to match by adding dummy clauses to the definiens. For example, Suppes notes (1957, 157) that the number-theoretic definition \( Q(x, y) =_{df} x > 0 \) can be turned into \( Q(x, y) =_{df} x > 0 \land y = y \).

84Suppes (1957) has a nice discussion of why the definiens may not contain a free variable that is not free in the definiendum. See his example (1957, 157) of how to derive a falsehood from a definition such as \( R(x) =_{df} x + y = 0 \).
is an instance of a definition-by- that extends the language with new terms of the form $\tau_{\alpha_1,\ldots,\alpha_n}$ and

(.b) if any object-language variables occur bound in the definiens of an instance of a definition of the form $\phi \equiv_{df} \psi$ or $\tau =_{df} \sigma$, then the result of replacing the definiens of that instance by one of its alphabetic variants is also an instance of the definition.\(^{86}\)

Thus, whenever the use of metavariables would make a definition significantly more difficult to read and grasp, we may use object-language variables instead. The two clauses of (.2) will become clearer when we start formulating definitions that contain free or bound object-language variables; in the first examples of such definitions, we include, or point to, explanatory remarks that outline how the two clauses of (.2) operate.

Finally, we also adopt the following convention, regarding encoding formula subterms (8) in definitions:

(3) Encoding Formula Convention:

In any definition, we regard any encoding formula subterms of the definiens as encoding formula subterms of the definiendum and regard any occurrence of a variable in an encoding formula subterm that is free [bound] in the definiens as free [bound] in the definiendum.

It would serve well to give examples of how this convention will be used, even though the discussion of these examples will reference some defined notions we’ve not yet introduced. Later in this work, we introduce the definition $x$ is identical to $y$ ($\equiv y$) as follows:

$$x = y \equiv_{df} (\mathcal{O}! x \& \mathcal{O}! y \& \Box \forall F (Fx \equiv Fy)) \lor (\mathcal{A}! x \& \mathcal{A}! y \& \Box \forall F (xF \equiv yF)) \quad (23.1)$$

This defines $x = y$ as: either $x$ and $y$ are both ordinary and necessarily exemplify the same properties or both are abstract and necessarily encode the same properties. Clearly, the variables $x$ and $y$ are both free in the definiens and in

\(^{85}\)In more technical terms, the import of (.a) is that each distinct object-language variable $\alpha$ that occurs free in a definition functions as a distinct Greek metavariable that ranges over terms of the same type as $\alpha$, with the proviso that if $\alpha$ falls within the scope of a variable-binding operator $\text{Op}$ in the definiens, then a term may serve as an instance of $\alpha$ only if it doesn’t contain free occurrences of the variable bound by $\text{Op}$. We shall illustrate this technical description in Remark (31), after we’ve introduced definition (20.1). Note separately that when the propositional variables $p,q,\ldots$ occur free in the definiens and definiendum, they function either as metavariables for $0$-place relation terms $\Pi^1_0, \Pi^2_0, \ldots$ or as metavariables for formulas $\phi, \psi, \ldots$.

\(^{86}\)In more technical terms, the import of (.b) is that each distinct object-language variable $\alpha$ that occurs bound by a variable-binding operator $\text{Op}$ in the definiens functions as a distinct Greek metavariable ranging over variables of the same type as $\alpha$, with the proviso that an object-language variable may serve as an instance of $\alpha$ only if it does not occur free in any term occurring within the scope of $\text{Op}$. We shall illustrate this technical description in Remark (32), after we’ve introduced definition (20.1).
the definiendum. But notice that there are occurrences of \( x \) and \( y \) in the encoding formula subterms \( xF \) and \( yF \) of the definiens and that these occurrences are free in the definiens. So the Encoding Formula Convention stipulates not only that the definiendum \( x = y \) has \( xF \) and \( yF \) as encoding formula subterms but also that it has free occurrences of \( x \) and \( y \) in encoding formula subterms. This allows us to conclude that the \( \lambda \) in the expression \( [\lambda xy.x = y] \) binds variables in encoding formula subterms, namely, it binds the variables \( x \) and \( y \) in the encoding formula subterms of \( x = y \). Because it does so, this \( \lambda \)-expression attempts to pick out a relation whose exemplification conditions are defined in terms of encoding conditions and this violates an intuition underlying object theory, namely, that one can’t define new relations using encoding conditions until it can be established that it is safe to do so. Since \( [\lambda xy.x = y] \) binds variables in encoding formula subterms, it does not meet the conditions of axiom (39.2) and so that axiom will not assert that \( [\lambda xy.x = y] \) signifies a relation.

To continue the example, consider the definite description \( \dot{x}(x = y) \) and then consider the two \( \lambda \)-expressions, \( [\lambda y P\dot{x}(x = y)] \) and \( [\lambda x P\dot{x}(x = y)] \), where \( P \) is any property. In the first of the two \( \lambda \)-expressions, not only does the \( \lambda \) bind the variable \( y \), but it binds the variable \( y \) in an encoding formula subterm. As we saw in the previous paragraph, \( x = y \), by convention, contains free occurrences of \( x \) and \( y \) in encoding formula subterms. But since \( x \) is bound in \( \dot{x}(x = y) \), only the occurrence of \( y \) is free in this description. So the matrix \( P\dot{x}(x = y) \) has a free occurrence of \( y \) in an encoding formula subterm, namely, the subterm \( yF \) of \( x = y \). Hence, the \( \lambda \) in \( [\lambda y P\dot{x}(x = y)] \) binds a variable in an encoding formula subterm. But the \( \lambda \) in \( [\lambda x P\dot{x}(x = y)] \) does not. To anticipate, \( [\lambda y P\dot{x}(x = y)] \) will fail the conditions of axiom (39.2), but \( [\lambda x P\dot{x}(x = y)] \) will meet those conditions; that axiom will assert that \( [\lambda x P\dot{x}(x = y)] \) signifies a relation.\(^{87}\)

These issues iterate as we layer definitions. Let continue our example further by considering the following definition, which we’ll introduce later purely for illustrative purposes in Remark (27):

\[ \dot{y} =_{df} \dot{x}(x = y) \]

This defines the \( y \) as: the \( x \) such that \( x \) is identical to \( y \). By the Encoding Formula Convention, since there is an occurrence of \( y \) in the encoding formula subterm of the definiens and that occurrence is free in the definiens, we must

\(^{87}\)Intuitively, \( [\lambda x P\dot{x}(x = y)] \) signifies either a property that everything exemplifies or a property that nothing exemplifies, depending on the value of \( y \). Since it a theorem that \( y = \dot{x}(x = y) \) (175.2), the \( \lambda \)-expression could be understood intuitively as signifying the property: \textit{being an individual \( x \) such that \( y \) exemplifies \( P \)}. If the value assigned to \( y \) is an individual that exemplifies \( P \), then \( [\lambda x P\dot{x}(x = y)] \) denotes a property that every object exemplifies, and if the value assigned to \( y \) is an individual that doesn’t exemplify \( P \), then the \( \lambda \)-expression denotes a property that no object exemplifies.
regard \( y \) as having a free occurrence in an encoding formula subterm of \( \iota y \). But \( x \) does not have a free occurrence in an encoding formula subterm of \( \iota y \); though \( x \) does occur in an encoding formula subterm of the definiens, but it does not occur free in the definiens. So it does not occur free in the definiendum.

Given these facts, consider the two \( \lambda \)-expressions \([\lambda y P \iota y]\) and \([\lambda x P \iota y]\). The first \( \lambda \)-expression is to be treated just as \([\lambda y P \iota x(x = y)]\). The \( \lambda \) in \([\lambda y P \iota x(x = y)]\) binds a variable in an encoding formula subterm, just as \([\lambda y P \iota x(x = y)]\) does. But the \( \lambda \) in \([\lambda x P \iota y]\) does not, just as \([\lambda x P \iota x(x = y)]\) does not. To anticipate, axiom (39.2) will assert that \([\lambda x P \iota y]\) signifies a relation, but does not assert that \([\lambda y P \iota y]\) signifies a relation.

One final point concerns the introduction of new constants using definiens that have encoding formula subterms but no free variables. For example, the following definitions would be acceptable, though hardly useful:

\[
\begin{align*}
\alpha &= \text{df } \iota(xP & \& \neg xP) \\
Q &= \text{df } [\lambda x \exists F(xF & \& \neg Fx)]
\end{align*}
\]

These are both legitimate definitions even though the definiens, in each case, provably fails to have a denotation (note that the definiens in the second definition is familiar from the Clark-Boolos paradox). Our theory of definitions will imply that both \( \alpha \) and \( Q \) fail to exist (intuitively, they fail to be significant terms). However, notice that, in both cases, the definiens has encoding formula subterms and that the occurrences of the variable \( x \) in the encoding formula subterms \( xP \) and \( xF \) are bound. So our Convention (.3) stipulates that \( \alpha \) has \( xP \) as an encoding formula subterm, \( Q \) has \( xF \) as an encoding formula subterm, and that the variable \( x \) in these subterms is bound. Consequently, in \( \lambda \)-expressions such as \([\lambda x Rxa]\) and \([\lambda x Qx]\), the \( \lambda \) does not bind any free occurrence of \( x \) in an encoding formula subterm! These \( \lambda \)-expressions will therefore provably denote properties, by (39.2), though the properties they denote are necessarily unexemplified.

In what follows, it will be crucial to keep a strict eye on the status of the individual variables in defined individual and relation terms whose definiens contains encoding formula subterms. This is key to understanding what is asserted by axiom (39.2). See the discussion immediately following the introduction of this axiom and Remark (55) for further discussion.

### 7.2.1 The Classical, Sentence-Forming Operators

**(18) Definitions:** The Connectives, Existential Quantifier, and Possibility Operator of Classical Quantified Modal Logic. Since it is clearer to use metavariables to define the standard connectives, existential quantifier, and possibility operator of classical quantified modal logic, we introduce them as follows: (.1)
\( \phi \) and \( \psi \) just in case it is not the case that if-\( \phi \)-then-not-\( \psi \); (.2) \( \phi \) or \( \psi \) just in case if not-\( \phi \) then \( \psi \); (.3) \( \phi \) if and only if \( \psi \) just in case both if-\( \phi \)-then-\( \psi \) and if-\( \psi \)-then-\( \phi \); (.4) there exists an \( \alpha \) such that \( \phi \) just in case it is not the case that every \( \alpha \) is such that not-\( \phi \); and (.5) It is possible that \( \phi \) if and only if it is not the case that necessarily not-\( \phi \):

\[
\begin{align*}
(1) \quad & \quad \phi \land \psi \equiv_{df} \neg(\phi \to \neg \psi) \\
(2) \quad & \quad \phi \lor \psi \equiv_{df} \neg \phi \to \psi \\
(3) \quad & \quad \phi \equiv \psi \equiv_{df} (\phi \to \psi) \land (\psi \to \phi) \\
(4) \quad & \quad \exists \alpha \phi \equiv_{df} \neg \forall \alpha \neg \phi \\
(5) \quad & \quad \Box \phi \equiv_{df} \neg \Box \neg \phi
\end{align*}
\]

When we uniformly substitute formulas of the object language for \( \phi \) and \( \psi \) in the above and uniformly substitute object-language variables for \( \alpha \), we obtain instances of the definitions.

These definitions preserve the classical understanding of the sentence-forming operators \&, \lor, \equiv, \exists \alpha, \text{and} \Box. Where where \( \phi \) and \( \psi \) are any formulas, and \( \alpha \) is any variable, the above extend our language with new formulas of the form \( \phi \land \psi \), \( \phi \lor \psi \), \( \phi \equiv \psi \), \( \exists \alpha \phi \), and \( \Box \phi \). We henceforth call both \( \exists \) and \( \Box \) modal operators.

We now stipulate that the metadefinitions of subformula, subterm, scope, and free/bound occurrence, open/closed formulas and terms, closures, substitutable for, alphabetic variant, etc., should all be appropriately extended to ensure that there are facts of the following kinds, among many others: (a) \( \phi \) is a subformula of \( \exists \alpha \phi \) and \( \Box \phi \), and \( \phi \) and \( \psi \) are subformulas of \( \phi \land \psi \), \( \phi \lor \psi \), and \( \phi \equiv \psi \); (b) if \( \tau \) is a subterm of \( \phi \) or \( \psi \), then \( \tau \) is a subterm of \( \phi \land \psi \), \( \phi \lor \psi \), \( \phi \equiv \psi \), \( \exists \alpha \phi \), and \( \Box \phi \); (c) the formulas \( \psi \land \chi \), \( \psi \lor \chi \), and \( \psi \equiv \chi \) are, respectively, the scope of the occurrence of the operators \& and \lor, and \( \psi \equiv \chi \); (d) the formula \( \exists \beta \psi \) is the scope of the left-most occurrence of the operator \( \exists \beta \) in that formula, and \( \psi \) is that operator’s proper scope; (e) the formula \( \Box \psi \) is the scope of the occurrence of the operator \( \Box \) in that formula; and (f) those occurrences of \( \beta \) that are free in \( \psi \) are bound by the left-most occurrence of \( \exists \beta \) in \( \exists \beta \psi \), as is the occurrence of \( \beta \) in that occurrence of \( \exists \beta \); and so on.

(19) **Notational Conventions**: Dominance Order. In what follows, our binary connectives shall be governed by the following partial dominance order: \( \equiv \) dominates \( \to \), \( \to \) dominates both \& and \lor, and neither \& nor \lor dominate each other. For example:

\[88\text{Interested readers might wish to review explanatory Remark (29), where we adduce reasons why one could have introduced this definition by using object-language variables under Convention (17.2).}\]
7.2. DEFINITIONS EXTENDING THE OBJECT LANGUAGE

• \( \varphi \rightarrow \psi \equiv \neg \psi \rightarrow \neg \varphi \) should be parsed as \((\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \equiv (\neg \psi \rightarrow \neg \varphi)\)
• \( \varphi \& \psi \rightarrow \chi \) should be parsed as \((\varphi \& \psi) \rightarrow \chi\)
• \( \varphi \lor \psi \rightarrow \chi \) should be parsed as \((\varphi \lor \psi) \rightarrow \chi\)
• \( (\varphi \lor \psi) \& \chi \) and \( \varphi \lor (\psi \& \chi) \) must be written as they are.

In cases such as the first two, we may drop parentheses without ambiguity.

7.2.2 Existence in the Logical Sense

(20) Definitions: Existence in the Logical Sense. We now define a condition that asserts existence in the logical sense. This condition is distinct from the variable-binding quantifier \( \exists \alpha \) (which asserts ‘there exists an \( \alpha \) such that’) and is distinct from the physical sense in which individuals are sometimes said to exist. The quantifier \( \exists \alpha \) was defined in (18.4) and the physical sense of existence is already represented in our system by the distinguished predicate \( E!, \) which may be interpreted as denoting the primitive property being concrete. By contrast, we now define a logical sense in which individuals and relations exist. Some readers may find it useful to first read Remark (30), which attempts to describe what is distinctive about the following definitions. The discussion there contrasts our approach, in which existence is defined in terms of predication, with classical approaches in which existence is defined in terms of identity. As we shall see, both logical existence and identity are definable in terms of predication in the present system.

We use the notation \( \downarrow \) to represent existence and define this notion for the following three, mutually-exclusive and jointly-exhaustive cases: (.1) individual terms, (.2) \( n \)-place relation terms \((n \geq 1)\), and (.3) 0-place relation terms. By employing Convention (17.2), we cast these definitions using object-language variables.

We first define (.1) \( x \) exists just in case \( x \) exemplifies some property:

\[
(\cdot1) \quad x \downarrow \equiv_{df} \exists Fx
\]

By Convention (17.2), the following are perfectly good instances of this definition:

\[
y \downarrow \equiv_{df} \exists Ggy
izFz \downarrow \equiv_{df} \exists HHzFz
\]

However, \( izFz \downarrow \equiv_{df} \exists FizFz \) is not an instance; the term \( izFz \) is not substitutable for \( x \) in the definiens of (.1) since its free variable \( F \) would get captured by the quantifier \( \exists F \). These facts make it clear why (.1), under Convention (17.2), is equivalent to the schematic definition \( \kappa \downarrow \equiv_{df} \exists \Omega \Omega \kappa \), where \( \kappa \) doesn’t
contain any free occurrences of the 1-place relation variable \( \Omega \). For a full discussion of this point, see Remarks (31) and (32), where we explain, respectively, the substitutability requirement in Convention (17.2.a) and the alphabetically-variant definientia allowed by Convention (17.2.b).

For \( n \geq 1 \), we say (2) \( F^n \) \textit{exists} just in case there are individuals \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) that encode \( F^n \):

\[
(2) \quad F^n \downarrow \equiv \text{df} \exists x_1 \ldots \exists x_n (x_1 \ldots x_n F^n)
\]

Given Convention (17.2), the following are perfectly good instances of this definition:

\[
G \downarrow \equiv \text{df} \exists y (y G)
\]
\[
[\lambda x. R x y] \downarrow \equiv \text{df} \exists z (\lambda x. R x y)
\]

However, \( [\lambda x. R x y] \downarrow \equiv \text{df} \exists y (\lambda x. R x y) \) is not an instance. The variable \( y \) occurs free in \( [\lambda x. R x y] \) and so one may not use \( y \) as the variable bound by the quantifier \( \exists \) in the definiens, since that captures the free occurrence of \( y \) in the definiendum. In general, Convention (17.2) allows us to produce well-formed instances of this definition by uniformly replacing \( F^n \) with any \( n \)-place relation term and by uniformly replacing \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \), respectively, with any distinct individual variables \( \nu_1, \ldots, \nu_n \), provided none of the \( \nu_i \) occur free in the term replacing \( F^n \).

Interested readers might wish to skip ahead to explanatory Remark (33), to get some idea as to why (2) offers a good definition of \( n \)-place relation existence for \( n \geq 1 \). Moreover, readers interested in why \( n \)-place relation existence for \( n \geq 2 \) can’t be defined in terms of property existence are referred to explanatory Remark (34).

When \( n = 0 \), we say (3) \( p \) \textit{exists} just in case \textit{being such that} \( p \) exists:

\[
(3) \quad p \downarrow \equiv \text{df} \lambda x. p \downarrow
\]

It is important here that the variable \( x \) is vacuously bound by the \( \lambda \) in the definiens. If we consider the 0-place relation term \( PizQz \), then by the clauses of Convention (17.2), the following is an instance of (3):

\[
PizQz \downarrow \equiv \text{df} [\lambda z. PizQz] \downarrow
\]

This is an instance because the \( \lambda \) vacuously binds \( z \) – no free occurrences of \( z \) in the matrix are bound by \( \lambda z \).

By contrast, the following is not an instance of (3):

\[
Rxy \downarrow \equiv \text{df} [\lambda x. Rxy] \downarrow
\]

\[\text{Note that the definiendum in this example is not ambiguous, despite the fact that } izQz \downarrow \text{ is well-formed. The expression } PizQz \downarrow \text{ can be interpreted only as } (PizQz) \downarrow; \text{ it can’t be interpreted as } P(izQz) \downarrow.\]
Here, the free occurrence of $x$ in $Rxy$ gets captured in the definiens by the variable-binding operator $\lambda x$. To define $Rxy \downarrow$ as specified by (.3), we have to formulate an instance such as $Rxy \downarrow \equiv_{df} [\lambda z Rxy] \downarrow$.

One final point about (.3): for some 0-place relation terms, the definiendum may need disambiguating parentheses. For example, the formula $\neg Px \downarrow$ is ambiguous between $\neg(Px \downarrow)$ and $(\neg Px) \downarrow$, given that both $Px$ and $\neg Px$ are 0-place terms. If, in any given case, parentheses don’t disambiguate which is meant, then we employ the convention: $\neg x \varphi \downarrow$ designates $(\neg x \varphi) \downarrow$; otherwise that $\downarrow$ applies to the smallest unit possible, so that $\neg Px \downarrow$ is to be interpreted as $\neg(Px \downarrow)$.

(21) Remark: An Intentional Ambiguity. In what follows, it shall be useful to have some word in our metalanguage that is intentionally neutral between the material mode notion of existence and the formal mode notion of having a denotation, i.e., some studiously ambiguous word that refers both to the material mode claim $\tau \downarrow (\tau \text{ exists})$ as well as to the formal mode claim that $\tau$ has a denotation. We shall use the expression significant, or logically significant, for this purpose, and use empty for terms that fail to be significant. Given such usage, it will be important to distinguish an empty property term (i.e., a 1-place relation term $\tau$ that doesn’t have a denotation) from an empty property (i.e., a property $F$ that isn’t exemplified). We’ll introduce axioms that guarantee (.1) that only significant terms can be instantiated into universal claims – see axiom (39.1); (.2) that the following terms are, in the first instance, stipulated to be significant: primitive constants, variables, and $\lambda$-expressions where the initial $\lambda$ doesn’t bind any variable in any encoding formula subterm – see axiom (39.2); and (.3) that (the primary terms of) true exemplification formulas are significant (39.5.a) and that (the primary terms of) true encoding formulas are significant (39.5.b).

---

90 The Quine corner quotes indicate that what $\tau \text{ exists}$ asserts is not a metatheoretic claim about the term $\tau$, but a claim in the object language. We shall, in what follows, generally omit the Quine corner quotes around schematic notions involving metavariables, with the understanding that our intention is to define an object-theoretic notion that applies to objects and relations, not a metatheoretic notion that applies to terms. When we do use the Quine corner quotes, this is simply to remind the reader that we are talking about an object-theoretic notion and not a metatheoretic notion.

91 I considered using the expression logically proper instead of significant, given its provenance. But it would be confusing when we wanted to talk about logically proper terms that have proper subterms that aren’t logically proper. I also considered using the expression defined instead of significant. But defined is already loaded with a special meaning, both theoretically and metatheoretically.
7.2.3 Identity

To define identity generally, we first need to define the properties of being ordinary (\(O!\)) and being abstract (\(A!\)). These take place in (22.1) and (22.2), respectively. Once these definitions are in place, we may then define, for any terms \(\tau\) and \(\sigma\), the condition \(\langle \tau \text{ is identical to } \sigma \rangle\) (written: \(\tau = \sigma\)), by cases. The four cases of the definition of \(\tau = \sigma\) are:

- \(\tau\) and \(\sigma\) are both individual terms \((23.1)\)
- \(\tau\) and \(\sigma\) are both 1-place relation terms \((23.2)\)
- \(\tau\) and \(\sigma\) are both \(n\)-place relation terms \((n \geq 2)\) \((23.3)\)
- \(\tau\) and \(\sigma\) are both 0-place relation terms \((23.4)\)

The preliminary definitions of \(O!\) and \(A!\) are used only in the first of these four cases.

\((22)\) Definitions: Ordinary vs Abstract Objects. We may define being ordinary (‘\(O!\)’) as a new 1-place relation constant as follows:

\((.1)\) \(O! = \text{df} [\lambda x E!x]\)

In other words, being ordinary is defined as possibly exemplifying concreteness. As we shall see, this definition implies \(O! = [\lambda x E!x]\); this will follow from our definitions-by-\(=\) and the fact that \([\lambda x E!x]\downarrow\). Moreover, from \(O! = [\lambda x E!x]\) and \([\lambda x E!x]\downarrow\) it will follow that \(O! \downarrow\), by the substitution of identicals; see (116.1).

By Convention (17.2.b), \(O! = [\lambda y E!y]\) is also an instance of the definition. Indeed, given this Convention, (.1) functions as the definition schema \(O! = [\lambda x E!x]\). An axiom asserted in the next chapter, namely \(\alpha\)-Conversion (48.1), will guarantee that \([\lambda x E!x] = [\lambda y E!y]\), given that \([\lambda x E!x]\downarrow\) and the fact that \([\lambda x E!x] = [\lambda y E!y]\) are alphabetic variants. So \([\lambda x E!x]\) and \([\lambda y E!y]\) will be substitutable for one another in any context, by the axiom for the substitution of identicals (41). This holds for any alphabetic variant of \([\lambda x E!x].\) So it really doesn’t matter which alphabetic variant of \([\lambda x E!x]\) we use to define \(O!\); it will be derivable that \(O! = [\lambda x E!x]\), for any individual variable \(x\).

We may also define being abstract, written \(A!\), as follows:

\((.2)\) \(A! = [\lambda x A!x]\)

\(^{92}\)In the term \([\lambda x \Diamond !x]\), the \(\lambda\) doesn’t bind any variable in any encoding formula subterm, and so axiom (39.2) will guarantee that \([\lambda x \Diamond !x]\downarrow.\) Then our theory of definitions-by-identity (74) will ensure that since the definiens is significant, the identity \(O! = [\lambda x E!x]\) is derivable.
I.e., being abstract is defined as not possibly exemplifying concreteness. Since it will be axiomatic that \([\lambda x \neg \lozenge E!x] \downarrow \) (39.2), this definition will yield the identity \(A! = [\lambda x \neg \lozenge E!x] \) as a theorem. Remarks analogous to those following definition of \(O! \) apply to \(A! \).

(23) **Definitions**: Identity. As noted earlier, the definition of identity requires four cases. We first say that individuals are identical just in case either they are \(E\)-identical or they are both abstract and necessarily encode the same properties:

\[(.1) \ x = y \equiv df (O!x \& O!y \& \Box \forall F (Fx \equiv Fy)) \lor (A!x \& A!y \& \Box \forall F (xF \equiv yF))\]

By our Convention (17.2), we obtain instances of this definition by uniformly replacing \(x\) and \(y\) by any individual terms \(\kappa_1\) and \(\kappa_1\), respectively, and by uniformly replacing \(F\) by any property variable \(\Omega\), provided \(\Omega\) doesn’t occur free in the terms replacing \(x\) and \(y\). See Remark (35), where we examine the behavior of the above definition for the definiendum \(x = izGz\).

In the explanatory discussion immediately following the Encoding Formula Convention (17.3), we saw that the definiendum \(x = y\) contains the encoding formula subterms of the definiens, and that the \(\lambda\) in \([\lambda xy x = y]\) binds variables in an encoding formula subterm. Similarly, the \(\lambda\) in each of \([\lambda xx x = y]\), \([\lambda xx a = y]\), and \([\lambda y x = y]\), and \([\lambda y a = y]\) binds a variable in an encoding formula subterm. These \(\lambda\)-expressions therefore will not be among the terms guaranteed to have a denotation by axiom (39.2). This undermines the McMichael/Boolos paradox discussed in Section 2.1.

The second case for the definition of identity governs properties. For the following case, we suppress the superscript on \(F^1\) and \(G^1\) and so use \(F\) and \(G\) as 1-place relation variables under Convention (17.2). We then say that \(F\) is identical to \(G\) just in case \(F\) and \(G\) both exist and, necessarily, all and only the individuals that encode \(F\) encode \(G\). Formally:

\[(.2) \ F = G \equiv df F \downarrow \& G \downarrow \& \Box \forall x (xF \equiv xG)\]

See Remark (36) for an extended discussion of why the existence clauses have been added to the definiens. Though the variables \(F\) and \(G\) in the above function as metavariables under Convention (17.2), they function normally when we state axioms and theorems. So since it will be axiomatic that \(F \downarrow \) and \(G \downarrow\), by axiom (39.2), we will be able to derive, from the relevant instance of the above definition, that \(F = G \equiv \Box \forall x (xF \equiv xG)\). We’ll then be able to infer that this holds for all \(F\) and \(G\). Given the free logic of complex terms that we’ll adopt, the following universal closure of this theorem, namely \(\forall F \forall G (F = G \equiv \Box \forall x (xF \equiv xG))\), can only be instantiated to significant property terms; see theorem (117.1). Contrast this with the definition displayed above, which can be instantiated to any property terms, significant or otherwise.
The third case of the definition of identity governs \( n \)-place relations \( (n \geq 2) \); it defines relation identity in terms of the notions of existence and property identity. Let \( F \) and \( G \) be two \( n \)-place relation variables \( (n \geq 2) \). Then we say that \( F \) is identical to \( G \) if and only if \( F \) and \( G \) both exist and each way of projecting \( F \) and \( G \) onto \( n-1 \) objects results in identical 1-place properties:

\[
\forall y_1 \ldots \forall y_{n-1} \left( \left[ \lambda x F y_1 \ldots y_{n-1} \right] = \left[ \lambda x G y_1 \ldots y_{n-1} \right] \right) \wedge \\
\left[ \lambda x F y_2 \ldots y_{n-1} \right] = \left[ \lambda x G y_2 \ldots y_{n-1} \right] \wedge \ldots \wedge \\
\left[ \lambda x F y_1 \ldots y_{n-1} x \right] = \left[ \lambda x G y_1 \ldots y_{n-1} x \right]
\]

See Remark (37) for a discussion of why relation identity is not defined by using \( n \)-ary encoding to generalize the definition of property identity.

The fourth case of the definition of identity governs propositions and is stated in terms of existence and property identity. Where \( p \) and \( q \) are any 0-place relation variables, we may say that \( p \) is identical to \( q \) just in case \( p \) and \( q \) both exist and \( \text{being such that } p \) is identical to \( \text{being such that } q \):

\[
p = q \equiv_{df} p \downarrow \wedge q \downarrow \wedge \left[ \lambda y p \right] = \left[ \lambda y q \right]
\]

It might be of interest to note that since it will be axiomatic that \( p \downarrow \) and \( q \downarrow \) by axiom (39.2), we will be able to derive, from the relevant instance of the above definition, that \( p = q \equiv \left[ \lambda y p \right] = \left[ \lambda y q \right] \). See theorem (117.2).

\((24)\) Definitions: Non-identity. We now introduce the notion of non-identity in terms of negation and identity as follows:

\[
\tau \neq \sigma \equiv_{df} \neg (\tau = \sigma),
\]

provided \( \tau \) and \( \sigma \) are both terms of the same type

This is not just a rewrite convention, for here we are defining non-identity in terms of primitive and defined notions. So we’re not just introducing easier-to-read notation.

It is important to observe that we intentionally omitted the existence clauses \( \tau \downarrow \) and \( \sigma \downarrow \) from the definiens. That’s because we want formulas of the form \( \tau \neq \sigma \) to be provable not just when both \( \tau \) and \( \sigma \) denote entities that fail to be identical but also when either \( \tau \) or \( \sigma \) fails to denote. For example, if \( \neg \left( \left[ \lambda x \psi \right] \downarrow \right) \), then by theorem (108.1), which asserts \( \tau = \sigma \rightarrow \tau \downarrow \), it will follow that \( \neg \left( \left[ \lambda x \psi \right] = \left[ \lambda x \psi \right] \right) \). So given the above definition, we may conclude \( \left[ \lambda x \psi \right] \neq \left[ \lambda x \psi \right] \). Though some philosophers and logicians have suggested that formulas of the form \( \tau = \tau \) should be true even when \( \tau \) denotes nothing, the case is not compelling and so the suggestion will not be preserved in the present system.

\((25)\) Remark: Four Final Observations About Definitions. The following observations about definitions may prove to be of interest. First, definitions often
have a dual role. Sometimes they merely introduce a new technical expression that either (a) captures a certain condition about objects or relations (or both) or (b) abbreviates a complex term. But sometimes they provide an analysis of (one sense of) a logically or philosophically significant word or phrase of natural language. As examples of this latter role, (18.1) analyzes one sense of ‘and’, (18.4) analyzes one sense of ‘there exists’, and (18.5) analyzes one sense of ‘possibly’. Similarly, definition (23.1) of ‘=’ offers an analysis of the English expression ‘is identical to’ as it is used in claims such as “Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus” or “Clark Kent is identical to Superman”. Definition (23.2), which provides a separate case of the definition of ‘=’, offers an analysis of the phrase ‘is identical to’ as it is used in such claims as:

- *being a brother* is identical to *being a male sibling*
- *being a circle* is identical to *being a closed plane figure every point of which lies equidistant from some given point*

Of course, the hope is that such definitions provide insightful analyses that demonstrate the power of the primitive notions of the language. For example, the definition of property identity in (23.2) is introduced as part of our *theory* of identity: it (a) analyzes the identity of properties in terms of the primitives of our language, (b) provides a precise reconstruction of a notion thought to be mysterious, (c) is consistent with the intuition that properties may be distinct even if necessarily exemplified by the same objects, and (d) leads to a proof that the identity conditions of properties are extensional, i.e., leads to a proof that properties $F$ and $G$ are identical just in case they are encoded by the same objects. This is theorem (187).

Second, note that there are two ways to define new 0-place terms. Consider:

$$q_0 \equiv_{df} \exists x(E!x \land \neg \diamond E!x)$$

$$q_0 =_{df} \exists x(E!x \land \neg \diamond E!x)$$

The second definition is well-formed because both terms flanking the symbol $=_{df}$ are 0-place relation terms. Moreover, the definiens is provably significant – a theorem proved in Chapter 9, namely, (105.2), guarantees that the proposition $\exists x(E!x \land \neg \diamond E!x)$ exists, i.e., that $(\exists x(E!x \land \neg \diamond E!x))$. So the second definition will imply identities of the form $q_0 = \exists x(E!x \land \neg \diamond E!x)$.

Though only one definition of $q_0$ is allowed within the system, one may introduce it via either the definition-by-$\equiv$ or the definition-by-$\equiv$. The choice ultimately rests on the inferential role that one wants $q_0$ to have. We’ll formalize the distinct inferential roles of definitions-by-$\equiv$ and definitions-by-$\equiv$ in Chapter 9, in items (73) and (74). But, to a first approximation, we can say the choice of definition comes down to whether one wants to be able to derive a necessary
equivalence or an identity between \( q_0 \) and \( \exists x (E!x \& \neg dE!x) \). In a hyperinten-
sional system such as ours, a necessary equivalence doesn’t imply identity. We
therefore leave the choice to be determined by the occasion and the way in
which the definition is to be applied. In cases like \( q_0 \), however, we’ll typically
use the stronger definition-by-\( = \), primarily so that we can simplify proofs.

Third, one of the axioms for quantification theory that we stipulate in the
next chapter asserts, among other things, that the primitive constants of the
language are significant; see (39.2). This axiom does not apply to constants that
have been introduced by definition and thereby avoids the following problem.
Our theory of definitions-by-identity will allow us to introduce a new con-
stant, say \( d_{31} \), by the definition \( d_{31} =_{df} \exists x (Px \& \neg Px) \). Since \( \exists x (Px \& \neg Px) \) will
provably fail to have a denotation, it is not clear what use there is for such a
definition. But, in this work, we aren’t requiring that one prove in advance that
the definiens is significant in order to introduce a definition-by-identity. As
we shall see in Chapter 9, in item (74), the inferential role of a definition-by-
identity is to make it axiomatically true that if the definiens is significant, then
the identity holds, otherwise the definiendum fails to be significant. So, in the
case we’re describing, the definition introduces the following axiom:

\[
(\exists x (Px \& \neg Px) \downarrow \to (d_{31} = \exists x (Px \& Px))) \& (\neg \exists x (Px \& \neg Px) \downarrow \to \neg d_{31} \downarrow)
\]

So we can’t use axiom (39.2) to assert \( \tau \downarrow \) for every constant \( \tau \), since the definiens
of a constant introduced by definition might be fail to denote. A similar con-
sideration applies to new relation constants defined in terms of paradoxical
predicates that aren’t significant, such as the predicate \( \lambda x \exists G (xG \& \neg Gx) \) (this
predicate is involved in the Clark/Boolos paradox). It will be provable that
\( \neg [\lambda x \exists G (xG \& \neg Gx)] \downarrow \) (190.1). While our theory of definition-by-identity al-
ows one to introduce \( S_{32} =_{df} [\lambda x \exists G (xG \& \neg Gx)] \), axiom (39.2) does not thereby
sanction \( S_{32} \downarrow \), since \( S_{32} \) is a constant introduced by a definition.\(^{93} \)

The fourth and final observation is that the discussion of definitions in this
section completes the precise syntactic characterization of our formalism. This
forestalls the concerns that Gödel (1944, 120) raised about Whitehead and Rus-
sell’s *Principia Mathematica*:

It is to be regretted that this first comprehensive and thorough-going pre-
sentation of a mathematical logic and the derivation of mathematics from
it [is] so greatly lacking in formal precision in the foundations (contained
in *1–21 of Principia) that it presents in this respect a considerable step
backwards as compared with Frege. What is missing, above all, is a pre-
cise statement of the syntax of the formalism. Syntactical considerations

\(^{93}\)Note how our discussion applies to (a) the case where one defines \( d_{31} \) as above and then defines
\( P_{33} =_{df} [\lambda x Rxd_{31}] \), and (b) the case where one defines the term \( S_{32} \) as above and then defines
\( d_{33} = \exists x \phi \), for some formula \( \phi \) in which \( S_{32} \) occurs. In these cases, our theory of definitions-by-
identity will guarantee that \( P_{33} \) and \( d_{33} \) are significant if their definiens are.
are omitted even in cases where they are necessary for the cogency of the proofs, in particular in connection with the “incomplete symbols”.

It is important to have taken some pains in the above development to ensure that such a criticism doesn’t apply to the present effort. Attention to the syntactic details should also be useful to those interested in the computational implementation of the system.

7.3 Explanatory Remarks: Digression

In this section, we develop a number of remarks that will offer some perspective on, and examples of, the metadefinitions and definitions in this chapter. Unfortunately, we shall need to appeal occasionally to facts about our system not yet in evidence. Some of the choices in the foregoing can’t be explained adequately without mentioning developments (definitions, axioms, and theorems) that are formulated much later in the text. Nevertheless, I’ve tried to make the discussion intuitive and, in some cases, have repeated later developments so that most of the Remarks can be read on their own.

(26) Remark: About Alphabetic Variants. Alphabetically-variant formulas and terms are complex expressions that differ only orthographically with respect to the bound variables they contain and intuitively have the same meaning. Thus, $Fx$ and $Fy$ are not alphabetic variants, nor are $Fa$ and $Ga$. Rather, in the simplest cases:

- $\forall xFx$ and $\forall yFy$ are alphabetically-variant formulas; they not only have the same truth conditions but denote the same proposition, namely, that every individual exemplifies $F$.
- $\exists xFx$ and $\exists yFy$ are alphabetically-variant descriptions; they either both denote the unique individual that in fact exemplifies $F$ if there is one, or both denote nothing if there isn’t.
- $[\lambda x \neg Fx]$ and $[\lambda y \neg Fy]$ are alphabetically-variant relation terms; they denote the same relation.

However, we shall need to define the notion of alphabetic variant for formulas and terms of arbitrary complexity. So we need a definition on which the following pairs of expressions count as alphabetic variants:

- $\forall f(Fx \equiv Fy) / \forall g(Gx \equiv Gy)$
- $\exists x \forall y Mxy / \exists y \forall z Myz$
- $[\lambda y RyzQz] / [\lambda z RzxQx]$
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Once we have a definition that counts the above pairs as alphabetic variants, we'll be in a position to state and prove a number of theorems, such as (1) alphabetically variant formulas denote the same proposition (112.4), (2) alphabetically-variant formulas are equivalent (112.5), (3) alphabetically-variant definite descriptions have the same denotation if they have one (154), (4) a formula is derivable from some premises if and only if its alphabetic variants are derivable from those premises (115), and (5) a formula is a theorem if and only if its alphabetic variants are theorems, which is a special case of (115).

The definition of alphabetic variance also enables us to stipulate an axiom schema that intuitively guarantees that alphabetically-variant λ-expressions denote the same relation if they have a denotation. This is the schema α-Conversion, introduced in (48.1). It has the following as instances, where ↓ is defined in (20.2) and (20.3) and intuitively asserts that the expression to which it attaches has a denotation:

\[
\lambda y \neg F y [a \to \forall x M x] \downarrow \to \lambda y \neg F y [a \to \forall x M x] = \lambda y \neg F y [a \to \forall x M x]
\]

Note that the second and third conditionals introduce an equation between two 0-place relation terms.

Our definition of alphabetic variance begins with clause (16.1), which introduces linked and independent variables. Here are some examples:

- In the formula \(\forall F (Fa \equiv Fb)\), each occurrence of the variable F is linked to every other occurrence.

- In the formula \(\forall F F a \equiv \forall F F b\), the first two occurrences of F are linked to each other and the last two occurrences of F are linked to each other, while each of the first two occurrences is independent of each of the last two occurrences and vice versa.

- In the formula \(\forall x F x \to F x\), the first two occurrences of x are linked, and both are independent of the third, given that this formula is shorthand for \((\forall x F x) \to F x\).

- In the term \(ix(F x \to G y)\), the two occurrences of x are linked.
• In the term \( \lambda y \forall x Gx \rightarrow (Gx \& Gy) \), the two occurrences of \( y \) are linked (both are bound by the \( \lambda \)), the first two occurrences of \( x \) are linked, and both of those occurrences of \( x \) are independent of the third occurrence of \( x \). Also, all three occurrences of \( G \) are free and hence linked.

Since linked is an equivalence condition on variables in a term or formula, we call the cells of each partition a linkage group. In the first example above, there is one linkage group for \( F \), and in the fourth example, there is one linkage group for \( x \). In the second example, there are two linkage groups for \( F \) and in the third example, there are two linkage groups for \( x \). In the fifth example, there is one linkage group for \( x \), two linkage groups for \( y \), and one linkage group for \( G \).

In (16.2), we defined BV-notation. Some examples help illustrate this definition:

• When \( \varphi = \forall F(Fx \equiv Fy) \), then \( \varphi \) in BV-notation is \( \varphi[F,F,F] \)
• When \( \tau = ix \forall y Myx \), then \( \tau \) in BV-notation is \( \tau[x,y,y,x] \)
• When \( \tau = [\lambda y RyixQx] \), then \( \tau \) in BV-notation is \( \tau[y,y,x,x] \)
• When \( \tau = [\lambda Pa \rightarrow \forall Fa] \), then \( \tau \) in BV-notation is \( \tau[F,F] \)
• When \( \tau = [\lambda x \neg Fx \rightarrow \forall y My \) \), then \( \tau \) in BV-notation is \( \tau[x,x,y,y] \)

In definitions (16.3)– (16.5), we completed the definition of alphabetic variant. The following examples of alphabetically-variant formulas and terms may also prove useful:

• \( \varphi = \forall F Fa \equiv \forall G Gb \)
  \( \varphi' = \forall F Fa \equiv \forall F Fb \)
• \( \varphi = \forall x Rx x \rightarrow \exists y S y z \)
  \( \varphi' = \forall y Ry y \rightarrow \exists x S x z \)
• \( \tau = iz(Fz \rightarrow Gy) \)
  \( \tau' = ix(Fx \rightarrow Gy) \)
• \( \tau = [\lambda y \forall x Gx \rightarrow (Gz \& Gy)] \)
  \( \tau' = [\lambda x \forall y Gy \rightarrow (Gz \& Gx)] \)

There are a number of final observations to make about the definition of alphabetic variant. First, note that even though all the free occurrences of a variable \( a \) in \( \varphi \) (or \( \tau \)) are linked, they are preserved as is (i.e., without change and in the same position) in any alphabetic variant \( \varphi' \) (or \( \tau' \)) since the free occurrences are not listed in BV-notation.
Second, note that our definitions imply that: 

If $\tau$ is a term occurring in $\varphi$ and $\tau'$ is an alphabetic variant of $\tau$, then if $\varphi'$ is the result of replacing one or more occurrences of $\tau$ in $\varphi$ by $\tau'$, then $\varphi'$ is an alphabetic variant of $\varphi$.

If $\varphi$ is a formula occurring in $\tau$ and $\varphi'$ is an alphabetic variant of $\varphi$, then if $\tau'$ is the result of replacing one or more occurrences of $\varphi$ in $\tau$ by $\varphi'$, then $\tau'$ is an alphabetic variant of $\tau$.

Here are some example pairs of the preceding facts (the first two pairs are examples of the first fact and the second two pairs are examples of the second fact):

- Where $\varphi_1 = \forall F (FxPx \equiv Fb)$, $\tau_1 = ixPx$, and $\tau_1' = iyPy$, then $\forall F (iyPy \equiv Fb)$ is an alphabetic variant of $\varphi_1$.
- Where $\varphi_2 = \forall x ([\lambda y \neg Fy]x \equiv \negFx)$, $\tau_2 = [\lambda y \neg Fy]$, and $\tau_2' = [\lambda z \neg Fz]$, then $\forall x ([\lambda y \neg Fy]x \equiv \negFx)$ is an alphabetic variant of $\varphi_2$.
- Where $\tau_3 = [\lambda y \forall x Gx \rightarrow Gy]$, $\varphi_3 = \forall x Gx$, and $\varphi_3' = \forall z Gz$, then $[\lambda y \forall z Gz \rightarrow Gy]$ is an alphabetic variant of $\tau_3$.
- Where $\tau_4 = iy\forall F(Fy \equiv Fa)$, $\varphi_4 = \forall F(Fy \equiv Fa)$, and $\varphi_4' = \forall G(Gr \equiv Ga)$, then $iy\forall G(Gr \equiv Ga)$ is an alphabetic variant of $\tau_4$.

In the first case, $iyPy$ is an alphabetic variant of $ixPx$, and replacing the latter by the former in $\varphi_1$ yields $\varphi_1'$. In this case, $\varphi_1$ in BV-notation is $\varphi[F,F,x,x,F]$ and $\varphi_1'$ in BV-notation is $\varphi_1'[F,F,y,y,F]$. So (a) $\varphi_1' = \varphi_1[F,F,F/F,y/x,y/x,F/F]$, and (b) any two variables in the list of bound variables for $\varphi_1$ are linked in $\varphi_1'$ if and only the corresponding variables in the list of bound variables for $\varphi_1'$ are linked in $\varphi_1$. We leave the explanation of the remaining cases as exercises for the reader.

Third, note that our definitions give rise to the following fact:

**Metatheorem (7.6)**

Alphabetic variance is an equivalence condition on the complex formulas of our language, i.e., alphabetic variance is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive.

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94The first of the following two facts holds because all the bound variable occurrences in $\tau[\alpha_1,\ldots,\alpha_n]$ will appear in $\varphi[\gamma_1,\ldots,\gamma_m]$ and the replacements for the $\gamma_i$s needed to replace $\tau$ with $\tau'[\beta_1,\ldots,\beta_n]$ can not break any linkage groups. The only variable occurrences in $\tau$ that could become linked to non-$\tau$ variable occurrences in $\varphi$ are the free variables of $\tau$ and those cannot be changed in $\tau'$ as noted above. The same reasoning explains why the second of the following two facts holds.
A proof can be found in the Appendix to this chapter.

A final observation concerns an important metatheorem that can be approached by way of an example. Let $\varphi$ be a formula of the form $\neg\psi$. Then any alphabetic variant of $\varphi$ we pick will be a formula of the form $\neg(\psi')$, for some alphabetic variant $\psi'$ of $\psi$. For example, if $\varphi$ is $\neg\forallxFx$, so that $\psi$ is $\forallxFx$. Then pick any alphabetic variant of $\varphi$, say, $\neg\forallyFy$. In this case, the formula $\forallyFy$ is the witness $\psi'$ such that $\varphi'$ is $\neg(\psi')$. This generalizes to formulas of arbitrary complexity, so that we have:

**Metatheorem (7.7):** Alphabetic Variants of Complex Formulas and Terms.

(a) If $\varphi$ is a formula of the form $[\lambda \psi] (\neg\psi, \exists\psi, \text{or} \Box\psi)$, then each alphabetic variant $\varphi'$ is a formula of the form $[\lambda \psi'] (\neg(\psi'), \exists(\psi')$ or $\Box(\psi')$, respectively), for some alphabetic variant $\psi'$ of $\psi$.

(b) If $\varphi$ is a formula of the form $\psi \rightarrow \chi$, then each alphabetic variant $\varphi'$ is a formula of the form $\varphi' \rightarrow \psi'$, for some alphabetic variants $\varphi'$ and $\psi'$, respectively, of $\varphi$ and $\psi$.

(c) If $\varphi$ is a formula of the form $\forall\alpha\psi$, then each alphabetic variant $\varphi'$ is a formula of the form $\forall\beta(\psi'_{\beta\alpha})$, for some alphabetic variant $\psi'$ of $\psi$ and some variable $\beta$ substitutable for $\alpha$ in $\psi'$ and not free in $\psi'$.\(^{95}\)

(d) If $\tau$ is a term of the form $\mu\nu\varphi$, then each alphabetic variant $\tau'$ is a term of the form $\mu\nu(\varphi'_{\nu\mu})$, for some alphabetic variant $\varphi'$ of $\varphi$ and individual variable $\mu$ substitutable for $\nu$ in $\varphi'$ and not free in $\varphi'$.

(e) If $\tau$ is a term of the form $[\lambda \nu_1 ... \nu_n \varphi] (n \geq 1)$, then each alphabetic variant $\tau'$ is a term of the form $[\lambda \mu_1 ... \mu_n (\varphi'_{\mu_1...\mu_n})]$, for some alphabetic variant $\varphi'$ of $\varphi$ and individual variables $\mu_i$ $(1 \leq i \leq n)$ substitutable, respectively, for the $\nu_i$ in $\varphi'$ and not free in $\varphi'$.\(^{96}\)

In the Appendix, the proof of this metatheorem is left as an exercise.

(27) **Remark:** Why Free Variables in Definitions Should Be, or Function As, Metavariables. In our system, we cannot use object-language variables to formulate definitions if those object-language variables are given their normal interpretation and the definition is understood classically. To see the problem with respect to free variables, let’s first consider a definition-by-$\equiv$. Suppose one wanted to define the condition, object $x$ *contingently exemplifies* property $F$, by stipulating that it holds just in case $x$ exemplifies $F$ but doesn’t necessarily exemplify $F$. One might expect to see this definition formalized using object language variables as follows:

(A) $\text{ContingentlyExemplifies}(x,F) \equiv_{df} Fx \& \neg\Box Fx$

\(^{95}\)Note that this allows for the case where $\beta$ is $\alpha$ or the case where $\psi'$ is $\psi$.

\(^{96}\)Note that this allows for the case where $\mu_1,...,\mu_n$ are, respectively, $\nu_1,...,\nu_n$.\(^{96}\)
In the present context, however, definitions like the above are problematic and have to be replaced by a definition schema. The traditional understanding of definitions like (A) fails for systems such as ours, in which individual and relation terms may fail to denote.

On the traditional understanding, a definition such as (A) becomes available to the deductive system as a biconditional axiom, i.e., as an axiom where \( \equiv \) replaces \( \equiv_{df} \) in (A). That is its traditional inferential role. This understanding of definitions suffices in simple systems of classical logic, in which every term of the language has a denotation and even the free variables that may occur in an asserted formula have some (arbitrarily assigned) value. The classical logic of quantification permits the instantiation of any individual or relation term \( \tau \) of such a language into a universally quantified claim of the form \( \forall \alpha \phi \).

So in such systems, (A) not only extends the language with new formulas of the form \( \text{ContingentlyExemplifies}(\kappa, \Pi) \) (where \( \kappa \) is any individual term and \( \Pi \) any 1-place relation term), but also extends the deductive system with new axioms, including both of the following:

(B) \( \text{ContingentlyExemplifies}(x, F) \equiv (Fx \& \neg \Box Fx) \)

(C) \( \forall x \forall F(\text{ContingentlyExemplifies}(x, F) \equiv (Fx \& \neg \Box Fx)) \)

In classical systems, every object term \( \kappa \) and every property term \( \Pi \) can be instantiated, respectively, for \( \forall x \) and \( \forall F \) in (C) to yield biconditional theorems stating the necessary and sufficient conditions for \( \text{ContingentlyExemplifies}(\kappa, \Pi) \).

However, our system includes both complex individual terms (definite descriptions) and complex \( n \)-place (\( n \geq 1 \)) relation terms (\( \lambda \)-expressions) that may fail to have a denotation. The free logic that governs such complex terms ensures that a term \( \tau \) can’t be instantiated into a universal claim unless it is (provably) significant. Now consider a description like \( \iz \left( Pz \& \neg Pz \right) \), which will provably fail to have a denotation. Let’s abbreviate \( \iz \left( Pz \& \neg Pz \right) \) as \( \iz \psi \).

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97 In some systems (not ours, though), where both (a) formulas with free variables are assertible and (b) the Rule of Generalization (GEN) is primitive, (A) implicitly adds only (B) as an axiom, since (C) follows from (B) by GEN. In other systems (again, not ours), where formulas with free variables are not assertible, the definition implicitly adds only (C) as an axiom. As we shall see, though, in our system, where (a) formulas with free variables are assertible but (b) the Rule of Generalization (GEN) is a metarule, the definition implicitly adds both (B) and (C) as axioms, since all of the closures of (B), including universal closures, are taken as axioms. We’ll make this explicit in Chapters 8 and 9.

98 We don’t include 0-place relation terms (and thus formulas) in this list, since it will be a theorem that all such terms have a denotation; see theorem (105.1).

99 In our system, the notion of a term’s having a denotation is represented in the object language by the logico-metaphysical notion of existence, which is defined in (20) and symbolized by \( \downarrow \). So the proof that \( \iz \left( Pz \& \neg Pz \right) \) fails to have a denotation, i.e., the proof that \( \neg \iz \left( Pz \& \neg Pz \right) \), goes by way of reductio. For suppose \( \iz \left( Pz \& \neg Pz \right) \). Then by definition (20.1), there is some property, say \( Q \), such that \( Q \iz \left( Pz \& \neg Pz \right) \). This implies, by the laws of definite descriptions, that \( \exists \iz \left( Pz \& \neg Pz \right) \), which
7.3. EXPLANATORY REMARKS: DIGRESSION

If definition (A) implicitly introduces the axiom (C), then although the classical logic of constants would allow us to instantiate the relation constant $P$ for the universal quantifier $VF$ in (C), the free logic of non-denoting terms would not allow us to instantiate the description $iz\psi$ for the universal quantifier $\forall x$ in (C). Thus, we wouldn’t be able to derive from (C):

(D) $ContingentlyExemplifies(iz\psi, P) \equiv (Piz\psi & \neg \Box Piz\psi)$

So given the classical understanding of definitions on which (A) implicitly introduces (B) and (C) as axioms, free logic prevents us from deriving (D). Thus, the notion $ContingentlyExemplifies$ isn’t really defined when $iz\psi$ fails to denote; no biconditional theorem states the necessary and sufficient conditions under which $ContingentlyExemplifies(iz\psi, \Pi)$, for any term $\Pi$.

Similarly, let $\Pi$ be a property term that provably fails to denote, such as one of the predicates that leads to the Clark/Boolos paradox. For simplicity, let $[\lambda x \varphi]$ be an arbitrary such property term. Then, analogously, if (A) implicitly introduces the axiom (C), then although the classical logic of constants would allow us to instantiate the individual constant $a$ for the quantifier $\forall x$ in (C), the free logic of non-denoting terms would not allow us to instantiate the $\lambda$-expression $[\lambda x \varphi]$ for the quantifier $VF$ in (C). Thus, we wouldn’t be able to obtain the following as a theorem:

(E) $ContingentlyExemplifies(a, [\lambda x \varphi]) \equiv ([\lambda x \varphi]a & \neg \Box [\lambda x \varphi]a)$

And, clearly, if both $iz\psi$ and $[\lambda x \varphi]$ fail to have a denotation, we wouldn’t be able to obtain the following as a theorem:

(F) $ContingentlyExemplifies(iz\psi, [\lambda x \varphi]) \equiv ([\lambda x \varphi]iz\psi & \neg \Box [\lambda x \varphi]iz\psi)$

So the fact that (D), (E), and (F) aren’t theorems means that definition (A) isn’t sufficient to guarantee that following formulas have the truth conditions specified by the definition:

$ContingentlyExemplifies(iz\psi, P)$

$ContingentlyExemplifies(a, [\lambda x \varphi])$

$ContingentlyExemplifies(iz\psi, [\lambda x \varphi])$

We can avoid this problem by using metavariables and formulating a definition schema. Let $\kappa$ be a metavariable ranging over individual terms and $\Pi$ be a metavariable ranging over 1-place relation terms. Then (G) avoids the problems just noted (A): yields a contradiction for any witness to the existence claim. But in our system, $Qiz(Pz & \neg Pz)$ immediately implies $iz(Pz & \neg Pz) \downarrow$, by axiom (39.5.a), thus directly contradicting our reductio assumption.
(G) \textit{ContingentlyExemplifies}(κ, Π) \equiv df Πκ \& \neg □Πκ

A definition schema such as (G) implicitly extends our language with the new syncategorematic expression \textit{ContingentlyExemplifies} and new formulas of the form \textit{ContingentlyExemplifies}(κ, Π). But, just as importantly, (G) will implicitly introduce (the closures of) the instances of the following schema as new axioms:

\textit{ContingentlyExemplifies}(κ, Π) \equiv (Πκ \& \neg □Πκ)

Given such an understanding of definition schemata, (G) yields (D), (E), and (F) as theorems, since these are all instances of the above biconditional. Consequently, the use of metavariables in (G) is required and (A), strictly speaking, doesn’t suffice as a definition. However, since (G) is more complex and more difficult to read than (A), we have formulated Convention (17.2.a), which specifically allows the free variables in (A) to function as metavariables, so that (D), (E), and (F) become instances of the definition.

Now let’s consider definitions-by-=. Though object-language variables that may occur free in a definition-by- should also function as metavariables, it is not for the reason just outlined. To see why, let’s consider a somewhat concocted example that has some interesting probative features. Consider theorem (175.1), i.e., \textit{ix}(x = y)↓, which asserts, for an arbitrary object y: the x such that x is identical to y exists. Let’s use \textit{ix}(x = y) as the definiens for \textit{ι}y in the following definition-by-:

(δ) \textit{ι}y = df \textit{ix}(x = y)

For example, \textit{ι}a (‘the a’) is thus defined as the individual x identical to a. (δ) is a fine definition given that the definiens has a denotation for each value assigned to the free variable y. No matter what is assigned to y, \textit{ι}y denotes the individual that is identical to y, i.e., denotes y.

Traditionally, (δ) would be understood as extending our language with a host of new complex terms. Though (δ) uses the free object-language variable y, it is standard to assume that (δ) would extend our language with terms of the form \textit{ι}κ, where κ is any term. So all of the following would be well-formed: \textit{ι}y, \textit{ι}z, \textit{ι}x, \textit{ι}y, etc.

Also traditionally, (δ) would be understood as implicitly introducing the closures of the axiom:

(ξ) \textit{ι}y = \textit{ix}(x = y)

In a classical logic, in which all terms have denotations, (ξ) yields an identity axiom for every term other than x, only terms other than x are substitutable for y in the matrix of the universal closure \forall y(\textit{ι}y = \textit{ix}(x = y))
7.3. EXPLANATORY REMARKS: DIGRESSION

At first glance, this understanding of the inferential role of definitions-by-\(=\) would appear to be desirable, for in our system, we have individual terms that fail to denote; our free logic does not permit us to instantiate empty terms into \(\forall y(t_y = ix(x = y))\), for that would yield identities in which the terms flanking the identity sign fail to have a denotation. So we don’t want to interpret \((\vartheta)\) as introducing, for any individual term \(\kappa\), the axiom schema:

\[ t_\kappa = ix(x = \kappa) \]

If \(iz\psi\) is a description that provably fails to have a denotation, the above would yield the following as an axiom:

\[ (\zeta) \quad t_{iz\psi} = ix(x = iz\psi) \]

In \((\zeta)\), both terms flanking the identity sign fail to have a denotation, and such a claim can’t be axiomatic.\(^{100}\) Identity statements can’t be true when the terms flanking them are empty unless heroic measures are taken, something we’ll forego here. So, in a free logic, the classical interpretation of \((\vartheta)\) as introducing \((\xi)\) blocks the introduction of identities like \((\zeta)\) with non-denoting descriptions.

Thus, one might conclude at this point that we should interpret \((\vartheta)\) as introducing \((\xi)\) and that we need not interpret the object-language variables in \((\vartheta)\) as metavariables. But this would be a mistake, for the classical interpretation doesn’t yield a mechanism for proving that \(t_{iz\psi}\) fails to have a denotation when \(iz\psi\) fails to have a denotation! Though we saw in footnote 100 that \(\neg ix(x = iz\psi)\) \(\downarrow\) is a consequence of \(\neg iz\psi\) \(\downarrow\), \((\vartheta)\) doesn’t allow us to derive \(\neg t_{iz\psi}\) \(\downarrow\) from \(\neg ix(x = iz\psi)\) \(\downarrow\). Intuitively, if the definiens \(ix(x = iz\psi)\), fails to be significant, then we should be able to derive that the definiendum \(t_{iz\psi}\) fails to be significant. So the problem is that \((\vartheta)\), under the standard interpretation of its object-language variables, doesn’t give us a means to conclude \(\neg t_{iz\psi}\) \(\downarrow\) when \(\neg ix(x = iz\psi)\) \(\downarrow\). The term \(t_{iz\psi}\) is well-formed and we know the claim \(t_{iz\psi}\) \(\downarrow\) to be false when \(ix(x = iz\psi)\) is empty, but we have no means of proving it.

\(^{100}\) Indeed, in our system, \((\zeta)\) would be provably false when \(iz\psi\) fails to have a denotation, though to see this we have to cite definitions, axioms, and theorems not yet introduced. Assume \(\neg(iz\psi)\). Then choose a variable, say \(x\), that isn’t free in \(iz\psi\). It follows by theorem (108.2) that \(\neg(x = iz\psi)\). Since \(x\) isn’t free in our assumption, it follows by GEN that this holds for any object \(x\), i.e., that \(\forall x \neg(x = iz\psi)\), i.e., \(\neg \exists x (x = iz\psi)\).

From this last conclusion, we may infer, by the laws of definite descriptions and the definition of \(\downarrow\) that \(\neg ix(x = iz\psi)\) \(\downarrow\), as follows:

Assume, for reductio, that \(ix(x = iz\psi)\) \(\downarrow\). Then by definition of \(\downarrow\) (20.1), it follows that for some property, say \(P\), that \(Ptx(x = iz\psi)\). But, then, by Russell’s analysis of descriptions (143), it follows a fortiori that that \(\exists x (x = iz\psi)\), which contradicts what we proved above.

From \(\neg ix(x = iz\psi)\) \(\downarrow\), we can again conclude, by theorem (108.2), that \(\neg(t_{iz\psi} = iz(z = iz\psi))\). Thus, we have a proof of the negation of \((\zeta)\), when \(iz\psi\) fails to be significant.
Our solution will be to let the object-language variables in definitions-by-\(\equiv\) function as metavariables but revise our understanding of the inferential role of these definitions. We’ll allow any terms to be substituted for the free object-language variables so that we have instances of the definition for every individual term of the language. But the inferential role of the definition, as formulated in (74), will be that it becomes a metarule stipulating that (the closures of) a certain conjunction of conditionals is (are) axiomatic. For the particular instance of (\(\theta\)) we’re now considering, namely, \(\text{ix}(x = \text{iz} \psi)\), the metarule will stipulate that the following is a necessary axiom schema: if \(\text{ix}(x = \text{iz} \psi)\) is significant, then \(\text{ix}(x = \text{iz} \psi)\), and if \(\text{ix}(x = \text{iz} \psi)\) fails to be significant, then \(\text{ix}\) fails to be significant.\(^{101}\)

We’ll discuss the inferential role of definitions-by-\(\equiv\) in more detail in (74), (120), (121), and especially in Remark (278). In that discussion, we’ll see that the object-language variables that occur free in such definitions still function as metavariables. So Convention (17.2.a) will apply even to definitions-by-\(\equiv\).

(28) Remark: Why Bound Variables in Definientia Should Be, or Function As, Metavariables. Consider definitions-by-\(\equiv\) first. Suppose one wanted to define:

\[x\text{ and } y\text{ are indiscernible just in case } x\text{ and } y\text{ exemplify the same properties.}\]

We might introduce this definition formally as:

\[(\vartheta) \quad \text{Indiscernible}(x,y) \equiv \forall F (Fx \equiv Fy)\]

However, the following would be a perfectly good instance of the definition:

\[\text{Indiscernible}(x,y) \equiv \forall G (Gx \equiv Gy)\]

Though we shall eventually be able to prove that the alphabetically-variant formulas \(\forall F (Fx \equiv Fy)\) and \(\forall G (Gx \equiv Gy)\) are equivalent, this theorem doesn’t become provable until (115). Moreover, we may not produce an instance of (\(\vartheta\)) by substituting \(\text{iz} F z\) for \(x\), since \(\text{iz} F z\) isn’t substitutable for \(x\) in the definiens. So, if we want \(\text{Indiscernible}(\text{iz} F z,y)\) to be defined, then something like the following has to be an instance of the definition:

\[\text{Indiscernible}(\text{iz} F z,y) \equiv \forall G (G\text{iz} F z \equiv Gy)\]

So, if we put aside the free variables (which we already know function as metavariables), it is important to interpret (\(\vartheta\)) as follows, where \(\Omega\) is a metavariable ranging over 1-place relation variables:

\(^{101}\)It is important to note that our example has been over-simplified, since in this instance, the definiens \(\text{ix}(x = \text{iz} \psi)\) is significant if and only if its argument \(\text{iz} \psi\) is. But this is an artifact of the particular example. We’ll see cases later where (i) the definiens doesn’t have a denotation even though all of its argument terms do, and (ii) the definiens has a denotation even though one or more of its argument terms do not. See the examples discussed in Remark (278). For now, however, the example we’ve used suffices for the purpose of giving an overview explanation of the inferential role of definitions-by-\(\equiv\).
Indiscernible}(x, y) \equiv \forall \Omega (\Omega x \equiv \Omega y)

But, clearly, this latter is more difficult to read and grasp, and so the Convention we formulate in (17.2.b) will allow us to suppose that the variables in the definiens of \((\delta)\) function as metavariables.

To see an example that shows why bound variables in the definiens of definitions-by-\(=\) should function as metavariables, we invoke an instance of a theorem schema proved much later (247), namely, that there is a unique abstract object that encodes all and only non-self-identical properties. Using the uniqueness quantifier \((\exists! x)\) defined in item (128.1), this theorem is formally represented as:

\[ \exists! x (A!x & \forall F (xF \equiv F \neq F)) \]

Consequently, it will be a theorem (249) that the abstract object that encodes exactly the non-self-identical properties exists, i.e.,

\[ \downarrow \]

So we may introduce the individual constant \(a_\emptyset\) as follows:

\[ a_\emptyset = \downarrow \] \(\exists! x (A!x & \forall F (xF \equiv F \neq F))\)

However, the following would also be a perfectly good instance of the definition:

\[ a_\emptyset = \downarrow \] \(\forall y (A!y & \forall G (yG \equiv G \neq G))\)

Though we will eventually prove that the alphabetic variants of a description that has a denotation all denote the same individual, this theorem doesn’t become provable until (154). So, until then, it important to ensure that the above definitions are interpreted as the following, where no special provisos are needed:

\[ a_\emptyset = \downarrow \] \(\forall \nu (A!\nu & \forall \Omega (\nu \Omega \equiv \Omega \neq \Omega))\)

Clearly, the definitions of \(a_\emptyset\) with bound object-language variables in the definiens are easier to read and grasp than the one involving metavariables, and so when developing definitions of this kind, we’ll use object-language variables under Convention (17.2).

\[ ^{102} \text{Though we won’t actually use this definition in our work, a definition such as this will be discussed in Remark (264). The new symbol } a_\emptyset \text{ is a complex individual term with no free variables and should be considered as a single unit, though we sometimes use the boldface lowercase symbol } a \text{ with a different decoration to introduce other new individual constants.} \]

\[ ^{103} \text{The instances of } \nu \text{ and } \Omega \text{ are variables and so } \nu \text{ can’t occur free in } \Omega \text{ and } \Omega \text{ can’t occur free in } \nu. \text{ So although, in the definiens, } \mu \text{ occurs under the scope of } \forall \Omega \text{ and } \Omega \text{ falls under the scope of } \forall \nu, \text{ no provisos are needed; no variable can get captured when we uniformly replace } \nu \text{ by an individual variable and uniformly replace } \Omega \text{ by a 1-place relation variable.} \]
The foregoing therefore explains (a) why the bound variables in the definienda of both definitions-by-≡ and definitions-by-= should be metavariables, and (b) why we have developed our Convention (17.2.b), which allows bound object-language variables to function as metavariables whenever that makes the definition easier to read and grasp.

(29) Remark: Why We Could Have Used Object-Language Variables in Definition (18). Though the reasons why it is actually clearer to use metavariables were given in (18), note that we could have invoked Convention (17.2.a) so as to formulate the definitions in (18) with object-language variables as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
(1) \ p & \& q \equiv df \ \neg (p \to \neg q) \\
(2) \ p \lor q \equiv df \ \neg p \to q \\
(3) \ p \equiv q \equiv df (p \to q) \& (q \to p) \\
(4) \ (a) \ \exists x p \equiv df \ \neg \forall x \neg p \\
\quad \quad (b) \ \exists F^n p \equiv df \ \neg \forall F^n \neg p \\
(5) \ \Diamond p \equiv df \ \neg \Box \neg p
\end{align*}
\]

By Convention (17.2.a), instances of these definitions are obtained by uniformly substituting 0-place terms for \(p\) and \(q\). Since our BNF (4) stipulates that formulas are 0-place relation terms, we obtain instances of the above when any formulas are uniformly substituted for \(p\) and \(q\). That's precisely the effect that the Greek metavariables \(\phi\) and \(\psi\) have in definition schemata (18.1) – (18.5). Moreover, by Convention (17.2.b), instances of (.4.a) and (.4.b) above can be obtained by replacing the definiens with any alphabetic variant. That's precisely the effect of interpreting \(x\) in (.4.a) and \(F^n\) in (.4.b), respectively, as the metavariables \(\nu\) and \(\Pi^n\). So, combining all these conventions, (.4.a) and (.4.b) would be interpreted as:

\[
\begin{align*}
\exists \nu \phi \equiv df \ \neg \forall \nu \neg \phi \\
\exists \Pi^n \phi \equiv df \ \neg \forall \Pi^n \neg \phi
\end{align*}
\]

But this reveals another reason why it is clearer to use metavariables as we did in (18): since \(\alpha\) is a metavariable that ranges over both individual variables and \(n\)-place relation variables \((n \geq 0)\), these last two definitions can be captured by the single definition schema, namely, (18.4). This single definition schema has, as instances, all of the instances of the above two definition schemata.

(30) Remark: Concerning the Definition of Existence. When we assert, using the logical sense of ‘existence’, that ‘Obama exists’, ‘The present king of France exists’, or ‘the property being possibly concrete exists’, we semantically imply
that the terms ‘Obama’, ‘the present king of France’, or ‘being possibly concrete’ denote or signify something. So the claim \( \tau \text{ exists} \), for any term \( \tau \), has ontological significance when true. Such claims may be false in languages containing either individual terms or relation terms that fail to denote. (For those who are reading this remark without having read footnote 90, the Quinean corner quotes serve to make it clear that the claim \( \tau \text{ exists} \) is not a metalinguistic assertion about \( \tau \), but an object-theoretic assertion that uses the term of our language which serves as the value of \( \tau \).)

In a classical, second-order language without identity but with non-denoting terms, one can’t use the exemplification mode of predication to define logical existence generally for both individuals and relations. Exemplification serves well enough to define existence for individuals, but not well enough to define existence for relations. Here is why.

In a classical, second-order language, one may define: individual \( \kappa \text{ exists} \) just in case \( \kappa \) exemplifies some property. Such a definition might be offered on the basis of the following claims, which both seem true:

- \( \text{Obama exists} \) if and only if Obama exemplifies some property.
- \( \text{The present king of France exists} \) if and only if the present king of France exemplifies some property.

These last two claims might be represented formally as follows:

\[
\text{o}\downarrow \equiv \exists F o \\
\text{ixKx}\downarrow \equiv \exists F \text{ixKx}
\]

To see that these serve well for defining the existence of individuals, consider the second example. If for some property, say \( P \), the exemplification formula \( P\text{ixKx} \) is true, then the term ‘\( \text{ixKx} \)’ denotes something. That’s because a classical, second-order language is intuitively grounded on the principle that:

An exemplification formula of the form \( \Pi^n \kappa_1 \ldots \kappa_n \) \((n \geq 1)\) is true if and only if the terms \( \Pi^n, \kappa_1, \ldots, \kappa_n \) all have a denotation and the individuals denoted by the terms \( \kappa_1, \ldots, \kappa_n \) exemplify the relation denoted by the term \( \Pi^n \).

So if we invoke Convention (17.2), the following would serve well as a definition of logical existence for individuals:

\[
\text{x}\downarrow \equiv_{df} \exists F x
\]

Any biconditional licensed by this definition is true. For consider any instance of the definition for a individual term \( x \) that is substitutable for \( x \). If \( x \) has a denotation, then \( x\downarrow \) is intuitively true while \( \exists F x \) is semantically true: in any
model of classical second-order logic, there have to be at least two properties (one true of everything in the model and one true of nothing in the model) and so if \( \kappa \) has a denotation, the individual it denotes exemplifies a property. If \( \kappa \) fails to denote an individual, then \( \kappa \downarrow \) is intuitively false and \( \exists \varphi \varphi \kappa \) becomes false semantically: no formula of the form \( \Pi \kappa \) is true and so the claim that \( \kappa \) exemplifies a property is false. So the biconditional licensed by the above definition is true no matter whether the term replacing \( x \) has a denotation or fails to have one.

However, if exemplification is the only mode of predication in the system, as it is in classical second-order logic, then one can’t similarly say that a property \( \exists \) if and only if some individual exemplifies it. This might be represented as the following definition:

\[
F \downarrow \equiv \exists x Fx
\]

The problem here is that \( F \) might be a property that provably isn’t exemplified, such as being concrete and failing to be concrete, i.e., \( [\lambda x E!x \& \neg E!x] \). In a theory on which \( [\lambda x E!x \& \neg E!x] \) denotes a property, any biconditional licensed by the above definition, such as:

\[
[\lambda x E!x \& \neg E!x] \downarrow \equiv \exists y ([\lambda x E!x \& \neg E!x]y)
\]

would be false. The left side would be true (since the \( \lambda \)-expression denotes a property), while the right side would be false (since nothing exemplifies the property in question, on pain of contradiction). This conclusion, of course, assumes that \( [\lambda x E!x \& \neg E!x] \) obeys the principle \( \forall y ([\lambda x E!x \& \neg E!x]y \equiv E!y \& \neg E!y) \).

These observations may explain why some free logicians working within a classical exemplification logic introduce a primitive notion of identity and define existence in terms of identity. Given a primitive notion of identity, the formula \( \exists \beta (\beta = \tau) \), where \( \beta \) is any variable and \( \tau \) is any term of the same type as \( \beta \) in which \( \beta \) doesn’t occur free, says that there exists something identical to \( \tau \), i.e., there exists such a thing as \( \tau \). Consequently, one might find the following definition schema being used to define existence for either individual terms or relation terms:

\[
\tau \downarrow \equiv \exists \beta (\beta = \tau), \text{ provided } \beta \text{ is a variable that doesn’t occur free in } \tau
\]

When \( \tau \) is an individual term, such as \( ixKx \), then the definition licenses the equivalence \( ixKx \downarrow \equiv \exists y (y = ixKx) \). Intuitively, this biconditional is true: if \( ixKx \) has a denotation, then both sides of the biconditional are true, and if \( ixKx \) doesn’t have a denotation, both sides of the biconditional are false. And similarly in the case of property terms, for the above definition also licenses the equivalence \( [\lambda x \varphi] \downarrow \equiv \exists \varphi (F = [\lambda x \varphi]) \). If \( [\lambda x \varphi] \) denotes a property (even one that nothing exemplifies), then both sides of the biconditional are true, and if it doesn’t denote a property, then both sides are false.
Though the above definition of existence in terms of identity will not be adopted in the present system, it does explain why either the claim $\exists \beta (\beta = \tau)$ or the equivalent claim $\tau \downarrow$ would typically be used in the axioms for a free logic of quantification that govern a second-order language (with identity) that includes non-denoting (individual and relation) terms. In such logics, it is important to ensure that the rules of reasoning which are valid only for denoting terms are not applied to non-denoting terms. Using a mixture of material and formal mode, then the three main axioms of such a free logic assert:

- If everything is such that $\varphi$, then if $\tau$ has a denotation, then $\tau$ is such that $\varphi$.
- Primitive constants, variables, and certain $\lambda$-expressions (namely, those in which the initial $\lambda$ doesn’t bind any variable in any encoding formula subterm) have denotations.
- If an atomic formula is true, then the primary terms (7.9) in that formula have denotations.

Of course, when the above axioms are formulated in a second-order language, one uses either $\exists \beta (\beta = \tau)$ or $\tau \downarrow$ in place of the metalinguistic claim that $\tau$ has a denotation.

In fact, versions of the above axioms are preserved in the present theory and are asserted in the next chapter as axioms (39.1), (39.2), and (39.5.a) and (39.5.b). However, the key point here is that in systems with only one mode of predication, identity ($=$) is taken as a primitive, existence ($\downarrow$) is defined in terms of identity, and then either the claim $\tau \downarrow$ or the claim $\exists \beta (\beta = \tau)$ is used to state the axioms of the free logic of second-order quantification.\(^{104}\)

By contrast, the present system has greater expressive and analytical power than the standard second-order predicate calculus. Our system is grounded on the additional principle:

An encoding formula of the form $\kappa_1 \ldots \kappa_n \Pi^p$ ($n \geq 1$) is true if and only if the terms $\kappa_1, \ldots, \kappa_n$, and $\Pi^p$ all have a denotation and the individuals denoted by the terms $\kappa_1, \ldots, \kappa_n$ encode the relation denoted by the term $\Pi^p$.

With two modes of predication, one can define existence (i.e., define $\tau \downarrow$) in terms of predication, as long as one uses the appropriate form of predication for the various cases. The keys to these definitions are the following intuitions, where $\kappa$ is any individual term and $\Pi$ any 1-place relation term: (a) $\check{\tau \kappa \text{ exists}}$ is true if and only if $\kappa$ exemplifies some property, and (b) $\check{\Pi \text{ exists}}$ is true if

---

\(^{104}\)I’m discounting the suggestion that one define identity for properties as either $F = G \equiv \forall x (Fx \equiv Gx)$ or $F = G \equiv \Diamond \forall x (Fx \equiv Gx)$, since such definitions collapse materially equivalent or necessarily equivalent properties.
and only if some individual encodes \( \Pi \). Definition (b) can then be generalized for \( n \)-place relations of any arity. These definitions will be formally presented in (20.1) – (20.3), respectively. In Remark (33), we describe why (b) is justified and constitutes a good definition of property existence.

In light of these developments, we won’t need identity as a primitive in order to define existence. Indeed, formulas of the form \( \tau = \sigma \) can be defined and, in the case of \( n \)-place relations \( (n \geq 0) \), will be defined in terms of existence. Then, once our deductive system is in place, we shall prove as a theorem (122.1) that the claim \( \tau \downarrow \equiv \exists \beta (\beta = \tau) \) governs the defined notions \( \tau \downarrow \) and \( \tau = \sigma \). So, the axioms of our free logic of quantification will use the claim \( \tau \downarrow \), as defined in our language, to capture the formal mode claim that \( \tau \) has a denotation. The above axioms therefore have greater significance than their counterparts in languages where \( \downarrow \) or \( = \) is primitive. The definitions in (20) and in (23.1) – (23.4) reveal that the two notions of predication that serve as the basis of object theory are more fundamental than the notions of existence and identity, and may thereby offer insightful definitions of both notions.

\[ (31) \text{Remark: Explanation of the Substitutability Requirement in Convention (17.2.a).} \] To illustrate the substitutability requirement in Convention (17.2.a), consider the definition of \( x \downarrow \) in (20.1), i.e.,

\[ x \downarrow \equiv_{df} \exists F Fx \]  

(20.1)

By Convention (17.2.a), we can uniformly replace \( x \) by any individual term \( \kappa \) to obtain an instance of this definition, \emph{provided \( \kappa \) is substitutable for \( x \) in} \( \exists F Fx \).

\[ 105 \text{Cf. Feferman 1995 (299), which includes primitive atomic formulas of the form} s = t, t \downarrow, \text{and} R(t_1, \ldots, t_n). \text{Compare also his} \text{‘Definedness’ axioms on p. 301.} \]
So the Convention says that the following are instances of the definition, since y and \( izGz \) are substitutable for \( x \) in the definiens:

\[
\begin{align*}
(x \downarrow)_x & \equiv_{df} (\exists FFx)_x, \text{ i.e.,} \\
y \downarrow & \equiv_{df} \exists FFy \\
(x \downarrow)_x^{izGz} & \equiv_{df} (\exists FFx)_x^{izGz}, \text{ i.e.,} \\
izGz \downarrow & \equiv_{df} \exists FizGz
\end{align*}
\]

However, the substitutability requirement rules out the following as an instance of (20.1):

\[
(\omega) \quad (x \downarrow)_x^{izFz} \equiv_{df} (\exists FFx)_x^{izFz}, \text{ i.e.,} \\
izFz \downarrow & \equiv_{df} \exists FizFz
\]

This is ruled out because \( izFz \) is not substitutable for \( x \) in the definiens of (20.1), as required by Convention (17.2.a).

In other words, we’re understanding (20.1) as the following schema, in which the individual variable \( x \) is replaced by the metavariable \( \kappa \):

\[
(\delta) \quad \kappa \downarrow \equiv_{df} \exists FF\kappa, \text{ provided } F \text{ doesn’t occur free in } \kappa.
\]

The proviso on (\( \delta \)) has to be added so that only terms substitutable for \( x \) in the definiens of (20.1) can be used to obtain instances of the definition. This illustrates footnote 85 to Convention (17.2.a), which tells us:

> each distinct object-language variable \( \alpha \) that occurs free in a definition functions as a distinct Greek metavariable that ranges over terms of the same type as \( \alpha \), with the proviso that if \( \alpha \) falls within the scope of a variable-binding operator \( Op \) in the definiens, then a term may serve as the instance of \( \alpha \) only if it doesn’t contain free occurrences of the variable bound by \( Op \).

If \( x \) in (20.1) is functioning in the same way as \( \kappa \) does in (\( \delta \)), the Convention requires that since \( x \) falls within the scope of the variable-binding operator \( \forall F \) in the definiens, the terms that serve as instances of \( x \) may not contain free occurrences of \( F \). (\( \omega \)) would change the meaning of the definition and increase the burden of proof for the claim \( ixFx \downarrow \). Intuitively, to prove \( izFz \) exists, it suffices to show that \( izFz \) exemplifies some property or other; it need not be \( F \).

If Convention (17.2.a) rules out (\( \omega \)) as an instance of (20.1), then we can’t as yet obtain an instance of the definition for the term \( izFz \). So what is the definition of the expression \( izFz \)? This is the topic of the next Remark, where we discuss Convention (17.2.b).

**Remark:** Discussion of Alphabetically-Variant Definientia. Consider the definition of \( x \downarrow \) in (20.1), i.e.,
\( x \downarrow \equiv_{df} \exists F Fx \quad (20.1) \)

We saw in Remark (28) why the variable \( F \) in (20.1) has to function as a metavariable, so that the following become instances of the definition:

\( x \downarrow \equiv_{df} \exists G Gx \)

\( x \downarrow \equiv_{df} \exists H Hx \)

Moreover, we saw in Remark (31) that we cannot substitute every individual term for \( x \) in (20.1) to produce an instance of the definition. In particular, we saw that we cannot obtain the instance:

\( (\zeta) \ izFz \downarrow \equiv_{df} \exists F izFz \)

But the following would be a viable definition of \( izFz \downarrow \):

\( (\delta) \ izFz \downarrow \equiv_{df} \exists G izFz \)

To see how Convention (17.2) implies that (\( \delta \)) is an instance of (20.1), note that by the (17.2.a), the following is an instance:

\( y \downarrow \equiv_{df} \exists F Fy \)

So by Convention (17.2.b), the following is an instance, since the definiens is an alphabetic-variant of the definiens in the above:

\( y \downarrow \equiv_{df} \exists G Gy \)

But, Convention (17.2.a) tells us that the free occurrence of \( G \) in the above functions as a metavariable, and that the following is therefore also an instance:

\( (y \downarrow) izFz \equiv_{df} (\exists G Gy)^{izFz} \), i.e.,

\( izFz \downarrow \equiv_{df} \exists G izGz \)

By this means, (\( \delta \)) becomes a well-formed instance of (20.1) and we obtain a well-formed definition of \( izFz \downarrow \).

Thus, given the two clauses in Convention (17.2), (20.1) becomes equivalent to the following definition schema, in which \( \Omega \) is a metavariable ranging over 1-place relation variables:

\( (\xi) \ k \downarrow \equiv_{df} \exists \Omega \Omega k, \quad \) provided \( \Omega \) doesn’t occur free in \( k \)

This understanding of definition (20.1) illustrates footnote 86 to Convention (17.2.b), which tells us:
each distinct object-language variable $\alpha$ that occurs bound by a variable-binding operator $\text{Op}$ in the definiens functions as a distinct Greek metavariable ranging over variables of the same type as $\alpha$, with the proviso that an object-language variable may serve as an instance of $\alpha$ only if it does not occur free in any term occurring within the scope of $\text{Op}$.

Since $F$ in (20.1) is functioning as $\Omega$ does in the ($\xi$), we can’t obtain an instance of the definition by replacing $F$ with some a variable that occurs free within a term substituted for $\kappa$, since $\kappa$ falls within the scope of $\exists F$. The reader should now convince him- or herself that every instance of the following is an instance of (20.1), for any individual variable $\nu$:

$$\nu \varphi \downarrow \equiv \exists F \nu \varphi,$$

provided $F$ doesn’t occur free in $\varphi$.

Finally, once it is established that alphabetically-variant formulas $\psi$ and $\psi'$ are equivalent and interderivable, then we shall be able to prove that the definitions $\varphi \equiv \psi$ and $\varphi \equiv \psi'$ are equivalent. But, in the present system, the proof that alphabetically-variant formulas are equivalent and interderivable doesn’t occur until (112.5) and (115), respectively. So, until that time, we must ensure that definitions-by-$\equiv$ have instances in which the definiens are alphabetic variants, so that we can produce instances of the definition for every open term that might be substituted for the free variables, as in the case of (20.1) and ($\vartheta$) above.

Now, to see how an alphabetically-variant definiens is needed for a definition-by-$\equiv$, consider the following definition of property negation:

$$(\omega) \quad F = \text{df} [\lambda x \neg F x]$$

Since $F$ functions as a metavariable ranging over 1-place relation terms, consider the term $[\lambda y Rxy]$. Note that $[\lambda y Rxy]$ is not substitutable for $F$ in the definiens of (\omega). So the following is not an instance of (\omega):

$$[\lambda y Rxy] =_{\text{df}} [\lambda z \neg [\lambda y Rxy] z]$$

Consequently, to produce a definition of $[\lambda y Rxy]$, we note that, by Convention (17.2.b), the following is an instance of (\omega), since its definiens is an alphabetic variant of the definiens in (\omega):

$$F =_{\text{df}} [\lambda z \neg F z]$$

But then, the variable $F$ in the above is also functioning as a metavariable, and so by Convention (17.2.a), the following is an instance:

$$[\lambda y Rxy] =_{\text{df}} [\lambda z \neg [\lambda y Rxy] z]$$
This illustrates how Convention (17.2.b) applies in definitions-by-=. As an exercise, the reader should explain how this example also illustrates footnote 86.

(33) Remark: Justification of the Definition of \( n \)-place Relation Existence For \( n \geq 1 \). It would serve well to explain in some detail why definition (20.2) is justified. Consider first the 1-place case of the definition, i.e., \( F \downarrow \equiv \exists x F \).

To see that this is a good definition, we need only show that if \( \downarrow \) had been an undefined, primitive operator yielding formulas of the form \( \Pi \downarrow \), then it would have been a theorem that \( F \downarrow \equiv \exists x F \).

To see that this would have been a theorem, we’ll again need to appeal to a number of facts not yet in evidence. In Remark (245) we note that our theory implies, without an appeal to the definition of existence, that every property is encoded by some object, i.e., \( \forall H \exists x xH \). This result is a relatively straightforward consequence of the Comprehension Principle for Abstract Objects, which is asserted as an axiom in the next chapter, in item (53).

With this fact, it is easy to see why \( F \downarrow \equiv \exists x xF \) would have been a theorem if \( \downarrow \) had been primitive. For the left-to-right direction, assume \( F \downarrow \). Then by axiom (39.1) of our free quantificational logic for complex terms and the fact that \( F \) doesn’t occur free in \( \forall H \exists x xH \) we can instantiate \( F \) into \( \forall H \exists x xH \) to conclude \( \exists x xF \). For the right-to-left direction, assume \( \exists x xF \). Assume further \( a \) is a witness to this claim, so that we know \( aF \). Then, by axiom (39.5.b) of our free quantificational logic for complex terms, it follows that \( F \downarrow \& a \downarrow \). So by Rule \&E, \( F \downarrow \).

Since it would have been a theorem that \( F \downarrow \equiv \exists x xF \) if \( \downarrow \) had been a primitive notion instead of a defined one, our system would have provided us with an analysis of property existence. Analogous reasoning shows that, for \( n > 1 \), if \( \downarrow \) had been primitive, it would have been a theorem that \( F^n \downarrow \equiv \exists x_1 \ldots \exists x_n (x_1 \ldots x_n F^n) \). In this case, the result is grounded in the provability of \( \forall G^n \exists x_1 \ldots \exists x_n (x_1 \ldots x_n G^n) \) without an appeal to the definition of existence. This is also discussed in item (245).

To anticipate the discussion in Remark (245), let \( H \) be an arbitrary property and note that the Comprehension Principle for Abstract Objects has the following instance:

\[
\exists x (A!x \& VF (xF \equiv \forall z(Fz \equiv Hz)))
\]

So where \( a \) is an arbitrary such object, we know \( \forall F (aF \equiv \forall z(Fz \equiv Hz)) \). Since we know \( H \downarrow \) by axiom (39.2) and \( H \) is substitutable for \( F \) in the matrix \( aF \equiv \forall z(Fz \equiv Hz) \), instantiate to \( H \) so that we can conclude \( aH \equiv \forall z(Hz \equiv Hz) \). But \( \forall z(Hz \equiv Hz) \) is a simple theorem of predicate logic. Hence, it follows that \( aH \), and further follows that \( \exists x xH \). Since \( H \) was arbitrarily chosen, we may conclude \( \forall H \exists x xH \).

To preview the discussion, the simplest proof of this claim relies on two facts, namely, axiom (50), which asserts that \( n \)-ary encoding facts of the form \( x_1 \ldots x_n G \) are equivalent to a conjunction of unary encodings of the properties that can be projected from \( G \), and the fact that there is an abstract object, say \( a \), that encodes every property. Note first that axiom (39.2) guarantees that all of the following properties exist: \( [\lambda x Gx \ldots a] \), \( [\lambda x Ga \ldots a] \), \ldots, and \( [\lambda x Ga \ldots ax] \). Since \( VF aF \), \( a \) encodes all of these latter properties. So we can conclude:
reduced the number of primitives by taking the analysis of relation existence to be a definition. Our system is powerful enough to define relation existence in terms of predication.

(34) Remark: Digression on the Definition of Relation Existence. It may be of interest to see why one can’t define relation existence in terms of property existence, i.e., why one can’t define, for $n \geq 2$:

$$F^n \equiv \forall y_1 \ldots \forall y_{n-1} ([\lambda x F^n x y_1 \ldots y_{n-1}] \downarrow \& [\lambda x F^n y_1 x y_2 \ldots y_{n-1}] \downarrow \& \ldots \& [\lambda x F^n y_1 \ldots y_{n-1} x] \downarrow)$$

(3) stipulates that $F^n$ exists just in case all of the properties projectable from it exist, i.e., just in case all of the properties that result from the different ways of plugging $n - 1$ objects into $F^n$ exist. The problem with (3) is that it would implicitly introduce, as axioms, biconditionals that are provably false.

According to the above definition and our conventions for definitions, the following biconditional, should be a theorem, where $\Pi$ is any 2-place relation term in which $x$ and $y$ don’t occur free:

$$(\xi) \quad \Pi \downarrow \equiv \forall y ([\lambda x \Pi x y] \downarrow \& [\lambda x \Pi y x] \downarrow)$$

But to see that (ξ) is false, we need only show that the right condition of (ξ) is true when the left side is false. So assume $\neg \Pi \downarrow$. To show that the right side holds, we need only show $[\lambda x \Pi x y] \downarrow \& [\lambda x \Pi y x] \downarrow$, since $y$ doesn’t occur free in our assumption. But both conjuncts will be instances of axiom (39.2); by hypothesis, $x$ doesn’t occur free in $\Pi$, and so, in the $\lambda$-expression in each conjunct, the initial $\lambda$ doesn’t bind any variable in an encoding formula subterm. So, the right side of (ξ) is true, while the left side is false. Hence, one can’t define relation existence in terms of property existence as in (3).

(35) Remark: About Identity for Individuals. It is important to understand the behavior of definition (23.1) with respect to definite descriptions. Consider a description such as $izGz$. Then we obtain instances of (23.1) in which $izGz$ uniformly replaces $x$ or $y$. So, for example, the following becomes an instance of the definition:

$$x = izGz \equiv df$$

$$(O!x \& O!izGz \& \Box F (Fx \equiv FizGz)) \lor (A!x \& A!izGz \& \Box F (xF \equiv izGzF))$$

It is important to observe:

$$[\lambda x Gx \ldots a] \& a[\lambda x Gx \ldots a] \& \ldots \& a[\lambda x Ga \ldots ax]$$

Hence, by axiom (50), $a \ldots aG$, and so $\exists x_1 \ldots \exists x_n (x_1 \ldots x_n G)$.

108 This was observed by Daniel Kirchner (personal communication, 19 September 2017), though the reason for the conclusion has subsequently changed from his original, given subsequent improvements made to axiom (39.2).
(a) The definiens of \((\vartheta)\) implies \(izGz\), since both disjuncts imply it. The left disjunct implies \(O!izGz\), which in turn implies \(izGz\), by axiom (39.5.a). This axiom guarantees that the primary terms (7.7) of an exemplification or encoding formula are significant; this will be discussed in a bit more detail in (228). Moreover, the right disjunct implies \(A!izGz\), which also implies \(izGz\), again by axiom (39.5.a).

(b) Consequently, if it is known, either by hypothesis or by proof, that \(\neg izGz\), then the negation of the definiens becomes derivable. So if \((\vartheta)\) implicitly introduces a biconditional axiom in which \(\equiv\) replaces \(\equiv_{df}\), then the negated identity \(\neg(x = izGz)\) becomes derivable. Since this holds for any \(x\), the claim \(\forall x \neg(x = izGz)\) becomes derivable for any description \(izGz\) for which it is known that \(\neg izGz\).

These facts play an important role as we develop and apply our system.

(36) Remark: Why Existence Clauses Are Sometimes Needed in the Definiens of Definitions-by-\(\equiv\). Before we consider specifically why existence clauses have been added to the definiens of (23.2), we discuss the more general problem that arises for definitions-by-\(\equiv\). To see the problem, suppose one wanted to say that a property is conditionally necessary for an object just in case the object necessarily exemplifies the property whenever it exemplifies the property. Then we would formalize this definition as:

\[
\text{CondNecFor}(F, x) \equiv_{df} Fx \rightarrow \Box Fx
\]

with the understanding that, by Convention (17.2), the above is to be interpreted as the following definition schema:

(A) \(\text{CondNecFor}(\Pi, \kappa) \equiv_{df} \Pi \kappa \rightarrow \Box \Pi \kappa\)

Suppose further that this schema introduces the instances (and their closures) of the following schema as axioms:

(B) \(\text{CondNecFor}(\Pi, \kappa) \equiv (\Pi \kappa \rightarrow \Box \Pi \kappa)\)

Now consider an arbitrary description, say \(iz\psi\), and an arbitrary 1-place \(\lambda\)-expression, say \([\lambda x \varphi]\), and suppose that both \(\neg iz\psi\) and \(\neg[\lambda x \varphi]\) are known, either by hypothesis or by proof. Then where \(P\) and \(a\) are constants (for which it will be axiomatic that \(P\) and \(a\)), then we should be able to derive the following from (B):

(C) \(\neg\text{CondNecFor}(P, iz\psi)\)

(D) \(\neg\text{CondNecFor}([\lambda x \varphi], a)\)

(E) \(\neg\text{CondNecFor}([\lambda x \varphi], iz\psi)\)
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In general, we should be able to derive \( \neg \text{CondNecFor}(\Pi, \kappa) \) whenever it is known that either \( \Pi \) or \( \kappa \) fails to denote. Such a derivation would preserve the garbage in, garbage out principle. However, one cannot derive such claims from (B). In fact, one can derive:

(F) \( \text{CondNecFor}(P, \iz \psi) \)

(G) \( \text{CondNecFor}(\lambda x \varphi, a) \)

(H) \( \text{CondNecFor}(\lambda x \varphi, \iz \psi) \)

Specifically, from \( \neg \iz \psi \Downarrow \) and (B), one can derive (F) and (H), and from \( \neg [\lambda x \varphi] \Downarrow \) and (B), one can derive (G) and (H). Here’s how.

To see that (F) and (H) are derivable from (B) and \( \neg \iz \psi \Downarrow \), note that our system will allow one to prove, from the latter, the negation of any exemplification or encoding formula in which \( \iz \psi \) occurs as a primary term. This is guaranteed by axioms (39.5.a) and (39.5.b); they are grounded in the fact that an \( n \)-place predication \((n \geq 1)\) is true if and only if its primary terms have denotations and the objects denoted by the individual terms exemplify or encode (as the case may be) the relation denoted by the relation term. Consequently, the negations of \( P \iz \psi \) and \( [\lambda x \varphi] \iz \psi \) both follow from \( \neg \iz \psi \Downarrow \). But then, the conditionals \( P \iz \psi \rightarrow \Box P \iz \psi \) and \( [\lambda x \varphi] \iz \psi \rightarrow \Box [\lambda x \varphi] \iz \psi \) are both derivable, by failure of the antecedent. Given (B), these respectively imply \( \text{CondNecFor}(P, \iz \psi) \), i.e., (F), and \( \text{CondNecFor}(\lambda x \varphi, \iz \psi) \), i.e., (H). Since (B) is implicitly introduced by (A), the latter leads to violations of the garbage in, garbage out principle; given (A), \( \text{CondNecFor} \) becomes a condition that holds even though its second argument fails to denote. So we have instances of the principle garbage in, roses out, something one should like to avoid when one can control it. We should be able to prove (C) and (E) when \( \iz \psi \) fails to denote.

By analogous reasoning, (G) and (H) are derivable from (B) and \( \neg [\lambda x \varphi] \Downarrow \). The latter implies the negations of \( [\lambda x \varphi] a \) and \( [\lambda x \varphi] \iz \psi \). So the conditionals \( [\lambda x \varphi] a \rightarrow \Box [\lambda x \varphi] a \) and \( [\lambda x \varphi] \iz \psi \rightarrow \Box [\lambda x \varphi] \iz \psi \) are both derivable by failure of the antecedent. Given (B), these respectively imply that \( \text{CondNecFor}(\lambda x \varphi, a) \), i.e., (G), and \( \text{CondNecFor}(\lambda x \varphi b, \iz \psi) \), i.e., (H). Since (B) is implicitly introduced by (A), the latter again leads to violations of the garbage in, garbage out principle; given (A), \( \text{CondNecFor} \) becomes a condition that holds even though its first argument fails to denote. We have further instances of the principle garbage in, roses out. We should be able to derive (D) and (E) when it is known, either by hypothesis or proof, that \( [\lambda x \varphi] \) isn’t significant.

To solve this problem in a general way, we need to add existence conditions to the definiens. In our example, we can reformulate our original definition, under Convention (17.2), as:

\[
\text{CondNecFor}(F, x) \equiv_{df} F \Downarrow \& x \Downarrow \& (Fx \rightarrow \Box Fx)
\]
where this is to be interpreted as the schematic definition:

\[(A') \text{\texttt{CondNecFor}}(\Pi, \kappa) \equiv_{df} \Pi \downarrow \& \kappa \downarrow \& (\Pi \kappa \rightarrow \Box \Pi \kappa)\]

\[(A')\] would implicitly extend our system with all of the instances, and the closures of the instances, of the following axiom or theorem schema:

\[(I) \text{\texttt{CondNecFor}}(\Pi, \kappa) \equiv (\Pi \downarrow \& \kappa \downarrow \& (\Pi \kappa \rightarrow \Box \Pi \kappa))\]

Thus, the following would all be theorems, by uniformly assigning terms to metavariables in \((I)\):

\[(J) \text{\texttt{CondNecFor}}(P, \iz \psi) \equiv (P \downarrow \& \iz \psi \downarrow \& (P \iz \psi \rightarrow \Box P \iz \psi))\]

\[(K) \text{\texttt{CondNecFor}}([\lambda x \varphi], a) \equiv ([\lambda x \varphi] \downarrow \& a \downarrow \& ([\lambda x \varphi]a \rightarrow \Box [\lambda x \varphi]a))\]

\[(L) \text{\texttt{CondNecFor}}([\lambda x \varphi], \iz \psi) \equiv ([\lambda x \varphi] \downarrow \& \iz \psi \downarrow \& ([\lambda x \varphi] \iz \psi \rightarrow \Box [\lambda x \varphi] \iz \psi))\]

So from \(\neg \iz \psi \downarrow\) and \((J)\) we can infer \((C)\), and from \(\neg \iz \psi \downarrow\) and \((L)\) we can infer \((E)\). Analogously, from \(\neg [\lambda x \varphi] \downarrow\) and \((K)\) we can infer \((D)\), and from \(\neg [\lambda x \varphi] \downarrow\) and \((L)\) we can infer \((E)\). This is as it should be: given \((A')\), the negation of \(\text{\texttt{CondNecFor}}(\Pi, \kappa)\) is derivable whenever \(\neg \Pi \downarrow\) or \(\neg \kappa \downarrow\) is known either by proof or by hypothesis. This gives us a way to preserve the garbage in, garbage out principle.

We’re not suggesting here that every definition-by-\(\equiv\) with free variables needs to include existence clauses in the definiens. There are a number of cases where they aren’t needed. In some cases, existence is already implied by the definiens, such as in the example from Remark (27):

\[\text{\texttt{ContingentlyExemplifies}}(x, F) \equiv_{df} Fx \& \neg \Box Fx\]

This definition doesn’t require existence clauses in the definiens, since no matter what terms \(\Pi\) and \(\kappa\) uniformly replace \(F\) and \(x\), respectively, in the definition, the definiens implies both \(\Pi \downarrow\) and \(\kappa \downarrow\). In other cases, we don’t specially need or want the definiens to imply existence, such as in the definitions of \&, \(\lor\), \(\equiv\), \(\exists x \varphi\), and \(\Box \varphi\) in (18), or in definition of \(\tau \pi \sigma\) in (24). And, there will be some cases where, in order to obtain a correct definiens, existence clauses have to be added to the definiens for some but not all of the variables that occur free in the definition.

Now that we have a good grasp on why existence clauses are sometimes needed in the definiens of definitions-by-\(\equiv\), we can return specifically to definition (23.2) of \(F = G\). In this case, the existence clauses in the definiens are essential. To see why, suppose we had omitted them and consider the following instance of the definition \emph{without} the existence clauses in the definiens, in which \([\lambda y \varphi]\) uniformly replaces \(F\) and \([\lambda z \psi]\) uniformly replaces \(G\):

\[(\delta) \ [\lambda y \varphi] = [\lambda z \psi] \equiv_{df} \Box x (x[\lambda y \varphi] \equiv x[\lambda z \psi])\]
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Now suppose that this definition were to introduce the following as an axiom:

\[ \vartheta'(\lambda y \varphi) = [\lambda z \psi] \equiv \Box \forall x(x[\lambda y \varphi] \equiv x[\lambda z \psi]) \]

Finally, suppose both \([\lambda y \varphi]\) and \([\lambda z \psi]\) are both \(\lambda\)-expressions that fail to have a denotation, i.e., suppose \(\neg [\lambda y \varphi] \downarrow\) and \(\neg [\lambda z \psi] \downarrow\). Then \((\vartheta')\) would yield a derivation of \([\lambda y \varphi] = [\lambda z \psi]\). Here’s why.

As mentioned previously, our free logic of quantification for complex terms will require, by axioms asserted in the next chapter, \((39.5.a)\) and \((39.5.b)\), that if an \(n\)-place exemplification or encoding formula \((n \geq 1)\) is true, then all the primary terms in that formula are significant. So, by the contrapositive, it follows from \(\neg [\lambda y \varphi] \downarrow\) and \(\neg [\lambda z \psi] \downarrow\) that the encoding formulas \(x[\lambda y \varphi]\) and \(x[\lambda z \psi]\) are both false. Since they both have the same truth value, it follows by propositional logic that \(x[\lambda y \varphi] \equiv x[\lambda z \psi]\). Since this holds for arbitrary \(x\), it follows by quantificational logic that \(\forall x(x[\lambda y \varphi] \equiv x[\lambda z \psi])\). Since this universal claim was established without appealing to any contingent assumptions, it follows by modal logic that \(\Box \forall x(x[\lambda y \varphi] \equiv x[\lambda z \psi])\). But if \((\vartheta)\) implicitly introduces \((\vartheta')\), then we would have a proof of \([\lambda y \varphi] = [\lambda z \psi]\). Clearly, we don’t want to prove that an identity holds between every pair of non-denoting \(\lambda\)-expressions!

We’ve adopted the solution of adding the clauses \(F \downarrow\) and \(G \downarrow\) in \((23.2)\). This avoids the derivation of identities in which the terms flanking the identity sign fail to denote. It instead implies that if a property identity statement is true, then the terms flanking the identity sign have a denotation. Consequently, if \(P\) is any property term that fails to be significant, so that \(P \downarrow\) is known to be false, the negation of the definiens of \((23.2)\) will be derivable, no matter whether \(P\) replaces \(F\) or \(G\) in the definition. So we’ll be able to infer \(\neg (P = P')\) if either \(\neg P \downarrow\) or \(\neg P' \downarrow\).

\((37)\) Remark: Digression on \(n\)-Place Relation Identity. Some readers may wonder why we haven’t defined relation identity by using \(n\)-ary encoding to generalize the definition of property identity, i.e., as follows, where \(F\) and \(G\) are \(n\)-place relation variables \((n \geq 2)\):

\[ (\vartheta)\quad F = G \equiv_{df} F \downarrow \& G \downarrow \& \Box \forall x_1 \ldots x_n (x_1 \ldots x_n F \equiv x_1 \ldots x_n G). \]

The problem with \((\vartheta)\) is that it implies: if there is exactly one necessarily unexemplified property, then there is at most one ordinary object.\(^{109}\) Here is the argument in full, though it may be skipped and reserved for later study without loss of understanding of what follows. However, the the argument makes use of a number of concepts and theorems that aren’t derived until later. Among

\(^{109}\)This was observed by Daniel Kirchner, who outlined the argument in personal communications (computer audio discussions and email exchanges) of 9–11 November 2017.
them are the defined relation constant \(=_E\), which isn’t introduced until (227), and theorems about \(=_E\), such as that it is a reflexive relation on the ordinary objects (236).1

We first derive some preliminary consequences of (\(\vartheta\)). Suppose that the inferential role of (\(\vartheta\)) is to implicitly introduce (the closures of) its instances as axioms. Then, if (\(\vartheta\)) had been offered as a definition, the following the 2-place case would become axiomatic, where \(F\) and \(G\) are object-language variables:

\[(\vartheta') F = G \equiv (F \downarrow \& G \downarrow \& \Box x\forall y(xyF \equiv xyG)).\]

Since \(F\downarrow\) and \(G\downarrow\) are axiomatic (39.2), (\(\vartheta'\)) reduces, by Rule \(\equiv\) (92), to:

\[F = G \equiv \Box x\forall y(xyF \equiv xyG)\]

Though it may not be immediately apparent why, this is equivalent to:

\[(\zeta) F = G \equiv \forall x\forall y(xyF \equiv xyG)\]

The reason they are equivalent is grounded in the axiom for the rigidity of encoding (51), i.e., that \(xF \rightarrow \Box xF\), and we leave a full demonstration to a footnote.\(^{110}\) Now the axiom governing \(n\)-ary encoding (50) has the following instances:

\[xyF \equiv (x[\lambda z Fzy] \& y[\lambda z Fxz])\]

\[xyG \equiv (x[\lambda z Gzy] \& y[\lambda z Gxz])\]

\(^{110}\)The reasoning that shows that \(\forall x\forall y(xyF \equiv xyG)\) is equivalent to \(\Box x\forall y(xyF \equiv xyG)\) depends on the Barcan Formula and the 2-place case of theorem (177.6), which is derived from the axiom for the rigidity of encoding (51) and the theorem (176.1) that is derivable from it. The 2-place case of (177.6) is:

\[(x_1 x_2 F \equiv y_1 y_2 G) \equiv \Box(x_1 x_2 F \equiv y_1 y_2 G)\]

(The derivation of this fact from (51) and (176.1) is in the Appendix.) By 4 applications of GEN:

\[\forall x_1 \forall x_2 \forall y_1 \forall y_2 ((x_1 x_2 F \equiv y_1 y_2 G) \equiv \Box(x_1 x_2 F \equiv y_1 y_2 G))\]

Instantiating the quantifiers, in order, to \(x, y, x,\) and \(y,\) respectively, it follows that:

\[(xyF \equiv xyG) \equiv \Box(xyF \equiv xyG)\]

So by GEN:

\[\forall x\forall y((xyF \equiv xyG) \equiv \Box(xyF \equiv xyG))\]

Now by two applications of the basic quantifier logic theorem \(\forall \alpha(\varphi \equiv \psi) \equiv (\forall \alpha \varphi \equiv \forall \alpha \psi)\) (100.3), it follows that:

\[\forall x\forall y(xyF \equiv xyG) \equiv \forall x\forall y\Box(xyF \equiv xyG)\]

But the right side of this last biconditional is equivalent, by two instances of the Barcan formula (167.1) and a Rule of Substitution (160.1) to \(\Box \forall x\forall y(xyF \equiv xyG).\) Hence:

\[\forall x\forall y(xyF \equiv xyG) \equiv \Box \forall x\forall y(xyF \equiv xyG)\]
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Since these are equivalences that don’t depend on a contingency, we may use the Rule of Substitution to substitute, in (ζ), the right condition of these equivalences for the left, to conclude:

(ξ) \( F = G \equiv \forall x \forall y((x[\lambda z Fzy] \& y[\lambda z Fxz]) \equiv (x[\lambda z Gzy] \& y[\lambda z Gxz])) \)

But notice, independently, that it is axiomatic (52) that ordinary objects fail to encode properties. So whenever \( x \) or \( y \) is an ordinary object, the (quantified) biconditional in the right condition of (ξ), i.e., \( (x[\lambda z Fzy] \& y[\lambda z Fxz]) \equiv (x[\lambda z Gzy] \& y[\lambda z Gxz]) \) will be true — the conjunctions on both sides of the biconditional are false whenever \( x \) or \( y \) is ordinary, since in either case, one of the conjuncts (all of which are encoding formulas) will be false. In other words, it is provable without appealing to any contingent assumptions (exercise) that:

**Fact:** \( \forall x \forall y(\neg (A!x \& A!y) \rightarrow (x[\lambda z Fzy] \& y[\lambda z Fxz]) \equiv (x[\lambda z Gzy] \& y[\lambda z Gxz])) \)

Given this Fact (which is a necessary truth given that no contingent assumptions are needed to prove it), (ξ) implies:

(ξ′) \( F = G \equiv \forall x \forall y((A!x \& A!y) \rightarrow (x[\lambda z Fzy] \& y[\lambda z Fxz]) \equiv (x[\lambda z Gzy] \& y[\lambda z Gxz])) \)

A strict proof that (ξ) implies (ξ′) is left to a footnote.\(^{111}\) Note that (ξ′) holds for any relations \( F \) and \( G \).

Now recall that we are trying to show that the claim, there is a unique property that is necessarily unexemplified, i.e.,

\[ \exists H (\Box \neg \exists x Hx \& \forall H' (\Box \neg \exists x H'x \rightarrow H' = H)) \]

implies that there is at most one ordinary object, i.e.,

\[ \forall x \forall y (O!x \& O!y \rightarrow x = y) \]

So, for conditional proof, assume there is exactly one necessarily unexemplified property. To show that there is at most one ordinary object, it suffices to

\(^{111}\)We simplify the proof that (ξ) implies (ξ′) by reasoning with respect to their form. Note that if we let \( \psi \) be the formula \( (x[\lambda z Fzy] \& y[\lambda z Fxz]) \equiv (x[\lambda z Gzy] \& y[\lambda z Gxz]) \), then (ξ) has the form:

(ξ) \( F = G \equiv \forall x \forall y \psi \)

Now let \( \chi \) be the formula \( (A!x \& A!y) \), so that (ξ′) has the form:

(ξ′) \( F = G \equiv \forall x \forall y (\chi \rightarrow \psi) \)

and the Fact has the form:

\[ \forall x \forall y (\neg \chi \rightarrow \psi) \]

Then we can reason that (ξ) implies (ξ′) as follows. Assume (ξ), i.e., \( F = G \equiv \forall x \forall y \psi \). To show (ξ′), we establish both directions. (⇒) Assume \( F = G \). Then by (ξ), \( \forall x \forall y \psi \). But this easily implies \( \forall x \forall y (\chi \rightarrow \psi) \), since \( \psi \rightarrow (\chi \rightarrow \psi) \) is the first law of propositional logic (38.1). (⇐) Assume \( \forall x \forall y (\chi \rightarrow \psi) \). To show \( F = G \), it suffices by (ξ) to show \( \forall x \forall y \psi \). By GEN, it suffices to show \( \psi \). Assume \( \neg \psi \) for reductio. But our local assumption, i.e., \( \forall x \forall y (\chi \rightarrow \psi) \), implies \( \chi \rightarrow \psi \). Hence, \( \neg \chi \). But our Fact, namely \( \forall x \forall y (\neg \chi \rightarrow \psi) \), implies \( \neg \chi \rightarrow \psi \). Hence \( \psi \). Contradiction.
show \((O!a & O!b) \rightarrow a = b\), where \(a\) and \(b\) are arbitrarily chosen. So assume \(O!a\)
and \(O!b\). Then since \(=_{E}\) is reflexive on the ordinary objects \(236.1\), it follows
that \(a =_{E} a\) and \(b =_{E} b\). Now consider the relations:

\((R_1) \ [\lambda uv \ u =_{E} a \& v =_{E} a]\)

\((S_1) \ [\lambda uv \ u =_{E} b \& v =_{E} b]\)

Both provably exist, either by axiom \((39.2)\). So from the fact that \(a =_{E} a\), it follows
by strengthened \(\beta\)-Conversion \((179)\) that \(R_1 a a\). Note that if we can
show \(R_1 = S_1\), then it follows that \(a = b\) and we’re done. For suppose \(R_1 = S_1\).
Then from the previously established \(R_1 a a\), it follows that \(S_1 a a\), and so \(a =_{E} b \& a =_{E} b\), again by \((179)\). \(A\) fortiori, \(a =_{E} b\) and therefore \(a = b\), by the definition
of \(=\) \((23.1)\).

So it remains to show \(R_1 = S_1\). Since \((\xi')\) holds for any two (existing) relations,
it suffices to show:

\[\forall x \forall y (A!x & A!y) \rightarrow ((x[\lambda z R_1 z y] & y[\lambda z R_1 x z]) \equiv (x[\lambda z S_1 z y] & y[\lambda z S_1 x z]))\]

And so by GEN, it suffices to show:

\[A!x & A!y \rightarrow ((x[\lambda z R_1 z y] & y[\lambda z R_1 x z]) \equiv (x[\lambda z S_1 z y] & y[\lambda z S_1 x z]))\]

So assume \(A!x & A!y\). Now if we can establish the identities \([\lambda z R_1 z y] = [\lambda z S_1 z y]\)
and \([\lambda z R_1 x z] = [\lambda z S_1 x z]\), then we can establish \((x[\lambda z R_1 z y] & y[\lambda z R_1 x z]) \equiv (x[\lambda z S_1 z y] & y[\lambda z S_1 x z])\). For if we assume the left condition of this biconditional,
\(x[\lambda z R_1 z y] & y[\lambda z R_1 x z]\), then by the identities just mentioned, we obtain
the right condition, \(x[\lambda z S_1 z y] & y[\lambda z S_1 x z]\). And analogous reasoning establishes the right-to-left direction.

So it remains only to show \([\lambda z R_1 z y] = [\lambda z S_1 z y]\) and \([\lambda z R_1 x z] = [\lambda z S_1 x z]\).
Note that since we have assumed that there is exactly one necessarily unexemplified property, it suffices to show (exercise) that the properties \([\lambda z R_1 z y]\),
\([\lambda z S_1 z y]\), \([\lambda z R_1 x z]\), and \([\lambda z S_1 x z]\) are all necessarily unexemplified. Without
loss of generality, then, we show only that the first, namely \([\lambda z R_1 z y]\), is necessarily unexemplified, since analogous reasoning yields the conclusion for the other three.

Now it will be provable that \([\lambda z R_1 z y]\) exists given that \(R_1\) exists. But by
definition of \(R_1\), this property just is \([\lambda z [\lambda uv u =_{E} a \& v =_{E} a] z y]\). Consequently,
where \(w\) is any individual, strengthened \(\beta\)-Conversion \((179)\) implies the following
biconditional chain:

\[\begin{align*}
[\lambda z [\lambda uv u =_{E} a \& v =_{E} a] z y] w & \equiv [\lambda uv u =_{E} a \& v =_{E} a] w y \\
& \equiv w =_{E} a \& y =_{E} a
\end{align*}\]

But, by hypothesis, \(y\) is abstract. Thus, we know, by reasoning from the definition
of \(=_{E}\) \((227)\), that \(\neg (y =_{E} a)\). Hence, \(\neg (w =_{E} a \& y =_{E} a)\). So given our bi-
conditional chain, \(\neg ([\lambda z [\lambda uv u =_{E} a \& v =_{E} a] z y] w)\), i.e., \(\neg [\lambda z R_1 z y] w\). This holds
for any object \(w\), i.e., \(\forall w \neg[\lambda z R_1 zy]w\), i.e., \(\neg \exists w[\lambda z R_1 zy]w\). Since we reasoned our way to this conclusion without appealing to any contingent assumptions, \(\square \neg \exists w[\lambda z R_1 zy]w\), i.e., \(\neg \exists w[\lambda z R_1 zy]w\). Since analogous reasoning allows us to establish that the other properties \(\lambda z R_1 xz\), \(\lambda z S_1 zy\), and \(\lambda z S_1 xz\) are necessarily unexemplified for abstract \(x\) and \(y\), it follows from the hypothesis that there is at most one necessarily unexemplified property that \(\lambda z R_1 zy = \lambda z S_1 zy\) and \(\lambda z R_1 xz = \lambda z S_1 xz\). And this was all that remained to be shown to complete our proof that, under the definition of relation identity given by (8), the hypothesis that there is a unique necessarily unexemplified property implies that there is at most one ordinary object.

One could argue that such a result is without consequence, since pretheoretically, it seems reasonable to assert that there are distinct, necessarily unexemplified properties, such as being a barber who shaves all and only those who don’t shave themselves and being a brown and colorless dog. If we assert the existence of distinct such properties, as our system allows us to do, we avoid the result that there is at most one ordinary object. But it is somewhat curious that what seems like a natural definition of relation identity should force us to assert the existence of distinct such properties. Further investigation is certainly called for. Fortunately, we need not positively assert the existence of distinct such properties if we proceed by eschewing (8) in favor of the more traditional definition (23.3).

Exercise: Give a reason for thinking that the official definition of relation identity (23.3) does not imply, when \(F\) and \(G\) exist, that if there is exactly one necessarily unexemplified property, then there is at most one ordinary object. As an outline of the reason, let \(F\) and \(G\) be any relations known to exist, so that (23.3) reduces to:  
\[(\omega)\quad F = G \equiv \forall y (\forall x (x[\lambda z Fzy] = x[\lambda z Gzy]) \& \forall x (x[\lambda z Fyz] = x[\lambda z Gyz]))\]

Then one can show that this is equivalent to:\(^{112}\)

\(^{112}\)Here's why. By definition of property identity (23.2), (\(\omega\)) is equivalent to:
\[F = G \equiv \forall y (\forall x (x[\lambda z Fzy] = x[\lambda z Gzy]) \& \forall x (x[\lambda z Fyz] = x[\lambda z Gyz]))\]

Since \(\square \phi \& \square \psi\) is equivalent to \(\square (\phi \& \psi)\), the above is equivalent to:
\[F = G \equiv \forall y (\forall x (x[\lambda z Fzy] = x[\lambda z Gzy]) \& \forall x (x[\lambda z Fyz] = x[\lambda z Gyz]))\]

By the Barcan Formula, this is equivalent to:
\[F = G \equiv \forall y (\forall x (x[\lambda z Fzy] = x[\lambda z Gzy]) \& \forall x (x[\lambda z Fyz] = x[\lambda z Gyz]))\]

And for reasons similar to those described in footnote 110, this is equivalent to:
\[F = G \equiv \forall y (\forall x (x[\lambda z Fzy] = x[\lambda z Gzy]) \& \forall x (x[\lambda z Fyz] = x[\lambda z Gyz]))\]

Since \(\forall x \phi \& \forall x \psi\) is equivalent to \(\forall x (\phi \& \psi)\), the above is equivalent to:
\[F = G \equiv \forall y (x[\lambda z Fzy] = x[\lambda z Gzy]) \& (x[\lambda z Fyz] = x[\lambda z Gyz])\]

Finally, since universal quantifiers commute, the above is equivalent to:
At this point, note that the above does lead to a claim analogous to the Fact we established for (\(\vartheta\)). The Fact showed that (\(\vartheta\)) yields identity conditions for relations that are independent of the properties that result when the relations projected to ordinary objects. But the identity conditions for relations given by (23.3) don’t allow us to ignore such projections. It is not a fact that:

\[\forall x \forall y (\neg (A!x \& A!y) \rightarrow ((x[\lambda z Fzy] \equiv x[\lambda z Gzy]) \& (x[\lambda z Fyz] \equiv x[\lambda z Gyz])))\]

An argument analogous to the one used to establish the Fact fails to establish the above claim.
Chapter 8

Axioms

Now that we have a precisely-specified philosophical language that allows to express claims using primitive and defined notions, we next assert the fundamental axioms of our theory in terms of these notions. We may group these axioms as follows:

- Axioms for negations and conditionals.
- Axioms for universal quantification and logical existence.
- Axioms for the substitution of identicals.
- Axioms for actuality.
- Axioms for necessity.
- Axioms for necessity and actuality.
- Axioms for definite descriptions.
- Axioms for relations.
- Axioms for encoding.

The statement of certain axiom groups require preliminary definitions.

In what follows, when we assert the closures of a schema as axioms, we mean that the closures of every instance of the schema are axioms. Moreover, it is important to recognize that when axioms are expressed not as schemata that use metavariables, but as statements involving object-language variables, these variables are not functioning as metavariables. Convention (17.2) applies only to definitions, not to axioms and theorems.
8.1 Axioms for Negations and Conditionals

(38) **Axioms**: Negations and Conditionals. To ensure that negation and conditionalization behave classically, we take the closures of the following schemata as axioms:

1. \( \varphi \to (\psi \to \varphi) \)
2. \( (\varphi \to (\psi \to \chi)) \to ((\varphi \to \psi) \to (\varphi \to \chi)) \)
3. \( (\neg \varphi \to \neg \psi) \to ((\neg \varphi \to \psi) \to \varphi) \)

By using the above, instead of defining tautology and asserting that all tautologies are axioms, we avoid the use of semantic notions in the statement of the system.

8.2 Axioms for Universal Quantification and Logical Existence

The axioms below assume familiarity with the syntactic notions primitive constant (1), variable (1), subformula (6), subterm (7), free/bound variables (10), and substitutable for (15). These definitions were developed in the previous chapter, along with the definitions upon which they depend. Thus, it should be clear what is meant when (39.2) makes use of the notion of a \( \lambda \)-expression in which the initial \( \lambda \) doesn’t bind any variables in any encoding formula subterm.

(39) **Axioms**: Quantification and Logical Existence. Where \( \alpha \) is any variable, \( \tau \) is any term, \( \Pi^n \) is any \( n \)-place relation term, and \( \kappa_1, \ldots, \kappa_n \) are any individual terms, we assert the closures of the following as axioms:

1. \( \forall \alpha \varphi \to (\tau \downarrow \to \varphi_{\alpha}^\tau) \), provided \( \tau \) is substitutable for \( \alpha \) in \( \varphi \)
2. \( \tau \downarrow \), whenever \( \tau \) is either a primitive constant (i.e., one not introduced by a definition), a variable, or a \( \lambda \)-expression in which the initial \( \lambda \) does not bind any variable in any encoding formula subterm.\(^{113} \)
3. \( \forall \alpha (\varphi \to \psi) \to (\forall \alpha \varphi \to \forall \alpha \psi) \)
4. \( \varphi \to \forall \alpha \varphi \), provided \( \alpha \) doesn’t occur free in \( \varphi \)
5. \( (a) \Pi^n \kappa_1 \ldots \kappa_n \rightarrow (\Pi^n \downarrow \& \kappa_1 \downarrow \& \ldots \& \kappa_n \downarrow), \)
   \hspace{1cm} where \( \Pi^n \kappa_1 \ldots \kappa_n \) is any exemplification formula \( (n \geq 0) \)
   \( (b) \kappa_1 \ldots \kappa_n \Pi^n \rightarrow (\Pi^n \downarrow \& \kappa_1 \downarrow \& \ldots \& \kappa_n \downarrow), \)
   \hspace{1cm} where \( \kappa_1 \ldots \kappa_n \Pi^n \) is any encoding formula \( (n \geq 1) \)

\(^{113}\)See the third observation about definitions in Remark (25) if it isn’t clear why this axiom doesn’t apply to new constants introduced by definition.
As we shall see, these axioms (i) yield classical quantification theory with respect to primitive constants, variables, and \( \lambda \)-expressions in which the initial \( \lambda \) doesn’t bind variables in encoding formula subterms, and (ii) yield a free logic of quantification for reasoning with respect to all other terms. (.1) guarantees that significant terms can be instantiated into universal claims;\(^\text{114}\) (.2) guarantees the significance of primitive constants, variables, and \( \lambda \)-expressions in which the initial \( \lambda \) doesn’t bind any variables in any encoding formula subterms; (.3) and (.4) are part of classical quantification theory; and (.5.a) and (.5.b) guarantee not only that the primary terms of true exemplification and encoding formulas are significant, but also that true formulas are significant (this is the 0-place case of (.5.a), since formulas are 0-place relation terms).

For a full discussion of some of the \( \lambda \)-expressions excluded by (.2), see Remark (55) at the end of this chapter. For now, the reader may find the observations in the next Remark useful.

(40) Remark: On the Formulation of (.39.2). (.39.2) asserts the significance of constants, variables, and certain \( \lambda \)-expressions. The significance of formulas, in so far as they are 0-place relation terms, will be derived (105.2).

There should be no question as to why (.39.2) stipulates that variables are significant; in a logic in which open formulas are assertible, free variables are assumed to have a value. So, (.39.2) tells us that we may assert \( \alpha \downarrow \) for any variable \( \alpha \). We may thereby consider variables to be terms \( \tau \) that meet one of the conditions required for the application of axiom (.39.1), namely \( \tau \downarrow \). We can always instantiate the variable \( \alpha \) into the universal claim \( \forall \beta \varphi \) provided \( \alpha \) is substitutable for \( \beta \) in \( \varphi \).

We’ve also discussed, in the third observation in Remark (25), why (.39.2) asserts that primitive constants, as opposed to constants generally, are significant. (.39.2) does not assert that constants introduced by definition are significant. The loss is not an egregious one. If we have defined a new constant \( \tau \) by means of a closed complex term that is provably significant, then the inferential role of definitions-by-identity, sketched earlier in (17) and articulated precisely in (74) and (121), ensures that we can derive \( \tau \downarrow \); a definition-by-\( = \) implies that if the definiens of a new constant is significant, then the identity stipulated in the definition holds. In our system, true identity claims will imply the existence of the entities identified – see the theorems in (108) – and so there will be a means of deriving the significance of new constants introduced by significant, closed terms in a definition-by-identity.

Before we discuss what (.39.2) asserts about \( \lambda \)-expressions, we should note

\(^{114}\)It should be kept in mind that the formula \( \tau \downarrow \) used in (.1) and (.2) is defined differently for individual terms and relation terms. So what the instances of \( \tau \downarrow \) assert when they are expanded by definition depends on whether \( \tau \) is an individual term or a relation term, and if the latter, the arity of the relation.
that while (39.2) tells us what terms are axiomatically guaranteed to be significant, it doesn’t assert that terms excluded by the axiom are not significant. For example, though the axiom doesn’t guarantee that descriptions are significant, the description $\text{ix}(x = y)$ will be provably significant, as will descriptions of the form $\text{ix}(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi))$, when $x$ doesn’t occur free in $\varphi$. Moreover, some $\lambda$-expressions excluded by (39.2) will be provably significant by other means; we’ll discuss one in item (237.3). But some $\lambda$-expressions excluded by (39.2), such as those leading to the Clark/Boolos, McMichael/Boolos, and Kirchner paradoxes, are provably empty.

To understand which $\lambda$-expressions are significant according to (39.2), we start with the fact that in classical second-order (exemplification) logic, the comprehension condition for relations is unrestricted and for every formula $\varphi$, the $\lambda$-expression $[\lambda \nu_1 \ldots \nu_n \varphi]$ is significant. But when we move to second-order logic with encoding formulas, the paradoxes of encoding tell us that we can’t simultaneously assert an unrestricted comprehension principle for relations and an unrestricted comprehension principle for abstract objects. Our solution has been to restrict comprehension for relations while maintaining unrestricted comprehension for abstract objects. The intuitive idea is that the comprehension principle for relations guarantees, in the first instance, only the existence of relations whose exemplification conditions are not defined in terms of encoding conditions. So (39.2) is designed to capture this intuition. If the initial $\lambda$ in a $\lambda$-expression were to bind a variable in an encoding formula subterm, then it would effectively make encoding conditions an integral rather than an incidental part of the exemplification conditions of the relation denoted. Such $\lambda$-expressions are thus excluded by (39.2). However, as noted above, we may still prove that some $\lambda$-expressions excluded by (39.2) are significant; indeed, some $\lambda$-expressions in which the $\lambda$ binds a variable in an encoding formula subterm are provably significant and thus safe. These are the $\lambda$-expressions having a matrix that is necessarily and universally equivalent to the matrix of a $\lambda$-expression that is known to be significant. This will be systematized as axiom (49).

Consider next the following three facts about the formulation of (39.2), all of which are worthy of remark:

- If a formula $\varphi$ contains no encoding formula subterms, then (39.2) asserts $[\lambda \nu_1 \ldots \nu_n \varphi] \downarrow$, for any individual variables $\nu_1, \ldots, \nu_n$ ($n \geq 0$).

- Since the initial $\lambda$ in an expression of the form $[\lambda \varphi]$ doesn’t bind any variables, it doesn’t bind any variables in any encoding formula subterm and so (39.2) asserts $[\lambda \varphi] \downarrow$.

- If none of $\nu_1, \ldots, \nu_n$ occur free in $\varphi$, then (39.2) asserts $[\lambda \nu_1 \ldots \nu_n \varphi] \downarrow$. 
It proves useful to remember that these three kinds of significant \(\lambda\)-expressions are always significant.

Finally, it is worth mentioning explicitly that the fact that a term \(\tau\) has an empty subterm doesn’t imply that \(\tau\) is empty. In footnote 168, we alluded to this by noting that (39.2) asserts that \([\lambda x Rxiz(Pz \& \neg Pz)]\) is significant, despite having an empty description as a subterm. We can also develop an example of a significant \(\lambda\)-expression that contains an empty \(\lambda\)-expression. Note that the \(\lambda\)-expression \([\lambda x \exists G(xG \& \neg Gx)]\], which plays a role in the Clark/Boolos paradox, is provably empty, on pain of contradiction; see theorem (190.1). But \([\lambda y [\lambda x \exists G(xG \& \neg Gx)]y]\) satisfies the conditions of (39.2), since the initial \(\lambda\) doesn’t bind any variable in any encoding formula subterm. So (39.2) asserts \([\lambda y [\lambda x \exists G(xG \& \neg Gx)]y]\) ↓. In Remark (155) of Chapter 9, we’ll see a number of examples of descriptions and \(\lambda\)-expressions that are provably significant despite the fact that they contain empty subterms.

### 8.3 Axioms for the Substitution of Identicals

(41) **Axioms:** The Substitution of Identicals. The identity symbol ‘\(=\)’ is not a primitive expression of our object language. Instead, identity was defined in items (23.1), (23.2), (23.3), and (23.4) for individuals and \(n\)-place relations \((n \geq 0)\). The classical law of the reflexivity of identity, i.e., \(\alpha = \alpha\), where \(\alpha\) is any variable, will be derived as a theorem — see item (118.1) in Chapter 9. By contrast, we take the classical law of the substitution of identicals as an axiom. The closures of the following schema are therefore asserted as axioms of our system:

\[
\alpha = \beta \rightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow \varphi'), \text{ whenever } \beta \text{ is substitutable for } \alpha \text{ in } \varphi, \text{ and } \varphi' \text{ is the result of replacing zero or more free occurrences of } \alpha \text{ in } \varphi \text{ with occurrences of } \beta.
\]

This is an unrestricted principle of substitution of identicals: (a) if \(x\) and \(y\) are identical individuals, then anything we can prove about \(x\) holds of \(y\), and (b) if \(F^n\) and \(G^n\) are identical \(n\)-place relations, then anything we can prove about \(F^n\) holds of \(G^n\). Some readers may be interested in the discussion in Remark (56), where we consider alternatives to the axiom schema asserted above.

### 8.4 Axioms for Actuality

(42) **Metadefinition:** Modally Fragile Axioms. In (43), we shall introduce a special group of axioms that have a profound affect on modal reasoning within our system. We call these *modally fragile* axioms. We define:
ϕ is modally fragile just in case ϕ is (asserted as) an axiom, but its modal closures are not.

There are various material or formal reasons why we may want to assert ϕ, but not its modal closures, as axioms. Materially, we may know or believe that ϕ is true but its necessitation is not. Formally, it may be that ϕ is semantically valid but □ϕ is not. If there is any suspicion that an axiom is grounded on a contingency, then we shall want to refrain from asserting its necessitation as an axiom; we may simply prefer to withhold judgment about the truth of the necessitation of that axiom. In all these cases, the axioms are modally fragile in the above sense.

Consequently, in what follows, we use the label ‘⋆Axiom’ to signpost that an axiom is modally fragile and subsequently place a ⋆ adjacent to its item number whenever we cite it. The ⋆ adjacent to the axiom number thereby signals that the modal closures of that principle are not asserted as axioms. (As we shall see, a ⋆ adjacent to a theorem number has a slightly different, but related, meaning.) When we reason from axioms that are modally fragile, we have to be especially careful when applying the Rule of Necessitation. Our proof theory will be formulated so that if the proof of a theorem ϕ contains an inferential step that is justified by a modally fragile axiom, then we may not use the Rule of Necessitation to infer that □ϕ is also a theorem.

Finally, in the next chapter, when the inferential role of definitions-by-≡ is described in (73), we’ll see that such definitions implicitly extend our system with new axioms, namely, the all the closures of instances of the definition in which ≡ replaces ≡df. The biconditional axioms introduced by such definitions are to be understood as necessary axioms; they are not modally fragile.

(43) ⋆Axioms: Modally Fragile Axioms of Actuality. Where ϕ is any formula, we assert only the universal closures of the following as modally fragile axioms of the system:

Aϕ ≡ ϕ

The necessitation of the above schema, i.e., □(Aϕ ≡ ϕ), is not semantically valid, and so we do not assert the modal closures of the schema’s instances as axioms.115 That’s why this is designated as a ⋆-axiom. We need not assert the actualizations of the above as axioms since the claim Ⅳ(Aϕ ≡ ϕ) is provable

115Intuitively, just consider models of the theory in which there are two possible worlds, wα and w1. In any such model where ϕ is true at the actual world wα and but false at w1, then □(Aϕ ≡ ϕ) is false at wα because the equivalence Aϕ ≡ ϕ is false at w1 (at w1, the left-side is true and the right side is false). Alternatively, in any two-world model where ϕ is false at the actual world wα and but true at w1, then □(Aϕ ≡ ϕ) is again false at wα because the equivalence Aϕ ≡ ϕ is false at w1 (at w1, the left-side is false and the right side is true). See Zalta 1988 where these issues are discussed.
(133.4); indeed, it can be proved without relying on the above $\star$-axiom. Moreover, (134) shows that all the $\Box$-free closures of the above $\star$-axiom can be so proved, where $\Box$-free closure was defined as in (11).

(44) Axioms: Necessary Axioms of Actuality. By constrast we take the all of the closures of the following axiom schemata to be axioms of the system:

1. $\Box \neg \varphi \equiv \neg \Box \varphi$
2. $\Box (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \equiv (\Box \varphi \rightarrow \Box \psi)$
3. $\Box \forall \alpha \varphi \equiv \forall \alpha \Box \varphi$
4. $\Box \varphi \equiv \Box \Box \varphi$

We leave the axioms governing the interaction between the actuality operator and the necessity operator for Section 8.6.116

8.5 Axioms for Necessity

(45) Axioms: Necessity. We take the closures of the following principles as axioms:

1. $\Box (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (\Box \varphi \rightarrow \Box \psi)$ (K)
2. $\Box \varphi \rightarrow \varphi$ (T)
3. $\Diamond \varphi \rightarrow \Box \Diamond \varphi$ (5)

Furthermore, if we read the formula $\exists x (E! x \& \neg \Box E! x)$ as asserting the existence of a concrete-but-not-actually-concrete object, then the following axiom asserts that it is possible that such objects exist:

4. $\Diamond \exists x (E! x \& \neg \Box E! x)$

(.1) – (.3) are well known. Axiom (.4) may not be familiar, but it will play a significant role in what follows. We’ll discuss it in more detail on several occasions. For now, it suffices to say that its philosophical justification is that it captures the idea that the world might have contained something distinct from every actually concrete thing. Interested readers may wish to examine Remark (57), in which reasons are given for preferring (.4) to alternative axioms that might suggest themselves.

Whereas many systematizations of quantified S5 modal logic use a primitive Rule of Necessitation (RN), we derive RN in item (69) (Chapter 9). RN is

116I should mention that in thinking about the logic of actuality, I’ve benefitted from reading Hazen 1978, 1990, and Hazen, Rin, & Wehmeier 2013.
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derived in a form that guarantees that if there is a proof of a formula $\varphi$ that doesn’t depend on a modally-fragile axiom, then there is a proof of $\Box \varphi$. Thus, we can’t apply RN to any formula derived from the logic of actuality axiom (43)*. Once RN is derived, we shall be able to derive the Barcan Formula and Converse Barcan Formula; this occurs in item (168).

8.6 Axioms for Necessity and Actuality

(46) **Axioms:** Necessity and Actuality. We take the closures of the following principles as axioms:

(1) $\forall \varphi \rightarrow \Box \forall \varphi$

(2) $\Box \varphi \equiv \forall \Box \varphi$

(1) asserts that if it is actually the case that $\varphi$, then necessarily it is actually the case that $\varphi$; (2) asserts that $\varphi$ is necessary if and only if it is actually the case that $\varphi$ is necessary.

8.7 Axioms for Definite Descriptions

(47) **Axioms:** Descriptions. We take the closures of the following axiom schema as axioms:

$x = \iota x \varphi \equiv \forall z(\forall \varphi z \equiv z = x)$, provided $z$ is substitutable for $x$ in $\varphi$ and doesn’t occur free in $\varphi$

We may read this as: $x$ is identical to the individual that is (in fact) such that $\varphi$ just in case all and only those individuals that are actually such that $\varphi$ are identical to $x$. The notation $\forall \varphi z$ used in the axiom involves a harmless ambiguity; it should strictly be formulated as $(\forall \varphi z)^*$. By the third bullet point in definition (14), we know that $(\forall \varphi z)^* = \forall (\varphi z)^*$.

8.8 Axioms for Relations

(48) **Axioms:** Complex $n$-Place Relation Terms. The axioms traditionally labeled $\alpha$-Conversion and $\beta$-Conversion govern the significant $\lambda$-expressions of our relational $\lambda$-calculus, while $\eta$-Conversion governs the elementary $\lambda$-expressions:

(1) $\alpha$-Conversion. Where $\nu_1, \ldots, \nu_n$ are any distinct individual variables, the closures of the following are axioms ($n \geq 0$):
8.8. AXIOMS FOR RELATIONS

\[ [\lambda v_1 \ldots v_n \varphi] \downarrow \rightarrow [\lambda v_1 \ldots v_n \varphi] = [\lambda v_1 \ldots v_n \varphi'], \]
where \( [\lambda v_1 \ldots v_n \varphi]' \) is any alphabetic variant of \( [\lambda v_1 \ldots v_n \varphi] \)

(2) \( \beta \)-Conversion. The closures of the following are axioms \((n \geq 1)\): \[ [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi] \downarrow \rightarrow ([\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi]x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv \varphi) \]

(3) \( \eta \)-Conversion: Where \( n \geq 0 \), the closures of the following are axioms:\[ [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n F^n x_1 \ldots x_n] = F^n \]

\( \alpha \)-Conversion guarantees that significant, alphabetically-variant \( n \)-place \( \lambda \)-expressions \((n \geq 0)\) denote the same relation. We shall see that a stronger, unconditioned, version of \( \alpha \)-Conversion can be derived for 0-place \( \lambda \)-expressions; see (112.3) and (112.4).

Note that \( \alpha \)-Conversion is formulated entirely with metavariables, while \( \beta \)-Conversion is formulated with a mixture of object-language variables and metavariables, and \( \eta \)-Conversion is formulated entirely in terms of object-language variables. Thus, \( \alpha \)-Conversion governs any \( \lambda \)-expressions having the right form.

By contrast, \( \beta \)-Conversion is formulated with respect to \((a)\) \( \lambda \)-expressions in which the \( \lambda \) binds the distinct object-language variables \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) and \((b)\) exemplification formulas involving the individual variables \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \). We’ve formulated \( \beta \)-Conversion with specific object-language variables because we can later prove a strengthened form of \( \beta \)-Conversion (179). It asserts that \( [\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi] \downarrow \rightarrow ([\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi]\nu_1 \ldots \nu_n \equiv \varphi_{\nu_1^{\mu_1}, \ldots, \nu_n^{\mu_n}}) \), for any distinct individual variables \( \mu_1, \ldots, \mu_n \) and for any individual variables \( \nu_1, \ldots, \nu_n \), provided \( \nu_1, \ldots, \nu_n \) are substitutable, respectively, for \( \mu_1, \ldots, \mu_n \) in \( \varphi \).

\( \beta \)-Conversion (2) guarantees that significant \( n \)-place \( \lambda \)-expressions behave classically: the left-to-right direction of the consequent is sometimes referred to as \( \lambda \)-Conversion, while the right-to-left direction is sometimes referred to as

\[ [\lambda x [\lambda z G (z G & \neg G)] x] \]

117It is worth observing an interesting fact about \( \beta \)-Conversion and \( \lambda \)-expressions that are built from empty \( \lambda \)-expressions. The \( \lambda \)-expression \([\lambda z G (z G & \neg G)] z\) is empty (it leads to the Clark-Boolos paradox) but the following \( \lambda \)-expression provably exists:

\[ [\lambda x [\lambda z G (z G & \neg G)] x] \]

By the discussion at the end of (39), we know that \([\lambda x [\lambda z G (z G & \neg G)] x] \downarrow\) is an instance of axiom (39.2). This establishes the antecedent of the following instance of \( \beta \)-Conversion:

\[(\delta) [\lambda x [\lambda z G (z G & \neg G)] x] \downarrow \rightarrow ([\lambda x [\lambda z G (z G & \neg G)] x] x \equiv [\lambda z G (z G & \neg G)] x) \]

Hence it follows that:

\[(\xi) [\lambda x [\lambda z G (z G & \neg G)] x] x \equiv [\lambda z G (z G & \neg G)] x \]

But since the Clark/Boolos predicate \([\lambda z G (z G & \neg G)] z\) can’t be significant on pain of contradiction, it will be provable (190.1) that \( [\lambda z G (z G & \neg G)] z \downarrow\). Hence, it follows by axiom (39.5.a) that \( [\lambda x [\lambda z G (z G & \neg G)] x] \downarrow\). So from this and (\xi), it follows that \( [\lambda x [\lambda z G (z G & \neg G)] x] x \). No \( x \) exemplifies the property signified by \([\lambda x [\lambda z G (z G & \neg G)] x] \).
 λ-Abstraction. We don’t need to assert β-Conversion for 0-place λ-expressions of the form \([ \lambda \varphi ]\) because in theorem (112.2), we derive the unconditional claim \([ \lambda \varphi ] \equiv \varphi \) for any formula \( \varphi \), without appealing to the 0-place case of (.2). Since \([ \lambda \varphi ] \equiv \varphi \) is derivable without appeal to the 0-place case of (.2), the 0-place case of (.2) itself then becomes, by propositional logic (by way of the axiom \( \varphi \rightarrow ( \psi \rightarrow \varphi ) \)).

Finally, η-Conversion is not schematic at all. Since the universal closures are axiomatic, the free logic of quantification will guarantee that only significant λ-expressions can be instantiated into such universal closures to produce instances. For example, the following is a universal closure of the 1-place case of η-Conversion and so an axiom:

\[ \forall F ([\lambda x \exists G (zG \& \neg Gz)] = F) \]

Since the λ-expression \([ \lambda z \exists G (zG \& \neg Gz) ]\) isn’t significant, we won’t be able to instantiate it into the above universal claim to derive:

\[ [\lambda x [\lambda z \exists G (zG \& \neg Gz)]]x = [\lambda z \exists G (zG \& \neg Gz)] \]

This can’t be a theorem, since the term on the left of the identity symbol is significant (for the reasons mentioned in footnote 117) while the term on the right is not (on pain of the Clark/Boolos paradox).

However, we later prove theorems that extend η-Conversion in two ways: (a) in (112.1), we derive, for \( n = 0 \), an unconditional equation of the form \([ \lambda \varphi ] = \varphi \), and (b) in (184.2), we derive \( \Pi^n \downarrow \rightarrow [\lambda \nu_1 \ldots \nu_n \Pi^n \nu_1 \ldots \nu_n] = \Pi^n \) for \( n \geq 0 \), where \([ \lambda \nu_1 \ldots \nu_n \Pi^n \nu_1 \ldots \nu_n ]\) is any elementary λ-expression, \( \Pi^n \) is any \( n \)-place relation term, and \( \nu_1 , \ldots , \nu_n \) are any distinct object variables that have no free occurrences in \( \Pi^n \).

(49) Axioms: Coexistence of Relations. We now assert that if the relation being \( x_1 \ldots x_n \) such that \( \varphi \) exists and necessarily, for all \( x_1 , \ldots , x_n \), \( \varphi \) is materially equivalent to \( \psi \), then the relation being \( x_1 \ldots x_n \) such that \( \psi \) exists \( (n \geq 0) \):

\[ ([\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi] \downarrow \& \Box \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n (\varphi \equiv \psi)) \rightarrow [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \psi] \downarrow \]

\( (n \geq 0) \)

Intuitively, this tells us that if a complex λ-expression is significant, then any λ-expression with a necessarily and universally equivalent matrix is also significant. We note, for future reference, that this axiom is not a trivial instance or consequence of the Rules of Substitution that we derive in item (160).\(^{118}\)

\(^{118}\)In the next chapter, we introduce Rules of Substitution and the notion of modal strictness. The Rules of Substitution (160) allow one to substitute, within a formula \( \chi \), a formula \( \psi \) for a formula \( \varphi \) only when (a) \( \varphi \) occurs as a subformula of \( \chi \), and (b) there is either a proof of \( \Box (\varphi \equiv \psi) \) or a modally strict proof (61.2) of \( \varphi \equiv \psi \). The above axiom isn’t implied by these rules, since by definition (6), \( \varphi \) is not a subformula of the term \([ \lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi ]\) and so is not a subformula of the claim \([ \lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi ]\). Moreover, unlike the Rules of Substitution, instances of the above axiom don’t require a proof of
Some readers may be interested in the discussion Remark (58), where we explain why the necessity operator and universal quantifiers are needed in the second conjunct of the antecedent of the above axiom.

It is worth mentioning again that this axiom allows us to prove the significance of some λ-expression excluded by (39.2). For example, consider a λ-expression Π in which the initial λ binds a variable in an encoding formula subterm. If one can show that the matrix of Π is necessarily and universally equivalent to the matrix of a λ-expression whose significance is known, then we can infer that Π is significant. For an example, see (237.3), where the λ binds variables in the encoding formula subterms xF and yF – by convention, these are subterms of x = y and so subterms of the λ-expression.

8.9 Axioms for Encoding

(50) Axiom: n-ary Encoding Reduction. When \( n \geq 2 \), we assert that individuals \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) encode relation \( F^n \) if and only if: \( x_1 \) encodes \( [\lambda y F^n y x_2 \ldots x_n] \) and \( x_2 \) encodes \( [\lambda y F^n x_1 y x_3 \ldots x_n] \) and \( \ldots \) and \( x_n[\lambda y F^n x_1 \ldots x_{n-1} y] \). Formally, we assert the closures of:

\[
x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \equiv \quad \quad x_1[\lambda y F^n y x_2 \ldots x_n] \& x_2[\lambda y F^n x_1 y x_3 \ldots x_n] \& \ldots \& x_n[\lambda y F^n x_1 \ldots x_{n-1} y]
\]

where \( n \geq 2 \).

(51) Axiom: Rigidity of Encoding. If an object \( x \) encodes a property \( F \), it does so necessarily. That is, the closures of the following are axioms of the system:

\[
xF \rightarrow \Box xF
\]

In other words, encoded properties are rigidly encoded. From this axiom, we will be able to prove both that \( \Box xF \rightarrow \Box xF \) and \( \Box xF \equiv \Box xF \). Moreover, given axiom (50), we shall be able to prove both that \( x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \rightarrow \Box x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \) and \( x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \equiv \Box x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \), for \( n \geq 1 \).

(52) Axiom: Ordinary Objects Fail to Encode Properties. The closures of the following are axioms:

\[
O!x \rightarrow \neg \exists F xF
\]

We prove in the next chapter that if \( x \) is ordinary, then necessarily \( x \) fails to encode any properties, i.e., that \( O!x \rightarrow \Box \neg \exists F xF \).

\( \Box (\phi \equiv \psi) \) or a modally strict proof of \( \phi \equiv \psi \); if \( \Box \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n (\phi \equiv \psi) \) were only an assumption, for example, we could use that fact when applying the above axiom. See the discussion in (72). For further discussion of some of these issues, see the examples of illegitimate uses of the Rules of Substitution in (161).
**(53) Axioms:** Comprehension Principle for Abstract Objects (‘Object Comprehension’). The closures of the following schema are axioms:

\[ \exists x (A!x \& \forall F (xF \equiv \varphi)), \text{ provided } x \text{ doesn’t occur free in } \varphi \]

When \( x \) doesn’t occur free in \( \varphi \), we may think of \( \varphi \) as presenting a condition on properties \( F \), whether or not \( F \) is free in \( \varphi \) (the condition \( \varphi \) being a vacuous one when \( F \) doesn’t occur free). So this axiom guarantees that for every condition \( \varphi \) on properties \( F \) expressible in the language, there exists an abstract object \( x \) that encodes just the properties \( F \) such that \( \varphi \).

**Remark:** The Restriction on Comprehension. In the formulation of the Comprehension Principle for Abstract Objects in (53), the formula \( \varphi \) used in comprehension may not contain free occurrences of \( x \). This is a traditional constraint on comprehension schemata. Without such a restriction, a contradiction would be immediately derivable by using the formula ‘\( \neg F \)’ as \( \varphi \), so as to produce the instance:

\[ \exists x (A!x \& \forall F (xF \equiv \neg F)) \]

Any such object, say \( a \), would be such that \( \forall F (aF \equiv \neg aF) \), and a contradiction of the form \( \varphi \equiv \neg \varphi \) would follow once we instantiate the quantifier \( \forall F \) to any property. Instances such as the one displayed above are therefore ruled out by the restriction.

### 8.10 Summary of the Axioms

*In order to investigate a subfield of a science, one bases it on the smallest possible number of principles, which are to be as simple, intuitive, and comprehensible as possible, and which one collects together and sets up as axioms.*

— Hilbert 1922 (translated in Ewald 1996, 1119)

We amend Hilbert’s observation only to suggest that one should base a science using the smallest number of principles needed to systematize the primitive and defined notions expressible in the language of the science. The closures of the following (and only universal closures of (43)\( \ast \)) axiomatize the primitive notions \( F^1 \ldots x_n, x_1 \ldots x_n F^n, \neg, \to, \forall, \Box, \lambda, \iota, \lambda, \text{ and the defined notions } \downarrow, =. \) (We use \& and \( \equiv \) only for expressive convenience.)

**Axioms for Negations and Conditionals:**

- \( \varphi \to (\psi \to \varphi) \)  
  \[ (38.1) \]
- \((\varphi \to (\psi \to \chi)) \to ((\varphi \to \psi) \to (\varphi \to \chi)) \)  
  \[ (38.2) \]
- \((\neg \varphi \to \neg \psi) \to ((\neg \varphi \to \psi) \to \varphi) \)  
  \[ (38.3) \]
8.10. SUMMARY OF THE AXIOMS

Axioms for Universal Quantification and Logical Existence:

- \( \forall \alpha \phi \rightarrow (\tau \downarrow \rightarrow \phi_{\tau}) \), provided \( \tau \) is substitutable for \( \alpha \) in \( \phi \)  
  \hspace{1cm} (39.1)
- \( \tau \downarrow \), provided \( \tau \) is primitive constant, a variable, or a \( \lambda \)-expression in which the initial \( \lambda \) does not bind any variable in any encoding formula subterm  
  \hspace{1cm} (39.2)
- \( \forall \alpha (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (\forall \alpha \varphi \rightarrow \forall \alpha \psi) \)  
  \hspace{1cm} (39.3)
- \( \varphi \rightarrow \forall \alpha \varphi \), provided \( \alpha \) doesn’t occur free in \( \varphi \)  
  \hspace{1cm} (39.4)
- \( \Pi^n \kappa_1 \cdots \kappa_n \rightarrow (\Pi^n \downarrow \& \kappa_1 \downarrow \& \cdots \& \kappa_n \downarrow) \)  
  \hspace{1cm} (n \geq 0) \hspace{1cm} (39.5.a)
- \( \kappa_1 \cdots \kappa_n \Pi^n \rightarrow (\Pi^n \downarrow \& \kappa_1 \downarrow \& \cdots \& \kappa_n \downarrow) \)  
  \hspace{1cm} (n \geq 1) \hspace{1cm} (39.5.b)

Axioms for the Substitution of Identicals:

- \( \alpha = \beta \rightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow \varphi') \), whenever \( \beta \) is substitutable for \( \alpha \) in \( \varphi \), and \( \varphi' \) is the result of replacing zero or more free occurrences of \( \alpha \) in \( \varphi \) with occurrences of \( \beta \)  
  \hspace{1cm} (41)

Axioms for Actuality:

- \( \forall \alpha \varphi \equiv \forall \alpha \alpha \varphi \)  
  \hspace{1cm} (43)*
- \( \forall \neg \varphi \equiv \neg \forall \varphi \)  
  \hspace{1cm} (44.1)
- \( \forall (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \equiv (\forall \varphi \rightarrow \forall \psi) \)  
  \hspace{1cm} (44.2)
- \( \forall \forall \alpha \varphi \equiv \forall \alpha \forall \varphi \)  
  \hspace{1cm} (44.3)
- \( \forall \alpha \varphi \equiv \exists \forall \alpha \varphi \)  
  \hspace{1cm} (44.4)

Axioms for Necessity:

- \( \Box (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (\Box \varphi \rightarrow \Box \psi) \)  
  \hspace{1cm} (45.1)
- \( \Box \varphi \rightarrow \varphi \)  
  \hspace{1cm} (45.2)
- \( \Diamond \varphi \rightarrow \Box \Diamond \varphi \)  
  \hspace{1cm} (45.3)
- \( \Diamond \exists ! \varphi(\forall \exists ! x \& \neg \Box \exists ! x) \)  
  \hspace{1cm} (45.4)

Axioms for Necessity and Actuality:

- \( \forall \alpha \varphi \rightarrow \Box \forall \alpha \varphi \)  
  \hspace{1cm} (46.1)
- \( \Box \neg \varphi \equiv \Box \Box \neg \varphi \)  
  \hspace{1cm} (46.2)

Axioms for Definite Descriptions:
\[ x = \tau \varphi \equiv \forall z (\exists \varphi \equiv z = x), \] provided \( z \) is substitutable for \( x \) in \( \varphi \) and doesn’t occur free in \( \varphi \) \( (47) \)

**Axioms for Relations:**

- \[ [\lambda v_1 \ldots v_n \varphi] \downarrow \rightarrow [\lambda v_1 \ldots v_n \varphi] = [\lambda v_1 \ldots v_n \varphi]’, \] where \( n \geq 0 \) and \( [\lambda v_1 \ldots v_n \varphi]’ \) is any alphabetic variant of \( [\lambda v_1 \ldots v_n \varphi] \) \( (48.1) \)
- \[ [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi] \downarrow \rightarrow ([\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi] x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv \varphi) \] \( (48.2) \)
- \[ [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n F^nx_1 \ldots x_n] = F^n, \text{ for } n \geq 0 \] \( (48.3) \)
- \[ ([\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi] \downarrow \& \square \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n (\varphi \equiv \psi)) \rightarrow [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \psi] \downarrow \] \( (n \geq 0) \) \( (49) \)

**Axioms for Encoding:**

- \( x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \equiv x_1 [\lambda y F^nx_2 \ldots x_n] \& x_2 [\lambda y F^nx_3 \ldots x_n] \& \ldots \& x_n [\lambda y F^nx_1 \ldots x_{n-1} y] \) \( (50) \)
- \( xF \rightarrow \square xF \) \( (51) \)
- \( O!x \rightarrow \neg \exists FxF \) \( (52) \)
- \( \exists x (A!x \& \forall F (xF \equiv \varphi)), \) provided \( x \) doesn’t occur free in \( \varphi \) \( (53) \)

### 8.11 Explanatory Remarks: Digression

**Remark:** Examples That Increase Understanding of Axiom (39.2). Some readers may find the following considerations, which led to the current formulation of axiom (39.2), interesting. The axiom asserts:

\[ \tau \downarrow, \] whenever \( \tau \) is either a primitive constant (i.e., one not introduced by a definition), a variable, or a \( \lambda \)-expression in which the initial \( \lambda \) does not bind any variable in any encoding formula subterm.

We discussed in (39.2) why this axiom asserts that primitive constants and variables are significant, and we described the intuition that underlies the condition under which \( \lambda \)-expressions are significant. But it would be helpful to give some examples of \( \lambda \)-expressions that aren’t asserted to be significant by (39.2), i.e., \( \lambda \)-expressions in which the initial \( \lambda \) binds a variable in an encoding formula subterm. Consider the following extended, bulleted list of examples of such \( \lambda \)-expressions.

- (39.2) does not assert \( [\lambda x \exists G(xG \& \neg Gx)] \downarrow \). In this expression, the \( \lambda \) binds the variable \( x \), which occurs in the encoding formula subterm \( xG \). Since this \( \lambda \)-expression leads to the Clark/Boolos paradox, it is provably empty (190).
- Consider the following definition:
Clark-Boolos(x) ≡ df ∃G(xG & ¬Gx)

Then (39.2) does not assert [λx Clark-Boolos(x)]↓. By Convention (17.3), xG is a subterm of Clark-Boolos(x) and since x occurs free in the definiens, it occurs free in an encoding subformula subterm of Clark-Boolos(x). Thus, the λ in [λx Clark-Boolos(x)] binds a variable in an encoding formula subterm, for the definition of subterm (7) qualifies xG as a subterm of the λ-expression.

- Consider the following definition:

\[
S_{10} = df \lambda x \exists G (xG & \neg Gx)
\]

Then (39.2) does not assert S_{10}↓, since it is a relation constant introduced by definition and not a primitive constant. (The inferential role of this definition-by-≡ will ensure that \(\neg S_{10}↓\) follows from the fact that \(\neg[\lambda x \exists G(xG & \neg Gx)]↓\), i.e., follows from theorem (190.1).) But also note that [λx S_{10}x]↓ is asserted by (39.2), since it doesn’t violate the restriction! The λ doesn’t bind a variable in an encoding formula subterm. The property [λx S_{10}x] denotes, though, will be provably empty, for given that such a property exists, β-Conversion yields, for an arbitrary x, that [λx S_{10}x]x ≡ S_{10}x. Since we’ve indicated why \(\neg S_{10}↓\), it follows from axiom (39.5.a) that \(\neg[\lambda x S_{10}x]x\), for any x.

- (39.2) does not assert [λx Giy(y = x & ∃H(xH & ¬Hx))]. This is a predicate that leads to the Kirchner paradox, and it fails the conditions for (39.2) because the λ binds the variable x in encoding formula subterms. Since y = x contains xF as an encoding formula subterm, given definition (23.1) and Convention (17.3), the λ binds the variable x in the encoding formula subterm of y = x. Moreover, the λ binds the x in the encoding formula subterm xH.

- Consider the following definition:

\[
c_x = df \lambda y (y = x & ∃H(xH & ¬Hx))
\]

Now consider the λ-expression [λx Gc_x]. (39.2) does not assert [λx Gc_x]↓. Note that if (39.2) were to assert [λx Gc_x]↓, then we could derive a contradiction.\(^{119}\)

\(^{119}\)For by (39.2), the universal closure would also be axiom:

(A) ∀G([λx Gc_x]↓)

Now it will be a theorem (191.2)• that:

(B) ∃G(¬[λx Giy(y = x & ∃H(xH & ¬Hx))]↓)

(A) and (B) are inconsistent. To see why, note that every universal property, i.e., every property that is exemplified by every individual, is a witness to (B) – see the proof of (191.1)•. Since it is easy to show that there are universal properties, let P be such a property and instantiate P into (A), to obtain [λx Pc_x]↓. From this and the relevant instance of β-Conversion (48.2) we obtain:

[λx Pc_x]x ≡ Pc_x

Now by the reasoning in the proof of (191.1)•, it can be shown that Pc_x is equivalent to ∃H(xH & ¬Hx). Hence it would follow that:
By not asserting \([\lambda x \ G c_x]↓\) (and its closures), (39.2) avoids this result. By convention, \(c_x\) contains encoding formula subterms, namely, \(xF\) and \(yF\), which are subterms of (the definiens of) \(y = x\). Moreover, since \(x\) is free in the definiens of \(c_x\), we have to regard it as free in \(c_x\). Thus, the \(\lambda\) in \([\lambda x \ G c_x]\) binds a variable in an encoding formula subterm.

• Let \(c_x\) be defined as above and let \(P\) again be any universal property. Then (39.2) asserts \([\lambda y \ P c_x]↓\) – it meets the condition that the \(\lambda\) doesn’t bind any variable in an encoding formula subterm. Of course, there are encoding formula subterms — \(c_x\) has encoding formula subterms, as we’ve just seen. But the occurrences of \(y\) in these encoding formula subterms are not bound by the \(\lambda\) in \([\lambda y \ P c_x]\)! Since \(y\) doesn’t occur free in the definiens of \(c_x\), it doesn’t occur free in \(c_x\). So the \(\lambda\) in \([\lambda y \ P c_x]\) doesn’t bind any variable other than the initial \(y\). Now since \([\lambda y \ P c_x]\)↓, consider the definition:

\[Q_x \equiv_df [\lambda y \ P c_x]\]

and then consider the predicate \([\lambda x \ Q_x a]\). (39.2) does not assert \([\lambda x \ Q_x a]↓\). Since \(Q_x\) has \(c_x\) as an encoding formula subterm, and \(c_x\) has \(xF\) as an encoding formula subterm, \(Q_x\) has \(xF\) as an encoding formula subterm. Thus, the \(\lambda\) in \([\lambda x \ Q_x a]\↓\) binds a variable in an encoding formula subterm.

• The variable \(x\) occurs free not only in the exemplification formula \(Rxz\) and in the term \([\lambda z Rxz]\), it also occurs free in the encoding formula \(y[\lambda z Rxz]\). But this encoding formula is an encoding formula subterm of the 1-place relation term \([\lambda x y[\lambda z Rxz]]\). Hence (39.2) does not assert \([\lambda x y[\lambda z Rxz]]↓\), since the \(\lambda\) in \([\lambda x y[\lambda z Rxz]]\) binds a variable in an encoding formula subterm.

(56) Remark: Digression on the Axiom for the Substitution of Identicals. Note that the definition of object identity (23.1) and the axiom for the substitution of identicals (41) jointly guarantee that if abstract objects \(x\) and \(y\) necessarily encode the same properties, then they necessarily exemplify the same properties. For if \(\square \exists x \ A!x & \exists y \ A!y & \forall F (xF \equiv yF)\), then definition (23.1) implies \(x = y\), and from this, the substitution of identicals allows us to infer \(\square \forall F (Fx \equiv Fy)\) from the classical theorem that \(\square \forall F (Fx \equiv Fx)\). Similarly, the axiom for the substitution of identicals will guarantee that if properties \(F\) and \(G\) are necessarily encoded by the same objects, then they are necessarily exemplified by the same objects. For if \(\exists \forall x (xF \equiv xG)\), then since \(F↓\) and \(G↓\) are axiomatic,

\[\lambda x \ P c_x]x \equiv \exists H(xH \& \neg Hx)\]

Since we’ve made no assumptions about the free variable \(x\), the last line holds for all \(x\):

\[\forall x(\lambda x \ P c_x]x \equiv \exists H(xH \& \neg Hx)\]

And since we derived \([\lambda x \ P c_x]↓\ from (A), it follows by \(\exists I\) that:

\[\exists F \forall x (Fx \equiv \exists H(xH \& \neg Hx))\]

This is a problematic assertion that leads to a version of the Clark/Boolos paradox.
we shall be able to derive $F = G$ from the definition of property identity (23.2). From this, the substitution of identals allows us to infer $\Box \forall x (Fx \equiv Gx)$ from the easily-established theorem that $\Box \forall x (Fx \equiv Fx)$.

Indeed, given such facts, one might wonder whether we might (a) replace the axiom for the substitution of identals with the following axioms:

- $(A!x & A!y & \Box \forall F(xF \equiv yF)) \rightarrow \Box \forall F(Fx \equiv Fy)$
- $\Box \forall x(xF \equiv xG) \rightarrow \Box \forall x(Fx \equiv Gx)$

and then (b) prove that the substitution of identals holds.

However, to see that the two proposed axioms are not sufficient to prove the substitution of identals, it suffices to show an instance of the substitution of identals that the two proposed axioms don’t imply. Consider the instance:

$$x = y \rightarrow (\exists F(xF & \neg Fx) \rightarrow \exists F(yF & \neg Fy))$$

The proposed axioms don’t imply this claim in absence of the substitution of identals. For suppose we assume both $x = y$ and $\exists F(xF & \neg Fx)$, with the goal of showing $\exists F(yF & \neg Fy)$. Note that from the second assumption, $\exists F(xF & \neg Fx)$, it will follow by axiom (52) (stated below), which asserts that ordinary objects don’t encode any properties, that $x$ is abstract. So since $x = y$ and $x$ is abstract, it follows by definition (23.1), both that $y$ is abstract and that $x$ and $y$ necessarily encode the same properties. Then, by the first of the proposed axioms, $x$ and $y$ exemplify the same properties. But this won’t help us establish $\exists F(yF & \neg Fy)$ because we can’t abstract out a property of $x$ from the assumption that $\exists F(xF & \neg Fx)$. We may not use $\beta$-Conversion to infer $[\lambda x \exists F(xF & \neg Fx)]x$ from $\exists F(xF & \neg Fx)$ because the antecedent, $[\lambda x \exists F(xF & \neg Fx)]\downarrow$, of the relevant instance of $\beta$-Conversion, isn’t available. $\beta$-Conversion can be applied only when $\lambda$-expression in question is provably significant. Since $\exists F(xF & \neg Fx)$ doesn’t yield a property that $x$ exemplifies, we can’t infer $[\lambda x \exists F(xF & \neg Fx)]y$ from the fact that $x$ and $y$ exemplify the same properties. And, consequently, we can’t use $\beta$-Conversion to derive $\exists F(yF & \neg Fy)$.

(57) Remark: Digression on Alternatives to (45.4). Various alternatives axioms were considered before settling on the version asserted as axiom (45.4). It may be of interest to some readers to learn why these alternatives were ultimately rejected in favor of (45.4). The alternatives that we considered are:

(.1) $\exists x (E!x & \Diamond \neg E!x)$

(.2) $\Diamond \exists x (E!x & \Diamond \neg E!x) & \Diamond \neg \exists x (E!x & \Diamond \neg E!x)$

(.3) $\Diamond \exists x (E!x & \Diamond \neg E!x)$

(.4) $\Diamond \exists x E!x & \Diamond \neg \exists x E!x$
Note that none of these asserts exactly what (45.4) asserts, namely, that it is possible that there exists a concrete-but-not-actually-concrete object.

The decision for using (45.4) can be summarized as follows. By asserting the possible existence of a concrete-but-not actually-concrete object, (45.4):

- plays a role in the proof of the existence of at least two contingent properties (203.5);
- plays a role in the proof of the existence of at least two contingent propositions (i.e., propositions that are both possibly true and possibly false) (209.4), and thus prove the existence of at least four propositions (210.4);
- plays a role in identifying two contingent propositions (213), one of which is contingently false (i.e., false but possibly true) and the other of which is contingently true (i.e., true but possibly false);
- plays a role in the proof of (theorems used in the proof of) the possible existence of concrete objects (203.3) and in the necessary existence of ordinary objects (225.1);
- plays a role in the proof of the existence of at least two possible worlds (529.4); and
- accomplishes the above without requiring the existence of concrete objects and without requiring the existence of a possible world that is devoid of (contingently) concrete objects.

The explanation as to why none of the alternatives have all these features will be conducted informally, by invoking as yet undefined notions of possible world and truth at at a possible world, as well as presupposing some basic model and set theory. So it should be remembered: (a) that, ultimately, talk about possible worlds and truth at a possible world is to be given the analysis in Chapter 12, Section 12.2; (b) that object theory doesn’t assume or require any set theory or model theory; and (c) that some notions and axioms of set-theory will be reconstructed in object theory in Chapter 10, Section 10.3.

(.1) asserts that there exists an object that is both concrete but possibly not, i.e., there exists a contingently concrete object. If one were to assume that there is such an object, say $a$, then we would know $E!a \& \diamondsuit E!a$. Since the expression $E!a$ denotes a proposition, we could conclude $\exists p(p \& \diamondsuit \lnot p)$, and that conclusion would remain once we discharge the assumption about $a$. Thus, (.1) allows us to prove that there is a contingently true proposition, though we couldn’t actually express such a proposition in our language. And once we have established that there is a contingently true proposition, it is straightforward to show that there is a contingently false one; just take the negation of any witness to the existence of a contingent truth.
Despite these virtues of (.1), the reason for not adopting it should be clear: we cannot justifiably assert (.1) \(a \text{ priori}\) given that it implies \(\exists x E!x\), i.e., there exist concrete objects. If we could justifiably assert (.1) \(a \text{ priori}\), Berkeley’s idealism would be convincingly refutable \(a \text{ priori}\). It isn’t. \(A \text{ posteriori}\) evidence derived from our senses leads us to assign \(\exists x E!x\) a very high probability. Since we can’t justifiably assert \(\exists x E!x \text{ a priori}\), we can’t assert (.1) \(a \text{ priori}\). By contrast, (45.4) can be asserted \(a \text{ priori}\); it is true \(a \text{ priori}\) that there might be a concrete-but-not-actually-concrete object, though I guess that a strict Humean might deny this.

(.2) asserts that there might be contingently concrete objects and that there might not be. (.2) immediately yields the existence of a contingent proposition, namely, \(\exists x (E!x \& \Diamond \neg E!x)\), since it asserts both that this proposition is possible and that its negation is possible. So if \(\exists x (E!x \& \Diamond \neg E!x)\) is true, it is contingently true (since it is possibly false), and if false, it is contingently false (since it is possibly true). Of course, (.2) doesn’t tell you whether \(\exists x (E!x \& \Diamond \neg E!x)\) is contingently true or contingently false. But (.2) also has the nice feature that it grounds a presupposition of Leibniz’s famous question, “Why is there something rather than nothing?” (Article 7, Principles of Nature and Grace, 1714, PW 199, G.vi 602). Leibniz poses this question in the context of considering the natural world, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that he is asking, “Why is there something contingently concrete rather than nothing contingently concrete?” This presupposes that there might be no contingently concrete objects, which is precisely what the second conjunct of (.2) asserts \(a \text{ priori}\).

However, this second conjunct of (.2) does raise some questions. In the idiom of possible worlds, (.2) implies that there exists a possible world in which there are no contingently concrete objects. But consider this counterargument: if the key to naturalizing abstract objects is to suppose that they arise from (or even regard them as) patterns of contingently concrete objects in the natural world, then if there had been no contingently concrete objects, there would have been no abstract objects, which seems to contradict the idea that abstract objects are necessary beings. Even if such an argument is cogent, it isn’t knockdown; as long the actual world in fact has contingently concrete objects and abstract objects arise from (or arise as) patterns of such objects, then it may not matter that a possible world empty of contingently concrete objects fails to give rise to abstract objects. So, although the second conjunct of (.2) gives rise to (the appearance of) controversy. Thus, we shall not assert (.2) given that the existence of a possible world devoid of contingently concrete objects may yield more metaphysical questions than it answers.

By contrast, (45.4) doesn’t require the existence of a possible world devoid of contingently concrete objects. (45.4) is true in models in which there are exactly two possible worlds (the actual world \(w_a\) and a distinct world \(w_1\)) and
two distinct objects, one of which is concrete at \( w_\alpha \) but not at \( w_1 \) and the other of which is concrete at \( w_1 \) but not at \( w_\alpha \). But (.2) rules out such models. Of course, (45.4) allows for models in which nothing is contingently concrete at \( w_\alpha \) as long as there is a world like \( w_1 \) at which some object is concrete there but not at \( w_\alpha \). (Of course, it is unlikely that such a model represents the way things are.) So, in this sense, (45.4) is weaker than (.2). But (45.4) is stronger in the sense that it rules out models with exactly two possible worlds in which there is one contingently concrete object at \( w_\alpha \) and none at \( w_1 \). Such a model is permitted by (.2).

(.3) doesn’t have the problem that (.2) has, since it simply drops the second conjunct of (.2). Though (.3) doesn’t immediately yield the existence of a contingent proposition, we may derive the existence of such a proposition from (.3) without appealing to the current (45.4). The disadvantages of (.3) emerge only in comparison with (45.4). From the latter, we shall not only be able to prove that there exist contingent propositions, but we’ll be able to identify a particular proposition that is contingently true and one that is contingently false. We’ll see in (213.1) that \( \exists x(Elx \& \neg \Box Elx) \) is contingently false, and in (213.2) that its negation is contingently true. By contrast, (.3) isn’t strong enough to yield these results.

Finally, (.4) has the virtue that it, too, implies the existence of a contingent proposition, namely, \( \exists xElx \), since it asserts both that this proposition and its negation are both possible. So if \( \exists xElx \) is true, it is contingently true (since it is possibly false), and if false, contingently false (since it is possibly true). But there are two problems with the second conjunct of (.4). Since the second conjunct requires that there be a world devoid of any concrete objects, it requires both (a) the existence of a world where there are no contingently concrete objects (i.e., objects that are concrete there but not concrete with respect to some other world) and (b) the existence of a world where there are no necessarily concrete objects (like Spinoza’s God). We’ve already discussed the questions that arise in connection with (a). As for (b), if Spinoza is correct that God just is Nature and that God is a necessary being, then given that Nature is concrete, it would follow that God (\( g \)) is necessarily concrete, i.e., that \( \Box Elg \).

---

120 By contrast, (.2) rules out, while (45.4) is true in, a model containing exactly two possible worlds, in which the actual world has a single contingently concrete object while the second world has two, since (.2) requires the existence of world empty of contingently concrete objects.

121 Assume \( \diamond \exists x(Elx \& \diamond \neg Elx) \). Then by BF\( \diamond \) (167.3), it follows that \( \exists x(\diamond Elx \& \diamond \neg Elx) \). Suppose \( a \) is such an object, so that we know \( \diamond (El a \& \diamond \neg El a) \). Since a possible conjunction implies that the conjuncts are possible, it follows that \( \diamond El a \) and \( \diamond \neg El a \). But by a relevant instance of the \( \diamond \diamond \) schema (165.7), the latter implies \( \diamond \neg El a \). So we have established \( \diamond El a \& \diamond \diamond \neg El a \). Now we also know that \( \lceil \lambda x Ela \rceil \), by (39.2), and so it follows that \( (El a) \), by definition (20.3). Since the formula \( El a \) has a denotation, \( \diamond El a \& \diamond \diamond \neg El a \) implies \( \exists p (\diamond p \& \diamond \neg p) \). Thus, we have derived that there exists a contingent proposition. This proof, however, is non-constructive; we can’t express a witness in our language.
If so, it wouldn’t be correct to assert that it is possible that there are no concrete objects; at least, we shouldn’t assert this \textit{a priori}. Note that in giving this argument, we’re not \textit{agreeing} with Spinoza’s view; only suggesting that object theory should not rule his view out \textit{a priori}. (Of course, some may think it would be a feature of the system if it were to rule out Spinoza’s view.) In any case, (45.4) doesn’t have the disadvantages of (.4).

\textbf{(58) Remark:} Digression on the Coexistence of Relations. It may be of some interest to learn why the 2nd conjunct of the antecedent of (49) must include both a modal operator and universal quantifiers.\footnote{The argument that follows was sketched by Daniel Kirchner, in personal communications (email correspondence) of 17 November 2017 and thereafter. For interested readers, we have reconstructed the argument in greater detail, by considering the 1-place case of the axiom.} Consider what the 1-place case of (49) would have asserted if the modal operator and universal quantifier had been removed from the second conjunct:

\[(\varphi) \quad ([\lambda x \varphi] \downarrow \land (\varphi \equiv \psi)) \to [\lambda x \psi] \downarrow\]

To see why the universal quantifier $\forall x$ must preface the second conjunct of the antecedent, we derive a contradiction from (\varphi) that would have been avoidable had the quantifier been present. Let $\varphi$ be $\forall p(p \to p)$ and let $\psi$ be the formula that leads to the Kirchner paradox, i.e., $Giy(y = x \land \exists H(xH \land \neg Hx))$, where $G$ is some universal property such as $[\lambda z \forall p(p \to p)]$. Then the following is an instance of \varphi:

\[(\xi) \quad ([\lambda x \forall p(p \to p)] \downarrow \land (\forall p(p \to p) \equiv Giy(y = x \land \exists H(xH \land \neg Hx)))) \to [\lambda x Giy(y = x \land \exists H(xH \land \neg Hx))] \downarrow\]

Note that the variable $x$ has three free occurrences in the second conjunct of the antecedent. These occurrences become bound in the universal closure of (\xi), which would, like (\xi), also be an axiom if (\varphi) were an axiom:

\[(\zeta) \quad \forall x([\lambda x \forall p(p \to p)] \downarrow \land (\forall p(p \to p) \equiv Giy(y = x \land \exists H(xH \land \neg Hx)))) \to [\lambda x Giy(y = x \land \exists H(xH \land \neg Hx))] \downarrow\]

Now consider any abstract object that encodes $\textit{O!}$; for example, let $a$ be an abstract object that encodes just $\textit{O!}$, but also, since $\textit{A!a}$, by (220.3). Hence, $\exists H(aH \land \neg Ha)$. Now if we instantiate $a$ into (\zeta), we obtain:

\[(\zeta') \quad ([\lambda x \forall p(p \to p)] \downarrow \land (\forall p(p \to p) \equiv Giy(y = a \land \exists H(xH \land \neg Hx)))) \to [\lambda x Giy(y = x \land \exists H(xH \land \neg Hx))] \downarrow\]

\textbf{122}The claim $\exists x(A!x \land VF(xF \equiv F = \textit{O!}))$ is an instance of the Comprehension Principle for Abstract Objects (53). It asserts the existence of an abstract object that encodes just $\textit{O!}$ and no other properties.
But both conjuncts of the antecedent of \((\xi')\) would now be derivable. The first conjunct is an axiom, since the \(\lambda\) doesn’t bind any variables in any encoding formula subterm (39.2). It then remains only to show:

\[
\forall p(p \rightarrow p) \equiv G\forall(y = a \& \exists H(aH \& \neg Ha))
\]

**Proof.** Since \(\forall p(p \rightarrow p)\) is a theorem, it suffices to show only that the right condition is a theorem. But when \(p\) is true, \(\forall y(y = x)\) is identical to \(\forall y(y = x \& p)\). Moreover both descriptions have the same denotation as \(x\). Since we’ve established \(\exists H(aH \& \neg Ha)\), it follows that \(\forall y(y = a \& \exists H(aH \& \neg Ha))\) denotes \(a\). So we only need to show \(Ga\). But this follows from the assumption that \(G\) is a universal property.

So it would follow from \((\xi')\) that \([\lambda x G\forall(y = x \& \exists H(xH \& \neg Hx))]\downarrow\), i.e., that the Kirchner predicate has a denotation. Since we know this result leads to a contradiction, we’ve shown why \((\vartheta)\) has to be replaced by:

\[
(\omega) \ (\downarrow [\lambda x \varphi] \& \forall x(\varphi \equiv \psi)) \rightarrow [\lambda x \psi]\downarrow
\]

With the quantifier \(\forall x\) prefaceing the second conjunct of the antecedent, the axiom can’t be true simply on the basis of a single assignment to the free variable \(x\) in \((\xi)\).

But \((\omega)\) still won’t do as an axiom. We must add not only the quantifier \(\forall x\) to the second conjunct of the antecedent, but also a modal operator, on pain of contradiction. To see how the contradiction would arise, we have to appeal to modal theorem (213.2)\*, which identifies a particular, contingently true proposition.\(^{124}\) To state this theorem, we let \(q_0\) be the proposition \(\exists x(E!x \& \neg E!x)\). Then (213.2)\* asserts that the negation of \(q_0\) is contingently true, i.e., that \(ContingentlyTrue(q_0)\). So by definition (211.1), we know \(\neg q_0 \& \diamond \neg q_0\), i.e.,

\[
(A) \quad \neg q_0 \& \diamond q_0
\]

Then we derive a contradiction from this fact and \((\omega)\) as follows.

Let \(\chi\) be the matrix of the Kirchner predicate, i.e., let \(\chi\) be \(G\forall(y = x \& \exists H(xH \& \neg Hx))\). (As we saw earlier in (55), \(\chi\) has encoding formula subterms.) Since we know \(\neg q_0\) by \((A)\), we also know \(\neg q_0 \lor \diamond \chi\). Hence we know the following equivalence, since the left side is easily derivable and the right side has been shown to be true:

\[
124\text{Since the following, extended reasoning appeals both to theorem (213.2)\* and axiom (43)\*, it is not modally strict (61.2). But a contradiction is to be avoided, no matter whether it arises by modally strict or non-modally strict reasoning. We might be able to derive a contradiction by modally strict means if we start with theorem (215.1), which asserts that there are contingently true propositions. But (a) the present reasoning is simpler if we just identify a specific, contingently true proposition, and (b) it suffices to make the point by deriving a contradiction by non-modally strict reasoning.}
\]
\[\forall p(p \rightarrow p) \equiv (\neg q_0 \lor \downarrow \chi)\]

Hence by GEN:

(B) \[\forall x(\forall p(p \rightarrow p) \equiv (\neg q_0 \lor \downarrow \chi))\]

Since \([\lambda x \forall p(p \rightarrow p)] \downarrow (39.2)\), it follows from (\omega) that:

(C) \[\lambda x (\neg q_0 \lor \downarrow \chi) \downarrow\]

Now the following is an axiom, since it is the universal generalization of an instance of (39.2):

(D) \[\forall G([\lambda x \Box Gx] \downarrow)\]

So from (C) and (D) it follows that:

(E) \[\lambda x [\lambda x (\neg q_0 \lor \downarrow \chi)] x] \downarrow\]

From (E) and an instance of \(\beta\)-Conversion (48.2) it follows that:

(F) \[\lambda x [\lambda x (\neg q_0 \lor \downarrow \chi)] x] x \equiv [\lambda x (\neg q_0 \lor \downarrow \chi)] x\]

Now theorem (107) tells us that if anything exists in the logical sense, it does so necessarily, i.e., that \(\tau \downarrow \rightarrow \Box \tau \downarrow\). So, it follows from (C) that:

(G) \[\Box [\lambda x (\neg q_0 \lor \downarrow \chi)] x] \downarrow\]

Now the following is axiomatic, since it is the modal closure of an instance of \(\beta\)-Conversion:

(H) \[\Box ([\lambda x (\neg q_0 \lor \downarrow \chi)] x \equiv (\neg q_0 \lor \downarrow \chi))]\]

Hence, by the K axiom (45.1), it follows from (G) and (H) that:

(I) \[\Box ([\lambda x (\neg q_0 \lor \downarrow \chi)] x \equiv (\neg q_0 \lor \downarrow \chi))]\]

Now (I) implies by the modal theorem (158.6) that:

(J) \[\Box [\lambda x (\neg q_0 \lor \downarrow \chi)] x \equiv (\neg q_0 \lor \downarrow \chi)]\]

Hence, by biconditional syllogism, (F) and (J) imply:

(K) \[\lambda x [\lambda x (\neg q_0 \lor \downarrow \chi)] x] x \equiv [\lambda x (\neg q_0 \lor \downarrow \chi)] x\]

Put (K) aside for the moment and let’s reason about its right side. Note that given the second conjunct of (A), we can establish:

(L) \[\Box (\neg q_0 \lor \downarrow \chi) \equiv \downarrow \chi\]
Proof. \((-\to)\) Assume \(\Box(\neg q_0 \lor \exists x \chi)\). This assumption and \(\Diamond \neg \neg q_0\) (which we can easily obtain from the second conjunct of (A), i.e., from \(\Diamond q_0\) imply, by (162.7), that \(\Diamond \exists x \chi\). But actuality claims are subject to modal collapse; i.e., by theorem (172.1), we know \(\Diamond \exists \varphi \equiv \Box \exists \varphi\). Hence, \(\Box \exists x \chi\). \((-\to)\) Assume \(\Box \exists x \chi\).

So, (K) and (L) imply:

(M) \(\lambda x \Box[\lambda x (\neg q_0 \lor \exists x \chi)] x \equiv \exists x \chi\)

Put (M) aside for the moment and reason about its right side. Note that we can establish:

(N) \(\Box \exists x \chi \equiv \chi\)

Proof. As an instance of axiom (46.1), we know \(\exists x \chi \rightarrow \Box \exists x \chi\). But the T schema yields \(\Box \exists x \chi \rightarrow \exists x \chi\). By conjoining the latter and former and applying the definition of \(\equiv\), we obtain \(\Box \exists x \chi \equiv \exists x \chi\). But the main axiom for the logic of actuality (43) tells us \(\exists x \chi \equiv \chi\). Hence by biconditional syllogism, \(\Box \exists x \chi \equiv \chi\).

So from (M) and (N) we have:

\(\lambda x \Box[\lambda x (\neg q_0 \lor \exists x \chi)] x \equiv \chi\)

Since we’ve derived this from no assumptions, it follows by GEN that:

\(\forall x (\lambda x \Box[\lambda x (\neg q_0 \lor \exists x \chi)] x \equiv \chi)\)

Since we’ve already established that \(\lambda x \Box[\lambda x (\neg q_0 \lor \exists x \chi)] x\), it follows by \(\exists I\) that:

\(\exists F \forall x (Fx \equiv \chi)\)

But recall that \(\chi\) is the matrix of the Kirchner predicate, which means we have established:

\(\exists F \forall x (Fx \equiv Gty(y = x \& \exists H(xH \& \neg Hx)))\)

And this, we know, leads to a contradiction when \(G\) is a necessary property.

We avoid this result by prefacing the modal operator \(\Box\) to the second conjunct of the antecedent of (\(\omega\)). By doing so, the conclusion (C) only follows if we can show that (B) is necessary. But (B) can’t be necessary if \(\neg q_0\) is contingent. Intuitively, consider any possible world, say \(w\), where both \(\neg q_0\) is false (i.e., where \(q_0\) is true) and where there is an object \(x\) that fails to be such that \(\exists x \chi\). Then (B) is false at \(w\): something is such that the left side of (B) is true at \(w\) while the right side of (B) is false at \(w\). Thus, the second conjunct of the antecedent of axiom (49) has to be a necessarily true universal claim.
Chapter 9

The Deductive System PLM

In science, what is provable shouldn’t be believed without proof.\footnote{Translation mine. The original German is: Was beweisbar ist, soll in der Wissenschaft nicht ohne Beweis geglaubt werden. This is the opening line from the Preface to Dedekind’s classic work of 1888; it occurs in the second edition (1893) on p. vii and in the seventh edition (1939) on p. iii.}

— Dedekind 1888

In this chapter, we introduce the deductive system PLM by combining the axioms of the previous chapter with a primitive rule of inference and defining notions of proof and theoremhood. We then develop a series of basic theorems, facilitated by the introduction and justification of metarules that help us to establish theorems more easily. Many of the proofs of theorems and justifications of metarules are left to the main Appendix, though some metatheorems are proved in chapter appendices.

Readers are reminded that object-language variables function normally in axioms and theorems, but function as metavariables when they appear in definitions, as per Convention (17.2).

9.1 Primitive Rule of PLM: Modus Ponens

(59) Primitive Rule of Inference: Modus Ponens. PLM employs just a single primitive rule of inference:

**Modus Ponens (Rule MP)**

\[ \varphi, \varphi \rightarrow \psi / \psi \]

We may read this as: \( \psi \) follows from \( \varphi \) and \( \varphi \rightarrow \psi \).
9.2 (Modally Strict) Proofs and Derivations

(60) **Metadefinitions:** Derivations, Proofs, and Theorems of PLM. In what follows, we say that \( \varphi \) is an *axiom* of PLM whenever \( \varphi \) is one of the axioms asserted in Chapter 8. The set of axioms of PLM is recursive and we introduce the following symbol to refer to it:

\[
\Lambda = \{ \varphi \mid \varphi \text{ is an axiom} \}
\]

Then we define:

(1) A *derivation* in PLM of \( \varphi \) from a set of formulas \( \Gamma \) is any non-empty sequence of formulas \( \varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_n \) such that \( \varphi \) is \( \varphi_n \) and for each \( i \) such that \( 1 \leq i \leq n \), \( \varphi_i \) either is an element of \( \Lambda \cup \Gamma \) or follows from two of the preceding members of the sequence by the Rule MP. When there exists a derivation of \( \varphi \) from some \( \Gamma \), we write \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi \) and we say either \( \varphi \) is derivable from \( \Gamma \), or \( \varphi \) is a logical consequence of \( \Gamma \) (in the proof-theoretic sense), or more simply \( \varphi \) follows from \( \Gamma \).

Thus, \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi \) expresses a multigrade metatheoretical relation between zero or more formulas in \( \Gamma \) (traditionally called the *premises* or *assumptions*) and \( \varphi \) (the *conclusion*).

The following conventions apply. We often write \( \varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_n \vdash \psi \) when \( \Gamma \vdash \psi \) and \( \Gamma \) is the set \( \{ \varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_n \} \). We often write \( \Gamma, \psi \vdash \varphi \) when \( \Gamma \cup \{ \psi \} \vdash \varphi \). We often write \( \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \varphi \) when \( \Gamma_1 \cup \Gamma_2 \vdash \varphi \).

When a sequence of formulas ending in \( \varphi \) is a derivation of \( \varphi \) from some set \( \Gamma \), we say the sequence is a *witness to* (the claim that) \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi \) and we call the members of the sequence the *lines* of the derivation.

Now using the definition of *derivation*, we may define the notions of *proof* in PLM and *theorem* of PLM:

(2) A *proof* of \( \varphi \) in PLM is any derivation of \( \varphi \) from \( \Gamma \) in PLM in which \( \Gamma \) is the empty set \( \emptyset \). A formula \( \varphi \) is a *theorem* of PLM, written \( \vdash \varphi \), if and only if there exists a proof of \( \varphi \) in PLM.

Two simple consequences of our definitions are:

(3) \( \vdash \varphi \) if and only if there is a non-empty sequence of formulas \( \varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_n \) such that \( \varphi \) is \( \varphi_n \) and for each \( i \) (\( 1 \leq i \leq n \)), \( \varphi_i \) either is an element of \( \Lambda \) or follows from two of the preceding members of the sequence by the Rule MP.

\[\text{Consequently, since } \Gamma_1 \cup \Gamma_2 = \Gamma_2 \cup \Gamma_1, \text{ the order in which premise sets are listed doesn't matter, and so in the case where } \Gamma_1 \text{ and } \Gamma_2 \text{ are singletons, the order in which the premises are listed doesn't matter. Thus, in general, } \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \varphi \text{ if and only if } \Gamma_2, \Gamma_1 \vdash \varphi, \text{ and in particular, } \varphi, \psi \vdash \chi \text{ if and only if } \psi, \varphi \vdash \chi. \text{ See (64.11).}\]
9.2. (Modally Strict) Proofs and Derivations

(.4) If \( \Gamma = \emptyset \), then \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi \) if and only if \( \vdash \varphi \).

(61) Metadefinitions: Modally Strict Proofs, Theorems, and Derivations. To precisely identify those derivations and proofs in which no inferential step is justified by a modally fragile axiom, we first say that \( \varphi \) is a necessary axiom whenever \( \varphi \) is any axiom such that all the closures of \( \varphi \) are also axioms. At present, \((43)\) is the only axiom that fails to be necessary in this sense.

We introduce the following symbol to refer to the set of necessary axioms:

\[ \Lambda_\Box = \{ \varphi \mid \varphi \text{ is a necessary axiom} \} \]

Then the following definitions of modally-strict derivations (\( \Gamma \vdash_\Box \varphi \)) and modally-strict proofs (\( \vdash_\Box \varphi \)) mirror (60.1) and (60.2), with the exception that the definientia refer to \( \Lambda_\Box \) instead of \( \Lambda \):

(1) A modally-strict derivation (or \( \Box \)-derivation) of \( \varphi \) from a set of formulas \( \Gamma \) in PLM is any non-empty sequence of formulas \( \varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_n \) such that \( \varphi = \varphi_n \) and for each \( i \) \((1 \leq i \leq n)\), \( \varphi_i \) is either an element of \( \Lambda_\Box \cup \Gamma \) or follows from two of the preceding members of the sequence by Rule MP. A formula \( \varphi \) is strictly derivable (or \( \Box \)-derivable) from the set \( \Gamma \) in PLM, written \( \Gamma \vdash_\Box \varphi \), just in case there exists a modally-strict derivation of \( \varphi \) from \( \Gamma \).

(2) A modally-strict proof (or \( \Box \)-proof) of \( \varphi \) in PLM is any modally-strict derivation of \( \varphi \) from \( \Gamma \) when \( \Gamma \) is the empty set. A formula \( \varphi \) is a modally-strict theorem (or \( \Box \)-theorem) of PLM, written \( \vdash_\Box \varphi \), if and only if there exists a modally-strict proof of \( \varphi \) in PLM.

These two definitions have simple consequences analogous to (60.3) and (60.4). We shall suppose that all of the conventions introduced in (60) concerning \( \vdash \) also apply to \( \vdash_\Box \).

(62) Remark: Metarules of Inference. In what follows, we often introduce, and sometimes prove, certain claims about derivations. These facts all have the following form:

If conditions \( \cdots \) hold, then there exists a derivation of \( \varphi \) from \( \Gamma \).

When calls facts of this form metarules of inference. Only two metarules of inference are taken as primitive and underived, namely, the Rule of Definition by Equivalence (73) and the Rule of Definition by Identity (74). The other metarules are proved or left as exercises in the Appendix.

Metarules of inference are to be contrasted with standard rules of inference; the latter allow us to infer \( \varphi \) from zero or more formulas, whereas the former allow us to infer the existence of a derivation of \( \varphi \) given certain conditions. Frequently, in the process of deriving \( \varphi \) from \( \Gamma \), we can stop at a point in
the reasoning where the reasoning thus far meets the conditions of a metarule whose consequent asserts that there is a sequence of formulas constituting a derivation of \( \varphi \) from \( \Gamma \). So metarules often shorten the reasoning we use in the Appendix to establish that \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi \).

Consequently, when we reason with metarules to establish the claim that \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi \), we don’t produce a witness to the claim. However, the proof of a derived metarule in the Appendix shows how to construct such a witness. As mentioned previously, we call the proof of a derived metarule its *justification*. The justification shows that reasoning with a metarule can always be converted reasoning without it.

(63) **Metarules:** Modally Strict Derivations are Derivations. It immediately follows from our definitions that: (.1) if there is a modally-strict derivation of \( \varphi \) from \( \Gamma \), then there is a derivation of \( \varphi \) from \( \Gamma \), and (.2) if there is a modally-strict proof of \( \varphi \), then there is a proof of \( \varphi \):

(.1) If \( \Gamma \vdash_{\Box} \varphi \), then \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi \)

(.2) If \( \vdash_{\Box} \varphi \), then \( \vdash \varphi \)

Clearly, however, the converses are not true in general, since derivations and proofs in which the modally fragile axiom (43)* is used are not modally strict. Consequently, modally-strict derivations and proofs constitute a proper subset, respectively, of all derivations and proofs.

(64) **Metarules:** Fundamental Properties of \( \vdash \) and \( \vdash_{\Box} \). The following facts are particularly useful as we prove new theorems and justify new metarules of PLM. Note that these facts come in pairs, with one member of the pair governing \( \vdash \) and the other member governing \( \vdash_{\Box} \):

(.1) If \( \varphi \in \Lambda \), then \( \vdash \varphi \). (“Axioms are theorems”)

(“Necessary axioms are modally-strict theorems”)

(.2) If \( \varphi \in \Gamma \), then \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi \).

If \( \varphi \in \Lambda \), then \( \Gamma \vdash_{\Box} \varphi \).

(Note the special case: \( \varphi \vdash \varphi \))

(Note the special case: \( \varphi \vdash_{\Box} \varphi \))

(.3) If \( \vdash \varphi \), then \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi \).

If \( \vdash_{\Box} \varphi \), then \( \Gamma \vdash_{\Box} \varphi \).

(.4) If \( \varphi \in \Lambda \cup \Gamma \), then \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi \).

If \( \varphi \in \Lambda \), then \( \Gamma \vdash_{\Box} \varphi \).

(.5) If \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi \) and \( \Gamma \vdash (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \), then \( \Gamma , \Gamma \vdash \psi \).

If \( \Gamma \vdash_{\Box} \varphi \) and \( \Gamma \vdash_{\Box} (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \), then \( \Gamma , \Gamma \vdash_{\Box} \psi \).

(.6) If \( \vdash \varphi \) and \( \vdash (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \), then \( \vdash \psi \).

If \( \vdash_{\Box} \varphi \) and \( \vdash_{\Box} (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \), then \( \vdash_{\Box} \psi \).
9.2. (MODALLY STRICT) PROOFS AND DERIVATIONS

(.7) If \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi \) and \( \Gamma \subseteq \Delta \), then \( \Delta \vdash \varphi \).

If \( \Gamma \vdash \Box \varphi \) and \( \Gamma \subseteq \Delta \), then \( \Delta \vdash \Box \varphi \).

(.8) If \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi \) and \( \varphi \vdash \psi \), then \( \Gamma \vdash \psi \).

If \( \Gamma \vdash \Box \varphi \) and \( \varphi \vdash \Box \psi \), then \( \Gamma \vdash \Box \psi \).

(.9) If \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi \), then \( \Gamma \vdash (\psi \rightarrow \varphi) \), for any \( \psi \).

If \( \Gamma \vdash \Box \varphi \), then \( \Gamma \vdash \Box (\psi \rightarrow \varphi) \), for any \( \psi \).

(.10) If \( \Gamma \vdash (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \), then \( \Gamma, \varphi \vdash \psi \).

If \( \Gamma \vdash (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \), then \( \Gamma, \varphi \vdash \psi \).

(.11) If \( \Gamma_1, \ldots, \Gamma_i, \ldots, \Gamma_j, \ldots, \Gamma_n \vdash \varphi \) (1 \( \leq i \leq j \leq n \))

If \( \Gamma_1, \ldots, \Gamma_i, \ldots, \Gamma_j, \ldots, \Gamma_n \vdash \varphi \), then \( \Gamma_1, \ldots, \Gamma_j, \ldots, \Gamma_i, \ldots, \Gamma_n \vdash \varphi \)

Fact (.11) indicates that the order in which premise sets are listed makes no difference. Note that in the case where \( \Gamma_1, \ldots, \Gamma_n \) are singletons, it follows that the order in which the premises are listed doesn’t matter. Thus, it follows as a special case of (.11) that:

If \( \psi_1, \ldots, \psi_j, \ldots, \psi_n \vdash \varphi \), then \( \psi_1, \ldots, \psi_{j-1}, \ldots, \psi_j, \ldots, \psi_n \vdash \varphi \) (1 \( \leq i \leq j \leq n \))

If \( \psi_1, \ldots, \psi_j, \ldots, \psi_n \vdash \varphi \), then \( \psi_1, \ldots, \psi_{j-1}, \ldots, \psi_j, \ldots, \psi_n \vdash \varphi \)

Notice also that in the special case of (.2), \( \varphi \vdash \Box \varphi \) holds even if \( \varphi \) isn't a necessary truth. In general, there can be modally-strict derivations in which neither the premises nor conclusion are necessary truths. The 3-element sequence \( Pa, Pa \rightarrow Qb, Qb \) is a modally-strict derivation of \( Qb \) from the assumptions \( Pa \) and \( Pa \rightarrow Qb \) whether or not the premises and the conclusion are necessary truths.

(65) Remark: Theorems That Aren’t Modally Strict (⋆-Theorems). For the most part, we shall be interested in proofs generally, not just modally-strict ones, since our primary interest is what claims we can prove (simpliciter). But since significantly more modally-strict \( \Box \)-theorems are proved in what follows, it is useful to mark the ones that are not. So we introduce the ⋆ annotation to make it explicit that a proof of a theorem is not modally-strict. So the reader may assume that all of the items marked Theorem in what follows have modally-strict proofs, and that ⋆-Theorems do not. We always concatenate a theorem’s item number with a ⋆ when referencing a ⋆-theorem.\(^\text{127}\) Similarly, in the case where the derivation of \( \varphi \) from \( \Gamma \) is not modally-strict, we may speak of ⋆-derivations and say that \( \varphi \) is ⋆-derivable from \( \Gamma \).

It is important to recognize that ⋆-theorems and ⋆-derivations are not defective in any way. Indeed, they are simply artifacts of a modal logic that allows

\(^{127}\) The first such theorems are (138.1)⋆ – (138.2)⋆ and (140)⋆ – (145.4)⋆ below.
one to reason from modally fragile axioms or contingent premises, which are often of great philosophical significance.

(66) **Metadefinition:** Dependence. It is sometimes useful to indicate the difference between □-derivations and ⋆-derivations by saying that in the latter, the conclusion depends upon a modally fragile axiom, or depends upon a ⋆-theorem that in turn depends upon a modally fragile axiom, etc. To make this talk of dependence precise, we define the conditions under which one formula depends upon another within the context of a derivation:

Let the sequence \( \varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_n \) be a derivation in PLM of \( \varphi (= \varphi_n) \) from the set of premises \( \Gamma \) and let \( \psi \) be a member of this sequence. Then we say that \( \varphi_i \) (1 ≤ \( i \) ≤ \( n \)) depends upon the formula \( \psi \) in this derivation iff either (a) \( \varphi_i = \psi \), or (b) \( \varphi_i \) follows by the Rule MP from two previous members of the sequence at least one of which depends upon \( \psi \).

When \( \Gamma = \emptyset \), the definiendum in the above becomes: \( \varphi \) depends on a formula \( \psi \) in a given proof of \( \varphi \). The ⋆-theorems formulated in what follows depend upon axiom (43)⋆ either because some inferential step directly cites this axiom, or because some inferential step cites a ⋆-theorem that directly cites this axiom, etc.

It follows from our definition that if a sequence \( S \) is a witness to \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi \), then \( S \) is a witness to \( \Gamma \vdash \Box \varphi \) if and only if \( \varphi \) doesn’t depend upon any instance of a modally fragile axiom in \( S \). This holds even if, in \( S \), \( \varphi \) depends upon a premise in \( \Gamma \) that isn’t necessary. The sequence \( S = Pa, Pa \rightarrow Qb, Qb \) is a witness to \( Pa, Pa \rightarrow Qb \vdash Qb \) and even if \( Pa \) fails to be a necessary truth, it follows that \( Pa, Pa \rightarrow Qb \vdash Qb \), since \( Qb \) doesn’t depend on (43)⋆ in \( S \). (This case will be discussed in some detail below, when we introduce the Rule of Necessitation.)

### 9.3 Two Fundamental Metarules: GEN and RN

(67) **Metarule:** The Rule of Universal Generalization. The Rule of Universal Generalization (GEN) asserts that whenever there is a derivation of \( \varphi \) from a set of premises \( \Gamma \), and the variable \( \alpha \) doesn’t occur free in any of the premises in \( \Gamma \), then there is a derivation from \( \Gamma \) of the claim \( \forall \alpha(\ldots \alpha \ldots) \) (even if \( \alpha \) occurs free in \( \varphi \)):

**Rule of Universal Generalization (GEN)**

If \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi \) and \( \alpha \) doesn’t occur free in any formula in \( \Gamma \), then \( \Gamma \vdash \forall \alpha \varphi \).

When \( \Gamma = \emptyset \), then GEN asserts that if a formula \( \varphi \) is a theorem, then so is \( \forall \alpha \varphi \):

If \( \vdash \varphi \), then \( \vdash \forall \alpha \varphi \)
We note here that the justification can be easily converted to a justification of a \( \vdash \square \) version of GEN, in which \( \vdash \square \) is substituted everywhere for \( \vdash \). We leave further discussion of this to Remark (68).

When \( \Gamma \) isn’t empty, the application of GEN requires that the variable \( \alpha \) not occur free in any premise in \( \Gamma \). This prohibits one from using GEN, for example, to derive \( \forall x Rx \) from the premise \( Rx \). We know \( Rx \vdash Rx \) by the special case of (64.2), but intuitively, \( \forall x Rx \) doesn’t follow from \( Rx \); from the premise that a particular, but unspecified, individual \( x \) exemplifies the property \( R \), it doesn’t follow that every individual exemplifies \( R \). The proviso to GEN, of course, is unnecessary when \( \varphi \) is a theorem since \( \varphi \) is then derivable from the empty set of premises. Whenever any formula \( \varphi \) with free variable \( \alpha \) is a theorem, we may invoke GEN to conclude that \( \forall \alpha \varphi \) is also a theorem. For example, we shall soon prove that \( \varphi \rightarrow \varphi \) is a theorem (75), so that the instance \( Px \rightarrow Px \) is a theorem. From this latter it follows by GEN that \( \forall x(Px \rightarrow Px) \).

Here is an example of GEN in action. The following reasoning sequence establishes that \( \forall x(Qx \rightarrow Px) \) is derivable from the premise \( \forall xPx \), even though strictly speaking, the sequence is not a witness to this derivability claim:

1. \( \forall xPx \) Premise
2. \( \forall xPx \rightarrow (x \downarrow \rightarrow Px) \) Instance, Axiom (39.1)
3. \( x \downarrow \rightarrow Px \) from 1,2, by MP
4. \( x \downarrow \) Instance, Axiom (39.2)
5. \( Px \) from 3,4, by MP
6. \( Px \rightarrow (Qx \rightarrow Px) \) Instance, Axiom (38.1)
7. \( Qx \rightarrow Px \) from 5, 6, by MP
8. \( \forall xPx + Qx \rightarrow Px \) from 1–7, by df \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi \) (60)
9. \( \forall xPx \vdash \forall x(Qx \rightarrow Px) \) from 8, by GEN

Line 9 asserts that there is a derivation of \( \forall x(Qx \rightarrow Px) \) from \( \forall xPx \), but lines 1–8 are not such a derivation. However, lines 1–7 are a witness to line 8: each of lines 1–7 is either an axiom, a premise, or follows by MP from two previous lines. Since line 8 is a claim that has the form of the antecedent to the metarule GEN, and the condition, that \( x \) is not free in the premise \( \forall xPx \), is met, we may apply GEN to obtain line 9.

Though lines 1–8 do not constitute a witness to \( \forall xPx \vdash \forall x(Qx \rightarrow Px) \), the justification (i.e., metatheoretic proof) of GEN given in the Appendix shows us how to convert the reasoning into a sequence of formulas that is a bona fide witness to the derivability claim. By studying the metatheoretic proof, it becomes clear that the above reasoning with GEN can be converted to the following derivation, in which no appeal to GEN is made:\(^{128}\)

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\(^{128}\)Line 2 in the following derivation is an axiom: \( Px \rightarrow (Qx \rightarrow Px) \) is an instance of (38.1) and since we’ve take the closures of the instances of (38.1) as axioms, \( \forall x(Px \rightarrow (Qx \rightarrow Px)) \) is an axiom.
Witness to \( \forall x Px \vdash \forall x (Qx \rightarrow Px) \)

1. \( \forall x Px \) \hspace{1cm} Premise
2. \( \forall x (Px \rightarrow (Qx \rightarrow Px)) \) \hspace{1cm} Closure of an instance of Axiom (38.1)
3. \( \forall x (Px \rightarrow (Qx \rightarrow Px)) \rightarrow (\forall x Px \rightarrow \forall x (Qx \rightarrow Px)) \) \hspace{1cm} Instance of Axiom (39.3)
4. \( \forall x Px \rightarrow \forall x (Qx \rightarrow Px) \) \hspace{1cm} from 2,3, by MP
5. \( \forall x (Qx \rightarrow Px) \) \hspace{1cm} from 1,4, by MP

This sequence is a \textit{bona fide} derivation of \( \forall x (Qx \rightarrow Px) \) from \( \forall x Px \), in the style of Frege and Hilbert. In this particular example, the \textit{bona fide} derivation is actually shorter by three steps than the meta-derivation that appeals to GEN. Most of the time, however, the meta-derivations that invoke GEN are shorter than \textit{bona fide} derivations that don’t. Of course, the reasoning with GEN already looks a bit more straightforward than the reasoning without it. In any case, this example shows how we can use a metarule with our deductive calculus to show that universal claims are derivable.

In light of the above facts, we shall adopt the following convention for reasoning with GEN. In the Appendix, we henceforth establish a claim such as \( \forall x Px \vdash \forall x (Qx \rightarrow Px) \) as follows:

From the premise \( \forall x Px \) and the instance \( \forall x Px \rightarrow (x \downarrow \rightarrow Px) \) of axiom (39.1), it follows that \( x \downarrow \rightarrow Px \), by MP. From this result and the instance \( x \downarrow \) of axiom (39.2), it follows that \( Px \), by MP. From this last conclusion and the instance \( Px \rightarrow (Qx \rightarrow Px) \) of axiom (38.1), it follows by MP that \( Qx \rightarrow Px \). Since \( x \) isn’t free in our premise, it follows that \( \forall x (Qx \rightarrow Px) \), by GEN. \( \vdash \)

Note that this takes the liberty of treating GEN as if it were a rule of inference instead of a metarule. However, the above discussion should have made it clear just what has and has not been accomplished in this piece of reasoning. We sometimes deploy other metarules in just this way.

\textbf{(68) Remark:} Conventions Regarding Metarules. Although GEN was formulated to apply to \( \vdash \), it also applies to \( \vdash \square \). The following version can be proved (exercise) by a trivial reworking of the justification for (67), since none of the reasoning involved an appeal to a modally fragile axiom:

- If \( \Gamma \vdash \square \phi \) and \( \alpha \) doesn’t occur free in any formula in \( \Gamma \), then \( \Gamma \vdash \forall \alpha \phi \).

However, in what follows, we usually refrain from formulating metarules twice, with one form for \( \vdash \) and a second form for \( \vdash \square \). Instead, we adopt the conventions:

(.1) Whenever a metarule of inference is formulated generally, so as to apply to \( \vdash \), we usually omit the statement of the metarule for the case of \( \vdash \square \).
The only exception to this occurs when one of the conditions in the metarule specifically requires ⊢□ instead of ⊢.

(.2) No metarule is to be adopted if the justification of the rule depends on a modally fragile axiom such as (43)★.

Though these conventions may be discussed on other occasions below, the following brief remarks may be sufficient for now. As noted previously, the justifications of metarules provided in the Appendix show how to convert reasoning with the metarules into bona fide derivations that don’t use them. As long as the justification doesn’t depend on a modally fragile axiom such as (43)★, a justification of a rule stated for ⊢ can be repurposed, with just a few obvious and trivial changes, to a justification of the analogous rule for ⊢□. Thus, any any metarule of inference that applies to derivations and proofs generally (i.e., none of its conditions specifically involve ⊢□) will be a metarule of inference that also applies to modally-strict derivations and proofs.

The next rule we consider, RN, contrasts with GEN because it is not a metarule that applies generally to all derivations and proofs. The antecedent of the Rule of Necessitation requires the existence of a modally-strict derivation or proof for the metarule to be applied.

(69) Metarules: Rule of Necessitation. The Rule of Necessitation (RN) is formulated in a way that prevents us from inferring the necessitation of a formula whose derivation or proof depends upon a modally fragile axiom. RN may be stated as follows:

• If there is a modally strict derivation of ϕ from zero or more premises, then there is a modally strict derivation of □ϕ from the necessitations of the premises.

To formulate this statement precisely, we first introduce a metadefinition:

• For any set of formulas Γ, we use the notation □Γ to refer to {□ψ | ψ ∈ Γ}.

So □Γ is the set of formulas that results when a □ is prefixed to every formula in Γ. Then RN may be stated as follows:

Rule of Necessitation (RN)
If Γ ⊢□ϕ, then □Γ ⊢□□ϕ.

Rule of Necessitation (Weaker Form)\(^{129}\)
If Γ ⊢□ϕ, then □Γ ⊢□ϕ.

When Γ = ∅, RN reduces to:

\(^{129}\)To see that the weaker form holds given the stronger form, assume Γ ⊢□ϕ. Then by RN, □Γ ⊢□ϕ. But then by (63.1), it follows that □Γ ⊢□ϕ.
• If \( \vdash \Box \varphi \), then \( \vdash \Box \Box \varphi \).

• If \( \vdash \Box \varphi \), then \( \vdash \Box \Box \varphi \). (Weak Form)

When we reason with RN to prove theorems, we almost always cite the weaker form of RN with the understanding that any conclusions drawn via the metarule within a larger reasoning context do not affect the modal strictness of that context (or lack thereof). However, in the following examples, we use the stronger form, for purposes of illustration.

Here is an example of how Rule RN is to be applied, in which we derive \( \varphi \) (= \( Qb \)) from \( \Gamma \) (= \( \{ Pa, Pa \to Qb \} \)) and then conclude by RN that \( \Box \varphi \) is derivable from \( \Box \Gamma \):

**Example 1**

1. \( Pa \)                      Premise
2. \( Pa \to Qb \)              Premise
3. \( Qb \) from 1,2, by MP
4. \( Pa, Pa \to Qb \vdash \Box Qb \) from 1–3, by df \( \Gamma \vdash \Box \varphi \) (61)
5. \( \Box Pa, \Box(Pa \to Qb) \vdash \Box Qb \) from 4, by RN

Lines 1–3 in this example constitute a witness to line 4 since (a) \( Qb \) follows by MP from two previous members of the sequence, both of which are in \( \Gamma \), and (b) the derivation of \( Qb \) from the premises doesn’t depend on a modally fragile axiom. RN then states that line 4 follows from line 3, so that we end up establishing that there is a modally strict derivation of \( \Box Qb \) from \( \Box Pa \) and \( \Box(Pa \to Qb) \).

Note that the conclusion on line 5 doesn’t require that the premises be true, nor that the premises be necessary. Even if the premises in a derivation are all contingently false (i.e., false but possibly true) and the conclusion is contingently false, RN will still assert that if there is a modally strict derivation of the conclusion from the premises, then there is a modally strict derivation of the necessitation of the conclusion from the necessitations of the premises. This in no way implies that the necessitations of the premises or conclusion are true.

Now, just as with GEN, the justification of RN in the Appendix shows us how to turn reasoning that appeals to RN into reasoning that does not. Although the sequence of formulas 1–4 in Example 1 isn’t a witness to the derivability claim on line 5, the justification of RN in the Appendix shows us how to convert Example 1 into the following 5-element annotated sequence that is such a witness:

**Witness to \( \Box Pa, \Box(Pa \to Qb) \vdash \Box Qb \)**

1. \( \Box Pa \)                      Premise in \( \Box \Gamma \)
2. \( \Box(Pa \to Qb) \)            Premise in \( \Box \Gamma \)
3. \( \Box(Pa \to Qb) \to (\Box Pa \to \Box Qb) \) Instance of Axiom (45.1)
4. \( \Box Pa \to \Box Qb \)            from 2,3, by MP
5. \( \Box Qb \) from 1,4, by MP
This conversion works generally for any formulas \( \varphi \) and \( \psi \): since there is a modally strict derivation of \( \psi \) from \( \varphi \) and \( \varphi \to \psi \), there is a modally strict derivation of \( \Box \psi \) from \( \Box \varphi \) and \( \Box (\varphi \to \psi) \).

Given the above discussion, it should be straightforward to see why we shall adopt the following, less formal style of reasoning in the Appendix when presented with a case like Example 1:

Let \( \Box Pa \) and \( \Box (Pa \to Qb) \) be premises. Note that from the non-modal premises \( Pa \) and \( Pa \to Qb \) it follows that \( Qb \), by MP. Since this is a modally-strict derivation of \( Qb \) from \( Pa \) and \( Pa \to Qb \), it follows by modally strict reasoning from our first two premises that \( \Box Qb \), by RN.

In effect, we have reasoned by producing a modally strict ‘sub-derivation’ showing \( Pa, Pa \to Qb \vdash \Box Qb \), within the larger, modally strict derivation of \( \Box Qb \) from \( \Box Pa \) and \( \Box (Pa \to Qb) \).

We now consider an example of RN involving quantifiers – one that involves a slight variant of the example we used to illustrate GEN. As an instance of RN we know: if there is a modally strict derivation of \( \forall x (Qx \to Px) \) from \( \forall x Px \), then there is a modally strict derivation of \( \Box \forall x (Qx \to Px) \) from \( \Box \forall x Px \):

**Example 2**

1. \( \forall x Px \) Premise
2. \( \forall x Px \to (x \downarrow \to Px) \) Instance of Axiom (39.1)
3. \( x \downarrow \to Px \) from 1,2, by MP
4. \( x \downarrow \) Instance of Axiom (39.2)
5. \( Px \) from 3,4, by MP
6. \( Px \to (Qx \to Px) \) Instance of Axiom (38.1)
7. \( Qx \to Px \) from 5,6, by MP
8. \( \forall x Px \vdash Qx \to Px \) from 1–7, by df \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi \) (61)
9. \( \forall x Px \vdash \forall x (Qx \to Px) \) from 8, by GEN
10. \( \Box \forall x Px \vdash \Box \forall x (Qx \to Px) \) from 9, by RN

Here, lines 1–7 constitute a witness to line 8, which asserts that there is modally-strict derivation of \( Qx \to Px \) from \( \forall x Px \). On line 9, we apply the version of GEN that governs \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi \), which was discussed in (68). So line 9 satisfies the condition for the application of RN, which then implies the conclusion on line 10. The justification of RN itself shows us how to convert Example 2 into a witness for \( \Box \forall x Px \vdash \Box \forall x (Qx \to Px) \):

**Witness to \( \Box \forall x Px \vdash \Box \forall x (Qx \to Px) \)**

1. \( \Box \forall x Px \) Premise
2. \( \Box (\forall x (Px \to (Qx \to Px))) \to \)
(\forall x P x \rightarrow \forall x (Q x \rightarrow P x))] \quad \text{Closure of an instance of Axiom (39.3)}
3. \Box[\forall x (P x \rightarrow (Q x \rightarrow P x))] \rightarrow
(\forall x P x \rightarrow \forall x (Q x \rightarrow P x)) \rightarrow
(\Box \forall x (P x \rightarrow (Q x \rightarrow P x)) \rightarrow
(\Box \forall x P x \rightarrow \forall x (Q x \rightarrow P x))) \quad \text{Instance of Axiom (45.1)}
4. \Box \forall x (P x \rightarrow (Q x \rightarrow P x)) \rightarrow
(\Box \forall x P x \rightarrow \forall x (Q x \rightarrow P x)) \quad \text{from 2,3, by MP}
5. \Box \forall x (P x \rightarrow (Q x \rightarrow P x)) \quad \text{Instance of Axiom (38.1)}
6. \Box (\forall x P x \rightarrow \forall x (Q x \rightarrow P x)) \quad \text{from 4,5, by MP}
7. \Box (\forall x P x \rightarrow \forall x (Q x \rightarrow P x)) \rightarrow
(\Box \forall x P x \rightarrow \Box \forall x (Q x \rightarrow P x)) \quad \text{Instance of Axiom (45.1)}
8. \Box \forall x P x \rightarrow \Box \forall x (Q x \rightarrow P x) \quad \text{from 6,7, by MP}
9. \Box \forall x (Q x \rightarrow P x) \quad \text{from 1,8, by MP}

This is a bona fide witness to the derivability claim since every line is either a necessary axiom, a premise, or follows from previous lines by MP. It should now be clear how the reasoning using GEN and RN in Example 2 is far easier to develop, or even grasp, when compared to the above reasoning. Indeed, we may compress the reasoning in Example 2 even further. The reasoning used in the Appendix for examples like this goes as follows:

Assume \Box \forall x P x as a global premise. From the local premise \forall x P x and the instance \forall x P x \rightarrow (x \downarrow \rightarrow P x) of axiom (39.1), it follows that x \downarrow \rightarrow P x, by MP. From this last result and the instance x \downarrow of axiom (39.2), it follows that P x, by MP. From this last conclusion and the instance P x \rightarrow (Q x \rightarrow P x) of axiom (38.1), it follows by MP that Q x \rightarrow P x. Since x isn’t free in our local premise, it follows that \forall x (Q x \rightarrow P x), by GEN. Since this constitutes a modally-strict derivation of \forall x (Q x \rightarrow P x) from the local premise \forall x P x, it follows from our global premise \Box \forall x P x that \Box \forall x (Q x \rightarrow P x) (by modally strict means).

Given the preceding discussion, this reasoning should be transparent; though it is not an actual derivation, it shows us how to construct one. Consequently, we have a way to show derivability claims without producing actual derivations.

(70) Remark: Preserving GEN and RN When Extending The System. It is important to note that, should one wish to extend our system with new axioms, GEN and RN can easily be preserved as justified metarules. GEN remains valid as long as we axiomatically assert the universal closures of any new axioms we assert.\textsuperscript{130} RN remains valid as long as we axiomatically assert the modal clo-

\textsuperscript{130}The justification of GEN in the Appendix is by induction on the length of a derivation of \Gamma \vdash \phi. The Base Case considers the two ways in which such a derivation could consist of a single
(71) **Remark:** Modally Strict Reasoning, Modally Fragile Axioms, and Contingent Premises. Using an intuitive notion of truth (or if you prefer, a notion of truth relative to some fixed interpretation of our language), then we may say that a contingent formula is one that is neither necessarily true nor necessarily false (i.e., one that is both possibly true and possibly false). It is important to understand the conditions under which RN can be applied when reasoning about contingent premises. In particular, it is important to register the difference between:

(a) a derivation in which one of the premises, if there are any, is a contingent formula, but the derivation doesn’t depend on any modally fragile axiom, and

(b) a derivation that depends upon a modally fragile axiom.

The first kind of derivation is *modally strict*, while the second kind is not.

For a scenario of type (a), start with Example 1 in the discussion of (69):

**Example 1**

1. $P_a$  
   (Premise)
2. $P_a \rightarrow Q_b$  
   (Premise)
3. $Q_b$  
   from 1,2, by MP
4. $P_a, P_a \rightarrow Q_b \vdash Q_b$  
   from 1–3, by df $\Gamma \vdash Q_b$ (61)
5. $\Box P_a, \Box(P_a \rightarrow Q_b) \vdash \Box Q_b$  
   from 4, by RN

In Example 1, the conclusion on line 4, i.e., that there exists a modally strict derivation of $Q_b$ from $P_a$ and $P_a \rightarrow Q_b$, holds even if one or more of $P_a$, $P_a \rightarrow Q_b$, and $Q_b$ are contingent. The modal strictness of a derivation from contingent premises to contingent conclusion not undermined as long as no modally fragile axioms (or, more generally, no $\star$-theorems) are used in the derivation. So RN can be applied on line 5, for it requires only that there be a modally strict derivation of $Q_b$ from $P_a$ and $P_a \rightarrow Q_b$.

Formula, namely, either $\varphi$ is an axiom or $\varphi$ is in $\Gamma$. When $\varphi$ is an axiom, then since we’ve taken all the universal closures of axioms as axioms, it follows that $\forall \alpha \varphi$ is an axiom as well. So $\forall \alpha \varphi$ is a theorem (64.1) and so is derivable from $\Gamma$ (64.3).

If we extend our system with new axioms, the reasoning in this case will be preserved as long as we always take their universal closures as axioms as well.

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131 Just as with GEN, the justification of RN in the Appendix is by induction on the length of a derivation, though in this case, on the length of a derivation $\Gamma \vdash \Box \varphi$. The Base Case considers the two ways in which such a derivation could consist of a single formula, namely, either $\varphi$ is a necessary axiom or $\varphi$ is in $\Gamma$. When $\varphi$ is necessary axiom, then since we’ve taken all the modal closures of axioms as axioms, it follows that $\Box \varphi$ is an axiom as well. So $\Box \varphi$ is a modally strict theorem (64.1) and becomes derivable from $\Gamma$ by modally strict means (64.3).

If we extend our system with new necessary axioms, the reasoning in this case will be preserved as long as we always take their modal closures as axioms as well.
This applies even for conditional proof, which is introduced later in (76). Suppose we reason by conditional proof to establish, as a theorem, \( Pa \rightarrow (Pa \lor Qb) \). That is, suppose we assume \( Pa \), derive \( Pa \lor Qb \), and then conclude \( Pa \rightarrow (Pa \lor Qb) \) by conditional proof. Then even if \( Pa \) is a contingent claim, it is discharged when we apply conditional proof and so the theorem no longer depends on a contingency; the theorem in question is modally strict. For a more interesting example, see the discussion in (216).

Contrast this with a scenario of type (b). Suppose that we have extended our system with the modally fragile axiom \( Pa \) and annotated it with a ⋆, say because (we know) it is not necessarily true. (We can even suppose we’ve added \( \neg \Box Pa \) as a further axiom to make it clear that \( Pa \) is contingent.) By adding \( Pa \) as a new, modally-fragile axiom, we have extended (the definitions of) our deductive system and consequently, of the derivability conditions \( \vdash \) and \( \vdash \Box \). As such, we have a new deductive relationship between \( Pa \rightarrow Qb \) and \( Qb \). \( Qb \) becomes derivable from the sole premise \( Pa \rightarrow Qb \) but not by modally strict means, i.e., \( Pa \rightarrow Qb \vdash Qb \) but not \( Pa \rightarrow Qb \vdash \Box Qb \). A derivation that bears witness to \( Pa \rightarrow Qb \vdash Qb \) will fail to be modally strict because the modally fragile axiom \( Pa \) is required in the derivation. So we can’t apply RN to conclude \( \Box(Pa \rightarrow Qb) \vdash \Box Qb \). To take another example, suppose that we have taken \( \neg \Box Pa \) as a necessary axiom along with the modally fragile axiom \( Pa \). Then, from the ⋆-axiom \( Pa \) and the necessary axiom \( \neg \Box Pa \), we may derive, by definition (211.1), that \( \text{ContingentlyTrue}(Pa) \). This latter becomes a ⋆-theorem since its proof depends on a modally fragile axiom.

In what follows, it will be essential to distinguish (a) modally strict derivations from contingent premises and (b) reasoning that is not modally strict because it depends upon a modally fragile axiom.

(72) Remark: Digression on the Converse of Weak RN. When we introduced RN in (69), we noted that when the premise set is empty, the weak form of RN asserts:

- If \( \vdash \Box q \), then \( \vdash \Box \Box q \).

We indicated that, for simplicity, we shall typically cite only this weaker form with the understanding that any modal strictness of the reasoning context is preserved.

However, it is important to distinguish the converse of RN from the converse of the weaker form. While the converse of RN is guaranteed to hold, the converse of the weaker form is not. The converse of RN is: if \( \vdash \Box q \), then \( \vdash q \). Clearly, this holds. For assume \( \vdash \Box q \). Note that the instances of the T schema

\[132\]

Note, however, that the deductive relationship \( Pa, Pa \rightarrow Qb \vdash \Box Qb \) still holds and we can still apply RN to conclude \( \Box Pa, \Box(Pa \rightarrow Qb) \vdash \Box Qb \). But we may not have much use for this fact if we’ve added \( \neg \Box Pa \) as an axiom.
(45.2), i.e., □φ → φ, are necessary axioms. So by (64.1), □ □φ → φ. But from this and our assumption that □ □φ, it follows by (64.5) that □ φ.

By contrast, the converse of the weaker form of RN is not valid. The converse asserts: if □ φ, then □ φ. To see a counterexample to this claim, we have to consider a very natural extension of our system (or, if you prefer, a model in which certain new axioms hold). Consider the scenario in the previous Remark, where we extended our system with the contingent axiom Pa (‘object a exemplifies property P’), where the contingency is a direct consequence of an additional axiom, namely, that ◻¬Pa. So Pa would be a modally fragile axiom and marked with a ★. Then our theory would guarantee, by theorem (247), that there is a unique abstract object that encodes all and only the properties that a exemplifies. So we would be able to show that this abstract object, call it c_a, encodes P, i.e., that c_a P. This conclusion would be a ★-theorem since it was derived with the help of a modally fragile axiom. But note that by the axiom for the rigidity of encoding (51), it would also follow that c_a necessarily encodes P. So □c_a P becomes a theorem and, indeed, a ★-theorem. Thus, we would have □ □c_a P. But there would be no modally strict proof of c_a P; the proof of c_a P requires an appeal to the modally fragile axiom that Pa. Hence, we would have a formula φ, namely c_a P, such that □ φ but not □ φ. Thus, the converse of the weaker form of RN would fail. An example of this kind is discussed in some detail in (254).

9.4 The Inferential Role of Definitions

Definitions play an important part in the proof of many theorems; few theorems are expressed using only primitive notions or rest solely on axioms that are expressed using only primitive notions. However, the classical theory of definitions has to be modified in a number of ways if we are to obtain a serviceable theory of definitions for the present system. We’ve already discussed a number of issues about the formulation and understanding of definitions, in Remarks (17), (27), (28), (31), (32), and (36). We also developed conventions in Remark (17), governing definitions. In particular, Convention (17.2) allows us to use object-language variables in definitions with the understanding that they function as metavariables.

In this section, however, we describe how definitions impact our reasoning system. Some readers may find it useful to skip ahead to Remark (277), which offers one important reason why we don’t use the classical theory of definitions, in which new individual terms are introduced using definitions by equivalence. In what follows, we rigorously distinguish the inferential roles of definitions-by≡ and definitions-by=. The resulting theory avoids the problems noted not only in Remark (277), but in Remark (278) as well. By the end of this section,
the reader should have a good grasp on what is meant when we say ‘So, by definition, … ’ during the course of reasoning in proofs and derivations.

(73) Primitive Metarule: The Inferential Role of Definitions by Equivalence. Though the general case of a definition-by-≡ has the form \( \varphi(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n) \equiv df \psi(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n) \), let us abbreviate this more simply as \( \varphi \equiv df \psi \) and that this represents any valid instance of the definition, i.e., any instance having the form \( \varphi(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n) \equiv df \psi(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n) \), where \( \tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n \) are substitutable for \( \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n \), respectively, in \( \psi \). Then the inferential role of a definition-by-≡ is captured by the following primitive metarule of inference:

**Rule of Definition by Equivalence**

A definition-by-≡ of the form \( \varphi \equiv df \psi \) introduces the closures of \( \varphi \to \psi \) and \( \psi \to \varphi \) as necessary axioms.

So given the definition \( \varphi \equiv df \psi \), the closures of \( \varphi \to \psi \) and \( \psi \to \varphi \) (a) become modally strict theorems, by (64.1), and (b) can be derived (by modally strict means) from any set of premises \( \Gamma \), by (64.3). Thus, the rule can be applied in any reasoning context without affecting the modal strictness of the reasoning.

Note also that the rule does not as yet guarantee that the definition \( \varphi \equiv df \psi \) yields the closures of \( \varphi \equiv \psi \) as necessary axioms. Eventually, we’ll derive a rule that does guarantee this. But at present, such a rule wouldn’t help us since we can’t at present reason from biconditional axioms: we haven’t yet proved the tautologies (governing \( \equiv \) and \&) that allow us to do so (we need those tautologies to expand, and reason from, biconditional axioms). Once we have established the tautologies governing \& and \( \equiv \), we can easily establish that \( \varphi \equiv \psi \) is a modally strict theorem that follows from the \( \varphi \equiv df \psi \); see (91.1).

(74) Primitive Metarule: The Inferential Role of Definitions by Identity. Those familiar with the classical theory of definitions and the problem of non-significant terms will recognize that the inferential role of definitions-by-=} has to be carefully formulated. A hint as to why this is so was offered at the end of Remark (27), but those not familiar with the issues here may find Remarks (277) and (278) useful. The latter Remark, in particular, takes the reader step-by-step through the motivation and justification of the following metarule as it applies to definitions with one free variable in the definiens and definiendum.

Let \( \tau(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n) \equiv df \sigma(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n) \) be a definition-by-=} in which the variables \( \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n \) occur free \( (n \geq 0) \). So when \( n = 0 \) and no variables occur free in \( \sigma \), the definition has the form \( \tau \equiv df \sigma \) and introduces the new constant \( \tau \). Now let us use \( \sigma(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n) \) and \( \tau(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n) \) to abbreviate \( \sigma_{\alpha_1=\tau_1, \ldots, \alpha_n=\tau_n} \) and \( \tau_{\alpha_1=\tau_1, \ldots, \alpha_n=\tau_n} \), respectively, so that \( \sigma(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n) \) and \( \tau(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n) \) are the result of uniformly substituting \( \tau_i \) for the free occurrences of \( \alpha_i \) in \( \sigma \) and \( \tau \) respectively \( (1 \leq i \leq n) \). Then we may state the inferential role of a definition-by-=} as follows:
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**Rule of Definition by Identity**

Whenever \( \tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n \) are substitutable for \( \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n \), respectively, in \( \sigma \), then a definition-by-\( = \) of the form \( \tau(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n) =_df \sigma(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n) \) introduces the closures of the following, necessary axiom schema:

\[
(\omega) \quad (\sigma(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n) \downarrow \rightarrow \tau(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n) = \sigma(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n)) \& \\
(\neg \sigma(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n) \downarrow \rightarrow \neg \tau(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n) \downarrow)
\]

Ignoring closures, the rule says that the inferential role of an instance of a definition-by-\( = \) is to introduce a necessary axiom that asserts: (a) if the definiens is significant, then an identity holds between the definiendum and definiens, and (b) if the definiens is empty, then the definiendum is empty.\(^{133}\) A full discussion motivating and justifying this rule is given in (278), though see also (277).

As we shall see, the Rule of Definition by Identity will yield, in (121.2), the classical introduction and elimination rules for the definiendum when the definiens is significant. Moreover, the Rule of Definition by Identity finesses the problem of ‘conditional definitions’, such as division by zero in real number theory. But a full discussion of this and other interesting issues that this rule gives rise to will be reserved for Remark (278), where we fully motivate the rule as stated above.\(^{134}\)

When \( n = 0 \), the definiens in a definition-by-\( = \) is a closed term and the definiendum is a new constant. So our rule asserts that the definition \( \tau =_df \sigma \) introduces the necessary axiom:

\[
(\sigma \downarrow \rightarrow \tau = \sigma) \& (\neg \sigma \downarrow \rightarrow \neg \tau \downarrow)
\]

Once we have rules in place for reasoning from conjunctions, we’ll see both that the above immediately yields \( \tau = \sigma \) as a \( \Box \)-theorem whenever we can establish \( \sigma \downarrow \) as a \( \Box \)-theorem, and yields \( \tau = \sigma \) as a \( \ast \)-theorem whenever we can

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\(^{133}\)Stated a bit more strictly, the inferential role of an instance of a definition-by-\( = \) is to introduce a necessary axiom that asserts: (a) if the definiens, when applied to suitable arguments \( \tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n \), is significant, then an identity holds between the definiendum and definiens when both are applied to those arguments, and (b) if the definiens is empty, when applied to the arguments \( \tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n \), then the definiendum, when applied to those arguments, is empty.

\(^{134}\)To anticipate the issue of conditional definition, consider that in real number theory, where \( x, y, z \) range over real numbers, one might define the operation of division, i.e., \( x/y \), as follows: if it is provable or assumed that \( y \neq 0 \), then \( x/y =_df \begin{array}{c} \exists z \end{array}(x = y \cdot z) \). Without antecedent condition, the description \( \exists z(x = y \cdot z) \) can fail to denote: there is no such \( z \) when \( x \) is any positive number and \( y = 0 \), and there is no unique such \( z \) when \( x = 0 \) and \( y = 0 \). But given our Rule of Definition by Identity, the definition yields axioms of the following form:

\[
(\exists z(x = y \cdot z) \downarrow \rightarrow (x/y = z(x = y \cdot z))) \& (\neg \exists z(x = y \cdot z) \downarrow \rightarrow \neg (x/y) \downarrow)
\]

So when \( y = 0 \), one can establish, for any \( x \), that \( \neg \exists z(x = 0 \cdot z) \downarrow \), and thereby conclude \( \neg (x/0) \downarrow \). One doesn’t have to use ‘conditional definitions’ that conditionally extend the language only when some condition is provable.
establish \( \sigma \downarrow \) as a \( \star \)-theorem. In both cases, \( \tau \) and \( \sigma \) become substitutable for one another in any context, though in the latter case, the substitution will undermine the modal strictness of the reasoning.

### 9.5 The Theory of Negations and Conditionals

**Theorems:** A Useful Fact. The following fact is derivable and is crucial to the proof of the Deduction Theorem:

\[ \varphi \rightarrow \varphi \]

Although the notion of a tautology is a semantic notion and isn’t officially defined in our formal system, we saw in Section 6.2 that the notion can be precisely defined if one takes on board the required semantic notions. It won’t hurt, therefore, if we use the notion unofficially and label the above claim a tautology. Other tautologies will be derived below. As we will see, all tautologies are derivable, but it will be some time before we have assembled all the facts needed to prove this metatheoretic fact.

**Metarule:** Deduction Theorem and Conditional Proof (CP). If there is a derivation of \( \psi \) from a set of premises \( \Gamma \) together with an additional premise \( \varphi \), then there is a derivation of \( \varphi \rightarrow \psi \) from \( \Gamma \):

**Rule CP**

If \( \Gamma, \varphi \vdash \psi \), then \( \Gamma \vdash (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \).

By convention (68.1), we omit the formulation of the analogous rule for \( \vdash \) \( \Box \). And hereafter, we shall not remark upon such omissions unless a special case calls for some such remark. Rule CP is most-often used when \( \Gamma = \emptyset \):

If \( \varphi \vdash \psi \), then \( \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi \).

When we cite this metarule in the proof of other metarules, we reference it as the Deduction Theorem. However, we shall adopt the following convention: during the course of reasoning, once we have produced a derivation of \( \psi \) from \( \varphi \), then instead of concluding \( \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi \) and citing the Deduction Theorem, we shall infer \( \varphi \rightarrow \psi \) and cite Conditional Proof (CP). The proof of the Deduction Theorem in the Appendix guarantees that we can indeed construct a proof of the conditional \( \varphi \rightarrow \psi \) once we have derived \( \psi \) from \( \varphi \).

**Metarules:** Corollaries to the Deduction Theorem. The following metarules are immediate consequences of the Deduction Theorem. They help us to prove the tautologies in (78), (86), and (89). Recall that ‘\( \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \)’ indicates ‘\( \Gamma_1 \cup \Gamma_2 \)’:

\[ \text{Metatheorem } \langle 6.7 \rangle \text{, which is proved in the Appendix to Chapter 6, establishes that } \Gamma, \varphi \models \psi \text{ if and only if } \Gamma \models (\varphi \rightarrow \psi). \]

\[ \text{Furthermore, Metatheorem } \langle 6.8 \rangle \text{, which is also proved in the Appendix to Chapter 6, establishes that } \varphi \models \psi \text{ if and only if } \models \varphi \rightarrow \psi. \]
9.5. THE THEORY OF NEGATIONS AND CONDITIONALS

(.1) If \( \Gamma_1 \vdash \phi \rightarrow \psi \) and \( \Gamma_2 \vdash \psi \rightarrow \chi \), then \( \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \phi \rightarrow \chi \)

(.2) If \( \Gamma_1 \vdash \phi \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \chi) \) and \( \Gamma_2 \vdash \psi \), then \( \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \phi \rightarrow \chi \)

It is interesting that the above metarules have the following Variant forms, respectively:

(.3) \( \phi \rightarrow \psi, \psi \rightarrow \chi \vdash \phi \rightarrow \chi \) \text{ [Hypothetical Syllogism]}

(.4) \( \phi \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \chi), \psi \vdash \phi \rightarrow \chi \)

(.3) is a Variant of (.1) because we can derive each from the other.\(^{136}\) Similarly, (.4) is a Variant of (.2).

Note that the Variants (.3) and (.4) are somewhat different from the stated metarules (.1) and (.2): the Variants don’t have the form of a conditional but instead simply assert the existence of a derivation. Of course they can be put into the traditional metarule form by conditionalizing them upon the triviality “If any condition holds” or “Under all conditions”. But, given that these metarules hold without preconditions, we may consider them derived rules of inference, i.e., rules of inference, like Modus Ponens, that allow us to infer formulas from formulas. Thus, (.3), for example, can be reconceived as a derived rule and not just a metarule. We may justifiably use this rule within derivations and consider the result to be a bona fide derivation. The justification of (.3) in the Appendix establishes that any derivation that yields a conclusion by an application of the above derived rule of Hypothetical Syllogism can be converted to a derivation in which this rule isn’t used.

This pattern, of taking the unconditional variants of metarules to be derived rules, will occur often in what follows; many of the derived metarules for reasoning with negation and conditionals have unconditional variants that

\(^{136}\) Here is a proof. \((\rightarrow)\) Assume (.1), i.e., if \( \Gamma_1 \vdash \phi \rightarrow \psi \) and \( \Gamma_2 \vdash \psi \rightarrow \chi \), then \( \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \phi \rightarrow \chi \).

We want to show \( \phi \rightarrow \psi, \psi \rightarrow \chi \vdash \phi \rightarrow \chi \). If we let \( \Gamma_1 \) be \( \{ \phi \rightarrow \psi \} \), then since by (64.2) we know \( \phi \rightarrow \psi \vdash \phi \rightarrow \psi \), we have \( \Gamma_1 \vdash \phi \rightarrow \psi \). By similar reasoning, if we let \( \Gamma_2 \) be \( \{ \psi \rightarrow \chi \} \), then we have \( \Gamma_2 \vdash \psi \rightarrow \chi \). Hence, by (.1), it follows that \( \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \phi \rightarrow \chi \). But, this is just \( \phi \rightarrow \psi, \psi \rightarrow \chi \vdash \phi \rightarrow \chi \).

\((\leftarrow)\) Assume (.3), i.e., \( \phi \rightarrow \psi, \psi \rightarrow \chi \vdash \phi \rightarrow \chi \). Then by (64.7), it follows that:

\[ \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2, \phi \rightarrow \psi, \psi \rightarrow \chi \vdash \phi \rightarrow \chi \]

From this, by two applications of the Deduction Theorem, we have:

\((\delta)\) \( \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash (\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow ((\phi \rightarrow \chi) \rightarrow (\phi \rightarrow \chi)) \)

Now to show (.1), assume \( \Gamma_1 \vdash \phi \rightarrow \psi \) and \( \Gamma_2 \vdash \psi \rightarrow \chi \). So by (64.7), it follows, respectively, that:

(a) \( \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \phi \rightarrow \psi \)

(b) \( \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \psi \rightarrow \chi \)

By (a) and (\( \delta \)), it follows by (64.5) that:

\((\xi)\) \( \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash (\psi \rightarrow \chi) \rightarrow (\phi \rightarrow \chi) \)

From (\( \xi \)) and (b), it follows by (64.5) that \( \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \phi \rightarrow \chi \). \( \therefore \)
will be regarded as derived rules. In the Appendix, however, we typically reason with the variant, derived rule whenever it is available.

(78) Theorems: More Useful Tautologies. The tautologies listed below (and their proofs) follow the presentation in Mendelson 1997 (Lemma 1.11, pp. 38–40). We present them as a group because they are needed in the Appendix to this chapter to establish Lemma (9.1) and Metatheorem (9.2), i.e., that every tautology is derivable.

\[(.1) \neg \neg \varphi \rightarrow \varphi\]
\[(.2) \varphi \rightarrow \neg \neg \varphi\]
\[(.3) \neg \varphi \rightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow \psi)\]
\[(.4) (\neg \psi \rightarrow \neg \varphi) \rightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow \psi)\]
\[(.5) (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (\neg \psi \rightarrow \neg \varphi)\]
\[(.6) (\varphi \rightarrow \neg \psi) \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \neg \varphi)\]
\[(.7) (\neg \varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (\neg \psi \rightarrow \varphi)\]
\[(.8) \varphi \rightarrow (\neg \psi \rightarrow \neg (\varphi \rightarrow \psi))\]
\[(.9) (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow ((\neg \varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow \psi)\]
\[(.10) (\varphi \rightarrow \neg \psi) \rightarrow ((\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow \neg \varphi)\]

(.1) and (.2) are used to derive Double Negation rules (79); (.5) is used to prove Modus Tollens (80); and (.10) is used to prove a form of reductio ad absurdum.

(79) Metarules/Derived Rules: Double Negation. It is easy to derive introduction and elimination metarules for double negation, along with their corresponding derived rules:

\[(.1) \text{Double Negation Introduction (Rule } \neg \neg \text{I):}\]

\[\text{If } \Gamma \vdash \varphi, \text{ then } \Gamma \vdash \neg \neg \varphi \quad \text{[Variant: } \varphi \vdash \neg \neg \varphi]\]

\[(.2) \text{Double Negation Elimination (Rule } \neg \neg \text{E):}\]

\[\text{If } \Gamma \vdash \neg \neg \varphi, \text{ then } \Gamma \vdash \varphi \quad \text{[Variant: } \neg \neg \varphi \vdash \varphi]\]

(80) Metarules/Derived Rules: Modus Tollens. We formulate Modus Tollens (MT) as two metarules:
9.5. **THE THEORY OF NEGATIONS AND CONDITIONALS**

**Rules of Modus Tollens (MT)**

1. If \( \Gamma \vdash (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \) and \( \Gamma \vdash \neg \psi \), then \( \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \neg \varphi \)

   [Variant: \( \varphi \rightarrow \psi, \neg \psi \vdash \neg \varphi \)]

2. If \( \Gamma \vdash (\varphi \rightarrow \neg \psi) \) and \( \Gamma \vdash \psi \), then \( \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \neg \varphi \)

   [Variant: \( \varphi \rightarrow \neg \psi, \psi \vdash \neg \varphi \)]

The Variants are equivalent, by reasoning analogous to that in footnote 136. In light of the discussion at the end of (77), the Variants may be conceived as the well-known derived rules.

**(81) Metarules/Derived Rules:** Contraposition. These metarules also come in two forms:

**Rules of Contraposition**

1. \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi \) if and only if \( \Gamma \vdash \neg \psi \rightarrow \neg \varphi \)

   [Variant: \( \varphi \rightarrow \psi, \neg \psi \vdash \neg \varphi \)]

2. \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \neg \psi \) if and only if \( \Gamma \vdash \psi \rightarrow \neg \varphi \)

   [Variant: \( \varphi \rightarrow \neg \psi, \psi \vdash \neg \varphi \)]

In the Variants, \( \chi \vdash \theta \) (‘\( \chi \) is interderivable with \( \theta \)’) is simply means \( \chi \vdash \theta \) and \( \theta \vdash \chi \).\(^{137}\) Given the discussion at the end of (77), we typically use the derived rules in proofs.

**(82) Metarules/Derived Rules:** Reductio Ad Absurdum. Two classic forms of Reductio Ad Absurdum (RAA) are formulated as follows:

**Rules of Reductio Ad Absurdum (RAA)**

1. If \( \Gamma_1, \neg \varphi \vdash \neg \psi \) and \( \Gamma_2, \neg \varphi \vdash \psi \), then \( \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \varphi \)

   [Variant: \( \neg \varphi \rightarrow \neg \psi, \neg \varphi \rightarrow \psi \vdash \varphi \)]

2. If \( \Gamma, \varphi \vdash \neg \psi \) and \( \Gamma, \varphi \vdash \psi \), then \( \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \neg \varphi \)

   [Variant: \( \varphi \rightarrow \neg \psi, \varphi \rightarrow \psi \vdash \neg \varphi \)]

The variant versions are, respectively, provably equivalent to their more general formulations.\(^{138}\) We may therefore use them as derived rules, if needed.

---

\(^{137}\)Although the reasoning is again analogous to that in footnote 136, we show here the left-to-right direction of (.1) is equivalent to the variant \( \varphi \rightarrow \psi \vdash \neg \psi \rightarrow \neg \varphi \). (\(\rightarrow\)) Assume metarule (.1): if \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi \), then \( \Gamma \vdash \neg \psi \rightarrow \neg \varphi \). Now let \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi \). Then we have \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi \), by the special case of (64.2). But then it follows from our assumption that \( \Gamma \vdash \neg \psi \rightarrow \neg \varphi \), i.e., \( \varphi \rightarrow \psi \vdash \neg \psi \rightarrow \neg \varphi \). (\(\rightarrow\)) Assume \( \varphi \rightarrow \psi \vdash \neg \psi \rightarrow \neg \varphi \). Then by (64.7), it follows that \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi \vdash \neg \psi \rightarrow \neg \varphi \). By the Deduction Theorem, it follows that \( \Gamma \vdash (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \vdash (\neg \psi \rightarrow \neg \varphi) \). But from this fact, we can derive \( \Gamma \vdash \neg \psi \rightarrow \neg \varphi \) from the assumption that \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi \), by (64.5).

We leave the other direction, and the proof of the equivalence of (.2) and its variant, as exercises.

\(^{138}\)We can show that (.1) is equivalent to the Variant as follows. (\(\rightarrow\)) Assume (.1): if \( \Gamma_1, \neg \varphi \vdash \neg \psi \) and \( \Gamma_2, \neg \varphi \vdash \psi \), then \( \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \varphi \). Now to derive the variant, note that if we let \( \Gamma_1 \equiv (\neg \varphi \rightarrow \neg \psi) \) and \( \Gamma_2 \equiv (\neg \varphi \rightarrow \psi) \), then we know by MP both that \( \Gamma_1, \neg \varphi \vdash \neg \psi \) and \( \Gamma_2, \neg \varphi \vdash \psi \). Hence by our assumption, \( \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \varphi \). (\(\rightarrow\)) Assume the variant version, i.e., \( \neg \varphi \rightarrow \neg \psi \rightarrow \neg \varphi \rightarrow \psi \vdash \varphi \). By (64.7), it follows that:
**Remark:** Introduction and Elimination Rules for $\rightarrow$ and $\neg$. Note that the metarules for the introduction and elimination of $\rightarrow$ and $\neg$ have already been presented. (64.5) is the metarule for $\rightarrow$Elimination ($\rightarrow$E); the Deduction Theorem (76) and its corollaries (77) are metarules for $\rightarrow$Introduction ($\rightarrow$I). Reductio Ad Absurdum, when formulated as in (82.1), is a metarule for $\neg$Elimination ($\neg$E), and when formulated as in (82.2), is a metarule for $\neg$Introduction ($\neg$I). And we’ve formulated the introduction and elimination rules for double negation in (79).

We now work our ways towards the formulation of the introduction and elimination metarules for $\&$, $\lor$, and $\equiv$. We also state their variant, derived rules when applicable, though we leave the proof that they are equivalent to the stated metarules for the reader. We also assume that, in each case, the ⊢ form of the metarules and derived rules can be easily proved using the ⊢ form as a guide.

**Theorems:** Principle of Excluded Middle.

$$
\phi \lor \neg \phi
$$

The proof in the Appendix of this classical principle involves an appeal to a previously established theorem (75) and our Rule of Definition by Equivalence (73).

**Theorems:** Principle of Noncontradiction.

$$
\neg (\phi \land \neg \phi)
$$

The proof in the Appendix of (.1) goes by way of a reductio, and involves an appeal to a previously established theorem (78.2), the definition of $\land$ (18.1) and the Rule of Definition by Equivalence (73).

**Theorems:** Basic Tautologies Governing Conjunction and Disjunction.

(1) $(\phi \land \psi) \rightarrow \phi$ (Conjunction Simplification)

So by two applications of the Deduction Theorem, we know:

(8) $\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \neg \phi \rightarrow \neg \psi$ 

(9) $(\neg \phi \rightarrow \neg \psi) \rightarrow ((\neg \phi \rightarrow \neg \psi) \rightarrow \phi)$

Now to show (82.1), assume $\Gamma_1, \neg \phi \vdash \neg \psi$ and $\Gamma_2, \neg \phi \vdash \psi$. Then by (64.7), it follows, respectively, that $\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2, \neg \phi \vdash \neg \psi$ and $\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2, \neg \phi \vdash \psi$. By applying the Deduction Theorem to each of these, we obtain, respectively:

(ξ) $\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \neg \phi \rightarrow \neg \psi$

(ζ) $\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \neg \phi \rightarrow \psi$

But from (8) and (ξ), it follows by (64.5) that:

$\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash ((\neg \phi \rightarrow \neg \psi) \rightarrow \phi)$

And from this last conclusion and (ζ) it follows again by (64.5) that $\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \phi$. ⊢
(2) \((\varphi & \psi) \rightarrow \psi\)  
Conjunction Simplification

(3) \(\varphi \rightarrow (\varphi \lor \psi)\)  
Disjunction Addition

(4) \(\psi \rightarrow (\varphi \lor \psi)\)  
Disjunction Addition

(5) \(\varphi \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow (\varphi & \psi))\)  
Adjunction

(6) \((\varphi & \varphi) \equiv \varphi\)  
Idempotence of &

(7) \((\varphi \lor \varphi) \equiv \varphi\)  
Idempotence of \(\lor\)


(1) &Introduction (&I):
If \(\Gamma \vdash \varphi\) and \(\Gamma \vdash \psi\), then \(\Gamma, \Gamma \vdash \varphi \& \psi\)  
[Variant: \(\varphi, \psi \vdash \varphi \& \psi\)]

(2) &Elimination (&E):
(a) If \(\Gamma \vdash \varphi \& \psi\), then \(\Gamma \vdash \varphi\)  
[Variant: \(\varphi \& \psi \vdash \varphi\)]

(b) If \(\Gamma \vdash \varphi \& \psi\), then \(\Gamma \vdash \psi\)  
[Variant: \(\varphi \& \psi \vdash \psi\)]

(3) \(\lor\)Introduction (\(\lor\)I):
(a) If \(\Gamma \vdash \varphi\), then \(\Gamma \vdash \varphi \lor \psi\)  
[Variant: \(\varphi \vdash \varphi \lor \psi\)]

(b) If \(\Gamma \vdash \psi\), then \(\Gamma \vdash \varphi \lor \psi\)  
[Variant: \(\psi \vdash \varphi \lor \psi\)]

(c) Disjunctive Syllogism:
If \(\Gamma_1 \vdash \varphi \lor \psi\), \(\Gamma_2 \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \chi\), and \(\Gamma_3 \vdash \psi \rightarrow \Theta\), then \(\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2, \Gamma_3 \vdash \chi \lor \Theta\)  
[Variant: \(\varphi \lor \psi, \varphi \rightarrow \chi, \psi \rightarrow \Theta \vdash \chi \lor \Theta\)]

(4) \(\lor\)Elimination (\(\lor\)E):
(a) Reasoning by Cases:
If \(\Gamma_1 \vdash \varphi \lor \psi\), \(\Gamma_2 \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \chi\), and \(\Gamma_3 \vdash \psi \rightarrow \chi\), then \(\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2, \Gamma_3 \vdash \chi\)  
[Variant: \(\varphi \lor \psi, \varphi \rightarrow \chi, \psi \rightarrow \chi \vdash \chi\)]

(b) Disjunctive Syllogism (alternative form):
If \(\Gamma_1 \vdash \varphi \lor \psi\) and \(\Gamma_2 \vdash \neg \varphi\), then \(\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \psi\)  
[Variant: \(\varphi \lor \psi, \neg \varphi \vdash \psi\)]

(c) Disjunctive Syllogism (alternative form):
If \(\Gamma_1 \vdash \varphi \lor \psi\) and \(\Gamma_2 \vdash \neg \psi\), then \(\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \varphi\)  
[Variant: \(\varphi \lor \psi, \neg \psi \vdash \varphi\)]

(88) Metarules/Derived Rules. Classical and Alternative Forms of RAA. In systems where & is a primitive connective, classical Reductio Ad Absurdum is stated as a primitive metarule which asserts that if there is a derivation of a
contradiction from some premises and an assumption, then there is a derivation of the negation of the assumption from the premises alone. But in our system, Reductio is derivable as a metarule, though only once the above theorems and rules are in place:

(.1) If \( \Gamma, \neg \varphi \vdash \psi \land \neg \psi \), then \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi \)

(.2) If \( \Gamma, \varphi \vdash \psi \land \neg \psi \), then \( \Gamma \vdash \neg \varphi \)

The reader should also confirm that Reductio Ad Absurdum also has the following forms:

(.3) If \( \Gamma, \varphi, \neg \psi \vdash \neg \varphi \), then \( \Gamma, \varphi \vdash \psi \)

[Variant: \( \varphi, \neg \psi \rightarrow \neg \varphi \vdash \psi \)]

(.4) If \( \Gamma, \neg \varphi, \neg \psi \vdash \varphi \), then \( \Gamma, \neg \varphi \vdash \psi \)

[Variant: \( \neg \varphi, \neg \psi \rightarrow \varphi \vdash \psi \)]

(.5) If \( \Gamma, \varphi, \psi \vdash \neg \psi \), then \( \Gamma, \varphi \vdash \neg \psi \)

[Variant: \( \varphi, \psi \rightarrow \neg \varphi \vdash \neg \psi \)]

(.6) If \( \Gamma, \neg \varphi, \psi \vdash \varphi \), then \( \Gamma, \neg \varphi \vdash \neg \psi \)

[Variant: \( \neg \varphi, \psi \rightarrow \varphi \vdash \neg \psi \)]

(89) Theorems: Other Useful Tautologies. The foregoing allow us to more easily prove many classical and other useful theorems governing the classical connectives:

(.1) Some Basic Facts:

(a) \( (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \equiv \neg (\varphi \land \neg \psi) \)

(b) \( \neg (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \equiv (\varphi \land \neg \psi) \)

(c) \( (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \equiv (\neg \varphi \lor \psi) \)

(.2) Commutative and Associative Laws of \&, \lor, and \equiv:

(a) \( (\varphi \land \psi) \equiv (\psi \land \varphi) \) (Commutativity of \&)

(b) \( (\varphi \land (\psi \land \chi)) \equiv ((\varphi \land \psi) \land \chi) \) (Associativity of \&)

(c) \( (\varphi \lor \psi) \equiv (\psi \lor \varphi) \) (Commutativity of \lor)

(d) \( (\varphi \lor (\psi \lor \chi)) \equiv ((\varphi \lor \psi) \lor \chi) \) (Associativity of \lor)

(e) \( (\varphi \equiv \psi) \equiv (\psi \equiv \varphi) \) (Commutativity of \equiv)

(f) \( (\varphi \equiv (\psi \equiv \chi)) \equiv ((\varphi \equiv \psi) \equiv \chi) \) (Associativity of \equiv)

(.3) Simple Biconditionals:

(a) \( \varphi \equiv \varphi \)

(b) \( \varphi \equiv \neg \neg \varphi \)

(c) \( \neg (\varphi \equiv \neg \varphi) \) (Form of Noncontradiction)
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(4) Conditionals and Biconditionals:

(a) \((\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow ((\psi \rightarrow \chi) \rightarrow (\phi \rightarrow \chi))\)
(b) \((\phi \equiv \psi) \equiv (\neg \phi \equiv \neg \psi)\)
(c) \((\phi \equiv \psi) \rightarrow ((\phi \rightarrow \chi) \equiv (\psi \rightarrow \chi))\)
(d) \((\phi \equiv \psi) \rightarrow ((\chi \rightarrow \phi) \equiv (\chi \rightarrow \psi))\)
(e) \((\phi \equiv \psi) \rightarrow ((\phi \& \chi) \equiv (\psi \& \chi))\)
(f) \((\phi \equiv \psi) \rightarrow ((\chi \& \phi) \equiv (\chi \& \psi))\)
(g) \((\phi \equiv \psi) \equiv ((\phi \& \psi) \lor (\neg \phi \& \neg \psi))\)
(h) \((\neg (\phi \equiv \psi) \equiv ((\phi \& \neg \psi) \lor (\neg \phi \& \psi))\)

(5) De Morgan's Laws:

(a) \((\phi \& \psi) \equiv (\neg \phi \lor \neg \psi)\)
(b) \((\phi \lor \psi) \equiv (\neg \phi \& \neg \psi)\)
(c) \((\neg (\phi \& \psi) \equiv (\neg \phi \lor \neg \psi)\)
(d) \((\neg (\phi \lor \psi) \equiv (\neg \phi \& \neg \psi)\)

(6) Distribution Laws:

(a) \((\phi \& (\psi \lor \chi)) \equiv ((\phi \& \psi) \lor (\phi \& \chi))\)
(b) \((\phi \lor (\psi \& \chi)) \equiv ((\phi \lor \psi) \& (\phi \lor \chi))\)

(7) Exportation and Importation:

(a) \(((\phi \& \psi) \rightarrow \chi) \rightarrow (\phi \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \chi))\) \hspace{1cm} \text{(Exportation)}
(b) \((\phi \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \chi)) \rightarrow ((\phi \& \psi) \rightarrow \chi)\) \hspace{1cm} \text{(Importation)}

(8) Other Miscellaneous Tautologies:

(a) \((\phi \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \chi)) \equiv (\psi \rightarrow (\phi \rightarrow \chi))\) \hspace{1cm} \text{(Permutation)}
(b) \((\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow ((\phi \rightarrow \chi) \rightarrow (\phi \rightarrow (\psi \& \chi)))\) \hspace{1cm} \text{(Composition)}
(c) \((\phi \rightarrow \chi) \rightarrow ((\psi \rightarrow \chi) \rightarrow ((\phi \lor \psi) \rightarrow \chi))\)
(d) \(((\phi \rightarrow \psi) \& (\chi \rightarrow \theta) \rightarrow ((\phi \& \chi) \rightarrow (\psi \& \theta))\) \hspace{1cm} \text{(Double Composition)}
(e) \(((\phi \& \psi) \equiv (\phi \& \chi)) \equiv (\phi \rightarrow (\psi \equiv \chi))\)
(f) \(((\phi \& \psi) \equiv (\chi \& \psi)) \equiv (\psi \rightarrow (\phi \equiv \chi))\)
(g) \((\psi \equiv \chi) \rightarrow ((\phi \lor \psi) \equiv (\phi \lor \chi))\)
(h) \((\psi \equiv \chi) \rightarrow ((\psi \lor \phi) \equiv (\chi \lor \phi))\)
(i) \((\phi \equiv (\psi \& \chi)) \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow (\phi \equiv \chi))\)
We leave the proof of these tautologies, with the exception of (.8.i), as exercises.

(90) Metarules/Derived Rules: Reasoning with Biconditionals. Our standard axiomatization of negation and conditionalization and the standard definition of the $\equiv$ allow us to reason using all the classical introduction and elimination rules for the biconditional. However, we formulate them, in the first instance, as metarules.

(.1) Disjunctive Syllogism (alternative form):
If $\Gamma_1 \vdash \phi \lor \psi$, $\Gamma_2 \vdash \phi \equiv \chi$, and $\Gamma_3 \vdash \psi \equiv \theta$, then $\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2, \Gamma_3 \vdash \chi \lor \theta$
   [Variant: $\phi \lor \psi, \phi \equiv \chi, \psi \equiv \theta \vdash \chi \lor \theta$]

(.2) $\equiv$Introduction ($\equiv$I):
If $\Gamma_1 \vdash \phi \rightarrow \psi$ and $\Gamma_2 \vdash \psi \rightarrow \phi$, then $\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \phi \equiv \psi$
   [Variant: $\phi \rightarrow \psi, \psi \rightarrow \phi \vdash \phi \equiv \psi$]

(.3) $\equiv$Elimination ($\equiv$E) (Biconditional Syllogisms):
   (a) If $\Gamma_1 \vdash \phi \equiv \psi$ and $\Gamma_2 \vdash \phi$, then $\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \psi$
       [Variant: $\phi \equiv \psi, \phi \vdash \psi$]
   (b) If $\Gamma_1 \vdash \phi \equiv \psi$ and $\Gamma_2 \vdash \psi$, then $\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \phi$
       [ Variant: $\phi \equiv \psi, \psi \vdash \phi$]
   (c) If $\Gamma_1 \vdash \phi \equiv \psi$ and $\Gamma_2 \vdash \neg \phi$, then $\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \neg \psi$
       [Variant: $\phi \equiv \psi, \neg \phi \vdash \neg \psi$]
   (d) If $\Gamma_1 \vdash \phi \equiv \psi$ and $\Gamma_2 \vdash \neg \psi$, then $\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \neg \phi$
       [Variant: $\phi \equiv \psi, \neg \psi \vdash \neg \phi$]
   (e) If $\Gamma_1 \vdash \phi \equiv \psi$ and $\Gamma_2 \vdash \psi \equiv \chi$, then $\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \phi \equiv \chi$
       [Variant: $\phi \equiv \psi, \psi \equiv \chi \vdash \phi \equiv \chi$]
   (f) If $\Gamma_1 \vdash \phi \equiv \psi$ and $\Gamma_2 \vdash \phi \equiv \chi$, then $\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \chi \equiv \psi$
       [Variant: $\phi \equiv \psi, \phi \equiv \chi \vdash \chi \equiv \psi$]

In every case, the modally strict, $\vdash_{\square}$-version of the rule holds and its justification requires only a trivial revision to the justification of the above versions. We leave the justification of these metarules, their variants, and their modally-strict versions and variants, as exercises and henceforth use the derived rules within proofs and derivations.

(91) Metarule: Derived Rule of Equivalence by Definition. Now that we have rules for reasoning with biconditionals, we can more easily derive, and make use of, the following rule:

(.1) Rule of Equivalence by Definition (Rule $\equiv$Df)
If $\phi \equiv_{df} \psi$ is any definition-by-$\equiv$ and $\Gamma$ is any premise set, then $\Gamma \vdash \phi \equiv \psi$. 
By convention (68.1), we omit the statement of the same rule for \( \vdash \). But it should be kept in mind that facts of the form \( \Gamma \vdash \Box \phi \equiv \psi \) derived from definitions by the \( \vdash \) form of the rule play an essential role proving important theorems in what follows.

It should be noted here that once the Rule of Actualization (RA) in is formulated and justified in (135), one can strengthen Rule \( \equiv \text{Df} \) so that it asserts:

If \( \phi \equiv \text{df} \psi \) is a definition-by-\( \equiv \), \( \Gamma \) is any premise set, and \( \chi \) is any closure of \( \phi \equiv \psi \), then \( \Gamma \vdash \chi \)

Once Rule RA is in place then we can use the rules GEN, RN, and RA enough times to show that if \( \phi \equiv \psi \) is a theorem, then any closure of \( \phi \equiv \psi \) is a theorem. But this strengthened version of (.1) will not be explicitly formulated as such in what follows.

Now, given (.1), and the various rules for reasoning with biconditionals, (90.1) – (90.3), we can easily derive the rules that lets us directly infer a definiens from a definiendum and infer a definiendum from a definiens, from any instance of a definition-by-\( \equiv \):

(.2) **Rule of Definiendum Elimination** (Rule \( \equiv \text{d} \text{fE} \))

If \( \Gamma \vdash \phi \), then \( \Gamma \vdash \psi \), whenever \( \phi \equiv \text{d} \psi \) is a definition-by-\( \equiv \).

[Variant: \( \phi \vdash \psi \), whenever ...]

(.3) **Rule of Definiendum Introduction** (Rule \( \equiv \text{d} \text{fI} \))

If \( \Gamma \vdash \psi \), then \( \Gamma \vdash \phi \), whenever \( \phi \equiv \text{d} \psi \) is a definition-by-\( \equiv \).

[Variant: \( \psi \vdash \phi \), whenever ...]

Again, by convention, we omit the statement of these rules for \( \vdash \). Given that (.1) – (.3) hold for both \( \vdash \) and \( \vdash \Box \), we may employ them in any reasoning environment without affecting the modal strictness, if any, of the reasoning. Once we gain some experience explicitly citing Rules \( \equiv \text{d} \text{fE} \) and \( \equiv \text{d} \text{fI} \) when proving theorems, we’ll then revert to the classical citation ‘by definition’ when using these rules to draw conclusions from definitions-by-\( \equiv \).

(92) **Metarule:** A Situation Permitting Biconditional Simplification. There is a situation that will occur frequently in which certain biconditionals can be simplified, namely, when one condition of the biconditional includes a number of conjuncts that are already known by hypothesis or by proof. The metarule for simplifying these biconditionals states that if there is a (modally-strict) derivation of \( \phi \equiv (\psi \& \chi) \) from \( \Gamma \) and there is a (modally-strict) derivation of \( \psi \) from \( \Gamma \), then there is a (modally-strict) derivation of \( \phi \equiv \chi \) from \( \Gamma \):

(.1) **Rule \( \equiv \text{S} \) of Biconditional Simplification**

If \( \Gamma \vdash \phi \equiv (\psi \& \chi) \) and \( \Gamma \vdash \psi \), then \( \Gamma \vdash \phi \equiv \chi \).

[Variant: \( \phi \equiv (\psi \& \chi) \), \( \psi \vdash \phi \equiv \chi \)]
The version for \( \vdash \square \) is obtained by replacing \( \vdash \) by \( \vdash \square \). The Variant simply says we can infer (i.e., there is a derivation of) \( \varphi \equiv \chi \) from the premises \( \varphi \equiv (\psi \& \chi) \) and \( \psi \). These rules are easily justified by (89.8.i).

A more general form of the above rule can also be derived. The Variant form states that from two assumptions, the first of which is a biconditional between \( \varphi \) and the conjunction of \( \psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n \) (\( n \geq 1 \)), and the second of which is just one of the \( \psi_i \) (\( 1 \leq i \leq n \)), there is a (modally-strict) derivation of the equivalence that results by omitting the conjunct \( \psi_i \) from the right condition of the first assumption. Formally, for \( 1 \leq i \leq n \):

\[
(\cdot2) \text{ Rule } \equiv S \text{ of Biconditional Simplification (General Form)} \\
\text{If } \Gamma \vdash \varphi \equiv (\psi_1 \& \ldots \& \psi_n \& \chi) \text{ and } \Gamma \vdash \psi_i, \\
\text{then } \Gamma \vdash \varphi \equiv (\psi_1 \& \ldots \& \psi_{i-1} \& \psi_{i+1} \& \ldots \& \psi_n \& \chi) \\
\text{Variant:} \\
\varphi \equiv (\psi_1 \& \ldots \& \psi_n \& \chi), \psi_i \vdash \varphi \equiv (\psi_1 \& \ldots \& \psi_{i-1} \& \psi_{i+1} \& \ldots \& \psi_n \& \chi)
\]

We leave the justification as an exercise.

A special case of the Variant of (.2) applies to biconditionals derived from definitions-by-\( \equiv \) in which the definiens has one or more existence claims as conjuncts. Consider such any instance of such a definition having the following form, in which the free occurrences of the variables \( \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n \) (\( n \geq 1 \)) are interpreted under Convention (17.2):

\[
\varphi(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n) \equiv_{df} \alpha_1 \downarrow \& \ldots \& \alpha_n \downarrow \& \chi
\]

Now let \( \tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n \) be any terms substitutable for \( \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n \). Then where \( 1 \leq i \leq n \), we have the following special case of the general form of Rule \( \equiv S \):

\[
\varphi_{\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n} \equiv (\tau_1 \downarrow \& \ldots \& \tau_n \downarrow \& \chi_{\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n}), \tau_i \downarrow \\
\varphi_{\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n} \equiv (\tau_1 \downarrow \& \ldots \& \tau_{i-1} \downarrow \& \tau_{i+1} \downarrow \& \ldots \& \tau_n \downarrow \& \chi_{\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n})
\]

This special case will often be applied in reasoning from definitions-by-\( \equiv \) in which the definiens contains a non-zero number of existence clauses as conjuncts.

(93) Remark: Not All Tautologies Are Yet Derivable. Rule MP and our axioms (38.1) – (38.3) for negations and conditionals are not yet sufficient for deriving all of the formulas that qualify as tautologies, as the latter notion was defined in Section 6.2. We discovered in that section that our system contains a new class of tautologies that arise in connection with 0-place relation terms of the form \([\lambda \varphi] \). Instances of the following schemata are members of this new class of tautologies: \([\lambda \varphi] \rightarrow \varphi \), \([\lambda \varphi] \equiv \varphi \), \([\lambda \varphi] \rightarrow \neg \varphi \), etc. To derive these tautologies, we must first prove that \([\lambda \varphi] \equiv \varphi \) is a theorem (112.2), and to do that, we will need to show that \([\lambda \varphi] = \varphi \) is a theorem (112.1). The derivations of these
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(...)

latter theorems appeal to \(\eta\)-Conversion, GEN, Rule \(\forall E\) (a rule of quantification theory derived in item (94) below), and Rule \(\Rightarrow E\) (i.e., the rule for the substitution of identicals, derived in item (111) below). Once we’ve derived all of these key principles, and (112.2) in particular, we will be in a position to prove Metatheorem (9.2), i.e., that all tautologies are derivable. This Metatheorem is proved in the Appendix to this chapter. With such a result, we can derive Rule \(T\), which is formulable using the semantic notions defined in Section 6.2, as a rule for our system:

**Rule \(T\)**

If \(\Gamma \vdash \varphi_1\) and \(\ldots\) and \(\Gamma \vdash \varphi_n\), then if \(\{\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_n\}\) tautologically implies \(\psi\), then \(\Gamma \vdash \psi\).

Rule \(T\) asserts that \(\psi\) is derivable from \(\Gamma\) whenever the formulas of which it is a tautological consequence are all derivable from \(\Gamma\). We won’t use this rule in proving theorems, since it requires semantic notions. But it is a valid shortcut. Rule \(T\) is proved as Metatheorem (9.4) in the Appendix to this chapter.

### 9.6 The Theory of Quantification

(94) **Metarules/Derived Rules:** \(\forall\) Elimination (\(\forall E\)). The elimination rule for the universal quantifier has two forms (with the first being the primary form):

**Rule \(\forall E\)**

1. If \(\Gamma_1 \vdash \forall \alpha \varphi\) and \(\Gamma_2 \vdash \tau \downarrow\), then \(\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \varphi_{\tau \alpha}\), provided \(\tau\) is substitutable for \(\alpha\) in \(\varphi\)
   
   [Variant: \(\forall \alpha \varphi, \tau \downarrow \vdash \varphi_{\tau \alpha}\), if \(\tau\) is substitutable for \(\alpha\)]

2. If \(\Gamma \vdash \forall \alpha \varphi\), then \(\Gamma \vdash \varphi_{\alpha}\), provided \(\tau\) is (a) a primitive constant, a variable, or a \(\lambda\)-expression in which the initial \(\lambda\) does not bind any variable in any encoding formula subterm, and (b) substitutable for \(\alpha\) in \(\varphi\)
   
   [Variant: \(\forall \alpha \varphi \vdash \varphi_{\alpha}\), provided ...]

(Here, and in what follows, the ellipsis should be filled in by the provisos of the official form of the rule.) In the usual manner, we may conceive the variants as derived rules and use them to produce genuine derivations.

Rule \(\forall E\) and its Variant have special cases when \(\tau\) is the variable \(\alpha\). Since every variable \(\alpha\) is substitutable for itself in any formula \(\varphi\) (see Metatheorem (7.4) in (15)) and \(\varphi_{\alpha} = \varphi\) (see Metatheorem (7.2) in (14)), the following special case obtains:

**Rule \(\forall E\) Special Case**

3. If \(\Gamma \vdash \forall \alpha \varphi\), then \(\Gamma \vdash \varphi\)
   
   [Variant: \(\forall \alpha \varphi \vdash \varphi\)]

(95) **Remark:** A Misuse of Rule \(\forall E\). Note that the following attempt to derive a contradiction involves a misuse of Rule \(\forall E\):
Let \( \varphi \) be the formula \( \neg y F \) and formulate the following instance of the Comprehension Principle for Abstract Objects: \( \exists x (A! x \& \forall F (xF \equiv \neg y F)) \). So by GEN, we may derive as a theorem:

\[ (\delta) \forall y \exists x (A! x \& \forall F (xF \equiv \neg y F)) \]

Hence, by Rule \( \forall E \) (94.2) [Variant], it follows that:

\[ (\xi) \exists x (A! x \& \forall F (xF \equiv \neg x F)) \]

From this, we can derive a contradiction.\(^{139}\)

The problem with this bit of reasoning is the invalid application of Rule \( \forall E \) (94.2) [Variant] to infer (\( \xi \)) from (\( \vartheta \)). (\( \vartheta \)) has the form \( \forall y \psi \), and (\( \xi \)) has the form \( \psi_x \), and so the inference from (\( \vartheta \)) to (\( \xi \)) doesn’t obey the condition that \( x \) must be substitutable for \( y \) in the formula \( \psi \).\(^{140}\)

(96) Theorems: Classical Quantifier Axioms as Theorems. Our system now yields two quantification principles as theorems:

1. \( \forall \alpha \varphi \rightarrow \varphi^x_{\alpha} \), provided \( \tau \) is (a) a primitive constant, a variable, or a \( \lambda \)-expression in which the initial \( \lambda \) does not bind any variable in any encoding formula subterm, and (b) substitutable for \( \alpha \) in \( \varphi \).

2. \( \forall \alpha (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow \forall \alpha \psi) \), provided \( \alpha \) is not free in \( \varphi \)

Versions of these theorems are often used as the principal axioms of classical quantification theory, with GEN as a primitive rule of inference. Cf. Mendelson 1997 (69), axioms (A4) and (A5); (A4) is a simpler version of (.1) because Mendelson’s formulation of predicate logic (with function terms) assumes that all terms have a denotation.

Clearly, since \( \varphi^x_{\alpha} \) is just \( \varphi \), formulas of the form:

\[ (3) \forall \alpha \varphi \rightarrow \varphi \]

are special cases of (.1).

(97) Metarule/Derived Rule: Rule \( \forall I \) (Universal Introduction) or Generalization on Constants. We introduce and explain the Rule \( \forall I \) by way of an example. We often argue as follows:

\(^{139}\)We can see this more easily if we take the liberty of reasoning with a rule of inference we haven’t officially introduced yet, namely Rule \( \exists E \) (103). For assume \( a \) is an arbitrary such object, so that we know \( A! a \& \forall F (aF \equiv \neg aF) \). By &E, it follows that \( \forall F (aF \equiv \neg aF) \). Hence by a special case of Rule \( \forall E \) (94.3), it follows that \( aF \equiv \neg aF \), which by (89.3.c) is a contradiction.

\(^{140}\)In this case, \( \psi \) is the formula \( \exists x (A! x \& \forall F (xF \equiv \neg y F)) \). Then the definition of substitutable for in (15) requires that for \( x \) to be substitutable for \( y \) in \( \psi \), every variable that occurs free in the term \( x \) must remain free after we substitute \( x \) for \( y \) in \( \psi \). But \( x \) itself, which is free in the term \( x \), doesn’t remain free when \( x \) is substituted for \( y \) in \( \psi \) to produce \( \psi^x_{\psi} \), i.e., \( \exists x (A! x \& \forall F (xF \equiv \neg x F)) \). Instead, \( x \) is captured by (i.e., falls within the scope of) the existential quantifier \( \exists x \) in \( \psi^x_{\psi} \).
Let \( P \) be an arbitrary property and \( a \) an arbitrary object; then as an instance of the tautology \( \varphi \equiv \varphi \) (89.3.a), we know \( Pa \equiv Pa \). Since \( a \) is arbitrary, the biconditional holds for all objects, i.e., \( \forall x(Px \equiv Px) \). Since \( P \) is arbitrary, this last claim holds for all properties, i.e., \( \forall F\forall x(Fx \equiv Fx) \).

The last two steps of this reasoning are justified by Rule \( \forall I \), which allows us to universally generalize once we have reached a conclusion about arbitrarily chosen entities, as long as we haven’t invoked any special assumptions about the chosen entities. In the example we just gave, no special facts about the property \( P \) or the individual \( a \) played a part in our intermediate conclusion that \( Pa \equiv Pa \).

Of course, the theorem \( \forall F\forall x(Fx \equiv Fx) \) could have been established without appealing to Rule \( \forall I \), as follows: \( Fx \equiv Fx \) is an instance of the tautology \( \varphi \equiv \varphi \) (89.3.a) and so by two applications of GEN, it follows that \( \forall F\forall x(Fx \equiv Fx) \). But though we can reason using variables in this way, it is nevertheless sometimes helpful (indeed, clearer) to use arbitrarily chosen (primitive) constants instead of free variables when reasoning.

To formulate Rule \( \forall I \) generally, we first introduce some notation. Where \( \tau \) is any constant and \( \alpha \) any variable of the same type as \( \tau \):

\[
\varphi^\alpha_\tau \text{ is the result of replacing every occurrence of the constant } \tau \text{ in } \varphi \text{ by an occurrence of } \alpha
\]

We then have:

**Rule \( \forall I \)**

If \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi \) and \( \tau \) is a primitive constant that does not occur in \( \Gamma \) or \( \Lambda \), then \( \Gamma \vdash \forall \alpha \varphi^\alpha_\tau \), provided \( \alpha \) is a variable that does not occur in \( \varphi \).

[Variant: \( \varphi \vdash \forall \alpha \varphi^\alpha_\tau \), provided ...]

Note that only one distinguished constant, namely \( E! \), is used in the statement of the axioms in \( \Lambda \) and so \( E! \) is not an acceptable value for \( \tau \) in Rule \( \forall I \). So, for example, from axiom (39.4), i.e., \( \diamond \exists x(E!x \& \neg \exists x \neg E!x) \), we cannot conclude \( \forall F(\diamond \exists x(Fx \& \neg \exists x \neg Fx)) \) by Rule \( \forall I \).

Here is another example of how we will use Rule \( \forall I \). Consider the following reasoning that shows \( \forall x(Px \rightarrow Qx) \), \( \forall yPy \vdash \forall xQx \):

1. \( \forall x(Px \rightarrow Qx) \) Premise
2. \( \forall yPy \) Premise
3. \( Pa \rightarrow Qa \) from 1, by \( \forall E \) (94.2) [Variant]
4. \( Pa \) from 2, by \( \forall E \) (94.2) [Variant]
5. \( Qa \) from 3, 4, by MP
6. \( \forall x(Px \rightarrow Qx), \forall yPy \vdash \forall xQx \) from 1–5, by \( \forall I \)
In this example, we set \( \Gamma = \{ \forall x(Px \rightarrow Qx), \forall yPy \} \), \( \varphi = Qa \), and \( \tau = a \). Given that \( \forall E \) is a derived rule as well as a metarule, lines 1–5 constitute a genuine derivation that is a witness to \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi \). Since \( a \) doesn't occur in \( \Gamma \) or \( \Lambda \), and \( x \) doesn't occur in \( \varphi \), we have an instance of the Rule \( \forall I \) in which \( \alpha \) is the variable \( x \), which we can then apply to lines 1–5 to infer the derivability claim on line 6.

Since \( \forall I \) is a metarule, we could have reached the conclusion on line 6 without it using the following reasoning, which doesn't involve the constant \( a \):

1. \( \forall x(Px \rightarrow Qx) \) Premise
2. \( \forall yPy \) Premise
3. \( Px \rightarrow Qx \) from 1, by \( \forall E \) (94.3)
4. \( Px \) from 2, by \( \forall E \) (94.2) [Variant]
5. \( Qx \) from 3, 4, by MP
6. \( \forall x(Px \rightarrow Qx), \forall yPy \vdash \forall xQx \) from 1–5, by GEN

The application of GEN on line 6 is legitimate since we have correctly derived \( Qx \) on line 5 from the premises \( \forall x(Px \rightarrow Qx) \) and \( \forall yPy \) and the variable \( x \) doesn't occur free in the premises. Of course, GEN itself is a metarule, but we already know how to eliminate it.

(98) Lemmas: Re-replacement Lemmas. In the following re-replacement lemmas, we assume that \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) are variables of the same type as term \( \tau \):

(1) If \( \beta \) is substitutable for \( \alpha \) in \( \varphi \) and \( \beta \) doesn’t occur free in \( \varphi \), then \( \alpha \) is substitutable for \( \beta \) in \( \varphi^\beta_\alpha \) and \( (\varphi^\beta_\alpha)^\beta = \varphi \).

(2) If \( \tau \) is a constant symbol that doesn’t occur in \( \varphi \), then \( (\varphi^\tau_\alpha)_\tau^\beta = (\varphi^\tau_\alpha)^\beta \).

(3) If \( \beta \) is substitutable for \( \alpha \) in \( \varphi \) and doesn’t occur free in \( \varphi \), and \( \tau \) is any term substitutable for \( \alpha \) in \( \varphi \), then \( (\varphi^\beta_\alpha)^\beta = (\varphi^\tau_\alpha)^\beta \).

It may help to read the following Remark before attempting to prove the above.

(99) Remark: Explanation of the Re-replacement Lemmas. By discussing (98.1) in some detail, (98.2) and (98.3) become more transparent and less in need of commentary. It is relatively easy to show that, in general, in the absence of any preconditions, \( (\varphi^\beta_\alpha)^\beta \neq \varphi \). The variable \( \alpha \) may occur in \( (\varphi^\beta_\alpha)^\beta \) at a place where it does not occur in \( \varphi \), or \( \alpha \) may occur in \( \varphi \) at a place where it does not occur in \( (\varphi^\beta_\alpha)^\beta \). Here is an example of each case:

• \( \varphi = Rxy \). Then \( \varphi^x_\beta = Ry \) and though \( x \) is substitutable for \( y \) in \( \varphi^x_\beta \) (i.e., \( y \) doesn’t fall under the scope of any variable-binding operator that binds \( x \)), \( (\varphi^x_\beta)^x_\tau = Rxx \). Hence \( (\varphi^x_\beta)^x_\tau \neq \varphi \). In this example, \( x \) occurs at a place in \( (\varphi^x_\beta)^x_\tau \) where it does not occur in \( \varphi \).
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- \( \varphi = \forall y Rxy \). Then \( \varphi^x_y = \forall y Ryy \). Since \( x \) is trivially substitutable for \( y \) in \( \varphi^x_y \) (there are no free occurrences of \( y \) in \( \varphi^x_y \)), \( (\varphi^x_y)^x = \forall y Ryy \). By inspection, then, \( (\varphi^x_y)^x = \varphi \). In this example, \( x \) occurs at a place in \( \varphi \) where it does not occur in \( \varphi^x_y \).

These two examples nicely demonstrate why the two antecedents of (98.1) are crucial. The first example fails the proviso that \( y \) not occur free in \( Ryx \); the second example fails the proviso that \( y \) be substitutable for \( x \) in \( \forall y Rxy \). But here is an example of (98.1) in which the antecedents obtain:

- \( \varphi = \forall y Py \rightarrow Qx \). In this example, the free occurrence of \( x \) is not within the scope of the quantifier \( \forall y \). So \( y \) is substitutable for \( x \) in \( \varphi \) and \( y \) does not occur free in \( \varphi \). Thus, \( \varphi^x_y = \forall y Py \rightarrow Qy \), and since \( y \) has a free occurrence in \( \varphi^x_y \) not under the scope of a variable-binding operator binding \( x \), \( x \) is substitutable for \( y \) in \( \varphi^x_y \). Hence \( (\varphi^x_y)^x = \forall y Py \rightarrow Qx \), and so \( (\varphi^x_y)^x = \varphi \).

These remarks and the proof of (98.1) should suffice to clarify the remaining two replacement lemmas. (98.1) is used to prove (100.13), (104.10), and the Rule of Alphabetic Variants (115). Lemma (98.3) is used in the proof of (104.8).

(100) Theorems: Basic Theorems of Quantification Theory. The following are all basic consequences of our quantifier axioms and (derived) rules:

1. \( \forall a \forall b \varphi \equiv \forall b \forall a \varphi \)
2. \( \forall a (\varphi \equiv \psi) \equiv (\forall a (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \& \forall a (\psi \rightarrow \varphi)) \)
3. \( \forall a (\varphi \equiv \psi) \rightarrow (\forall a \varphi \equiv \forall a \psi) \)
4. \( \forall a (\varphi \& \psi) \equiv (\forall a \varphi \& \forall a \psi) \)
5. \( \forall a_1 \ldots \forall a_n \varphi \rightarrow \varphi \)
6. \( \forall a \forall a \varphi \equiv \forall a \varphi \)
7. \( (\varphi \rightarrow \forall a \psi) \equiv \forall a (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \), provided \( a \) is not free in \( \varphi \)
8. \( (\forall a \varphi \vee \forall a \psi) \rightarrow \forall a (\varphi \vee \psi) \)
9. \( (\forall a (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \& \forall a (\psi \rightarrow \chi)) \rightarrow \forall a (\varphi \rightarrow \chi) \)
10. \( (\forall a (\varphi \equiv \psi) \& \forall a (\psi \equiv \chi)) \rightarrow \forall a (\varphi \equiv \chi) \)
11. \( \forall a (\varphi \equiv \psi) \equiv \forall a (\psi \equiv \varphi) \)
12. \( \forall \alpha \varphi \rightarrow \forall a (\psi \rightarrow \varphi) \)
\[ \forall \alpha \phi \equiv \forall \beta (\phi^\beta), \]
provided \( \beta \) is substitutable for \( \alpha \) in \( \phi \) and doesn't occur free in \( \phi \)

\[ \forall \alpha_1 \ldots \forall \alpha_n (\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (\forall \alpha_1 \ldots \forall \alpha_n \phi \rightarrow \forall \alpha_1 \ldots \forall \alpha_n \psi), \]
for any distinct variables \( \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n \) and \( n \geq 2 \)

\[ \forall \alpha_1 \ldots \forall \alpha_n (\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \forall \alpha_1 \ldots \forall \alpha_n \psi), \]
provided \( \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n \) (\( n \geq 2 \)) are distinct variables that don't occur free in \( \phi \)

The two provisos on (.13) can be explained by referencing and adapting the examples used in Remark (99) that helped us to understand the antecedent of the Re-replacement Lemma (98.1):

- In the formula \( \phi = Rx \), \( y \) is substitutable for \( x \) but also occurs free. Without the second proviso in (.13), we could set \( \alpha \) to \( x \) and \( \beta \) to \( y \) and obtain the instance: \( \forall x Rx \equiv \forall y Ry \). Clearly, this is not valid: the left side asserts that everything bears \( R \) to \( y \) while the right asserts that everything bears \( R \) to itself.

- In the formula \( \phi = \forall y Rx \), \( y \) is not substitutable for \( x \) and does not occur free. Without the first proviso in (.13), we could set \( \alpha \) to \( x \) and \( \beta \) to \( y \) and obtain the instance: \( \forall x \forall y Rx \equiv \forall y \forall y Ry \). Again, clearly, this is not valid: the left side is true when everything bears \( R \) to everything while the right side, which by (.6) is equivalent to \( \forall y Ry \), is true only when everything bears \( R \) to itself.

(.13) is a special case of the interderivability of alphabetic variants; indeed, it is a special case of a special case. The interderivability of alphabetically-variant universal generalizations is a special case of the interderivability of alphabetically-variant formulas of arbitrary complexity. Note that there are two basic ways in which a universal generalization of the form \( \forall \alpha \phi \) can have an alphabetic variant. (.13) concerns one of those ways, namely, alphabetic variants of the form \( \forall \beta (\phi^\beta) \). But \( \forall \alpha \phi \) can also have alphabetic variants of the form \( \forall \alpha (\phi') \), where \( \phi' \) is an alphabetic variant of \( \phi \). We aren't yet in a position to prove the interderivability of \( \forall \alpha \phi \) and \( \forall \alpha (\phi') \) in such a case, much less prove the interderivability of alphabetically-variant formulas of arbitrary complexity. (.13) tells us only that whenever we have established a theorem of the form \( \forall \alpha \phi \), we may infer any formula with the same exact form but which differs throughout only by the choice of the variable bound by the leftmost universal quantifier, provided the choice of the new variable is a safe one, i.e., one that will preserve the meaning of the original formula when the substitution is carried out.

\textbf{(101) Metarule/Derived Rule:} Corollary to Rule VI. Using fact (100.13), we may prove the following:
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Corollary to Rule ∀I:

If \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi^\tau_0 \), and \( \tau \) is a primitive constant (of the same type as \( \alpha \)) that doesn’t occur in \( \Gamma, \Lambda, \) or \( \varphi \), then \( \Gamma \vdash \forall \alpha \varphi \) and there is a derivation of \( \forall \alpha \varphi \) from \( \Gamma \) in which \( \tau \) doesn’t occur. [Variant: \( \varphi^\tau_0 \vdash \forall \alpha \varphi \), provided . . .]

In the usual manner, the ellipsis in the Variant states the conditions included in the official version of the rule.

(102) Metarules/Derived Rules: ∃I Introduction (∃I). The metarules of ∃Introduc- tion allow us to infer the existence of derivations of existential generaliza-
tions, though their variant forms yield derived rules that let us existentially
generalize, within a derivation, on any term \( \tau \) known to have a denotation.
Rule ∃I has two forms: one that applies to any term whatsoever and a restricted
form that applies to terms whose significance is axiomatic:

Rule ∃I

(1) If \( \Gamma_1 \vdash \varphi^\tau_0 \) and \( \Gamma_2 \vdash \varphi \), provided \( \tau \) is substitutable
for \( \alpha \) in \( \varphi \)

[Variant: \( \varphi^\tau_0 \vdash \exists \alpha \varphi \), provided \( \tau \) is substitutable for \( \alpha \) in \( \varphi \)]
(2) If \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi^\tau_0 \), then \( \Gamma \vdash \exists \alpha \varphi \), provided \( \tau \) is (a) a primitive constant, a
variable, or a \( \lambda \)-expression in which the initial \( \lambda \) does not bind any
variable in any encoding formula subterm, and (b) substitutable for
\( \alpha \) in \( \varphi \).

[Variant: \( \varphi^\tau_0 \vdash \exists \alpha \varphi \), provided . . .]

Two examples of the Variant version of (.2) are:
\( \text{Gy} \vdash \exists x \text{Gx} \) and \( \text{Gy} \vdash \exists \text{FFy} \). In the first case, \( \varphi \) is \( \text{Gx} \), \( \alpha \) is \( x \), \( \tau \) is \( y \), \( \varphi^\tau_0 \) is \( \text{Gy} \). So the conditions are met: \( y \) is a variable and substitutable for \( x \) in \( \text{Gx} \). In the second case, \( \varphi \) is \( \text{Fy} \), \( \alpha \) is \( F \), \( \tau \) is \( G \), \( \varphi^\tau_0 \) is \( \text{Gy} \). So the conditions are met: \( G \) is a variable and substitutable for \( F \) in \( \text{Fy} \). Note that even \( \text{Gx} \vdash \exists x \text{Gx} \) and \( \text{Fy} \vdash \exists \text{FFy} \) are also instances of the Variant
version.

However, \( \text{Pa} \& \text{Qx} \vdash \exists x (\text{Px} \& \text{Qx}) \) is not a valid instance of the rule. Here, \( \varphi \)
is \( \text{Px} \& \text{Qx} \) and the premise \( \text{Pa} \& \text{Qx} \) does not have the required form \( \varphi^\tau_0 \), since
that is defined to be the formula \( \text{Pa} \& \text{Qa} \), by (14). Thus, we can’t existentially
generalize on \( a \) in \( \text{Pa} \& \text{Qx} \) by using the quantifier \( \exists \) to conclude \( \exists x (\text{Px} \& \text{Qx}) \),
for that would invalidly capture the free variable \( x \). Similarly, from \( \text{Pa} \& \text{Fb} \) we
may not validly use \( \exists \) to infer \( \exists \text{F} (\text{Fa} \& \text{Fb}) \).

Note also that the inference from \( \neg \text{P} \times \text{Q}x \) and \( x \text{Q}x \) to \( \exists x \neg \text{P}x \) is justified
by the Variant version of (.1), as is the inference from \( \neg [\lambda x \psi] y \) and \( [\lambda x \psi] y \) to \( \exists \text{F} \neg \text{Fy} \). Since versions of Rule ∃I are covered in detail in basic courses on
predicate logic, we omit further examples and explanation of the conditions
that must be satisfied for the rule to be applied.

(103) Metarule: ∃ Elimination (∃E) on Constants. Let \( \tau \) be a primitive constant
(i.e., not one introduced by a definition). If we validly reason our way to \( \psi \)
from $\varphi^\tau_\alpha$ (and some other premises) without making any special assumptions about $\tau$ other than $\varphi^\tau_\alpha$, then $\exists E$ allows us to discharge our assumption about $\tau$ and validly conclude that we can derive $\psi$ from (any premises we used and) $\exists \alpha \varphi$:

**Rule $\exists E$**

If $\Gamma, \varphi^\tau_\alpha \vdash \psi$, then $\Gamma, \exists \alpha \varphi \vdash \psi$, provided $\tau$ is a primitive constant that does not occur in $\varphi$, $\psi$, $\Gamma$, or $\Lambda$.

We will often use this rule along with conditional proof when proving a theorem of the form $\exists \alpha \varphi \rightarrow \psi$, as follows. First, we assume $\exists \alpha \varphi$, for conditional proof. Then we assume that $\tau$ is an arbitrary such $\varphi$, i.e., that $\varphi^\tau_\alpha$, where $\tau$ is a *fresh*, primitive constant (of the same type as $\alpha$) that hasn’t previously appeared in the context of reasoning or in our axioms. Then, once we derive $\psi$ from $\varphi^\tau_\alpha$, we appeal to Rule $\exists E$ to discharge the assumption $\varphi^\tau_\alpha$ and conclude that we’ve derived $\psi$ only from the assumption that $\exists \alpha \varphi$. Then we conclude $\exists \alpha \varphi \rightarrow \psi$ by conditional proof.

(104) **Theorems**: Further Theorems of Quantification Theory. The various rules for quantification theory introduced thus far facilitate the derivation of many of the following theorems:

(1) $\forall \alpha \varphi \rightarrow \exists \alpha \varphi$

(2) $\neg \forall \alpha \varphi \equiv \exists \alpha \neg \varphi$

(3) $\forall \alpha \varphi \equiv \neg \exists \alpha \neg \varphi$

(4) $\neg \exists \alpha \varphi \equiv \forall \alpha \neg \varphi$

(5) $\exists \alpha (\varphi \& \psi) \rightarrow (\exists \alpha \varphi \& \exists \alpha \psi)$

(6) $\exists \alpha (\varphi \lor \psi) \equiv (\exists \alpha \varphi \lor \exists \alpha \psi)$

(7) $\exists \alpha \varphi \equiv \exists \beta (\varphi^\beta_\alpha)$,

provided $\beta$ is substitutable for $\alpha$ in $\varphi$ and doesn’t occur free in $\varphi$

(8) $(\forall \alpha \varphi \& \forall \alpha \psi) \rightarrow \forall \alpha (\varphi \equiv \psi)$

(9) $(\neg \exists \alpha \varphi \& \neg \exists \alpha \psi) \rightarrow \forall \alpha (\varphi \equiv \psi)$

(10) $(\exists \alpha \varphi \& \neg \exists \alpha \psi) \rightarrow \neg \forall \alpha (\varphi \equiv \psi)$

(11) $\forall \alpha \exists \beta \varphi \equiv \exists \beta \forall \alpha \varphi$

These are all classical theorems of predicate logic.
9.7 Logical Existence, Identity, and Truth

(105) Theorems: Every 0-place Relation Term and Formula is Significant. For any relation term $\Pi^0$, it is a theorem that (.1) $\Pi^0$ exists; and for any formula $\varphi$, it is a theorem that (.2) $\varphi$ exists:

(.1) $\Pi^0 \downarrow$, for any 0-place relation term $\Pi^0$

(.2) $\varphi \downarrow$, for any formula $\varphi$

Intuitively, (.1) and (.2) tells us, respectively, that every 0-place relation term and every formula of our language has a denotation. But though every formula $\varphi$ provably has a denotation, it doesn’t follow that every $\lambda$-expression of the form $[\lambda \nu \varphi]$ constructed from $\varphi$ has a denotation. In particular, if $\varphi$ has a free occurrence of $\nu$, then although $\varphi$ is significant, $[\lambda \nu \varphi]$ may fail to be significant. For example, the formula $\exists F (xF \& \neg Fx)$, in which $x$ occurs free, is significant, by (.2), but $[\lambda x \exists F (xF \& \neg Fx)]$ provably fails to be significant; this is the $\lambda$-expression that leads to the Clark/Boolos paradox.

(106) Remark: An Interesting Fact Made Clear by the Foregoing. It is worth remarking on how theorem (105.2) implies an important difference between what can be inferred from the truth of a formula and what can be inferred from the existence of the proposition signified by such a formula. Consider, for example, an encoding formula of the form $\forall \nu \varphi[\lambda z \psi]$. By axiom (39.5.b), the truth of $\forall \nu \varphi[\lambda z \psi]$ implies that both $\forall \nu \varphi \downarrow$ and $[\lambda z \psi] \downarrow$. So by the contrapositive, if either $\neg \forall \nu \varphi \downarrow$ or $\neg[\lambda z \psi] \downarrow$, then $\neg \forall \nu \varphi[\lambda z \psi]$.

Thus, while there is, for every formula $\varphi$, a corresponding term of the form $[\lambda \nu \varphi]$, it doesn’t follow that the corresponding term has a denotation. So the argument in Oppenheimer & Zalta 2011 is still valid, though it needs to be reframed. The argument in that paper, to the conclusion that object theory can’t be straightforwardly represented in functional type theory (FTT), rested on two premises:

(a) FTT semantically analyzes a quantifier claim such as $\forall \nu \varphi$, where $\nu$ occurs free in $\varphi$ and so bound by $\forall \nu$, by first converting $\varphi$ to a term of the form $[\lambda \nu \varphi]$, and

(b) object theory includes some formulas $\varphi$ and variables $\nu$ that can’t be converted to the corresponding term $[\lambda \nu \varphi]$, on pain of contradiction. (For example, where $\varphi$ is $\exists F (xF \& \neg Fx)$ and $\nu$ is $x$, $[\lambda x \exists F (xF \& \neg Fx)]$ was not even well-formed.)

In the formalism we used in 2011, no $\lambda$-expression was well-formed if the matrix $\varphi$ contained any encoding subformulas.

But in this text, $[\lambda \nu \varphi]$ is well-formed even if $\varphi$ has encoding subformulas or encoding formula subterms, so that every formula $\varphi$ gives rise to terms of the form $[\lambda \nu \varphi]$. But not every formula gives rise to significant terms of the form $[\lambda \nu \varphi]$. So the argument in Oppenheimer & Zalta 2011 has to be expressed a bit differently. In particular, premise (b) in the argument of Oppenheimer & Zalta 2011 has to be revised to assert that object theory includes some formulas $\varphi$ (e.g., certain ones with encoding formula subterms and in which $\nu$ occurs free) can’t be converted to a denoting term of the form $[\lambda \nu \varphi]$, on pain of contradiction. This is sufficient to make the point in Oppenheimer & Zalta 2011, since FTT’s analysis of quantification requires that every formula $\varphi$ in which the variable $\nu$ is free be convertible to a term of the form $[\lambda \nu \varphi]$ that has a denotation.
However, the claim \( \psi_\lambda \) \( \downarrow \), i.e., that the proposition \( \psi_\lambda \) exists, does not imply that either \( \psi_\lambda \downarrow \) or \( \lambda \psi \downarrow \). One can find \( \phi \) and \( \psi \) such that all three of the following hold: \( \psi_\lambda \downarrow \), \( \neg \psi_\lambda \downarrow \), and \( \neg \lambda \psi \downarrow \). For let \( \psi_\lambda \) be some closed description that couldn’t be significant, say \( \psi_\lambda (Py \& \neg Py) \), and let \( \lambda \psi \) be some closed \( \lambda \)-expression such as the one involved in the Clark/Boolos paradox, so that we know \( \neg \lambda \psi \downarrow \). It is still a theorem that \( \psi_\lambda \), as the proof of (105.2) shows: for this particular \( \phi \) and \( \psi \), \( \lambda x \psi_\lambda (\lambda z \psi) \) is axiomatic, by (39.2) – since the initial \( \lambda \) doesn’t bind \( x \) anywhere in the matrix, it doesn’t bind any variable in any encoding formula subterm. So it follows by definition (20.3) that \( \psi_\lambda \).

Of course, the proposition asserted to exist is necessarily false. By hypothesis, \( \neg \psi_\lambda \downarrow \) and \( \neg \lambda \psi \downarrow \), and each of these facts independently yield \( \neg \psi_\lambda \), by (39.5.b). Since this derivation is modally strict, it follows by RN that \( \square \neg \psi_\lambda \). This makes it clear that although the proposition \( \psi_\lambda \) exists, it is necessarily false, given that its primary terms fail to denote.

In general, every formula has truth conditions and denotes a proposition, but that fact doesn’t imply that the terms in the formula denote something. In particular, \( \psi_\lambda \) is a theorem (indeed, an instance of (105.2)), whether or not the terms \( \psi_\lambda \) and \( \lambda \psi \) are significant.

(107) **Theorems:** The Necessity of Logical Existence. It is derivable, for any term \( \tau \), that if \( \tau \) exists, then necessarily \( \tau \) exists:

\[
\tau \downarrow \rightarrow \square \tau
\]

Thus, when any individual or relation exists in the logical sense, it necessarily does so and we can reference it in any modal context. Note that when \( \tau \) is an individual term, this theorem doesn’t imply that if \( \tau \) is concrete, then \( \tau \) is necessarily concrete. So-called contingent beings are ones that are concrete in some worlds but not others. They aren’t contingent because they go in and out of logical existence from world to world. It is also important to note that we shall derive the necessity of logical non-existence in (169.3), once we have derived the principles of modal logic needed to prove it.

(108) **Theorems:** Identity Implies Existence. For any terms \( \tau \) and \( \sigma \), if \( \tau = \sigma \), then both \( \tau \) and \( \sigma \) exist:

\[
(1) \quad \tau = \sigma \rightarrow \tau \downarrow
\]

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142 We’ll see an exception to this when we move to type theory in Chapter 15, where the increased expressive power allows us to form definite descriptions that are also formulas. In particular, we’ll be able to form the following description of a proposition: \( \psi_\phi (\rho \& \neg \rho) \) (“the proposition that is both true and not true”). This expression is both a term and a formula, and when in formula position, it asserts: the proposition that is both true and not true is true. So this is formula that has truth conditions (clearly, it is false) but which does not denote a proposition.
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\( \tau = \sigma \rightarrow \sigma \downarrow \)

Note that this theorem holds even when \( \tau \) or \( \sigma \) is a definite description or a \( \lambda \)-expression. If a term \( \tau \) appears in a true identity statement, then it has a denotation. Similarly, if we can establish either \( \neg \tau \downarrow \) or \( \neg \sigma \downarrow \), then the contra-positive of (.1) or (.2) yields \( \neg (\tau = \sigma) \). In such a case, we can infer \( \tau \neq \sigma \), by definition (24).

(109) Theorems: Identical Relations are Necessarily Equivalent. It is now easily provable, for any \( n \)-place relation terms (\( n \geq 0 \)), that (.1) if an identity holds when those terms flank the identity sign, then the relations they signify are necessarily equivalent:

\[ \Pi = \Pi' \rightarrow \square \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n (\Pi x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv \Pi' x_1 \ldots x_n) \]

where \( \Pi \) and \( \Pi' \) are any \( n \)-place relation terms, \( n \geq 0 \)

The converse, however, does not hold in the present system.

Since formulas are 0-place relation terms, it is a 0-place instance of the above that (.2) if \( \varphi \) is identical to \( \psi \), then necessarily, \( \varphi \) if and only \( \psi \), where \( \varphi \) and \( \psi \) are any formulas:

\[ \varphi = \psi \rightarrow \square (\varphi \equiv \psi) \]

We formulate these theorems not only because they capture intuitions that should be preserved, but also to make the following observation.

(110) Remark: Definitions by Equivalence vs. Definition by Identity. Theorems (105.2) and (109.2) have an interesting consequence for our theory of definitions, namely, that one could eliminate definitions-by-equivalence in favor of definitions-by-identity. To see why, note that formulas are terms and so a definition of the form \( \varphi =_{df} \psi \) is a definition-by-identity of the form \( \tau =_{df} \sigma \). So by (74), the inferential role of \( \varphi =_{df} \psi \) is to introduce (the closures of) \((\psi \downarrow \rightarrow (\varphi = \psi) \& (\neg \psi \downarrow \rightarrow \neg \varphi \downarrow))\) as necessary axioms. But if every formula \( \psi \) is significant (105.2), then one can derive \( \varphi = \psi \) from any definition-by-identity \( \varphi =_{df} \psi \). So, by (109.2), one can derive \( \square (\varphi \equiv \psi) \) from such definitions. Since one can derive necessarily equivalences from definitions-by-identity, our system offers the option of foregoing definitions-by-equivalence in favor of definitions-by-identity.\(^{143}\)

\(^{143}\)This observation applies to the present, second-order version of object theory. In typed object theory, not every formula \( \varphi \) is significant, and so one may not derive \( \varphi = \psi \) from any definition-by-identity \( \varphi =_{df} \psi \); one can only derive such identities when \( \psi \) is significant. Thus, in typed object theory, whereas every definition by equivalence yields a well-formed biconditional theorem, not every definition by identity of a 0-place relation term yields an identity as a theorem and so we can’t always derive an equivalence from a definition by identity. Typed object theory won’t have the option of eliminating definitions by equivalence in favor of definitions by identity.
However, we shall not eschew definitions-by-equivalence in favor of definitions-by-identity. The reason has to do with maximizing our system's ability to preserve the hyperintensional contexts of natural language when the sentences of natural language are represented within our system. For suppose $S$ and $S'$ are sentences of natural language, that $S'$ serves as an analysis of $S$, and that $S$ and $S'$ exhibit hyperintensionality (i.e., there are contexts of natural language in which $S$ and $S'$ are not substitutable for one another, despite the fact that analysis shows them to be necessarily equivalent). Then if formulas $\varphi$ and $\psi$ are formal representations of $S$ and $S'$, respectively, within our system, we might capture that analysis by way of a definition of the form $\varphi \equiv_{df} \psi$. But we wouldn’t want to capture the analysis in terms of the definition of the form $\varphi =_{df} \psi$, since that would make it impossible to represent the contexts of natural language in which $S$ and $S'$ exhibit hyperintensionality. So, unless there is a good reason to suppose that the definiens and definiendum in a formula definition bear a stronger connection than necessary equivalence, we’ll continue to introduce definitions-by-equivalence. Such definitions yield only the modal equivalence $\Box(\varphi \equiv \psi)$ from the definition $\varphi \equiv_{df} \psi$, and not an identity.

(111) **Metarules/Derived Rules:** Rule for the Substitution of Identicals (Rule $=E$). We now have:

\[ \text{Rule } =E \]

If $\Gamma_1 \vdash \varphi_{\tau}$ and $\Gamma_2 \vdash \tau = \sigma$, then $\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \varphi', $ whenever $\tau$ and $\sigma$ are any terms

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144 Given that ‘hyperintensionality’ is now used to describe contexts where necessarily equivalent entities can’t be substituted for one another preserving truth, it is important to note that this usage gives rise to cases of ‘hyper-hyperintensionality’. For example, hyperintensionally-conceived properties and propositions may be distinct even if necessarily equivalent. But given that *being a woodchuck* = *being a groundhog* ($W = G$), i.e., given that *being a woodchuck* and *being a groundhog* are identical properties, it follows that the propositions that Woodie is a woodchuck ($\lambda W w$) and that Woodie is a groundhog ($\lambda G w$) are identical propositions, by the substitution of identicals. These propositions aren’t just necessarily equivalent propositions, but rather identical. Moreover, they aren’t substitutable for one another within belief contexts. That is, these identical propositions don’t help represent the fact that it does not follow from “$S$ believes Woodie is a woodchuck” that “$S$ believes Woodie is a groundhog”. Since we can’t substitute identical (but hyperintensional) entities for one another and preserve truth, we need something more fine-grained than hyperintensionally-conceived entities to provide such a representation.

In object theory, we analyze such cases of hyper-hyperintensionality by representing the *sense* of the natural language expressions as abstract entities of the same type as those denoted by the expression. The sense of ‘is a woodchuck’ can be represented as an abstract property that encodes properties of properties, while the sense of ‘is a groundhog’ can be represented as a different abstract that encodes properties of properties. But we shall leave further discussion of abstract properties for a later chapter, when we have typed object theory in hand.

145 If one exercises the option of using $=_{df}$ to define new formulas, then it should be remembered that the following is not a valid inference: $\varphi = (\psi \land \chi), \psi \vdash \varphi = \chi$. In general, there is no rule of simplification for identity that corresponds to the Rule $\equiv S$ of Biconditional Simplification (92).
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substitutable for \( \alpha \) in \( \varphi \), and \( \varphi' \) is the result of replacing zero or more occurrences of \( \tau \) in \( \varphi_a^\tau \) with occurrences of \( \sigma \).  

[Variant: \( \varphi_a^\tau, \tau = \sigma \vdash \varphi' \)]

In the usual manner, we may conceive of the Variant of Rule =E as a derived rule that lets us infer formulas from formulas. Note also that Rule =E governs any terms \( \tau \) and \( \sigma \). Since \( \tau = \sigma \) is an assumption of the rule, the rule is applicable only when both terms are significant, given theorems (108.1) and (108.2). Note finally that as a special case of the rule, we have \( \varphi_a^\tau, \tau = \sigma \vdash \varphi_a^\sigma \). This is the case where \( \varphi' \) is \( \varphi_a^\sigma \), i.e., the result of replacing all of the occurrences of \( \tau \) in \( \varphi_a^\tau \) by \( \sigma \).

(112) Theorems: Unconditional \( \eta^- \), \( \beta^- \), and \( \alpha^- \)-Conversion for 0-Place \( \lambda \)-Expressions, and Other Facts. Theorem (105.2) allows us to prove, as theorem schemata, the following unconditional conversion principles governing 0-place \( \lambda \)-expressions and formulas: (.1) that-\( \varphi \) is identical to \( \varphi \); (.2) that-\( \varphi \) is true if and only if \( \varphi \); (.3) that-\( \varphi \) and its alphabetic variants are identical; (.4) \( \varphi \) and its alphabetic variants are identical; (.5) \( \varphi \) and its alphabetic variants are equivalent; and (.6) \( \varphi \) is equivalent to \( \psi \) if and only if that-\( \varphi \) is equivalent to that-\( \psi \). Formally:

(112.2) constitutes a theory of truth. In this theorem, the \( \lambda \) expresses ‘that’ (since it binds no variables) and the expression \( [\lambda \varphi] \) must be read as a formula (since stands to the left of the biconditional sign). We observed, in (3), that since \( \text{truth} \) is the 0-place case of predication, we should read (112.2) as: that-\( \varphi \) is true if and only if \( \varphi \). Assuming we’ve applied our theory in the usual way, then the instance \( [\lambda \text{Po}] \equiv \text{Po} \) might assert that-Obama-is-President is true if and only if Obama is President. With (112.2), we have established that the propositional version of the Tarski T-Schema is a theorem! Some philosophers may regard this as a deflationary theory of truth, since the concept of \( \text{truth} \) is, in some

\[146\] It is also a tautology; see Zalta 2014, where this was first noted, as well as Remark (93) and the next Remark.
sense, eliminated; it is expressed one one side of (112.2) but not on the other. Other philosophers may regard this as a primitivist theory of truth, since truth has been reduced to the primitive, 0-place case of predication, i.e., where the 0-place case of predication is where the two primitive forms of \( n \)-place predication, exemplification and encoding, for \( n \geq 1 \), converge.

(114) **Remark:** On the Derivability of Tautologies. The derivation of (112.1) and (112.2) is needed for the proof of Metatheorem \(<9.1>\), which asserts that every valuation of the prime formulas (i.e., formulas not having the form \( \neg \psi \), \( \psi \to \chi \), or \( [\lambda \psi] \)) induces a certain derivability relation. This metatheorem is the key lemma needed for the proof of Metatheorem \(<9.2>\), i.e., that every tautology is derivable. See the proofs of these metatheorems in the Appendix to this chapter.

(115) **Metarule/Derived Rule:** Rule of Alphabetic Variants. The classical Rule of Alphabetic Variants is now easily established from the recently proved theorem (112.5). The classical rule asserts that \( \phi \) is derivable from \( \Gamma \) if and only if any of its alphabetic variants is derivable from \( \Gamma \):

**Rule of Alphabetic Variants**

\[\Gamma \vdash \phi \text{ if and only if } \Gamma \vdash \phi', \text{ where } \phi' \text{ is any alphabetic variant of } \phi\]

[Variant \( \phi \vdash \phi' \)]

As a special case, when \( \Gamma = \emptyset \), our rule asserts that a formula is a theorem if and only if all of its alphabetic variants are theorems. We henceforth use the Variant form within derivations as a derived rule.

Now that it is established that every pair of alphabetically-variant formulas have the same inferential role, we no longer need to adopt the convention that bound object-language variables in definientia function as metavariables; i.e., convention (17.2.b) is no longer strictly necessary. If we use object-language variables for the bound variables in a definiens, then the alphabetic variants of any theorem introduced by the resulting definition will also be a theorem. This fact was mentioned in Remark (28), where we discussed why bound variables in definientia should be, or function as, metavariables.

(116) **Theorems:** Individuals Are Ordinary or Abstract. We now prove that (.1) being ordinary exists, (.2) being abstract exists, and (.3) an object is either ordinary or abstract:

(.1) \( O! \downarrow \)

(.2) \( A! \downarrow \)

(.3) \( O!x \lor A!x \)
We observe here that (.3) is one of the elements needed to prove that identity is a reflexive condition on individuals, which forms part of the proof that identity is reflexive (118.1).

**Theorems:** Facts About Relation Identity. Our definitions for relation identity and theory of definitions yield that (.1) \( F^1 = G^1 \equiv \square \forall x (xF^1 \equiv xG^1) \) (\( n \geq 1 \))

(2) \( F^n = G^n \equiv \forall y_1 \ldots y_{n-1} (\lambda x F^n x y_1 \ldots y_{n-1}) = (\lambda x G^n x y_1 \ldots y_{n-1}) \) &
\( (\lambda x F^n x y_1 \ldots y_{n-1}) = (\lambda x G^n x y_1 \ldots y_{n-1}) \) & ... &
\( (\lambda x F^n y_1 \ldots y_{n-1} x) = (\lambda x G^n y_1 \ldots y_{n-1} x) \)

(.3) \( p = q \equiv [\lambda x p] = [\lambda x q] \)

These equivalences were used as definitions in previous publications on object theory, where less attention was paid to the issues surrounding non-denoting complex terms.

It is important not to misconstrue these theorems as principles that determine whether arbitrary relations \( F \) and \( G \) are identical. Some relation identities have to discovered a posteriori, and no a priori principle can be used as a substitute. For example, \( \text{being a woodchuck} = \text{being a groundhog} \) is an identity claim about properties that is discovered a posteriori and not determined by an a priori principle, just as Hesperus = Phosphorus is an identity claim about individuals that is discovered a posteriori rather than determined by an a priori principle. So, in an important sense, these theorems are not ‘criteria of identity’ for relations. Rather, what they do is tell us (a) what it is we know when we assert or prove that \( F = G \), (b) what we have to prove if we are to show that relations (represented in our system) are identical, and (c) what the consequences are of asserting in our system that \( F = G \) (e.g., what the consequences are of adding \( \text{being a woodchuck} = \text{being a groundhog} \) as an axiom or hypothesis to our system). So these are principles that govern relations by placing constraints on their inferential role within PLM. For further discussion, see Remark (188).

**Theorems:** Identity is an Equivalence Condition. Our system yields, as theorems, that that identity is an equivalence condition on individuals and on relations of every arity. We can express this using schemata, in which \( \alpha, \beta, \) and \( \gamma \) are any individual variable or any \( n \)-place relation variables for some \( n \):

(1) \( \alpha = \alpha \)
(2) \( \alpha = \beta \rightarrow \beta = \alpha \)

(3) \( \alpha = \beta \land \beta = \gamma \rightarrow \alpha = \gamma \)

Clearly, it also follows that:

(4) \( \alpha = \beta \equiv \forall \gamma (\alpha = \gamma \equiv \beta = \gamma) \)

**Exercise:** Prove that (2) holds for any two terms \( \tau \) and \( \tau' \) having the same type, and prove that (3) holds for any three terms, \( \tau, \tau', \) and \( \tau'' \), all of the same type.

Explain why (4) fails in the right-to-left direction when arbitrary terms of the same type \( \tau \) and \( \sigma \) replace \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \), respectively, in the statement of the claim.

(119) **Metarules/Derived Rules:** Rules of Identity Introduction (Rule =I). The following rules govern the terms of our language:

(1) **Rule =I**

If \( \Gamma \vdash \tau \downarrow \), then \( \Gamma \vdash \tau = \tau \)  

[Variant: \( \tau \downarrow \vdash \tau = \tau \)]

(2) **Rule =I (Special Case)**

\( \vdash \tau = \tau \), provided \( \tau \) is a primitive constant, a variable, or a \( \lambda \)-expression in which the initial \( \lambda \) does not bind any variable in any encoding formula subterm.

The Variant of (1) tells us that whenever we take \( \tau \downarrow \) as an assumption when reasoning, we may infer \( \tau = \tau \).\(^{147}\)

It is worth observing here that from the Variant rule \( \tau \downarrow \vdash \tau = \tau \), it follows by the Deduction Theorem (76) that \( \tau \downarrow \rightarrow \tau = \tau \) is a theorem. And since we know, by an instance of (108.1), that \( \tau = \tau \rightarrow \tau \downarrow \), it follows that \( \tau \downarrow \equiv \tau = \tau \). So for any definite description, it follows that \( \tau \downarrow \equiv (ix\varphi \downarrow = (ix\varphi = ix\varphi) \). This captures principle \( \ast 14 \cdot 28 \) in Whitehead and Russell 1910–1913 ([1925–1927], pp. 175, 184):

\[ \ast 14 \cdot 28. \vdash : E!(ix)(\varphi x) \equiv (ix)(\varphi x) \]

It is interesting that Whitehead and Russell read this claim as: “\( (ix)(\varphi x) \) only satisfies the reflexive property of identity if \( (ix)(\varphi x) \) exists” (175). Given their discussion on pp. 30–31 ([1925–1927], Chapter I), it should be clear that our formula \( ix\varphi \downarrow \) is the counterpart to Whitehead & Russell’s formula \( E!(ix)(\varphi x) \).

(120) **Remark:** Preparing the Ground for the Rule of Identity by Definition. We now show how to derive the classical inferential role of definitions-by-="
for the case in which no variable occurs free in the definiens and definiendum. It should then be clear how this generalizes to the case in which there are free variables in the definition and so prepare us for the general statement of the metarule in (121).

When there are no free variables in the definiens or definiendum, a definition-by-\(=\) has the simple form \(\tau =_{df} \sigma\) and introduces \(\tau\) as a new constant of the same type as \(\sigma\). We saw in (74) that in this case, the primitive Rule of Definition by Identity implies that the following is an axiom:

\[
(\sigma \downarrow \rightarrow \tau = \sigma) \& (\neg \sigma \downarrow \rightarrow \neg \tau \downarrow)
\]

So whenever \(\sigma \downarrow\) is a theorem or a hypothesis, it follows that \(\tau = \sigma\). Thus, the inferential role of a definition-by-\(=\) without free variables reduces to the classical one; if it is provable, by modally strict means, that the definiens is significant, then the definition \(\tau =_{df} \sigma\) yields \(\tau = \sigma\) as a \(\Box\)-theorem and, moreover, yields that \(\tau = \sigma\) follows from any set of premises, by (64.3). This reasoning now generalizes to the following derived metarule.

(121) Metarule: The Rule of Identity by Definition. Let us again use \(\sigma(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n)\) and \(\tau(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n)\) to abbreviate \(\alpha_{\tau_1 \ldots \tau_n}^\sigma\) and \(\tau_{\tau_1 \ldots \tau_n}\) respectively (\(1 \leq i \leq n\)). Then the following derived metarule is justified:

(.1) **Rule of Identity by Definition**

If \(\tau(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n) =_{df} \sigma(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n)\) is a definition-by-\(=\) and \(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n\) are substitutable for \(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n\), respectively, in \(\sigma\), then if \(\Gamma \vdash \sigma(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n) \downarrow\), then

\[
\Gamma \vdash \tau(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n) = \sigma(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n)
\]

By convention, we omit the identical form of the rule for \(\vdash\). The justification of this metarule, which is straightforward, is in the Appendix.

It immediately follows that, for any instance of a definition-by-\(=\), when the definiens is significant, we have the classical introduction and elimination rules for the definiendum:

(.2a) **Rule of Definiendum Elimination** (Rule \(=_{df} E\)):

If \(\tau(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n) =_{df} \sigma(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n)\) is a definition-by-\(=\), \(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n\) are substitutable for \(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n\), respectively, in \(\sigma\), \(\varphi\) contains one or more occurrences of \(\tau(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n)\) and \(\varphi'\) is the result of replacing zero or more occurrences of \(\tau(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n)\) in \(\varphi\) by \(\sigma(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n)\), then if \(\Gamma \vdash \sigma(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n) \downarrow\) and \(\Gamma \vdash \varphi\), then \(\Gamma \vdash \varphi'\).

[Variant: \(\sigma(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n) \downarrow, \varphi \vdash \varphi'\)]

(.2b) **Rule of Definiendum Introduction** (Rule \(=_{df} I\)):

If \(\tau(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n) =_{df} \sigma(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n)\) is a definition-by-\(=\), \(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n\) are substitutable for \(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n\), respectively, in \(\sigma\), \(\varphi\) contains one or more occurrences of \(\sigma(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n)\) and \(\varphi'\) is the result of replacing zero or more occurrences of \(\sigma(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n)\) in \(\varphi\) by \(\tau(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n)\), then if \(\Gamma \vdash \sigma(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n) \downarrow\) and \(\Gamma \vdash \varphi\), then \(\Gamma \vdash \varphi'\).

[Variant: \(\sigma(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n) \downarrow, \varphi \vdash \varphi'\)]
And similarly for $\vdash\Box$.

Once we gain some experience citing these rules when proving theorems, we’ll then revert to the classical citation ‘by definition’ when reasoning from definitions-by-$=$. Clearly, if $\tau(\tau_1,\ldots,\tau_n) =_{df} \sigma(\tau_1,\ldots,\tau_n)$ is an instance of a definition-by-$=$, then reasoning is classical when $\sigma(\tau_1,\ldots,\tau_n)$ is significant; we can substitute $\tau(\tau_1,\ldots,\tau_n)$ and $\sigma(\tau_1,\ldots,\tau_n)$ for one another in any context.

(122) Theorems: The Definitions and Axioms of (Negative) Free Logic Derived as Theorems.

(1) $\tau \downarrow \equiv \exists\beta(\beta = \tau)$, provided that $\beta$ doesn’t occur free in $\tau$

(2) $\forall\alpha\varphi \rightarrow (\exists\beta(\beta = \tau) \rightarrow \varphi^\dagger)$, provided $\tau$ is substitutable for $\alpha$ in $\varphi$ and $\beta$ doesn’t occur free in $\tau$

(3) $\exists\beta(\beta = \tau)$, provided (a) $\tau$ is either a primitive constant, a variable, or a $\lambda$-expression in which the initial $\lambda$ does not bind any variable in any encoding formula subterm, and (b) $\beta$ doesn’t occur free in $\tau$

(4) $(\Pi^n\kappa_1\ldots\kappa_n \lor \kappa_1\ldots\kappa_n\Pi^n) \rightarrow \exists\beta(\beta = \tau)$, where $\tau$ is any of $\Pi^n$, $\kappa_1$, . . . , or $\kappa_n$, and $\beta$ doesn’t occur free in $\tau$.

(123) Remark: Digression on the Proviso for (122). Each of the theorems in (122) require the proviso that $\beta$ doesn’t occur free in $\tau$. To see why it is required for the left-to-right direction of (122.1), consider the fact that the proviso rules out $[\lambda x \neg Fx] \downarrow \rightarrow \exists F(F = [\lambda x \neg Fx])$ as an instance, since the variable $F (= \beta)$ occurs free in $[\lambda x \neg Fx] (= \tau)$. Call this formula $(\delta)$. If $(\delta)$ had been a theorem, we would have been able to derive a contradiction, as follows. By (39.2), we know $[\lambda x \neg Fx] \downarrow$, since this is a $\lambda$-expression in which the initial $\lambda$ does not bind any variable in any encoding formula subterm. Hence, it would follow from this and $(\delta)$ that $\exists F(F = [\lambda x \neg Fx])$. Suppose $P$ were a witness to $\exists F(F = [\lambda x \neg Fx])$, so that $P = [\lambda x \neg Px]$ and, by symmetry, $[\lambda x \neg Px] = P$. Now since $[\lambda x \neg Px]$ has no encoding formula subterms, (39.2) would also yield $[\lambda x \neg Px] \downarrow$. So by an appropriate instance of $\beta$-Conversion (48.2), it would follow that:

$$(\ast) \ [\lambda x \neg Px]y \equiv \neg Py$$

But since $[\lambda x \neg Px] = P$, Rule =E would allow us to substitute $P$ for $[\lambda x \neg Px]$ in $(\ast)$ to obtain $Py \equiv \neg Py$, which would be a contradiction.

The reason why the proviso that $\beta$ doesn’t occur free in $\tau$ is required for the right-to-left direction of (122.1) is given in the proof of this direction in the Appendix; in particular, see footnote 380.

Given our explanation as to why the proviso is needed for the left-to-right direction of (122.1), it should be clear why the proviso governs (122.3); we can’t allow $\exists F(F = [\lambda x \neg Fx])$ to be an instance of (122.3), by the reasoning
just described. Intuitively, such a formula asserts the falsehood that there is a
property that is identical to its own negation.

As to (122.2) and (122.4), we leave it to the reader to come up with an
explanation as to why the proviso is needed. But note that in (122.2), if β were
to have a free occurrence in τ, then if we were to apply (122.2) by using ∀αϕ
and ∃β(β = τ) to conclude ϕ↓, the latter formula would have a free occurrence
of β. While ϕ↓ (with a free occurrence of β) might hold for some values of β,
it is not guaranteed to hold universally for all values of β. But, if we were to
derive such a formula as a theorem, Rule GEN would let us conclude ∀βϕ↓.

(124) Theorems: (Necessarily) Every Individual/Relation (Necessarily) Exists
and is such that (Necessarily) Something is Identical to it. Where α and β are
distinct variables of the same type, it is a consequence of our axioms and rules
that:

\[(.1) (.a) \forall \alpha \alpha \downarrow \]
\[(.b) \forall \alpha \exists \beta (\beta = \alpha) \]

\[(.2) (.a) \Box \alpha \downarrow \]
\[(.b) \Box \forall \beta (\beta = \alpha) \]

\[(.3) (.a) \Box \forall \alpha \downarrow \]
\[(.b) \Box \exists \beta (\beta = \alpha) \]

\[(.4) (.a) \forall \alpha \Box \alpha \downarrow \]
\[(.b) \forall \alpha \exists \beta (\beta = \alpha) \]

\[(.5) (.a) \Box \forall \alpha \Box \alpha \downarrow \]
\[(.b) \Box \forall \alpha \exists \beta (\beta = \alpha) \]

Note that when α and β are the individual variables x and y, we have the
following instances of (.1.a) and (.1.b), respectively:

\[\forall x x \downarrow \]
\[\forall x \exists y (y = x)\]

The first asserts that every individual exists, while the second asserts that every
individual is such that there exists something identical to it. Similarly, the
following are instances of (.2.a) and (.2.b), respectively:

\[\Box x \downarrow \]
\[\Box \exists y (y = x) \]

The first asserts that necessarily x exists, while the second asserts that neces-
sarily there exists an individual identical to x. These are distinct modal claims.
Strictly speaking, we should not read ∃y(y = x) as x exists, for otherwise we
would collapse the readings of the (.a) and (.b) forms of the above theorems. $x \downarrow$ and $\exists y (y = x)$ make distinct claims. Since they are equivalent (122.1), it often does no harm, in some contexts, to slide between them. But the former is literally defined as an existence claim (20.1) while the latter is literally defined as an existentially quantified identity claim (23.1).148

(125) **Theorems**: Self-Identity and Necessity. It is a consequence of the foregoing that (.1) necessarily everything is self-identical, and that (.2) everything is necessarily self-identical. Where $\alpha$ is any variable:

(1) $\Box \forall \alpha (\alpha = \alpha)$

(2) $\forall \alpha \Box (\alpha = \alpha)$

These well-known principles of self-identity and necessity are thus provable.

(126) **Theorems**: Necessity of Identity. Where $\alpha$ and $\beta$ are any variables of the same type, and $\tau$ and $\sigma$ are any terms of the same type, it is provable that (.1) if $\alpha$ and $\beta$ are identical, then necessarily they are identical, and (.2) if $\tau$ and $\tau'$ are identical, then necessarily they are identical:

(1) $\alpha = \beta \rightarrow \Box \alpha = \beta$, provided $\alpha$ and $\beta$ are variables of the same type

(2) $\tau = \sigma \rightarrow \Box \tau = \sigma$, provided $\tau$ and $\sigma$ are terms of the same type

When $\alpha$ and $\beta$ are the individual variables $x$ and $y$, (.1) asserts $x = y \rightarrow \Box x = y$. This is the famous principle of the necessity of identity for individuals, discussed at length in Kripke 1971. But (.1) has greater significance than the principle that Kripke discusses: (a) it is derived in a more general form as a theorem schema whose instances apply to any individual or relation, and (b) it doesn’t assume identity as a primitive. We’ve already seen that the definitions of object identity in (23.1) and relation identity in (23.2), (23.3), and (23.4) ground the reflexivity of identity (118.1). The reflexivity of identity is one of the key facts used in the proof of (.1).

(127) **Theorems**: Quantification and Identity.

(1) $\varphi \equiv \exists \beta (\beta = \alpha \& \varphi^\beta\alpha)$, provided $\beta$ is substitutable for $\alpha$ in $\varphi$ and doesn’t occur free in $\varphi$.

(2) $\tau \downarrow \rightarrow (\varphi^\tau\alpha \equiv \exists \alpha (\alpha = \tau \& \varphi))$, provided $\tau$ is substitutable for $\alpha$ in $\varphi$

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148Thus, given the present work, one should use the label Necessary Existence (NE) to designate the instance $\forall x \Box x \downarrow$ of (.4.a) ('everything necessarily exists') and not the instance $\forall x \Box \exists y (y = x)$ of (.4.b). This differs from Linsky & Zalta 1994 (435), where identity was taken as a primitive and the label (NE) was used to designate $\forall x \Box \exists y (y = x)$. Though the present work preserves the fixed-domain understanding of quantified S5 modal logic defended in Linsky & Zalta 1994, we would now read its theorems a bit differently.
9.7. LOGICAL EXISTENCE, IDENTITY, AND TRUTH

(.3) \( (\varphi \land \forall \beta (\varphi \equiv \beta = \alpha)) \equiv \forall \beta (\varphi \equiv \beta = \alpha) \),
provided \( \alpha, \beta \) are distinct variables of the same type, and \( \beta \) is substitutable for \( \alpha \) in \( \varphi \) and doesn’t occur free in \( \varphi \).

(.4) \( (\varphi \equiv \alpha = \beta) \iff \forall \alpha (\varphi \equiv \alpha = \beta) \),
provided \( \alpha, \beta \) are distinct variables of the same type, and \( \beta \) is substitutable for \( \alpha \) in \( \varphi \) and doesn’t occur free in \( \varphi \).

A simple example of (.1) is \( Px \equiv \exists y (y = x \land Py) \), and a simple example of (.2) is \( a \downarrow \to (Qa \equiv \exists x (x = a \land Qx)) \). But these theorems also apply to relation terms; as examples we have \( Fa \equiv \exists G (G = F \land Ga) \) and \( P \downarrow \to (Px \equiv \exists F (F = P \land Fx)) \), respectively. The reader should construct examples in which \( \varphi \) has greater complexity. Note that the antecedent of (.2) restricts the consequent to significant terms. To see why, let \( \varphi \) be \( \neg Px \), \( \alpha \) be \( x \), and \( \tau \) be \( \forall y Qy \), so that \( \varphi^{\tau} \) is \( \neg \forall y Qy \). Then if \( \neg (\forall y Qy) \), it is easy to show that \( \neg \forall y Qy \) is provably true but \( \exists x (x = y Qy \land \neg Px) \) is provably false (exercise).

Theorem (.3) and (.4) are noteworthy; in each case, the two sides of the main biconditionals are equivalent ways of asserting an important claim. Consider (.3). When \( \alpha \) is an individual variable, both sides of the biconditional are true whenever \( \alpha \) is a unique individual such that \( \varphi \), and when \( \alpha \) is a relation variable, both sides are true whenever \( \alpha \) is a unique relation such that \( \varphi \). (In the formal mode, we would say that both sides of the biconditional are true if and only if \( \alpha \) uniquely satisfies \( \varphi \).) Similar remarks apply to (.4), except that both sides of the biconditional intuitively assert that \( \beta \) uniquely satisfies \( \varphi \).

(128) Definitions: Uniqueness Quantifier. In light of the last observation, there are two ways to define the special uniqueness quantifier ‘\( \exists! \)’ so that formulas of the form \( \exists! \alpha \varphi \) assert that there exists a unique \( \alpha \) such that \( \varphi \). We may define it either as (.1) some \( \alpha \) is such that \( \varphi \) and every entity such that \( \varphi \) is identical to \( \alpha \), or as (.2) there exists an \( \alpha \) such that all and only the entities such that \( \varphi \) are identical to \( \alpha \):

(1) \( \exists! \alpha \varphi \equiv_{df} \exists \alpha (\varphi \land \forall \beta (\varphi \equiv \beta = \alpha)) \),
provided \( \beta \) doesn’t occur free, and is substitutable for \( \alpha \), in \( \varphi \)

(2) \( \exists! \alpha \varphi \equiv_{df} \exists \alpha \forall \beta (\varphi \equiv \beta = \alpha) \),
provided \( \beta \) doesn’t occur free, and is substitutable for \( \alpha \), in \( \varphi \)

No harm should arise if we sometimes appeal to (.1) and at other times appeal to (.2). Also, be sure not to confuse the defined, variable-binding, formula-forming operator ‘\( \exists! \)’ with the simple (primitive) predicate ‘\( E! \)’.

(129) Theorems: Uniqueness Implies At Most One. It follows from the definition of the uniqueness quantifier that if there exists a unique \( \varphi \), then at most one entity is such that \( \varphi \):
\[ \exists ! \alpha \varphi \rightarrow \forall \beta \forall \gamma ((\varphi \beta \& \varphi \gamma) \rightarrow \beta = \gamma), \]

provided \( \beta \) and \( \gamma \) don’t occur free, and are substitutable for \( \alpha \), in \( \varphi \)

In this theorem schema, \( \alpha \), \( \beta \), and \( \gamma \) are either all individual variables or all \( n \)-place relation variables, for some \( n \).

(130) **Theorems:** Uniqueness and Necessity. It is now provable that if every entity such that \( \varphi \) is necessarily such that \( \varphi \), then if there is a unique entity such that \( \varphi \), there is a unique entity necessarily such that \( \varphi \):

\[ \forall \alpha (\varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi) \rightarrow (\exists ! \alpha \varphi \rightarrow \exists ! \alpha \Box \varphi) \]

In other words, if for every \( \alpha \), \( \varphi \) is a formula that necessarily holds of \( \alpha \) whenever it holds of \( \alpha \), then if there is exactly one entity such that \( \varphi \), there is exactly one entity necessarily such that \( \varphi \).

### 9.8 The Theory of Actuality and Descriptions

Although the theorems in this section sometimes involve the necessity operator, no special principles for necessity other than the axioms and rules introduced thus far are required to prove the basic theorems and metarules governing actuality and descriptions.

#### 9.8.1 The Theory of Actuality

We turn first to several groups of modally strict theorems that are needed to prove the Rule of Actualization.

(131) **Theorems:** Actuality Distributes Over a Conditional. It follows from axiom (44.2) that if it is actually the case that if-\( \varphi \)-then-\( \psi \), then if it is actually the case that \( \varphi \), then it is actually the case that \( \psi \):

\[ \forall (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (\exists \alpha \varphi \rightarrow \exists \alpha \psi) \]

This is analogous to the K axiom for the modal operator \( \Box \); the actuality operator distributes over a conditional.

(132) **Theorems:** Necessity Implies Actuality. It is straightforward to show that if necessarily \( \varphi \), then actually \( \varphi \):

\[ \Box \varphi \rightarrow \exists \alpha \varphi \]

Note that in the Appendix, we do not give the following proof of this theorem: from the assumption \( \Box \varphi \), infer \( \varphi \) by the T schema; then infer \( \exists \alpha \varphi \) by the modally fragile axiom for actuality (43); then and conclude \( \Box \varphi \rightarrow \exists \alpha \varphi \) by conditional proof. Though this is a perfectly good proof, it is not modally strict.
9.8. THE THEORY OF ACTUALITY AND DESCRIPTIONS

By contrast, the proof in the Appendix is modally strict and so one may apply RN to our theorem to obtain □(□ϕ → □q).

(133) Theorems: Actuality, Conjunctions, and Biconditionals. The following theorems also have modally strict proofs. (.1) it is actually the case that if actually ϕ then ϕ; (.2) it is actually the case that if ϕ then actually φ; (.3) if is actually the case that ϕ and actually the case that φ, then it is actually the case that both ϕ and ψ; and (.4) it is actually the case that, actually ϕ if and only if ϕ:

(.1) □(□ϕ → ϕ)
(.2) □(ϕ → □ϕ)
(.3) □(ϕ & □ψ) → □(ϕ & ψ)
(.4) □(□ϕ ≡ ϕ)

We should note that the right-to-left direction of (.3) will be established later, as the left-to-right direction of (139.2). Also note that (.4) tells us that the actualizations of instances of the modally fragile axiom (43) are modally strict theorems.

(134) Theorems: Actualizations and Universal Closures of the Previous Theorem. Note that the left-to-right direction of axiom (44.4) tells us that if actually ϕ, then actually, actually ϕ. If we apply this principle to theorem (133.4) and repeat the process, then (.1) every actualization of the modally fragile axiom (43) is derivable:

(.1) □...□(□ϕ ≡ ϕ), for any finite string of actuality operators □...

Moreover, by applying GEN to (44.4), we know (.2) every α is such that it is actually the case that: actually ϕ if and only if ϕ, i.e.,

(.2) ∀α□(□ϕ ≡ ϕ)

Now it follows from (.2) by axiom (44.3) that (.3) actually, every α is such that: actually ϕ if and only if ϕ, i.e.,

(.3) □∀α(□ϕ ≡ ϕ)

Hence the actualization of a universal closure of an instance of axiom (43) is derivable. Moreover, by repeating steps (.2) and (.3) enough times, it follows that:

(.4) □∀α₁...∀αₙ(□ϕ ≡ ϕ)
(.4) tells us that the actualization of any universal closure of any instance of $\forall x \varphi \equiv \varphi^*$ is a modally strict theorem. Thus, given (.4) and (133.4), the actualizations of all the axioms asserted in (43) are modally strict theorems. This fact is needed in the proof of the Rule of Actualization, to which we now turn.

**Remark:** Digression the Formulation of RA. It is important to recognize why RA is formulated as in (135), as opposed to the following alternative:

\[ \text{If } \Gamma \vdash \varphi, \text{ then } \forall \Gamma \vdash \varphi \]

The base case of the inductive justification of RA (in the Appendix) considers one-step derivations of $\varphi$ from $\Gamma$ in which $\varphi$ is an axiom. So it has to consider the case where $\varphi$ is an instance of (43)•. But for the $\forall \Gamma$ version of RA, the base step would consider the *modally strict* one-step derivations of $\varphi$ from $\Gamma$ in which $\varphi$ is an axiom. But, then, $\varphi$ can’t be an instance of (43)•; there can’t be a modally strict one-step derivation of $\varphi$ from $\Gamma$ in which $\varphi$ is an instance of (43)•. As with GEN and RN, the justification of RA in the Appendix is by induction on the length of a derivation that establishes $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$. The Base Case considers the two ways in which such a derivation could consist of a single formula, namely, either $\varphi$ is an axiom or $\varphi$ is in $\Gamma$. When $\varphi$ is an axiom, then either it is a necessary axiom or a (universal closure of an) instance of (43)•. If the former, then $\forall \varphi$ is also an axiom, and so a theorem and thus derivable from $\forall \Gamma$; if the latter, then we cite either (133.4) or (134.4) to show $\forall \varphi$ is a theorem and thus derivable from $\forall \Gamma$.

The reasoning in this case will be preserved if we extend our system with new axioms as long as we ensure that their actualizations are axioms or theorems.
This consequent of this rule differs from the consequent of RA by stating that there is a derivation of $\trianglebar \phi$ from $\Gamma$. One can prove that this version of the rule is semantically valid.\(^{151}\) However, the justification of this rule depends on the modally fragile axiom of actuality (43)\(^{*}\), i.e., (43)\(*\) is used in the justification.\(^{152}\) Clearly, the application of this alternative rule would undermine modally-strict derivations. For example, given that $\psi \vdash \phi$ is an instance of derived rule (64.4), this alternative version of RA would allow us to conclude $\phi \vdash \trianglebar \phi$, which by the Deduction Theorem (76) yields $\psi \rightarrow \trianglebar \phi$ as a theorem. But we certainly don’t want this to be a modally-strict theorem—we know that its necessitation, $\Box (\psi \rightarrow \trianglebar \phi)$, fails to be valid. By formulating the consequent of RA with $\trianglebar \Gamma$, we forestall such a derivation. All that follows from $\psi \rightarrow \phi$ via RA, as officially formulated in (135), is that $\trianglebar \phi \rightarrow \trianglebar \phi$, which by the Deduction Theorem, yields only $\vdash \trianglebar \phi \rightarrow \trianglebar \phi$. Moreover, this derivation of $\trianglebar \phi \rightarrow \trianglebar \phi$ is modally-strict and we may happily apply RN to derive a valid necessary truth.

Call those rules (like the alternative to RA considered above) whose justification depends on the modally fragile axiom (43)\(*\) non-strict rules. If we were to use non-strict rules, we would have to tag any theorem proved by means of such a rule a *-theorem and, indeed, tag the rule itself as a *-rule. This explains why we adopted convention (68.2) described in Remark (68), namely, that we avoid metarules whose justification depends on modally fragile axioms. With such a convention in place, we don’t have to worry about redefining modal strictness to ensure that derivations that depend on a modally fragile axiom or on a non-strict rule fail to be modally-strict.

Third, and finally, note that there are other valid but non-strict metarules that we shall eschew because they violate our convention. Consider, for example, the following rule:

If $\Gamma \vdash \trianglebar \phi$, then $\Gamma \vdash \phi$.

This rule can be justified from the basis we now have.\(^{153}\) Again, however, the

\(^{151}\)It is provable that if $\Gamma \vdash \phi$, then $\Gamma \vdash \trianglebar \phi$. Intuitively, if $\Gamma \vdash \phi$, i.e., if $\phi$ is true at the distinguished world in every interpretation in which all the formulas in $\Gamma$ are true at the distinguished world, then it follows that in every interpretation in which all the formulas in $\Gamma$ are true at the distinguished world, $\trianglebar \phi$ is true at the distinguished world, i.e., it follows that $\Gamma \vdash \trianglebar \phi$.

\(^{152}\)To see this, assume the antecedent, i.e., $\Gamma \vdash \phi$. Now since $\phi \rightarrow \trianglebar \phi$ is a simple consequence of the modally fragile axiom of actuality (43)\(*\), $\trianglebar \phi \equiv \phi$, we know $\vdash \phi \rightarrow \trianglebar \phi$. So by (64.10), we have $\psi \vdash \trianglebar \phi$. But from $\Gamma \vdash \phi$ and $\phi \vdash \trianglebar \phi$, it follows by (64.8) that $\Gamma \vdash \trianglebar \phi$.

\(^{153}\)To see this, assume the antecedent, i.e., $\Gamma \vdash \trianglebar \phi$. Note that since the modally fragile axiom of actuality (43)\(*\) asserts that $\trianglebar \phi \equiv \phi$, it follows by (64.1) that $\vdash \trianglebar \phi \equiv \phi$. So by (64.3), it follows that $\Gamma \vdash \trianglebar \phi \equiv \phi$. Then from $\Gamma \vdash \trianglebar \phi$ and $\Gamma \vdash \trianglebar \phi \equiv \phi$, it follows by biconditional syllogism (90.3.a) that
justification depends on the modally fragile axiom (43)★. Since this reasoning shows us how to turn a proof using the metarule into a proof that doesn’t use that rule, it becomes apparent that any proof that uses the above rule implicitly involves an appeal to the modally fragile axiom (43)★. Unless we take further precautions, this rule could permit us to derive invalidities. So instead of taking such precautions as tagging the rule with a ★ (to mark it as non-strict) and tagging any derivations involving the rule as non-strict, we simply avoid non-strict rules altogether.

(137) Remark: A Distinction Among Modally Fragile Axioms. The ★-axiom asserted in (43)★ is traditionally a part of the logic of actuality. It is a distinctive, modally fragile axiom in that its actualization, $\Delta(\Delta p \equiv p)$, is a modally strict theorem (133.4). Given this theorem, the following fact (indeed, metarule) holds about our system as it currently stands, namely, if $p$ is a theorem, then $\Delta p$ is a modally strict theorem:

**Fact:** If $\vdash p$, then $\vdash \Box \Delta p$.

**Exercise:** Prove this by induction on the length of a proof of $p$.

This fact will hold as long as our system contains only modally fragile axioms whose actualizations are derivable as modally strict theorems.

However, we may wish to extend our system with modally fragile axioms whose actualizations are not, and should not, be derivable as modally strict theorems. To see an example, consider a scenario we’ve discussed before, in which we extend our system with the axioms $Pa$ (‘$a$ exemplifies $P$’) and $\Diamond \neg Pa$, say where ‘$a$’ names some concrete individual and $P$ some property that $a$ exemplifies contingently. Alternatively, suppose we extend our system with the axioms there exists a unique moon of Earth, i.e., $\exists! x Mxe$, and Earth might not have had a moon, i.e., $\Diamond \neg \exists! x Mxe$. Now in these cases, we would stipulate that $Pa$ and $\exists! x Mxe$ are modally fragile and mark them as ★-axioms. And to preserve our metarules under such extensions, we would also (a) take the □-free closures of $Pa$ and $\exists! x Mxe$ as modally fragile axioms, and (b) take all the closures of $\Diamond \neg Pa$ and $\Diamond \neg \exists! x Mxe$ as necessary axioms. Given (a), $\Delta Pa$ and $\Delta \exists! x Mxe$ would

\[ \Gamma \vdash q. \]

154 Here is a simple example. As an instance of $q \vdash q$ (64.4), we know: $\Delta q \vdash \Delta q$. So the proposed rule of actuality elimination would allow one to infer $\Delta q \vdash q$. But by the Deduction Theorem (76), it would follow that $\Delta q \rightarrow q$ is a modally-strict theorem. We know that the necessitation of this claim is invalid, but without further constraints on RN, it would follow that $\Box(\Delta q \rightarrow q)$ is a theorem.

155 The following is stronger than the metarule: if $\vdash q$, then $\vdash \Box \Delta q$. For this latter metarule is easily proved without induction. Assume $\vdash q$. Then RA yields that $\vdash \Delta q$. But by axiom (46.1) and (64.1), we know $\vdash \Delta q \rightarrow \Box \Delta q$. Hence $\vdash \Box \Delta q$, by (64.6).

156 A proof is given in the Appendix.
become asserted as $\star$-axioms. And it would immediately follow, by (46.1), that $\Box \diamond Pa$ and $\Box \exists ! x M x e$ become $\star$-theorems. It is important that we not let this last fact mislead us into thinking that it would be acceptable to assert $\diamond Pa$ and $\exists ! x M x e$ as necessary axioms. If we were to do so, then their necessitations (i.e., modal closures) would become necessary axioms as well. Given the understanding of these claims in the previous paragraph, it shouldn’t be axiomatic that necessarily, it is actually the case that a exemplifies $P$ or that necessarily, it is actually the case that there is a unique moon of the Earth. As we saw in the previous paragraph, $\diamond Pa$ and $\exists ! x M x e$ would become assertible as $\star$-axioms if we were to take the $\Box$-free closures of $\diamond Pa$ and $\exists ! x M x e$ as $\star$-axioms. But it is one thing to accept $\Box \diamond Pa$ and $\Box \exists ! x M x e$ as $\star$-theorems given that they become derivable on the basis of, and so depend on, a contingency, while it is quite another thing to assert $\Box \diamond Pa$ and $\Box \exists ! x M x e$ as necessary axioms. The latter is to be avoided.

The moral here is that if one were to extend our system with modally fragile axioms such as $Pa$ and $\exists ! x M x e$, the following would hold:

$\vdash Pa$ and $\not\vdash \Box \diamond Pa$

$\vdash \exists ! x M x e$ and $\not\vdash \Box \exists ! x M x e$

So it is possible to extend our system in ways that are inconsistent the Fact proved above that currently holds. $Pa$ and $\exists ! x M x e$ would be modally fragile axioms but, unlike (43)$\star$, their actualizations would not be modally strict theorems. Thus, there are two kinds of modally fragile axioms and these should be distinguished.

(138) $\star$Theorems: Actuality and Negation. The following are simple consequences of (43)$\star$:

(.1) $\not\exists ! \theta$ $\equiv \neg \theta$

(.2) $\not\exists ! \neg \theta$ $\equiv \theta$

Given that the proofs of these theorems depend on (43)$\star$, we may not apply RN to either theorem.

(139) Theorems. Modally Strict Theorems of Actuality.

(.1) $\diamond \theta \lor \not \diamond \neg \theta$

(.2) $\diamond (\theta \land \psi) \equiv (\diamond \theta \land \diamond \psi)$

(.3) $\diamond (\theta \equiv \psi) \equiv (\diamond (\theta \rightarrow \psi) & \diamond (\psi \rightarrow \theta))$

(.4) $(\diamond (\theta \rightarrow \psi) & \diamond (\psi \rightarrow \theta)) \equiv (\diamond \theta \equiv \diamond \psi)$

(.5) $\diamond (\theta \equiv \psi) \equiv (\diamond \theta \equiv \diamond \psi)$
(6) $A\varphi \equiv \Box A\varphi$

(7) $A\Box \varphi \rightarrow \Box A\varphi$

(8) $\Box \varphi \rightarrow \Box A\varphi$

(9) $A(\varphi \lor \psi) \equiv (A\varphi \lor A\psi)$

(10) $A\exists \alpha \varphi \equiv \exists \alpha A\varphi$

(11) $A\forall \alpha (\varphi \equiv \psi) \equiv \forall \alpha (A\varphi \equiv A\psi)$

Note that one can develop far simpler proofs of some of the above theorems than the ones given in the Appendix by using the modally fragile axiom (43)★. But such proofs would fail to be modally strict. Note also that (2) is used in the proof of (3), and (3) and (4) are used in the proof of (5). The latter is used to prove (159.1), which is a key lemma in the proof of the main Rule of Substitution proved in (160.1).

(140) ★Lemmas: A Consequence of the Modally Fragile Axiom of Actuality. It is a straightforward consequence of the modally fragile axiom for actuality (43)★ that an entity $\alpha$ is uniquely such that $A\varphi$ if and only if $\alpha$ is uniquely such that $\varphi$:

$\forall \beta (A\varphi^\beta \equiv \beta = \alpha) \equiv \forall \beta (\varphi^\beta \equiv \beta = \alpha)$, provided $\beta$ is substitutable for $\alpha$ in $\varphi$ and doesn’t occur free in $\varphi$

Recall the discussion after we introduced axiom (47): the notation $A\varphi^x$ used in this theorem involves a harmless ambiguity. Though it should strictly be formulated as $(A\varphi)^x_\alpha$, definition (14) implies $(A\varphi)^x_\alpha = A(\varphi^x_\alpha)$.

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(141) ★Theorems: Fundamental Theorems Governing Descriptions. It follows from the previous lemma that $x$ is the individual that is (in fact) such that $\varphi$ just in case $x$ is uniquely such that $\varphi$:

$x = \iota x \varphi \equiv \forall z (\varphi^x_z \equiv z = x)$, provided $z$ is substitutable for $x$ in $\varphi$ and doesn’t occur free in $\varphi$

As a simple instance, we have $x = \iota x Rxa \equiv \forall z (Rza \equiv z = x)$. It follows from this instance by GEN that $\forall x (x = \iota x Rxa \equiv \forall z (Rza \equiv z = x))$. So if we instantiate the universal claim to $b$, we have: $b = \iota x Rxa \equiv \forall z (Rza \equiv z = b)$. In other words, $b$ is the object that bears $R$ to $a$ if and only if all and only objects that bear $R$ to $a$ are identical to $b$. 
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The proof of the above theorem depends on the axiom for descriptions (47) and lemma (140)⋆, and hence depends on the modally fragile axiom for actuality (43)⋆. So we may not apply RN to this theorem to derive its necessitation. But even though it is a ⋆-theorem, it plays a role in the proof of other important and well-known principles involving descriptions; in the present context, these too are ⋆-theorems. Examples are Hintikka’s schema (142)⋆ and Russell’s analysis of descriptions (143)⋆. Though the classical statement of these well-known principles are derived in a way that is not modally-strict, the principles can be slightly modified so as to be derivable by modally-strict proofs. This will become apparent below.

(142) ⋆Theorems: Hintikka’s Schema. We may derive the instances of Hintikka’s schema for definite descriptions namely, x is identical to the individual (in fact) such that ϕ if and only if ϕ is true and everything such that ϕ is identical to x, i.e.,

\[ x = ixϕ \equiv (ϕ \& \forall z(ϕ^z_x \rightarrow z = x)), \]

provided z is substitutable for x in ϕ and doesn’t occur free in ϕ.

If we apply GEN to the free variable x and then instantiate the result to any variable other than z, say y, then we obtain \( y = iyϕ \equiv (ϕ^y_x \& \forall x(ϕ \rightarrow x = y)) \).
Cf. Hintikka 1959 (83, 7b), i.e., \( \forall y = iyf^\land \leftrightarrow \forall f(y/x) \& \forall x(f \rightarrow x = y) \). Note that whereas Hintikka’s original schema involves a primitive identity symbol, our theorem, which we’ll henceforth call Hintikka’s schema, involves a defined identity symbol.

The proof of Hintikka’s schema appeals to the ⋆-theorem (141)⋆ and so fails to be modally-strict. Note that in Hintikka’s schema, ϕ is within the scope of the rigidifying operator ix on the left side of the biconditional but not within the scope of such an operator on the right side. This is an indicator that (the proof of) the theorem won’t be modally strict.

(143) ⋆Theorems: Russell’s Analysis of Descriptions. Our derived quantifier rules also help us to more easily prove, as a theorem, a version of Russell’s famous (1905) analysis of definite descriptions:

\[ \psi^{x\psi}_x \equiv \exists x(ϕ \& \forall z(ϕ^z_x \rightarrow z = x) \& ψ), \]

provided (a) ψ is either an exemplification formula Π"κ₁...κₙ (n ≥ 1) or an encoding formula κ₁...κₙ,Π" (n ≥ 1), (b) x occurs in ψ and only as one or more of the κᵢ (1 ≤ i ≤ n), and (c) z is substitutable for x in ϕ and doesn’t occur free in ϕ.

This asserts: the individual (in fact) such that ϕ is such that ψ if and only if something x is such that ϕ, everything such that ϕ just is x, and x is such that

\[ 157 \text{Here, } z \text{ is the only variable not substitutable for the two free occurrences of } x \text{ in the above, since } z \text{ would get captured if we replace the second free occurrence of } x. \]
Note that Russell’s analysis is a \( \star \)-theorem; the proof relies on Hintikka’s schema, which in turn depends on (141)\( \star \).

\[ \psi \]

\((144) \star \text{Theorems:} \) Significant Descriptions and Uniqueness. The following are now facts about descriptions and uniqueness: (.1) the \( x \) such that \( \varphi \) exists if and only if there exists a unique \( x \) such that \( \varphi \); and (.2) something is identical to the \( x \) such that \( \varphi \) if and only if there exists a unique \( x \) such that \( \varphi \). Formally:

\[(.1) \, ix\varphi \downarrow \equiv \exists ! x \varphi \]

\[(.2) \, \exists y (y = ix\varphi) \equiv \exists ! x \varphi, \text{ provided that } y \text{ doesn’t occur free in } \varphi \]

Clearly, (.2) follows from (.1) by the instance \( ix\varphi \downarrow \equiv \exists ! (y = ix\varphi) \) of theorem (122.1). This instance allows us to regard a description \( ix\varphi \) as significant whenever we know that \( \exists y (y = ix\varphi) \).

Note that with (.1), we have derived definition \(^{14}02\) in *Principia Mathematica* (Whitehead & Russell 1910–1913 [1925–1927]). On p. 174 of the second edition (p. 182 of the first), we find:

\[ ^{14}02 \quad E!(ix)(q\varphi) \quad = : \quad (\exists b) : \varphi x . \equiv x . x = b \quad \text{Df} \]

To show that (.1) is our version of \(^{14}02\), we need to show that the definiendum and the definiens of the two definitions are equivalent. First, recall again that the discussion on pp. 30–31 ([1925–1927], Introduction, Chapter I) makes it clear that \( ix\varphi \downarrow \) is the counterpart to their formula \( E!(ix)(q\varphi) \); their formula \( E!(ix)(q\varphi) \) asserts that the \( x \) such that \( \varphi \) exists. Moreover, our definiens, \( \exists ! x \varphi \), is equivalent to their definiens, \( (\exists b) : \varphi x . \equiv x . x = b \), by (128.2), given their notational conventions.

However, since the proofs of our theorems appeal to Hintikka’s schema, (.1) and (.2) are both \( \star \)-theorems and so not subject to RN. The necessitations of both (.1) and (.2) fail to be valid, in both directions.

\[ (145) \star \text{Theorems:} \] Facts About the Matrices of (Significant) Descriptions.

\[(.1) \, x = ix\varphi \rightarrow \varphi \]

\[(.2) \, z = ix\varphi \rightarrow q^z_x, \text{ provided } z \text{ is substitutable for } x \text{ in } \varphi \]

\[(.3) \, ix\varphi \downarrow \rightarrow q^x_{ix\varphi}, \text{ provided } ix\varphi \text{ is substitutable for } x \text{ in } \varphi \]

\[(.4) \, \exists y (y = ix\varphi) \rightarrow q^y_{ix\varphi}, \text{ provided } y \text{ doesn’t occur free in } ix\varphi \text{ and } ix\varphi \text{ is substitutable for } x \text{ in } \varphi \]

These theorems license substitutions into the matrix of a description under certain conditions. Note that in (.2), \( z \) may occur free in \( ix\varphi \). (.3) and (.4) both intuitively tell us we can substitute a significant description into its own
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matrix. Note that since the proofs appeal to Hintikka’s schema, they are all $\star$-theorems.

(146) **Lemmas:** Consequence of the Necessary Equivalence of $\forall q$ and $\forall \forall q$.
One of the necessary axioms for actuality is (44.4), namely, $\forall q \equiv \forall \forall q$. It is a straightforward, modally-strict consequence of this axiom that an entity $\alpha$ is uniquely such that $\forall q$ if and only if $\alpha$ is uniquely such that $\forall \forall q$:

$$\forall \beta (\forall q^{\beta} \equiv \beta = \alpha) \equiv \forall \beta (\forall \forall q^{\beta} \equiv \beta = \alpha),$$

provided $\beta$ is substitutable for $\alpha$ in $q$ and doesn’t occur free in $q$.

The modally fragile axiom for actuality (43)$\star$ is not needed to prove this lemma.

(147) **Theorems:** Additional Theorems for Descriptions and Actuality. It is provable that (.1) $x$ is identical to the individual such that $q$ if and only if $x$ is identical to the individual actually such that $q$, and (.2) if the $x$ such that $q$ exists, then it is identical to the $x$ actually such that $q$:

(1.1) $x = \forall q \equiv x = \forall \forall q$

(1.2) $\forall q \downarrow \rightarrow \forall q = \forall \forall q$

These are modally-strict theorems.

**Exercise:** Develop modally strict proofs of:

- $\psi_x \forall q \rightarrow \forall \forall q \downarrow$, provided (a) $\psi$ is either an exemplification formula $\Pi^n \kappa_1 ... \kappa_n (n \geq 1)$ or an encoding formula $\kappa_1 ... \kappa_n \Pi^n (n \geq 1)$, (b) $x$ occurs in $\psi$ and only as one or more of the $\kappa_i (1 \leq i \leq n)$, and (c) $\nu$ is any individual variable that doesn’t occur free in $q$.

- $\psi_x \forall q \rightarrow \forall q = \forall \forall q$, provided (a) $\psi$ is either an exemplification formula $\Pi^n \kappa_1 ... \kappa_n (n \geq 1)$ or an encoding formula $\kappa_1 ... \kappa_n \Pi^n (n \geq 1)$ and (b) $x$ occurs in $\psi$ and only as one or more of the $\kappa_i (1 \leq i \leq n)$.

(148) **Theorems:** Modally Strict Version of Hintikka’s Schema. By a judicious placement of the actuality operator, we obtain the following modally strict versions of Hintikka’s schema (142)$\star$, namely, $x$ is the individual (in fact) such that $q$ if and only if it is actually the case that $q$ and everything actually such that $q$ is identical to $x$, i.e.,

$$x = \forall q \equiv \forall q \& \forall z (\forall q^z \rightarrow z = x),$$

provided $z$ is substitutable for $x$ in $q$ and doesn’t occur free in $q$.

The proof of this theorem appeals to the necessary axiom (47) instead of to theorem (141)$\star$. Since it depends on no $\star$-theorems, it is modally-strict.
Theorems: Descriptions, Actuality, and Necessity. The modally strict version of Hintikka’s schema allows us to formulate and prove a nice theorem in connection with the descriptions $ix\phi$ and $ix\psi$ whose matrices are (actually or necessarily) universally equivalent. (.1) If it is actually the case that everything is such that $\phi$ iff $\psi$, then for any $x$, $x$ is identical to the $\phi$ iff $x$ is identical to the $\psi$:

$\forall x (\phi \equiv \psi) \rightarrow \forall x (ix\phi \equiv x = ix\psi)$

Note that we can’t prove $\forall x (\phi \equiv \psi) \rightarrow ix\phi = ix\psi$; the consequent implies that the descriptions are significant, which is something that is not guaranteed by the antecedent. To see this, consider a situation in which both $\neg \exists x (x = \phi)$ and $\neg \exists x (x = \psi)$. Then by (104.9), it would follow that $\forall x (\phi \equiv \psi)$ and, by the right-to-left direction of (139.11), $\forall x (\phi \equiv \psi)$, which is the antecedent of (.1). But in this situation, the descriptions $ix\phi$ and $ix\psi$ both fail to be significant, and $ix\phi = ix\psi$ would be false.

It follows from (.1), by modally strict means, that (.2) if the $x$ such that $\phi$ exists and actually everything is such that $\phi$ iff $\psi$, then the $x$ such that $\phi$ is identical to the $x$ such that $\psi$:

$ix\phi \downarrow \& \forall x (\phi \equiv \psi) \rightarrow ix\phi = ix\psi$

Clearly, then, (.3) if the $x$ such that $\phi$ exists and necessarily everything is such that $\phi$ iff $\psi$, then the $x$ such that $\phi$ is identical to the $x$ such that $\psi$:

$ix\phi \downarrow \& \Box \forall x (\phi \equiv \psi) \rightarrow ix\phi = ix\psi$

Two other theorems are worthy of mention. (.4) if the $x$ such that $\phi$ exists, it does so necessarily, and (.5) if the $x$ such that $\phi$ exists, then something is necessarily identical to it:

$ix\phi \downarrow \rightarrow \Box ix\phi \downarrow$

$ix\phi \downarrow \rightarrow \exists y (y = ix\phi)$, provided $y$ doesn’t occur free in $\phi$

These last two theorems also have modally-strict proofs. The fact that descriptions are rigid is key to understanding both theorems. If we think semantically in terms of a primitive notion of possible world, then we can say that when $ix\phi$ is significant and occurs within the scope of the modal operator $\Box$, it still denotes the object that, at the actual world, is uniquely such that $\phi$. Note that (.4) is simply an instance of (107) and that (.5) follows from the instance of theorem (125.2) that asserts: every individual is necessarily self-identical, i.e., $\forall z (z = z)$.

(150) ★Theorems: Descriptions With Matrices That Obey a Universal Equivalence. We obtain non-modally strict versions of some recent theorems if we
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start from universalized material equivalences. (.1) If everything is such that \( \varphi \) iff \( \psi \), then for all \( x \), \( x \) is identical to the \( \varphi \) if and only if \( x \) is identical to the \( \psi \); and (.2) if the \( x \) such that \( \varphi \) exists and everything is such that \( \varphi \) iff \( \psi \), then the \( x \) such that \( \varphi \) is identical to the \( x \) such that \( \psi \):

\[
(1) \; \forall x(\varphi \equiv \psi) \rightarrow \forall x(x = ix\varphi \equiv x = ix\psi)
\]

\[
(2) \; ix\varphi \downarrow \; \& \; \forall x(\varphi \equiv \psi) \rightarrow ix\varphi = ix\psi
\]

(151) Theorems: Modally Strict Version of Russell’s Analysis of Descriptions. By a another judicious placement of the actuality operator, we can prove a modally strict version of Russell’s analysis of descriptions. For any exemplification or encoding formula \( \psi \), if the \( x \) (in fact) such that \( \varphi \) is such that \( \psi \), then there exists an \( x \) such that (i) it is actually the case that \( \varphi \), and (ii) anything \( z \) for which it is actually the case that \( \varphi \) just is \( x \), i.e.,

\[
\psi \uparrow \varphi \equiv \exists x(\exists \varphi \; \& \; \forall z(\exists \varphi \rightarrow z = x) \; \& \; \psi),
\]

provided (a) \( \psi \) is either an exemplification formula \( \Pi \kappa_1 \ldots \kappa_n \) \( (n \geq 1) \) or an encoding formula \( \kappa_1 \ldots \kappa_n \Pi \) \( (n \geq 1) \), (b) \( x \) occurs in \( \psi \) and only as one or more of the \( \kappa_i \) \( (1 \leq i \leq n) \), and (c) \( z \) is substitutable for \( x \) in \( \varphi \) and doesn’t occur free in \( \varphi \)

No appeal to (43)\* or (143)\* is necessary.

(152) Theorems: Theorems for Significant Descriptions and Actuality. We now have:

\[
(1) \; ix\varphi \downarrow \equiv \exists ! x\exists \varphi
\]

\[
(2) \; x = ix\varphi \rightarrow \exists \varphi
\]

\[
(3) \; z = ix\varphi \rightarrow \exists \varphi \uparrow z, \text{ provided } z \text{ is substitutable for } x \text{ in } \varphi
\]

\[
(4) \; ix\varphi \downarrow \rightarrow \exists \varphi \uparrow z, \text{ provided } ix\varphi \text{ is substitutable for } x \text{ in } \varphi
\]

\[
(5) \; ix\varphi = ix\psi \rightarrow \exists \forall x(\varphi \equiv \psi)
\]

These are modally-strict theorems. Compare (.1) with (144.2)\*, and (.2) – (.4) with (145.1)\* – (145.3)\*, respectively.

(153) Theorems: Modally Strict Conditions For Applying the Matrix of a Description. Here are some interesting facts about descriptions. (.1) If there exists a unique individual that is necessarily such that \( \varphi \), then anything identical to the \( x \) such that \( \varphi \) is such that \( \varphi \):

\[
(1) \; \exists ! x\exists \varphi \rightarrow \forall y(y = ix\varphi \rightarrow \varphi \uparrow y), \text{ provided } y \text{ doesn’t occur free in } \varphi \text{ and is substitutable for } x \text{ in } \varphi
\]
This is modally strict; by comparing this theorem with (145.2)*, we see that
\[ \exists ! x \Box \varphi \]
provides modally strict conditions under which \( \varphi \) applies to anything identical to the \( x \) such that \( \varphi \).

Furthermore (.1) helps us to prove another useful theorem, namely, that (.2) if everything such that \( \varphi \) is necessarily such that \( \varphi \), then if there is a unique thing such that \( \varphi \), then anything identical to the \( x \) such that \( \varphi \).

\[ \forall x (\varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi) \rightarrow (\exists ! x \varphi \rightarrow \forall y (y = ix \varphi \rightarrow \varphi y x \)), \]
provided \( y \) doesn’t occur free in \( \varphi \) and is substitutable for \( x \) in \( \varphi \).

Later in this chapter, we’ll see how this theorem helps us to prove facts about a distinguished group of canonical abstract objects.

(154) **Theorems**: Alphabetically Variant Descriptions. It follows from the preceding rule that alphabetic-variants of significant descriptions can be put into an equation:

\[ \nu \varphi \downarrow \rightarrow \nu \varphi = (\nu \varphi)' \], where \( (\nu \varphi)' \) is any alphabetic variant of \( \nu \varphi \).

Given the Rule of Alphabetic Variants (115), this theorem is a consequence of the facts (a) that significant descriptions can be instantiated into the universal claim \( \forall x (x = x) \) and (b) that the two formulas \( \nu \varphi = \nu \varphi \) and \( \nu \varphi = (\nu \varphi)' \) are themselves alphabetic variants if \( \nu \varphi \) and \( (\nu \varphi)' \) are.

(155) **Remark**: Digression on Significant Terms. In this Remark, we first produce some examples of complex terms (both descriptions and \( \lambda \)-expressions) that are provably empty and then produce some examples of complex terms that are provably significant despite having provably empty subterms. Specifically, we develop examples of:

(A) descriptions and \( \lambda \)-expressions that are provably empty, i.e., complex terms of the form \( \lambda \varphi \) and \( [\lambda x \varphi] \) such that \( \vdash \neg \lambda \varphi \) and \( \vdash \neg [\lambda x \varphi] \),

(B) descriptions that are provably significant despite having a provably empty description as a subterm, i.e., \( ix \varphi \) for which \( \vdash ix \varphi \) but where \( ix \varphi \) contains a subterm \( \lambda \varphi \) for which \( \vdash \neg \lambda \varphi \),

(C) descriptions that are provably significant despite having a provably empty \( \lambda \)-expression as a subterm, i.e., \( ix \varphi \) for which \( \vdash ix \varphi \) but where \( ix \varphi \) contains a subterm \( [\lambda x \chi] \) for which \( \vdash \neg [\lambda x \chi] \),

(D) \( \lambda \)-expressions that are provably significant despite having a provably empty description as a subterm; i.e., \( [\lambda x \varphi] \) for which \( \vdash [\lambda x \varphi] \) but where \( [\lambda x \varphi] \) contains a subterm \( \nu \varphi \) for which \( \vdash \neg \nu \varphi \), and

(E) \( \lambda \)-expressions that are provably significant despite having a provably empty \( \lambda \)-expression as a subterm, i.e., \( [\lambda y \varphi] \) for which \( \vdash [\lambda y \varphi] \) but where \( [\lambda y \varphi] \) contains a subterm \( [\lambda x \chi] \) for which \( \vdash \neg [\lambda x \chi] \).
We begin with examples of a description and a $\lambda$-expression that provably fail to be significant. For an empty description, consider $is(Hz & \neg Hz)$, in which $H$ is a free variable. No matter what property is assigned to the variable $H$, no object $z$ both exemplifies $H$ and fails to exemplify $H$. Hence, the object $z$ that both exemplifies $H$ and fails to exemplify $H$ fails to exist; it is an easy theorem that $\neg is(Hz & \neg Hz) \Downarrow$ (exercise). For an empty $\lambda$-expression, first recall that in the discussion of the Clark/Boolos paradox in Section 2.1, we sketched how a contradiction follows from the claim $\exists x (Fx \equiv \exists G (xG \land \neg Gx))$. This reasoning can be reproduced in our system. Moreover, with the help of the strengthened version of $\beta$-Conversion proved in (179) below, we’ll develop a formal derivation of $\neg [\lambda x \exists G (xG \land \neg Gx)] \Downarrow$ in (190.1).

Next, we give an example of a provably significant description that contains a provably empty one. Since (we’ve just seen that) $\neg is(Hz & \neg Hz)$ is a theorem, the contrapositive of axiom (39.5.a) implies that the exemplification formula $Giz(Hz & \neg Hz)$ is false, i.e., that $\neg Giz(Hz & \neg Hz)$ is also a theorem, for any property $G$. Now we shall later prove as a theorem that $y = ix(x = y)$ (175.2); intuitively, every individual $y$ is identical to the individual identical to $y$. Moreover, we leave it as an exercise to show that whenever $p$ is a true proposition, $ix(x = y & p)$ denotes whatever $ix(x = y)$ denotes. Then since $\neg Giz(Hz & \neg Hz)$ is known to be true, it follows both that:

$$\begin{align*}
ix(x = y) &= ix(x = y & \neg Giz(Hz & \neg Hz)) \\
y &= ix(x = y & \neg Giz(Hz & \neg Hz))
\end{align*}$$

for any object $y$. Since $ix(x = y & \neg Giz(Hz & \neg Hz))$ appears in true identity claims, it is significant, i.e.,

$$\neg Giz(Hz & \neg Hz) \Downarrow,$$

despite the fact that it contains the provably empty description $is(Hz & \neg Hz)$.

Next, we give an example of a provably significant description that contains a provably empty $\lambda$-expression. As we’ve seen, $[\lambda x \exists G (xG & \neg Gx)]$ is a provably empty $\lambda$-expression. So is its alphabetic variant $[\lambda z \exists G (zG & \neg Gz)]$, by analogous reasoning. Abbreviate this latter $\lambda$-expression as $[\lambda z \chi]$, so that $\neg [\lambda z \chi] \Downarrow$ is provable. Then where $a$ is some arbitrarily chosen individual, the formula $\neg [\lambda z \chi] a$ is provable, by (39.5.a). Hence, we may formulate the description $ix(x = y & \neg [\lambda z \chi] a)$. Now we’ve seen that when $p$ is true, $ix(x = y & p)$ is significant. So $ix(x = y & \neg [\lambda z \chi] a)$ is similarly significant, despite having a provably empty $\lambda$-expression as a subterm.

Since we know that $iz(Pz & \neg Pz)$ is a provably empty description, all it takes to see that $[\lambda x Rxiz(Pz & \neg Pz)]$ is a provably significant $\lambda$-expression that contains a provably empty description is to note that $[\lambda x Rxiz(Pz & \neg Pz)] \Downarrow$ is an instance of axiom (39.2).
(E) Finally, we’ve already seen examples of a provably significant \( \lambda \)-expression that contains a provably empty \( \lambda \)-expression, in the discussions at the end of (39) and (48). For those who skipped those discussions, start with the provably empty \( \lambda \)-expression \( [\lambda x \exists G(xG \& \neg Gx)] \). Abbreviate this expression as \( [\lambda x \chi] \). Since \( [\lambda x \chi] \) is empty, it follows by (39.5.a) that \( \neg [\lambda x \chi]y \), for any \( y \). So now consider the \( \lambda \)-expression \( [\lambda y \neg [\lambda x \chi]y] \). This is significant; the initial \( \lambda \) does not bind any variable in any encoding formula subterm. (The \( \lambda \) binds \( y \), but not the \( x \) in the one encoding formula subterm, \( xG \) of \( \chi \).) So by axiom (39.2), \( [\lambda y \neg [\lambda x \chi]y] \). But \( [\lambda y \neg [\lambda x \chi]y] \) contains a provably empty \( \lambda \)-expression as a subterm.

Examples (A) – (E) above show why we may not add, as an axiom or hypothesis, the assertion that if a term is significant then all of its subterms are significant, i.e., we may not assert:

\[
\tau \downarrow \rightarrow \sigma \downarrow, \text{ whenever } \sigma \text{ is a subterm of } \tau
\]

The counterexamples to this claim also explain why we do not strengthen (39.5.a) and (39.5.b) to assert that if an \( n \)-place exemplification or encoding formula \( (n \geq 1) \) is true, then every term whatsoever in the formula is significant. To find a counterexample, we construct a true exemplification formula of the form \( \Pi\kappa \) such that both primary terms \( \Pi \) and \( \kappa \) contain the provably empty subterm \( \exists(Hz \& \neg Hz) \). First consider the fact that the \( \lambda \)-expression \( [\lambda x_1 x_2 \forall F(Fx_1 \equiv Fx_2)] \) is significant, by axiom (39.2). Abbreviate this \( \lambda \)-expression as \( R \), so that we know by \( \beta \)-Conversion (48.1) that \( Ryy \equiv \forall F(Fy \equiv Fy) \). But since \( \forall F(Fy \equiv Fy) \) is easily established as a theorem, it follows that \( Ryy \). Now consider \( [\lambda x Rxy] \), i.e., \( [\lambda x [\lambda x_1 x_2 \forall F(Fx_1 \equiv Fx_2)]xy] \). Since the initial \( \lambda \) doesn’t bind any variables in any encoding formula subterms, \( [\lambda x Rxy] \downarrow \), by (39.2). Since \( \beta \)-Conversion now implies \( [\lambda x Rxy]y \equiv Ryy \), it follows that \( [\lambda x Rxy]y \). Now recall that in (B) above we established, for any \( y \), that:

\[
y = \tau(x = y \& G\exists(Hz \& \neg Hz))
\]

Abbreviate the description as \( \kappa \), so that the above asserts \( y = \kappa \). Then by Rule =E, it follows from \( [\lambda x Rxy]y \) that \( [\lambda x Rxx]\kappa \). So where \( \Pi \) is \( [\lambda x Rxx] \), we have established a true exemplification formula of the form \( \Pi\kappa \) in which both \( \Pi \) and \( \kappa \) contain the provably empty description \( \exists(Hz \& \neg Hz) \). Thus, \( \Pi\kappa \) is a true exemplification formula having significant primary terms that contain empty subterms.

We leave it as an exercise to show that there are true encoding formulas with primary terms that contain empty subterms. Hence axioms (39.5.a) and (39.5.b) respectively guarantee the significance only of the primary terms in a true exemplification or encoding formula.
9.9 The Theory of Necessity

9.9.1 Propositional Modal Logic

(156) Remark: Tautologies Are Necessary. In Remark (114), we called attention to Metatheorem (9.2), that every tautology is derivable. We now observe that since the proof of this metatheorem shows that no derivation of a tautology requires an appeal to a modally fragile axiom or a ⋆-theorem, it follows by RN, that every tautology is provably necessary. See Metatheorem (9.3) in the Appendix to this chapter.

(157) Metarules: Rules RM, RM⊙, RE, and RE⊙. The classical metarule RM of modal logic asserts that if \( \vdash \phi \rightarrow \psi \), then \( \vdash \Box \phi \rightarrow \Box \psi \). However, in our system, Rule RM has to be adjusted slightly to accommodate reasoning with modally fragile axioms and ⋆-theorems. To see that Rule RM is inappropriate in its classical form, consider what would happen if we were to extend our theory by asserting, for some proposition \( p \), both \( p \) and \( \neg \Box p \) as axioms. Clearly, \( p \) is contingent and since we wouldn’t also assert the modal closures of \( p \), \( p \) would have to be marked as modally fragile. Now consider the formula \( \diamond p \rightarrow p \). Clearly, \( \vdash \diamond p \rightarrow p \), since this is the left-to-right direction of axiom (43)⋆. By the classical rule RM, it would follow that \( \vdash \Box \diamond p \rightarrow \Box p \). But since \( p \) is, by hypothesis, an axiom, it is a theorem, i.e., \( \vdash p \). So by Rule RA (135), we know \( \vdash \diamond p \). But then by axiom (46.1), it follows that \( \vdash \Box \diamond p \). But this and our previous result (i.e., \( \vdash \boxdot \diamond p \rightarrow \Box p \)) yield \( \vdash \Box p \). This would mean a contradiction is derivable, since \( \neg \Box p \) is also, by hypothesis, an axiom, thereby yielding \( \vdash \neg \Box p \).

The problem here is that the classical metarule RM allows one to infer \( \vdash \Box \phi \rightarrow \Box \psi \) from any proof of \( \phi \rightarrow \psi \), whereas in systems (like the present one) containing modally fragile axioms, it should be restricted so that we may infer \( \vdash \Box \phi \rightarrow \Box \psi \) only when there is a modally strict proof of \( \phi \rightarrow \psi \). In the previous paragraph, the proof of \( \diamond p \rightarrow p \) was not modally strict. If we formulate RM so that it applies to conditional theorems proved by modally strict means, we can forestall the derivation of contradictions in cases analogous to the one just presented. But we first formulate the rule for derivations generally:

(1) Rule RM:
If \( \Gamma \vdash \Box \phi \rightarrow \psi \), then \( \Box \Gamma \vdash \Box \phi \rightarrow \Box \psi \).

Rule RM (Weaker Form):
If \( \Gamma \vdash \phi \rightarrow \psi \), then \( \Box \Gamma \vdash \Box \phi \rightarrow \Box \psi \).

In other words, if there is a modally-strict derivation of \( \phi \rightarrow \psi \) from \( \Gamma \), then there is a (modally strict) derivation of \( \Box \phi \rightarrow \Box \psi \) from the necessitations of the formulas in \( \Gamma \). As with RN, we almost always cite the weaker form of RM.
with the understanding that any conclusions drawn via the metarule within a larger reasoning context do not affect the modal strictness of that context (or lack thereof).

When $\Gamma = \emptyset$, then RM reduces to the principle:

- If $\vdash \Box \varphi \rightarrow \psi$, then $\vdash \Box \varphi \rightarrow \Box \psi$

- If $\vdash \Box \varphi \rightarrow \psi$, then $\vdash \Box \Box \varphi \rightarrow \Box \psi$  

(Weaker Form)

i.e., if $\varphi \rightarrow \psi$ is a modally-strict theorem, then $\Box \varphi \rightarrow \Box \psi$ is a (modally strict) theorem.

RM° is a corresponding rule:

(2) **Rule RM°:**

- If $\Gamma \vdash \Box \varphi \rightarrow \psi$, then $\Box \Gamma \vdash \Box \varphi \rightarrow \Box \psi$.

- If $\Gamma \vdash \Box \varphi \rightarrow \psi$, then $\Box \Gamma \vdash \Box \Box \varphi \rightarrow \Box \psi$  

(Weaker Form)

In other words, if there is a modally-strict derivation of $\varphi \rightarrow \psi$ from $\Gamma$, then there is a (modally strict) derivation of $\Box \varphi \rightarrow \Box \psi$ from the necessitations of the formulas in $\Gamma$. When $\Gamma = \emptyset$, then RM° reduces to the principle:

- If $\vdash \Box \varphi \rightarrow \psi$, then $\vdash \Box \varphi \rightarrow \Box \psi$

- If $\vdash \Box \varphi \rightarrow \psi$, then $\vdash \Box \Box \varphi \rightarrow \Box \psi$  

(Weaker Form)

i.e., if $\varphi \rightarrow \psi$ is a modally-strict theorem, then $\Box \varphi \rightarrow \Box \psi$ is a (modally strict) theorem. Again, as with RN and RM, we almost always cite the weaker form of RM° with the understanding that any conclusions drawn via the metarule within a larger reasoning context do not affect the modal strictness of that context (or lack thereof).

Finally, we have Rules RE and RE°:

(3) **Rule RE:**

- If $\Gamma \vdash \varphi \equiv \psi$, then $\Box \Gamma \vdash \Box \varphi \equiv \Box \psi$.

- Rule RE (Weaker Form):

- If $\Gamma \vdash \varphi \equiv \psi$, then $\Box \Gamma \vdash \Box \varphi \equiv \Box \psi$.

(4) **Rule RE°:**

- If $\Gamma \vdash \varphi \equiv \psi$, then $\Box \Gamma \vdash \Box \varphi \equiv \Box \psi$.

- Rule RE° (Weaker Form):

- If $\Gamma \vdash \varphi \equiv \psi$, then $\Box \Gamma \vdash \Box \varphi \equiv \Box \psi$.

If we consider these rules when $\Box \Gamma$ is empty, RE and RE° become, respectively:
• If $\vdash \Box \varphi \equiv \psi$, then $\vdash \Box \Box \varphi \equiv \Box \psi$ (Weaker Form)

Finally, it is important to note the following, when reasoning with a definition by equivalence, i.e., a definition having the form $\varphi \equiv_{df} \psi$. Rule $\equiv$Df of Equivalence by Definition (91.1) tells us that, given such a definition, we know not just that $\vdash \varphi \equiv \psi$ but also $\vdash \Box \varphi \equiv \psi$ (the $\vdash$ form of the rule was omitted from (91.1) by convention (68)). So from the definition $\varphi \equiv_{df} \psi$, Rules RE and RE$\Diamond$ immediately allow us to conclude (by modally strict means), respectively, that $\Box \varphi \equiv \Box \psi$, and $\Diamond \varphi \equiv \Diamond \psi$.

(158) Theorems: Basic K Theorems. The presentation and proofs of some of the following basic theorems that depend upon the K schema have been informed by Hughes & Cresswell 1968 and 1996:

1. $\Box \varphi \rightarrow \Box (\psi \rightarrow \varphi)$
2. $\Box \neg \varphi \rightarrow \Box (\varphi \rightarrow \neg \psi)$
3. $\Box (\varphi \& \psi) \equiv (\Box \varphi \& \Box \psi)$
4. $\Box (\varphi \equiv \psi) \equiv (\Box (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \& \Box (\psi \rightarrow \varphi))$
5. $(\Box (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \& \Box (\psi \rightarrow \varphi)) \rightarrow (\Box \varphi \equiv \Box \psi)$
6. $\Box (\varphi \equiv \psi) \rightarrow (\Box \varphi \equiv \Box \psi)$
7. $((\Box \varphi \& \Box \psi) \lor (\Box \neg \varphi \& \Box \neg \psi)) \rightarrow \Box (\varphi \equiv \psi)$
8. $\Box (\varphi \& \psi) \rightarrow \Box (\varphi \equiv \psi)$
9. $\Box (\neg \varphi \& \neg \psi) \rightarrow \Box (\varphi \equiv \psi)$
10. $\Box \varphi \equiv \Box \neg \neg \varphi$
11. $\neg \Box \varphi \equiv \Diamond \neg \varphi$ (Df$\Box$)
12. $\Box \varphi \equiv \neg \Diamond \neg \varphi$
13. $\Box (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (\Diamond \varphi \rightarrow \Diamond \psi)$ (K$\Diamond$)
14. $\Diamond \Box \varphi \equiv \neg \Box \Diamond \neg \varphi$
15. $(\Box \varphi \lor \Box \psi) \rightarrow \Box (\varphi \lor \psi)$
16. $(\Box \varphi \& \Diamond \psi) \rightarrow \Diamond (\varphi \& \psi)$
We pause here to make a few remarks about (1) – (6) only.

If we follow the usual practice of reading the formula □(χ → θ) as χ necessarily implies θ, then (1) intuitively guarantees that a necessary truth is necessarily implied by everything, and (2) intuitively guarantees that a necessary falsehood necessarily implies everything. These facts constituted the “paradoxes of strict implication” (Lewis & Langford 1932 [1959], 511). However, given the meaning of the conditional, they are harmless. (.3) establishes that a necessary conjunction is equivalent to a conjunction of necessities, while (.4) and (.5) are lemmas needed for the proof of (.6), which asserts that the necessity operator distributes over a biconditional.

Note that the converse of (.6), namely (□Φ ≡ □ψ) → □(Φ ≡ ψ), is not a theorem: the material equivalence of □Φ and □ψ doesn’t imply that the biconditional Φ ≡ ψ is necessary. To see this, consider an interpretation in which there are two worlds, w₀ and w₁, such that (a) Φ is true at w₀ and false at w₁, and (b) ψ is false at w₀ and true at w₁. Then clearly, both □Φ and □ψ are false at w₀ and so □Φ ≡ □ψ is true at w₀ (since □Φ and □ψ have the same truth value at w₀). But the claim □(Φ ≡ ψ) is false at w₀: the conditional Φ ≡ ψ fails at both worlds given that Φ and ψ have different truth values at each world. (It is important to be familiar with this counterexample since as we shall see, there are special conditions under which the converse of (.6) holds, namely, if both Φ and ψ are necessary when true. See (171.4) and (177.5) below.)

(159) Metarules: Rules of Necessary Equivalence. Theorems (89.4.b), (89.4.c), (89.4.d), (100.3), (112.5), (139.5), and (158.6) each help to establish one of the cases of the following rule:

(.1) If ⊢ □(ψ ≡ χ), then:

    (a) ⊢ ¬ψ ≡ ¬χ
    (b) ⊢ (ψ → θ) ≡ (χ → θ)
    (c) ⊢ (θ → ψ) ≡ (θ → χ)
    (d) ⊢ ∀αψ ≡ ∀αχ
    (e) ⊢ [λ ψ] ≡ [λ χ]
    (f) ⊢ dψ ≡ dχ
    (g) ⊢ □ψ ≡ □χ

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158To see why these results are to be expected, note that the left-to-right direction of (.12) asserts that □Φ → □¬¬Φ. So, if the negation of a necessary truth Φ is not possible, then a fortiori, the negation of Φ conjoined with any ψ is not possible, i.e., □Φ → □¬(ψ & ¬Φ). But this is provably equivalent to (.1) (exercise). Similarly, the left-to-right direction of (162.1), which is proved later in the text, asserts □¬¬Φ → □¬Φ. But if a necessary falsehood Φ is not possible, then Φ conjoined with the negation of any ψ is not possible, i.e., □¬¬Φ → □¬Φ & ¬ψ). But this last fact is provably equivalent to (.2) (exercise).
It is worth noting here that, by our convention in Remark (68), we omit the presentation of the metarule that results by substituting $\vdash \Box$ for $\vdash$ everywhere in (.1). But such a version of (.1) is justified; the justification of (.1) in the Appendix easily converts to a proof of the $\vdash \Box$ version, since no appeal is made to a modally fragile axiom to justify the metarule.

Since (.1) covers all the cases where a formula $\psi$ (or $\chi$) can occur as a sub-formula of a formula $\varphi$, the following rule is derivable:

(2) If $\vdash \Box (\psi \equiv \chi)$, then if $\varphi'$ is the result of substituting the formula $\chi$ for zero or more occurrences of $\psi$ where the latter is a subformula of $\varphi$, then $\vdash \varphi \equiv \varphi'$.

By convention (68), we omit the formulation and justification of the rule obtained by replacing both occurrences of $\vdash$ by $\vdash \Box$ in (2).

Using (2), we may easily justify the following rule: (3) if there is a modally strict proof of $\psi \equiv \chi$, $\psi$ is a subformula of a formula $\varphi$, and $\varphi'$ is the result of substituting (not necessarily uniformly) $\chi$ for the subformula $\psi$ in $\varphi$, then it is a theorem that $\varphi \equiv \varphi'$:

(3) If $\vdash \Box \psi \equiv \chi$, then if $\varphi'$ is the result of substituting the formula $\chi$ for zero or more occurrences of $\psi$ where the latter is a subformula of $\varphi$, then $\vdash \varphi \equiv \varphi'$.

Clearly, the rule obtained by replacing the second occurrence of $\vdash$ by $\vdash \Box$ in (3) is also justified, but we leave its formulation and justification to the reader.

(2) and (3) are central reasoning principles and the key to the proofs of the Rules of Substitution formulated below. Here are some examples of their use:

**Examples of (2).**

If $\vdash (A!x \equiv \neg \Diamond E!x)$, then $\vdash \exists x A!x \equiv \exists x \neg \Diamond E!x$

If $\vdash (Rxy \equiv (Rxy \& (Qa \lor \neg Qa)))$, then

$\vdash (Pa \& \Box Rxy) \equiv (Pa \& \Box (Rxy \& (Qa \lor \neg Qa)))$

**Examples of (3).**

If $\vdash (A!x \equiv \neg \Diamond E!x)$, then $\vdash \exists x A!x \equiv \exists x \neg \Diamond E!x$

If $\vdash (Rxy \equiv (Rxy \& (Qa \lor \neg Qa)))$, then

$\vdash (Pa \& \Box Rxy) \equiv (Pa \& \Box (Rxy \& (Qa \lor \neg Qa)))$

In the second example in (2) and (3), we’ve conjoined a tautology $Qa \lor \neg Qa$ with the formula $Rxy$ and the result is not just necessarily equivalent to $Rxy$, but also materially equivalent to $Rxy$ by a modally strict proof. Hence we may replace $Rxy$ in the formula, $Pa \& \Box Rxy (= \varphi)$ by the (necessarily and strictly) equivalent formula $Rxy \& (Qa \lor \neg Qa)$, and the result $\varphi'$ is (provably) equivalent to $\varphi$.
Finally, since a definition-by-equivalence of the form $\psi \equiv_{df} \chi$ yields theorems of the form $\Box(\psi \equiv \chi)$ (among others), such definitions immediately allow us to reason by way of the following rule:

(4) If $\psi \equiv_{df} \chi$ is a definition-by-equivalence, and $\varphi'$ is the result of substituting $\psi$ for zero or more occurrences of the $\chi$ where the latter is a subformula of $\varphi$, then $\vdash \varphi \equiv \varphi'$.

The $\vdash$ version of this rule is justified by the fact that the definition $\psi \equiv_{df} \chi$ yields modally strict theorems of the form $\psi \equiv \chi$. (See the footnote to the proof of (.4) in the Appendix.)

(160) Metarules/Derived Rules: The Rules of Substitution. The principal Rule of Substitution is (.1) if there is a modally strict proof of $\psi \equiv \chi$, then in any derivation, $\psi$ and $\chi$ can be substituted for one another wherever one or the other occurs as a subformula of any line of the derivation:

(1) Rule of Substitution
If $\vdash_{\Box} (\psi \equiv \chi)$, then where $\Gamma$ is any set of formulas and $\varphi'$ is the result of substituting the formula $\chi$ for zero or more occurrences of $\psi$ where the latter is a subformula of $\varphi$, $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$ if and only if $\Gamma \vdash \varphi'$.

[Variant: If $\vdash_{\Box} (\psi \equiv \chi)$, then where ... , $\varphi \vdash \varphi'$]


We leave it to the reader to formulate and justify (a) the rule obtained by replacing the two unadorned occurrences of $\vdash$ in (.1) by $\vdash_{\Box}$ and (b) the rule obtained by replacing $\vdash_{\Box}$ in the Variant by $\vdash_{\Box_{\Box}}$. The justification of these $\vdash_{\Box}$ versions are straightforward. Since the $\vdash_{\Box}$ versions are justified, we may cite (.1) or its Variant within any derivation or proof without having any affect on the modal strictness (or lack thereof) of the reasoning context. That is, we shall, by convention, simply cite the Rule of Substitution with the knowledge that it does not undermine the modal strictness of any reasoning context in which it is applied.

Note that the following is not justifiable: if $\vdash \Box(\psi \equiv \chi)$, then $\Gamma \vdash_{\Box} \varphi$ if and only if $\Gamma \vdash_{\Box} \varphi'$. The reason is that if $\vdash \Box(\psi \equiv \chi)$ holds because the only proofs of $\Box(\psi \equiv \chi)$ are $\star$-theorems, then the substitution of $\chi$ for $\psi$ in $\varphi$ to obtain $\varphi'$ would undermine the modal strictness of the derivation of $\varphi'$ from $\Gamma$.

Finally, since a definition-by-equivalence of the form $\psi \equiv_{df} \chi$ yields necessary axioms, and hence modally strict theorems, of the form $\psi \equiv \chi$, such definitions allow us to reason by way of the following rule:

(2) Rule of Substitution for Defined Subformulas
If $\psi \equiv_{df} \chi$ is a definition-by-equivalence, and $\varphi'$ is the result of substituting $\psi$ for zero or more occurrences of the $\chi$ where the latter is a subformula of $\varphi$, then $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$ if and only if $\Gamma \vdash \varphi'$.

[Variant: $\varphi \vdash \varphi'$, provided ... ]
The $\vdash$ version of (.2) is also easily justified.

(161) Remark: Digression on Legitimate and Illegitimate Uses of the Rules of Substitution. Here are some legitimate examples of the Variant version of (160.1):

Example 1.
If $\vdash □A!x \equiv {\neg}E!x$, then $\Gamma \vdash {\neg}A!x$ if and only if $\Gamma \vdash {\neg}{\neg}E!x$.

Example 2.
If $\vdash □Rxy \equiv (Rxy \& (Qa \lor {\neg}Qa))$, then $\Gamma \vdash p \rightarrow Rxy$ if and only if $\Gamma \vdash p \rightarrow (Rxy \& (Qa \lor {\neg}Qa))$.

Example 3.
If $\vdash □A!x \equiv {\neg}E!x$, then $\exists xA!x \vdash \exists x{\neg}E!x$.

Example 4.
If $\vdash □{\neg}{\neg}Px \equiv Px$, then $A\neg{\neg}Px \vdash APx$.

Example 5.
If $\vdash □(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \equiv (\neg\psi \rightarrow \neg\varphi)$, then $\square(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \vdash □(\neg\psi \rightarrow \neg\varphi)$.

Example 6.
If $\vdash □\psi \equiv \chi$, then $\square(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \vdash □(\varphi \rightarrow \chi)$.

Example 7.
If $\vdash □\varphi \equiv {\neg}\varphi$, then $\square(\varphi \rightarrow \varphi) \vdash □(\neg\varphi \rightarrow \varphi)$.

Note, however, that the Rules of Substitution do not allow us to substitute $\chi$ for $\psi$ in any context whatsoever, but rather only when $\psi$ occurs as a subformulas of some given formula:

Non-Example 1. Suppose $\vdash □\psi \equiv \chi$. Then (160) does not permit one to substitute $\chi$ for $\psi$ in the formula $y[\lambda x \psi \& \theta]$ to infer $y[\lambda x \chi \& \theta]$.

The formula $\psi$ is not a subformula of $y[\lambda x \psi \& \theta]$, and so (160) is not applicable.

The following case, in which $\Gamma$ is empty, also fails to yield a legitimate instance of (160):

• Non-Example 2. It can be shown that $\vdash □Pa \equiv (Pa \& (q \lor {\neg}q))$. But (160) does not permit one to substitute $Pa \& (q \lor {\neg}q)$ for an occurrence of $Pa$ in the theorem $Pa = Pa$ to infer $Pa = (Pa \& (q \lor {\neg}q))$.

Though one can easily establish both $\vdash □Pa \equiv (Pa \& (q \lor {\neg}q))$ and $\vdash Pa = Pa$, we may not conclude $\vdash Pa = (Pa \& (q \lor {\neg}q))$ because $Pa$ is not a subformula of $Pa = Pa$! When one expands the identity symbol in $Pa = Pa$ by its definition, the formula $Pa$ will appear nested with the matrix of complex terms and not as a
subformula.\textsuperscript{159} Hence, we may not use (160) to substitute \( Pa \& (Qb \lor \neg Qb) \) for \( Pa \) in \( Pa = Pa \) to obtain \( Pa = (Pa \& (Qb \lor \neg Qb)) \).

Similarly, the following is not an instance of (160):

- **Non-Example 3.** It can be shown that \( \vdash \Box \psi \equiv [\lambda x \psi \& \theta]y \). But (160) does not permit one to substitute \([\lambda x \psi \& (q \lor \neg q)]y \) for an occurrence of \( Py \) in the theorem \( Py = Py \) to infer \( Py = [\lambda x \psi \& (q \lor \neg q)]y \).

It is straightforward to establish \( \vdash \Box \psi \equiv [\lambda x \psi \& (q \lor \neg q)]y \).\textsuperscript{160} But \( Py \) is not a subformula of the theorem \( Py = Py \) and so we can't legitimately apply the rule (160) to obtain \( Py = \{\lambda x \psi \& (q \lor \neg q)]y \).

There are, however, special cases where rule (160) can play a useful role legitimizing a substitution that isn't directly allowed by the rule. To see an example, we consider a variant of **Non-Example 1.** Let \( \phi = [\lambda x \psi \& \theta]y \) instead of \([\lambda x \psi \& \theta]y \). For the reasons discussed earlier, when \( \vdash \psi \equiv \chi \), we may not use (160.1) to substitute \( \chi \) for \( \psi \) in the formula \([\lambda x \psi \& \theta]y \). However, in this particular case, when \( y \) is substitutable for \( x \) in \( \psi, \chi \), and \( \theta \), then we can substitute \( \chi \) for \( \psi \) in \([\lambda x \psi \& \theta]y \), though not solely by (160.1). That is, the following special case holds:

**Fact:** If \( \vdash \Box \psi \equiv \chi \), then \([\lambda x \psi \& \theta]y \vdash [\lambda x \chi \& \theta]y \), provided \( y \) is substitutable for \( x \) in \( \psi, \chi \), and \( \theta \).

**Proof.** Suppose \( \vdash \Box \psi \equiv \chi \) and that \( y \) is substitutable for \( x \) in \( \psi, \chi \), and \( \theta \). Without loss of generality, we show only \([\lambda x \psi \& \theta]y \vdash [\lambda x \chi \& \theta]y \).

\textsuperscript{159}By definition (23.4), \( Pa = Pa \) is equivalent (eliminating duplicate conjuncts) to:

\( Pa \& [\lambda x Pa] = [\lambda x Pa] \)

This, in turn is equivalent, by definition (23.2), (eliminating duplicate conjuncts) to:

\( \vdash Pa \& [\lambda x Pa] \equiv [\lambda x Pa] \)

This, in turn is equivalent, by definition (23.2), (eliminating duplicate conjuncts) to:

\( \vdash Pa \& [\lambda x Pa] \equiv [\lambda x Pa] \)

Note that \( Pa \downarrow \) expands, by definition (20.3), to \([\lambda x Pa] \). And \([\lambda x Pa] \) (which is also the second conjunct of (36)) expands, by definition (20.2) to \( \exists x([\lambda x Pa]) \). So (36) expands (eliminating duplicate conjuncts) to:

\( \exists x([\lambda x Pa]) \& [\lambda x Pa] \equiv y([\lambda x Pa]) \)

The definition of subformula (6) doesn't count \( Pa \) as a subformula of (36). The subformulas of the first conjunct are \( \exists x([\lambda x Pa]) \) and \( [\lambda x Pa] \) and nothing else. As for the second conjunct, \( [\lambda x Pa] \equiv y([\lambda x Pa]) \) is a subformula of itself; so by (6.2), \( \forall y([\lambda x Pa] \equiv y([\lambda x Pa]) \) is also a subformula; by (6.2) again, \( [\lambda x Pa] \equiv y([\lambda x Pa] \) is also a subformula; and by (6.3) and fact (a) in the final paragraph of (18), \( [\lambda x Pa] \) is also a subformula. These are the only subformulas of \( [\lambda x Pa] \).

\textsuperscript{160}By (39.2), \( [\lambda x Pa \& (q \lor \neg q)] \). So it follows from \( \beta \)-Conversion (48.2) that:

\( [\lambda x Pa \& (q \lor \neg q)]y \equiv Py \& (q \lor \neg q) \)

Now \( Py \& (q \lor \neg q) \) is provably equivalent to \( Py \); it is an instance of the tautology \( (q \& (\psi \lor \neg \psi)) \equiv \psi \).

Thus, it follows by biconditional syllogism and the commutativity of \( \equiv \) that \( Py \equiv [\lambda x Px \& (q \lor \neg q)]y \).

Since this proof is modally-strict, we've established that:

\( \vdash Py \equiv [\lambda x Px \& (q \lor \neg q)]y \)
Our strategy is to use conditional proof and then (64.10). So assume \([\lambda x \psi & \theta] y\), to prove \([\lambda x \chi & \theta] y\). Then \([\lambda x \psi & \theta] \downarrow\), by (39.5.a). Note that from \(\vdash \psi \equiv \chi\), it follows by GEN that \(\vdash \forall x(\psi \equiv \chi)\). Since \(\psi\) is, by hypothesis, substitutable for \(x\) in \(\psi\) and \(\chi\), it is substitutable for \(x\) in \(\psi \equiv \chi\). So it follows by Rule VE that \(\vdash \psi^x \equiv \chi^x\). Note also that if \(\psi\) is substitutable for \(x\) in \(\psi\) and \(\theta\), then \(\psi\) is substitutable for \(x\) in \(\psi \& \theta\). Then since \([\lambda x \psi & \theta] \downarrow\), \(\beta\)-Conversion tells us that \([\lambda x \psi & \theta] y\) implies \((\psi & \theta)^x\), i.e., \(\psi^x \& \theta^x\). From this and the previously established fact that \(\vdash \psi^x \equiv \chi^x\), the Rule of Substitution (160.1) allows us to infer \(\chi^x & \theta^x\), i.e., \((\chi & \theta)^x\). Now if we can show \([\lambda x \chi & \theta] \downarrow\), then we can apply \(\beta\)-Conversion to conclude \([\lambda x \chi & \theta] y\), thereby completing our conditional proof of \([\lambda x \psi & \theta] y \rightarrow [\lambda x \chi & \theta] y\); our Fact will then follow by (64.10). But we can show \([\lambda x \chi & \theta] \downarrow\) by first noting that the following is an instance of axiom (49):

\[
([\lambda x \psi & \theta] \downarrow\ & \square \forall x(\psi \& \theta \equiv \chi & \theta)) \rightarrow [\lambda x \chi & \theta] \downarrow
\]

We already know \([\lambda x \psi & \theta] \downarrow\). So if we can show \(\square \forall x(\psi \& \theta \equiv \chi & \theta)\), then we can conclude \([\lambda x \chi & \theta] \downarrow\) and be done. Note that, by hypothesis, \(\vdash \psi \equiv \chi\). Moreover, we know by (89.4.e) that \(\vdash (\psi \equiv \chi) \rightarrow (\psi \& \theta \equiv \chi \& \theta)\). So by (64.6), it follows that \(\vdash \psi \& \theta \equiv \chi \& \theta\). It follows by GEN that \(\vdash \forall x(\psi \& \theta \equiv \chi \& \theta)\). So by RN, \(\vdash \square \forall x(\psi \& \theta \equiv \chi \& \theta)\), which is all that remained for us to show.

So though the Rule of Substitution doesn’t by itself let us infer \([\lambda x \chi & \theta] y\) from \([\lambda x \psi & \theta] y\) and \(\vdash \psi \equiv \chi\), we can nevertheless draw the inference under certain circumstances.

(162) Theorems: Additional K Theorems. The Rules of Necessary Equivalence and Substitution also make it easier to prove the following theorems:

(1) \(\square \neg \varphi \equiv \neg \varphi\)

(2) \(\Diamond (\varphi \lor \psi) \equiv (\Diamond \varphi \lor \Diamond \psi)\)

(3) \(\Diamond (\varphi \& \psi) \rightarrow (\Diamond \varphi \& \Diamond \psi)\)

(4) \(\Diamond (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \equiv (\Diamond \varphi \rightarrow \Diamond \psi)\)

(5) \(\Diamond \Diamond \varphi \equiv \Diamond \neg \neg \varphi\)

(6) \(\square (\varphi \lor \psi) \rightarrow (\square \varphi \lor \Diamond \psi)\)

(7) \((\square (\varphi \lor \psi) \& \Diamond \neg \neg \varphi) \rightarrow \Diamond \psi)\)

(163) Theorems: The T\(\Diamond\) and 5\(\Diamond\) Schemata. The T schema (45.2) and the 5 schema (45.3) are axioms of our modal logic. Their duals are theorems:
These help us to derive the following classical theorems of propositional S5 modal logic.

(164) Theorems: Theorems of Actuality, Negation, and Possibility. The Rules of Substitution make it easier to prove (.1) actually \( q \) if and only if it is not the case that actually not \( q \); (.2) possibly \( q \) if and only if actually possibly \( q \); (.3) if it is actually the case that \( q \), then possibly \( q \); (.4) it is actually the case that \( q \) if and only if it is possible that it is actually the case that \( q \); and (.5) possibly actually \( q \) implies actually possibly \( q \):

(1) \( Aq \equiv \neg\mathcal{A}\neg q \)

(2) \( \Diamond q \equiv \mathcal{A}\Diamond q \)

(3) \( Aq \rightarrow \Diamond q \)

(4) \( \mathcal{A}q \equiv \Diamond Aq \)

(5) \( \Diamond \mathcal{A}q \rightarrow A\Diamond q \)

Note that the commuted form of (1), i.e., \( \mathcal{A}\Diamond q \equiv \Diamond q \), is another special case of a formula of the form \( A\psi \equiv \psi \) that isn't modally fragile.

(165) Theorems: Basic S5 Theorems. The following list of basic S5 theorems, i.e., theorems provable from the K, T, and 5 schemata (45.1) – (45.3), was informed by a study of Chellas 1980 (16–18):

(1) \( \Diamond q \equiv \mathcal{A}\Diamond q \)

(2) \( \Box q \equiv \mathcal{A}\Box q \)

(3) \( q \rightarrow \Box\Diamond q \)

(4) \( \Diamond \Box q \rightarrow q \)

(5) \( \Box q \rightarrow \Box\Box q \)

(6) \( \Box q \equiv \Box\Box q \)

(7) \( \Diamond\Diamond q \rightarrow \Diamond q \)

(8) \( \Diamond\Diamond q \equiv \Diamond q \)

(9) \( \Box(q \lor \Box\psi) \equiv (\Box q \lor \Box\psi) \)

(10) \( \Box(q \lor \Diamond\psi) \equiv (\Box q \lor \Diamond\psi) \)
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(11) \( \Diamond (p \& \Diamond q) \equiv (\Diamond p \& \Diamond q) \)

(12) \( \Diamond (p \& \Box q) \equiv (\Diamond p \& \Box q) \)

(13) \( \Box (p \rightarrow \Box q) \equiv \Box (\Diamond p \rightarrow q) \)

**Metarules:** Consequences of the B and B\(\Diamond\) Schemata. The following rules are derivable with the help of the B (165.3) and B\(\Diamond\) (165.4) schemata:

(1) If \( \Gamma \vdash \Box \Diamond q \rightarrow \psi \), then \( \Box \Gamma \vdash \Box \Diamond q \rightarrow \Box \psi \) (Weaker Form)

(2) If \( \Gamma \vdash \Box q \rightarrow \Box \psi \), then \( \Box \Gamma \vdash \Diamond q \rightarrow \Box \psi \) (Weaker Form)

When \( \Gamma \) is empty and there are no premises or assumptions involved, the above reduce to:

- If \( \vdash \Box \Diamond q \rightarrow \psi \), then \( \vdash \Box q \rightarrow \Box \psi \) (Weaker Form)

- If \( \vdash \Box q \rightarrow \Box \psi \), then \( \vdash \Diamond q \rightarrow \Box \psi \) (Weaker Form)

(Cf. Prior 1956, p. 62, Rule RLM.) As with RN, RM, and RE, we almost always cite the weaker versions of these rules, with the understanding that the modal strictness of the reasoning context remains unaffected.

9.9.2 **Quantified Modal Logic**

**Theorems:** Barcan Formulas.

(1) \( \forall \alpha \Box q \rightarrow \Box \forall \alpha q \) (Barcan Formula = BF)

(2) \( \Box \forall \alpha q \rightarrow \forall \alpha \Box q \) (Converse Barcan Formula = CBF)

(3) \( \Diamond \exists \alpha q \rightarrow \exists \alpha \Diamond q \) (BF\(\Diamond\))

(4) \( \exists \alpha \Diamond q \rightarrow \Diamond \exists \alpha q \) (CBF\(\Diamond\))

By an application of RN to (1), we obtain Theorem 18 of Barcan 1946. By an application of RN to (3), we obtain Axiom 11 of Barcan 1946.

**Theorems:** Other Theorems of Modal Quantification.

(1) \( \exists \alpha \Box q \rightarrow \Box \exists \alpha q \) (Buridan)

(2) \( \Diamond \forall \alpha q \rightarrow \forall \alpha \Diamond q \) (Buridan\(\Diamond\))
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(.3) \( \Diamond \exists \alpha (\varphi \& \psi) \rightarrow \Diamond (\exists \alpha \varphi \& \exists \alpha \psi) \)

(.4) \( \Diamond \exists \alpha (\varphi \& \psi) \rightarrow \Diamond \exists \alpha \varphi \)

(.5) \( (\Box \forall (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \& \Box \forall (\psi \rightarrow \chi)) \rightarrow \Box \forall (\varphi \rightarrow \chi) \)

(.6) \( (\Box \forall (\varphi \equiv \psi) \& \Box \forall (\psi \equiv \chi)) \rightarrow \Box \forall (\varphi \equiv \chi) \)

9.9.3 Conditions for, and Consequences of, Modal Collapse

Though it isn’t strictly contradictory, a theory of necessity (\( \Box \)) is nevertheless trivialized if it yields, for an arbitrary formula \( \varphi \), the theorem \( \varphi \equiv \Box \varphi \). For if \( \varphi \equiv \Box \varphi \) were a theorem for arbitrary \( \varphi \), then \( \neg \varphi \equiv \Box \neg \varphi \) would be an instance, and so by (89.4.b), \( \neg \varphi \equiv \Box \neg \varphi \). Thus, by definition of \( \Diamond \) and principles of double negation, it would follow that \( \varphi \equiv \Diamond \varphi \). So all modal distinctions would disappear; every formula \( \varphi \) would be equivalent to both \( \Box \varphi \) and \( \Diamond \varphi \). We say that such systems suffer from modal collapse.

Clearly, a modally collapsed system is inconsistent with the claim that there is a true proposition that might not have been true (or a false proposition that might be true).\(^{161}\) Indeed, modal collapse would produce a contradiction in the present system, since the claims, there are contingent truths and contingent falsehoods, are theorems — see (215.1) and (215.2) below.

But though the theory of necessity developed in Sections 9.9.1 and 9.9.2 does not suffer from modal collapse, there are some distinctive kinds of formulas \( \varphi \) for which it is provable that \( \Diamond \varphi \equiv \Box \varphi \). We’ll therefore say that those formulas exhibit modal collapse. As we shall see, modal collapse for these claims is something that our system embraces to good effect. In what follows, we investigate, in depth, (a) a variety of claims that are modally collapsed, (b) the conditions that give rise to modal collapse, and (c) some consequences of modally collapsed formulas. We’ll focus, in turn, on (the conditions for) modal collapse as it affects: existence claims, identity claims, certain modal and actuality claims, claims involving descriptions, and encoding predications. None of these results imply that ordinary (i.e., possibly concrete) individuals are necessarily concrete.

We’ve already seen (107) that \( \tau \downarrow \rightarrow \Box \tau \downarrow \). The modal logic we now have makes it easy to derive (.1) if it is possible that \( \tau \) exists, then \( \tau \) exists:

\[(1) \Diamond \tau \downarrow \rightarrow \tau \downarrow\]

\(^{161}\)Suppose \( \exists p (p \& \Diamond \neg p) \) and let \( q_0 \) be such a proposition, so that we know both \( q_0 \) and \( \Diamond \neg q_0 \). If the system is modally collapsed then \( q_0 \) implies \( \Box q_0 \). But \( \Diamond \neg q_0 \) implies \( \neg \Box q_0 \). Contradiction.

Analogously, suppose \( \exists p (\neg p \& \Diamond p) \) and let \( q_1 \) be such a proposition, so that we know both \( \neg q_1 \) and \( \Diamond q_1 \). If the system is modally collapsed, then as we saw above, \( q_1 \equiv \Diamond q_1 \) and so \( \neg q_1 \) implies \( \neg \Diamond q_1 \). Contradiction.
From (.1) and (107), it immediately follows that (.2) it is possible that \( \tau \) exists if and only if it is necessary that \( \tau \) exists:

\( .2 \) \( \Diamond \tau \downarrow \equiv \Box \tau \downarrow \)

So the existence claim \( \tau \downarrow \) is subject to modal collapse. Moreover, it is straightforward to show (.3) if \( \tau \) doesn’t exist, then necessarily \( \tau \) doesn’t exist, and (.4) it is possible that \( \tau \) doesn’t exist if and only if it is necessary that \( \tau \) doesn’t exist:

\( .3 \) \( \neg \tau \downarrow \rightarrow \Box \neg \tau \downarrow \)

\( .4 \) \( \Diamond \neg \tau \downarrow \equiv \Box \neg \tau \downarrow \)

So non-existence claims are subject to modal collapse as well.

(170) Theorems: Modal Collapse of Identity and Non-identity Claims. We established in (126.1) that \( \alpha = \beta \rightarrow \Box \alpha = \beta \) as a modally strict theorem. As a consequence, we have that (.1) if \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) are possibly identical then they are identical; (.2) if \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) are distinct, they are necessarily distinct; (.3) if \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) are possibly distinct, they are distinct; (.4) if \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) are possibly distinct, they are necessarily distinct, and (.5) if \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) are possibly distinct, they are necessarily distinct:

\( .1 \) \( \Diamond \alpha = \beta \rightarrow \alpha = \beta \)

\( .2 \) \( \alpha \neq \beta \rightarrow \Box \alpha \neq \beta \)

\( .3 \) \( \Diamond \alpha \neq \beta \rightarrow \alpha \neq \beta \)

\( .4 \) \( \Diamond \alpha = \beta \rightarrow \Box \alpha = \beta \)

\( .5 \) \( \Diamond \alpha \neq \beta \rightarrow \Box \alpha \neq \beta \)

In the usual manner, these theorems assume that \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) are both variables of the same type, i.e., both individual variables or both \( n \)-place relation variables, for some \( n \).

(171) Theorems: Conditions for, and Consequences of, Modal Collapse. By (165.13), we already know that \( \Box (\varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi) \) is equivalent to \( \Box (\Diamond \varphi \rightarrow \varphi) \). We now establish that (.1) necessarily, \( \varphi \)-implies-necessarily-\( \varphi \) if and only if, possibly-\( \varphi \) implies necessarily-\( \varphi \):

\( .1 \) \( \Box (\varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi) \equiv (\Diamond \varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi) \)

It follows that (.2) if either (a) necessarily, \( \varphi \)-implies-necessarily-\( \varphi \) or (b) possibly-\( \varphi \) implies necessarily-\( \varphi \), then (c) possibly-\( \varphi \) if and only if necessarily-\( \varphi \):

\( .2 \) \( (\Box (\varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi) \lor (\Diamond \varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi)) \rightarrow (\Diamond \varphi \equiv \Box \varphi) \)
So if the conditions $\Box(q \rightarrow \Box q)$ (or its equivalent $\Box(\Diamond q \rightarrow q)$ or $\Diamond q \rightarrow \Box q$ holds, $\Diamond q$ and $\Box q$ become equivalent; the distinction between possibly $q$ and necessarily $q$ collapses and thus $q$ is not subject to modal distinctions.

It also follows that (.3) if necessarily, $q$-implies-necessarily-$q$, then $q$ is not necessary if and only if $\neg q$ is necessary:

\[(.3) \quad \Box(q \rightarrow \Box q) \rightarrow (\neg\Box q \equiv \Box \neg q)\]

(.3) helps us to establish an important fact about the conditions producing modal collapse, namely, (.4) if necessarily, $q$ implies $\Box q$, and necessarily, $\psi$ implies $\Box \psi$, then the material equivalence of $\Box q$ and $\Box \psi$ implies that $q \equiv \psi$ is necessary:

\[(.4) \quad (\Box(q \rightarrow \Box q) \land \Box(\psi \rightarrow \Box \psi)) \rightarrow ((\Box q \equiv \Box \psi) \rightarrow \Box(q \equiv \psi))\]

In other words, (.4) tells us that the converse of (158.6) holds when both $q$ and $\psi$ are subject to modal collapse. (.4) plays an important role in the proofs of (177.5) and (258.1), which are key theorems.

Finally, it follows that if $q$ and $\psi$ are subject to modal collapse, then their material equivalence implies their necessary equivalence:

\[(.5) \quad (\Box(q \rightarrow \Box q) \land \Box(\psi \rightarrow \Box \psi)) \rightarrow ((q \equiv \psi) \rightarrow \Box(q \equiv \psi))\]

(.5) is a consequence of (.4).

**Theorems:** Modal Collapse, Actuality, and Descriptions. From theorem (139.6), i.e., $\exists \Box q \equiv \Box \exists q$, and theorem (164.4), i.e., $\exists \Box q \equiv \Diamond \exists q$, it follows that (.1) possibly actually $q$ if and only if necessarily actually $q$:

\[(.1) \quad \Diamond \exists q \equiv \Box \exists q\]

Thus, $\exists \Box q$ is subject to modal collapse and exhibits no modal distinctions.

Moreover, if $q$ is subject to a condition that leads to modal collapse, then $\exists \Box q$ and $q$ are provably equivalent by a modally strict proof, i.e., (.2) if necessarily, if $q$ then necessarily $q$, then $\exists \Box q$ if and only if $q$:

\[(.2) \quad \Box(q \rightarrow \Box q) \rightarrow (\exists \Box q \equiv q)\]

Thus, (.2) provides conditions under which $\exists \Box q$ and $q$ become equivalent by modally strict reasoning. **Exercise:** Show that if a non-modally strict theorem $\psi$ relies only on instances of (43)⋆ involving some formula $q$, then if $q$ is modally collapsed, there is a proof of $\psi$ that is modally strict.

Finally, there are results concerning the conditions for modal collapse and definite descriptions. We can prove, by modally strict means, that (.3) if necessarily everything such that $q$ is necessarily such that $q$, then if there is a unique thing such that $q$, then the $x$ such that $q$ exists; and (.4) if necessarily everything such that $q$ is necessarily such that $q$, then $x$ is identical to the $x$ such that $q$ if and only if $q$ is true and everything such that $q$ is identical to $x$. 


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(3) \( \Box \forall x (\varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi) \rightarrow (\exists ! x \varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi \downarrow) \)

(4) \( \Box \forall x (\varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi) \rightarrow (x = ix \varphi \equiv (\varphi \& \forall z (\varphi^z \rightarrow z = x))) \), provided \( z \) is substitutable for \( x \) in \( \varphi \) and doesn’t occur free in \( \varphi \).

By appeal to the Barcan Formula, (4) implies that if the condition for the modal collapse of \( \varphi \) is universally true, i.e., if \( \forall x (\varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi) \), then a modally strict version of the Hintikka scheme (142) holds.

(173) Theorems: Identity and Actuality. The necessity of identity, i.e., \( \alpha = \beta \rightarrow \Box \alpha = \beta \) (126.1), implies that \( \Box (\alpha = \beta \rightarrow \Box \alpha = \beta) \), by Rule RN. From this fact, we can easily show that (1) individuals and \( n \)-place relations \( (n \geq 0) \) are identical if and only if actually identical, and (2) individuals and \( n \)-place relations are non-identical if and only if actually non-identical:

(1) \( \alpha = \beta \equiv \exists ! \alpha = \beta \), where \( \alpha, \beta \) are variables of the same type

(2) \( \alpha \neq \beta \equiv \exists ! \alpha \neq \beta \), where \( \alpha, \beta \) are variables of the same type

(174) Lemmas: Actuality and Unique Existence. Since identity claims are modally collapsed, the actuality operator commutes with the unique existence quantifier:

(1) \( \exists ! \exists ! x \varphi \equiv \exists ! \exists ! x \varphi \)

Furthermore, it follows from (1) and (152.1) that:

(2) \( (ix \varphi) \downarrow \equiv \exists ! x \varphi \)

(2) is especially important. If we can establish a claim of the form \( \exists ! x \varphi \) by way of a modally strict proof, then the \( \rightarrow \) form of the Rule of Actualization (RA) implies that there is a modally-strict proof of \( \exists ! x \varphi \). Then, by (.2), we can derive \( ix \varphi \downarrow \) as a modally-strict theorem. This reasoning will play a crucial role when we establish, by modally strict means, that canonical descriptions of the form \( \alpha (A! x \& \forall F (xF \equiv \varphi)) \) are significant (249).

(175) Theorem: A Distinguished Description Involving Identity. The conditions for the modal collapse of \( \alpha = \beta \) were cited in the proof of theorem (173.1). It also plays a key role in the proof of the following theorems, namely, (1) the individual identical to \( y \) exists, and (2) \( y \) is identical to the individual identical to \( y \):

(1) \( ix (x = y) \downarrow \)

(2) \( y = ix (x = y) \)
These are modally-strict theorems and though they appear to be trivial, keep in mind that existence and identity are defined notions and that definite descriptions are axiomatized in terms of the actuality operator.

It is worth observing that Frege used a somewhat more complicated version of (.2) as an axiom governing his definite description operator \( \xi \). In his 1893 (§18), Frege asserts Basic Law VI, which we may write as: 
\( y = \{ e = y \} \). In Frege’s axiom, the description operator \( \xi \) has been applied to \( \{ e = y \} \), which is the extension of a concept under which falls one and only one object. Thus, we may use Frege’s explanation of the description operator (1893, §11) to see that Law VI asserts: \( y \) is identical to the unique member of the extension of the concept being identical to \( y \). By contrast, (.2) asserts that \( y \) is identical to the individual identical to \( y \); the description operator isn’t applied to an expression for an extension of a concept.

(176) Theorem: \( N \)-ary Encoding and Modality. The modal logic of encoding yields both (.1) if \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) encode \( F^n \), then they necessarily encode \( F^n \), and (.2) if \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) fail to encode \( F^n \), then they necessarily fail to encode \( F^n \):

\[
\begin{align*}
(1) & \quad x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \rightarrow \square x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \\
(2) & \quad \neg x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \rightarrow \square \neg x_1 \ldots x_n F^n
\end{align*}
\]

It is relatively easy to derive (.1) from axioms (50) and (51), and the proof of (.2) is simplified by appealing to rule (166.2).

(177) Theorem: Modal Collapse of Encoding Predications. From the rigidity of unary encoding axiom (51) and the rigidity of \( n \)-ary encoding theorem (176.1), we may prove some important modally-strict theorems pertaining to the modal collapse of encoding predications, for \( n \geq 1 \): (.1) possibly \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) encode \( F^n \) iff necessarily \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) encode \( F^n \); (.2) \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) encode \( F^n \) iff necessarily \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) encode \( F^n \); (.3) possibly \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) encode \( F^n \) iff \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) encode \( F^n \); (.4) \( x_1, \ldots, x_n F^n \) and \( y_1 \ldots y_n G^n \) are materially equivalent iff \( \square x_1, \ldots, x_n F^n \) and \( \square y_1 \ldots y_n G^n \) are materially equivalent; (.5) \( x_1, \ldots, x_n F^n \) and \( y_1 \ldots y_n G^n \) are materially equivalent iff \( \square x_1, \ldots, x_n F^n \) and \( \square y_1 \ldots y_n G^n \) are materially equivalent; (.6) \( x_1, \ldots, x_n F^n \) and \( y_1 \ldots y_n G^n \) are materially equivalent iff it is necessary that they are materially equivalent; (.7) \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) fail to encode \( F^n \) iff necessarily \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) fail to encode \( F^n \); (.8) possibly \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) fail to encode \( F^n \) iff \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) fail to encode \( F^n \); (.9) possibly \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) fail to encode \( F^n \) iff necessarily \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) fail to encode \( F^n \); and (.10) actually \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) encode \( F^n \) iff \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) encode \( F^n \):

\[
\begin{align*}
(1) & \quad \Diamond x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \equiv \square x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \\
(2) & \quad x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \equiv \square x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \\
(3) & \quad \Diamond x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \equiv x_1 \ldots x_n F^n
\end{align*}
\]

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(.4) \((x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \equiv y_1 \ldots y_n G^n) \equiv (\Box x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \equiv \Box y_1 \ldots y_n G^n)\) (\(n \geq 1\))

(.5) \(\Box(x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \equiv y_1 \ldots y_n G^n) \equiv (\Box x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \equiv \Box y_1 \ldots y_n G^n)\) (\(n \geq 1\))

(.6) \((x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \equiv y_1 \ldots y_n G^n) \equiv (\Box(x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \equiv y_1 \ldots y_n G^n)\) (\(n \geq 1\))

(.7) \(\neg x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \equiv \Box \neg x_1 \ldots x_n F^n\) (\(n \geq 1\))

(.8) \(\Box \neg x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \equiv \neg x_1 \ldots x_n F^n\) (\(n \geq 1\))

(.9) \(\Box \neg x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \equiv (\Box \neg x_1 \ldots x_n F^n)\) (\(n \geq 1\))

(.10) \(A x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \equiv x_1 \ldots x_n F^n\) (\(n \geq 1\))

(.1) is especially significant, given the entanglement of logic and metaphysics. Logically, (.1) is a fact about encoding predications, namely, that they are subject to modal collapse; the possibility and necessity of \(x_1 \ldots x_n F^n\) are equivalent. Metaphysically, (.1), is a fact about abstract objects, namely, which relations abstract objects possibly encode is not relative to any circumstance.

(.4) – (.6) are also interesting. (.4) tells us that if two encoding formulas are equivalent, then their necessitations are equivalent. (.5) is significant not because of the left-to-right direction, which is just an instance (158.6), but because of its right-to-left direction. In general, \(\Box \varphi \equiv \Box \psi\) doesn’t materially imply the claim \(\Box(\varphi \equiv \psi)\), as we saw in the brief discussion following (158.6). But when \(\varphi\) and \(\psi\) are two encoding claims, such as \(x_1 \ldots x_n F^n\) and \(y_1 \ldots y_n G^n\), the implication holds because of both encoding claims are subject to modal collapse, as we would expect from the discussion of theorem (171.4). (.6) is a simple but interesting consequence of (.4) and (.5). Finally, (.10) is significant because it is a modally strict theorem and has the form \(A \varphi \equiv \varphi\), but is provable without an appeal to the modally fragile axiom schema having this form (43)*.

Exercise: Use (.6) to prove \(\Box(x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \equiv y_1 \ldots y_n G^n) \equiv (x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \equiv y_1 \ldots y_n G^n)\), for \(n \geq 1\), and that \(\Box(x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \equiv y_1 \ldots y_n G^n) \equiv (x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \equiv y_1 \ldots y_n G^n)\).

(178) Theorems: Being Ordinary and Being Abstract are both Modally Collapsed.

(1) \(O!x \rightarrow \Box O!x\)

(2) \(A!x \rightarrow \Box A!x\)

(3) \(\Box O!x \rightarrow O!x\)

(4) \(\Box A!x \rightarrow A!x\)

(5) \(\Box O!x \equiv \Box O!x\)
The last two theorems are especially interesting. They are commuted claims of the form \( \Box \varphi \equiv \varphi \) that can be proved by modally-strict means, without an appeal to axiom (43).\( ^\star \).

### 9.10 The Theory of Relations

In this subsection, we describe some important theorems that govern properties, relations, and propositions.

#### 9.10.1 Principles Governing Complex Relation Terms

**Theorem:** Strengthened \( \beta \)-Conversion. The axiom \( \beta \)-Conversion (48.2) governs both \( \lambda \)-expressions of the specific form \([\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi]\) and exemplification formulas of the specific form \([\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi]x_1 \ldots x_n\), for \( n \geq 1 \). But given the Rule of Alphabetic Variants (115), we may now derive a version of \( \beta \)-Conversion for every \( \lambda \)-expression, no matter what distinct individual variables are bound by the \( \lambda \) and no matter what individual variables appear as primary terms in the exemplification formula:

**Strengthened \( \beta \)-Conversion:** \( (n \geq 1) \)

\([\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi]\) \rightarrow (\([\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi]\nu_1 \ldots \nu_n \equiv \varphi^{\nu_1 \ldots \nu_n})

provided \( \mu_1, \ldots, \mu_n \) are any distinct individual variables and \( \nu_1, \ldots, \nu_n \) are any individual variables substitutable, respectively, for \( \mu_1, \ldots, \mu_n \) in \( \varphi \)

The proof is involved and requires that one allow for the presence of free variables in \( \lambda \)-expressions. Note that if we let \( \nu_i \) be \( \mu_i \) for all \( i, 1 \leq i \leq n \), then we have the following:

**Special Case:** \( (n \geq 1) \)

\([\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi]\) \rightarrow (\([\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi]\mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \equiv \varphi)\)

provided \( \mu_1, \ldots, \mu_n \) are any distinct individual variables.

Clearly, this holds because (a) the definition of substitutable for guarantees the \( \mu_i (1 \leq i \leq n) \) is substitutable for itself in \( \varphi \), and (b) \( \varphi^{\mu_1 \ldots \mu_n} \) is just \( \varphi \).

**Remark:** Digression on Free Variables in \( \lambda \)-Expressions. The theorems governing \( n \)-place relations \( (n \geq 1) \) developed below are sometimes expressed using \( \lambda \)-expressions that may or may not have free variables. It may prove useful to discuss some examples of such terms. As our first example, consider the...
following, which is a perfectly good instance of Strengthened $\beta$-Conversion, in which two free variables, $F$ and $z$, occur in the $\lambda$-expression:

$$(\xi) \ [\lambda x \neg Fxz] \downarrow \rightarrow ([\lambda x \neg Fxz]y \equiv \neg Fyz)$$

This tells us, relative to some $F$ and $z$, that if $[\lambda x \neg Fxz]$ is significant, then an object $y$ exemplifies $[\lambda x \neg Fxz]$ if and only if $\neg Fyz$. By GEN, $(\xi)$ implies:

$$\forall y ([\lambda x \neg Fxz] \downarrow \rightarrow ([\lambda x \neg Fxz]y \equiv \neg Fyz))$$

and since $y$ doesn’t occur free in the antecedent of the conditional, we may, by theorem (96.2), move the quantifier $\forall y$ across the antecedent to conclude that:

$$(\zeta) \ [\lambda x \neg Fxz] \downarrow \rightarrow \forall y ([\lambda x \neg Fxz]y \equiv \neg Fyz)$$

This tells us, relative to some $F$ and $z$, that if $[\lambda x \neg Fxz]$ is significant, then every object $y$ is such that $y$ exemplifies $[\lambda x \neg Fxz]$ if and only if $\neg Fyz$. And since $(\zeta)$ was derived from no assumptions, it holds for all $F$ and for all $z$, by GEN:

$$\forall F \forall z ([\lambda x \neg Fxz] \downarrow \rightarrow \forall y ([\lambda x \neg Fxz]y \equiv \neg Fyz))$$

Here, we may not move the quantifiers $\forall F$ and $\forall z$ across the antecedent, since the variables $F$ and $z$ occur free there. But by theorem (100.14), we may distribute the quantifiers $\forall F$ and $\forall z$ over the conditional to conclude:

$$\forall F \forall z ([\lambda x \neg Fxz] \downarrow \rightarrow \forall F \forall z \forall y ([\lambda x \neg Fxz]y \equiv \neg Fyz))$$

Note that in this particular example, the antecedent is an axiom; it is a universal closure of an instance of (39.2). Hence, in this example, we can derive a completely general form of $\beta$-Conversion, namely:

$$\forall F \forall z \forall y ([\lambda x \neg Fxz]y \equiv \neg Fyz)$$

in which all the free variables in the matrix $[\lambda x \neg Fxz]y \equiv \neg Fyz$ are universally quantified.

Our second example is related to the first; the following is a perfectly good instance of Strengthened $\beta$-conversion (179) where, for simplicity, we may take $R$ to be a constant:

$$[\lambda x \neg Rxy] \downarrow \rightarrow ([\lambda x \neg Rxy]y \equiv \neg Ry)$$

This tells us, relative to some object $y$, that if $[\lambda x \neg Rxy]$ is significant, then $y$ exemplifies $[\lambda x \neg Rxy]$ if and only if $\neg Ry$. By GEN, this holds for all $y$, i.e.,

$$(\delta) \ \forall y ([\lambda x \neg Rxy] \downarrow \rightarrow ([\lambda x \neg Rxy]y \equiv \neg Ry))$$

For reasons noted previously, we may not move the quantifier across the antecedent to conclude:
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\[ \lambda x \neg Rxy \downarrow \forall y ([\lambda x \neg Rxy]y \equiv \neg Ry) \]

But we may distribute the quantifier \( \forall y \) in (8) over the conditional to infer:

\[ \forall y ([\lambda x \neg Rxy] \downarrow) \rightarrow \forall y ([\lambda x \neg Rxy]y \equiv \neg Ry) \]

Again, in this case, the antecedent is an axiom. Consequently, we may derive a general version of \( \beta \)-Conversion for this particular \( \lambda \)-expression, namely:

\[ \forall y ([\lambda x \neg Rxy]y \equiv \neg Ry) \]

One important moral to draw in these two cases is that it is important to keep track of any variables that occur free in \( \lambda \)-expressions. If the variable \( \alpha \) occurs free in \( [\lambda x \varphi] \) and \([\lambda x \varphi] \downarrow \) is assumed rather than provable as a theorem, we may not infer \( \forall \alpha ([\lambda x \varphi] y \equiv \varphi^v_1 \ldots \varphi^v_n) \). If \([\lambda x \varphi] \downarrow \) is provable as a theorem, then by GEN, it follows that \( \forall \alpha ([\lambda x \varphi] \downarrow) \) and in this case, we can then infer \( \forall \alpha ([\lambda x \varphi] y \equiv \varphi^v_1 \ldots \varphi^v_n) \).

(181) Theorems: Corollaries to Strengthened \( \beta \)-Conversion. The foregoing Remark should help one to understand the significance of the following corollaries of strengthened \( \beta \)-Conversion. These hold for any variables meeting the stated conditions:

(1) \( \forall v_1 \ldots \forall v_n ([\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi] \downarrow) \rightarrow \forall v_1 \ldots \forall v_n ([\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi]v_1 \ldots v_n \equiv \varphi^v_1 \ldots \varphi^v_n) \), provided \( v_1, \ldots, v_n \) are substitutable, respectively, for \( \mu_1, \ldots, \mu_n \) in \( \varphi \)

(2) \([\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi] \downarrow \rightarrow \forall v_1 \ldots \forall v_n ([\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi]v_1 \ldots v_n \equiv \varphi^v_1 \ldots \varphi^v_n) \), provided none of \( v_1, \ldots, v_n \) occur free in \( [\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi] \) and \( v_1, \ldots, v_n \) are substitutable, respectively, for \( \mu_1, \ldots, \mu_n \) in \( \varphi \)

(3) \( \forall v_1 \ldots \forall v_n ([\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi]v_1 \ldots v_n \equiv \varphi^v_1 \ldots \varphi^v_n) \), provided none of the \( \mu_i \) (1 \( \leq \) \( i \) \( \leq \) \( n \)) occur free in \( \varphi \) within an encoding formula subterm, and \( v_1, \ldots, v_n \) are substitutable, respectively, for \( \mu_1, \ldots, \mu_n \) in \( \varphi \)

(182) Derived Rules: Simple Conditions for Classical \( \beta \)-Conversion. In light of the previous theorems, we formulate simple, derived rules of inference for \( \beta \)-Conversion that apply to closed \( \lambda \)-expressions only. Let \( \kappa_1, \ldots, \kappa_n \) be any individual terms. Then we have:

(1) Rule \( \overset{\beta}{\rightarrow} C \)

(a) \( [\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi] \kappa_1 \ldots \kappa_n \vdash \varphi^\kappa_1 \ldots ^\kappa_n \)

(b) \( \neg \varphi^\kappa_1 \ldots ^\kappa_n \vdash \neg [\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi] \kappa_1 \ldots \kappa_n \)

provided \([\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi] \) has no free variables and \( \kappa_1, \ldots, \kappa_n \) are any individual terms substitutable, respectively, for \( \mu_1, \ldots, \mu_n \) in \( \varphi \)
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Clearly, if \( \rho \) and \( \Sigma \) are immediate \( \eta \)-variants of each other with respect to \( \Pi \) and \( \Phi \), then \( \rho \) is an immediate \( \eta \)-variant of \( \rho' \) with respect to \( \Pi' \). Note that definition (4) also applies in the case where \( \rho \) is \( \Phi \) and \( \rho' \) is \( \Phi ' \), or vice versa. Thus, \( \Phi \) and \( \Phi ' \) are immediate \( \eta \)-variants of each other with respect to \( \Phi \) (which is a 0-place relation term, according to our BNF). And \( \lambda x P \Phi [ \lambda \Phi ] \) and \( \lambda x P \Phi \) are immediate \( \eta \)-variants of each other with respect to \( \Phi \).

Finally we say, for \( n \)-place relation terms \( \rho \) and \( \rho' \):
(5) \( \rho' \) is an \( \eta \)-variant of \( \rho \) whenever there is a finite sequence of \( n \)-place relation terms \( \rho_1, \ldots, \rho_m (m \geq 1) \) with \( \rho = \rho_1 \) and \( \rho' = \rho_m \) such that, for every \( i \) such that \( 1 \leq i \leq m - 1 \), there is some \( \Pi^n \) \((n \geq 0)\) such that \( \rho_{i+1} \) is an immediate \( \eta \)-variant of \( \rho_i \) with respect to \( \Pi^n \) (i.e., such that every member of the sequence is an immediate \( \eta \)-variant of the preceding member of the sequence with respect to some \( \Pi^n \)).

(6) \( \rho \) is \( \eta \)-irreducible just in case no relation subterm of \( \rho \) is subject to \( \eta \)-contraction (i.e., none of the relation subterms of \( \rho \) have an \( \eta \)-contraction).

Thus, the syntactic relation \( \rho \) is an \( \eta \)-variant of \( \rho' \) is the transitive closure of the relation \( \rho \) is an immediate \( \eta \)-variant of \( \rho' \).\(^{162}\) We now illustrate these definitions with examples:

\( \eta \)-Variants of Elementary \( \lambda \)-Expressions (Expansion/Contraction Pairs):

- \([\lambda x y z F^3 x y z] / F^3\)
- \([\lambda x [\lambda y \neg F y] x] / [\lambda y \neg F y]\)
- \([\lambda x y [\lambda u v \Box F (F u \equiv F v)] x y] / [\lambda u v \Box F (F u \equiv F v)]\)
- \([\lambda p] / p\)
- \([\lambda \neg P a] / \neg P a\)

Immediate \( \eta \)-Variants

- All of the above
- \([\lambda y [\lambda z P z] y \rightarrow Say] / [\lambda y P y \rightarrow Say]\)
- \([\lambda y P y \rightarrow [\lambda u v S u v] a y] / [\lambda y P y \rightarrow Say]\)
- \([\lambda y [\lambda z P z] y \rightarrow [\lambda u v S u v] a y] / [\lambda y [\lambda z P z] y \rightarrow Say]\)
- \([\lambda y [\lambda z P z] y \rightarrow [\lambda u v S u v] a y] / [\lambda y P y \rightarrow [\lambda u v S u v] a y]\)
- \([\lambda y [\lambda p]] / [\lambda y p]\)
- \([\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n [\lambda P a]] / [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n P a]\)
- \([\lambda z P z] y \rightarrow Say / P y \rightarrow Say\)
- \([\lambda [\lambda z P z] y] / [\lambda P y]\)

\( \eta \)-Variant Pairs

- All of the above

\(^{162}\)Intuitively, the transitive closure of \( R \) is that relation \( R' \) that relates any two elements in a chain of \( R \)-related elements. That is, for any elements \( x \) and \( y \) of a domain of \( R \)-related elements, \( x R' y \) holds whenever there exist \( z_0, z_1, \ldots, z_n \) such that (i) \( z_0 = x \), (ii) \( z_n = y \), and (iii) for all \( 0 \leq i < n, z_i R z_{i+1} \).
• \([\lambda y \ [\lambda z Pz] y \rightarrow [\lambda uv Suv] ay] / [\lambda y P y \rightarrow Say]\)
• \([\lambda z Pz] y \rightarrow [\lambda uv Suv] ay / Py \rightarrow Say\)
• \([\lambda y [\lambda z Pz] y \rightarrow Say] / [\lambda y P y \rightarrow [\lambda uv Suv] ay]\)

With a thorough grip on the notion of \(\eta\)-variants, we may prove the following theorems. Note: the above examples are simple examples since none of the \(\lambda\)-expressions have non-denoting subterms.

(184) **Lemma**: Useful Facts About \(\eta\)-Conversion. We’ve already established an unconditional and general form of \(\eta\)-Conversion for 0-place relation terms; theorem (112.1) asserts \([\lambda \varphi] = \varphi\). But for \(n\)-place relation terms where \(n \geq 1\), the more general forms of \(\eta\)-Conversion are conditional on the significance of the relation term being \(\eta\)-expanded:

\[(1) \quad \Pi^n \downarrow \rightarrow [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \Pi^n x_1 \ldots x_n] = \Pi^n, \text{ where } x_1, \ldots, x_n \text{ are distinct individual variables and } \Pi^n \text{ is any } n\text{-place relation term } (n \geq 0) \text{ in which none of } x_1, \ldots, x_n \text{ occur free}\]

A somewhat more general form of (1) holds for elementary \(\lambda\)-expressions constructed with any individual variables \(\nu_1, \ldots, \nu_n\), not just those constructed with \(x_1, \ldots, x_n\):

\[(2) \quad \Pi^n \downarrow \rightarrow [\lambda \nu_1 \ldots \nu_n \Pi^n \nu_1 \ldots \nu_n] = \Pi^n, \text{ where } \nu_1, \ldots, \nu_n \text{ are any distinct individual variables and } \Pi^n \text{ is any } n\text{-place relation term } (n \geq 0) \text{ in which none of } \nu_1, \ldots, \nu_n \text{ occur free}\]

So while \([\lambda x \exists.G(xG & \neg Gx)] \downarrow \rightarrow ([\lambda z [\lambda x \exists.G(xG & \neg Gx)] z] = [\lambda x \exists.G(xG & \neg Gx)]\) is an instance of (2), we can’t detach the consequent because it is provable that \(\neg [\lambda x \exists.G(xG & \neg Gx)] \downarrow (190.1)\).

(185) **Metarule**: Conditions Under Which \(\eta\)-Conversion holds for Significant \(\eta\)-Variants. Where \(\rho\) is any complex relation term, the most general form of \(\eta\)-Conversion is the following:

**Rule of \(\eta\)-Conversion \((\eta C)\)**

If (a) \(\vdash \rho \downarrow\), (b) \(\rho'\) is an \(\eta\)-variant of \(\rho\) witnessed by the sequence \(\rho_1, \ldots, \rho_m\), for which \(\rho = \rho_1\) and \(\rho' = \rho_m\), and (c) if \(\rho_{i+1}\) is an immediate \(\eta\)-variant of \(\rho_i\) with respect to the \(n\)-place relation term \(\Pi^n\) \((n \geq 0)\), then \(\vdash \Pi^n \downarrow\) (for each \(i\) such that \(1 \leq i \leq m - 1\)), then \(\vdash \rho = \rho'\).

This general theorem is handy since it allows us to give the following two line proof of the equation between \([\lambda y [\lambda z Pz] y \rightarrow [\lambda uv Suv] ay]\) and its \(\eta\)-irreducible form \([\lambda y P y \rightarrow Say]\):

(a) \([\lambda y [\lambda z Pz] y \rightarrow [\lambda uv Suv] ay] \downarrow \)  \(\quad (39.2)\)
(b) \([\lambda y [\lambda z Pz] y \rightarrow [\lambda uv Suv] ay] = [\lambda y P y \rightarrow Say] \quad \eta C, (a)\)
So, under the conditions stated by the metarule, we may collapse some \(\eta\)-variants to their \(\eta\)-irreducible forms to simplify formulas.

**Theorem:** Relation Terms That Differ by Co-Denoting Descriptions. It should be clear why we state these next theorems in the formal mode. (.1) If a significant \(\lambda\)-expression \(\Pi\) contains the description \(ix\varphi\), and \(ix\varphi = ix\psi\), then the result of substituting \(ix\psi\) for one or more occurrences of \(ix\varphi\) in \(\Pi\) yields a \(\lambda\)-expression \(\Pi'\) such that \(\Pi = \Pi'\); (.2) if \(ix\varphi = ix\psi\), then the result of substituting \(ix\psi\) for one or more occurrences of \(ix\varphi\) in a 0-place relation term \(\Pi\) containing \(ix\varphi\) yields a 0-place relation term \(\Pi'\) such that \(\Pi = \Pi'\):

\[(.1) [\lambda z_1...z_n \chi_y^{ix\varphi}] & \varphi = \chi_y^{ix\psi} \rightarrow [\lambda z_1...z_n \chi_y^{ix\varphi}] = [\lambda z_1...z_n \chi'] \]

provided \(ix\varphi\) and \(ix\psi\) are both substitutable for \(y\) in \([\lambda z_1...z_n \chi]\) and \(\chi'\) is the result of substituting \(ix\psi\) for one or more occurrences of \(ix\varphi\) in \(\chi_y^{ix\varphi}\) \((n \geq 1)\)

\[(.2) ix\varphi = ix\psi \rightarrow \Pi_y^{ix\varphi} = \Pi', \text{ provided } \Pi\text{ is any 0-place relation term, } ix\varphi\text{ and } ix\psi\text{ are both substitutable for } y \text{ in } \Pi, \text{ and } \Pi'\text{ is the result of substituting } ix\psi\text{ for one or more occurrences of } ix\varphi\text{ in } \Pi_y^{ix\varphi}.\]

Intuitively, these theorems tell us that when we have two descriptions that denote the same object, then any two relation terms that differ only by substituting one description for the other (not necessarily uniformly) can be put into an equation.

Some examples might prove useful. From the fact that the property \textit{lands on the moon of Earth} exists \(([\lambda z LzixMxe]\) and the fact that the moon of Earth is identical to the moon of the planet inhabited by \textit{homo sapiens} \((ixMxe = iy(Myiz(Pz & Iz)h)))\), (.1) allows us to infer that the property \textit{lands on the moon of Earth} is identical to the property \textit{lands on the moon of the planet inhabited by homo sapiens}, i.e., \([\lambda z LzixMxe] = [\lambda z Lziz(Myiz(Pz & Iz)h)].\) From \(ixMxe = iy(Myiz(Pz & Iz)h)), it follows by (.2) that the proposition \textit{that Armstrong lands on the moon of Earth} \(([\lambda LaixMxe]\) is equal to the proposition \textit{that Armstrong lands on the moon of the planet inhabited by homo sapiens} \(([\lambda Laiy(Myiz(Pz & Iz)h)]).\)

It is important to remember here that the formal representations just offered are not intended to be sensitive to the cognitive significance or Fregean sense of the English noun phrases ‘moon of Earth’ and ‘moon of the planet inhabited by \textit{homo sapiens’}. Mutatis mutandis, they are not intended to be sensitive to the cognitive significance or Fregean sense of the descriptions ‘the moon of the Earth’ and ‘the moon of the planet inhabited by \textit{homo sapiens’}, nor to be sensitive to the cognitive significance or Fregean sense of the verb phrases ‘landed on the moon of Earth’ and ‘landed on the moon of the planet inhabited by \textit{homo sapiens}’. So our formal representations are not intended to represent how these expressions function in intensional contexts like “S believes that Armstrong landed on the moon of Earth” and “S believes that Armstrong landed on the
moon of the planet inhabited by *homo sapiens*. Our formal representations of these inferences capture the *de re* reading on which *only the denotation* of a (significant, natural language) description is relevant to both (a) the identity of the property denoted by a noun or verb phrase in which that description occurs, and (b) the identity of the proposition denoted by a sentence in which that description occurs. Typed object theory is needed to analyze the Fregean sense of a noun or verb phrase and explain why distinct such phrases can signify the same entity but have different senses (and hence distinct cognitive values). Consequently, we won’t pursue this issue any further here; see Zalta 1988 (Part IV).

9.10.2 Facts About Relations

(187) Theorem: Equivalence and Identity of Properties. The following theorem establishes that our theory of properties constitutes an *extensional* theory of hyperintensional entities, since it asserts that properties (which are more fine-grained than intensions classically understood, i.e., more fine-grained than functions from possible worlds to sets of individuals) are identical whenever they are materially equivalent in the encoding sense:

\[ F^1 = G^1 \equiv \forall x (xF^1 \equiv xG^1) \]

The proof of this theorem is relatively easy, given theorems (177.2) and (177.5). The left-to-right direction is trivial, but for the right-to-left direction, one can straightforwardly show that \( \forall x (xF^1 \equiv xG^1) \) implies \( \square \forall x (xF^1 \equiv xG^1) \), which by theorem (117.1), implies \( F^1 = G^1 \).

The important point here, then, is that when we have to prove that properties \( F \) and \( G \) are identical, we need not prove that they are necessarily encoded by the same objects, but only that they are encoded by the same objects.

(188) Remark: A Digression on the Identity of Relations. Our theory of identity for \( n \)-place relations now consists of the following principles (some of which are simplifications of others):

- \( F = G \equiv_F F \downarrow \& G \downarrow \& \forall x (xF \equiv xG) \)

- \( F = G \equiv_f F \downarrow \& G \downarrow \& \forall y_1 \ldots \forall y_{n-1} ([\lambda x Fxy_1 \ldots y_{n-1}] = [\lambda x Gxy_1 \ldots y_{n-1}]) \)

Note that we cannot generalize the proof of the right-to-left direction, i.e., we cannot generalize the proof of \( \forall x (xF^1 \equiv xG^1) \rightarrow F^1 = G^1 \) to establish \( \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n (x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \equiv x_1 \ldots x_n G^n) \rightarrow F^n = G^n \) for \( n \geq 2 \). Though one can show:

\[ \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n (x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \equiv x_1 \ldots x_n G^n) \rightarrow \square \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n (x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \equiv x_1 \ldots x_n G^n) \]

this isn’t sufficient for \( n \)-place relation identity when \( n \geq 2 \). For (23.3) requires us to show that each way of projecting \( F^n \) and \( G^n \) onto \( n-1 \) objects yields identical properties.
[\lambda x F y_1 x y_2 \ldots y_{n-1}] = [\lambda x G y_1 x y_2 \ldots y_{n-1}] \& \ldots
[\lambda x F y_1 \ldots y_{n-1} x] = [\lambda x G y_1 \ldots y_{n-1} x]) \quad (23.3)

• \( p = q \equiv \downarrow p \downarrow \& [\lambda x p] = [\lambda x q] \quad (23.4)

• \([\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi] \downarrow \rightarrow [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi] = [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi]',
where \([\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi]'\) is any alphabetic variant of \([\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi]\) \quad (48.1)

• \([\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n F^n x_1 \ldots x_n] = F^n \quad (48.3)

• \( F = G \equiv \Box \forall x (xF \equiv xG) \quad (117.1)

• \( F^n = G^n \equiv (n \geq 2)
\forall y_1 \ldots \forall y_{n-1}([\lambda x F^n y_1 x y_2 \ldots y_{n-1}] = [\lambda x G^n y_1 x y_2 \ldots y_{n-1}] \& \ldots
[\lambda x F^n y_1 y_2 y_3 \ldots y_{n-1}] = [\lambda x G^n y_1 y_2 y_3 \ldots y_{n-1}] \& \ldots
[\lambda x F^n y_1 y_2 y_3 \ldots y_{n-1} x] = [\lambda x G^n y_1 y_2 y_3 \ldots y_{n-1} x]) \quad (117.2)

• \( p = q \equiv [\lambda y p] = [\lambda y q] \quad (117.3)

• \( p = q \equiv [\lambda p] = [\lambda q] \quad (Exercise)

• \( [\lambda \varphi] = \varphi \quad (112.1)

• \( [\lambda \varphi] = [\lambda \varphi]',\) where \( [\lambda \varphi] \) and \( [\lambda \varphi]' \) are alphabetic variants \quad (112.3)

• \( \varphi = \varphi',\) where \( \varphi \) and \( \varphi' \) are alphabetic variants \quad (112.4)

• \( \Pi^n \downarrow \rightarrow [\lambda v_1 \ldots v_n \Pi^n v_1 \ldots v_n] = \Pi^n,\) where \( v_1, \ldots, v_n \) are any
distinct individual variables and \( \Pi^n \) is any \( n \)-place relation
term \( (n \geq 0) \) in which none of \( v_1, \ldots, v_n \) occur free \quad (184.2)

• Rule \( \eta C \quad (185)

• \( F = G \equiv \forall x (xF \equiv xG) \quad (187)

These principles all provide a different perspective on the question: under what conditions are relations identical? Each principle yields a condition sufficient (and sometimes necessary) for establishing an identity.

Note that these principles do not constitute a procedure for determining whether an arbitrary pair of (nominalized) predicates of natural language denote the same property or relation, nor a procedure for determining whether the members of such pairs denote at all. We’ve seen, for example, that the theory does not predict that the property being a woodchuck is the same property as being a groundhog. This is a theoretical identity that can’t be established a priori. Similarly, if we represent being red and round as \([\lambda x R_1 x \& R_2 x]\), represent being round and red as \([\lambda x R_2 x \& R_1 x]\), then although our theory tells us that both formal expressions are significant, it doesn’t force these expressions
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to denote the same property; it leaves one free to assert or deny this particular identity. And should one believe there is an over-riding reason to do so, one could assert $\forall F \forall G ([\lambda x Fx & Gx] = [\lambda x Gx & Fx])$ and other, similar principles.

**Theorems:** Comprehension Principles for Relations and Properties. The following is a theorem schema derivable directly from the axiom of $\beta$-Conversion (48.2) and constitutes a comprehension principle for relations:

\[ \exists F^n \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n (F^n x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv \varphi), \]\n
where $n \geq 1$, $F^n$ doesn’t occur free in $\varphi$, and $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ don’t occur free in $\varphi$ in any encoding formula subterms.

When $n = 1$, (.1) becomes a comprehension principle for properties:

\[ \exists F \forall x (Fx \equiv \varphi), \quad F \text{ doesn’t occur free in } \varphi, \text{ and } x \text{ doesn’t occur free in } \varphi \text{ within an encoding formula subterm.} \]

We’ll derive a comprehension principle for propositions a bit later, in (192).

**Theorems:** The Classical Paradoxical Predicates Don’t Denote Relations. It is important to see that the $\lambda$-expression that leads to the Clark/Boolos paradox is provably empty:

\[ \neg [\lambda x \exists G(xG & \neg Gx)] \]

We also know that (.2) there is no property that is exemplified by all and only the objects $x$ that encode a property that $x$ fails to exemplify:

\[ \neg \exists F \forall x (Fx \equiv \exists G(xG & \neg Gx)) \]

Moreover, our system implies that the $\lambda$-expression which leads to the McMichael-Boolos paradox, namely, $[\lambda z z = y]$, doesn’t denote a property for every object $y$:

\[ \neg \forall y ([\lambda z z = y]) \]

Note that this does not assert that $\forall y \neg ([\lambda z z = y])$. We’ll prove later that if $y$ is ordinary, being identical to $y$ exists, i.e., $O!y \to [\lambda z z = y]$. See theorem (237.2). Consequently, our system implies (.4) it is not the case that for every object $y$, there exists a property exemplified by all and only the individuals identical to $y$:

\[ \neg \forall y \exists F \forall x (Fx \equiv x = y) \]

Clearly, it also follows that it is not the case that for every $x$ and $y$, there is a relation that $x$ and $y$ exemplify whenever they are identical:

\[ \neg \forall x \forall y \exists F (Fxy \equiv x = y) \]
We’ll see later, however, in (237.3), that the relation, being an \( x \) and \( y \) such that \( x \) and \( y \) are identical ordinary objects, exists. Thus, there are identity relations that hold among the objects of certain restricted subdomains.

\((191)\) ★Theorem: The Kirchner Predicate Is Empty. (.1) If everything is \( G \), then being an \( x \) such that the individual \( y \), which is both identical to \( x \) and such that \( x \) fails to exemplify a property it encodes, exemplifies \( G \) doesn’t exist:

\[(.1) \forall x G x \rightarrow \neg[\lambda x G y (y = x & \exists H (x H & \neg H x))]|]

Since there are properties that are universal, we can conclude that (.2) some Kirchner predicates fail to be significant:

\[(.2) \exists G (\neg[\lambda x G y (y = x & \exists H (x H & \neg H x))]|)]

Exercise: Develop answers, and justifications for them, to the questions: Are there modally strict proofs of (.1) and (.2)?

\((192)\) Theorems: Comprehension Principle for Propositions. From the fact that every formula is term that is provably significant (105.2), we obtain the following comprehension principle for propositions:

\[\exists p \Box (p \equiv \varphi),\]

where \( \varphi \) is any formula with no free occurrences of \( p \).

This comprehension principle and theorem (117.2) jointly offer a precise theory of propositions. On this theory, the claim that propositions are necessarily equivalent, i.e., \( \Box (p \equiv q) \), does not entail that \( p \) and \( q \) are identical. One may consistently assert that there are propositions \( p \) and \( q \) such that \( \Box (p \equiv q) \) & \( p \neq q \).

\((193)\) Theorems: Conditions Implying Distinctness of Relations. For any \( n \geq 0 \), it is straightforward to show that (.1) relations \( F^n \) and \( G^n \) that might fail to be materially equivalent are distinct, and (.2) if it is possible that \( F^n \)'s being such that \( \varphi \) is not equivalent to \( G^n \)'s being such that \( \varphi \), then \( F^n \) and \( G^n \) are distinct:

\[\phi \neg \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n (F^n x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv G^n x_1 \ldots x_n) \rightarrow F^n \neq G^n\]

\[(n \geq 0)\]

\[\phi \neg (\varphi \equiv \varphi') \rightarrow F^n \neq G^n,\]

whenever \( G^n \) is substitutable for \( F^n \) in \( \varphi \) and \( \varphi' \) is the result of substituting \( G^n \) for one or more occurrences of \( F^n \) in \( \varphi \).

\[(n \geq 0)\]

As easy corollaries, we have (.3) if \( F^n \) and \( G^n \) aren’t materially equivalent, they are distinct; and (.4) if \( F^n \)'s being such that \( \varphi \) is not equivalent to \( G^n \)'s being such that \( \varphi \), then \( F^n \) and \( G^n \) are distinct:

\[\neg \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n (F^n x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv G^n x_1 \ldots x_n) \rightarrow F^n \neq G^n\]

\[\neg (\varphi \equiv \varphi') \rightarrow F^n \neq G^n,\]

whenever \( G^n \) is substitutable for \( F^n \) in \( \varphi \) and \( \varphi' \) is the result of substituting \( G^n \) for one or more occurrences of \( F^n \) in \( \varphi \).
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(194) **Definition:** Definition of Relation Negation. We define \( \overline{F}^n \) (‘not-\( F^n \)’) as being \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) such that it is not the case that \( F^n x_1 \ldots x_n \) \( (n \geq 0) \):

\[
\overline{F}^n = \text{df} \ [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \neg F^n x_1 \ldots x_n] \quad (n \geq 0)
\]

The inferential role of this definition, as described in (74), ensures that the following theorem holds.

(195) **Theorems:** Fact about the Relation Negation Operator. It is an interesting fact about our theory of definitions that every relation term has a significant negation:

\[
\Pi = [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \neg \Pi^n x_1 \ldots x_n], \text{ for any } n\text{-place relation term } \Pi \ (n \geq 0) \text{ in which } x_1, \ldots, x_n \text{ don’t occur free.}
\]

This holds even for empty relation terms \( \Pi \). For if \( \neg (\Pi \downarrow) \), it follows by the contrapositive of axiom (39.5.a) that \( \neg \Pi x_1 \ldots x_n \) \( (n \geq 0) \). Since this holds for any \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \), the \( \lambda \)-expression \( [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \neg \Pi^n x_1 \ldots x_n] \), which is deemed significant by axiom (39.2), denotes a universal \( n \)-place relation, i.e., one exemplified by every sequence of \( n \) objects. So, even in the case where \( \Pi \) fails to be significant, \( \Pi \) signifies what \( [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \neg \Pi^n x_1 \ldots x_n] \) signifies.

(196) **Remark:** A Reminder About Definitions by Identity. If the previous theorem comes as a surprise, then it would serve well to review the conventions for, and inferential role of, definitions-by-\( \equiv \), as described in (17), (74), and (121). First, convention (17.2) permits us to use definition (194) instead of the following, less easy-to-read and less user-friendly definition, which is otherwise strictly required:

\[
\Pi^n = \text{df} \ [\lambda v_1 \ldots v_n \neg \Pi^n v_1 \ldots v_n], \quad (n \geq 0)
\]

where \( v_1, \ldots, v_n \) are any distinct variables that don’t occur free in \( \Pi^n \).

Thus, (194) stipulates that the overline is a relation term-forming operator that applies to every relation term whatsoever.

Second, note that (194) has a single free variable, \( F^n \), in both the definiens and definiendum, and so has the form \( \tau(a) = \text{df} \ \sigma(a) \). The Rule of Definition by Identity (74) then guarantees, for any \( n \)-place relation term \( \Pi \ (n \geq 0) \) in which \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) don’t occur free, that the following is a necessary axiom:

\[
(\delta) \ (([\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \neg \Pi x_1 \ldots x_n] \downarrow \rightarrow \Pi = [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \neg \Pi x_1 \ldots x_n]) \& \\
(\neg [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \neg \Pi x_1 \ldots x_n] \downarrow \rightarrow \neg \Pi) 
\]

And the derived Rule of Identity by Definition (121.1) implies, when the premise set \( \Gamma \) is empty, that the following holds:

\[
(\zeta) \ If \vdash [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \neg \Pi x_1 \ldots x_n] \downarrow, \ then \vdash \Pi = [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \neg \Pi x_1 \ldots x_n]
\]
Third, as noted in the proof of (195), \([\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \neg \Pi x_1 \ldots x_n] \downarrow\) is an instance of axiom (39.2), provided \(\Pi\) has no free occurrences of \(x_1, \ldots, x_n\). So an identity between \(\Pi\) and \([\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \neg \Pi x_1 \ldots x_n]\) provably holds, thereby implying by (108.1) that \(\Pi\) is provably significant, even if \(\Pi\) isn’t.

Although \(\Pi\) can be put into an equation with a significant \(\lambda\)-expression even when \(\Pi\) itself is empty, it seems intuitive to regard \(\Pi\) as a kind of impractical, defined term when \(\Pi\) is empty. There will be other examples of such terms, i.e., defined terms that have a significance even though they are the result of applying an operation to a term that is empty. Though there are ways to further refine the Rule of Definition by Identity (and its consequences) so as to rule out impractical terms (i.e., always derive that defined terms are empty whenever their arguments are empty), such refinements have a cost in system complexity without much gain to show for it. So we’ll forego such further refinements in this text. The reader may find a full discussion of the issues involved in Remark (278).

(197) Theorems: Relations and their Negations. The following consequences of the definition of relation negation are relatively straightforward:

1. \(\overline{F^n} x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv \neg F^n x_1 \ldots x_n\) \((n \geq 0)\)
2. \(\neg \overline{F^n} x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv F^n x_1 \ldots x_n\) \((n \geq 0)\)
3. \(\overline{p} \equiv \neg p\)
4. \(\neg \overline{p} \equiv p\)
5. \(F^n \neq \overline{F^n}\) \((n \geq 0)\)
6. \(p \neq \overline{p}\)

The following are also consequences:

7. \(\overline{\overline{p}} = p\)
8. \(p = q \rightarrow \neg p = \neg q\)
9. \(p = q \rightarrow \overline{p} = \overline{q}\)

(198) Definitions: Noncontingent and Contingent Relations. Remembering the reasons why we sometimes have to include existence clauses in the definiens of definitions-by-\(\equiv\) (36), we may say: (1) \(F^n\) \((n \geq 0)\) is necessary just in case necessarily, all objects \(x_1, \ldots, x_n\) are such that \(x_1, \ldots, x_n\) exemplify \(F^n\); (2) \(F^n\) is impossible just in case \(F^n\) exists and necessarily, all objects \(x_1, \ldots, x_n\) are such that \(x_1, \ldots, x_n\) fail to exemplify \(F^n\); (3) \(F^n\) is noncontingent whenever it is necessary or impossible; and (4) \(F^n\) is contingent whenever it is neither necessary nor impossible.
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(1) **Necessary**($F^n$) $\equiv_{df} \Box \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n F^n x_1 \ldots x_n$  
($n \geq 0$)

(2) **Impossible**($F^n$) $\equiv_{df} F^n \downarrow \& \Box \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n \neg F^n x_1 \ldots x_n$  
($n \geq 0$)

(3) **NonContingent**($F^n$) $\equiv_{df}$ Necessary($F^n$) $\lor$ Impossible($F^n$)  
($n \geq 0$)

(4) **Contingent**($F^n$) $\equiv_{df}$ F^n $\downarrow \& \neg$ (Necessary($F^n$) $\lor$ Impossible($F^n$))  
($n \geq 0$)

The explicit existence clauses in (.2) and (.4) allow us to prove $\neg$Impossible($\Pi^n$) and $\neg$Contingent($\Pi^n$) when $\Pi^n$ is provably empty.

**Remark:** Observations About Definitions by Equivalence. The following observations serve as reminders for those who may have skipped the discussion of definitions-by-$\equiv$ in Remarks (17.2) and (36). The points made below by way of the definitions (198.1) and (198.2) are completely general.

By Convention (17.2), definition (198.1) and (198.2) are shorthand, respectively, for the following, in which $\Pi^n$ is any $n$-place relation term ($n \geq 0$):

(1) **Necessary**($\Pi^n$) $\equiv_{df} \Box \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n \Pi^n x_1 \ldots x_n$  
($n \geq 0$)

(2) **Impossible**($\Pi^n$) $\equiv_{df} \Pi^n \downarrow \& \Box \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n \neg \Pi^n x_1 \ldots x_n$  
($n \geq 0$)

Given the inferential role of definitions-by-$\equiv$ described in (73) and (91), (.1) and (.2) (respectively), and (198.1) and (198.2) (respectively), introduce, as new (modally strict) theorems, the instances (and their closures) of the following:

(1') **Necessary**($\Pi^n$) $\equiv_{df} \Box \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n \Pi^n x_1 \ldots x_n$  
($n \geq 0$)

(2') **Impossible**($\Pi^n$) $\equiv (\Pi^n \downarrow \& \Box \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n \neg \Pi^n x_1 \ldots x_n)$  
($n \geq 0$)

Consider the instances of these theorem schemata when the metavariable $\Pi$ takes the variable $F^n$ as its value:

(8) **Necessary**($F^n$) $\equiv \Box \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n F^n x_1 \ldots x_n$  
($n \geq 0$)

(ξ) **Impossible**($F^n$) $\equiv (F^n \downarrow \& \Box \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n \neg F^n x_1 \ldots x_n)$  
($n \geq 0$)

Clearly, these result by substituting $\equiv$ for $\equiv_{df}$ in (198.1) and (198.2). Furthermore, (ξ) and the axiom $F^n \downarrow$ imply the following, by the special case of Rule $\equiv S$ of Biconditional Simplification (92):

**Impossible**($F^n$) $\equiv \Box \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n \neg F^n x_1 \ldots x_n$  
($n \geq 0$)

This kind of reduction is completely general and applies to any formula definition that (a) has a definiens that includes existence clauses, and (b) is instantiated to denoting terms. That is, when we consider the instances of the definition in which known denoting terms (i.e., terms known to be significant by proof or by hypothesis) are substituted for the metavariables, we may reduce the resulting...
modally strict biconditionals implied by the definition to modally strict biconditionals in which the existence clauses have been omitted from the right-side condition.

(200) Theorems: Facts About Noncontingent and Contingent Properties. The following facts about properties \( F \) are now derivable:

1. \( \text{NonContingent}(F) \equiv \text{NonContingent}(\neg F) \)
2. \( \text{Contingent}(F) \equiv \Diamond \exists x Fx \land \exists x \neg Fx \)
3. \( \text{Contingent}(F) \equiv \text{Contingent}(\neg F) \)

(201) Theorems: Some Noncontingent Properties. Since \( \vdash [\lambda x E!x \rightarrow E!x] \downarrow \), let \( L =_{df} [\lambda x E!x \rightarrow E!x] \) (i.e., \textit{being concrete if concrete}). Then we have:

1. \( \text{Necessary}(L) \)
2. \( \text{Impossible}(L) \)
3. \( \text{NonContingent}(L) \)
4. \( \text{NonContingent}(\neg L) \)
5. \( \exists F \exists G (F \neq G \& \text{NonContingent}(F) \& \text{NonContingent}(G)) \),
   i.e., there are at least two noncontingent properties.

(202) Lemmas: A Symmetry. Note that our definitions allow us to more easily derive (.1) it is possible that there is something that exemplifies \( F \) but which might not have if and only if it is possible that there is something that doesn’t exemplify \( F \) but might have:

1. \( \Diamond \exists x (Fx \land \Diamond \neg Fx) \equiv \Diamond \exists x (\neg Fx \land \Diamond Fx) \)

But from this, it follows that (.2) it is possible that there is something that exemplifies \( F \) but which might not have if and only if it is possible that there is something that exemplifies not-\( F \) but might not have:

2. \( \Diamond \exists x (Fx \land \Diamond \neg Fx) \equiv \Diamond \exists x (\neg Fx \land \Diamond Fx) \)

If we think semantically for the moment and take possible worlds as primitive entities, then (.2) tells us:

There is a world \( w \) and an object \( o \), such that both (i) \( o \) exemplifies \( F \) at \( w \) and (ii) for some (other) world \( w' \), \( o \) fails to exemplify \( F \) at \( w' \)
   if and only if
There is a world \( w \) and an object \( o \), such that both (i) \( o \) exemplifies not-\( F \) at \( w \) and (ii) for some (other) world \( w' \), \( o \) fails to exemplify not-\( F \) at \( w' \).
Thus (.2) yields a modal symmetry between \( F \) and its negation \( \neg F \).

(203) **Theorems:** \( E! \) and \( \neg E! \) are Contingent Properties.

(1) \( \Diamond \exists x (E!x & \Diamond \neg E!x) \)

(2) \( \Diamond \exists x (\neg E!x & \Diamond E!x) \)

(3) \( \Diamond \exists x E!x \)

(4) \( \Diamond \exists x \neg E!x \)

(5) \( Contingent(E!) \)

(6) \( Contingent(\neg E!) \)

(7) \( \exists F \exists G (Contingent(F) & Contingent(G) & F \neq G) \),

i.e., there are at least two contingent properties.

If we suppose that \( E!x & \Diamond \neg E!x \) asserts that \( x \) is contingently concrete and that \( \neg E!x & \Diamond E!x \) asserts that \( x \) is contingently nonconcrete, then (.1) asserts the possible existence of contingently concrete objects and (.2) asserts the possible existence of contingently nonconcrete objects. Linsky and Zalta 1994 show that theorems such as (.2), on this understanding, are consistent with actualism, though see Williamson 2013, Menzel 2016 and 2020, for more recent discussion.

On an alternative interpretation of our formalism, in which (a) the quantifier \( \exists \) asserts only “there is” (and not “there exists”) and (b) the predicate ‘\( E! \)’ asserts existence rather than concreteness, then (.2) asserts that it is possible that there are contingently nonexistent objects. This is a way of expressing the view known as possibilism. See, for example, Plantinga (1974, 21).

(204) **Theorems:** Facts About Property Existence. Given the definition of \( L \) as \( [\lambda x E!x \rightarrow E!x] \), we have the following general and specific facts about the existence of properties:

(1) \( NonContingent(F) \rightarrow \neg \exists G (Contingent(G) & G = F) \)

(2) \( Contingent(F) \rightarrow \neg \exists G (NonContingent(G) & G = F) \)

(3) \( L \neq \top & L \neq E! & L \neq \top & E! & \top \neq E! & \top \neq \top & \neg E! & \neg E! \),

i.e., \( L, \top, E!, \) and \( \neg E! \) are pairwise distinct.

(205) **Theorems:** Facts About Noncontingent and Contingent Propositions. If we focus now just on propositions, the following facts can be established:

(1) \( NonContingent(p) \equiv NonContingent(\neg p) \)
Contingent \((p)\) \(\equiv \Box p \& \Box \neg p\)

Contingent \((p)\) \(\equiv \) Contingent \((\neg p)\)

**Theorems:** Some Noncontingent Propositions. Let \(p_0\) abbreviate \(\forall x(E!x \to E!x)\) or, if you prefer, use a definition-by-\(=\) to stipulate \(p_0 =_{df} \forall x(E!x \to E!x)\). Then we have:

1. Necessary \((p_0)\)
2. Impossible \((\neg p_0)\)
3. NonContingent \((p_0)\)
4. NonContingent \((\neg p_0)\)
5. \(\exists p \exists q (\text{NonContingent}(p) \& \text{NonContingent}(q) \& p \neq q)\),
   i.e., there are at least two noncontingent propositions.

**Theorem:** Fact About Concrete-But-Not-Actually-Concrete Objects. It is straightforward to establish, by non-modally strict reasoning, that concrete-but-not-actually-concrete objects don’t exist:

\[\neg \exists x(E!x \& \neg \exists!E!x)\]

Though it follows by the T \(\Box\) schema that this fact is possibly true, we can prove the possibility claim by modally strict reasoning, as shown in the next item.

**Theorem:** Distinguished Facts About Objects that Aren’t Actually Concrete. It is a modally strict theorem that (.1) a concrete-but-not-actually-concrete object doesn’t actually exist, i.e.,

\[\neg \exists!x(E!x \& \neg \exists!E!x)\]

Without much further reasoning, it follows that (.2) possibly, no concrete-but-not-actually-concrete object exists:

\[\Diamond \neg \exists!x(E!x \& \neg \exists!E!x)\]

As we shall see, (.2) leads to a proof of the existence of a contingent proposition. Note that the proofs of (.1) and (.2) are independent of axiom (45.4).

One other important theorem about objects that aren’t actually concrete is that (.3) some possibly concrete object isn’t actually concrete:

\[\exists!x(\Diamond E!x \& \neg \exists!E!x)\]
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(209) Theorems: Some Contingent Propositions. The formula $\exists x (E!x & \neg A E!x)$ asserts the existence of a concrete-but-not-actually-concrete object. Let us therefore use a definition-by-=- to stipulate: $q_0 = df \exists x (E!x & \neg A E!x)$. Then, by Rule $= df I$, the conjunction of axiom (45.4) and theorem (208.2) becomes $\diamond q_0 \& \diamond \neg q_0$. This makes it easy to see that the following claims regarding propositions are derivable:

(1) $Contingent(q_0)$
(2) $\exists p Contingent(p)$
(3) $Contingent(q_0)$
(4) $\exists p \exists q (p \neq q \& Contingent(p) \& Contingent(q))$, i.e., there are at least two contingent propositions.

(210) Theorems: Facts About Proposition Existence. The following general facts about proposition existence are easily derivable:

(1) $NonContingent(p) \rightarrow \neg \exists q (Contingent(q) \& q = p)$
(2) $Contingent(p) \rightarrow \neg \exists q (NonContingent(q) \& q = p)$

And given the definitions $p_0 = df \forall x (E!x \rightarrow E!x)$ and $q_0 = df \exists x (E!x \& \neg A E!x)$, we have the following specific facts about the existence of propositions:

(3) $p_0 \neq p_0$ and $p_0 \neq q_0$ and $p_0 \neq \neg q_0$ and $\neg p_0 \neq q_0$ and $\neg q_0 \neq \neg q_0$, i.e., $p_0, \neg p_0, q_0$, and $\neg q_0$ are pairwise distinct.
(4) There are at least four propositions.

Note that our proof that there are contingent propositions is constructive, since we showed that $q_0$ is possibly true and possibly false.

(211) Definitions: Contingently True and Contingently False Propositions. Let us say that: (1) a proposition $p$ is contingently true just in case $p$ is true and possibly false, and (2) $p$ is contingently false just in case $p$ is false but possibly true:

(1) $ContingentlyTrue(p) = df p \& \diamond \neg p$
(2) $ContingentlyFalse(p) = df \neg p \& \diamond p$

Clearly, if one were to assert axioms having the form $ContingentlyTrue(p)$ or $ContingentlyFalse(p)$, such axioms would have to be marked with a $\star$ as modally fragile; see the discussion in Remark (71). By the same reasoning, it should be clear that no theorem of the form $ContingentlyTrue(p)$ or $ContingentlyFalse(p)$ can be be modally strict, on pain of contradiction. For suppose it were provable...
by modally strict means that ContingentlyTrue(p), i.e., \( p \& \Box \neg p \). Then it would follow that \( \Box(p \& \Diamond \neg p) \), by RN. But the conjuncts of a necessary conjunction are themselves necessary, in which case it would follow that \( \Box p \) and \( \Box \Diamond \neg p \). By the T schema, the latter implies \( \Diamond \neg p \), which in turn implies \( \neg \Box p \), leaving us with a contradiction. And, by analogous reasoning, no theorem of the form ContingentlyFalse(p) can be modally strict. Thus, in (213.1)\# and (213.2)\# below, when we derive, respectively, a specific, contingently false proposition and a specific, contingently true proposition, the theorems are not modally strict.

(212) **Theorems:** Contingently True (False) vs. Contingent. Our definitions and theorems thus far imply the following. (.1) if \( p \) is contingently true, it is contingent; (.2) if \( p \) is contingently false, it is contingent; (.3) \( p \) is contingently true if and only if not-\( p \) is contingently false; and (.4) \( p \) is contingently false if and only if not-\( p \) is contingently true:

\[
\begin{align*}
(1) & \text{ ContingentlyTrue}(p) \to \text{ Contingent}(p) \\
(2) & \text{ ContingentlyFalse}(p) \to \text{ Contingent}(p) \\
(3) & \text{ ContingentlyTrue}(p) \equiv \text{ ContingentlyFalse}(\neg p) \\
(4) & \text{ ContingentlyFalse}(p) \equiv \text{ ContingentlyTrue}(\neg p)
\end{align*}
\]

Finally, two other theorems are worthy of mention. (.5) if \( p \) is contingently true and \( q \) is necessary, then \( p \) is not identical to \( q \); and (.6) if \( p \) is contingently false and \( q \) is impossible, then \( p \) is not identical to \( q \):

\[
\begin{align*}
(5) & \text{ (ContingentlyTrue}(p) \& \text{ Necessary}(q)) \to p \neq q \\
(6) & \text{ (ContingentlyFalse}(p) \& \text{ Impossible}(q)) \to p \neq q
\end{align*}
\]

Recall that Necessary\((q)\) was defined, by the 0-place cases of (198.1), as \( \Box q \), and that Impossible\((q)\), by (198.2), the axiom \( q \downarrow \) and Rule \( \equiv S \) (92), is equivalent to \( \Box \neg q \).

(213) **Theorems:** A Contingently False Proposition and a Contingently True One. If we continue to let the constant \( q_0 \) be defined as \( \exists x(E!x \& \neg \forall E!x) \), it follows that (.1) \( q_0 \) is contingently false, and (.2) not-\( q_0 \) is contingently true:

\[
\begin{align*}
(1) & \text{ ContingentlyFalse}(q_0) \\
(2) & \text{ ContingentlyTrue}(\neg q_0)
\end{align*}
\]

As to be expected from the discussion in (211), the reasoning in each case is not modally strict.

(214) **Remark:** Actually Contingently True and False Propositions. Note that if one were to define:
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ActuallyContingentlyTrue(p) ≡_{df} \neg p \& \lozenge \neg p

ActuallyContingentlyFalse(p) ≡_{df} p \& \lozenge p

then where q₀ is again defined as \exists x (E!x & \neg \exists!x), one can immediately establish, as modally strict theorems, that:

(δ₁) ActuallyContingentlyTrue(p) ≡ ActuallyContingentlyFalse(¬p)

(δ₂) ActuallyContingentlyFalse(p) ≡ ActuallyContingentlyTrue(¬p)

(ξ) ActuallyContingentlyFalse(q₀)

(ζ) ActuallyContingentlyTrue(¬q₀)

We give the proof of (δ₁) in a footnote but leave the proof of (δ₂) to the reader.¹⁶⁴ Here is a proof of (ξ):

From (208.1), it follows by axiom (44.1) that \exists x (E!x & \neg \exists!x). So, by definition of q₀, \exists x \neg q₀. Independently by axiom (45.4), we know \lozenge q₀. Hence ActuallyContingentlyFalse(q₀).

We leave the proof of (ζ) to the reader.

(215) Theorems: There Are Contingently True Propositions and Contingently False Ones. If we were to immediately infer \exists p ContingentlyFalse(p) from theorem (213.1)⋆, and immediately infer \exists p ContingentlyTrue(p) from (213.2)⋆, the resulting theorems would fail to be modally strict. But, in fact, we can derive these theorems by modally strict means:

(1) \exists p ContingentlyTrue(p)

(2) \exists p ContingentlyFalse(p)

Thus, we need not appeal to (213.2)⋆ to derive (1) or appeal to (213.1)⋆ to derive (2).

(216) Remark: On the Existence of Contingently True Propositions and Contingently False Ones. Many philosophers would grant (215.1) and (215.2), i.e., that there are contingently true and contingently false propositions. But by deriving these as theorems, our theory answers a philosophical question, namely, what resources are needed to (a) prove rather than assert the existence of a contingently true proposition (and a contingently false proposition) and (b) do

¹⁶⁴ We prove both directions: (→) Assume ActuallyContingentlyTrue(p). Then \exists p \& \lozenge \neg p. We want to show \exists p \& \lozenge p. But by (197.4), we know that \neg \exists p \equiv p. So by a Rule of Substitution, \exists p implies \exists p. Analogously, by (197.3), we know that \exists p \equiv \neg p. So by a Rule of Substitution, \lozenge \neg p implies \lozenge p. (←) By analogous reasoning.
so without asserting, for some particular individual \( x \) and property \( F \), either 
\[ Fx \& \Diamond \neg Fx \text{ or } \neg Fx \& \Diamond Fx? \]

The present theory gives us both modally strict and non-modally strict proofs that such propositions exist, and axiom (45.4) plays a role in these arguments. This is another virtue of taking (45.4) as an axiom. The non-modally strict proofs are immediate existential generalizations of (213.1)\( \star \) and (213.2)\( \star \) and, as such, are constructive (specific witnesses to the existential claims can be identified). The modally strict proofs of (215.1) and (215.2) aren’t constructive and, indeed, can’t be; as we’ve seen, there can’t be a modally strict argument for the contingent truth or falsehood of a particular proposition that would serve as a witness.

Thus, we sometimes have a choice of strategies when arguing for claims that depend on the existence of contingently true or contingently false propositions. If one directly uses (213.1)\( \star \) or (213.2)\( \star \) in the reasoning for the claim, the resulting theorem is not modally strict. However, in some cases, it may be that the very same theorem can be proved by modally strict means from (215.1) or (215.2). Here it is important to recall and extend our discussion in Remark (71). That discussion explained (a) how there can be modally strict derivations of contingent conclusions \( \varphi \) from contingent premises \( \Gamma \), and (b) how we can still use RN in such cases to conclude \( \Box \Gamma \vdash \Box \varphi \). In the case of (215.1) and (215.2), we proved a modally strict theorem, not just deriving a conclusion from some premises. To prove the theorem, we have to discharge any premises used in the proof and, in particular, discharge any contingent premises used in the proof. This guarantees that the theorem rests on no contingent assumptions. For example, one may invoke the modally strict theorem that there are contingently true propositions (215.1) and then assume that some arbitrarily chosen proposition is a witness. Then we can we reason from this assumption by modally strict means and once we discharge the assumption by \( \exists \), the conclusions we reach depend only on the modally strict fact that there are contingent propositions, and so these conclusions are modally strict.

To be maximally explicit, let’s rehearse the ‘Simpler Proof’ for (215.2) given in the Appendix. The simpler proof goes as follows:

By (215.1), we know \( \exists p \text{ContingentlyTrue}(p) \). Let \( r \) be such a proposition, so that we know \( \text{ContingentlyTrue}(r) \). Then since \( r \) exists by hypothesis, we may infer \( \text{ContingentlyFalse}(\neg r) \), by (212.3). But \( \neg r \not\downarrow \), and so by \( \exists \), \( \exists p \text{ContingentlyFalse}(p) \). Hence, by \( \exists \), \( \exists p \text{ContingentlyFalse}(p) \). \( \Box \)

In this reasoning, the assumption \( \text{ContingentlyTrue}(r) \) is discharged, and since the theorem depends only on (215.1), it is modally strict.

**Exercise.** Consider argument (A), which attempts to derive a contradiction in our system, and before reading the discussion that follows it, explain where it goes wrong:
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(A) By (215.1), we know $\exists p \text{ContingentlyTrue}(p)$. Suppose $p_1$ is an arbitrary such proposition, so that we know $\text{ContingentlyTrue}(p_1)$. Then, by definition (211.1), $p_1 \& \Diamond \neg p_1$. So by $\&E$, $p_1$. Since this reasoning is modally strict, we may use RN to infer $\Box p_1$, i.e., by (158.12), $\neg \Diamond \neg p_1$. But this contradicts $\Diamond \neg p_1$.

Argument (A) is interesting because it demonstrates a subtle misuse of RN. In argument (A), it is assumed that $p_1$ is a contingently true proposition. This assumption implies, by modally strict reasoning, that $p_1$ is true. But RN can’t be applied to conclude that $\Box p_1$, since $p_1$ isn’t a theorem but was instead derived from an assumption (all we’re entitled to conclude by RN at this point is that there is a derivation of $\Box p_1$ from $\Box \text{ContingentlyTrue}(p_1)$). This doesn’t get us into trouble since we can’t prove the latter. So the reasoning in (A) isn’t valid.

One may not use RN to necessitate a conclusion derived from premises, unless those premises are known to be necessary.

(217) Theorems: There are Contingently Exemplified and Contingently Empty Properties. By making use of contingent propositions, we can go further than theorem (203.7), which tells us that there are at least two contingent properties; we can now establish that (.1) there are contingently exemplified properties, i.e., properties $F$ such that some object exemplifies $F$ but might not have, and (.2) there are contingently unexemplified properties (i.e., properties $F$ such that some object that doesn’t exemplify $F$ might have):

(.1) $\exists F \exists x (Fx \& \Diamond \neg Fx)$

(.2) $\exists F \exists x (\neg Fx \& \Diamond Fx)$

In the Appendix, the modally strict reasoning for (.1) starts with theorem (215.1), i.e., that $\exists p \text{ContingentlyTrue}(p)$ and proceeds by assuming that $p_1$ is an arbitrarily chosen such proposition, i.e., that $p_1 \& \Diamond \neg p_1$. We then show that the property $[\lambda x p_1]$ is a witness that establishes the theorem, i.e., that any fixed, but arbitrary object $y$ exemplifies $[\lambda x p_1]$ but doesn’t necessarily exemplify $[\lambda x p_1]$.165 The proof illustrates the discussions in Remarks (71) and (216); the temporary assumption $p_1 \& \Diamond \neg p_1$ isn’t a necessary truth, but since it constitutes an arbitrary instance of a modally strict, and hence necessarily true,

165 Propositional properties like $[\lambda x p_1]$ will be discussed at some length in Section 9.12. For now, all one needs to know that they are perfectly well-behaved – every $\lambda$-expression $[\lambda x \varphi]$ in which $x$ doesn’t occur free in $\varphi$ is significant, by (39.2), and so all such expressions are governed by $\beta$-Conversion. Thus, by $\beta$-Conversion, $[\lambda x p_1]p \equiv p_1$ holds generally.

If one prefers, (.1) can be proved by appeal to a non-propositional property. For example, $[\lambda x (E!x \rightarrow E!x) \& p_1]$ would do the job. The variable $x$ in the expression denoting this property isn’t vacuously bound by the $\lambda$. But the property will suffice since the proof requires an appeal to a universal property (i.e., everything exemplifies it), but one that is only contingently a universal property.
existence claim, it can be used and discharged in a way that doesn’t subvert
the modally strict reasoning in the proof.

There is a non-modally strict argument for (.1), namely, let Q in the proof
be \( \lambda x \overline{q_0} \), where \( q_0 \) is defined as \( \exists x (E!x \& \neg E!x) \). By (213.2)\( \star \), we know \( \overline{q_0} \) is
contingently true, i.e., such that \( \overline{q_0} \& \neg \overline{q_0} \). By reasoning analogous to that used
in the proof of (.1) in the Appendix, one can show that \( \lambda x \overline{q_0} \) is exemplified
but not possibly not exemplified. Intuitively, since \( \neg \overline{q_0} \), there is a possible
world where \( \overline{q_0} \) is false and, at that world, objects fail to exemplify \( \lambda x \overline{q_0} \). So it
would be a witness to the claim that some property is contingently exemplified,
though the reasoning wouldn’t be modally strict.

(218) Remark: Equivalent But Possibly Not Equivalent Properties. It is straight-
foward to apply object theory by adding theoretical properties to the system
and then asserting, as an axiom, that certain theoretical properties are materi-
ally equivalent but not necessarily equivalent. A well-known example of this
phenomena is due to Quine (1951, 21–2): Let H be the property being a creature
with a heart and let K be the property being a creature with a kidney. Then let us
suppose, for the sake of the example, that \( \forall x (Hx \equiv Kx) \) represents a biological
fact and is asserted as an axiom, but not a necessary axiom. After all, it seems
doubtful that this claim is necessary; from a modal point of view, it seems
reasonable to assert, also as an axiom, that it is possible that there be crea-
tures with a heart but without kidneys or creatures with kidneys but without
hearts. While such extensions of the theory are straightforward, a more inter-
esting question arises, namely, can we prove without adding assumptions such
as the foregoing that there are properties which are materially equivalent but
not necessarily equivalent? The following theorems establishes that we can.
Indeed, these theorems can be strengthened to show that for every property
F, there is a property G that is materially equivalent to F but not necessarily
equivalent to F.

(219) Theorem: Equivalent But Not Necessarily Equivalent Properties. (.1)
There are properties F and G such that F and G are materially equivalent but
not necessarily equivalent:

(1) \( \exists \forall \exists \forall \exists (\forall x (Fx \equiv Gx) \& \neg \forall \neg \forall x (Fx \equiv Gx)) \)

In the Appendix, the modally strict reasoning for this claim again starts with
theorem (215.1), i.e., that \( \exists p (\text{Contingently True}(p)) \) and proceeds by assuming
that \( p_1 \) is an arbitrarily chosen such proposition, i.e., that \( p_1 \& \neg p_1 \). We then
show that the properties \( \lambda x E!x \rightarrow E!x \) (= L) and \( \lambda x p_1 \) (= Q) are witnesses
to our theorem, i.e., that L and Q are materially equivalent but not necessarily
equivalent. The proof is another illustration of the discussions in Remarks
(71) and (216) about the circumstances in which assumptions that aren’t nec-
essarily true (e.g., our assumption that \( p_1 \& \neg p_1 \)) can be used temporarily and
discharged without subverting modally strict reasoning.

By analogous reasoning from the existence of contingently false propositions, it can be shown that (.2) there are properties $F$ and $G$ that are not materially equivalent but possibly materially equivalent:

\[(.2) \exists F \exists G (\neg \forall x (Fx \equiv Gx) \& \forall x(Fx \equiv Gx))\]

Finally, the following fact proves useful, namely (.3) there are properties $F$ and $G$ that are actually not equivalent but possibly equivalent:

\[(.3) \exists F \exists G (\forall \neg \exists x(Fx \equiv Gx) \& \exists \forall x(Fx \equiv Gx))\]

In fact, even stronger claims follow, namely: (.4) for every property $F$, there is a property $G$ that is equivalent to $F$ but possibly not equivalent; (.5) for every property $F$, there is a property $G$ that is not equivalent to $F$ but possibly so; and (.6) for every property $F$, there is a property $G$ that is actually not equivalent to $F$ but which is possibly equivalent to $F$:

\[(.4) \forall F \exists G (\forall x(Fx \equiv Gx) \& \exists \neg \forall x(Fx \equiv Gx))\]
\[(.5) \forall F \exists G (\exists \neg \forall x(Fx \equiv Gx) \& \forall \exists x(Fx \equiv Gx))\]
\[(.6) \forall F \exists G (\forall \neg \exists x(Fx \equiv Gx) \& \exists \forall x(Fx \equiv Gx))\]

While (.4) – (.6) don’t play an immediate role in the theorems that follows, they will prove to be important in a later chapter.

(220) Theorems: $O!$ and $A!$ Are Contingent. Recall that a contingent property is defined to be one that is neither necessary nor impossible (198), from which it follows that a property $F$ is contingent just in case it is both possible that there is something that exemplifies $F$ and possible that there is something that fails to exemplify $F$ (200.2). We now show that the properties being ordinary and being abstract are distinct, contradictory contingent properties:

\[(.1) \ O! \neq A! \]
\[(.2) \ O!x \equiv \neg A!x \]
\[(.3) \ A!x \equiv \neg O!x \]
\[(.4) \ Contingent(O!) \]
\[(.5) \ Contingent(A!) \]

Moreover, the negations of being ordinary and being abstract are distinct and contradictory contingent properties:

\[(.6) \ \neg O! \neq A! \]
Definition: Weakly Contingent Properties. We say that a property $F$ is weakly contingent just in case $F$ is contingent but anything that possibly exemplifies $F$ necessarily exemplifies $F$:

$$\text{WeaklyContingent}(F) \equiv \text{Contingent}(F) \& \forall x (\Diamond Fx \to \Box Fx)$$

No existence clause is needed in the definiens (cf. (17.2)), since one is already implied by the definition of $\text{Contingent}(F)$ (198.4).

Theorems: Facts About Weakly Contingent Properties. (.1) $F$ is weakly contingent if $F$ is weakly contingent; (.2) if $F$ is weakly contingent and $G$ is not, then $F$ is not $G$:

$$\begin{align*}
(\text{.1}) \quad & \text{WeaklyContingent}(F) \equiv \text{WeaklyContingent}(F) \\
(\text{.2}) \quad & (\text{WeaklyContingent}(F) \& \neg \text{WeaklyContingent}(G)) \to F \neq G
\end{align*}$$

Theorems: Facts About $O!$, $A!$, $E!$, and $L$. Using the definition $L = df [\lambda x E!x \to E!x]$, we have the following facts: (.1) being ordinary is weakly contingent; (.2) being abstract is weakly contingent; (.3) being concrete is not weakly contingent; (.4) being concrete if concrete is not weakly contingent; (.5) being ordinary is distinct from: $E!$, $\Box E!$, $L$, and $\Box L$; and (.6) being abstract is distinct from: $E!$, $\Box E!$, $L$, and $\Box L$:

$$\begin{align*}
(\text{.1}) \quad & \text{WeaklyContingent}(O!)
\quad \text{(221)}
\quad \text{(222)}
\quad \text{(223)}
\quad \text{(224)}
\quad \text{(Exercise)}
\quad \text{(166)}
\quad \text{Contributed by Daniel Kirchner, personal communication, 29 May 2018.}
\end{align*}$$

Exercise: Show how this theorem could be used to prove that there are at least 65,556 (= $2^{16}$) abstract objects.
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(225) Theorem: Ordinary vs. Abstract Objects. Our system implies that (.1) necessarily, there exists an object that exemplifies being ordinary; (.2) necessarily, there exists an object that exemplifies being abstract; (.3) necessarily, it is not the case that every object exemplifies being ordinary; (.4) necessarily, it is not the case that every object exemplifies being abstract; and (.5) necessarily, it is not the case that every object exemplifies being concrete:

(.1) □∃xO!x
(.2) □∃xA!x
(.3) □¬∀xO!x
(.4) □¬∀xA!x
(.5) □¬∀xE!x

It is important to note that none of these imply ∃xE!x, i.e., these theorems don’t imply the existence of any concrete objects. The existence of concrete objects is an empirical matter, subject to a posteriori investigation rather than a derivation from axioms asserted a priori.

(226) Theorems: The Domain of Objects is Partitioned. Since it follows by GEN from theorem (116.3) that ∀x(O!x ∨ A!x), we can show that the domain of objects is partitioned if we now establish that no object is both ordinary and abstract:

¬∃x(O!x & A!x)

This is a modally-strict theorem and, hence, a necessary truth.

9.11.1 Ordinary Objects

In the classical second-order predicate calculus, with a single form of predication (namely, exemplification formulas), the identity conditions for individuals has to be expressed in terms of such formulas. The classical principle for the identity of individuals, Leibniz’ law of the identity of indiscernibles, does just that: ∀F(Fx ≡ Fy) → x = y. As it turns out, this condition is the key to the identity of ordinary objects and, indeed, allows us to define a relation of identity for ordinary objects. We begin our study of ordinary objects there.

(227) Definition: The Identity E Relation. We define the two-place relation being identical E (‘=E’) as: being an individual x and an individual y such that x exemplifies being ordinary, y exemplifies being ordinary, and necessarily, x and y exemplify the same properties:
\[ E =_{df} [\lambda xy \ O!x \& O!y \& □VF(Fx \equiv Fy)] \]

By now, it should be clear that \( E \downarrow \). The \( \lambda \) in the definiens doesn’t bind any variables in any encoding formula subterm. So by axiom (39.2), the definiens is significant, i.e., \( [\lambda xy \ O!x \& O!y \& □VF(Fx \equiv Fy)] \downarrow \). Then the Rule of Identity by Definition (121.1) yields the claim \( E = [\lambda xy \ O!x \& O!y \& □VF(Fx \equiv Fy)] \) as a theorem. So by theorem (108.1), it follows that \( E \downarrow \).\(^\circ\)

(228) **Rewrite Convention:** Identity \( E \) Infix Notation. We adopt, as a convention, the following infix notation for formulas involving the new 2-place relation symbol \( = \). Where \( \kappa_1 \) and \( \kappa_2 \) are any two individual terms, we henceforth write \( \kappa_1 \ =_E \kappa_2 \) instead of \( \kappa_1 \ =_E \kappa_2 \). So where \( \kappa_1 \) is the variable \( x \) and \( \kappa_2 \) is the constant \( a \), we write \( x \ =_E a \) instead of \( \kappa_1 \ =_E \kappa_2 \). When \( \kappa_1 \) is \( a \) and \( \kappa_2 \) is \( \lambda xy \ O \) (\( \varphi \) any formula), then we write \( a \ =_E \lambda xy \ O \) instead of \( \kappa_1 \ =_E \kappa_2 \). And we write \( \lambda xy \ O \ =_E \lambda xy \ O \) instead of \( \kappa_1 \ =_E \kappa_2 \).

It is important to note here that if either \( \kappa_1 \) or \( \kappa_2 \) is a description that fails to have a denotation, i.e., if either \( \kappa_1 \downarrow \) or \( \kappa_2 \downarrow \), then \( \neg(\kappa_1 \ =_E \kappa_2) \) will be derivable. To see why, we note that \( \kappa_1 \ =_E \kappa_2 \to \kappa_1 \downarrow \) and \( \kappa_1 \ =_E \kappa_2 \to \kappa_2 \downarrow \) will both be implied by axiom (39.5.a), since \( \kappa_1 \) and \( \kappa_2 \) are primary terms of \( \kappa_1 \ =_E \kappa_2 \). So if either \( \kappa_1 \downarrow \) or \( \kappa_2 \downarrow \), then \( \neg(\kappa_1 \ =_E \kappa_2) \) will be derivable by Modus Tollens.\(^\circ\)

The reader is encouraged to review explanatory Remark (229) below, on nested \( \lambda \)-expressions and layers of definition. That Remark contains an important preview of the methods that will become available for unpacking the defined notation in a \( \lambda \)-expression such as \( [\lambda x \ x \ =_E \ a] \).

The formula \( x \ =_E \ y \) is therefore unlike, and is to be rigorously distinguished from, the formula \( x \equiv y \). The expressions \( [\lambda xy \ x \ =_E \ y], [\lambda xy \ x \ =_E \ y], [\lambda y \ x \ =_E \ y], \) and \( [\lambda y \ a \ =_E \ y] \) have no encoding formula subterms and, \( \text{a fortiori} \), the \( \lambda \)s in these expressions don’t bind any variables in any encoding formula.

---

\(^\circ\)One can also establish \( E \downarrow \) by using the symmetry of identity to argue that \( [\lambda xy \ O!x \& O!y \& □VF(Fx \equiv Fy)] =_E \). So by Rule \( =_E \), we can substitute \( =_E \) for the \( \lambda \)-expression in the claim \( [\lambda xy \ O!x \& O!y \& □VF(Fx \equiv Fy)] \downarrow \) to obtain \( E \downarrow \).

And there are other means of establishing \( E \downarrow \). For example, note that by (39.2), it is axiomatic that:

\[ [\lambda xy \ Gx \& Gy \& □VF(Fx \equiv Fy)] \downarrow \]

where \( G \) is a variable. So by the Rule of Generalization (GEN):

\((\delta)\) \( \forall G[[\lambda xy \ Gx \& Gy \& □VF(Fx \equiv Fy)] \downarrow] \)

From the fact that \( O \downarrow \), we can then instantiate \( O \) into \((\delta)\) and conclude that \( [\lambda xy \ O!x \& O!y \& □VF(Fx \equiv Fy)] \downarrow \). The proof now reduces to one of the ones described in the text.

\(^\circ\)It is worth remembering here that \( \tau \downarrow \) doesn’t imply \( \sigma \downarrow \) when \( \sigma \) is a proper subterm of \( \tau \). So axioms (39.5.a) and (39.5.b) don’t imply that \( \text{every} \) subterm in a true exemplification or encoding formula has a denotation; only the primary terms. To give a simple example, axiom (39.2) asserts that \( [\lambda x \ Rxz(Pz \& \sim Pz)] \) is significant, even though its subterm \( \sim(Pz \& \sim Pz) \) will be provably empty. (It is provable that nothing exemplifies the property signified by the \( \lambda \)-expression.) See Remark (155) for further examples.
subterms. So it is axiomatic that these expressions are significant, by (39.2).\footnote{Another way to prove that \(\lambda x \ x =_E b\) is by using axiom (39.2) to assert \(\lambda x Rxy\), where \(R\) is a 2-place relation variable. Then by GEN, \(\forall R(\lambda x Rxy)\). Then, since the definiens of \(=_E\) (227) is significant, the theory of definitions-by-identity and theory of identity will thereby guarantee that \(=_E\) (as noted above). Hence, we shall be able to instantiate \(=_E\) into the universal claim \(\forall R(\lambda x Rxy)\). The result, in infix notation (228) is \(\lambda x x =_E y\).}

\textbf{(229) Remark:} Digression on Nested \(\lambda\)-expressions and Layers of Definition. Given the foregoing discussion, it is important to note how the layers of definition are compounding and how some \(\lambda\)-expressions contain nested occurrences of other \(\lambda\)-expressions. For example, by the convention for infix notation (228), the \(\lambda\)-expression:

\[\lambda x \ x =_E b\]

is shorthand for:

\[\lambda x \ =_E b\]

But the definition of the 2-place relation constant \(=_E\) (227) will imply the identity claim \(=_E = \{\lambda x O!x \& O!y \& \Box VF(Fx \equiv Fy)\}\), and since the substitution of identicals holds universally, we can replace the \(=_E\) by its definiens in any context. So the last \(\lambda\)-expression set in display can be expanded, in any context in which it appears, to:

\[\lambda x \ [\lambda xy O!x \& O!y \& \Box VF(Fx \equiv Fy)]xb\]

Now definition (22.1) of the 1-place relation constant \(O!\) will imply the identity claim \(O! = \{\lambda x E!x\}\) and so we can replace \(O!\) by \([\lambda x E!x]\) in any context. So we can, in turn, replace the last \(\lambda\)-expression displayed above, in any context, by:

\[(\vartheta) \ [\lambda x \ [\lambda xy E!x]x \& [\lambda x E!x]y \& \Box VF(Fx \equiv Fy)]xb\]

Now at this point, \((\vartheta)\) still contains the defined symbols \(\Diamond\), \&, and \(\equiv\), but we cannot further expand the \(\lambda\)-expression by applying the definitions of these symbols. These are syncategorematic symbols introduced by definitions-by-\(\equiv\). The Rule of Substitution derived in (160.2) allows us to substitute the definiens for the definiendum in a definition-by-\(\equiv\) only when the definiendum occurs as a subformula within some formula; the formulas containing \(\Diamond\), \&, and \(\equiv\) in \((\vartheta)\) do not occur as subformulas of \((\vartheta)\). Indeed, subformula of is not defined for terms generally and so not defined for \(n\)-place \(\lambda\)-expressions \((n \geq 1)\). So we can’t further unpack \((\vartheta)\).

However, asserting that an individual, say \(a\), exemplifies \((\vartheta)\), can be simplified by the principle of \(\beta\)-Conversion (48.2). That is, if we assert:

\[\lambda x \ [\lambda xy \ [\lambda x E!x]x \& [\lambda x E!x]y \& \Box VF(Fx \equiv Fy)]xb]\]
then since (8) is a significant $\lambda$-expression, $\beta$-Conversion will allow us to infer:

$$[\lambda xy [\lambda x \triangleleft E!x]x \& [\lambda x \triangleleft E!x]y \& \Box \forall F(Fx \equiv Fy)]ab]$$

Then by a further application of $\beta$-Conversion, we can infer:

$$[\lambda x \triangleleft E!x]a \& [\lambda x \triangleleft E!x]b \& \Box \forall F(Fa \equiv Fb)]$$

And our deductive system will then allow us to infer:

$$\triangleleft E!a \& \triangleleft E!b \& \Box \forall F(Fa \equiv Fb)]$$

Finally, we leave further analysis to the reader; classical theorems and rules of inference will allow one to apply the definitions of $\&$, $\triangleleft$, and $\equiv$ to the subformulas of the above, to expose the primitive notions deeply nested inside the matrix of $[\lambda x x =_E b]$.

(230) Theorems: Usefull Theorems About Identity $E$ and Identity. The following are simple, but useful theorems: (.1) $x =_E y$ if and only if $x$ exemplifies being ordinary, $y$ exemplifies being ordinary, and $x$ and $y$ necessarily exemplify the same properties, and (.2) whenever objects are identical $E$, they are identical:

(.1) $x =_E y \equiv (O!x \& O!y \& \Box \forall F(Fx \equiv Fy))$

(.2) $x =_E y \rightarrow x = y$

(231) Theorems: Identity $E$ is Modally Collapsed. (.1) objects $x$ and $y$ are identical $E$ if and only if they are necessarily identical $E$; and (.2) objects $x$ and $y$ are possibly identical $E$ if and only if they are identical $E$:

(.1) $x =_E y \equiv \Box x =_E y$

(.2) $\Diamond x =_E y \equiv x =_E y$

(.3) $\Diamond x =_E y \equiv \Box x =_E y$

Thus, (.3) establishes $x =_E y$ is indifferent to modal distinctions. We’ll see further consequences of this below.

(232) Rewrite Conventions: Distinctness $E$. Note that since $=_E$ is a (defined) relation term (227) and $\equiv$ is an operation on relation terms, $\equiv_{=E}$ is a well-defined symbol of our language. We adopt the following conventions for the defined relation symbol $\equiv_{=E}$:

(.1) We henceforth write $x =_E$ instead of $\equiv_{=E}$.

(.2) Where $\kappa_1$ and $\kappa_2$ are any individual terms, we henceforth write $\kappa_1 \neq_E \kappa_2$ instead of $\neq_{=E} \kappa_1 \kappa_2$. 
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For example, these conventions not only allow us to write \( x \neq_E y \) instead of \( \equiv_E x y \), but also \( [\lambda xy \ x \neq_E y] \) instead of \( [\lambda xy \equiv_E x y] \).

(233) Theorem: Equivalence of Distinctness\(_E\) and Not Identical\(_E\).

\[ x \neq_E y \equiv \neg(x =_E y) \]

It may come as a surprise that the proof of this theorem is not immediate but rather requires an appeal to (39.2), (179), (194), (228), (232.1), and (232.2).

Though this theorem holds generally for all objects \( x \) and \( y \), it may fail for arbitrary individual terms \( \kappa \) and \( \kappa' \): the schemas \( \kappa \neq_E \kappa' \) and \( \neg(\kappa =_E \kappa') \) are not equivalent. For if either \( \neg \kappa \downarrow \) or \( \neg \kappa' \downarrow \) is provable, then both \( \kappa =_E \kappa' \) and \( \kappa \neq_E \kappa' \) are provably false (they are both exemplification formulas with an empty primary term), in which case \( \neg(\kappa =_E \kappa') \) becomes provably true.

(234) Theorems: Distinctness\(_E\) is Modally Collapsed. (.1) objects \( x \) and \( y \) are distinct\(_E\) if and only if necessarily they are distinct\(_E\); (.2) objects \( x \) and \( y \) are possibly distinct\(_E\) if and only if they are distinct\(_E\); and (.3) objects \( x \) and \( y \) are possibly distinct\(_E\) if and only if they are necessarily distinct\(_E\):

\[
\begin{align*}
(1) \quad & x \neq_E y \equiv \square x \neq_E y \\
(2) \quad & \Diamond x \neq_E y \equiv x \neq_E y \\
(3) \quad & \Diamond x \neq_E y \equiv \square x \neq_E y
\end{align*}
\]

(235) Theorems: Identity\(_E\), Distinctness\(_E\), and Actuality.

\[
\begin{align*}
(1) \quad & x =_E y \equiv \exists ! x =_E y \\
(2) \quad & x \neq_E y \equiv \exists ! x \neq_E y
\end{align*}
\]

It is important to observe here that these are both modally-strict theorems having the form \( \phi \equiv \exists ! \phi \). So each constitutes another special group of formulas which, when commuted, have the same form as the modally fragile axiom (43)\(\star\) but which are provable without that axiom.

(236) Theorems: Identity\(_E\) is an Equivalence Relation on Ordinary Objects.

\[
\begin{align*}
(1) \quad & O! x \to x =_E x \\
(2) \quad & x =_E y \to y =_E x \\
(3) \quad & (x =_E y \& y =_E z) \to x =_E z
\end{align*}
\]

(237) Theorems: Ordinary Objects and Identity. It now follows that (.1) if either \( x \) or \( y \) is ordinary, then necessarily, \( x \) is identical to \( y \) if and only if \( x \) is \( E\)-identical to \( y \); (.2) if \( y \) is ordinary, then being \textit{identical to} \( y \) exists; and (.3) the relation \textit{being strictly identical} \textit{ordinary objects} exists:
(1) \((O!x \lor O!y) \rightarrow □(x = y \equiv x =_E y)\)

(2) \(O!y \rightarrow [\lambda x \ x = y]↓\)

(3) \([\lambda xy \ O!x & O!y \ & x = y]↓\)

Note that (2) tells us that if \(y\) is an ordinary object, its haecceity exists. Compare theorem (190.3), which told us that there isn’t such a property for every object whatsoever. And (3) asserts the existence of the relation, strict identity between ordinary objects. Note that this relation is denoted by a \(\lambda\)-expression in which the initial \(\lambda\) binds variables an encoding formula subterm – the formula \(y = x\) contains \(y F\) and \(x F\) as encoding formula subterms, and these subterms have occurrences of \(y\) and \(x\) bound by the \(\lambda\).

(238) Theorem: Exemplification Indiscernibility Implies Necessary Indiscernibility. It is an interesting fact that if any objects \(x\) and \(y\) are indiscernible, i.e., they exemplify the same properties, then they necessarily do so:

\[
∀F(Fx ≡ Fy) \rightarrow □∀F(Fx ≡ Fy)
\]

(239) Theorem: Ordinary Objects Obey Leibniz’s Law. The identity \(_E\) and identity of indiscernible ordinary objects are theorems:

(1) \((O!x & O!y) \rightarrow (∀F(Fx ≡ Fy) \rightarrow x =_E y)\)

(2) \((O!x & O!y) \rightarrow (∀F(Fx ≡ Fy) \rightarrow x = y)\)

These tell us that we only have to show that ordinary objects \(x\) and \(y\) exemplify the same properties to conclude they are identical \(_E\) and, hence, identical. We don’t have to show that they necessarily exemplify the same properties. By contraposition, if we know two ordinary objects \(x, y\) are distinct \(_E\) or distinct simpliciter, then we know that there exists a property that distinguishes them.

(240) Theorem: Distinct Ordinary Objects Have Distinct Haecceities. It is now relatively straightforward to show that (1) if \(x\) and \(y\) are ordinary, then they are distinct iff being \(E\)-identical to \(x\) is distinct from being \(E\)-identical to \(y\), and (2) ordinary objects are distinct iff they have distinct haecceities:

(1) \((O!x & O!y) \rightarrow (x ≠ y \equiv [\lambda z z =_E x] ≠ [\lambda z z =_E y])\)

(2) \((O!x & O!y) \rightarrow (x ≠ y \equiv [\lambda z z = x] ≠ [\lambda z z = y])\)

(241) Theorem: Ordinary Objects Necessarily Fail to Encode Properties.

\(O!x \rightarrow □\neg ∃Fx F\)
9.11.2 Abstract Objects

(242) Theorem: Abstract Objects Obey the Encoding Form of Leibniz’s Law. A variant of Leibniz’s Law is now derivable, namely, (1) whenever abstract objects \( x, y \) encode the same properties, they are identical:

\[ (A!x \& A!y) \rightarrow (\forall F(xF \equiv yF) \rightarrow x = y) \]

Thus to show abstract objects \( x \) and \( y \) are identical, it suffices to prove that they encode the same properties; we don’t have to show that they necessarily encode the same properties. Similarly, it is provable that (2) whenever one abstract object encodes a property the other fails to encode, they are distinct:

\[ (A!x \& A!y) \rightarrow ((\exists F(xF \& \neg yF) \lor \exists F(yF \& \neg xF)) \rightarrow x \neq y) \]

(243) Theorem: Objects that Encode Properties Are Abstract. We can easily derive from the contraposition of axiom (52) that if \( x \) encodes a property, then \( x \) is abstract:

\[ \exists FxF \rightarrow A!x \]

The converse fails because there exists an abstract null object that encodes no properties. See theorem (261.1) below.

(244) Theorems: Every Property is Encoded by Some Object and Every Relation is Encoded By Some Objects.

(1) \( \forall H \exists x \, xH \)

(2) \( \forall G \exists x_1 \ldots \exists x_n (x_1 \ldots x_n G) \quad (n \geq 2) \)

(3) \( \exists x \, x \Pi \equiv \exists H (H = \Pi), \) where \( \Pi \) is any 1-place relation term in which \( x \) and \( H \) don’t occur free

(4) \( \exists x_1 \ldots \exists x_n (x_1 \ldots x_n \Pi) \equiv \exists G (G = \Pi), \) where \( \Pi \) is any \( n \)-place relation term \( (n \geq 2) \) in which \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) and \( G \) don’t occur free

(245) Remark: Justifying the Definition of Property Existence. Note that the proof of (244.1) would have been much more involved if we had not defined \( H \downarrow \) in (20.2) as \( \exists x \, xH \). Without this definition, the proof of (244.1) requires an appeal to the Comprehension Principle for Abstract Objects (53):

By GEN, it suffices to prove \( \exists x \, xH \). Note that the following is an instance of the Comprehension Principle for Abstract Objects (53):

\[ \exists x (A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \forall z(Fz \equiv Hz))) \]

Suppose \( a \) is such an object, so that we know:
A!a & ∀F(aF ≡ ∀z(Fz ≡ Hz))

Since \( H \downarrow (39.2) \) and \( H \) is substitutable for \( F \) in the matrix of the second conjunct, we know \( aH \equiv ∀z(Hz ≡ Hz) \). But \( ∀z(Hz ≡ Hz) \) is an easily established theorem. Hence, it follows that \( aH \), and so by \( ∃I, ∃xxH \).

Similarly, without definition (20.2), the proof of (244.2), previewed in footnote 107 in item (33), is more complicated:

Again, by GEN, it suffices to prove \( ∃x_1...∃x_n(x_1...x_nG) \). Note that the following is an instance of the Comprehension Principle for Abstract Objects (53):

\[ ∃x(A!x & ∀F(Fx ≡ F = F)) \]

Suppose \( a \) is such an object, so that we know:

\[ A!a & ∀F(aF ≡ F = F) \]

Now it is straightforward to show that \( ∀H aH \) (exercise). Note that by (39.2), all of the following properties exist: \([λy Gya...a], [λy Gaya...a], \ldots, \text{and} [λy Ga...ay] \). So \( a \) encodes each of these properties. That is, we know:

\[ a[λy Gya...a] & a[λy Gaya...a] & \ldots & a[λy Ga...ay] \]

Hence, by axiom (50), \( a...aG \), and so \( ∃x_1...∃x_n(x_1...x_nG) \).

Since our system would have yielded these as theorems, it made sense to \textit{define} the existence of properties and relations in terms of the fact that there are objects that encode them.

\textbf{(246) Exercise:} Practice with the Comprehension Principle for Abstract Objects. Say what is wrong with the following reasoning:

Consider any instance of the Comprehension Principle for Abstract Objects (53), say \( ∃x(A!x & ∀F(xF ≡ ϕ)) \). Assume \( a \) is such an object, so that we know \( A!a & ∀F(aF ≡ ϕ) \). Hence, by RN, \( □(A!a & ∀F(aF ≡ ϕ)) \). So by \( ∃E, ∃x□(A!x & ∀F(xF ≡ ϕ)) \).

Now show that if the conclusion of the above reasoning were correct, there would be modal collapse, i.e., that \( ∃x□(A!x & ∀F(xF ≡ ϕ)) \) implies \( ϕ ≡ □ϕ \).170

\[ \text{Solution to the second part of the exercise: Suppose } ∃x□(A!x & ∀F(xF ≡ ϕ)), \text{ for an arbitrary formula } ϕ. \text{ Then let } a \text{ be such an object, so that we know } □(A!a & ∀F(aF ≡ ϕ)). \text{ Since a necessary conjunction implies that the conjuncts are necessary, it follows that } □A!a & □∀F(aF ≡ ϕ). \text{ From the second conjunct of this last result, it follows both that:} \]

\[ (8) \ ∀F□(aF ≡ ϕ) \]

by the CBF schema (167.2)
9.11. THE THEORY OF OBJECTS

(247) Theorems: Strengthened Comprehension Principle for Abstract Objects. The Comprehension Principle for Abstract Objects (53) and the definition of identity (23.1) jointly imply that there is a unique abstract object that encodes just the properties such that \( \varphi \):

\[ \exists! x (A! x \land \forall F (xF \equiv \varphi)), \text{ provided } x \text{ doesn’t occur free in } \varphi \]

The proof is simplified by appealing to (242).

(248) Theorems: Examples of Abstract Objects via Strengthened Comprehension. The Strengthened Comprehension Principle for Abstract Objects (247) asserts the unique existence of a number of interesting abstract objects. There exists a unique abstract object that encodes all and only the properties \( F \) such that:

1. \( y \) exemplifies \( F \);
2. \( y \) and \( z \) exemplify \( F \);
3. \( y \) or \( z \) exemplify \( F \);
4. \( y \) necessarily exemplifies \( F \);
5. \( F \) is identical to property \( G \); and
6. \( F \) is necessarily implied by \( G \):

\[ \exists! x (A! x \land \forall F (xF \equiv F y) \land \forall F (xF \equiv F z)) \]
\[ \exists! x (A! x \land \forall F (xF \equiv F y \lor F z)) \]
\[ \exists! x (A! x \land \forall F (xF \equiv \Box F y)) \]
\[ \exists! x (A! x \land \forall F (xF \equiv F = G)) \]
\[ \exists! x (A! x \land \forall F (xF \equiv \Box \forall y (G y \rightarrow F y))) \]

Many of the above objects (and others) will figure prominently in the theorems which follow.

(249) Theorems: Descriptions Guaranteed to be Significant. By appealing to the right-to-left direction of theorem \((ix\varphi) \downarrow \equiv \exists! x \varphi \) (174.2), we can establish, by a modally-strict proof, that for any condition \( \varphi \) in which \( x \) doesn’t occur free, the abstract individual that encodes just the properties such that \( \varphi \) exists:

\[ ix(A! x \land \forall F (xF \equiv \varphi)) \downarrow, \text{ provided } x \text{ doesn’t occur free in } \varphi \]

\[
\begin{align*}
(\xi) \quad & \forall F (a F \equiv \varphi) & \text{by the T schema (45.2)}
\end{align*}
\]

If we apply \( \forall E \) to both, we obtain, respectively:

\( (\xi') \quad \Box (a F \equiv \varphi) \)
\( (\xi') \quad a F \equiv \varphi \)

From \( (\xi') \) it follows by (158.6) that:

\( \xi \quad \Box a F \equiv \Box \varphi \)

Now to see how this implies that truth and necessity are equivalent, we need only show \( \varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi \), since \( \Box \varphi \rightarrow \varphi \) is an instance of the T schema. So assume \( \varphi \). From this, it follows from \( (\xi') \) that \( a F \). From this it follows that \( \Box a F \), by axiom (51). So by \( (\xi) \), it follows that \( \Box \varphi \).
Although this theorem is an immediate consequence of (247) and (144.1)\(\star\), the proof that appeals to these theorems isn’t modally-strict. But we’ve already hinted at how the proof in the Appendix establishes our theorem by modally-strict means, namely, via an appeal to the Rule of Actualization and (174.2). Since this theorem schema has a modally-strict proof, its necessitation follows by RN.

Intuitively, in terms of primitive possible worlds, we may note that the necessitation of this theorem does not say that, at every world \(w\), the \(x\) that both exemplifies being abstract at \(w\) and encodes all and only the properties satisfying \(\varphi\) at \(w\) exists at \(w\). Rather, the necessitation says that at every possible world \(w\), the \(x\) that both exemplifies being abstract at the distinguished actual world \(w_0\) and encodes exactly the properties satisfying \(\varphi\) at \(w_0\) exists at \(w\).

\((250)\) **Metadefinitions:** Canonical Descriptions, Matrices, and Canonical Individuals. The previous theorem guarantees that descriptions of the form \(\nu(A!\nu & \forall F (\nu F \equiv \varphi))\) are significant whenever \(\nu\) is any individual variable that doesn’t occur free in \(\varphi\). We henceforth say:

A definite description is *canonical* iff it has the form \(\nu(A!\nu & \forall F (\nu F \equiv \varphi))\), for any formula \(\varphi\) in which the individual variable \(\nu\) doesn’t occur free.

We call the matrix \(A!\nu & \forall F (\nu F \equiv \varphi)\) of a canonical description a *canonical matrix*. By an abuse of language, we shall call the individuals denoted by such descriptions *canonical individuals*.

\((251)\) **Theorems:** Canonical Individuals Encode Their Defining Properties. As an instance of (145.2)\(\star\), it is a theorem that if \(y\) is the abstract individual that encodes just the properties such that \(\varphi\), then \(y\) is abstract and encodes just the properties such that \(\varphi\):

\[
y = \nu(A!x & \forall F (xF \equiv \varphi)) \rightarrow (A!y & \forall F (yF \equiv \varphi)), \text{ provided } x \text{ doesn’t occur free in } \varphi
\]

In general, we cannot give a modally strict proof of this claim. But as we shall see, for a certain group of formulas \(\varphi\), there is a modally strict proof.

\((252)\) **Theorems:** Canonical Individuals are Abstract. While the previous theorem implies that anything identical to a canonical individual exemplifies *being abstract*, this particular conditional can be derived by modally strict means:

\[
y = \nu(A!x & \forall F (xF \equiv \varphi)) \rightarrow A!y, \text{ provided } x \text{ doesn’t occur free in } \varphi
\]

\((253)\) **Theorems:** The Abstraction Principle for Canonical Individuals. Note that the expression \(\varphi^G_F\), i.e., the result of substituting \(G\) for every free occurrence of \(F\) in \(\varphi\), asserts that \(G\) is such that \(\varphi\). Consequently, we may state the Abstraction Principle for canonical individuals as follows: the abstract object,
which encodes exactly the properties such that \( \varphi \), encodes a property \( G \) if and only if \( G \) is such that \( \varphi \):

\[
\text{ix}(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi))G \equiv \varphi[F/x],
\]

provided \( x \) doesn’t occur free in \( \varphi \) and \( G \) is substitutable for \( F \) in \( \varphi \).

To see an example, let \( b \) be an arbitrary object. Then we have the following instance of the above theorem: \( \text{ix}(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv Fb))G \equiv Gb \). This asserts: the abstract object that encodes exactly the properties that \( b \) exemplifies encodes \( G \) if and only if \( b \) exemplifies \( G \). The reason we call this ‘abstraction’ should be clear: in the right-to-left direction, we’ve abstracted out, from the simple predication \( Gb \), an encoding claim about a particular abstract object.

We may describe this example intuitively as follows. When \( \varphi \) is formula \( Gb \), then \( \varphi \) describes a unique logical pattern of predications about \( b \), namely, the logical pattern consisting of those properties \( G \) that are such that \( Gb \). The Strengthened Comprehension Principle (247) objectifies this pattern and asserts its unique existence. Moreover, (249) guarantees that the canonical description of the objectified pattern is significant. Finally, the Abstraction Principle then yields an important truth about this objectified pattern, namely, that it encodes \( G \) if and only if \( G \) matches the pattern. This way of looking at the Abstraction Principle applies to arbitrarily complex formulas \( \varphi \) in which \( x \) doesn’t occur free, since these express a condition on properties and thereby define a logical pattern of properties.

(254) Remark: The Abstraction Principle and Necessitation. Inspection shows that the proof of the Abstraction Principle depends upon Hintikka’s schema (142)\( \star \), which in turn depends on the fundamental theorem (141)\( \star \) governing descriptions. So the Abstraction Principle is not a modally strict theorem and is not subject to the Rule of Necessitation. It would serve well to get a broad perspective on these important facts. In the discussion that follows, we provide such a perspective in the material mode and leave the explanation in the formal mode to a footnote.

To understand more fully why RN can’t be applied to instances of Abstraction, suppose we want to extend our theory with some contingent facts, by asserting those facts as new axioms. For example, we might assert, as part of the body of truths we’d like to systematize with our theory, that the individual \( b \) exemplifies being a philosopher but might not have been a philosopher. So, suppose we’ve extended our theory with the following two axioms, where \( P \) is the property being a philosopher:

\( \star \text{Fact: } Pb \)

\( \text{Modal Fact: } \diamond \neg Pb \)
Thus, the claim $Pb$ is contingently true, by definition (211.1). Hence $Pb$ is a modally fragile axiom and that is why we've labeled $Pb$ as a $\star$Fact. If these claims are taken as axioms, they become part of our deductive system and any reasoning that depends on $\star$Fact fails to be modally strict.

Now consider the following instance of the Abstraction Principle (253)$\star$:

\[(a) \ i x(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv Fb))P \equiv Pb\]

It then follows from (a) and our $\star$Fact that:

\[(b) \ i x(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv Fb))P\]

Since the description in (b) is canonical, it is significant (249) and so may be instantiated, along with $P$, in our axiom for the rigidity of encoding (51), which asserts $xF \rightarrow \Box xF$. By doing so, we may infer:

\[(c) \ \Box i x(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv Fb))P\]

Of course, the proof of (c) fails to be modally strict, since it was derived from two $\star$-claims: the above contingent $\star$Fact ($Pb$) and (a), which is an instance of (253)$\star$. Nevertheless, (c) is a theorem in the extended theory we’re considering.

Now if we could apply RN to (a), we would obtain:

\[(d) \ \Box (i x(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv Fb))P) \equiv Pb\]

Then from (d), (c), and the relevant instance of (158.6), which asserts that $\Box (\varphi \equiv \psi) \rightarrow (\varphi \equiv \Box \psi)$, it would follow that:

\[(e) \ \Box Pb\]

But this would contradict our Modal Fact $\Diamond \neg Pb$, which is equivalent to $\neg \Box Pb$.

It should therefore be clear why RN isn’t applicable to the Abstraction Principle — if it were so applicable, our system would become inconsistent when extended with natural but contingent (and thus modally fragile) axioms.\(^{171}\)

\(^{171}\)In the formal mode, the reason why we can’t generally apply RN to instances of Abstraction is that there are interpretations in which the necessitation of the Abstraction Principle fails to be true, thus demonstrating its invalidity. To see this, let us again help ourselves for the moment to the semantically primitive notion of a possible world. The semantic counterpart of the above $\star$Fact and Modal Fact is any interpretation of our language in which $Pb$ is true at the actual world $w_0$ but false at some other possible world, say, $w_1$. In such an interpretation, our instance (a) of the Abstraction Principle fails to be necessarily true. (a) fails to be necessarily true in the left-to-right direction by the following argument. Since $Pb$ is true at $w_0$, $i x(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv Fb))$ encodes $P$ at $w_0$. Since the properties an object encodes are necessarily encoded (177.2), $i x(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv Fb))$ encodes $P$ at $w_1$. But, by hypothesis, $Pb$ is false at $w_1$. Hence, $w_1$ is a world that is the witness to the truth of the following possibility claim:

\[\Diamond (i x(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv Fb))P) \& \neg Pb\]

Since the left-to-right condition of (a) isn’t necessary in this interpretation, the necessitation of this
It is important to note that in the foregoing discussion, we have described a scenario of the kind mentioned in (72), where we outlined conditions under which the converse of RN fails to hold. The converse of RN asserts that if \( \vdash \Box \varphi \), then \( \vdash \varphi \). But if we let \( \varphi \) be sentence (b) in the above scenario, then we indeed have \( \vdash \Box \varphi \) and not \( \vdash \varphi \). For we saw that since (b) is an encoding formula and a theorem, its necessitation (c) is also a theorem. But there isn’t a modally strict proof of (b), since any proof would depend on our \( \star \text{Fact } P_b \) as well as some non-modally strict fact about descriptions, such as the right-to-left direction of the Abstraction Principle (253)\( \star \).\(^{172}\)

(255) Theorems: Actualized Abstraction. By strategically placing an actuality operator in the Abstraction Principle, we obtain a principle that has a modally strict proof, namely, the abstract object, which encodes just the properties such that \( \varphi \), encodes a property \( G \) if and only if it is actually the case that \( G \):

\[
ix(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv q))G \equiv dqq^G_F,
\]

provided \( x \) doesn’t occur free in \( q \) and \( G \) is substitutable for \( F \) in \( q \)

The reader is encouraged to prove this theorem without appealing to (43)\( \star \) or any other \( \star \)-theorem (and without the benefit of the proof in the Appendix).

(256) Theorems: Properties That Are Necessarily Such That \( \varphi \). There are modally strict proofs of the claims: (.1) if \( G \) is necessarily such that \( \varphi \), then

\[
ix(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv q))\]

encodes \( G \), and (.2) if \( G \) is necessarily such that \( \varphi \), then necessarily, \( ix(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv q)) \) encodes \( G \) if and only if \( G \) is such that \( \varphi \): condition fails to be valid.

Similarly, if we consider the negation of \( P \), namely \( \overline{P} \), with respect to the interpretation described above, then the following consequence of the Abstraction Principle fails to be necessarily true in the right-to-left direction:

\( f \) \( \vdash \vdash \)

To see that it is possible for the right condition of (f) to be true while the left condition false, we may reason as follows. Since \( P_b \) is true at \( w_0 \) in the interpretation we’ve described, \( \overline{P} \) is false at \( w_0 \) and so \( ix(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv Fb)) \) fails to encode \( P \) at \( w_0 \). Since the properties an abstract object fails to encode are properties it necessarily fails to encode (177.7), it follows that \( iy(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv Fb)) \) fails to exemplify \( P \) at \( w_1 \). But, by hypothesis, \( P_b \) is false at \( w_1 \) and so \( \overline{P} \) is true at \( w_1 \). Hence, \( w_1 \) is a witness to the truth of the following possibility claim:

\( \Box( P_b \& \neg ix(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv Fb)) \overline{P} ) \)

Since this shows that the right-to-left direction of (f) isn’t necessarily true in this interpretation, the necessitation of this direction fails to be valid.\(^{172}\) Since (b) is not an axiom, any proof of (b) must infer it by Modus Ponens from two previous lines in the proof. One of those lines has to be our \( \star \text{Fact } P_b \) and the other has to be the right-to-left direction of the Abstraction Principle (253)\( \star \). In other words, any proof of (b) must either include the lines \( P_b \) (\( \star \text{Fact} \)) and \( P_b \rightarrow ix(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv Fb))P \) (253)\( \star \). But such lines aren’t necessary truths. See the second part of footnote 171 for the reasoning that shows why the right-to-left direction of the Abstraction Principle isn’t necessary.
The proof of (.1) in the Appendix uses Actualized Abstraction (255), and the proof of (.2) utilizes (.1). Note that (.2) describes sufficient conditions under which instances of the Abstraction Principle, as formulated in (253)⋆, become necessary truths, namely, when \( G \) is a property that is necessarily such that \( \varphi \).

\[ (.1) \quad \Box \varphi \rightarrow \Box (A!x & \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi)) \]

\[ \text{provided } x \text{ doesn't occur free in } \varphi \text{ and } G \text{ is substitutable for } F \text{ in } \varphi \]

\[ (.2) \quad \Box \varphi \rightarrow \Box (A!x & \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi)) \]

\[ \text{provided } x \text{ doesn't occur free in } \varphi \text{ and } G \text{ is substitutable for } F \text{ in } \varphi \]

Theorems: Facts About Strict Canonocity. When \( \varphi \) is a rigid condition on properties, it is a modally strict fact that (.1) if \( x \) is an abstract individual that encodes exactly the properties such that \( \varphi \), then necessarily \( x \) is an abstract individual that encodes exactly the properties such that \( \varphi \):

\[ (.1) \quad (A!x & \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi)) \rightarrow \Box (A!x & \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi)) \]

\[ \text{provided } \varphi \text{ is a rigid condition on properties in which } x \text{ doesn't occur free.} \]

Moreover, when \( \varphi \) is a rigid condition on properties, it is a modally strict fact that (.2) anything identical to a strictly canonical individual both exemplifies being abstract and encodes all and only the properties such that \( \varphi \):

\[ (.2) \quad y = \Box (A!x & \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi)) \rightarrow (A!y & \forall F(yF \equiv \varphi)) \]

\[ \text{provided } \varphi \text{ is a rigid condition on properties in which } x \text{ doesn't occur free.} \]

Thus, theorem (251)⋆ has a modally strict special case, namely, when the description \( \Box (A!x & \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi)) \) is strictly canonical.

Finally, we note that the Abstraction Principle formulated in (253)⋆ becomes a modally strict theorem with respect to strictly canonical objects:
(3) $ix(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi))G \equiv \varphi^G$, provided $\varphi$ is a rigid condition on properties in which both $x$ doesn’t occur free and $G$ is substitutable for $F$.

As it turns out, however, (2) will be more useful than (3). Since we’ll introduce many new terms using a definition-by-identity in which the definiens is a strictly canonical description, (2) becomes immediately applicable to the identity statements such definitions make available as theorems.

(259) **Remark:** Some Examples of Strictly Canonical Individuals. In item (248), we presented a series of instances of the Strengthened Comprehension Principle for Abstract Objects. The last three are examples of strictly canonical individuals. Consider the following canonical descriptions based on those last three examples:

(a) $ix(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \Box Fy))$

(b) $ix(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv F = G))$

(c) $ix(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \Box \forall y(Gy \rightarrow Fy)))$

These are all instances of $ix(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi))$ and, hence, significant, by (249). Moreover, in each case, the formula $\varphi$ in question is a rigid condition on properties, i.e., $\vdash \Box \forall F(\varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi)$. We can see this as follows:

- In example (a), $\varphi$ is $\Box Fy$. But as an instance of the 4 schema (165.5), we know $\Box Fy \rightarrow \Box \Box Fy$, i.e., $\varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi$. Hence, by applying GEN, we have $\forall F(\varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi)$.

- In example (b), $\varphi$ is $F = G$, and so by (126.1), we know that $\varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi$. So, again, by GEN we have $\forall F(\varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi)$.

- In example (c), $\varphi$ is $\Box \forall y(Gy \rightarrow Fy)$. Hence we can reason as we did in (a), by way of the 4 schema, to establish $\forall F(\varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi)$.

Thus, (a) – (c) are examples of strictly canonical individuals.

(260) **Definitions:** Null and Universal Objects. We say: (1) $x$ is a *null* object just in case $x$ is an abstract object that encodes no properties; and (2) $x$ is a *universal* object just in case $x$ is an abstract object that encodes every property:

(1) $Null(x) \equiv_{df} A!x \& \neg \exists FxF$

(2) $Universal(x) \equiv_{df} A!x \& \forall FxF$

We are taking advantage here of our conventions in (17.2) by using object language variables as the free variables in the definiens and definiendum, instead of metavariables. Moreover, since for any individual term $\kappa$, the claim $A!\kappa$ implies $\kappa \downarrow$, no existence clauses have to be added to the definiens for (1) and (2), for the reasons noted in Remark (36).
Theorems: Existence and Uniqueness of Null and Universal Objects. It
is now easily established that (.1) there is a unique null object, and (.2) there is
a unique universal object:

(1) $\exists x \text{Null}(x)$

(2) $\exists x \text{Universal}(x)$

Consequently, it follows, by a modally strict proof that (.3) the null object ex-
ists, and (.4) the universal object exists:

(3) $\downarrow \text{Null}(x)$

(4) $\downarrow \text{Universal}(x)$

Definitions: Notation for the Null and Universal Objects. We now intro-
duce new constants to designate the null object and the universal object:

(1) $a_\emptyset = \downarrow \text{Null}(x)$

(2) $a_V = \downarrow \text{Universal}(x)$

Since $\downarrow \text{Null}(x)$ and $\downarrow \text{Universal}(x)$ are provably significant, the Rule of Iden-
tity by Definition (121.1) tells us that definitions become theorems asserting
identities.

Theorems: Facts Implied by the Foregoing. We begin with some facts
about the conditions $\text{Null}(x)$ and $\text{Universal}(x)$: (.1) if $x$ is a null object, then
necessarily $x$ is a null object, and (.2) if $x$ is a universal object, then necessarily
$x$ is a universal object:

(1) $\text{Null}(x) \rightarrow \square \text{Null}(x)$

(2) $\text{Universal}(x) \rightarrow \square \text{Universal}(x)$

We may also prove, by modally strict means, that (.3) the null object is a null
object; (.4) the universal object is a universal object; (.5) the null object is not
identical to the universal object; (.6) the null object is identical to the (canonical)
abstract object that encodes all and only non-self-identical properties; and
(.7) the universal object is identical to the (canonical) abstract object that en-
codes all and only self-identical properties:

(3) $\text{Null}(a_\emptyset)$

(4) $\text{Universal}(a_V)$

(5) $a_\emptyset \neq a_V$

(6) $a_\emptyset = \downarrow (\exists x!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv F \neq F))$
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\( \alpha_V = \bar{x}(A!x & \forall F(xF \equiv F=F)) \)

Though these theorems sound trivial, their proof by modally strict means is not.

(264) Remark: A Rejected Alternative. Now that we’ve seen how to obtain a modally strict proof of (263.3) and (263.6), one might wonder whether it would have been simpler to define \( \alpha_\varnothing \) directly as:

\( \alpha_\varnothing = \bar{x}(A!x & \forall F(xF \equiv F=F)) \)

This alternative definition (8) is certainly legitimate, but we have a good reason for not deploying it. Since (8) defines \( \alpha_\varnothing \) as the abstract object that encodes all and only non-self-identical properties, it does not explicitly introduce \( \alpha_\varnothing \) as the null object. Of course, one can use (8) to derive that \( \alpha_\varnothing \) is a unique null object, i.e., that both \( \text{Null}(\alpha_\varnothing) \) and \( \forall y(\text{Null}(y) \rightarrow y=\alpha_\varnothing) \). One could then start referencing it as ‘the null object’. But this fails to take advantage of the fact that our system allows us to properly define the condition \( \text{Null}(x) \) as \( A!x & \neg \exists FxF \), prove \( \exists!x \text{Null}(x) \), show \( \bar{x} \text{Null}(x) \), and then use the well-defined description \( \bar{x} \text{Null}(x) \) to introduce the notation \( \alpha_\varnothing \). If we are going to use the expression \( \alpha_\varnothing \) to name the null object, the correct way to do so is to define \( \alpha_\varnothing \) as \( \bar{x} \text{Null}(x) \) after having shown that the latter is significant. But once we do this, it takes a little work to show that \( \alpha_\varnothing \) can be instantiated into its own defining matrix by a modally strict proof.

A similar observation may be made about whether it might have been simpler to define \( \alpha_V \) directly as \( \bar{x}(A!x & \forall F(xF \equiv F=F)) \).

(265) Theorems: Facts About the Granularity of Relations. The following facts govern the granularity of relational properties having abstract constituents:

(1) for any relation \( R \), there are distinct abstract objects \( x \) and \( y \) for which \( \text{bearing } R \text{ to } x \) is identical to \( \text{bearing } R \text{ to } y \), and (2) for any relation \( R \), there are distinct abstract objects \( x \) and \( y \) for which \( \text{being a } z \text{ such that } x \text{ bears } R \text{ to } z \) is identical to \( \text{being a } z \text{ such that } y \text{ bears } R \text{ to } z \):

\( \forall R \exists x \exists y (A!x & A!y & x \neq y & [\lambda z Rzx]=[\lambda z Ryz]) \)

\( \forall R \exists x \exists y (A!x & A!y & x \neq y & [\lambda z Rzx]=[\lambda z Ryz]) \)

These theorems are to be expected if we think semantically for the moment and reconsider the Aczel models discussed in Chapter 3. Recall that for the

\[ ^{173} \text{Let } \varphi \text{ be the formula } F \neq F \text{ and let } \chi \text{ be the formula } A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv F=F). \text{ Now by applying GEN to an appropriate instance of (170.2), we have a modally strict proof of } \forall F(\varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi). \text{ Since } \varphi \text{ is therefore a rigid condition on properties (257.1), (8) defines } \alpha_\varnothing \text{ as a strictly canonical object. So the identity } \alpha_\varnothing = \bar{x} \chi \text{ licensed by (8) implies } \chi_\varnothing = \chi_\varnothing, \text{ i.e., } A! \alpha_\varnothing \& \forall F(\alpha_\varnothing F \equiv F \neq F), \text{ by (258.2). But from this we can derive } \text{Null}(\alpha_\varnothing) \text{ since all that remains to be shown is that the second conjunct implies } \neg \exists F \alpha_\varnothing F \text{ (exercise). Moreover, it is then easy to establish that } \forall y(\text{Null}(y) \rightarrow y=\alpha_\varnothing) \text{ (exercise).} \]
purpose of modeling the theory, abstract objects were represented as sets of properties (though for the reasons pointed out in Section 3.6, we shouldn’t confuse abstract objects with the sets that represent them in Aczel models). Now consider any relation \( R \). Cantor’s Theorem now tells us there can’t be a distinct property \( \text{bearing } R \text{ to } s \) for each distinct set \( s \) of properties, for then we would have a one-to-one mapping from the power set of the set of properties into a subset of the set of properties. This model-theoretic fact is captured by the above theorem: there can’t be a distinct property \( \text{bearing } R \text{ to } x \) for each distinct abstract object \( x \). Thus, Cantor’s Theorem isn’t violated: there are so many abstract objects that for some distinct abstract objects \( x \) and \( y \), the property \( \text{bearing } R \text{ to } x \) collapses to the property \( \text{bearing } R \text{ to } y \). This is just what one expects given that two powerful principles, comprehension for abstract objects (53) and comprehension for properties (189.2), are true simultaneously.

It also follows that, for any property \( F \), there are distinct abstract objects \( x, y \) such that \( \text{that-}Fx \) is identical to \( \text{that-}Fy \):

\[
(3) \quad \forall F \exists x \exists y (A!x \& A!y \& x \neq y \& [\lambda Fx] = [\lambda Fy])
\]

This is as expected, given (.1) and (.2).

(266) **Theorem:** Abstract Objects Are Not Strictly Leibnizian. A previous theorem, (265.1), has a rather interesting consequence, namely, that there exist distinct abstract objects that exemplify exactly the same properties:\(^{174}\)

\[
\exists x \exists y (A!x \& A!y \& x \neq y \& \forall F (Fx \equiv Fy))
\]

In other words, there are distinct abstract objects that are indiscernible with respect to the properties they exemplify.\(^{175}\) The proof of this claim begins by instantiating theorem (265.1) to the relation \([\lambda xy \forall F (Fx \equiv Fy)]\).

Thus classical Leibnizian indiscernibility doesn’t imply the identity of abstract objects. Nevertheless, in light of theorem (242.1), a related form of the identity of indiscernibles applies to abstract objects: such objects are identical whenever they are indiscernible with respect to the properties they encode.

(267) **Remark:** In Preparation for Kirchner’s Theorem. Daniel Kirchner, deploying tools developed by, and in collaboration with, Christoph Benzmüller, has been implementing object theory in Isabelle/HOL.\(^{176}\) This implementation consists of two parts: (a) a shallow semantic embedding of object theory

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\(^{174}\) I am indebted to Peter Aczel for pointing out (in email correspondence, 11 November 1996) that this theorem results once impredicatively-defined relations are allowed into the system.

\(^{175}\) If one recalls the structure of the Aczel models, this result is to be expected. When properties are modeled as sets of urelements, and abstract objects are modeled as sets of properties, then the claim that an abstract object \( x \) exemplifies a property \( F \) is true just in case the special urelement that serves as the proxy of \( x \) is an element of \( F \). Consequently, since distinct abstract objects must sometimes have the same proxy, some distinct abstract objects exemplify the same properties.

\(^{176}\) See Kirchner 2017 [2020], Kirchner, Benzmüller, & Zalta 2020, and Kirchner’s GitHub repository at https://github.com/ekpyron/TAO/tree/NewAOT.
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in Isabelle/HOL, and (b) a reconstruction of PLM’s deductive system. (a) The shallow semantic embedding uses the infrastructure of Isabelle/HOL (which includes set theory in the framework of functional type theory) to (i) construct enhanced Aczel models of object theory, (ii) reconstruct (i.e., define) the syntax of object theory in terms of this model (by preserving and using as much of the syntax of Isabelle/HOL as possible), and (iii) prove that the axioms of object theory, thus reconstructed, are true in the model. (b) Using the shallow semantic embedding as a basis, Kirchner implements object theory computationally by rebuilding its deductive system, as developed here, on top of the reconstructed axioms. Thus, the automated/interactive reasoning system that results doesn’t imply any artifactual theorems, i.e., doesn’t imply the set-theoretic consequences of the Aczel model that are not expressible in the language of object theory or those that are expressible but not derivable in object theory.

The two key principles of Aczel’s models of object theory are that (a) properties can be modeled as sets of urelements (and relations as sets of \( n \)-tuples of urelements), and (b) abstract objects can be modeled as sets of properties. However, the urelements include a subdomain of special proxy individuals that stand in for abstract objects when evaluating exemplification formulas. As noted in Chapter 3, distinct abstract objects must sometimes have the same proxy (given that there are more sets of properties than there are urelements), and so Aczel models demonstrate why there are distinct but indiscernible abstract objects. Only encoding formulas can discriminate among distinct but indiscernible abstract objects and these formulas can’t always express new properties or relations on pain of contradiction, for otherwise, we could establish a one-to-one correlation from the set of abstract objects (i.e., the set of sets of properties) to a subset of the set of properties, in violation of Cantor’s Theorem.

Therefore, in building the shallow semantic embedding of object theory in Isabelle/HOL, Kirchner’s construction of enhanced Aczel models is based on a principle governing the conditions under which a formula \( \varphi \) expresses a property or relation, i.e., may serve as a matrix for a significant \( \lambda \)-expression (or as a matrix for the comprehension principle for relations). Intuitively, the idea is

\[ \text{Automated reasoning in object theory, to derive consequences of premises, takes place directly with respect to the formulas so defined, which are subject to the logic implemented in Isabelle/HOL. This stands in contrast to a deep semantic embedding, in which (i) each element of the language of object theory would be represented in Isabelle/HOL in terms of an inductive data structure that realizes the BNF, and (ii) the semantics of object theory would be stated, and a formula would be evaluated, by recursively traversing the data structure and translating it into the language of Isabelle/HOL. In a deep semantic embedding, automated reasoning about object theory, to derive theorems and consequences of premises, would take place only after each formula is semantically evaluated in Isabelle/HOL’s infrastructure, since those semantic evaluations are governed by the logic implemented in Isabelle/HOL.} \]
that \( \varphi \) is a matrix for a significant \( \lambda \)-expression just in case \( \varphi \) can’t distinguish between indiscernible objects, i.e., \( \varphi \) can’t distinguish between objects that exemplify the same properties. When the current formulations of axioms (39.2) and (49) were put into place, Kirchner found a proof of his principle in the theory itself.\(^{178}\) We present this theorem next; the proof in the Appendix was developed on the basis of Kirchner’s proof sketch.

(268) Theorem: Kirchner’s Theorem. In the 1-place case, Kirchner’s Theorem asserts that a \( \lambda \)-expression of the form \( [\lambda x \varphi] \) signifies a property just in case necessarily, for any indiscernible objects \( x \) and \( y \) (i.e., for any objects that exemplify the same properties), \( \varphi \) is equivalent to \( \varphi^y_x \). The theorem can be stated formally as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
(1) \quad [\lambda x \varphi] &\downarrow \equiv \square \forall x \forall y (\forall F(Fx \equiv Fy) \rightarrow (\varphi \equiv \varphi^y_x)), \\
&\text{provided } y \text{ doesn’t occur free in } \varphi.
\end{align*}
\]

As long as it is a necessary fact that \( \varphi \) can’t distinguish among indiscernible objects, then \( [\lambda x \varphi] \) is significant, even if the initial \( \lambda \) binds variables in encoding formula subterms.

Kirchner’s Theorem generalizes to:

\[
\begin{align*}
(2) \quad [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi] &\downarrow \equiv \\
&\square \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n \forall y_1 \ldots \forall y_n (\forall F(Fx_1 \ldots x_n \equiv Fy_1 \ldots y_n) \rightarrow (\varphi \equiv \varphi^{y_1 \ldots y_n}_{x_1 \ldots x_n})), \\
&\text{for } n \geq 1, \text{ provided } y_1, \ldots, y_n \text{ don’t occur free in } \varphi.
\end{align*}
\]

In other words, \( [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi] \) exists just in case necessarily, \( \varphi \) and \( \varphi^{y_1 \ldots y_n}_{x_1 \ldots x_n} \) are equivalent with respect to any objects \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) and \( y_1, \ldots, y_n \) that exemplify the same relations.

To see (1) in action, notice that it predicts that if \( \varphi \) fails right-hand condition, then \( [\lambda x \varphi] \) is not significant. To see a simple example, we show that there are properties \( G \) such that \( [\lambda x xG] \) fails to signify a property because the right-hand condition of the principle fails for the formula \( xG \). To see this, note that by the previous theorem, there are distinct abstract objects that are indiscernible. Let \( a \) and \( b \) be such objects, so that we know \( a = b \) and \( \forall F(Fa \equiv Fb) \). Since \( a \) and \( b \) are distinct, then without loss of generality, let \( G \) be a property such that \( aG \) and \( \neg bG \). Then we know \( \neg(aG \equiv bG) \). So we have \( \forall F(Fa \equiv Fb) \rightarrow \neg(aG \equiv bG) \). Hence, \( \exists x \exists y (\forall F(Fx \equiv Fy) \& \neg(xG \equiv yG)) \). So \( \diamond \exists x \exists y (\forall F(Fx \equiv Fy) \& \neg(xG \equiv yG)) \). Hence, the right side of the above principle is false, and so it follows that \( \neg[\lambda xxG] \downarrow \), for any \( G \) that can distinguish between indiscernible abstract objects.

(269) Theorem: Corollary to Kirchner’s Theorem. It follows from Kirchner’s Theorem and the fact that indiscernibles are necessarily indiscernible (238)

\(^{178}\)Personal email communication, 3 March 2020.
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that if a \( \lambda \)-expression of the form \([\lambda x \varphi]\) signifies a property, then \( \varphi \) and \( \varphi^y_x \) are necessarily equivalent with respect to any indiscernible objects \( x \) and \( y \):

\[
(1) \quad \downarrow [\lambda x \varphi] \rightarrow \forall x \forall y (\forall F (Fx \equiv Fy) \rightarrow \Box (\varphi \equiv \varphi^y_x)),
\]

provided \( y \) doesn’t occur free in \( \varphi \).

And the theorem generalizes to:

\[
(2) \quad \downarrow [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi] \rightarrow \\
\forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n \forall y_1 \ldots \forall y_n (\forall F (Fx_1 \ldots x_n \equiv Fy_1 \ldots y_n) \rightarrow \Box (\varphi \equiv \varphi^y_{x_1 \ldots x_n})),
\]

for \( n \geq 1 \), provided \( y_1, \ldots, y_n \) don’t occur free in \( \varphi \).

In other words, if a \( \lambda \)-expression of the form \([\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi]\) signifies a relation, then \( \varphi \) and \( \varphi^y_{x_1 \ldots x_n} \) are necessarily equivalent with respect to any objects \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) and \( y_1, \ldots, y_n \) that exemplify the same relations.

9.12 Propositional Properties

(270) Definition: Propositional Properties. Let us say that a property \( F \) is propositional iff for some proposition \( p \), \( F \) is being such that \( p \):

\[
\text{Propositional}(F) \equiv_{df} \exists p (F = [\lambda y \ p])
\]

Note that if a property term \( \Pi \) is known to be empty (either as a theorem or by hypothesis), then by (108.1), it follows that \( \neg([\Pi = [\lambda y \ p]]) \), for any \( p \); i.e., it follows that \( \neg \exists p ([\Pi = [\lambda y \ p]]) \). So, in that case, we can derive \( \text{Propositional}(\Pi) \). So no existence clauses are needed in the definiens to ensure that the definiendum is false when the variable \( F \) in the definition is instanced by an empty term.

(271) Theorems: Existence of Propositional Properties. (1) For any proposition (or state of affairs) \( p \), the propositional property being an individual such that \( p \) exists.

\[
(1) \quad \forall p ([\lambda y \ p] \downarrow)
\]

Next, we leave it to the reader to find two different proofs of the following theorem schema, namely, that (2) being an individual such that \( \varphi \) exists:

\[
(2) \quad [\lambda v \varphi] \downarrow, \text{where } \varphi \text{ is any formula in which } v \text{ doesn’t occur free}
\]

Moreover, (3) if \( F \) is being such that \( p \), then necessarily, for any \( x, x \) exemplifies \( F \) iff \( p \) is true:

\[
(3) \quad F = [\lambda y \ p] \rightarrow \Box \forall x (Fx \equiv p)
\]

Finally, (4) if \( F \) is propositional, then necessarily \( F \) is propositional:

\[
(4) \quad \text{Propositional}(F) \rightarrow \Box \text{Propositional}(F)
\]
Propositional properties play an extremely important role in some of the applications of object theory in later chapters.

(272) **Definition:** Indiscriminate Properties. Let us say that a property \( F \) is **indiscriminate** if and only if necessarily, if anything exemplifies \( F \) then everything exemplifies \( F \):

\[
\text{Indiscriminate}(F) \equiv_{df} F \downarrow \& \Box(\exists x Fx \rightarrow \forall x Fx)
\]

Clearly, then, if \( F \) is indiscriminate, then there are no objects \( x \) and \( y \) such that \( Fx \) exemplifies \( F \) and \( \neg Fy \) (exercise).

**Exercise.** Explain why \( F \downarrow \) is needed as a conjunct in the definiens, i.e., show that without this existence clause, then when \( \Pi \) is an empty property term, one can derive the simpler definiens \( \Box(\exists x \Pi x \rightarrow \forall x \Pi x) \), and hence \( \text{Indiscriminate}(F) \), using axiom \((39.5.a)\) and standard quantifier and modal reasoning.

(273) **Theorem:** Propositional Properties are Indiscriminate. It follows from our two previous definitions that propositional properties are indiscriminate:

\[
\text{Propositional}(F) \rightarrow \text{Indiscriminate}(F)
\]

(274) **Theorem:** Other Facts About Indiscriminate Properties. Some of the following facts will prove useful in later chapters: (.1) necessary properties are indiscriminate; (.2) impossible properties are indiscriminate; (.3) \( E!, E!, O!, \) and \( A! \) are not indiscriminate; and (.4) \( E!, E!, O!, \) and \( A! \) are not propositional properties.

(1) \( \text{Necessary}(F) \rightarrow \text{Indiscriminate}(F) \)

(2) \( \text{Impossible}(F) \rightarrow \text{Indiscriminate}(F) \)

(3) (.a) \( \neg \text{Indiscriminate}(E!) \)
    (.b) \( \neg \text{Indiscriminate}(E!) \)
    (.c) \( \neg \text{Indiscriminate}(O!) \)
    (.d) \( \neg \text{Indiscriminate}(A!) \)

(4) (.a) \( \neg \text{Propositional}(E!) \)
    (.b) \( \neg \text{Propositional}(E!) \)
    (.c) \( \neg \text{Propositional}(O!) \)
    (.d) \( \neg \text{Propositional}(A!) \)

(275) **Theorems:** Propositional Properties, Necessity, and Possibility. The following claims about propositional properties can be established: (.1) if \( F \) might
be a propositional property, then it is one; (.2) if $F$ isn’t a propositional property, then necessarily it isn’t; (.3) if $F$ is a propositional property, then necessarily it is; and (.4) if $F$ might not be a propositional property, then it isn’t one:

$$\begin{align*}
(.1) & & (\diamond \exists p (F = [\lambda y \ p])) \rightarrow \exists p (F = [\lambda y \ p]) \\
(.2) & & \forall p (F \neq [\lambda y \ p]) \rightarrow \Box \forall p (F \neq [\lambda y \ p]) \\
(.3) & & \exists p (F = [\lambda y \ p]) \rightarrow \Box \exists p (F = [\lambda y \ p]) \\
(.4) & & (\diamond \forall p (F \neq [\lambda y \ p])) \rightarrow \forall p (F \neq [\lambda y \ p])
\end{align*}$$

(276) Theorems: Propositional Properties and Encoding. It is provable that:

(.1) if it is possible that every property that $x$ encodes is propositional, then in fact every property $x$ encodes is propositional, and (.2) if every property that $x$ encodes is propositional, then necessarily every property $x$ encodes is propositional:

$$\begin{align*}
(.1) & & (\diamond \forall F (xF \rightarrow \exists p (F = [\lambda y \ p]))) \rightarrow \forall F (xF \rightarrow \exists p (F = [\lambda y \ p])) \\
(.2) & & \forall F (xF \rightarrow \exists p (F = [\lambda y \ p])) \rightarrow \Box \forall F (xF \rightarrow \exists p (F = [\lambda y \ p]))
\end{align*}$$

Intuitively, this is a consequence of the rigidity of encoding; the condition of encoding only propositional properties is rigid (modally collapsed) and doesn’t admit of modal distinctions.

### 9.13 Explanatory Remarks on Definitions

The discussion in the following Remarks help to justify the theory of definitions-by-=$=$ developed earlier in this chapter. The first Remark, (277) is designed to help one see why the classical theory of definitions designed for classical logic needs to be refined for the modal contexts in the present system. Remark (277) doesn’t require any familiarity with our previous discussion of the inferential role of definitions. The second Remark (278) is designed to help one understand the motivations underlying the primitive Rule of Definition by Identity (74). The final Remark (279) offers examples of definitions for which the proof that the definiens is significant fails to be modally strict. This Remark may be skipped by those who aren’t concerned at present with the application of the system.

(277) Remark: Transitioning Away From the Classical Theory of Definitions by Identity – The Problem of Modality. Let’s consider the ways in which the classical theory of definitions-by-=$=$ fails for a system like the present one. The
classical theory of such definitions is usually formulated for a non-modal, first-order predicate calculus with identity, but *without* definite descriptions. In such systems, it is sometimes provable that $\exists x \varphi$ where, for simplicity, $x$ is the only variable that occurs free in $\varphi$. In such situations, one may introduce, by definition, a new individual constant, say $\delta$, to designate the object satisfying $\varphi$. But since there are no definite descriptions in the language, one can’t formulate the definition as $\delta = \equivaxiomatic{\varphi}$. Instead, when $\vdash \exists x \varphi$, one must introduce $\delta$ with a definition-by-$\equiv$, i.e., by stipulating:

$$\delta = x = \equivaxiomatic{\varphi}$$

(cf. Suppes 1957, 159–60; Gupta 2014, Section 2.4). For the purposes of our discussion, we shall continue to assume that $x$ is the only variable that occurs free in $\varphi$.

Now suppose that we allowed such definitions within the present system. Then since the above example implicitly guarantees that the (closures of the) equivalence $\delta = x = \equivaxiomatic{\varphi}$ are axioms, it correctly follows that $\delta \downarrow 179$. Moreover, the definition (also correctly) allows one to eliminate $\delta$ from any formula in which it subsequently occurs.\textsuperscript{180}

But this method of introducing new individual constants would be disastrous for the present system. To explain this by way of an example, suppose that the following two claims are provable as theorems:

(a) $\exists x \varphi$

(b) $\Diamond \neg \exists x \varphi$

\textsuperscript{179}The reasoning is straightforward. The definition licenses the axiom $\forall x (\delta = x = \equivaxiomatic{\varphi})$, since this is a universal closure of the equivalence $\delta = x = \equivaxiomatic{\varphi}$. But, by hypothesis, $\exists x \varphi$ is a theorem. Then suppose $\delta$ is such an object, so that we know both $\psi_k^\delta$ and $\forall y (\psi_l^y \rightarrow y = b)$, by the definition of the uniqueness quantifier (128). Instantiating the universal claim to $b$, it follows that $\delta = b = \equivaxiomatic{\varphi}$. Since we know $\psi_k^\delta$, it follows that $\delta = b$. So by (108.1), it follows that $\delta \downarrow 179$.

\textsuperscript{180}To see this, we show that $\psi_k^\delta$, i.e., any formula $\psi$ in which $\delta$ has been substituted for all the free occurrences of $x$, is equivalent to $\exists x \varphi \& \exists x (\varphi \& \psi)$. (\textsuperscript{\rightarrow}) Assume $\psi_k^\delta$. Since we’ve just seen that the definition of $\delta$ implies $\delta \downarrow 179$, we can conclude $\delta = \equivaxiomatic{\varphi}$ by instantiating $\delta$ into $\forall x (\delta = x = \equivaxiomatic{\varphi})$ (a universal closure licensed by the definition). And we can independently infer $\delta = \equivaxiomatic{\varphi}$ by instantiating $\delta$ into $\forall x (x = x)$, which is obtained by GEN from theorem (118.1). Hence, $\psi_k^\delta$. Conjoining what we know, we have $\psi_k^\delta \& \psi_l^\delta$. Hence, by $\exists x \varphi \& \exists x (\varphi \& \psi)$. But, by hypothesis, $\exists x \varphi$ is a theorem. Hence, $\exists x \varphi \& \exists x (\varphi \& \psi)$.

(\textsuperscript{\leftarrow}) Assume $\exists x \varphi \& \exists x (\varphi \& \psi)$, to show $\psi_k^\delta$. Let $a$ be a witness to the first conjunct, so that we know:

(C) $\psi_k^a \& \forall y (\psi_l^y \rightarrow y = a)$

And let $b$ be a witness to the second conjunct, so that we know:

(\xi) $\psi_l^b \& \forall y (\psi_l^y \rightarrow y = b)$

Then by the first conjunct of (C) and the definition of $\delta$, it follows that $\delta = a$. It follows from this and the second conjunct of (C) that $\forall y (\psi_l^y \rightarrow y = \delta)$. But this and the first conjunct of (\xi) imply $b = \delta$. So we may substitute $\delta$ for $b$ in the second conjunct of (\xi) to conclude $\psi_k^\delta$.\textsuperscript{\textsection 9. THE DEDUCTIVE SYSTEM PLM

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Since (a) is a theorem, the classical theory would allow one to stipulate:

(c) \( \delta = x \equiv q \)

Definition (c) would, in our system, allow us to take the (closures of) \( \delta = x \equiv q \) as axioms. So, for example, we would be able to take the following as axioms:

(d) \( \forall x (\delta = x \equiv q) \)

(e) \( \forall x (\Box(\delta = x \equiv q)) \)

But these would allow us to derive \( \Box \exists x q \), which contradicts (b). If well-formed definitions introduce contradictions, then something has gone wrong.

One might suggest here that in order to use (c) as a definition in our system, we have to require more than just \( \vdash \exists ! x q \). Instead, the suggestion goes, the condition \( \vdash \Box \exists ! x q \) is required. Such a condition would block the example we’ve been discussing since (b) couldn’t be a theorem if \( \vdash \Box \exists ! x q \). The latter implies, a fortiori, that \( \vdash \Box \exists ! x q \), but if (b) were a theorem, then \( \neg \Box \exists ! x q \) would be as well. Since the example essentially assumes that a contradiction is derivable, it can be discounted.

But this suggestion for preserving the classical theory doesn’t work. We can see why, at least intuitively, if we temporarily speak in the familiar idiom of semantically-primitive possible worlds. Suppose it were a theorem that \( \Box \exists ! x q \). This would be true even if there were just two possible worlds, \( w_a \) (the actual world) and \( w_1 \), and two distinct objects \( a \) and \( b \) such that \( a \) is uniquely \( q \) at \( w_a \) and \( b \) is uniquely \( q \) at \( w_1 \). In this modal situation, the equivalence licensed by definition (c), namely \( \delta = a \equiv q^a \), would fail to be necessary. For since the terms of our language are rigid, the definition would introduce \( \delta \) as a rigid designator of \( a \), since \( a \) is uniquely \( q \) at \( w_a \). So \( \delta = a \) would be true at \( w_1 \), since \( \delta \) rigidly denotes \( a \). But \( q^a \) would be false at \( w_1 \) since, by hypothesis, \( b \) is uniquely \( q \) at \( w_1 \). Hence, the equivalence \( \delta = a \equiv q^a \) would fail to be true at \( w_1 \). So the universalized modal equivalence (e), which is licensed by definition (c), can’t be true, since it has false instances.

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181To see why, suppose \( b \) is some witness to (a), so that we know \( q^b \) and \( \forall y (q^b \rightarrow y = b) \), by the definition of the uniqueness quantifier \( \exists ! x q \) (128). Then by (d) it follows that:

(f) \( \delta = b \equiv q^b \)

and by (e) it follows that:

(g) \( \Box(\delta = b \equiv q^b) \)

Now by the reasoning in footnote 179, definition (c) implies \( \delta \downarrow \). Hence by (126), we know:

(h) \( \delta = b \rightarrow \Box \delta = b \)

So we can establish \( q^b \rightarrow \Box q^b \) by a hypothetical syllogism chain, as follows: \( q^b \rightarrow \delta = b \), by (f); \( \delta = b \rightarrow \Box \delta = b \), by (h); and \( \Box \delta = b \rightarrow \Box q^b \), by (g) and the modal theorem \( \Box(\psi \equiv \chi) \rightarrow (\Box \psi \equiv \Box \chi) \) (158.6). Having thus established that \( q^b \rightarrow \Box q^b \), then since we know \( q^b \), it follows that \( \Box q^b \).

Hence, by \( \exists !, \exists x q \). So by the Buridan formula (168.1), \( \Box \exists ! x q \), which contradicts (b).
But another suggestion along these lines presents itself, namely, that definition (c) becomes legitimate if we require that $\exists! x \square \phi$, instead of $\square \exists! x \phi$, be a theorem. Unfortunately, this suggestion fails as well. That’s because $\exists! x \square \phi$ can be true while $\exists! x \phi$ is not. Intuitively, from the fact that there is exactly one thing which is $\phi$ at every possible world, it doesn’t follow that there is exactly one thing which is in fact $\phi$. Suppose there were just two things $a$ and $b$, and just two worlds $w_n$ and $w_1$, and that $a$ exemplifies $P$ at both $w_n$ and $w_1$, and that $b$ exemplifies $P$ only at $w_n$. Then, in that modal situation, at $w_n$, there is exactly one object (namely $a$) that exemplifies $P$ at every world, i.e., $\exists! x \square P x$. But it is not the case, at $w_n$, that there is exactly one thing that exemplifies $P$, since both $a$ and $b$ exemplify $P$ there. Thus, given only that $\vdash \exists! x \square \phi$, we can’t define $\delta$ by saying $\delta = x \equiv_{df} \phi$, since $\vdash \exists! x \square \phi$ doesn’t guarantee $\vdash \exists! x \phi$.

By now, it may be apparent that if one wants to stipulate $\delta = x \equiv_{df} \phi$, the conditions $\vdash \exists! x \square \phi$ and $\vdash \exists! x \phi$ are both required. But we shall not adapt the classical theory of definitions by introducing new individual constants in this way. Instead, we shall typically introduce a new individual constant when we know that $\vdash \exists x \phi$ and $x$ is the sole variable that occurs free in $\phi$. For then, the definition-by-identity:

$\begin{align*}
(c') \quad \delta & =_{df} \exists x \phi
\end{align*}$

introduces the rigidly-designating constant $\delta$ by way of a significant, rigidly-designating description. This blocks the example that was problematic for the classical theory because $(c')$ doesn’t license the equivalence $\delta = x \equiv \phi$ as axiomatic. Instead, as we’ll see in the next Remark, $(c')$ will imply the identity $\delta = \exists x \phi$ when it is known, by proof or by hypothesis, that $\exists x \phi \downarrow$. And we’ll see that one need not require that there be a proof of $\exists x \phi \downarrow$ to introduce $(c')$ – the inferential role of definitions by identity will imply that $\neg \delta \downarrow$ if $\neg \exists x \phi \downarrow$. So we shall defer further discussion of the inferential role of $(c')$ until Remark (278). Moreover, we postpone, until Remark (279), the discussion of what $(c')$ implies when the proof that $\exists x \phi \downarrow$ is a $\star$-theorem.

Two final observations are in order. The first is that we should follow the same procedures when introducing a new relation constant. We typically introduce such definitions only when the definiens is provably significant. Items (22.1), (22.2), and (227), which contain the definitions of $O!$, $A!$, and $\equiv_E$, respectively, are examples:

$\begin{align*}
O! & =_{df} [\lambda x \Diamond E! x] \\
A! & =_{df} [\lambda x \Diamond E! x]
\end{align*}$

However, $\vdash \exists! x \square \phi$ is sufficient to block the case that led to the original contradiction described above, for one can’t simultaneously assert $\exists! x \square \phi$ and $\Diamond \neg \exists! \phi$. A contradiction would ensue without the mediation of any definitions. Moreover, it also blocks the case where, at each world, a different witness uniquely satisfies $\phi$, i.e., blocks the case where $\square \exists! \phi$ is true but not $\exists! x \phi$.
These definitions introduce new 1- and 2-place relation constants that are provably significant, respectively, by theorems (116.1), (116.2), and the discussion in (227). In the next Remark we’ll see exactly how the above definitions introduce the corresponding identities into our system.

The second and final observation is that the foregoing remarks about the definition of new individual and relation constants have to be generalized to definitions-by- in which there are free variables in the definiens and definitendum. This brings with it a new set of interesting issues, which are the subject of Remark (278).

(278) Remark: Definitions by Identity (With Free Variables) and Empty Terms. A definition-by- takes the following form, in which the distinct variables \( \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n \) \((n \geq 0)\) occur free:

\[
\tau(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n) = \text{df } \sigma(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n)
\]

In any given definition-by-=, the object-language variables that would instance the \( \alpha_i \) function as metavariables, by Convention (17.2.a).

The classical understanding of definitions-by- is that they implicitly assert identity axioms. So where \( \tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n \) are any terms substitutable for \( \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n \) respectively, and where \( \tau(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n) \) and \( \sigma(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n) \) abbreviate, respectively, \( \tau_{\alpha_1 \cdots \alpha_n} \) and \( \sigma_{\alpha_1 \cdots \alpha_n} \), then on the classical understanding, the above definition would introduce the closures of the following as an axiom schema:

\[
\tau(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n) = \sigma(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n)
\]

But such an understanding won’t work in the present system, given the problem of empty terms.

To understand the simplest form of the problem, consider a ‘classical’ theory such as the theory of real numbers, for illustrative purposes only. In that theory, mathematicians typically use a conditional to define division, i.e., to introduce \( x/y = z \), where \( x, y, z \) range over real numbers. They want to ignore terms like \( 3/0, 3/(\pi - \pi), 3/(3/0) \), etc., and so stipulate that:

\[
\text{If } y \neq 0, \text{ then the following definition holds, } x/y = \text{df } iz(x = y \cdot z)
\]

But if this definition is supposed to conservatively extend real number theory with new expressions and axioms, this is somewhat awkward. For now, one

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We discussed this example briefly in footnote 134. In the following discussion, we formulate this definition using a definite description as the definiens, so that we can use a definition-by- to introduce this kind of division; cf. Suppes 1957, §8.6, which introduces division using a definition-by-≡.
can’t specify the expanded language of real number theory (i.e., the one represented by the definition) so as to only include terms of the form \(x/y\) when \(y \neq 0\); for any general specification of the language would have to allow terms such as \(3/0\), \(3/(\pi - \pi)\), \(3/(3/0)\), etc., to be well-formed. You can’t conditionally specify the language to include those terms only if there is a proof that their denominator is not identical to 0, since you can’t specify the proof system until you specify the language. One could perhaps, as a way out, specify a sequence of language and proof system pairs, so that at each pair in the sequence, the proof system of that pair is used to specify the language of the next pair.

But this hardly seems like a good solution to the problem of definition by division. What is needed is a way to state the definition in a completely general way but so that (a) it doesn’t yield identities in which one of the terms is a division by 0, and (b) it gives one the ability to prove that such facts as \(\neg(3/0)\downarrow\), \(\neg(3/(\pi - \pi))\downarrow\), \(\neg(3/(3/0))\downarrow\), etc. We’ll see below how the Rule of Definition by Identity solves this problem. This solution starts by admitting that real number theory is most naturally expressed in a (free) logic that allows for complex terms that fail to have a denotation, such as \(3/0\), \(3/(\pi - \pi)\), \(3/(3/0)\), etc.

So, let’s now examine this same problem from the point of view of a theory like the present one, which allows for complex terms that may fail to denote. Consider the following definition, which has a single free variable in the definiens and definiendum and which we introduce for illustrative purposes only (though we’ve discussed this example in (27) in connection with a different issue):

\[(\delta) \quad t_y =_{df} ix(x = y)\]

This defines \(t_y\) (‘the \(y\)’) as the individual identical to \(y\). We’ve seen that our system asserts, as a theorem, that the definiens is significant (175.1), and this holds for any value assigned to \(y\). By Convention (17.2), the free variable \(y\) in \((\delta)\) functions as a metavariable, so that we know that \((\delta)\) has well-formed instances even when a non-denoting individual term is uniformly substituted for \(y\). In other words, \((\delta)\) is to be interpreted as the following definition schema:\footnote{We are ignoring the fact that, strictly speaking, even the variable \(x\) should be interpreted as a metavariable, for we now have established that alphabetic variants are interderivable. So the reasons for treating the bound variable \(x\) as a metavariable no longer apply.}

\[(\xi) \quad t_\kappa =_{df} ix(x = \kappa), \text{ provided } x \text{ doesn’t occur free in } \kappa\]

Thus, \(t_\kappa\) is well-formed, for any individual term \(\kappa\). When \(\kappa\) is a description of the form \(iz\varphi\), then the following is an instance of \((\delta)\), in its interpretation as \((\xi)\):

\[(\zeta) \quad t_{iz\varphi} =_{df} ix(x = iz\varphi), \text{ provided } x \text{ doesn’t occur free in } iz\varphi\]
Now, clearly, we can't suppose that the inferential role of \((\vartheta)\) or \((\xi)\) is to introduce the axiom schema:

\[
i_\kappa = ix(x = \kappa), \text{ provided } x \text{ doesn't occur free in } \kappa
\]

While this would be true when \(\kappa\) is a significant term, it fails when \(\kappa\) is empty; when \(\kappa\) is the provably empty description \(iz(Pz \& \neg Pz)\), then the following is not true:

\[
i_{iz(Pz \& \neg Pz)} = ix(x = iz(Pz \& \neg Pz))
\]

As we noted in Remark (27), identity statements can't be true when the terms flanking them are empty; nor do we plan to undertake heroic measures such as letting all empty descriptions denote some arbitrary object, such as the null object (262.1). So, what is the inferential role of definition \((\vartheta)\) and \((\xi)\)?

There is an additional issue to keep in mind before we answer this question. Since it is provable that \(\neg iz(Pz \& \neg Pz)\downarrow\) and hence that \(\neg ix(x = iz(Pz \& \neg Pz))\downarrow\), then it should be provable that \(\neg i_{iz(Pz \& \neg Pz)}\downarrow\). If the definiens is provably empty then the definiendum should be provably empty. After all, the expression \(i_{iz(Pz \& \neg Pz)}\) is well-formed even if its definiens doesn't have a denotation. So the inferential role of \((\vartheta)\) and \((\xi)\) should give us a means to conclude \(\neg i_{iz(Pz \& \neg Pz)}\downarrow\) when \(\neg ix(x = iz(Pz \& \neg Pz))\downarrow\). The former is well-formed and we know it to be true, but we need a means of proving it.

These observations explain why the classical theory of definition by identity doesn't work for the present system; a new understanding is required. This new understanding is embodied by the primitive Rule of Definition by Identity (74). To simplify the discussion of this metarule, let us consider definitions-by-\(=\) with only one free variable, i.e., definitions of the form \(\tau(\alpha) =_{df} \sigma(\alpha)\). Then the Rule of Definition by Identity stipulates that a definition of this form introduces an axiom that is a conjunction of two conditionals, expressible in the formal mode as follows: if \(\sigma(\tau_1)\) has a denotation, then the equation \(\tau(\tau_1) = \sigma(\tau_1)\) is true, and if \(\sigma(\tau_1)\) doesn't have a denotation, then neither does \(\tau(\tau_1)\). Formally, this would be captured as:

**Rule of Definition by Identity** (One-Free Variable)

Whenever \(\tau_1\) is substitutable for \(\alpha\) in \(\sigma\), then a definition-by-\(=\) of the form \(\tau(\alpha) =_{df} \sigma(\alpha)\) introduces the closures of the following, necessary axiom schema:

\[
(\omega) \quad (\sigma(\tau_1)\downarrow \to \tau(\tau_1) = \sigma(\tau_1)) \& (\neg \sigma(\tau_1) \downarrow \to \neg \tau(\tau_1) \downarrow)
\]

Though this rule gives rise to some interesting issues (discussed below), let's first see how it addresses the cases discussed so far.

First, consider the definition of division in real number theory. According to the Rule of Definition by Identity, the definition \(x/y =_{df} iz(x = y \cdot z)\) would introduce the axiom:
antecedent of the first conjunct of \( \omega \omega \)

Let’s consider how this applies to specific instances, starting with a case where in the language with new terms of the form \( \kappa/\kappa \)

the definition of division in real number theory in a general way – it extends

stance is to introduce the following necessary axiom (and hence a claim deriv-

So, the Rule of Definition by Identity says that the inferential role of this in-

definiens is empty.

Significant; and it allows us to prove that the definiendum is empty when the

\( \kappa \) and \( \kappa' \) is empty.

Second, reconsider \((\vartheta)\). Let \( \kappa \) be any individual term substitutable for \( y \) in \( \iota \chi(x = y) \). Then, on the proposed inferential role, \((\vartheta)\) would introduce the following, necessary axiom schema:

\[
(\omega') \quad (\iota \chi(x = \kappa) \uparrow \rightarrow \iota_\kappa = \iota \chi(x = \kappa)) \& (\neg (\iota \chi(x = \kappa) \uparrow) \rightarrow \neg \iota_\kappa \uparrow).
\]

Let’s consider how this applies to specific instances, starting with a case where the first conjunct of \((\omega')\) is operative, i.e., a case where we can show that the antecedent of the first conjunct of \((\omega')\) holds. Suppose \( \kappa \) is the constant \( a \), so that the relevant instance of definition \((\vartheta)\) is:

\[
i_a =_{df} \iota \chi(x = a)
\]

So, the Rule of Definition by Identity says that the inferential role of this in-

stance is to introduce the following necessary axiom (and hence a claim deriv-

able from any premises):

\[
(\omega''') \quad (\iota \chi(x = a) \uparrow \rightarrow \iota_a = \iota \chi(x = a)) \& (\neg (\iota \chi(x = a) \uparrow) \rightarrow \neg \iota_a \uparrow)
\]

\(^{185}\)For reductio, suppose \(((3/0) \cdot z) \uparrow\). Then by the axioms for multiplication, \((3/0) \cdot z = 3z/0\). But by the previous case we examined in the text, we saw that \(\neg (x/0) \uparrow \), for any \( x \), and so \(\neg (3z/0) \uparrow \).

Hence, \(\neg (3(3/0) \cdot z = 3z/0)\), by theorem \((108.2)\). Contradiction. Thus, \(\neg (3(3/0) \cdot z) \uparrow\) Alternatively, just assume that in the formulation of real number theory under consideration, which allows for empty complex terms, multiplication is axiomatized in such a way that the term \( \kappa \cdot \kappa' \) is empty if either \( \kappa \) or \( \kappa' \) is empty.
Clearly, the antecedent of the first conjunct is derivable: since \(\forall x (ix(x=y) \downarrow)\) is a theorem (175), it follows that \(\forall y (ix(x=y) \downarrow)\), and since \(a \downarrow\) is axiomatic (39.2), it follows that \(ix(x=a) \downarrow\). So the first conjunct of \((\omega'')\) yields \(\tau = ix(x=a)\) as a theorem. On this understanding, \((\delta)\) enables an appeal to this identity in any reasoning we might conduct.

Now consider a case where the second conjunct of \((\delta')\) is the operative one. Suppose \(k\) is the description \(iz\psi\), where \(\psi\) is \(Pz \& \neg Pz\), so that the relevant instance of definition \((\gamma)\) is:

\[
\tau = df \quad ix(x=iz\psi)
\]

Given the inferential role stipulated by the Rule of Definition by Identity, the above introduces the following as a necessary axiom:

\[
(\omega'') \quad (ix(x=iz\psi) \downarrow \rightarrow \tau = ix(x=iz\psi)) \& (\neg(ix(x=iz\psi) \downarrow) \rightarrow \neg\tau)
\]

Now the laws governing descriptions will guarantee that \(\neg(iz\psi \downarrow)\), and so by reasoning described in footnote 100, we can infer \(\neg(ix(x=iz\psi) \downarrow)\). It follows from the second conjunct of \((\omega'')\) that \(\neg(\tau)\). So on this understanding of \((\delta)\), we have a proof of \(\neg(\tau)\) from the fact that the definiens of \(\tau\) doesn’t have a denotation. We may therefore continue any reasoning we’re engaged in secure in the knowledge that no true exemplification, encoding, or identity formula will have \(\tau\) as a primary term.

At this point, we have sufficiently motivated the Rule of Definition by Identity (74) as a primitive metarule. The key to its formulation and generalization concerns the issues that arise for the classical understanding of definitions-by-\(=\) with free variables in the definiens and definiendum. In (74), the rule is formulated so that it governs definitions with \(n\)-free variables in the definiens and definiendum, i.e., so that it governs the introduction of \(n\)-ary term-forming operators. Thus, the foregoing remarks indicate the conditions under which we can preserve a classical understanding of the inferential role of term-forming operators. We can rest assured that term-forming operators introduced into our language by definition are logically well-behaved if they are significant when applied to appropriate arguments.

There is, however, one final issue to discuss. By guaranteeing that the definiendum is empty whenever the definiens is empty, the Rule of Definition by Identity does implement the garbage in, garbage out principle, but only in the first instance. For the rule still allows one to introduce new, impractical terms that have denotations even though the arguments to the term-forming operator do not. To illustrate the issue, we’ll consider some examples of new terms of the form \(\tau(\tau_1)\) that have denotations even though the argument term \(\tau_1\) does not. But the reader should note: these examples will not lead us to further refine the Rule of Definition by Identity so as to ensure that \(\tau(\tau_1)\) is provably empty if \(\tau_1\) is empty. That’s because the system already has terms
τ that denote even though τ contains empty subterms, and so adding new, defined terms of this sort won’t cause logical problems. Moreover, the refinements needed to forestall new, impractical terms would not only complicate the Rule of Definition by Identity significantly, but would also give rise to a problem of its own that requires even further revisions. So the following discussion is primarily for edification purposes; those interested in the issues surrounding a more sensitive rule might find the following discussion to be of value.

To see how the Rule of Definition by Identity yields impractical terms, consider the following definitions of the individual-term-forming operator \( a(\_\_\_\_) \) and the relation-term-forming operator \( \tau(\_\_\_\_) \):

(A) \( a_\psi =_{df} \_x(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv FY)) \)

(B) \( \tau =_{df} [\lambda y \neg]\)

Intuitively, the intent of these definitions is to identify new individuals and relations in terms of some given individuals and relations. But, in object theory, we shall be able to prove the following:

(a) \( \_x(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv F\psi)) \downarrow \), for any individual term \( \kappa \) in which \( x \) and \( F \) don’t occur free

(b) \( [\lambda y \neg] \downarrow \), for any property term \( \Pi \) in which \( y \) doesn’t occur free

It is worth a brief digression to explain why these hold even when \( \kappa \) and \( \Pi \) are terms that fail to have a denotation, though (b) should already be familiar from the discussion of example (E) in Remark (155).

If \( \kappa \) is a non-denoting description in which \( x \) and \( F \) don’t occur free, say \( iz\psi \), then consider the canonical description \( \_x(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv Fiz\psi)) \). This canonical description has a denotation; it denotes the abstract object that encodes no properties, since in such a case no property \( F \) is such that \( Fiz\psi \). It is a theorem that there is a unique abstract object that encodes no properties (261). So (a) is true when \( \kappa \) is assigned the non-denoting description \( iz\psi \). The current Rule of Definition by Identity allows us to derive, from definition (A), that \( a_{iz\psi} = \_x(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv Fiz\psi)) \). Thus, the new term \( a_{iz\psi} \) has a denotation even though its argument \( iz\psi \) does not.

Similarly, if \( \Pi \) is a non-denoting property expression in which \( y \) doesn’t occur free, say \( [\lambda z \psi] \), then consider the \( \lambda \)-expression \( [\lambda y \neg][\lambda z \psi]y \). This expression has a denotation; it denotes a universal property. Intuitively, if \( [\lambda z \psi] \) denotes nothing, then \( [\lambda z \psi]y \) is (universally) false and so \( [\lambda y \neg][\lambda z \psi]y \) denote a property that everything exemplifies. Therefore (b) is true when \( \Pi \) is \( [\lambda z \psi] \). The current Rule of Definition by Identity implies, given definition (B), that \( [\lambda z \psi] = \_x(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv Fiz\psi)) \). In this case, \( [\lambda z \psi] \) has a denotation even though \( [\lambda z \psi] \) does not – recall Remark (196).
So we've now seen:

- examples of empty terms $\kappa$ and $\Pi$ that occur as arguments in provably significant terms of the form (a) and (b),
- that, in these cases, the inferential role of (A) and (B) assigned by the Rule of Definition by Identity allows us to derive an identity claim governing $a_\kappa$ and $\Pi$, and
- that, in these cases, the definienda thereby provably have a denotation even though they consist of a term-forming operator that is operating on a non-denoting argument.

Since there are no significant logical issues posed by these facts, and the complications needed to forestall them are significant, we may simply ignore them. But if one were to rigorously pursue the garbage in, garbage out principle, one could take the following steps.

One could refine the Rule of Definition by Identity by having it stipulate: if the arguments to the definiens all have a denotation and the definiens (with the arguments substituted for the free variables) has a denotation, then the equation between the definiendum and definiens holds; otherwise, the definiendum fails to denote. In the case of a definition with one free variable, this could be stated formally as:

**Alternative Rule of Definition by Identity (1 free variable)**

Whenever $\tau_1$ is substitutable for $a$ in $\sigma$, then a definition-by-$=$ of the form $\tau(a) =_{df} \sigma(a)$ introduces the closures of the following, necessary axiom schema:

\[
(\omega) \quad ((\downarrow \tau_1 \& \downarrow \sigma(\tau_1)) \rightarrow (\tau(\tau_1) =_{df} \sigma(\tau_1))) \& ((\downarrow \neg \tau_1 \vee \neg \sigma(\tau_1)) \rightarrow \neg \tau(\tau_1))
\]

Before we explore how this would imply that impractical terms are empty, note that how this rule would be generalized for the definition of term-forming operators that take $n$ variables ($n \geq 0$):

**Alternative Rule of Definition by Identity ($n$ free variables)**

Whenever $\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n$ are substitutable, respectively, for $a_1, \ldots, a_n$ in $\sigma$, then a definition-by-$=$ of the form $\tau(a_1, \ldots, a_n) =_{df} \sigma(a_1, \ldots, a_n)$ introduces the closures of the following, necessary axiom schema:

\[
(\omega) \quad [(\downarrow \tau_1 \& \ldots \& \downarrow \tau_n \& \downarrow \sigma(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n)) \rightarrow \tau(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n) = \sigma(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n)] \& \\
[\neg \tau_1 \vee \ldots \vee \neg \tau_n \vee \neg \sigma(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n) \rightarrow \neg \tau(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n)]
\]

The axiom $(\omega)$ in this rule stipulates that the identity $\tau(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n) = \sigma(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n)$ holds if all of the arguments $\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n$ and the definiens $\sigma(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n)$ are significant and that the new term $\tau(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n)$ is empty if any of the arguments $\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n$ or the definiens $\sigma(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n)$ are empty.
Note that the Alternative Rule of Definition by Identity still correctly allows one to derive the following identities from (A) and (B), respectively:

(i) \( a_y = \text{ix}(A!x & \forall F(xF \equiv Fy)) \)

(ii) \( \mathcal{F} = [\lambda y ~\neg Fy] \)

In each case, the first conjunct of the Alternative Rule is operative, since not only is it axiomatic that \( y \downarrow, G \downarrow, \) and \( F \downarrow, \) but the definiens in each of (A) and (B) is provably significant.

But, more significantly, definitions (A) and (B), under the Alternative Rule, would guarantee, respectively that:

- \( \neg a_{iz\psi} \downarrow \) is a theorem whenever \( \neg iz\psi \downarrow \) is a theorem

- \( \neg [\lambda z \psi] \downarrow \) is a theorem whenever \( \neg [\lambda z \psi] \downarrow \) is a theorem

These results follow from the second conjunct of the axiom schema implicitly introduced by the definitions. So, given this alternative inferential role, to show that the definiendum fails to denote, it suffices to show that the argument to the term-forming operator fails to denote.

But even this Alternative Rule of Definition by Identity has to be further refined. A problem arises in connection with the definition of new 0-place relation terms with free variables. The problem is that the Alternative Rule is inconsistent with the theorem that every 0-place relation term \( \Pi^0 \) is significant. Both \( \Pi^0 \downarrow (105.1) \) and \( \varphi \downarrow (105.2) \) are theorems, for any 0-place relation term \( \Pi^0 \) or formula \( \varphi. \) But suppose we’re introducing, by definition, a new 0-place term-forming operator \( \Pi() \) and suppose further that it takes a free individual term as an argument, so that the definition takes the form \( \Pi(x) =df \sigma(x), \) where \( \sigma(x) \) is a 0-place relation term. Then, when the argument is a description, say \( iz\psi, \) the Alternative Rule of Definition by Identity stipulates that the following is an axiom:

\[
((iz\psi \downarrow & \sigma(iz\psi) \downarrow) \rightarrow (\Pi(iz\psi) = \sigma(iz\psi))) & ((\neg iz\psi \downarrow \vee \neg \sigma(iz\psi) \downarrow) \rightarrow \neg (\Pi(iz\psi) \downarrow))
\]

So if \( iz\psi \) is \( iz(Pz \& \neg Pz) \) and \( \neg iz\psi \downarrow \) is thereby derivable, the second conjunct is operative, thereby implying \( \neg (\Pi(iz\psi) \downarrow). \) But this contradicts \( \Pi(iz\psi) \downarrow, \) which is an instance of theorem (105.2).

To address this new problem, one might propose:

**Second Alternative Rule of Definition by Identity**

If \( \tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n \) are substitutable for \( \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n, \) respectively, in \( \sigma, \) then a definition-by-\( = \) of the form \( \tau(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n) =df \sigma(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n) \) introduces the closures of the following, necessary axiom schema:
9.13. EXPLANATORY REMARKS ON DEFINITIONS

(ω) \([(\tau_1 \downarrow \& \ldots \& \tau_n \downarrow \& \sigma(\tau_1,\ldots,\tau_n) \downarrow) \rightarrow \tau(\tau_1,\ldots,\tau_n) = \sigma(\tau_1,\ldots,\tau_n)] \&
\[\neg \tau_1 \downarrow \lor \ldots \lor \neg \tau_n \downarrow \lor \neg \sigma(\tau_1,\ldots,\tau_n) \downarrow \rightarrow \neg \tau(\tau_1,\ldots,\tau_n)\]\]
whenever \(\sigma(\alpha_1,\ldots,\alpha_n)\) is an individual term, an \(m\)-place relation term \((m \geq 1)\), or a 0-place relation term in which none of \(\alpha_1,\ldots,\alpha_n\) are individual variables or \(k\)-place relation variable for \(k \geq 1\),

and:

(\(\omega'\)) \([(\tau_1 \downarrow \& \ldots \& \tau_n \downarrow \& \sigma(\tau_1,\ldots,\tau_n) \downarrow) \rightarrow \tau(\tau_1,\ldots,\tau_n) = \sigma(\tau_1,\ldots,\tau_n)] \&
\[\neg \tau(\tau_1,\ldots,\tau_n) \rightarrow \Box \neg \tau(\tau_1,\ldots,\tau_n)\],
whenever \(n \geq 1\) and \(\sigma(\alpha_1,\ldots,\alpha_n)\) is a 0-place relation term in which one or more of \(\alpha_1,\ldots,\alpha_n\) is an individual variable or \(k\)-place relation variable for \(k \geq 1\).

Though this lays the problem of defining new 0-place term-forming operators to rest, the reader might, at this point, be convinced that the official version of the rule suffices and stands in need of no further refinement. The cost of ruling out impractical terms is significant and since there is no real harm in living with impractical terms that arise by definition, we have chosen not to pursue the above alternatives.

(279) Remark: When the Significance of the Definiens Rests on a \(\star\)-Theorem. Consider, again, the general case of any individual constant \(\delta\) introduced by the following definition, in which \(\xi \varphi\) is a closed term:

\[\delta =_{df} \xi \varphi\]

The inferential role of this definition, as we just saw in Remark (278) is to introduce the following as a necessary axiom:

(\(\omega\)) \((\xi \varphi \downarrow \rightarrow (\delta = \xi \varphi)) \& (\neg \xi \varphi \downarrow \rightarrow \neg \delta)\)

Now suppose that we can prove \(\xi \varphi \downarrow\), but that the proof rests on a \(\star\)-theorem, so that \(\xi \varphi \downarrow\) is a \(\star\)-theorem. Then when we appeal to \(\xi \varphi \downarrow\) to detach the consequent from the antecedent of the first conjunct of \((\omega),\) the resulting identity \(\delta = \xi \varphi\) becomes a \(\star\)-theorem. And since identities are necessary, \(\Box (\delta = \xi \varphi)\) becomes a \(\star\)-theorem. This is as it should be: a necessary identity has been proved as a theorem on the basis of a contingency and should therefore be flagged as such.

To see how this works in practice, suppose one were to extend our theory by adding, as an axiom, the contingent claim that there exists a unique moon of Earth. If we use \('e'\) as the name of Earth and represent this axiom as \(\exists!x Mxe\), then we would annotate the axiom as \(modally\ fragile\) and decorate
its item number with a $\star$. Since $\exists! x M x e$ is asserted as a modally fragile axiom, all of its $\Box$-free closures are also taken to be modally fragile axioms and so become $\star$-theorems. So by theorem (144.1)$\star$, or by RA and theorem (174.2), it would follow that $M x e \downarrow$ is a $\star$-theorem. Since $M x e$ is provably significant, we might introduce a name, say $m$, to designate this unique object, via the following definition:

$$m =_{df} M x e$$

Given the inferential role of definitions-by-$=_{df}$ described in (278), this introduces the necessary axiom:

$$(\omega_1) \ (M x e \downarrow \rightarrow (m = M x e)) \& (\neg M x e \downarrow \rightarrow \neg(m \downarrow))$$

In this scenario, note that all of the following become provable as $\star$-theorems:

- $\star \ m = M x e$, by $(\omega_1)$ and the $\star$-theorem $M x e \downarrow$
- $\star \ m \downarrow$, by the $\star$-theorem $m = M x e$ and the $\Box$-theorem (108.1)
- $\star \ \Box M x e \downarrow$, by the $\star$-theorem $M x e \downarrow$ and the $\Box$-theorem (107)
- $\star \ \Box m \downarrow$, by the $\star$-theorem $m \downarrow$ and the $\Box$-theorem (107)
- $\star \ \Box m = M x e$, by the $\star$-theorem $m = M x e$ and the $\Box$-theorem (126.2)

And so on. These consequences, again, are as they should be: all are claims derived from an axiom whose necessitation was not asserted and so flagged as such.

We conclude these observations by generalizing the discussion to relation terms. Suppose $[\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi]$ is a closed term and that the proof of $[\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi] \downarrow$ is a $\star$-theorem. If we introduce a new $n$-place relation constant, say $P_{10}$ by the definition:

$$P_{10} =_{df} [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi]$$

then the identity claim $P_{10} = [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi]$ becomes a $\star$-theorem, given the inferential role of a definition-by-$=_{df}$ described in (278), for the reasons just discussed in connection with new individual constants. The reader might try to construct an example of a $\lambda$-expression whose significance is provable only by appeal to a contingency.
is not such an example. The resulting ★-theorem $\downarrow ixMxe$ isn’t required to establish the modally strict conclusion that $[\lambda y y =_E ixMxe]$, since this latter claim is axiomatic by (39.2) – the $\lambda$ doesn’t bind any variables in an encoding formula subterm. So it takes some work to develop an example of a $\lambda$-expression $[\lambda x \varphi]$ such that $[\lambda x \varphi]$ is a ★-theorem.

To develop an example of a $\lambda$-expression whose significance is proved on the basis of a contingency, let $ixMxe \downarrow$ be a ★-theorem from the above example. Now recall the $\lambda$-expression leading the to Kirchner paradox:

$$[\lambda y Gix(x = y \& \exists H(y H \& \sim Hy))]$$

where $G$ is some universal property such that $\forall x Gx$. Abbreviate the matrix of this $\lambda$-expression as $\chi$. Note that $y$ occurs free in $\chi$. Now consider the $\lambda$-expression $[\lambda y ixMxe \downarrow \vee \chi]$. It can be shown that $[\lambda y ixMxe \downarrow \vee \chi]$ is a ★-theorem (exercise).
Chapter 10

Basic Logical Objects

In this chapter, we prove the existence of some basic logical objects and some fundamental theorems about them. Such objects include the truth-value of proposition \( p \) (\( \langle p \rangle \)), the extension of property \( F \) (\( \epsilon F \)), the class of \( Fs \) (\( \{ y | Fy \} \)), the direction of line \( a \) (\( \vec{a} \)), the shape of figure \( c \) (\( \tilde{c} \)), etc. We also generalize these applications to develop theorems governing any logical object abstracted from an equivalence condition or an equivalence relation.\(^{189}\)

10.1 Truth-Values

(280) Remark: On Truth-Values. Frege postulated truth-values in his lecture of 1891 (13), and they are the very first logical objects that he officially introduces in his *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik*; they appear in Volume I, §2, just after the section on functions (see Frege 1893, 7). In what follows, we identify truth-values as abstract, logical objects, prove they exist, and further prove, among other things: (a) that necessarily there are exactly two truth-values, and (b) that the truth-value of \( p \) is identical to the truth-value of \( q \) if and only if \( p \) is equivalent to \( q \). The theorems about truth-values proved below are often principles that Frege implicitly assumed. The key idea underlying truth-values of

\(^{189}\)Some of the definitions and theorems below are revised and enhanced versions of those developed in Anderson & Zalta 2004. The main difference is that, in the present work, we develop definitions of such notions as *truth-value*, *class*, etc., so as to allow for modally strict theorems about these notions. By contrast, in Anderson & Zalta 2004, the definitions often used rigid definite descriptions, thereby making it difficult to establish modally strict theorems. Compare, for example, the definition of \( x \) is a *truth-value* in Anderson & Zalta (2004, 14) with the one developed below in (293). There are modally strict facts about truth-values proved below for which the version in Anderson & Zalta 2004 not modally strict. For example, theorem (298), that there are exactly two truth-values, is modally strict in the present work, but the corresponding version in Anderson & Zalta (2004, 14) is not.
propositions is that, given a proposition $p$, the condition, $q$ is materially equivalent to $p$, intuitively defines a logical pattern relative to $p$. This pattern can be objectified into an abstract, logical object that encodes just those properties $F$ having the form $[\lambda y \ q]$ for propositions $q$ materially equivalent to $p$. Such a logical object is identified as the truth-value of $p$.

(281) Definitions: Truth-Value of a Proposition. Recall that in (270) we defined a propositional property to be any property $F$ such that $\exists q(F \equiv [\lambda y \ q])$. Employing our conventions for definitions-by-$\equiv$ in (17), we now say that $x$ is a truth-value of $p$ just in case $x$ is an abstract object that encodes all and only those properties $F$ such that for some proposition $q$ materially equivalent to $p$, $F$ is the propositional property $[\lambda y \ q]$:

$$\text{TruthValueOf}(x, p) \equiv_{df} A!x \& \forall F(x F \equiv \exists q((q \equiv p) \& F = [\lambda y \ q]))$$

If we informally say $F$ is constructed from $q$ whenever $F = [\lambda y \ q]$, then we may read the above definition as follows: $x$ is a truth-value of $p$ whenever $x$ is an abstract object that encodes all and only properties constructed from a proposition materially equivalent to $p$.

(282) Remark: Reminder About Definitions. Note the following facts about the foregoing definition:

- We no longer need to interpret the bound variables under Convention (17.2.b); that is, we need not suppose that the bound variables $F$, $q$, and $y$ function as metavariables. By Rule $\equiv_{Df}$, the definition introduces a biconditional axiom. Since axioms are theorems, we can derive, as a theorem, any alphabetic variant of the axiom, by the Rule of Alphabetic Variants (115). Indeed, given Rules GEN, RN, and RA, any closure of the biconditional axiom is derivable as a theorem and, therefore, so are their alphabetic variants. So the discussion in Remarks (32) and (28) no longer applies.

- We no longer need to interpret the free variable $p$ under Convention (17.2.a); that is, we need not suppose that $p$ functions as a metavariable. Since every 0-place relation term provably has a denotation (105.1), every 0-place relation term in which $F$ doesn’t occur free can be substituted for $\forall p$ in the universally quantified biconditional that can be derived from the definition. So the discussion in Remark (27) no longer applies to the variable $p$.

- The variable $x$ does still function as a metavariable, under Convention (17.2.a); every individual term $\kappa$ in which $F$ doesn’t occur free, whether significant or not, can be used to form an instance of the definition in which $\kappa$ is uniformly substituted for $x$. So the discussion in Remark (27) still applies to the variable $x$. 

• For instances of the definition involving individual terms \( \kappa \) such that \( \vdash \neg \kappa \downarrow \), we don’t need to add an existence clause to the definiens to ensure that \( \neg \text{TruthValueOf}(x, \kappa) \) is provable. If \( \vdash \neg \kappa \downarrow \), then \( \forall \kappa \) is provably false and the definiens will be provably false, thereby yielding a derivation of \( \neg \text{TruthValueOf}(x, \kappa) \). See the discussion in Remark (36).

See the Remarks indicated if these facts aren’t clear.

(283) **Theorem:** There Exists a (Unique) Truth-Value of \( p \).

(1) \( \exists x \text{TruthValueOf}(x, p) \)

(2) \( \exists! x \text{TruthValueOf}(x, p) \)

So, by GEN, for every proposition \( p \), there is a (unique) truth-value of \( p \). And, schematically, \( \exists! x \text{TruthValueOf}(x, \varphi) \) is provable for any formula \( \varphi \).

(284) **Theorem:** The Truth-Value of \( p \) Exists. It now follows from the previous theorem (283.2), the Rule of Actualization (RA), and a lemma for actuality and existence (174.2) that the truth-value of \( p \) exists:

\[ \text{ixTruthValueOf}(x, p) \downarrow \]

So, by GEN, for every proposition \( p \), the truth-value of \( p \) exists.

(285) **Definition:** Notation for the Truth-Value of \( p \). The previous theorem guarantees that the description \( \text{ixTruthValueOf}(x, p) \) is significant and so holds for every proposition \( p \). Let us therefore introduce the notation \( \circ p \) to refer to \( p \)'s truth-value:

\[ \circ p \equiv df \text{ixTruthValueOf}(x, p) \]

This definition is interesting in the following respect. We know by (105.1) that \( \Pi \downarrow \), for every 0-place relation term \( \Pi \). We can therefore prove from (284) that \( \text{ixTruthValueOf}(x, \Pi) \downarrow \), for any 0-place relation term \( \Pi \) in which \( x \) doesn’t occur free. And if \( x \) does occur free in \( \Pi \), we can always pick some individual variable that doesn’t occur free in \( \Pi \), say \( y \), to prove \( \forall \text{TruthValueOf}(y, \Pi) \downarrow \).

So given the inferential role of definitions-by-\( = \), as described in (74), we can establish an identity of the form \( \circ \Pi = \forall \text{TruthValueOf}(y, \Pi) \), for any 0-place relation term \( \Pi \). It is interesting when a term-forming operator is significant, and yields an identity relative to every term that can serve as its argument.

(286) **Theorem:** The Truth-Value of \( p \) is Canonical. It is an easy consequence of our definitions that the truth-value of \( p \) is identical to the abstract object that encodes exactly the properties \( F \) constructed out of propositions materially equivalent to \( p \):

\[ \circ p = \text{ix}(\forall x \forall F(xF \equiv \exists q((q \equiv p) \& F = [\lambda y q])))) \]
Thus, by (250), $\circ p$ is (identical to) a canonical individual.

(287) Theorem: When the Submatrix is Contingent. To help set up the observation that $\circ p$ is not strictly canonical, it will prove useful to show that: for some proposition $p$ and some property $F$, it is possible that both (a) for some proposition $q$ materially equivalent to $p$, $F$ is the property being such that $q$ and (b) it is possible that there is no proposition $q$ materially equivalent to $p$ such that $F$ is being such that $q$:

$$\exists p \exists F (\exists q ((q \equiv p) & F = [\lambda y q]) \& \diamond \neg \exists q ((q \equiv p) & F = [\lambda y q]))$$

Note that if let $\varphi$ be the formula $\exists q ((q \equiv p) \& F = [\lambda y q])$, then this theorem establishes, for some proposition $p$ and property $F$, that $\exists p \exists F \diamond (\exists q ((q \equiv p) \& F = [\lambda y q]))$.

In the proof of (287), we didn’t have to choose our witnesses to the existential quantifiers be a contingently true proposition and a propositional property
constructed from a necessarily true proposition. We could have chosen the witnesses to be:

- a contingently false proposition and a property constructed from a necessarily false proposition,
- a necessarily true proposition and a property constructed from a contingently true proposition, or
- a necessarily false proposition and a property constructed from a contingently false proposition.

Since every proposition has to be either contingently true, contingently false, necessarily true, or necessarily false, we would have covered all the cases. Thus, we would have a proof of the stronger claim displayed above.

But it suffices, for our purposes to show only (287), since that establishes that the formula \( \phi \) we’re considering isn’t a rigid condition on properties. This is instructive because it tells us that any general conclusions we draw about the properties \( op \) encodes will rest on a contingency and so such conclusions will fail to be modally strict. The theorems in (290) below constitute good examples. If the point comes as a surprise, a closer inspection of the proofs of the theorems that follow should make it clearer. It may also be worth noting that when we define possible worlds in Chapter 12, we shall be in a position to define, for each world \( w \), the truth-value of \( p \) with respect to \( w \). The truth-value of \( p \) with respect to a world \( w \) is, by contrast, a strictly canonical object. For more on this world-relativized notion of the truth-value of \( p \), see (538) – (544).

Moreover, as the reader works through the following definitions and theorems, it should be kept in mind that many of the theorems that fail to be modally strict could be turned into modally strict theorems by defining:

\[
ActualTruthValueOf(x, p) \equiv_{df} A!x \land \forall F(x, F \equiv \exists q(A(q \equiv p) \land F = [\lambda y q]))
\]

This definition also yields as theorems:

\[
\exists!x ActualTruthValueOf(x, p)
\]

\[
\downarrow x ActualTruthValueOf(x, p)
\]

Thus, we could introduce the notation:

\[\hat{\circ} p \equiv_{df} \downarrow x ActualTruthValueOf(x, p)\]

We leave it as an exercise to show that \( \hat{\circ} p \) is a strictly canonical object, by developing a modally strict proof of:

\[
\forall F(\exists q(A(q \equiv p) \land F = [\lambda y q]) \rightarrow \Box \exists q(A(q \equiv p) \land F = [\lambda y q]))
\]
It is worth remembering, therefore, that the non-modally strict theorems developed below could be converted to modally strict theorems often by substituting $ActualTruthValueOf(x,p)$ for $TruthValueOf(x,p)$, substituting $\hat{\circ}p$ for $\circ p$, and strategically placing the actuality operator $\downarrow$. We leave it as an exercise for the reader to determine exactly how to exploit these ideas to reformulate the non-modally strict theorems below so that they become modally strict.

(289) **Definition**: How Objects Encode Propositions. We now extend the notion of encoding. We say that object $x$ encodes proposition $p$ (written $x \Sigma p$) just in case $x$ exists and encodes being-such-that-$p$, i.e., encodes $[\lambda y p]$:

$$x \Sigma p \equiv_{df} x \downarrow \& x[\lambda y p]$$

It is important to remember that although every formula $\varphi$ signifies a proposition (105.1), one may not substitute a formula $\varphi$ for $p$ in this definition if $y$ occurs free in $\varphi$. That would not result in a valid instance of the definition, for the free variable in $\varphi$ would get captured by $\lambda y$ in the term $[\lambda y \varphi]$! As we noted in the Convention for Variables in Definitions (17.2.b), the $y$ in the above definition is functioning as a metavariable. If we state the definition using a metavariable, say $\nu$, instead of $y$, then we must add the proviso that $\nu$ not be free in $\varphi$. Clearly, the operator $\lambda y$ in the term $[\lambda y p]$ doesn’t capture any variable in the matrix $p$, and so any well-formed instance of the definition has to conform to this standard – the variable bound by the $\lambda$ may not capture any variable free in the substitution instance for $p$. So if $y$ does occur free in $\varphi$, then we find a variable not free in $\varphi$, say $z$, and regard the definition as asserting $x \Sigma \varphi \equiv_{df} \downarrow x[\lambda z \varphi]$.

Thus, the definition has no instances in which the $\lambda$-expression in the definiens fails to be significant. For since $\varphi$ may not contain $y$ free, $[\lambda y \varphi]$ meets the conditions of (39.2) – the $\lambda$ doesn’t bind any variable in an encoding formula sub-term since it doesn’t bind any variable in any legitimate substitution instance for $p$. Hence the $\lambda$-expressions of the form $[\lambda y \varphi]$ that yield well-formed instances of the definition are significant, by (39.2).

We henceforth adopt the convention that ‘$x \Sigma \ldots$’ is to be interpreted with the smallest scope possible. For example, $x \Sigma p \rightarrow p$ is to be parsed as $(x \Sigma p) \rightarrow p$ rather than as $x \Sigma(p \rightarrow p)$.

(290) **Lemma**: Lemmas Concerning Truth-Values of Propositions. The following lemmas are simple consequences of our definitions: (.1) the truth-value of $p$ is a truth-value of $p$; (.2) the truth-value of $p$ encodes a property $F$ just in case $F$ is identical to being such that $q$, for some proposition $q$ materially equivalent to $p$; (.3) the truth-value of $p$ encodes proposition $r$ if and only $r$ is materially equivalent to $p$; (.4) the truth-value of $p$ encodes $p$; and (.5) $x$ is a truth-value of $p$ if and only $x$ is identical to the truth-value of $p$. Formally:

(.1) $TruthValueOf(\circ p, p)$
(2) $\forall F (\circ p F \equiv \exists q ((q \equiv p) \& F = [\lambda y q]))$

(3) $\circ p \Sigma r \equiv (r \equiv p)$

(4) $\circ p \Sigma p$

(5) $\text{TruthValueOf}(x, p) \equiv x = \circ p$

These consequences are not modally-strict.

\textbf{(291) \star \textbf{Theorem}:} The Fregean Biconditional Principle for Truth-Values of Propositions.

$$\circ p = \circ q \equiv p \equiv q$$

That is, the truth-value of $p$ is identical to the truth-value of $q$ if and only if $p$ is materially equivalent to $q$.

\textbf{(292) Lemmas:} Facts About Propositional Properties and Truths (or Falsehoods). Some basic facts about propositional properties are: (1) $p$ is true if and only if the propositional properties constructed from true propositions are precisely the propositional properties constructed from propositions materially equivalent to $p$; and (2) it is not the case that $p$ if and only if the propositional properties constructed from false propositions are precisely the propositional properties constructed from propositions materially equivalent to $p$:

\begin{align*}
(1) & \text{ } p \equiv \forall F (\exists q (q \equiv p) \& F = [\lambda y q]) \\
(2) & \text{ } \neg p \equiv \forall F (\exists q (q = \neg p) \& F = [\lambda y q])
\end{align*}

Note that these theorems are modally-strict.

\textbf{(293) Definition:} Truth-Values. When Frege introduced truth-values in 1891, he not only stipulated that they exist (without defining them) but also asserted that there are exactly two of them, naming them The True and The False. By contrast, our procedure has been to first define what it is for an object to be a \textit{truth-value-of} a proposition and show that for any proposition $p$, there is a unique such entity. We now define what it is for an object to be a \textit{truth-value} in terms of the notion \textit{truth-value-of}. We say that $x$ is a \textit{truth-value} iff $x$ is a truth-value of some proposition:

$$\text{TruthValue}(x) \equiv_{df} \exists p (\text{TruthValueOf}(x, p))$$

We now prove some general facts about truth-values, define The True and The False as abstract objects, prove that The True and The False are truth-values, and then prove that there are \textit{exactly} two truth-values.

\textbf{(294) \star \textbf{Theorem}:} The Truth-Value of $q$ is a Truth-Value.
10.1. TRUTH-VALUES

We next work our way to the modally-strict claim that there are exactly two truth-values.

(295) Lemmas: Abstract Objects That Encode Just The Truths (or Just The Falsehoods) Are Truth-Values. We now prove (.1) if \( x \) is an abstract object that encodes all and only properties constructed from true propositions, then it is a truth-value, and (.2) if \( x \) is an abstract object that encodes all and only properties constructed from false propositions, then it is a truth-value:

\[
\begin{align*}
(\cdot.1) \ & (A!x & \forall F(xF \equiv \exists q(q \& F = [\lambda y q]))) \rightarrow \text{TruthValue}(x) \\
(\cdot.2) \ & (A!x & \forall F(xF \equiv \exists q(\neg q \& F = [\lambda y q]))) \rightarrow \text{TruthValue}(x)
\end{align*}
\]

These facts are modally strict.

(296) Definitions: The True and The False. We take advantage of the fact that canonical descriptions are significant (249) to define The True (‘\( \top \)’) as the abstract object that encodes all and only properties constructed from true propositions, and define The False (‘\( \bot \)’) as the abstract object that encodes all and only properties constructed from false propositions:

\[
\begin{align*}
(\cdot.1) \ & \top = df \ ix(A!x & \forall F(xF \equiv \exists p(p \& F = [\lambda y p]))) \\
(\cdot.2) \ & \bot = df \ ix(A!x & \forall F(xF \equiv \exists p(\neg p \& F = [\lambda y p])))
\end{align*}
\]

Clearly, both \( \top \) and \( \bot \) are canonical objects (250), but we leave it as an exercise to show that they are not strictly canonical (257.2).\(^{\text{190}}\) The conditions under which \( \top \) and \( \bot \) encode properties fail to be rigid and any conclusions we draw about the properties these two objects encode will fail to be modally strict.

(297) ★Theorems: The True and The False Are Distinct Truth-Values:

\[
\begin{align*}
(\cdot.1) \ & \text{TruthValue}(\top) \\
(\cdot.2) \ & \text{TruthValue}(\bot) \\
(\cdot.3) \ & \top \neq \bot
\end{align*}
\]

Note that (.1) and (.2) are not trivialities. We haven’t stipulated that The True and The False are truth-values.

(298) Theorem: There are Exactly Two Truth-Values. We could invoke theorems (297.1)★ – (297.3)★ to help us prove that there are exactly two truth-values: we would only need to show that any truth-value is identical to \( \top \) or \( \bot \).

\(^{\text{190}}\)In a later chapter, when we introduce possible worlds and use \( w \) as a restricted variable to range over possible worlds, we will define The-True-at-\( w \) (\( \top_w \)) and The-False-at-\( w \) (\( \bot_w \)). These distinguished world-relativized truth-values are strictly canonical. See items (540.1) and (540.2).
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But then the claim, there are exactly two truth-values, would be a $\star$-theorem. It may be of interest, however, to see that there is a modally strict proof of the same claim:

$$\exists x \exists y [\text{TruthValue}(x) \& \text{TruthValue}(y) \& x \neq y \& \forall z (\text{TruthValue}(z) \rightarrow z = x \lor z = y)]$$

By RN, this is a necessary truth.

(299) $\star$Lemmas: TruthValueOf, The True, and The False.

(1) $\text{TruthValueOf}(x, p) \rightarrow (p \equiv x = \top)$

(2) $\text{TruthValueOf}(x, p) \rightarrow (\neg p \equiv x = \bot)$

These lemmas need no gloss; they help us to prove the next theorems.

(300) $\star$Theorems: Facts About $\circ p$, $\top$, and $\bot$. The following two principles governing truth-values are provable: (.1) a proposition is true iff its truth-value is The True; (.2) a proposition is false iff its truth-value is The False:

(1) $p \equiv (\circ p = \top)$

(2) $\neg p \equiv (\circ p = \bot)$

These two principles seem obvious a priori. But they are capable of proof and so have been proved, in compliance with Dedekind’s maxim that serves as the epigraph to Chapter 9.

It is also straightforward to show that: (.3) $p$ is true iff The True encodes $p$; (.4) $p$ is true iff The False fails to encode $p$; (.5) $\neg p$ is true iff The False encodes $p$, and (.6) $\neg p$ is true iff The True fails to encode $p$, i.e.,

(3) $p \equiv \top \Sigma p$

(4) $p \equiv \neg \bot \Sigma p$

(5) $\neg p \equiv \bot \Sigma p$

(6) $\neg p \equiv \neg \top \Sigma p$

10.2 Extensions of Propositions

Though Frege thought that sentences denote truth-values, he never claimed that a truth-value was the extension of a sentence. But in Carnap 1947 (26), section numbered 6-1 is titled “The extension of a sentence is its truth-value” and section numbered 6-2 is titled “The intension of a sentence is the proposition expressed by it”. These stipulations on Carnap’s part are central to his method of extension and intension (1947, 1–68) and into the semantics of formal logical systems based on that method.
By contrast, we define an *extension of* a proposition $p$ to be an abstract object of a certain kind and show that these abstract objects are truth values. So, object-theoretic extensions apply, in the first instance, to propositions rather than to sentences. In the next section, we investigate the *extension of a property*.

**Definitions:** Extension of a Proposition. Let us say that $x$ is an extension of $p$ just in case $x$ is an abstract object, $x$ encodes only propositional properties, and $x$ encodes all and only propositions materially equivalent to $p$:

$$\text{ExtensionOf}(x, p) \equiv_{df} \forall x \forall F ((xF \rightarrow \text{Propositional}(F)) \land \forall q ((x \Sigma q) \equiv (q \equiv p))$$

No special existence clauses are needed in the definiens.

**Theorems:** An Equivalence. It now follows that $\text{ExtensionOf}(x, p)$ is equivalent to $\text{TruthValueOf}(x, p)$:

$$\text{ExtensionOf}(x, p) \equiv \text{TruthValueOf}(x, p)$$

Since this equivalence is established by a modally strict proof, a Rule of Substitution allows us to substitute one for the other wherever either occurs as a subformula. Note also that if we apply the Rule of Actualization to this theorem, then it follows by (149.1) that, for any individual $x$, $x$ is identical to $ix\text{ExtensionOf}(x, p)$ iff $x$ is identical to $ix\text{TruthValueOf}(x, p)$.

**Theorems:** Fundamental Theorems of Extensions of Propositions. It is now provable that: (.1) there is a unique extension of $p$; (.2) the extension of $p$ exists; (.3) the extension of proposition $p$ is the truth-value of $p$, and (.4) the extension of proposition $p$ is a truth-value:

- (.1) $\exists! x \text{ExtensionOf}(x, p)$
- (.2) $ix\text{ExtensionOf}(x, p) \downarrow$
- (.3) $ix\text{ExtensionOf}(x, p) = \circ p$
- (.4) $\text{TruthValue}(ix\text{ExtensionOf}(x, p))$

Cf. (.3) with Carnap’s assertion (1947, 26) that the extension of a sentence is its truth-value. On our reconstruction, this is a principle is about propositions, not sentences.

### 10.3 Extensions of Properties: Natural Classes

**Remark:** Natural vs. Theoretical Mathematics. In what follows it is important to distinguish between *natural* mathematics and *theoretical* mathematics. Natural mathematics consists of ordinary, pretheoretic claims we make about mathematical objects, such as the following:
• The number of planets is eight.

• There are more individuals in the class of insects than in the class of humans.

• The lines on the pavement have the same direction.

• The figures drawn on the board have the same shape.

By contrast, the claims of theoretical mathematics are the axioms, theorems, hypotheses, conjectures, etc., asserted in the context of some explicit mathematical theory or in the context of some implicit or informal, but distinctly mathematical, assumptions. Example of such claims are:

• In Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, the null set is an element of the unit set of the null set.

• In Real Number Theory, 2 is less than or equal to \( \pi \).

The sentence operator “In theory \( T \)” is frequently omitted when mathematicians make such claims.

One distinguishing feature of pure theoretical mathematics is that the fundamental axioms and assumptions of those theories govern special, abstract mathematical relations and operations (e.g., membership, predecessor, less than, addition, etc.) and don’t involve ordinary relations or individuals. An analysis of theoretical mathematics is reserved for Chapter 15, where its objects and relations are identified as abstract objects and abstract relations, respectively. Prior to that chapter, however, we shall have occasion to analyze various natural mathematical objects, by identifying them as abstractions from the body of ordinary (exemplification) predications that are independent of any mathematical theory.

The first group of natural mathematical objects we examine are the natural classes. A natural class is not an abstraction based on the axioms of some mathematical theory of sets, but is rather an abstraction from the facts about the exemplification of properties (both as to how they are exemplified by different individuals and how different properties may be exemplified by the very same individuals). In what follows, then, we shall be investigating natural classes and analyzing them as the (exemplification) extensions of properties.

\(^{(305)}\) Remark: In Sections 10.1 and 10.2, we introduced the notion of a truth-value and then the notion an extension of a proposition. In this section, however, we first define the notion of an (exemplification) extension of a property and...
subsequently use it to define the notion a (natural) class. The change in the order of presentation can be understood as follows. Frege (Frege 1891) introduced the notion of a truth-value prior to Carnap’s claim (1947, 26) that the extension of a sentence is its truth value. But Carnap extended the historical notion of an extension, which had traditionally been applied to general terms (see below), to sentences. So we introduced truth values, then extensions of propositions, and then validated a version of Carnap’s insight in the present system.

But the notion of an extension of a general term goes back to medieval logic and is well-entrenched in the Port Royal Logic (1662), whereas the notion of a class is much more modern.\footnote{See Buroker 2014 (Section 3), for a discussion of the notion of an extension of a general term in the Port Royal Logic.} We therefore define the modern notion of a class in terms of the older philosophical notion, though in our system, we take extensions to apply, in the first instance, to properties rather than to general terms.

Our analysis retains some features of Whitehead & Russell’s no class theory (1910–1913 [1925–1927], \( \ast 20 \cdot 02 \) and \( \ast 20 \cdot 3 \)), in so far as it attempts to introduce classes by definition. We’ll also prove a theorem (362)\footnote{The original is:
Unter einer ‘Menge’ verstehen wir jede Zusammenfassung \( M \) von bestimmten wohlunterschiedenen Objekten \( m \) unserer Anschauung oder unseres Denkens (welche die ‘Elemente’ von \( M \) genannt werden) zu einem Ganzen.} that bears a similarity to their theorem \( \ast 20 \cdot 3 \) (and corresponding definition \( \ast 20 \cdot 01 \)). But, unlike the no class theory, we explicitly define classes rather than contextually define them. Before we develop our analysis, we begin with an important distinction.

\( \text{(306) Remark: The Naive/Logical Conception of Set.} \) The conception of natural classes just described is very closely related to the naive conception of set, which derives from Cantor. In the opening lines of Cantor 1895, 481 (1915, 85; 1932, 282), we find:\footnote{The original is:
Unter einer ‘Menge’ verstehen wir jede Zusammenfassung \( M \) von bestimmten wohlunterschiedenen Objekten \( m \) unserer Anschauung oder unseres Denkens (welche die ‘Elemente’ von \( M \) genannt werden) zu einem Ganzen.
}

By a ‘set’ we understand any collection \( M \) of definite well-differentiated objects \( m \) of our intuition or thought (which are called the ‘elements’ of \( M \)) into a whole.

Moreover, in Cantor 1932, 204, we find:\footnote{Unter einer ‘Mannigfaltigkeit’ oder ‘Menge’ verstehe ich nämlich allgemein jedes Viele, welches sich als Eines denken läßt, d.h. jeden Inbegriff bestimmter Elemente, welcher durch ein Gesetz zu einem Ganzen verbunden werden kann, und ich glaube hiermit etwas zu definieren, was verwandt ist mit dem Platonischen \( \varepsilon \iota\delta\omicron\varsigma \) oder \( \iota\delta\epsilon\kappa\zeta \), \ldots .}
By a ‘manifold’ or ‘set’ I understand a many which can be thought of as one, i.e., a totality of particular elements that can be combined into a whole by a law, and I believe something is defined thereby that is related to Platonic Forms or Ideas, . . . .

The final clause of the quoted passage is also interesting. No doubt, Cantor has related sets to Platonic Forms because the former, like Forms, are abstractions. But the sentence might be thought apt because if the ‘laws that combine into a whole’ are universals, where universals are traditionally understood as Platonic Forms, then Cantor has related sets to the universals of which they are the extensions.

Boolos elaborates on the naive conception of set as follows (1971, 216):

Here is an idea about sets that might occur to us quite naturally, and is perhaps suggested by Cantor’s definition of a set as a totality of definite elements that can be combined into a whole by a law.

By the law of excluded middle, any (one-place) predicate in any language either applies to a given object or does not. So, it would seem, to any predicate there correspond two sorts of thing: the sort of thing to which the predicate applies (of which it is true) and the sort of thing to which it does not apply. So, it would seem, for any predicate there is a set of all and only those things to which it applies (as well as a set of just those things to which it does not apply). Any set whose members are exactly the things to which the predicate applies—by the axiom of extensionality, there cannot be two such sets—is called the extension of the predicate. Our thought might therefore be put: “Any predicate has an extension.” We shall call this proposition, together with the argument for it, the naive conception of set.

Boolos then generalizes further by moving from 1-place predicates to open formulas $\varphi$ in which $y$ doesn’t occur free (but which typically have a free occurrence of $x$). Using $K$ to denote a standard first-order language having (a) variables that range over both sets and individuals, (b) a distinguished 1-place

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195 Later, Boolos contrasts the naive conception with the iterative conception, where sets are structured in such a way that they arise in an ordered series of stages. In describing the iterative conception, Boolos writes (1971, 221):

At stage zero, there is a set for each possible collection of individuals (and if there are no individuals, there is only one set, namely, the null set). At stage one, there exists a set for each possible collection consisting of individuals and sets formed at stage zero. And so on, until one reaches stage omega, at which there exists a set for each possible collection consisting of individuals and sets formed at stages one, two, three, . . . . Of course, this is only the beginning.

We shall put aside further discussion of the iterative conception of set, since that conception informs our understanding of the theoretical mathematics of sets and, in particular, Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF). The philosophical analysis of the language and theorems of ZF will be discussed in Chapter 15, where we analyze theoretical mathematics generally.
predicate \( S \) for being a set, and (c) a distinguished 2-place predicate \( \in \) for membership, Boolos writes (1971, 217):

If the naive conception of set is correct, there should (at least) be a set of just those things to which \( \varphi \) applies, if \( \varphi \) is a formula of \( K \). So (the universal closure of) \( \forall (\exists y)(Sy \land (x)(x \in y \equiv \varphi)) \) should express a truth about sets (if no occurrence of ‘\( y \’ \) in \( \varphi \) is free).

Of course, Boolos takes it that he has properly represented the central claim ("every predicate has an extension") of the naive conception because he is assuming that every open formula \( \varphi \) with free variable \( x \) defines a predicate or property, either by way of the \( \lambda \)-expression \( [\lambda x \varphi] \) or by way of the instance \( \exists F \forall x(Fx \equiv \varphi) \) of property comprehension.

But this is an assumption that object theory doesn’t completely endorse. In object theory, though every open formula \( \varphi \) with a free occurrence of an individual variable \( y \) can be used to formulate a \( \lambda \)-expression \( [\lambda y \varphi] \), not every such predicate is guaranteed to be significant. Axiom (39.2) guarantees that \( [\lambda x \varphi] \) is significant if the \( \lambda \) doesn’t bind any variables in any encoding formula subterm. And axiom (49) guarantees that \( [\lambda x \varphi] \) is significant if both \( [\lambda x \psi] \) is significant and \( \Box \forall x(\psi \equiv \varphi) \). These axioms undermine the paradoxes of naive object theory. And we’ll see that they forestall the paradoxes of naive set theory once we formally define the logical notion of a set and define member of.

We shall nevertheless be able to approximate, in the material mode, the central claim of the naive conception of set ("every predicate has an extension") as a theorem. We shall do this by defining the notion of \( \text{Class}(x) \) and then deriving: for every property \( F \), there is a class whose members are precisely the individuals exemplifying \( F \), i.e.,

\[
\text{Fundamental Principle of Naive Set Theory} \\
\forall F \exists x(\text{Class}(x) \land \forall y(y \in x \equiv Fy))
\]

See (315) below. Thus, Boolos’ talk of predicates and predicate application becomes represented by talk of properties and property exemplification, and so the claim “every predicate has an extension” becomes represented as the principle: for every property \( F \), there is a class whose members are precisely the individuals exemplifying \( F \). Indeed, we’ll see in Remark (308) below that one may even preserve the idea that every predicate has an extension, if one accepts that predicates (i.e., 1-place relation terms) that aren’t significant have an empty extension.

If this is correct, then the natural conception of a class and the logical conception of set nicely dovetail and can be formalized without inconsistency. One of our goals in what follows, therefore, is to show that this analysis is indeed correct. To do this, we: (a) precisely define what it is for an abstract object to be an extension of a property, (b) define classes to be extensions of properties,
and (c) prove that every property has an extension, (d) prove that every class is the extension of some property, (e) define membership in a class, and (f) prove that for every property $F$, there is a class whose members are precisely the individuals exemplifying $F$. Since these and other principles formulated below make the naive conception of set formally precise, we shall henceforth re-label the ‘naive’ conception with the following, less rhetorical label: the logical conception of set. Thus, in what follows, natural classes are identified with sets logically conceived.

(307) Definition: Extension Of, Class Of, and Class. We now say that $x$ is an (exemplification) extension of $G$, or $x$ is a class of $G$s, if and only if $x$ is an abstract object, $G$ exists, and $x$ encodes just the properties materially equivalent to $G$ (with respect to exemplification):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ExtensionOf}(x, G) & \equiv_{df} A!x \& G \downarrow \& \forall F (xF \equiv \forall z (Fz \equiv Gz)) \\
\text{ClassOf}(x, G) & \equiv_{df} A!
\end{align*}
\]

In the usual way, this is shorthand for a definition that uses metavariables $\kappa$ and $\Pi^1$ instead of the object language variables $x$ and $G$.\footnote{Since we can use bound object-language variables in the definien} Where Carnap famously stipulated that the extension of a predicate is a class (1947, 19, 4-14), we adopt the view that a natural class may be defined as an extension of a property. Accordingly, we say (2) $x$ is a (natural) class, or $x$ is a logical set, if and only if $x$ is an extension of (a or class of) some property $G$:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Class}(x) & \equiv_{df} \exists G (\text{ExtensionOf}(x, G)) \\
\text{LogicalSet}(x) & \equiv_{df} \exists G (\text{ClassOf}(x, G))
\end{align*}
\]

For simplicity, we’ve used $\text{Class}(x)$ instead of $\text{NaturalClass}(x)$ as the definiti-\underline{}\emph{\footnote{Since we can use bound object-language variables in the definien}}\nemph{dum}. We don’t need $x \downarrow$ in the definiens, by the following reasoning. If it is known, by proof or by hypothesis, that $\kappa$ is a non-denoting individual term, then $\neg \text{ExtensionOf}(\kappa, G)$ becomes derivable, for every $G$. Hence we can derive $\neg \exists G (\text{ExtensionOf}(x, G))$, and so $\neg \text{Class}(\kappa)$ when $\kappa$ is any term known to be empty. The clause $x \downarrow$ is therefore not needed in the definiens.

(308) Remark: Intuitions About What Extensions Are. In the definiens of the foregoing definitions, none of the notions of collection, whole, totality, element, membership, etc., are used. Nevertheless, the definition isn’t completely
unrelated to Cantor’s conception of a set as a collection of definite entities combined into a whole by a law (quoted above). Let us analyze Cantor’s conception as involving a law, a collection of entities, and the combining into a whole. On the above definition, a class is an extension of some property $G$, where an extension is an abstract object that encodes the properties $F$ such that $\forall F(Fz \equiv Gz)$. So, for any property $G$, the formula $\forall z(Fz \equiv Gz)$ constitutes a rule, or law-like condition on properties, that defines a collection of properties $F$ which comply with the law. Any $x$ that encodes all and only such properties $F$, is an object that combines into a whole the collection of those properties that satisfy the law. Thus, whereas Cantor conceived of the set of $G$s from below, as the totality of objects $x$ obeying the rule $Gx$, our more Fregean conception carves out the extension of $G$ from above, as the reified totality of properties that obey the higher-order rule: being a property exemplified by the same objects that exemplify $G$. In what follows, we’ll define a member or element of the extension of $G$ to be any individual $x$ such that $Gx$. But the extension itself encodes properties, in the first instance, and derivatively contains individuals as members.

If we temporarily allow ourselves some intuitive notions from set theory, then one could say that each class of $Gs$ objectifies the equivalence class of properties $F$ that are materially equivalent to $G$. So the $x$ in the definition of $\text{ExtensionOf}(x, G)$ is an abstraction over the properties that are in the cell of the partition that contains $G$.

One final note is that we could also define an encoding extension of $G$ to be an abstract object that encodes exactly the properties $F$ that are materially equivalent to $G$ with respect to encoding:

$$\text{EncodingExtensionOf}(x, G) \equiv df \ A!x \& G \downarrow \& \forall F(xF \equiv \forall z(Fz \equiv zG))$$

But since $\forall z(Fz \equiv zG) \equiv F = G$ (187), an encoding extension of $G$ would encode just $G$. Intuitively, this definition would partition the domain of properties into equivalence classes each of which contains a single property. We won’t be exploring this development in what follows, though see the discussion of the thin Form of $G$ in the next chapter.

(309) Theorem: Pre-Basic Law V and Other Facts. It is a modally strict fact underlying Frege’s Basic Law V that (.1) if $x$ is an extension of $G$ and $y$ is an extension of $H$, then $x$ is identical to $y$ if and only if $G$ and $H$ are exemplified by the same objects:

$\text{ExtensionOf}(x, G) = df A!x \& G \downarrow \& \forall F(xF \equiv \exists y(Gy \& F = [\lambda zz \equiv y]))$

We know, from the McMichael-Boolos paradox, that $[\lambda zz \equiv y]$ doesn’t signify a property when $y$ is an abstract object. So if $G$ is exemplified by some abstract object $y$, $F = [\lambda zz \equiv y]$ is false for every $F$. Hence, given (8), the null object would be the extension of such a $G$, contrary to intuition. So we won’t be using that definition.
(1) \((\text{ExtensionOf}(x, G) \& \text{ExtensionOf}(y, H)) \rightarrow (x = y \equiv \forall z (Gz \equiv Hz))\)

It is also a useful fact that (2) if \(x\) is an extension of some property \(H\) and encodes both \(F\) and \(G\), then \(F\) and \(G\) are materially equivalent:

(2) \((\text{ExtensionOf}(x, H) \& xF \& xG) \rightarrow \forall z (Fz \equiv Gz)\)

It follows straightforwardly that (3) if an object \(x\) encodes properties that aren’t materially equivalent, then \(x\) is not a class:

(3) \((xF \& xG \& \neg \forall z (Fz \equiv Gz)) \rightarrow \neg \text{Class}(x)\)

(310) **Theorems:** There is a (Unique) Extension of \(G\) and the Existence of Classes.

(1) \(\exists x \text{ExtensionOf}(x, G)\)

(2) \(\exists! x \text{ExtensionOf}(x, G)\)

It follows from (2) by GEN that for every property \(G\), there is a unique extension of \(G\). This consequence doesn’t quite yet capture the intuition that every property has an extension whose members are precisely the objects exemplifying the property, since we haven’t yet defined membership or shown that if \(x\) is an extension of \(G\), then the members of \(x\) are all and only the objects that exemplify \(G\). However, from (2) we can derive that (3) the extension of \(G\) exists:

(3) \(\downarrow x \text{ExtensionOf}(x, G)\)

In the next section, we’ll use this last fact to reconstruct a Fregean operator that takes a property term \(\Pi\) as an argument and yields a term that denotes the extension of the property denoted by \(\Pi\) if \(\Pi\) denotes a property, and denotes nothing otherwise.

It is a straightforward consequence of (1) and definition (307.2) that (4) classes exist:

(4) \(\exists x \text{Class}(x)\)

(311) **Theorem:** Classes Aren’t Necessarily Classes. Recall that in (219.1) we proved that there are properties that are materially equivalent but possibly not materially equivalent, and that in (219.3) we proved that there are properties that are actually materially equivalent but possibly not materially equivalent.

Three interesting facts follow from these results. The first is that (1) it is not the case that for every \(x\) and \(G\), if \(x\) is an extension of \(G\), then necessarily \(x\) is an extension of \(G\):

(1) \(\neg \forall x \forall G (\text{ExtensionOf}(x, G) \rightarrow \Box \text{ExtensionOf}(x, G))\)
The second interesting fact is (.2) not every class is necessarily a class:

\[(.2) \neg \forall x (\text{Class}(x) \rightarrow \Box \text{Class}(x)) \]

Thus, some classes fail are not necessarily classes. The final interesting fact is (.3) it is not necessary that every class is actually a class:

\[(.3) \neg \Box \forall x (\text{Class}(x) \rightarrow \Diamond \text{Class}(x)) \]

(.2) and (.3) prove to have some interesting consequences when we start reasoning with restricted variables, especially in modal contexts. This will be discussed in Section 10.5, in (335).

Recall also that in (219.4) we proved that for every property \( F \), there is a property materially equivalent to \( F \) but possibly not. From this, we can prove claim even stronger than (.1) – (.3), namely, that (.4) if \( x \) is an extension of \( H \), then \( x \) might not be an extension of \( H \), and (.5) classes (in general) possibly fail to be classes:

\[(.4) \text{ExtensionOf}(x,H) \rightarrow \Diamond \neg \text{ExtensionOf}(x,H) \]
\[(.5) \text{Class}(x) \rightarrow \Diamond \neg \text{Class}(x) \]

It follows trivially that classes aren’t necessarily classes!

(312) **Definition:** Membership. We now say that \( y \) is a member of \( x \), or \( y \) is an element of \( x \), written \( y \in x \), if and only if \( x \) is an extension of some property that \( y \) exemplifies:

\[ y \in x \equiv_{df} \exists G (\text{ExtensionOf}(x,G) \& Gy) \]

Cf. Frege 1893, §34, A.

(313) **Theorem:** Membership is not a Necessary Condition. It is important to observe that the condition \( y \in x \), as defined in (312), does not generally hold by necessity when it holds – it is not the case that for every \( x \) and \( y \), if \( x \) is a member of \( y \) then necessarily \( x \) is a member of \( y \):

\[(.1) \neg \forall x \forall y (y \in x \rightarrow \Box y \in x) \]

The proof of this claim in the Appendix appeals only to resources within the system. But if we temporarily (a) extend our system with some plausible (modal) facts, such as that Socrates is wise (\( Ws \)) but might not have been (\( \Diamond \neg Ws \)), and (b) appeal to the semantically primitive notion of a possible world, we can give an intuitive argument for this theorem by showing why it holds in models where the modal facts hold. In such models, we can find an \( x \) and \( y \) such that \( y \in x \) holds at the actual world \( w_0 \), but fails to hold at some other possible world. It is to be emphasized, however, that the proof of this theorem given
in the Appendix makes no use of the modal facts in (a), but rather analogous modal facts available within the system.

Here then is the semantic proof sketch. By hypothesis, $Ws$ is true at $w_0$ but false at some other possible world, say $w_1$. Now consider any $x$ such that, at $w_0$, $\text{ExtensionOf}(x,W)$. Then we know several things: by definition of $\epsilon$, it follows that (a) $s \in x$ holds at $w_0$, and by definition of $\text{ExtensionOf}$, it follows that (b) $x$ encodes at $w_0$ all and only the properties materially equivalent to $W$ at $w_0$. Hence, it follows from (b) that $x$ encodes $W$ at $w_0$ and since encoding is rigid, it follows that (c) $x$ encodes $W$ at $w_1$.

Now to see that $\neg(s \in x)$ holds at $w_1$, suppose, for reductio, that $s \in x$ holds at $w_1$. Then, $\exists G(\text{ExtensionOf}(x,G) \& Gs)$ holds at $w_1$, by definition. Let $P$ be such a property, so that we know both $\text{ExtensionOf}(x,P)$ and $Ps$ hold at $w_1$. The former implies (d) $x$ encodes at $w_1$ all and only the properties materially equivalent to $P$ at $w_1$. But, by hypothesis, $\neg Ws$ at $w_1$, and so $W$ and $P$ are not materially equivalent at $w_1$. Hence, by (d), $x$ doesn’t encode $W$ at $w_1$. But by (c), $x$ encodes $W$ at $w_1$. Contradiction.

Indeed, as one might expect, an even stronger claim can be established, namely, that (it is generally the case that) membership, when it holds, fails to hold necessarily:

$$\neg(s \in x) \rightarrow \neg \Box y \in x$$

(314) **Theorem:** Membership and Exemplification. A precise correlation between membership and exemplification now obtains for extensions, namely, if $x$ is an extension of $H$, then $y$ is an element of $x$ iff $y$ exemplifies $H$

$$\text{ExtensionOf}(x,H) \rightarrow \forall y(y \in x \equiv Hy)$$

(315) **Theorem:** The Fundamental Theorem for Natural Classes and Logically-Conceived Sets. We saw in Remark (306) that the fundamental principle governing the conception of natural classes and logical sets is: for every property $F$, there is a natural class (i.e., logical set) whose members are precisely the individuals exemplifying $F$. We now have a proof of this claim:

$$\forall F \exists x(\text{Class}(x) \& \forall y(y \in x \equiv Fy))$$

The proof in the Appendix shows how this follows from previous theorems.

### 10.4 Reconstructing the Fregean Extension of $F$

(316) **Definition:** Notation for the Extension of a Property. Recall that for an arbitrary property $G$, we established that the description $\epsilon xG$ is significant, by a modally strict proof (310.3). So let’s introduce $\epsilon G$ to rigidly refer to the extension of $G$: 
10.4. RECONSTRUCTING THE FREGIAN EXTENSION OF F

\[ eG \overset{\text{df}}{=} \text{ixExtensionOf}(x, G) \]

Note that whereas Frege's \(\circ\)-operator is a variable-binding operator, our \(e\)-operator is not; it is simply a functional, term-forming operator. We'll say more about how our operator compares with Frege's in (324) and (326) below.

(317) Theorems: The \(e\)-Operator Doesn’t Yield Impractical Terms. It is important to observe that if \(\Pi\) is an empty property term, then \(\text{ixExtensionOf}(x, \Pi)\) is an empty term, and so is the defined term \(e\Pi\):

(1) \(\neg \Pi \downarrow \rightarrow \neg \text{ixExtensionOf}(x, \Pi) \downarrow\), where \(\Pi\) is any 1-place relation term in which \(x\) doesn’t occur free

(2) \(\neg \Pi \downarrow \rightarrow \neg e\Pi \downarrow\), where \(\Pi\) is any 1-place relation term

Thus, the \(e\)-operator doesn’t give rise to any impractical terms, i.e., complex terms that denote even though the argument to the defined term-forming operator is empty. As discussed in the latter part of Remark (278), though our system doesn’t rule out such impractical terms, they don’t occur in this case because \(\text{ExtensionOf}(x, \Pi)\) fails to be true when \(\Pi\) is empty. Consequently, the derived Rule of Identity by Definition (121.1) allows us to immediately conclude that \(e\Pi = \text{ixExtensionOf}(x, \Pi)\) when \(\Pi\) is significant, and the primitive Rule of Definition by Identity (74.1) yields \(\neg e\Pi \downarrow\) when it is not.\(^{198}\)

(318) Theorem: The Extension of \(G\) is Canonical. It now follows that, for an arbitrary property \(G\), the extension of \(G\) is identical to the abstract object that encodes exactly the properties that are materially equivalent to \(G\):

\[ eG = \text{ix}(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \forall z(Fz \equiv Gz))) \]

So by (250), \(eG\) is (identical to) a canonical individual.

(319) Theorem: Another Fact About Contingently Equivalent Properties. Recall again that in (219.1) we proved that there are properties that are materially equivalent but possibly not materially equivalent. It is straightforward consequence of this that there are properties \(F\) and \(G\) such that possibly, \(F\) and \(G\) are materially equivalent but possibly not materially equivalent:

\[ \exists G \exists F \diamond (\forall z(Fz \equiv Gz) \& \diamond \neg \forall z(Fz \equiv Gz)) \]

This theorem will help us show that \(eG\) is not a strictly canonical object. Where \(\varphi\) is the formula \(\forall z(Fz \equiv Gz)\), the above establishes that there are properties \(G\) and \(F\) such that \(\diamond (\varphi \& \diamond \neg \varphi)\), i.e., by (165.11), that \(\diamond \varphi \& \diamond \neg \varphi\).

\(^{198}\)Note that if we had defined \(\text{ExtensionOf}(x, G)\) more simply as \(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \forall z(Fz \equiv Gz))\), then there would have been property terms \(\Pi\) such that \(\neg \Pi \downarrow \& e\Pi \downarrow\). Under this simpler definition of \(\text{ExtensionOf}(x, G)\), \(e\Pi\) would have denoted (when \(\Pi\) is empty) the abstract object that encodes all and only the unexemplified properties. Though a harmless outcome, the impractical term would have been innocuous, if distracting.
Remark: \(\epsilon G\) is Not Strictly Canonical. By (318), we know \(\epsilon G\) is (identical to) a canonical object. But it isn’t too hard to see that \(\epsilon G\) isn’t (identical to) a strictly canonical object. We have to show that where \(\varphi\) is the formula \(\forall z (Fz \equiv Gz)\), that \(\varphi\) isn’t a rigid condition on properties, i.e., by (257.2), that there is no modally strict proof of \(\forall F (\varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi)\). By reasoning analogous to that displayed in Remark (288), we can argue that the assumption that \(\varphi\) is rigid would require our system to be inconsistent:

\[
\begin{align*}
\vdash \Box F(\varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi) & \quad \text{assumption, definition of strict canonicity} \\
\vdash \Box \forall F(\varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi) & \quad \text{by RN} \\
\vdash \neg \Diamond \neg \forall F(\varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi) & \quad \text{by Df (158.2)} \\
\vdash \neg \Diamond \forall (\varphi \& \neg \Box \varphi) & \quad \text{by classical quantifier reasoning} \\
\vdash \neg \Diamond \forall (\varphi \& \Diamond \neg \varphi) & \quad \text{by (158.11)} \\
\vdash \neg \exists F (\varphi \& \Box \neg \varphi) & \quad \text{by BF (167.3)} \\
\vdash \forall G \neg \exists F (\varphi \& \Diamond \neg \varphi) & \quad \text{by GEN} \\
\vdash \neg \exists \exists F (\varphi \& \Diamond \neg \varphi) & \quad \text{by quantifier negation}
\end{align*}
\]

But the proof of (319) establishes \(\vdash \exists G \exists F (\varphi \& \Diamond \neg \varphi)\). So, on pain of system inconsistency, \(\varphi\) fails to be a rigid condition on properties and \(\epsilon G\) fails to be (identical to) a strictly canonical object.

Lemma: Facts About the Extension of a Property. The previous definition, together with earlier theorems, straightforwardly yield, as non-modally strict theorems, that: (.1) the extension of \(G\) is an extension of \(G\); (.2) the extension of \(G\) encodes a property \(F\) iff \(F\) is materially equivalent to \(G\); and (.3) the extension of \(G\) encodes \(G\):

\[
\begin{align*}
(1) & \quad \text{ExtensionOf}(\epsilon G, G) \\
(2) & \quad \forall F (\epsilon GF \equiv \forall z (Fz \equiv Gz)) \\
(3) & \quad \epsilon GG \\
(4) & \quad \text{ExtensionOf}(x, G) \equiv x = \epsilon G
\end{align*}
\]

We’ve adopted here a convention of putting the symbol ‘\(G\)’, in formulas of the form \(\epsilon GF\), in a slightly smaller font to make it easier to parse such formulas as encoding formulas of the form \(xF\) with the complex individual term \(\epsilon G\) substituted for \(x\).

Theorem: Frege’s Basic Law V. A consistent version of Frege’s Basic Law V is now derivable, namely, the extension of \(F\) is identical with the extension of \(G\) iff all and only the objects that exemplify \(F\) exemplify \(G\):

\[
\epsilon F = \epsilon G \equiv \forall x (Fx \equiv Gx)
\]
10.4. RECONSTRUCTING THE FREGIAN EXTENSION OF F

Cf. Frege, Grundgesetze I, §20. See Remark (329) for a discussion about how this \( \star \)-theorem can be turned into a modally strict one. Also, it should be mentioned that in a later chapter, we’ll develop a modally strict proof of: the extension of \( F \) at \( w \) is identical to the extension of \( G \) at \( w \) if and only if \( F \) and \( G \) are materially equivalent at \( w \). See (549).

(323) Remark: Fregean Epsilon Notation. In what follows, the reader should carefully distinguish the symbols \( \epsilon, \epsilon, \text{ and } \varepsilon \). We’ve introduced the symbol \( \epsilon \) for the defined notion of membership, as in the formula \( x \in y \) (312). And we’ve introduced \( \epsilon \) as a term-forming operator, as in \( \epsilon F \) (316). We shall now start using \( \epsilon \) to represent Frege’s variable-binding epsilon operator, in expressions such as \( \epsilon f(\epsilon) \). Since the use of the modern, stylized \( \epsilon \) symbol for set membership is historically connected to Peano’s use of a Greek epsilon (Peano 1889, vi, x; Russell 1903, 19), we are therefore using this Greek letter in at least three different font faces. Fortunately, it is easy to tell them apart.

(324) Remark: Frege on the Contradiction. After receiving the letter from Russell (dated 16 June 1902) that outlined the paradox that affects predication and set membership, Frege added an Appendix to his (then forthcoming) 1903a and reconstructed the paradox in two different ways: the first derivation doesn’t use the defined notion of membership whereas the second one does. So let’s focus on the first derivation; later, in (326), we’ll compare his notion of membership with ours.

In 1903a ([2013, 256]), Frege explicitly notes that the following formula says that \( \Delta \) is a class that does not belong to itself:

\[
\neg \forall g \left( \varepsilon g(\varepsilon) = \Delta \right)
\]

But strictly speaking, this formula says: not every concept \( g \) is such that its extension \( \Delta \) falls under it, i.e., some concept \( g \) has an extension (\( \Delta \) that doesn’t fall under \( g \), i.e., \( \Delta \) is the extension of a concept under which \( \Delta \) does not fall. Frege then goes on to show how a contradiction can be derived using this formula, by building a paradoxical extension from the concept it expresses.

Frege’s formula can be reconstructed in our system, but it doesn’t lead to a contradiction because it can’t be used to construct a an expression for a paradoxical property. If we ignore all the judgment strokes and write his formula using our notation for negations, conditionals, quantifiers, and identity, we have:

\[
\neg \forall g(\varepsilon g(\varepsilon) = \Delta \rightarrow g(\Delta))
\]

Now if we take the liberty of representing Fregean concepts as properties (Frege 1892, 51), use upper case \( G \) for the property variable \( g \), and use our notation \( \epsilon G \) instead of \( \varepsilon g(\varepsilon) \) to refer to the extension of \( G \), the above formula converts to:
\neg \forall \Delta (\varepsilon \Delta = \Delta \rightarrow \Delta (\Delta))

If we use \( x \) instead of \( \Delta \) and exemplification instead of functional application, this becomes:

\neg \forall \Delta (\varepsilon \Delta = x \rightarrow Gx)

But by quantifier laws and the symmetry of identity, this is equivalent to:

\exists \Delta (x = \varepsilon \Delta \& \neg Gx)

This formula explicitly asserts: \( x \) is the extension of a property that \( x \) doesn’t exemplify. But we now show that the relation term \([\lambda x \exists \Delta (x = \varepsilon \Delta \& \neg Gx)]\) is provably empty, and that the individual term \( \varepsilon [\lambda x \exists \Delta (x = \varepsilon \Delta \& \neg Gx)] \) is as well.

(325) ★Theorems: Some Interesting Empty Terms. In our system, the predicate \([\lambda x \exists \Delta (x = \varepsilon \Delta \& \neg Gx)]\) violates the restrictions on axiom (39.2) – by the Encoding Formula Convention (17.2) and the definition of identity (23.1), the subterm \( x = \varepsilon \Delta \) contains encoding formula subterms in which \( x \) is free and so the \( \lambda \) binds a variable in these encoding formula subterms.\(^{199}\) So (39.2) doesn’t assert \([\lambda x \exists \Delta (x = \varepsilon \Delta \& \neg Gx)]\) ↓. Instead, one can prove:

(.1) \neg [\lambda x \exists \Delta (x = \varepsilon \Delta \& \neg Gx)] ↓

Thus, the \( \lambda \)-expression that has Frege’s formula (i.e., the one discussed in the previous remark) as the matrix isn’t significant. Consequently, given how \( \varepsilon F \) has been defined, it is provable that the extension of being an extension \( x \) of a concept under which \( x \) doesn’t fall doesn’t exist:

(.2) \neg \varepsilon [\lambda x \exists \Delta (x = \varepsilon \Delta \& \neg Gx)] ↓

Thus, the problematic extension provably doesn’t exist.

(326) Remark: Frege’s Version of ‘Set Membership’. Although we have suggested that the reader should compare definition of membership (312) to the definition in Frege 1893 (§34, A), it is no doubt a bit awkward to do so. In the cited passage, Frege says:

\ldots our concern is only to designate the value of the function \( \Phi(\xi) \) for the argument \( \Delta \), that is, \( \Phi(\Delta) \), using ‘\( \Delta \)’ and ‘\( \varepsilon \Phi(\varepsilon) \)’. I do so in this way:

\‘\( \Delta \sim \varepsilon \Phi(\varepsilon) \)’

\(^{199}\)The Encoding Formula Convention (17.3) says the defined formula \( x = \varepsilon \Delta \) has the encoding formula subterms \( xF \) and \( \varepsilon GF \), given that these are subterms of the definiens in the definition of \( x = \varepsilon \Delta \) (23.1). The definiens of \( x = \varepsilon \Delta \) is \((O!x \& O!\varepsilon \Delta \& \Box \forall F(x \equiv F \varepsilon \Delta)) \lor (A!x \& A!\varepsilon \Delta \& \Box \forall F(x \equiv \varepsilon GF))\). Clearly, the formula \( xF \) in this definiens is an encoding formula subterm of the definiens, and so by the Convention, \( xF \) is an encoding formula subterm of \( x = \varepsilon \Delta \). So by the definition of subterm, \( xF \) is a subterm of the matrix of \([\lambda x \exists \Delta (x = \varepsilon \Delta \& \neg Gx)]\) as well as of the \( \lambda \)-expression itself. Hence, the \( \lambda \) binds a variable in an encoding formula subterm.
which is to be co-referential with ‘Φ(Δ)’.

So Frege doesn’t really say that ^ is the notion of membership in a set, or even membership in an extension. Immediately after the above passage, he offers the formal definition of the binary function ξ^ζ:

\[ \text{\| } \wedge \forall \exists \left( \tau \in g(a) = \alpha \right) = a^\neg u \]

(A)

What’s being defined here is the value of the function a^\neg u. And Frege defines it as: the object α such that there exists a function g for which u is the extension of g and α is the value of g for the argument a. Let’s limit the definition to the case where g is a concept, so that we can replace it with our variable G. Then we might initially render Frege’s definition in our notation as:

\[ a^\neg u = \text{df } \exists \forall \exists G(\text{ExtensionOf}(u,G) \& G(a) = \alpha) \]

Moreover, Frege’s claim u = εg(ε) can be represented in our notation as u = εG, which by (321.4)• is equivalent to ExtensionOf(u,G). So the definition now becomes:

\[ a^\neg u = \text{df } \exists \forall \exists G(\text{ExtensionOf}(u,G) \& G(a) = \alpha) \]

Finally, when u is a concept, the α in Frege’s definiens is a truth-value and, indeed, the truth-value The True when α falls under the concept G. So the claim G(a) = α in Frege’s definition can be represented by the exemplification predication Ga. That means the variable α is no longer needed. Thus, we can transform Frege’s definition-by-= of a^\neg u to a definition-by= of a ∈ u by eliminating the variable-binding description operator and the variable α from Frege’s definiens, so that Frege’s definition now becomes:

\[ a \in u \equiv \text{df } \exists G(\text{ExtensionOf}(u,G) \& Ga) \]

This is a simple notational variant of (312).

---

200 Since Frege didn’t work within a modal context, it is not clear how u = εg(ε) would or should behave when we evaluate it with respect to such a context; it depends on whether the term εg(ε) is interpreted rigidly and whether identity claims are necessary if true. In our system, the counterpart of u = εg(ε), namely, u = εG, is a rigid condition on properties: the claim □∀u[□(u = εG) → □(u = εG)] follows by GEN and RN from an instance of the necessity of identity. But (321.4)•, i.e., ExtensionOf(x,G) ≡ x = εG, is not a modally strict theorem, and so it is to be expected that ExtensionOf(u,G) is not a rigid condition on properties. This should be relatively easy to see from the discussion in Remark (320).

It should be clear, then why we have substituted the condition ExtensionOf(u,G) for the equivalent condition u = εG in the Fregean definition of membership. This allows certain general theorems about extensions to be proved in a modally strict manner. By contrast, if we had preserved u = εG as part of the definition, then since εG is defined in terms of a rigid definite description, certain general theorems about membership would fail to be modally strict.
**Corollary:** Fregean Principle of Extensions. It is an immediate, though not modally strict, corollary of (314) that an individual \( x \) is a member of the extension of \( F \) if and only if \( x \) exemplifies \( F \):

\[
x \in \epsilon F \equiv Fx
\]

Cf. Frege 1893, §55, Theorem 1, where Frege proves \( f(a) = a \land f(\varepsilon) \).

**Theorem:** The Extension of \( G \) is a Class. Finally, the extension of a property is a class:

\[
\text{Class}(\epsilon G)
\]

This captures a claim found in Carnap (1947, 19, 4-14), but as a logico-meta-physical claim about properties, not a semantic claim about predicates.

**Remark:** Actual Extensions. As the reader works through the following definitions and theorems, it should be kept in mind that many of the theorems that fail to be modally strict could be turned into modally strict theorems by defining:

\[
\text{ActualExtensionOf}(x, G) \equivdf A!x \land \forall F(xF \equiv \forall z(Fz \equiv Gz))
\]

This definition also yields as theorems:

\[
\exists! x \text{ActualExtensionOf}(x, G)
\]

\[
\land x \text{ActualExtensionOf}(x, G) \downarrow
\]

Thus, we could introduce the notation:

\[
\hat{\epsilon} G \equivdf \land x \text{ActualExtensionOf}(x, G)
\]

Clearly, \( \hat{\epsilon} G \) is a strictly canonical object, since the application of GEN to an appropriate instance of axiom (46.1) yields a modally strict proof of:

\[
\forall F(\forall z(Fz \equiv Gz) \rightarrow \Box \forall z(Fz \equiv Gz))
\]

The reader should therefore keep in mind that the non-modally strict theorems developed below could be converted to modally strict theorems often by simply substituting \( \text{ActualExtensionOf}(x, G) \) for \( \text{ExtensionOf}(x, G) \), substituting \( \hat{\epsilon} G \) for \( \epsilon G \), and strategically placing the actuality operator \( \Box \). **Exercise:** (a) Show that \( \forall x \forall G(\text{ActualExtensionOf}(x, G) \rightarrow \Box \text{ActualExtensionOf}(x, G)) \). (b) Use \( \text{ActualExtensionOf}(x, G) \) to formulate modally-strict counterparts of the theorems proved below. (c) Show that if we define:

\[
\text{Class}'(x) \equivdf \exists G(\text{ActualExtensionOf}(x, G))
\]

then it follows that \( \forall x(\text{Class}'(x) \rightarrow \Box \text{Class}'(x)) \).
10.5 Interlude: Restricted Variables

Our next goal in the application of object theory is to derive the basic principles of natural classes (logical sets). But to simplify the expression of the theorems, we shall adopt the expedient of restricted variables. While the use of bound restricted variables to express theorems and free restricted variables to state definitions is straightforward enough, the presence of free restricted variables can easily lead one astray when reasoning. In this section, then, we’ll discuss the principles and conventions that govern the use of restricted variables, and explain the problems of reasoning with free restricted variables in modal contexts.

(330) Metadefinition: Restricted Variables. A restricted variable is, intuitively, a variable introduced to range only over some, but not all, of the entities in the domain of an unrestricted variable, namely, those individuals or relations satisfying a restriction condition \( \psi \) that meets three requirements:

\begin{enumerate}
  \item \( \psi \) contains a single free variable, say \( \alpha \),
  \item \( \psi \) is strictly non-empty in the sense that \( \vdash \Box \exists \alpha \psi \), and
  \item \( \psi \) has strict existential import in the sense that \( \vdash \Box \psi \alpha \rightarrow \tau \downarrow \), for any term \( \tau \) substitutable for \( \alpha \).
\end{enumerate}

For example, the conditions \( O!x \), Propositional\((F) \), and Class\((x) \) are restriction conditions. Let’s confirm this before we indicate how one might introduce corresponding restricted variables. By inspection, each condition contains a single free variable. Moreover, each is strictly non-empty since all of the following are provable by modally strict means: \( \exists x O!x \), \( \exists F(\text{Propositional}(F)) \), and \( \exists x \text{Class}(x) \) (exercises). And each has strict existential import, for the following are all modally strict theorems:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \( O!\kappa \rightarrow \kappa \downarrow \), for any individual term \( \kappa \)
  \item \( \text{Propositional}(\Pi) \rightarrow \Pi \downarrow \), for any property term \( \Pi \)
  \item \( \text{Class}(\kappa) \rightarrow \kappa \downarrow \), for any individual term \( \kappa \)
\end{itemize}

We leave the first two as exercises, but to see that the third holds, assume Class\((\kappa) \). Then by definition (307.2), it follows that \( \exists G(\text{ExtensionOf}(\kappa, G)) \), at which point definition (307.1) implies \( A!\kappa \), and thus, by axiom (39.5.a), \( \kappa \downarrow \).\(^{201}\)

Since \( O!x \), Propositional\((F) \), and Class\((x) \) are restriction conditions, we may, in each case, introduce distinguished variables that range over the entities satisfying the condition. Later, we’ll use \( u, v, \ldots \) to range over ordinary objects,

\(^{201}\)By contrast, \( \neg \text{Class}(x) \) is not a restriction condition. Though it contains a single free variable and is strictly non-empty (i.e., \( \vdash \Box \exists x \neg \text{Class}(x) \)), it doesn’t have existential import. The formula \( \neg \text{Class}(x) \) doesn’t strictly imply \( \kappa \downarrow \), for when \( \neg \kappa \downarrow \), both \( \neg \text{Class}(\kappa) \) and \( \neg \kappa \downarrow \) hold.
and use the letters $c, c', c'', \ldots$ to range over classes. Though we could also distinguish certain upper case letters to range over propositional properties, we shall not have the need to do so. By requiring that restriction conditions be strictly non-empty, we ensure that quantifier principles such as $\forall u \phi \rightarrow \exists u \phi$ and $\forall c \phi \rightarrow \exists c \phi$ hold, and we ensure that $u \downarrow, v \downarrow, c \downarrow$, and $c' \downarrow$ are still axiomatic. By requiring that restriction conditions have existential import, we ensure that definitions-by-equivalence using free restricted variables always abbreviate definitions in which the definiens will be false for any terms that either fail to denote or fail to meet the restriction condition. This will become clear in (332) below.

Restricted variables allow us to write long formulas and terms in abbreviated form. Thus, any expression (formula or term) written using a restricted variable is simply shorthand for an expanded expression that uses unrestricted variables. The primary purpose of restricted variables, therefore, is to reduce cognitive load by simplifying the expression of complex claims. Bound occurrences of restricted variables are easily eliminable; there is a straightforward way to interpret formulas containing them. Similarly, it is straightforward to interpret free occurrences of restricted variables in definitions. But, when reasoning, free occurrences of restricted variables aren’t as easily eliminable; their interpretation is highly dependent on the context. The use of free restricted variables to state axioms and theorems, and when reasoning in proofs and derivations, is highly problematic when modal operators, actuality operators, and rigid definite descriptions are present; in particular, reasoning with free restricted variables often increases cognitive load and it is important to see why this is so, if only to counterbalance the strong temptation to use them and to identify the conditions under which one may safely use them. We’ll discuss this at length in (334) and (335).

Accordingly, our discussion of restricted variables will be divided into the following remarks:

• conventions for bound restricted variables (331),
• conventions for free restricted variables in definitions-by-≡ (332),
• conventions for free restricted variables in definitions-by-= (333),
• reasoning with bound restricted variables (334), and
• the problem of, and conditions for, using free restricted variables to assert axioms/theorems and to reason within derivations/proofs (335).

(331) Remark: Bound Restricted Variables. In this Remark, we consider restricted variables that are bound by sentence- and term-forming operators. We begin with a general statement of our conventions followed by a discussion of
each convention and some of its implications. We can summarize these conventions in two groups – one group for the quantifiers and one group for the term-forming operators.

To introduce our conventions for the quantifiers $\forall$ and $\exists$, let:

- $\psi$ be any restriction condition, as defined in (330),
- $\alpha$ be the unrestricted variable that occurs free in $\psi$ (where $\alpha$ is either an individual variable or an $n$-place relation variable, for some $n$),
- $\gamma$ be introduced a variable of the same type as $\alpha$ but restricted by the condition $\psi$, and
- $\varphi$ be any formula in which $\gamma$ is substitutable for $\alpha$.

Then we may introduce, as abbreviations, formulas in which restricted variables are bound by quantifiers:

\[(.1) \forall \gamma \varphi_{|\gamma}\alpha = \text{abbr} \forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \varphi)\]
\[(.2) \exists \gamma \varphi_{|\gamma}\alpha = \text{abbr} \exists \alpha (\psi \& \varphi)\]

Strictly speaking, since we only have one primitive quantifier in the system, we don’t need the second abbreviation; we can derive from (.1) that $\exists \gamma \varphi_{|\gamma}\alpha$ abbreviates $\exists \alpha (\psi \& \varphi)$, by the definition of $\exists$.

Before we introduce our conventions for the term-forming operators $\iota$ and $\lambda$, it would serve well to give some examples of (.1) and (.2). To see a nice example of (.1), which shows that it even provides an interpretation of a string of universal quantifiers, start with theorem (239.1), which asserts $(O!x \& O!y) \rightarrow (\forall F(Fx \equiv Fy) \rightarrow x =_{E} y)$, and note that by (89.7.a) and (89.7.b), it is equivalent to $O!x \rightarrow (O!y \rightarrow (\forall F(Fx \equiv Fy) \rightarrow x =_{E} y))$. After applying GEN twice and then some predicate logic, it follows that:

$$\forall x(O!x \rightarrow \forall y((\forall F(Fx \equiv Fy) \rightarrow x =_{E} y)))$$

Using convention (.1) however, with $u, v$ as restricted variables over ordinary objects, we may abbreviate the embedded universal claim and so obtain:

$$\forall x(O!x \rightarrow \forall y(\forall F(Fx \equiv Fv) \rightarrow x =_{E} y))$$

and by a second application of (.1), shorten this to:

\[\forall x(O!x \rightarrow \forall y(\forall F(Fx \equiv Fv) \rightarrow x =_{E} y))\]

\[\forall x(O!x \rightarrow \forall y(\forall F(Fx \equiv Fv) \rightarrow x =_{E} y))\]

\[\forall x(O!x \rightarrow \forall y(\forall F(Fx \equiv Fv) \rightarrow x =_{E} y))\]

\[\forall x(O!x \rightarrow \forall y(\forall F(Fx \equiv Fv) \rightarrow x =_{E} y))\]

\[\forall x(O!x \rightarrow \forall y(\forall F(Fx \equiv Fv) \rightarrow x =_{E} y))\]

\[\forall x(O!x \rightarrow \forall y(\forall F(Fx \equiv Fv) \rightarrow x =_{E} y))\]
\(\forall u \forall v (\forall F (F u \equiv F v) \rightarrow u =_E v)\)

It should be evident from this example that since the following two claims are equivalent:

\((\psi_1 \land \ldots \land \psi_n) \rightarrow \varphi\)

\(\psi_1 \rightarrow (\ldots \rightarrow (\psi_n \rightarrow \varphi)\ldots)\)

our system is indifferent as to which of the following \(\forall \gamma_1 \ldots \forall \gamma_n \varphi\gamma_1 \ldots \gamma_n\) abbreviates:

\(\forall \alpha_1 \ldots \forall \alpha_n ((\psi_1 \land \ldots \land \psi_n) \rightarrow \varphi)\)

\(\forall \alpha_1 \ldots \forall \alpha_n (\psi_1 \rightarrow (\ldots \rightarrow (\psi_n \rightarrow \varphi)\ldots))\)

Now for a rather different example of (.1), let \(c\) be a restricted individual variable ranging over classes. Then we may write the (true) claim \(\neg \forall x (\text{Class}(x) \rightarrow \exists y (y \in x))\) (i.e., not every class has members), as \(\neg \forall c \exists y (y \in c)\). Moreover, we may write the (false) claim \(\forall x (\text{Class}(x) \rightarrow \neg \exists y (y \in x))\) (i.e., every class fails to have members) more simply as \(\forall c \neg \exists y (y \in c)\).

For an example of (.2), note that theorem (208.3) implies \(\exists x (O! x & \neg aE! x)\). We may therefore write this last claim as \(\exists u \exists v (u =_E v)\). Similarly, the (true) claim that some class fails to have members, i.e., \(\exists x (\text{Class}(x) & \neg \exists y (y \in x))\) may be more simply written with restricted variables as \(\exists c \neg \exists y (y \in c)\). And we leave it to the reader to show why \(\forall u \exists v (u =_E v)\), by (.1) and (.2), abbreviates \(\forall x (O! x \rightarrow \exists y (O! y & x =_E y))\).

We now introduce our convention for the term-forming operators \(I\) and \(\lambda\). Let \(\psi, \alpha, \gamma,\) and \(\varphi\) be as above but where \(\psi\) is a restriction condition on individuals, so that \(\alpha\) and \(\gamma\) are some individual variables \(\nu\) and \(\mu\), respectively, where \(\mu\) is substitutable for \(\nu\) in \(\varphi\). Then we may introduce, as abbreviations, definite descriptions in which restricted variables are bound by the \(I\) symbol:

\((.3) \ I \psi \varphi^\mu_{\nu} \equiv_{abstr} I \nu (\psi & \varphi)\)

As an example of (.3), note that \(u(u \neq u)\) is shorthand for the empty description \(I x (O! x & x \neq x)\). For a more interesting example, suppose we could prove \(\exists x (\text{Class}(x) & \neg \exists y (y \in x))\). It would follow that \(I x (\text{Class}(x) & \neg \exists y (y \in x)) \downarrow\). Then we could abbreviate this last claim as \(I c \neg \exists y (y \in c) \downarrow\).

Finally, to introduce our convention for the term-forming operator \(\lambda\), let:

- \(\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n\) be any restriction conditions on individuals,
- \(\nu_1, \ldots, \nu_n\) be, respectively, the unrestricted and distinct individual variable that occurs free in \(\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n\),
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- \( \mu_1, \ldots, \mu_n \) be respectively introduced as a distinct individual variable restricted by the conditions \( \psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n \), and
- \( \varphi \) be any formula in which \( \mu_1, \ldots, \mu_n \) are substitutable, respectively, for \( \nu_1, \ldots, \nu_n \).

Then we may introduce, as abbreviations, \( \lambda \)-expressions in which restricted variables are bound by the \( \lambda \) symbol:

\[
(4) \quad [\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi_{\mu_1 \ldots \mu_n}] =_{abbr} [\lambda \nu_1 \ldots \nu_n \psi_1 \ldots \psi_n \& \varphi]
\]

For an example of (4), consider that 
\[
[\lambda u \neg E!u]
\]
abbreviates 
\[
[\lambda x O!x \& \neg E!x]
\]
and 
\[
[\lambda c \neg \exists y (y \in c)]
\]
abbreviates 
\[
[\lambda x Class(x) \& \neg \exists y (y \in x)]
\]
And if \( \psi \) is \( O!x \) and \( u_1, \ldots, u_n \) are taken to be a restricted variables ranging over ordinary individuals, and \( \varphi \) is \( \neg R^n x_1 \ldots x_n \), then the expression 
\[
[\lambda u_1 \ldots u_n \neg R^n u_1 \ldots u_n]
\]
abbreviates 
\[
[\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n O!x_1 \& \ldots \& O!x_n \& \neg Rx_1 \ldots x_n]
\]

(332) Remark: Conventions for the Use of Free Restricted Variables in Definitions-by-Equivalence. One often finds free restricted variables in definitions-by-equivalence and definitions-by-identity. For example, set theorists introduce \( \alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta \) as restricted variables ranging over ordinals. They then define functions on, and properties of, ordinals by using these restricted variables. In this Remark, we confine ourselves to definitions-by-equivalence and begin with an example concerning classes.

Suppose we stipulate that a class \( c \) is empty just in case \( c \) has no members:

\[
(A) \quad \text{Empty}(c) \equiv df \neg \exists y (y \in c)
\]

How are we to understand this definition, i.e., what definition does (A) abbreviate? In the present text, the answer is that (A) abbreviates (B):

\[
(B) \quad \text{Empty}(x) \equiv df \text{Class}(x) \& \neg \exists y (y \in x)
\]

In this Remark, we confine ourselves to definitions-by-equivalence and begin with an example concerning classes.

Suppose we stipulate that a class \( c \) is empty just in case \( c \) has no members:

\[
(A) \quad \text{Empty}(c) \equiv df \neg \exists y (y \in c)
\]

In standard texts on set theory, one typically finds an \textit{ordinal} to be defined as any set strictly well-ordered with respect to \( \in \) and such that every element is also a subset. Then, using the restricted variables \( a \) and \( \beta \) to range over ordinals, one might find the following definition of the function term the successor of \( a \) and the notion \( a \) is a \textit{limit ordinal}:

\[
\text{Suc}(a) =_{df} a \cup \{a\}
\]

\[
\text{LimitOrdinal}(a) =_{df} a \neq \emptyset \& \neg \exists \beta (a = \text{Suc}(\beta))
\]

In Drake 1974 (41), for example, we find ordinal addition defined basically as follows, where \( \lambda \) ranges over limit ordinals and 0 is defined earlier (25) as \( \emptyset \):

\[
a + 0 = a
\]

\[
a + \text{Suc}(\beta) = \text{Suc}(a + \beta)
\]

\[
a + \lambda = \bigcup_{\delta < \lambda} (a + \delta)
\]

Though Drake says how we should interpret restricted variables when they appear as bound variables (1974, 22, 26), he never indicates what is meant when they occur free in definitions.
where (B) is governed by a version of Convention (17.2), i.e., one where the free variable \( x \) functions as a metavariable but the bound variable \( y \) needs no special interpretation (since we know that alphabetically-variant formulas are interderivable).\(^\text{204}\) So (B) is, in turn, shorthand for the definition:

\[(B') \text{Empty}(\kappa) \equiv_{df} \text{Class}(\kappa) \& \neg \exists y (y \in \kappa), \text{provided } y \text{ doesn't occur free in } \kappa\]

As we know from various remarks and theorems in the foregoing, (B') extends our language to include formulas of the form \( \text{Empty}(\kappa) \) and implies the closures of the following theorem schema:

\[(C) \text{Empty}(\kappa) \equiv \text{Class}(\kappa) \& \neg \exists y (y \in \kappa), \text{provided } y \text{ doesn't occur free in } \kappa\]

But it is important to see why (A) should not be interpreted as a kind of conditional or contextual definition, i.e., as shorthand for adding \( \text{Empty}(\kappa) \) to the language and stipulating the closures of the following as new axioms:

\[(D) \text{Class}(\kappa) \rightarrow (\text{Empty}(\kappa) \equiv \neg \exists y (y \in \kappa)), \text{provided } y \text{ doesn't occur free in } \kappa\]

Note that (C) and (D) aren’t equivalent; (C) implies (D) but not vice versa, since \( \varphi \equiv (\psi \& \chi) \) implies \( \psi \rightarrow (\varphi \equiv \chi) \), but the converse doesn’t hold.\(^\text{205}\)

There are two (related) reasons why (D) is a problematic way to eliminate the restricted variables in (A). The first is that (D) fails the eliminability criterion for definitions-by-equivalence: (D) doesn’t generally define \( \text{Empty}(\kappa) \) but rather defines it only when \( \kappa \) is a class.\(^\text{206}\) The second, related problem is that if \( \kappa \) is an empty singular term, then (D) doesn’t give one the means to prove \( \neg \text{Empty}(\kappa) \), whereas (B) does.

Of course, some texts allow conditional/contextual definitions-by-\( = \), but in the present work, we prefer to avoid them.\(^\text{207}\) Any condition needed for a

\(^{204}\)It is worth mentioning that in a properly formulated definition with free restricted variables, we won’t need existence clauses in the definiens, since by (330.3), any condition \( \varphi(\alpha) \) that is used to introduce a restricted variable \( y \) has to be such that, for any term \( \tau \) substitutable for \( \alpha \), it is provable that \( \varphi^\tau_\alpha \rightarrow \tau \downarrow \). So we don’t need existence clauses in definiens using free restricted variables, since a definiens \( \varphi(y) \) will imply \( \tau \downarrow \) if \( \varphi^\tau_y \) holds.

\(^{205}\)Theorem (89.8.i) establishes that \( \varphi \equiv (\psi \& \chi) \) implies \( \varphi \rightarrow (\varphi \equiv \chi) \). To see that the converse doesn’t hold, consider the scenario in which \( \psi \) is false but \( \varphi \) and \( \chi \) are both true. Then \( \psi \rightarrow (\varphi \equiv \chi) \) is true, by failure of the antecedent, but \( \varphi \equiv (\psi \& \chi) \) is false.

\(^{206}\)This gives rise to a version of Frege’s infamous ‘Julius Caesar’ problem. The problem is that (D) doesn’t give us the means to prove whether or not Julius Caesar (‘j’) is empty, even given that \( \neg \text{Class}(j) \).

\(^{207}\)Note that §8.6 in Suppes 1957 is titled Conditional Definitions and the discussion (pp. 165–166) is primarily about the definition of the operation symbol of division \( (x/y) \). But, since there are no definite descriptions in the system Suppes is discussing, he can’t define \( x/y \) outright using a definition-by-\( = \). Instead he defines it using a conditional definition-by-\( = \) as follows: if \( y \neq 0 \), then \( x/y = z \equiv x = y \cdot z \). It is thus clear from his discussion that Suppes allows conditional definitions-by-\( = \). But we shall not. However, we’ll discuss a form of conditional definition-by-\( = \) in (360) and in the following Remark (361).
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Definition-by-$\equiv$ can be built into the definiens. Thus, we consider it preferable to regard (A) as an abbreviation of (B). (B) defines $\text{Empty}(x)$ in all contexts, and has the virtue that if we know $\text{Class}(x)$, then by Rule $\equiv S$, the biconditionals that (B) gives rise to become equivalent to $\text{Empty}(x) \equiv \neg \exists y (y \in x)$. So in what follows, we’ll use free restricted variables in a definition-by-$\equiv$ on the model of (A) and (B).

We may summarize this discussion of free restricted variables in definitions-by-$\equiv$ as follows. Let $\psi$ be a restriction condition with $\alpha$ free and $\gamma$ be the restricted variable, and let $\varphi$ and $\chi$ be conditions on on $\alpha$. Furthermore, let us use the simple notation $\chi(\gamma)$ and $\varphi(\gamma)$, respectively, instead of $\chi^\gamma\alpha$ and $\varphi^\gamma\alpha$.

Then:

\[(.1) \text{ A definition of the form } \chi(\gamma) \equiv_{df} \varphi(\gamma) \text{ abbreviates the definition:}\]

\[\chi \equiv_{df} \psi \& \varphi,\]

where this latter definition is governed by Convention (17.2).

Thus, (A) and (B) are a simple example. Of course, (.1) should be generalized to the case where the definiens and definiendum have multiple (free) restricted variables as arguments. Let $\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n$ be conditions on the distinct variables $\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n$, respectively; i.e., $\psi_i$ is a condition on $\alpha_i$, for $1 \leq i \leq n$, and $\alpha_i$ is the only variable that occurs free in $\psi_i$. Suppose further that $\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n$ have been introduced as distinct restricted variables of the same type, respectively, as $\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n$, so that $\gamma_i$ ($1 \leq i \leq n$) ranges over the entities such that $\psi_i$. Moreover, for simplicity, let $\chi(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)$ and $\varphi(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)$, respectively, abbreviate $\chi^\gamma_{\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n}$ and $\varphi^\gamma_{\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n}$. Then:

\[(.2) \text{ A definition of the form } \chi(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n) \equiv_{df} \varphi(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n) \text{ abbreviates the definition:}\]

\[\chi \equiv_{df} \psi_1 \& \ldots \& \psi_n \& \varphi,\]

where this latter definition is governed by convention (17.2).

To see an example, consider the following, which is officially presented as item (344) in the next section. The definition for $c$ is the union of $c'$ and $c''$ is:

\[\text{UnionOf}(c, c', c'') \equiv_{df} \forall y (y \in c \equiv y \in c' \lor y \in c'')\]

This has the form:

\[\chi(\gamma_1, \gamma_2, \gamma_3) \equiv_{df} \varphi(\gamma_1, \gamma_2, \gamma_3)\]
and is to be regarded as shorthand for:

\[ \text{UnionOf}(x, z, w) \equiv_{df} \text{Class}(x) \& \text{Class}(z) \& \text{Class}(w) \& \forall y(y \in x \equiv y \in z \lor y \in w) \]

which has the form:

\[ \chi \equiv_{df} \psi_1 \& \psi_2 \& \psi_3 \& \varphi \]

where the substitutions for the metavariables are straightforward.\(^{209}\) And by Convention (17.2), the strict form of the above definition is:

\[ \text{UnionOf}(\kappa_1, \kappa_2, \kappa_3) \equiv_{df} \text{Class}(\kappa_1) \& \text{Class}(\kappa_2) \& \text{Class}(\kappa_3) \& \forall y(y \in \kappa_1 \equiv y \in \kappa_2 \lor y \in \kappa_3), \]

provided \( y \) doesn’t occur free in \( \kappa_1, \kappa_2, \) or \( \kappa_3 \)

One final observation is that our conventions, thus far, for bound and free restricted variables lead to some redundancies. For an example of such a redundancy, consider the following. In (338), we define a class \( c \) to be \textit{empty} just in case it has no members:

\[ \text{Empty}(c) \equiv_{df} \neg \exists y(y \in c) \quad (338) \]

Now suppose we want to prove \( \exists c \text{Empty}(c) \). Then by our convention (331.2) for bound restricted variables, we have to show:

(\( \vartheta \)) \( \exists x (\text{Class}(x) \& \text{Empty}(x)) \)

But by our convention (.1), the definition of \( \text{Empty}(c) \) (338), which we repeated above, abbreviates:

\[ \text{Empty}(x) \equiv_{df} \text{Class}(x) \& \neg \exists y(y \in x) \]

By a Rule of Substitution (160.2), we can exchange the definiens and definien- dum when they occur as subformulas. So to show (\( \vartheta \)), it would suffice to show:

\[ \exists x (\text{Class}(x) \& \neg \exists y(y \in x)) \]

But here, our conventions have lead us to prove something with an otiose conjunct. We can simply ignore this redundancy, for the idempotence of \& \( & \), i.e., \( (\varphi \& \varphi) \equiv \varphi \), is a modally strict theorem (86.6). So we may simplify and prove only:

(\( \xi \)) \( \exists x (\text{Class}(x) \& \neg \exists y(y \in x)) \)

\(^{209}\)Specifically, \( \alpha_1 \) is \( x \), \( \alpha_2 \) is \( z \) and \( \alpha_3 \) is \( w \), \( \psi_1 \) is \( \text{Class}(x) \), \( \psi_2 \) is \( \text{Class}(z) \), \( \psi_3 \) is \( \text{Class}(w) \), \( \chi \) is \( \text{UnionOf}(x, z, w) \), \( \varphi \) is \( \forall y(y \in x \equiv y \in z \lor y \in w) \), and \( \gamma_1, \gamma_2, \gamma_3 \) are \( c, c', c'' \), respectively.
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We’ll henceforth disregard other redundancies of this kind that might arise from combining our conventions for restricted variables.

(333) **Remark:** On the Use of Free Restricted Variables in Definitions-by-Identity. The conventions for interpreting free restricted variables in definitions-by-identity are straightforward. Let $\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n, \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n$, and $\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n$ be as stipulated in the foregoing remarks, but where $\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n$ occur free in both $i\nu\phi$ and $[\lambda v_1 \ldots v_n \varphi]$. Finally, let $\kappa$ and $\Pi$ be definienda in which $\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n$ occur free, and let:

- $\kappa(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)$ represent $\kappa_{\gamma_1 \ldots \gamma_n}$
- $\Pi(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)$ represent $\Pi_{\alpha_1 \ldots \alpha_n}$
- $\varphi(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)$ represent $\varphi_{\gamma_1 \ldots \gamma_n}$

Then we observe the following conventions:

1. $\kappa(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n) =_{df} i\nu \varphi(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)$ abbreviates the definition:
   
   $\kappa =_{df} i\nu (\psi_1 & \ldots & \psi_n & \varphi)$

2. $\Pi(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n) =_{df} [\lambda v_1 \ldots v_n \varphi(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)]$ abbreviates the definition:
   
   $\Pi =_{df} [\lambda v_1 \ldots v_n \psi_1 & \ldots & \psi_n & \varphi]$

As an example of (1), we might define the *natural pair class* of ordinary objects $u$ and $v$, written $\{u, v\}_E$ as follows:

(A) $\{u, v\}_E =_{df} i\nu \forall y(y \in c \equiv y =_{E} u \lor y =_{E} v))$

So by (1), (A) abbreviates:

(B) $\{z, w\}_E =_{df} i\nu (O!z \& O!w \& \forall y(y \in c \equiv (y =_{E} z \lor y =_{E} w)))$

And if we then eliminate the bound restricted variable in the definiens, (B) abbreviates:

(C) $\{z, w\}_E =_{df} i\nu (Class(x) \& O!z \& O!w \& \forall y(y \in x \equiv (y =_{E} z \lor y =_{E} w)))$

Given that (A) and (B) abbreviate (C), the expression $\{\kappa, \kappa'\}_E$ is well-formed for any natural pair of individual terms $\kappa$ and $\kappa'$, by our convention that variables in definitions function as metavariables (17.2.a). Moreover, if we know, by proof or by hypothesis, that one or both of $\kappa$ and $\kappa'$ is an empty term or that one or both of $\kappa$ and $\kappa'$ denotes an abstract object, then the Rule of Definition by Identity (74) yields that $\{\kappa, \kappa'\}_E$ is an empty term, by the following argument.
Without loss of generality, consider just \( \kappa \) and assume \( \neg \kappa \downarrow \lor A!\kappa \). Then, in either case, \( \neg O!\kappa \) (exercise). Moreover, in either case, \( \Box \neg O!\kappa \).\(^{210}\) Note that from \( \neg O!\kappa \) it follows that no object satisfies the condition: \( x \) is a class such that both \( \kappa \) and \( \kappa' \) are ordinary and such that the members of \( x \) are \( E \)-identical to either \( \kappa \) or \( \kappa' \), i.e.,

\[
(D) \quad \neg O!\kappa \vdash \neg \exists x (\text{Class}(x) \& O!\kappa \& O!\kappa' \& \forall y (y \in x \equiv (y =_E \kappa \lor y =_E \kappa'))) 
\]

\( \text{A fortiori,} \) \( \neg O!\kappa \) implies that there is no unique such object, i.e.,

\[
(D) \quad \neg O!\kappa \vdash \neg \exists x (\text{Class}(x) \& O!\kappa \& O!\kappa' \& \forall y (y \in x \equiv (y =_E \kappa \lor y =_E \kappa'))) 
\]

So by the Rule of Actualization:

\[
(E) \quad \vdash \neg O!\kappa \vdash \vdash \exists x (\text{Class}(x) \& O!\kappa \& O!\kappa' \& \forall y (y \in x \equiv (y =_E \kappa \lor y =_E \kappa'))) 
\]

But, from the previously established fact that \( \Box \neg O!\kappa \), it follows that \( \vdash \neg O!\kappa \), by (132). It follows from this and (E) that:

\[
\vdash \neg \exists x (\text{Class}(x) \& O!\kappa \& O!\kappa' \& \forall y (y \in x \equiv (y =_E \kappa \lor y =_E \kappa'))) 
\]

Then by theorem (44.1), we have:

\[
\neg \exists x (\text{Class}(x) \& O!\kappa \& O!\kappa' \& \forall y (y \in x \equiv (y =_E \kappa \lor y =_E \kappa'))) 
\]

So by theorem (174.2):

\[
(F) \quad \neg \exists x (\text{Class}(x) \& O!\kappa \& O!\kappa' \& \forall y (y \in x \equiv (y =_E \kappa \lor y =_E \kappa'))) \downarrow 
\]

But (C) tells us, by the Rule of Definition by Identity (74), that:

\[
(G) \quad (\exists x (\text{Class}(x) \& O!\kappa \& O!\kappa' \& \forall y (y \in x \equiv (y =_E \kappa \lor y =_E \kappa'))) \downarrow \rightarrow \\
\{ \kappa, \kappa' \}_{E} = \exists x (\text{Class}(x) \& O!\kappa \& O!\kappa' \& \forall y (y \in x \equiv (y =_E \kappa \lor y =_E \kappa'))) \quad \& \quad \\
(\neg \exists x (\text{Class}(x) \& O!\kappa \& O!\kappa' \& \forall y (y \in x \equiv (y =_E \kappa \lor y =_E \kappa'))) \downarrow \rightarrow \\
\neg \{ \kappa, \kappa' \}_{E} \downarrow 
\]

So (F) and the second conjunct of (G) imply \( \neg \{ \kappa, \kappa' \}_{E} \downarrow \).

Thus the inferential role and conventions for using restricted free variables in definitions-by-identity sometimes combine to preserve the garbage in, garbage out principle. When we substitute an argument term (of the appropriate type) for a free restricted variable in a term-forming operator with such a variable, the

\(^{210}\) We reason separately from the disjuncts \( \neg \kappa \downarrow \lor A!\kappa \). If \( \neg \kappa \downarrow \), then by (169.3), \( \Box \neg \kappa \downarrow \). But \( \Box (O!\kappa \to \kappa \downarrow) \) is a closure of axiom (39.5.a) and so an axiom. But since \( (\varphi \to \psi) \equiv (\neg \psi \to \neg \varphi) \) is a modally strict theorem, it follows by a Rule of Substitution (160.1) that \( \Box (\neg \kappa \downarrow \to \neg O!\kappa) \). So by the K axiom, \( \Box \neg \kappa \downarrow \to \Box \neg O!\kappa \). Since we’ve established \( \Box \neg \kappa \downarrow \), it follows that \( \Box \neg O!\kappa \).

If \( A!\kappa \). Then since \( \kappa \downarrow \), (a) \( \Box A!\kappa \) follows from \( A!\kappa \), by an instance of by theorem (178.2), and (b) \( A!\kappa \equiv \neg O!\kappa \) is an instance of the modally strict theorem (220.3). But (a) and (b) imply, by a Rule of Substitution that \( \Box \neg O!\kappa \).
resulting complex term will fail to be significant if its argument term is empty or has a denotation not in the domain over which the restricted variable ranges. Our definitions-by-identity that have free restricted variables will follow this pattern.

(334) Remark: Reasoning and Bound Restricted Variables. In this Remark, we examine the use of bound restricted variables when reasoning and, after examining some expected results, outline the issues that arise, and the precautions that have to be taken, when modal, actuality, and description operators are involved. In what follows, assume that the formulas \( \varphi \) being discussed have only the bound restricted variables indicated in the example, and no free restricted variables.

It is well-known that if \( \psi \) is a restriction condition with \( \alpha \) free and \( \gamma \) is a restricted variable introduced via this condition, then \( \forall \alpha \varphi \) implies \( \forall \gamma \varphi \gamma^\alpha \), i.e., if a claim is true of everything in the domain, it is true for the restricted class. This follows from the principle \( \varphi \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \varphi) \) (38.1) and we leave the proof to a footnote.\(^{211}\) For example, if every individual is ordinary or abstract, i.e., \( \forall x (O!x \lor A!x) \), then every every class is ordinary or abstract, i.e., \( \forall c (O!c \lor A!c) \). But, clearly, \( \forall \gamma \varphi \gamma^\alpha \) doesn’t imply \( \forall \alpha \varphi \); from the fact that every class is abstract \( (\forall c A!c) \), it doesn’t follow that every object is abstract \( (\forall x A!x) \).

Dual principles hold for the restricted variables bound by existential quantifiers. A theorem of the form \( \exists \gamma \varphi \gamma^\alpha \) implies \( \exists \alpha \varphi \),\(^{212}\) but again the converse doesn’t hold. We leave it to the reader to construct examples.

Another consequence of our definition of a restriction condition was previously mentioned, namely, the fact that \( \forall \gamma \varphi \gamma^\alpha \rightarrow \exists \gamma \varphi \gamma^\alpha \) is a theorem.\(^{213}\) However, in Remark (336), we’ll briefly discuss the option of allowing restriction conditions \( \psi \) that don’t have existential import, so that \( \forall \gamma \varphi \gamma^\alpha \) doesn’t imply \( \exists \gamma \varphi \gamma^\alpha \).

It is also important to observe that adjacent pairs of universal quantifiers commute even if one member of the pair binds a restricted variable and the other binds an unrestricted variable. To be specific, the following is a modally strict fact:

\[
\forall \gamma \forall \beta \varphi \gamma^\alpha \equiv \forall \beta \forall \gamma \varphi \gamma^\alpha , \text{ where } \gamma \text{ is a restricted variable introduced by some restriction condition which has only } \alpha \text{ free}
\]

\(^{211}\) Assume \( \forall \alpha \varphi \). Then, \( \varphi \), by \( \forall \varepsilon \). Hence, \( \psi \rightarrow \varphi \), by axiom (38.1). So by \( \text{GEN}, \forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \varphi) \). Hence, by our convention (331.1), it follows that \( \forall \gamma \varphi \gamma^\alpha \).

\(^{212}\) Assume \( \exists \gamma \varphi \gamma^\alpha \). Then by (2), \( \exists \alpha (\psi \& \varphi) \). Hence, \( \exists \alpha \varphi \).

\(^{213}\) Assume \( \forall \gamma \varphi \gamma^\alpha \). Then by (1) this abbreviates \( \forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \varphi) \). But, by hypothesis, \( \psi \) is a restriction condition, and so we know \( \exists \alpha \psi \), by (330). Let \( \tau \) be any witness, so that we know \( \psi \tau^\alpha \). Then \( \varphi \gamma^\alpha \), and by conjoining the last two claims and using our rules for the existential quantifier, it follows that \( \exists \alpha (\psi \& \varphi) \).
The proof is left to a footnote.\textsuperscript{214}

Though the foregoing principles for bound restricted variables suggest that reasoning with them is unproblematic, it is important to note that modal principles involving such variables fail. For example, given our conventions in (331.1) and (331.2), the Barcan and Converse Barcan Formulas fail for quantified claims with restricted variables. The following are not theorems:

\[
\forall \gamma \Box \phi_\gamma^\alpha \rightarrow \Box \forall \gamma \phi_\gamma^\alpha
\]

\[
\Box \forall \gamma \phi_\gamma^\alpha \rightarrow \forall \gamma \Box \phi_\gamma^\alpha
\]

To see why, consider that the above abbreviate, respectively:

\[
\forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \Box \varphi) \rightarrow \Box \forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \varphi)
\]

\[
\Box \forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \varphi) \rightarrow \forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \Box \varphi)
\]

By appealing, for the sake of argument, to semantically-primitive possible worlds, one can see, intuitively, why these are false; we leave this to a footnote.\textsuperscript{215} So when reasoning with a restricted variable \(\gamma\), one may not commute \(\forall \gamma\) and \(\Box\), and the same applies to \(\Diamond\) and \(\exists \gamma\). This suggests that any quantified

\textsuperscript{214}Suppose \(\psi\) is the restriction condition. Then if we eliminate the bound restricted variable from both sides of the biconditional, we have to show:

\[
\forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \forall \beta \varphi) \equiv \forall \beta \forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \varphi)
\]

(\(\rightarrow\)) Assume \(\forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \forall \beta \varphi)\). Then \(\psi \rightarrow \forall \beta \varphi\), by \(\forall \alpha\). We want to show \(\forall \beta \forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \varphi)\). Since \(\alpha\) and \(\beta\) don’t occur free in our assumption, it suffices by GEN to show \(\psi \rightarrow \varphi\). So assume \(\psi\). Then \(\forall \beta \varphi\). (\(\leftarrow\)) Assume \(\forall \beta \forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \varphi)\). We want to show \(\forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \forall \beta \varphi)\). Since \(\alpha\) doesn’t occur free in our assumption, it suffices to show \(\psi \rightarrow \forall \beta \varphi\). So assume \(\psi\). Since \(\beta\) doesn’t occur free in our assumption, it suffices by GEN to show \(\varphi\). But our initial assumption implies \(\psi \rightarrow \varphi\), and \(\psi\) holds by assumption.

\textsuperscript{215}In what follows, we simplify notation by writing \(\phi^\alpha_e\) as \(\psi(e)\). To see that the first is false, consider any 2-world model in which \(w_0\) is the actual world and where \(e\) ranges over the entities in the domain of \(a\):

- at \(w_0\): \(\forall \psi(e)\)
- at \(w_1\): \(\exists e(\psi(e) \& \neg \varphi(e))\)

Then the antecedent \(\forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \Box \varphi)\) is true (i.e., true at \(w_0\)) by failure of the antecedent, but the consequent \(\Box \forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \varphi)\) is false (i.e., false at \(w_0\)) because \(w_1\) is a world where \(\forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \varphi)\) is false.

To see that the second is false, consider the following 2-world model in which entity \(e_1\) is in the domain and so can serve as a value of \(a\):

- at \(w_0\): \(\psi(e_1), \varphi(e_1)\), \(\forall e(e \neq e_1 \rightarrow \neg \psi(e))\)
- at \(w_1\): \(\forall \neg \psi(e), \neg \varphi(e_1)\)

Then the antecedent \(\Box \forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \varphi)\) is true (i.e., true at \(w_0\)) because at both worlds, the claim \(\forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \varphi)\) is true: at \(w_0\), if the value of \(a\) is \(e_1\), then both \(\psi\) and \(\varphi\) are true, so that \(\psi \rightarrow \varphi\) is true, and if the value of \(a\) is something other than \(e_1\), then the antecedent is false, making \(\psi \rightarrow \varphi\) true; and at \(w_1\), \(\psi\) is false for all values of \(a\) and so \(\forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \varphi)\) is true. But the consequent \(\forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \Box \varphi)\) is false (i.e., false at \(w_0\)) because when \(\alpha\) has the value \(e_1\), \(\psi\) is true at \(w_0\) while \(\Box \varphi\) is false at \(w_0\) (since at \(w_1\), \(\neg \varphi(e_1)\) is false).
modal theorems derived from the Barcan and Converse Barcan formulas won’t have instances in which the quantifier binds restricted variables.

There is a special case, however, where $\forall \gamma$ and $\Box$ do validly commute. If $\gamma$ ranges over the entities that satisfy a rigid restriction condition, i.e., a condition that, by a modally strict proof, is necessarily satisfied by anything that satisfies it, then we may safely apply RN or RA. In such a situation, the Barcan and Converse Barcan formulas are valid.

To see this, first recall that in (257.1), we stipulated that $\psi$ is a rigid condition on $\alpha$ just in case $\vdash \Box \forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \Box \psi)$. Then let us first define:

$\psi$ is a rigid restriction condition on $\alpha$ just in case $\psi$ is a restriction condition on $\alpha$ that is also a rigid condition on $\alpha$.

For example, $O!x$ is a rigid restriction condition on individuals, given that by GEN, it follows from (178.1) that $\vdash \Box \forall x (O!x \rightarrow \Box O!x)$. By contrast, $\text{Class}(x)$ is not a rigid restriction condition on individuals, given theorem (311.2); indeed, in (311.4) we saw that classes necessarily fail to be classes.²¹⁶

Now we may say:

$\gamma$ is a rigid restricted variable just in case, for some rigid restriction condition $\psi$ on $\alpha$, $\gamma$ is (introduced as) a variable whose values may be any $\alpha$ such that $\psi$.

So, we may now establish that if $\gamma$ is a rigid restricted variable, then the Barcan and Converse Formulas hold with respect to $\gamma$, i.e., that $\Box \forall \gamma \phi \gamma \alpha \rightarrow \Box \forall \gamma (\forall \gamma \phi \gamma \alpha)$ and that $\forall \gamma (\forall \gamma \phi \gamma \alpha) \rightarrow \forall \gamma (\Box \phi \gamma \alpha)$. It suffices to show that the formulas that they abbreviate are modally strict theorems:

- $\forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \Box \psi) \rightarrow \Box \forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \phi)$, when $\psi$ is a rigid restriction condition.

Proof. Assume:

$(\theta) \ \forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \Box \psi)$

For reductio, assume $\Box \forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \phi)$. Then $\Box \exists \alpha (\psi \& \neg \phi)$. So by BF $\Box (167.3), \exists \alpha \Diamond (\psi \& \neg \phi)$. Suppose $\tau$ is such an entity, so that we know

²¹⁶Note that in (259), we saw three examples of rigid conditions on properties, namely, $\Box F y$, $F = G$, and $\Box \forall y (G y \rightarrow F y)$. But these aren’t (rigid) restriction conditions on properties, since they contain two free variables. If we assign $y$ and $G$ a value, say $a$ and $P$ (i.e., $a$ and $P$ are primitive constants, so that we know $a \downarrow$ and $P \downarrow$), respectively, then $\Box F a$ and $F = P$ are rigid restriction conditions on properties, but $\Box \forall y (P y \rightarrow F y)$ is not. (Exercise: Identify the clause in the definition of restriction condition that $\Box F y (P y \rightarrow F y)$ fails and say why.) We’ve also seen two examples of defined restriction conditions: $\text{Null}(x)$ is a restriction condition on objects and $\text{Propositional}(F)$ is a restriction condition on properties. Theorems (263.1) and (271.4), by GEN, imply, respectively, that $\forall x (\text{Null}(x) \rightarrow \Box \text{Null}(x))$ and $\forall F (\text{Propositional}(F) \rightarrow \Box \text{Propositional}(F))$ are modally strict theorems.
(\(\Diamond(p \& \neg q)\)\)\(\tau_\alpha\)). By definition of \(\chi^*\), it follows that \(\Diamond\neg\phi^*\). By (162.3), therefore, we may infer both \(\phi^*_\alpha\) and \(\neg\phi^*_\alpha\). The latter is equivalent to \(\neg\Box\phi^*_\alpha\). To reach a contradiction, we show \(\Box\phi^*_\alpha\).

Since \(\psi\) is, by hypothesis, a rigid restriction condition, we also know:

\((\psi) \models \phi^*_\alpha\). By definition of \(\tau^*_\alpha\), it follows that \(\psi^*_\alpha\). By (162.3), therefore, we may infer both \(\psi^*_\alpha\) and \(\neg\phi^*_\alpha\). The latter is equivalent to \(\neg\Box\phi^*_\alpha\). To reach a contradiction, we show \(\Box\phi^*_\alpha\).

Since \(\psi\) is, by hypothesis, a rigid restriction condition, we also know:

\[(\xi) \models \forall\alpha(\psi \rightarrow \Box\psi)\]

So by Rule \(\forall E\), it follows from (\(\xi\)) that there is a modally strict proof of \(\psi^*_\alpha \rightarrow \Box\psi^*_\alpha\). Hence by rule (166.2), it is a (modally strict) theorem that \(\Diamond\psi^*_\alpha \rightarrow \psi^*_\alpha\). Since we’ve established the antecedent of this last result, it follows that \(\psi^*_\alpha\). But (\(\theta\)) implies \(\phi^*_\alpha \rightarrow \Box\phi^*_\alpha\). Hence \(\Box\phi^*_\alpha\). Contradiction.

• \(\Box\forall\alpha(\psi \rightarrow \varphi) \rightarrow \forall\alpha(\psi \rightarrow \Box\varphi)\), when \(\psi\) is a rigid restriction condition.

Proof. Assume \(\Box\forall\alpha(\psi \rightarrow \varphi)\). To show \(\forall\alpha(\psi \rightarrow \Box\varphi)\), it suffices, by GEN, to show \(\psi \rightarrow \Box\varphi\), since \(\alpha\) isn’t free in our assumption. So assume \(\psi\). Since \(\psi\) is a rigid restriction condition, we know that it is a modally strict theorem that \(\forall\alpha(\psi \rightarrow \Box\psi)\). By VE, \(\psi \rightarrow \Box\psi\). Hence \(\Box\psi\). But by the Converse Barcan Formula (167.2), our assumption implies \(\forall\alpha(\psi \rightarrow \Box\psi)\). So, \(\Box(\psi \rightarrow \varphi)\). It follows by the K axiom that \(\Box\psi \rightarrow \Box\varphi\). Hence, \(\Box\varphi\).

Thus, the Barcan formulas apply to bound restricted variables when those variables are rigid.

A final observation about reasoning with conventions (331.1) and (331.2) is that there is an analogous phenomena affecting the actuality operator; both directions of axiom (44.3) fail to be necessary truths when the variables are restricted. The following are not modally strict theorems:

\[\forall\gamma\exists\alpha\phi^*_\alpha \rightarrow \exists\forall\gamma\phi^*_\alpha\]
\[\exists\forall\gamma\phi^*_\alpha \rightarrow \forall\gamma\exists\alpha\phi^*_\alpha\]

To see why, consider what they abbreviate:

\[\forall\alpha(\psi \rightarrow \exists\varphi) \rightarrow \exists\forall\alpha(\psi \rightarrow \varphi)\]
\[\exists\forall\alpha(\psi \rightarrow \varphi) \rightarrow \forall\alpha(\psi \rightarrow \exists\varphi)\]

Both of these latter are theorems, but they are not modally strict theorems. Again, we leave the argument to a footnote.\(^{217}\) So it is important to recognize

\(^{217}\)Here, we not only have to show that they are in fact \(\vdash\) theorems, but also that their necessitations are invalid. To see that the first is a \(\vdash\) theorem, assume \(\forall\alpha(\psi \rightarrow \exists\varphi)\). Then by axiom (43)\(\vdash\), it suffices to show \(\forall\alpha(\psi \rightarrow \varphi)\), and by GEN it suffices to show \(\psi \rightarrow \varphi\). So assume \(\psi\). But our initial assumption implies \(\psi \rightarrow \exists\varphi\), by VE. So \(\exists\varphi\). Hence, by (43)\(\vdash\), \(\varphi\). To see that the second is a theorem, assume \(\exists\forall\alpha(\psi \rightarrow \varphi)\). Then by GEN, it suffices to show \(\psi \rightarrow \exists\varphi\). So assume \(\psi\). Our initial assumption implies, by (43)\(\vdash\), that \(\forall\alpha(\psi \rightarrow \varphi)\). So \(\psi \rightarrow \varphi\) and, hence, \(\varphi\). And so by (43)\(\vdash\),
when reasoning with restricted variables that \( \forall \gamma \) and \( \forall \) commute at the price of modal strictness.

Here again, though, the requirements that \( \psi \) be a rigid restriction condition and \( \gamma \) a rigid restricted variable restores the necessity of these commutation principles. For one can show that if \( \psi \) is a rigid restriction condition, then \( \forall \gamma \exists \forall \gamma \) and \( \forall \gamma \exists \forall \gamma \) abbreviate modally strict theorems, by arguments somewhat similar to the proofs displayed in the bulleted points above. We leave the proof of the first to a footnote, and leave the proof of the second to the reader.\(^{218}\)

\((335)\) **Remark and Metatheorem:** The Problem of Free Restricted Variables in Axioms/Theorems and Derivations/Proofs. Once bound restricted variables are used to assert axioms and theorems, and free restricted variables are used to formulate definitions, it won’t be long before one attempts to reason with free restricted variables. The discussion in \((334)\) already suggests why there may be concerns about doing so, but let’s now explicitly identify some of the problems.

\(\exists \forall \) and \(\forall \exists\).

Now to see that their necessitations are invalid, we again appeal to semantically primitive possible worlds. We just need to describe a model where these claims are true at \( w_0 \) but fail at some other possible world \( w_1 \). For the first, consider a model where:

- at \( w_0 \): \( \exists \forall (\psi(e) \& \neg \psi(e)) \)
- at \( w_1 \): \( \neg \exists \forall \psi(e) \)

Then the claim, \( \forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \exists \forall \psi) \rightarrow \exists \forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \psi) \), is true at \( w_0 \) (because the antecedent \( \forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \exists \forall \psi) \) is false at \( w_0 \)), but false at \( w_1 \) (because the antecedent \( \forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \exists \forall \psi) \) is true at \( w_1 \) and the consequent \( \exists \forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \psi) \) false at \( w_1 \)).

For the second, consider a model where:

- at \( w_0 \): \( \neg \psi(e_1) \), \( \exists \forall \psi(e) \)
- at \( w_1 \): \( \psi(e_1) \)

Then the claim \( \exists \forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow \forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \exists \forall \psi) \) is true at \( w_0 \) (because the antecedent and consequent are both true at \( w_0 \)), but false at \( w_1 \) (because the antecedent \( \exists \forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \psi) \) is true at \( w_1 \) and the consequent \( \forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \exists \forall \psi) \) is false at \( w_1 \)).

\(^{218}\)We want to show that what \( \forall \gamma \exists \forall \gamma \rightarrow \exists \forall \gamma \) abbreviates, namely:

\[ \forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \exists \forall \psi) \rightarrow \forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \psi) \]

where \( \psi \) is a rigid restriction condition.

is a *modally strict* theorem. So assume:

(\( \theta \)) \( \forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \exists \forall \psi) \)

For reductio, assume \( \neg \exists \forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \psi) \). Then \( \exists \forall \alpha (\psi \& \neg \psi) \). So by \((139.10)\), \( \exists \forall \exists (\psi \& \neg \psi) \). Suppose \( \tau \) is such an entity, so that we know \( \exists \forall (\psi \& \neg \psi) \). By definition of \( \exists \forall \), it follows that \( \exists \forall (\psi \& \neg \psi) \).

By \((139.2)\), therefore, we may infer both \( \exists \forall \psi \) and \( \exists \forall \neg \psi \). The former implies, by \((164.3)\), \( \forall \exists \psi \), while the latter is equivalent to \( \neg \exists \forall \psi \). To reach a contradiction, we now show \( \exists \forall \).

Since \( \psi \) is, by hypothesis, a rigid restriction condition, we know:

(\( \xi \)) \( \forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \square \psi) \)

So by Rule VE, it follows from \((\xi)\) that there is a modally strict proof of \( \psi \rightarrow \square \psi \). Hence by rule \((166.2)\), it is a (modally strict) theorem that \( \diamond \psi \rightarrow \psi \). Since we’ve established the antecedent of this last result, it follows that \( \psi \rightarrow \psi \). But \((\theta)\) implies \( \exists \forall \psi \). Hence \( \exists \forall \psi \). Contradiction.
First, note that the use of free restricted variables immediately raises questions of interpretation. To see why, consider the formula \( \neg \exists F u F \), in which \( u \) is a free restricted variable ranging over ordinary objects. It could be used to assert a theorem or a conclusion of a derivation, in which case it would be interpreted conditionally, as \( O!x \rightarrow \neg \exists F x F \); indeed, on this understanding, \( \neg \exists F u F \) would simplify the statement of the axiom for encoding (51). However, if one is reasoning in a derivation and one takes the formula \( \neg \exists F u F \) as an assumption or premise, then it would be interpreted conjunctively, as \( O!x \& \neg \exists F x F \), since \( \neg \exists F u F \) carries the information that \( u \) is an ordinary object. So formulas with free restricted variables give rise to ambiguities, which can often be resolved by the context.

Despite the threat of ambiguity, the tendency to use free restricted variables is a strong one. Given that the conditional interpretation helps to simplify the statement of theorems and conclusions of reasoning, and the conjunctive interpretation helps to simplify assumptions and premises, one is tempted to let the context determine the interpretation of a formula with free restricted variables. But even if the context is always clear, the use of such variables can give rise to errors in reasoning, particularly in modal contexts.

We can approach the problem by first examining a simple case where we escape error only by a happy coincidence. Clearly, it is a modally strict theorem that \( O!x \rightarrow O!x \). So, if we use free restricted variables, we should be able to assert this as the modally strict theorem \( O!u \). Since the theorem is modally strict, suppose we were to apply Rule RN to conclude \( \Box O!u \). Then by the conventions just described for eliminating the restricted variable, this last claim would abbreviate \( O!x \rightarrow \Box O!x \). This is, in fact, a theorem (178.1), and so is its universalization \( \forall x (O!x \rightarrow \Box O!x) \), by GEN. So it looks like we have reasoned validly, but although the conclusions we’ve reached are theorems, we’ve not reasoned to them by valid means. The inference from \( O!u \) to \( \Box O!u \) by appeal to RN is not strictly valid, for the conclusion, \( \Box O!u \), i.e., \( O!x \rightarrow \Box O!x \), does not validly follow by RN from the premise \( O!u \), i.e., from \( O!x \rightarrow O!x \). The only reason we reached a theorem, despite our invalid application of RN, is that the theorem in question, \( O!x \rightarrow \Box O!x \), is derivable by other, completely valid means, as in the proof of (178.1).

To see how the application of RN to theorems with free restricted variables could turn out to be disastrous, consider an analogous piece of reasoning in connection with classes. Clearly, it is a modally strict theorem that \( \text{Class}(x) \rightarrow \text{Class}(x) \). So, by the conventions described in the foregoing, we should be able to assert this as the modally strict theorem \( \text{Class}(c) \). Since the theorem is modally strict, suppose we apply Rule RN to conclude that \( \Box \text{Class}(c) \) is a theorem. Then by the conventions just described for eliminating the restricted variable, this last claim would abbreviate \( \text{Class}(x) \rightarrow \Box \text{Class}(x) \). And since
we've just apparently established it as a theorem, we may infer \( \forall x (\text{Class}(x) \rightarrow \Box \text{Class}(x)) \), by GEN. But this contradicts theorem (311.2), which explicitly asserts \( \neg \forall x (\text{Class}(x) \rightarrow \Box \text{Class}(x)) \). By contrast, if we had simply applied RN to the modally strict theorem with which we began, i.e., \( \text{Class}(x) \rightarrow \text{Class}(x) \), then we obtain \( \Box (\text{Class}(x) \rightarrow \text{Class}(x)) \). And by GEN, we have \( \forall x \Box (\text{Class}(x) \rightarrow \text{Class}(x)) \). Both of these last conclusions are theorems and harmless.

A related problem affects Rule RA, as follows. Start again with the modally strict theorem \( \text{Class}(x) \rightarrow \text{Class}(x) \), and abbreviate this as \( \text{Class}(c) \). Then Rule RA implies \( \Box \text{Class}(c) \) is a theorem. So by the conventions just described for eliminating the restricted variable, this last claim would abbreviate \( \Box \text{Class}(x) \rightarrow \Box \text{Class}(x) \). And since we've just apparently established it as a theorem, we may infer \( \forall x \Box (\text{Class}(x) \rightarrow \Box \text{Class}(x)) \), by GEN, and then \( \Box \exists x (\text{Class}(x) \rightarrow \Box \text{Class}(x)) \), by RN. But theorem (311.3) is \( \neg \Box \forall x (\text{Class}(x) \rightarrow \Box \text{Class}(x)) \).

Thus, any modal reasoning with Rules RN and RA has to be undertaken with great care if there are free restricted variables present; this calls into question whether we can invoke instances, with such variables, of any theorems derived with the help of RN and RA. Moreover, there are issues with other axioms and theorems as well. For example, one might wonder, when \( c \) is the only restricted variable occurring free in \( \varphi \), whether the following is a legitimate instance of axiom (47) and whether it is a necessary truth:

\[
c = \Box c \varphi \equiv \forall c' (\exists! c' c \equiv c' = c)
\]

But to complicate the question, recall the discussion of \( \text{UnionOf}(c, c', c'') \), i.e., \( c \) is the union of \( c' \) and \( c'' \), in (332), and consider the fact that a description such as \( \Box \text{UnionOf}(c, c', c'') \) has free restricted variables \( c' \) and \( c'' \) that are governed by restriction conditions that are not within the scope of the \( \Box \)-operator, whereas the bound variable \( c \) is governed by a restriction condition that is within the scope of that operator. So is the following an instance of necessary axiom (47) and is it subject to Rule RN:

\[
c = \Box \text{UnionOf}(c, c', c'') \equiv \forall c''' (\exists! \text{UnionOf}(c''', c', c'') \equiv c''' = c)
\]

Similarly, consider theorem (174.2). If \( c \) is the only free restricted variable in \( \varphi \), then is the following an instance of this theorem:

\[
\Box \varphi \equiv \exists! c \varphi
\]

And is the following, with additional free restricted variables, an instance:

\[
\Box \text{UnionOf}(c, c', c'') \equiv \exists! c \text{UnionOf}(c, c', c'')
\]

In all these cases, the use of free restricted variables increases cognitive load; one has to spend significant cognitive resources to answer one or more of these questions and this can be distracting when one is in the middle of reasoning.
for some conclusion. We leave further discussion of these particular questions
to an appendix to this chapter (Appendix IV). For now it should be clear that
there are real concerns about reasoning with free restricted variables.

To address these concerns, we adopt two methodologies; one is for variables
introduced by non-rigid restriction conditions, while the other is for variables
introduced by rigid restriction conditions. The first method is to:

(a) banish free restricted variables from the statement of axioms and theo-
    rems except when those principles are closed and have a form that can be
    abbreviated, as described in (331); then we can shorten the statement of
    the principle either by using bound restricted variables or by using free
    restricted variables under the generality interpretation (see below), and

(b) apply Rules RN and RA only when there are no free restricted variables
    and, as the first step of any derivation or proof, eliminate the bound re-
    stricted variables so as to avoid reasoning with premises and conclusion
    that contain free restricted variables.

Note how (a) and (b) combine to avoid the problems discussed above. By (a),
we may not abbreviate the theorem \( \text{Class}(x) \rightarrow \text{Class}(x) \) as \( \text{Class}(c) \). Instead,
since \( \forall x (\text{Class}(x) \rightarrow \text{Class}(x)) \) is a theorem that has a form that can be abbre-
viated with bound restricted variables, then we may either abbreviate this as
\( \forall c \text{Class}(c) \) or stipulate that \( \text{Class}(c) \) is to be understood as \( \forall c \text{Class}(c) \), thereby
giving the variable \( c \) the generality interpretation. If we apply RN or RA to
\( \forall c \text{Class}(c) \), to obtain \( \Box \forall c \text{Class}(c) \) or \( \forall c \Box \text{Class}(c) \), no untoward consequences
arise. When expanded, these last claims assert \( \Box \forall x (\text{Class}(x) \rightarrow \text{Class}(x)) \) and
\( \forall x \Box (\text{Class}(x) \rightarrow \text{Class}(x)) \), both of which are trivially true.

To take a more interesting example, consider the Principle of Extensionality
(337), which we shall prove in the next section:

\[
(\text{Class}(x) \& \text{Class}(y)) \rightarrow (x = y \equiv \forall z (z \in x \equiv z \in y))
\]  

(337)

By GEN, it is a theorem that:

\[
\forall x \forall y ((\text{Class}(x) \& \text{Class}(y)) \rightarrow (x = y \equiv \forall z (z \in x \equiv z \in y)))
\]  

(337)

This has a form that we can abbreviate with bound restricted variables, so we
may either assert the above as:

\[
(\vartheta) \ \forall c \forall c' (c = c' \equiv \forall z (z \in c \equiv z \in c'))
\]

or assert the following under the generality interpretation:

\[
(\zeta) \ c = c' \equiv \forall z (z \in c \equiv z \in c')
\]
Under the generality interpretation of the variables, \((\zeta)\) simply abbreviates \((\vartheta)\). So by adopting either of these two expediencies, we can’t get into trouble by applying RN or RA to an axiom or theorem. For if we apply RN or RA to \((\vartheta)\) and then eliminate the bound restricted variable, we obtain:

\[
\Box \forall x \forall y ((\text{Class}(x) \& \text{Class}(y)) \rightarrow (x = y \equiv \forall z (z \in x \equiv z \in y)))
\]

\[
\forall x \forall y ((\text{Class}(x) \& \text{Class}(y)) \rightarrow (x = y \equiv \forall z (z \in x \equiv z \in y)))
\]

These follow validly from theorem (337) by two applications of GEN and one of RN or RA.

Clearly, this first method ensures that Rules RN and RA are never improperly applied to axioms or theorems that contain free restricted variables. Moreover, part (b) of this method ensures that we don’t formulate instances of axioms like (47) and theorems like (174.2) unless we know that they or their closures have a form that can be abbreviated with bound restricted variables.

The second method for reasoning with free restricted variables applies to those introduced by rigid restriction conditions; these allow us to both assert axioms and theorems with such variables and to reason with them, as described next.

If the free restricted variables are rigid, i.e., range over the entities satisfying a rigid restriction condition, as defined in (334), then we may:

(c) assert axioms and theorems containing such variables (giving them a conditional interpretation), and

(d) when reasoning, apply RN or RA to premises and conclusions within derivations (giving the premises a conjunctive interpretation and the conclusion a conditional interpretation), and reason generally using such variables.

Consider the following fact about RN and RA:

(1) **Metatheorem:** Rules RN, RA, and Rigid Restricted Variables.

Let \(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n\) be rigid restricted variables introduced by the rigid restriction conditions \(\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n\), respectively, where \(n \geq 1\) and each \(\psi_i\) has \(\alpha_i\) as its single, free unrestricted variable, for \(1 \leq i \leq n\). Suppose some possibly empty subset of \(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n\) occur free in the formulas in \(\Gamma\), and a possibly distinct (also possibly empty) subset of \(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n\) occur free in \(\varphi\). Let \(\varphi(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)\), \(\Gamma(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)\), \(\Box \Gamma(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)\), and \(\forall \Gamma(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)\), respectively, be the result of substituting \(\gamma_i\) for any free occurrences of \(\alpha_i\) in \(\varphi\) and in the formulas of \(\Gamma\), \(\Box \Gamma\), and \(\forall \Gamma\), for \(1 \leq i \leq n\). Then the following metarules are justified:

\[\text{Recall that } \Box \Gamma \text{ is the set of necessitations of all the formulas in the set } \Gamma, \text{ i.e., } \{\Box \chi \mid \chi \in \Gamma\}, \text{ and } \forall \Gamma \text{ is the set of actualizations of all the formulas in the set } \Gamma, \text{ i.e., } \{\forall \chi \mid \chi \in \Gamma\}. \text{ So:}\]
(a) If $\Gamma(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n) \vdash \psi(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)$, then $\Box \Gamma(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n) \vdash \Box \psi(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)$

(b) If $\Gamma(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n) \vdash \psi(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)$, then $\forall \Gamma(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n) \vdash \forall \psi(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)$

where the premises in $\Gamma(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)$, $\Box \Gamma(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)$, and $\forall \Gamma(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)$ are given the conjunctive interpretation, and the conclusions $\psi(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)$, $\Box \psi(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)$, and $\forall \psi(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)$ are given the conditional interpretation.

A few observations are in order. First, the proof given in the Appendix adopts the following strategy: we use our conventions to unpack the abbreviations in the metarule (i.e., eliminate the free restricted variables) and then show that the resulting metarule is justified. The conjunctive interpretation has to be given to each formula in each premise set. But when we give the conditional interpretation to the conclusion $\psi(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)$, then it doesn’t matter whether we abbreviate it as $(\psi_1 \& \ldots \& \psi_n) \rightarrow \psi$ or as $\psi_1 \rightarrow (\ldots \rightarrow (\psi_n \rightarrow \psi)\ldots)$. They are equivalent. Similarly, it doesn’t matter whether the conclusion $\Box \psi(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)$ abbreviates $(\psi_1 \& \ldots \& \psi_n) \rightarrow \Box \psi$ or $\psi_1 \rightarrow (\ldots \rightarrow (\psi_n \rightarrow \Box \psi)\ldots)$. And similar considerations apply to conclusions of the form $\forall \psi(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)$. Once these abbreviations are unpacked, the proof in the Appendix shows that the resulting metarule is justified.

Second, note that (1.a), the analogue metarule for RN, is the strong version of the rule. By the reasoning in footnote 129, the weak version of the metarule will follow from the strong version, where the weak version of the metarule is:

$\Gamma(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n) \vdash \psi(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)$, then $\Box \Gamma(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n) \vdash \Box \psi(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)$

The only difference here is that in the consequent of the metarule, the derivability relation is $\vdash$ rather than $\vdash_{\Box}$.

Third, when $\Gamma(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)$ is empty, then (1.a) and (1.b) reduce, respectively, to the metarules:

If $\vdash \psi(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)$, then $\vdash \Box \psi(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)$

If $\vdash \psi(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)$, then $\vdash \forall \psi(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)$

Here it is easy to see and state what these abbreviate:

If $\vdash (\psi_1 \& \ldots \& \psi_n) \rightarrow \psi$, then $\vdash (\psi_1 \& \ldots \& \psi_n) \rightarrow \Box \psi$,

where $\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n$ are rigid restriction conditions.

---

\*\*\*\*\*\*

$\Gamma(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)$ is the set of formulas of the form $\chi(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)$ such that $\chi \in \Gamma$.

$\Box \Gamma(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)$ is the set of formulas of the form $\Box \chi(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)$ such that $\chi \in \Gamma$.

$\forall \Gamma(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)$ is the set of formulas of the form $\forall \chi(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)$ such that $\chi \in \Gamma$.

---

When we give the premises the conjunctive interpretation, then each $\chi(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)$ in $\Gamma(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)$ abbreviates $\psi_1 \& \ldots \& \psi_n \& \chi$. Each $\Box \chi(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)$ in $\Box \Gamma(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)$ abbreviates $\psi_1 \& \ldots \& \psi_n \& \Box \chi$. And each $\forall \chi(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)$ in $\forall \Gamma(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)$ abbreviates $\psi_1 \& \ldots \& \psi_n \& \forall \chi$. 

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10.5. INTERLUDE: RESTRICTED VARIABLES

If \( \vdash (\psi_1 \& \ldots \& \psi_n) \rightarrow \varphi \), then \( \vdash (\psi_1 \& \ldots \& \psi_n) \rightarrow \square \varphi \), where \( \psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n \) are rigid restriction conditions.

The proofs of (.1.a) and (.1.b) in the Appendix imply that both of these metarules are justified.

Fourth, it would make the foregoing even clearer to see (.1.a) in action, even though the following example is not optimal:

(A) If \( \forall F(Fu \equiv Fv) \vdash \Box u =_E v \), then \( \Box \forall F(Fu \equiv Fv) \vdash \Box \Box u =_E v \)

By the reasoning in the proof of (.1.a) in the Appendix and the fact that the same variables occur free in the premise and conclusion of the derivations in both the antecedent and consequent, (A) abbreviates:

(B) If \( O!x, O!y, \forall F(Fx \equiv Fy) \vdash x =_E y \), then \( O!x, O!y, \Box \forall F(Fx \equiv Fy) \vdash \Box x =_E y \)

To see that (B) is justified, assume \( O!x, O!y, \forall F(Fx \equiv Fy) \vdash x =_E y \). Then we have to show that there is a modally strict proof of \( \Box x =_E y \) from \( O!x, O!y \), and \( \Box \forall F(Fx \equiv Fy) \). So assume \( O!x, O!y \), and \( \Box \forall F(Fx \equiv Fy) \). Since \( O!x \) and \( O!y \) are rigid restriction conditions (178.1), we know \( O!x \rightarrow \Box O!x \) and \( O!y \rightarrow \Box O!y \). Hence, \( \Box O!x \) and \( \Box O!y \). But it follows from our initial assumption by the original Rule RN (69) that \( \Box O!x, \Box O!y, \Box \forall F(Fx \equiv Fy) \vdash \Box x =_E y \). Since we’ve established all of the premises, it follows that \( \Box x =_E y \). Thus, there is a modally strict proof of \( \Box x =_E y \) from \( O!x, O!y \), and \( \Box \forall F(Fx \equiv Fy) \).

We can repurpose this example to show how Rule RN applies to a theorem with free but rigid restricted variables. For since \( u \) and \( v \) are rigid restricted variables ranging over ordinary objects, we can express theorem (239.1), i.e.,

\[
(O!x & O!y) \rightarrow (\forall F(Fx \equiv Fy) \rightarrow x =_E y)
\]  

(239.1)

as follows:

(C) \( \forall F(Fu \equiv Fv) \vdash u =_E v \)

Then the version of (.1) in which \( \Gamma \) is empty implies:

(D) \( \Box (\forall F(Fu \equiv Fv) \rightarrow u =_E v) \)

The example is not optimal for two reasons:

- The formula being derived in the antecedent of (A), \( x =_E y \), is a necessary truth (231.1) when true, and that might vitiate the example since its necessitation can be derived by other means. But it should be remembered that we are considering a particular instance of (.1.a), to see why a meta-inference from one derivation to another is justified.

- The very same variables appear free in the premises and conclusion. But we’ve formulated (.1.a) in a more general way, so that the rigid restricted variables that are free in \( \Gamma \) are different from the rigid restricted variables free in \( \varphi \) (indeed, the variables may be of different types and involve different restriction conditions).

So the reader is encouraged to try to construct an example without these deficiencies.
where this abbreviates:

\[(E) \quad (O!x \& O!y) \rightarrow \Box VF(Fx \equiv Fy) \rightarrow x =_E y\]

Clearly, (E) is a theorem:

Proof. Assume \(O!x \& O!y\). If we apply Rule RM (or apply Rule RN and the K axiom) to theorem (239.1), which is reproduced above, then we know:

\[(F) \quad \Box(O!x \& O!y) \rightarrow \Box VF(Fx \equiv Fy) \rightarrow x =_E y\]

But \(O!x \rightarrow \Box O!x\) and \(O!y \rightarrow \Box O!y\), by (178.1). Hence we know \(\Box O!x \& \Box O!y\).

And this implies, by (158.3), \(\Box(O!x \& O!y)\). From this last result and (F), it follows that \(\Box VF(Fx \equiv Fy) \rightarrow x =_E y\).

Thus, we’ve established \(E\) by conditional proof, and this shows that this particular application of Rule RN to theorems with free, but rigid, restricted variables is justified. We leave it to the reader to construct examples that show Rule RA can be deployed in derivations and to theorems when all the free restricted variables are rigid.

Here, then, is a summary of our conventions for using free restricted variables in axioms/theorems and in derivations/proofs. These conventions are designed to bracket any reasoning with free restricted variables that are not rigid and force us to make sure that in such cases, any use of RN, RA, or any other rules or modal principles derived from them, are applied with caution. These conventions cover the two methods introduced above:

(2) When a closed axiom or a theorem has a form that can be abbreviated with non-rigid restricted variables:

- we may abbreviate the claim either by using only bound restricted variables or by using free restricted variables under the generality interpretation, and
- when reasoning in any derivation or proof, we eliminate the bound restricted variables as the first step, and subsequently apply RN and RA only to premises and conclusions that don’t have non-rigid restricted variables (free or bound).

(3) When a closed axiom or a theorem has a form that can be abbreviated with rigid restricted variables:

- we may assert the claim with free and bound restricted variables (with free variables given the conditional interpretation), and
- when reasoning, apply Rules RN and RA to premises and conclusions that contain free restricted variables and treat such variables in accordance with the usual principles.
10.6. THE LAWS OF NATURAL CLASSES AND LOGICAL SETS

These conventions should help to lighten cognitive load and avoid error. Since $\text{Class}(x)$ is a non-rigid condition, the restricted variables $c, c', c'', \ldots$ will be governed by convention (.2) and, when we turn to the theorems about natural classes in the next section, (.2) will direct our method of proof in the Appendix. By eschewing free but non-rigid restricted variables in derivations and proofs, we avoid the burdensome reasoning required to establish the validity of reasoning with terms that advertise themselves one way, but which may falsely advertise themselves when the modal context changes.

(336) Remark: Digression on Restricted Variables and Empty Conditions. In Metadefinition (330.2), we stipulated that $\vdash \exists x \psi$ is a necessary condition for introducing the restricted variable $\gamma$ to range over the $x$ such that $\psi$. But this condition could be relaxed. If one were to use a condition $\psi$ that fails this requirement, the variables introduced wouldn’t obey axiom (39.2) and the quantifiers $\forall \gamma$ and $\exists \gamma$ wouldn’t be guaranteed to exhibit the classical behavior analogous to the theorem $\forall \alpha \varphi \rightarrow \exists \alpha \varphi$ (104.1). Specifically, if $\psi$ is a well-defined but empty condition in which the variable $\alpha$ is free, then $\gamma \downarrow$ wouldn’t be axiomatic (though one could take it as an assumption) and the claim:

$$(\delta) \ \forall \gamma \varphi_{\alpha} \rightarrow \exists \gamma \varphi_{\alpha}$$

would fail to hold. To see the , note that by the conventions for bound restricted variables given in (331.1), (\xi) is shorthand for:

$$(\xi) \ \forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \varphi) \rightarrow \exists \alpha (\psi \& \varphi)$$

Then, under the hypothesis $\neg \exists \alpha \psi$, one could derive the antecedent of (\xi) and the negation of its consequent. From $\neg \exists \alpha \psi$, i.e., $\forall \alpha \neg \psi$, it would follow that $\neg \psi$; hence $\psi \rightarrow \varphi$, and so $\forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \varphi)$, by GEN. But if $\neg \exists \alpha \psi$, then $\neg \exists \alpha (\psi \& \varphi)$.

So one were to introduce a restricted variable $\gamma$ to range over those as such that $\psi$ without having a proof that $\exists \alpha \psi$, one have to be much more careful when reasoning with them. We are, of course, safe in the case of $\text{Class}(x)$, since we’ve established $\exists x \text{Class}(x)$ (310.4). It then follows that $\forall \varphi_{\alpha} \rightarrow \exists \varphi_{\alpha}$.

10.6 The Laws of Natural Classes and Logical Sets

With the foregoing understanding of free restricted variables, we now officially make use of $c, c', c'', \ldots$ to range over classes, as the latter were defined in (307.2). Since $\text{Class}(x)$ is not a rigid restricted condition, we must assert the universal closures of any theorems asserted with variables $c, c', \ldots$ or take the

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222Given $\exists x \text{Class}(x)$, let $a$ be an arbitrary such individual, so that we know $\text{Class}(a)$. Now assume $\forall \varphi_{\alpha}$. Then by our convention, $\forall x (\text{Class}(x) \rightarrow \varphi)$. In particular, $\text{Class}(a) \rightarrow \varphi_{\alpha}$. Hence, $\varphi_{\alpha}$. Conjoining what we know, we may infer $\text{Class}(a) \& \varphi_{\alpha}$. So by $\exists \text{Class}(x) \& \varphi$, which conclusion remains once we discharge our assumption that $\text{Class}(a)$ by $\exists \text{E}$. So by our convention, $\exists \varphi_{\alpha}$. 

CHAPTER 10. BASIC LOGICAL OBJECTS

generality interpretations of these variables, as discussed in (335). But since
we’ve established that classes exist, the principle \(\forall c \phi \rightarrow \exists c \phi\) holds, and we are
assured that \(c \downarrow\), \(c' \downarrow\), are always axiomatic.

It should be noted that the laws of natural classes and logical sets derived
below are not intended to capture the iterative conception of membership; the
axiom for power sets will not be derivable. The iterative conception, as cap-
tured by Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, is part of theoretical mathematics and,
as such, its objects will be discussed in Chapter 15.

(337) **Theorem:** The Principle of Extensionality. For any classes \(c\) and \(c'\), \(c\) and
\(c'\) are identical if and only if they have the same members:

\[
\forall c \forall c' (c = c' \equiv \forall z (z \in c \equiv z \in c'))
\]

This theorem shows our definitions of natural classes (i.e., logically-conceived
sets) and membership in a class preserve a fundamental and intuitive principle
about the individuation of these objects.

(338) **Definition:** Natural Empty Classes. We say that a class \(c\) is empty just in
case it has no members:

\[
\text{Empty}(c) \equiv \neg \exists y (y \in c)
\]

(339) **Theorems:** There Exists a (Unique) Empty Class.

(1) \(\exists c \text{Empty}(c)\)

(2) \(\exists c \text{Empty}(c)\)

(2) uses bound restricted variables in the context of a unique-existence quan-
tifier. To interpret it, eliminate the uniqueness quantifier first and then apply
the metadefinition in (331.2).\(^{223}\) Though, of course, one could just as well add
the convention that \(\exists c \text{Empty}(c)\) abbreviates \(\exists x (\text{Class}(x) \& \text{Empty}(x))\).

The reader should confirm why it is that one can validly apply the Rule of
Actualization to (2) and then apply (174.2) to yield the modally strict conclu-
sion:

(3) \(\text{icEmpty}(c)\)

(340) **Definition:** Given (339.3), we may introduce the empty class symbol \(\emptyset\)
to designate the empty class:

\[
\emptyset =_{df} \text{icEmpty}(c)
\]

\(^{223}\)To be maximally explicit, (2) abbreviates \(\exists c (\text{Empty}(c) \& \forall c' (\text{Empty}(c') \rightarrow c' = c))\). This in turn abbreviates: \(\exists x (\text{Class}(x) \& \text{Empty}(x) \& \forall z ((\text{Class}(z) \& \text{Empty}(z)) \rightarrow z = x))\). In other words, there is a
class \(x\) that is an empty class and such that every class that is empty and identical to \(x\) is empty.
10.6. THE LAWS OF NATURAL CLASSES AND LOGICAL SETS

(341) **Theorem:** \( \emptyset \) Exists and Is Canonical.

(1) \( \emptyset \downarrow \)

(2) \( \emptyset = \exists x (A!x \& \forall F (xF \equiv \neg \exists z Fz)) \)

Though (1) is a simple consequence of our definitions and theorems, we’ve taken the trouble to formulate it because of its philosophical significance. In general, the existence of abstract objects seems to confound a number of philosophers, and the empty class in particular is an egregious example; its existence offends the naturalist. But object theory offers a way to understand the empty class as a natural, (objectified) pattern of properties, namely, the pattern consisting of (i.e., encoding) all those properties that are unexemplified.\(^{224}\) In object theory, (3) provably identifies the null set with that objectified pattern.

(342) **Definition:** Universal’ Classes. We’ve already defined the notion of a universal object; in (260.2) we defined: Universal\((x)\) iff \(x\) is an abstract object that encodes every property. To avoid clash of notation, we introduce a different expression to define a universal class. We say that a class \(c\) is universal’ just in case every individual is a member of \(c\):

\[
\text{Universal}'(c) \equiv df \forall y (y \in c)
\]

(343) **Theorems:** There Exists a (Unique) Universal’ Class.

(1) \( \exists c \text{Universal}'(c) \)

(2) \( \exists ! c \text{Universal}'(c) \)

(344) **Definition:** Unions. We say that a class \(c\) is a union of \(c'\) and \(c''\) just in case the elements of \(c\) are precisely the elements of \(c'\) supplemented by the elements of \(c''\):

\[
\text{UnionOf}(c, c', c'') \equiv df \forall y (y \in c \equiv (y \in c' \lor y \in c''))
\]

Note that we explained how to eliminate the free restricted variables from this particular definition in (332.1).

(345) **Theorems:** Existence of (Unique) Unions. It now follows that (1) for any classes \(c'\) and \(c''\), there is a class \(c\) that is their union; and (2) for any classes \(c'\) and \(c''\), there is a unique class that is their union:\(^{225}\)

\(^{224}\)Such a pattern clearly exists; we encounter such properties not just in logic but also in the pursuit of science—just consider properties like being a molecule of DNA at a time before any such molecules existed. Surely there are properties like that now, and \(\neg \exists z Fz\) defines a pattern consisting of those properties.

\(^{225}\)If we eliminate the unique-existence quantifier, then where \(x, y, z, w\) are all unrestricted variables, (2) is short for:

\[
\forall x \forall y (\text{Class}(x) \& \text{Class}(y)) \rightarrow \exists z (\text{Class}(z) \& \text{UnionOf}(z, x, y) \& \forall w (\text{Class}(w) \& \text{UnionOf}(w, x, y) \rightarrow w = z))
\]

I.e., for any two classes \(x\) and \(y\), there is a unique class that is their union.
(1) \( \forall c \forall c' \exists \text{UnionOf}(c, c', c'') \)

(2) \( \forall c' \forall c'' \exists \text{UnionOf}(c, c', c'') \)

**Theorem:** The Union of Two Classes Exists. It is a theorem, but not a modally strict one, that for any classes \( c' \) and \( c'' \), the class that is a union of \( c' \) and \( c'' \) exists:

\( (\forall c' \forall c'' \exists \text{UnionOf}(c, c', c'')) \)

This can't be necessitated. For given theorem (311.3), we may intuitively reason that from the fact that \( x \) and \( y \) are classes at some other possible world, it doesn't follow that they are classes at the actual world; without such a guarantee, there is no guarantee that there is something at the actual world that is the union of \( x \) and \( y \), since unions are classes that can only be formed from two classes (344). So from the fact that \( x \) and \( y \) are classes at some other possible world, the existence of the \( z \), which (in fact) is a class and a union of \( x \) and \( y \), is not assured.

For a purely object-theoretic account of why this theorem can't be necessitated, we simply prove the following:

\( (\neg \Box \forall c' \forall c'' \exists \text{UnionOf}(c, c', c'')) \)

That is, it is not necessarily the case that for any classes \( c' \) and \( c'' \), the union of \( c' \) and \( c'' \) exists.

**Theorem:** Modally Strict Version of the Foregoing. The previous theorem can be proved by modally strict means:

\( (\neg \Box \forall c' \forall c'' \exists \text{UnionOf}(c, c', c'')) \)

**Definition:** Notation for the Union of Two Classes. Given (345.3), we may introduce the standard notation \( c' \cup c'' \) to denote the union of classes \( c' \) and \( c'' \):

\[ c' \cup c'' =_{df} \text{UnionOf}(c, c', c'') \]

Since we proved that \( \text{UnionOf}(c, c', c'') \) exists (345.3) by a non-modally strict proof, the (derivation of the) identity \( c' \cup c'' = \text{UnionOf}(c, c', c'') \) from the primitive Rule of Definition by Identity (74) or the derived Rule of Identity by Definition (121.1) is not modally strict. See the discussion in Remark (279). And see Remarks (333.1) and (331.3) for a full discussion of the conventions for eliminating the free and bound restricted variables in this definition. **Exercise:** Suppose we have extended our language with name \( s \) (Socrates) and that we have extended our system with the (necessary) axiom that Socrates is an
ordinary object \((O!s)\). Prove that \(\neg(s \cup \varnothing)\). That is, prove that the term \(s \cup \varnothing\) isn’t significant. [Hint: See the discussion at the end of Remark (333).]

(349) ★ Theorem: The Principle of Unions. For any classes \(c’\) and \(c’’\), an object \(z\) is an element of \(c’ \cup c’’\) if and only if \(z\) is an element of \(c’\) or an element of \(c’’\):

\[ \forall c’' \forall c' \forall z (z \in c' \cup c'' \equiv (z \in c' \lor z \in c'')) \]

(350) Definition: Class Complements. Let us say that \(c’\) is a class complement of \(c\) just in case the members of \(c’\) are all and only those individuals that fail to be members of \(c\). Then, if we write \(\kappa \notin c’\) instead of \(\neg(\kappa \in c’)\), we may formalize our definition as:

\[ \text{ComplementOf}(c', c) \equiv_{df} \forall y (y \in c' \equiv y \notin c) \]

It may worth mentioning that if \(\kappa_1\) is a provably empty individual term, then although we can prove that for any class \(c\), \(\kappa_1 \notin c\),\(^{226}\) we can’t instantiate the claim \(\forall y (y \in c' \equiv y \notin c)\) to obtain \(\kappa_1 \in c' \equiv \kappa_1 \notin c\). So if \(\text{ComplementOf}(c', c)\), one can’t derive that \(\kappa_1 \in c'\) from the fact that \(\kappa_1 \notin c\).

(351) Theorems: Existence of (Unique) Complements. It now follows that (.1) for any class \(c\), there is a class \(c’\) that is its complement, and (.2) for an class \(c\), there is a unique class \(c’\) that is its complement:

(1) \(\forall c \exists! c' \text{ComplementOf}(c', c)\)
(2) \(\forall c \exists! c' \text{ComplementOf}(c', c)\)

(352) ★ Theorems: The Complement of a Class Exists. By reasoning analogous to that used in the proof of (346.1)★, we may now infer that for every class \(c\), the complement of \(c\) exists:

(3) \(\forall c (c' \text{ComplementOf}(c', c)) \downarrow\)

(353) Definition: Intersections. We say that \(c\) is an intersection of \(c’\) and \(c’’\) just in case \(c\) has as members all and only the individuals that are common members of \(c’\) and \(c’’\):

\[ \text{IntersectionOf}(c, c', c'') \equiv_{df} \forall y (y \in c \equiv y \in c' \land y \in c'') \]

(354) Theorem: Existence of (Unique) Intersections. It follows that (.1) for any classes \(c’\) and \(c’’\), there is a class \(c\) that is their intersection; and (.2) for any classes \(c’\) and \(c’’\), there is a unique class \(c\) that their intersection:

\(^{226}\)From \(\neg \kappa_1 \downarrow\), it follows by axiom (39.5.a) that \(\neg G \kappa_1\). Since this holds for every \(G\), it can then be established that \(\neg \exists G (\text{ExtensionOf}(x, G) \land G \kappa_1)\). Since this holds for every \(x\), we can infer from the definition of \(\in (312)\) that \(\neg \exists x (\kappa_1 \in x)\). A fortiori, \(\neg \exists c (\kappa_1 \in c)\), for any \(c\).
These are modally strict theorems.

(355) ★Theorem: The Intersection of Two Classes Exists. By contrast, it is a theorem, but not a modally strict one, that for any two classes \( c' \) and \( c'' \), the intersection of \( c' \) and \( c'' \) exists:

\[
\forall c' \forall c'' \exists c \text{IntersectionOf}(c, c', c'')
\]

Exercise: Show by either modally strict, or non-modally strict means, that it is not necessary that for any classes \( c' \) and \( c'' \), the intersection of \( c' \) and \( c'' \) exists, i.e., \( \neg \Box \forall c' \forall c'' \exists c \text{IntersectionOf}(c, c', c'') \).

(356) Definition: Notation for the Intersection of Two Classes. Given (355)★, we introduce the notation \( c' \cap c'' \) to denote the intersection of \( c' \) and \( c'' \):

\[
c' \cap c'' =_{df} \text{IntersectionOf}(c, c', c'')
\]

Note that, as in the case of unions, the fact that the proof of \( (c \text{IntersectionOf}(c, c', c'') \downarrow) \) in (355)★ is not modally strict implies that the identity \( c' \cap c'' = c \text{IntersectionOf}(c, c', c'') \) isn’t either. Moreover, given the inferential role of definitions-by-= and our conventions for restricted variables, expressions of the form \( \kappa \cap \kappa' \) are significant only when we know, either by proof or by hypothesis, that \( \text{Class}(\kappa) \) and \( \text{Class}(\kappa') \). Thus, \( \cap \) is a binary functional symbol that produces significant terms only when both arguments are significant and denote classes.

(357) ★Theorem: The Principle of Intersections. It is now straightforward to show that for any classes \( c' \) and \( c'' \), an individual \( z \) is a member of \( c' \cap c'' \) if and only if \( z \) is a member of both \( c' \) and \( c'' \):

\[
\forall c' \forall c'' \forall z (z \in c' \cap c'' \iff (z \in c' \& z \in c''))
\]

(358) Theorems: Conditional Class Comprehension. When naive set theory is formulated in a first-order logic so as to avoid quantification over properties, a comprehension schema is used an axiom: for every formula \( \varphi \) in which \( x \) doesn’t occur free, there is a set \( x \) that has as members all and only the objects such that \( \varphi \) (recall Boolos 1971, 217). This ‘naive’ comprehension principle uses a primitive notion of membership and is subject to Russell’s paradox.

In the present system, we may obtain a conditional comprehension schema that is immune to Russell’s paradox if we limit the schema to those matrices that are guaranteed to define properties, i.e., to formulas \( \varphi \) such that \( [\lambda y \varphi] \downarrow \). Thus, (1) if being an \( x \) such that \( \varphi \) exists, then there is a class whose members consist of all and only the individuals such that \( \varphi \); (2) if being an \( x \) such that \( \varphi \)
exists, then there is a unique class whose members consist of all and only the
individuals such that \( \varphi \); and (.3) if being an \( x \) such that \( \varphi \) exists, then the class
of individuals such that \( \varphi \)

\[ (.1) \quad \lambda x \varphi \quad \downarrow \rightarrow \exists c \forall y \left( y \in c \equiv \varphi^y_x \right), \] provided \( \varphi \) has no free occurrences of \( x \) and \( y \),
and \( y \) is substitutable for \( x \) in \( \varphi \)

\[ (.2) \quad \lambda x \varphi \quad \downarrow \rightarrow \exists! c \forall y \left( y \in c \equiv \varphi^y_x \right), \] provided \( \varphi \) has no free occurrences of \( x \) and \( y \),
and \( y \) is substitutable for \( x \) in \( \varphi \)

\[ (.3) \quad \lambda x \varphi \quad \downarrow \rightarrow \exists c \forall y \left( y \in c \equiv \varphi^y_x \right), \] provided \( \varphi \) has no free occurrences of \( x \) and \( y \),
and \( y \) is substitutable for \( x \) in \( \varphi \)

By convention, (.1) is shorthand for \( \lambda x \varphi \quad \downarrow \rightarrow \exists z \left( \text{Class}(z) \land \forall y \left( y \in z \equiv \varphi^y_x \right) \right) \),
provided \( \varphi \) has no free occurrences of \( z \) and \( y \),
and \( y \) is substitutable for \( x \) in \( \varphi \).

\[ (359) \text{Metadefinitions: } \nu-\text{Predicable Formulas and the Restricted Metavari-
ables That Range Over Them. The foregoing group of theorems exhibits a cer-
tain pattern that we can exploit. Let us say:} \]

- A formula \( \varphi \) is \( \nu \)-predicable if and only if there is a proof that being an
individual \( \nu \) such that \( \varphi \) exists, i.e., if and only if \( \vdash \lambda \nu \varphi \downarrow \).

For present purposes, we need not generalize the above definition to define
\( \nu_1, \ldots, \nu_n \)-predicable formulas.

Clearly, there are \( \nu \)-predicable formulas — any 1-place \( \lambda \)-expression of the
form \( \lambda \nu \varphi \) asserted to exist by (39.2) has a \( \nu \)-predicable matrix. This includes those
\( \lambda \)-expressions of the form \( \lambda \nu \varphi \) in which \( \varphi \) taken by itself contains no
free occurrences of \( \nu \). Another source of \( \nu \)-predicable formulas arises when we can prove
\( \lambda \nu \varphi \downarrow \) by means of axiom (49). Just as clearly, there are formulas that fail to be predicable. If \( \varphi \) is a formula such as the matrix in the
Clark/Boolos paradox, namely \( \exists G \left( xG \land \neg Gx \right) \), then \( \varphi \) is not \( x \)-predicable. And
if \( \varphi \) is the formula involved in the McMichael/Boolos paradox, namely \( x = y \),
then \( \varphi \) is neither \( x \)- nor \( y \)-predicable.

In what follows, let us adopt the conventions that:

- \( \varphi[y], \psi[y] \ldots \) are metavariables that range over \( \nu \)-predicable formulas.

- The use of \( \varphi[y] \) to express a theorem schema serves to indicate that the
theorem is conditional on \( \lambda \nu \varphi \downarrow \).

For example, \( \vdash \ldots \varphi[y] \ldots \) is shorthand for \( \vdash \lambda y \varphi \downarrow \rightarrow \ldots \varphi \ldots \).

Thus, we may rewrite the theorems in (358) about Conditional Class Com-
prehension as follows. (.1) there is a class whose members consist of all and
only the individuals \( y \) such that \( \varphi[y] \); (.2) there is a unique class whose members consist of all and only the individuals \( y \) such that \( \varphi[y] \); and (.3) the class of individuals \( y \) such that \( \varphi[y] \) exists:

(.1)  \( \exists c \forall y (y \in c \equiv \varphi[y]) \), provided \( \varphi[y] \) has no free occurrences of \( c \)

(.2)  \( \exists! c \forall y (y \in c \equiv \varphi[y]) \), provided \( \varphi[y] \) has no free occurrences of \( c \)

(.3)  \( \mathfrak{c} \forall y (y \in c \equiv \varphi[y]) \), provided \( \varphi[y] \) has no free occurrences of \( c \)

(360) **Definition:** Class Abstracts. By (358.3) and our conventions in (359), it is a theorem that \( \mathfrak{c} \forall y (y \in c \equiv \varphi[y]) \), for any \( y \)-predicable formula \( \varphi[y] \) in which \( c \) doesn’t occur free. So we could introduce the class abstract notation \( \{ y | \varphi \} \) ("the class of individuals \( y \) such that \( \varphi[y] \") and be assured that it is significant. However, our theory of definitions-by-\( = \) allows us to give the following, more general definition of class abstracts, where \( \varphi \) is any formula:

\[ \{ y | \varphi \} =_{df} \mathfrak{c} \forall y (y \in c \equiv \varphi), \text{ where } \varphi \text{ has no free occurrences of } c \]

Observe that in the above, \( \varphi \) may have free variables other than \( y \). If \( \varphi \) is \( y \)-predicable and \( y \) is the only variable that has a free occurrence in \( \varphi \), then \( \{ y | \varphi \} \) is a closed term will denote a particular class if \( \mathfrak{c} \forall y (y \in c \equiv \varphi) \) is significant. But if \( \varphi \) is \( y \)-predicable and there are variables other than \( y \) with free occurrences in \( \varphi \), then \( \{ y | \varphi \} \) will denote a class relative to the values of the other free variables whenever \( \mathfrak{c} \forall y (y \in c \equiv \varphi) \) denotes a class relative to those values of the free variables.

(361) **Remark:** Defined Variable-Binding Term-Forming Operators. There are two distinctive features of definition (360). The first is that the expression being introduced, \( \{ y | \ldots \} \) doesn’t take variables as arguments but rather binds the occurrences of those variables in any formula \( \varphi \) that appears within the ellipsis (i.e., within its scope). (We haven’t discussed this kind of term previously, for the term-forming operators defined heretofore haven’t been variable-binding operators, nor have they had formulas within their scope; instead they have had a free variable as an argument.) The first occurrence of the variable \( y \) in \( \{ y | \varphi \} \) is not a free occurrence, but rather part of the variable-binding operator and serves to indicate which of the variables with free occurrences in \( \varphi \) are bound by the operator (just as the first occurrence of \( x \) in the expression \( [\lambda x \varphi] \) is not a free occurrence but rather bound by the \( \lambda \) and serves to indicate which of the variables with free occurrences in \( \varphi \) are bound by the \( \lambda \)). Thus, \( \{ y | \varphi \} \) is rather different from such terms as \( T, op, c, c', c'' \), etc.

The second distinctive feature of (360) is that the definiens, \( \mathfrak{c} \forall y (y \in c \equiv \varphi) \), is a provably empty term for some formulas \( \varphi \). For example, if \( \varphi \) is \( \exists G (yG \& \neg Gy) \), then the definiens \( \mathfrak{c} \forall y (y \in c \equiv \exists G (yG \& \neg Gy)) \) doesn’t denote anything, not
even the empty set. Consequently, the second conjunct of the Rule of Definition by Identity (74) implies \( \neg \{y \in G \wedge \neg G y\}\). This is to be expected since the Clark/Boolos paradox shows that \( \exists G(y G \wedge \neg G y) \) is not \( y \)-predicable.

However, as long as we use a \( y \)-predicable formula \( \varphi[y] \) to introduce class abstracts of the form \( \{y \mid \varphi[y]\} \), then since \( \neg \psi y(y \in c \equiv \varphi[y]) \) is a theorem, by (358.3) and our conventions in (359), we can invoke the first conjunct of the Rule of Definition by Identity (74) and validly assert the identity \( \{y \mid \varphi[y]\} = \psi y(y \in c \equiv \varphi[y]) \) as a theorem.

(362) \( \star \) Theorems: Class Abstraction Principles. The classical abstraction principles now govern class abstracts built with \( y \)-predicable formulas. (.1) \( y \) is a member of \( \{y \mid \varphi[y]\} \) if and only if \( \varphi[y] \); and (.2) \( z \) is an element of the class of individuals such that \( \varphi[y] \) just in case \( z \) is such that \( \varphi[y] \):

1. \( y \in \{y \mid \varphi[y]\} \equiv \varphi[y] \)
2. \( z \in \{y \mid \varphi[y]\} \equiv \varphi[y] \)

(.2) is an analogue of a definition in Principia Mathematica. In Whitehead & Russell (1910–1913 [1925–1927], *20:02), we find \( x \in (\varphi ! z). \equiv \varphi ! x \) stipulated as a definition, and we find \( x \in z(\psi z). \equiv \psi x \) asserted as a theorem (*20:3). They read the theorem in the 2nd edition as “\( x \) is a member of the class determined by \( \psi \) when, and only when, \( x \) satisfies \( \psi \)” (1910–1913 [1925–1927, 193]).

(363) Theorems: Modally Strict Identities. We now establish a modally strict proof of (.1) the class of individuals \( y \) such that \( \varphi[y] \) is identical to the extension of the property \( \lambda y \varphi[y] \). From this, it follows that (.2) the class of \( G \)s is identical to the extension of the property \( G \):

1. \( \{y \mid \varphi[y]\} = c[\lambda y \varphi[y]] \)
2. \( \{y \mid G y\} = c G \)

---

227 To show that \( \psi y(y \in c \equiv \exists G(y G \wedge \neg G y)) \) is a provably empty term, it suffices to show:

\[ \neg \exists x(\text{Class}(x) \wedge \forall y(y \in x \equiv \exists G(y G \wedge \neg G y))) \]

For reductio, suppose otherwise and let \( a \) be such an object, so that we know Class\( (a) \) and:

\( (\delta) \) \( \forall y(y \in a \equiv \exists G(y G \wedge \neg G y)) \)

Since \( a \) is a class, we know by definitions (307.2) that \( \exists G(\text{ExtensionOf}(a, G)) \). Suppose \( P \) is such a property, so that we know ExtensionOf\( (a, P) \). Then by (314), it follows that:

\( (\xi) \) \( \forall y(y \in a \equiv P y) \)

From \( (\delta) \) and \( (\xi) \) it follows that:

\( (\zeta) \) \( \forall y(P y \equiv \exists G(y G \wedge \neg G y)) \)

But now, one can use \( (\zeta) \) to derive a contradiction, as in the Clark/Boolos paradox, by considering the abstract object, say \( b \), that encodes just the property \( P \) and asking the question: does \( b \) exemplify \( P \)? It does if and only if it does not.
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By the symmetry of identity, (2) yields $eG = \{y \mid Gy\}$. This is another object-theoretic analogue of Carnap’s semantic assertion in 1947 (19, 4-14) that “the extension of a predicator . . . is the corresponding class.” This latter claim was part of Carnap’s extended definition of the general semantic notion of an extension, with class used as a primitive axiomatized by mathematical theory of sets or classes. By contrast, our theorem is in the object language, with ClassOf ultimately defined in terms of our mathematics-free primitives.

Of course, given that we defined ClassOf$(x, G)$ as ExtentionOf$(x, G)$, it is to be expected that $eG = \{y \mid Gy\}$ is a theorem. Nevertheless, the result serves as a sanity check, given the many subsequent definitions and theorems needed to state and prove it.

(364) **Theorems:** The Separation Schema. Let $\varphi[y]$ any $y$-predicable formula (359). Then (1) for any class $c'$, there is a class whose elements $y$ are precisely the members of $c'$ and such that $\varphi[y]$; and (2) for any class $c'$, there is a unique class whose elements are precisely the members of $c'$ such that $\varphi[y]$: 

\[
\forall c' \exists c \forall y (y \in c \equiv y \in c' \& \varphi[y]), \text{ provided } \varphi[y] \text{ has no free occurrences of } c
\]

\[
\forall c' ! \exists c \forall y (y \in c \equiv y \in c' \& \varphi[y]), \text{ provided } \varphi[y] \text{ has no free occurrences of } c
\]

(365) **Theorems:** The Separation Set. Where $\varphi[y]$ is any $y$-predicable formula (359), it follows, as a non-modally strict theorem, that for any class $c'$, the class, whose elements are precisely the members of $c'$ such that $\varphi[y]$, exists:

\[
\forall c' (\exists c \forall y (y \in c \equiv y \in c' \& \varphi[y]) \downarrow), \text{ provided } \varphi[y] \text{ has no free occurrences of } c
\]

(366) **Definition:** Class Separation Abstracts. In light of (365)*, the following definition:

\[
[y \mid y \in c' \& \varphi] =_{df} \exists c \forall y (y \in c \equiv y \in c' \& \varphi), \text{ provided } c \text{ isn’t free in } \varphi
\]

yields a significant class abstract whenever $\varphi$ is a $y$-predicable formula. However, for reasons that should now be familiar, the identity claim derived from this definition is not modally strict, given theorem (365)* and the theory of definitions by identity. Note also that this definition also introduces a variable-binding, term-forming operator, of the kind discussed in Remark (361).

(367) **Theorem:** Separation Abstraction Principle. Let $\varphi[y]$ be any $y$-predicable formula. Then the class abstracts introduced in (366)* are subject to the principle that for any class $c'$ and for any object $z$, $z$ is an element of the class of individuals $y$ such that $y$ is an element of $c'$ and such that $\varphi[y]$ if and only if $z$ is an element of $c'$ and such that $\varphi[y]$:

\[
\forall c' \exists z (z \in [y \mid y \in c' \& \varphi[y]] \equiv z \in c' \& \varphi[y]^z),
\]

provided $z$ is substitutable for $y$ in $\varphi[y]$
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(368) ★Theorem: Consequence of Class Separation and Intersection. Where \( \varphi[y] \) is any \( y \)-predicable formula, it follows that for every class \( c' \), the class whose elements are members of \( c' \)-objects such that \( \varphi[y] \) is identical to the intersection of \( c' \) and the class whose elements are such that \( \varphi[y] \):

\[
\forall c'(\{y \mid y \in c' \land \varphi[y]\} = c' \cap \{y \mid \varphi[y]\})
\]

(369) Theorem: Collection. For any 2-place relation \( R \) and class \( c \), there is a class \( c' \) whose members are precisely those objects \( y \) such that some member of \( c \) bears \( R \) to \( y \):

\[
\forall R \forall c \exists c' \forall y (y \in c' \equiv \exists z (z \in c \land Ryz))
\]

Clearly, \( c' \) need not be a subset of \( c \), since the members of \( c \) may be \( R \)-related to non-members of \( c \).

(370) Remark: Not Every Object Has a Singleton. Our theory does not assert that, for any individual \( x \), there is a class whose members consist of just those individuals identical to \( x \). That is, it is not a theorem that:

\[
\forall x \exists c \forall y (y \in c \equiv y = x)
\]

The formula \( y = x \) is not \( y \)-predicable, on pain of contradiction; if it were \( y \)-predicable, i.e., if it were provable that \( [\lambda y y = x] \downarrow \), the system would be subject to the McMichael/Boolos paradox. So we cannot use \( y = x \) in an instance of class comprehension (358.1). Moreover, since the predicate \( [\lambda y y = x] \) doesn’t denote a property, it can’t be substituted for \( F \) to produce an instance of the Fundamental Theorem for Natural Classes (315). Indeed, none of the other existence principles we’ve derived for natural classes allow us to assert the existence of \( \{y \mid y = x\} \). Nevertheless, our theory does assert that there are singletons with respect to \( =_E \). As we shall see, it is well-behaved on the ordinary objects.

(371) Theorems: Natural Singletons. Our theory guarantees that (.1) there is a class whose members are the objects identical \( E \) to \( x \); (.2) there is a unique class whose members are the objects identical \( E \) to \( x \); and (.3) the class of individuals identical \( E \) to \( x \) exists:

(.1) \( \exists c \forall y (y \in c \equiv y =_E x) \)

(.2) \( \exists ! c \forall y (y \in c \equiv y =_E x) \)

(.3) \( \text{i}c \forall y (y \in c \equiv y =_E x) \downarrow \)

Hence, it follows that:

(.4) \( \{y \mid y =_E x\} \downarrow \)
Clearly, the matrix \( y =_E x \) complies with the requirement that \( \varphi \) be \( y \)-predicable if a class abstract is to be significant.

(372) **Definition:** The Natural Singleton of an Individual. In virtue of (371.4), we may define the natural singleton, or natural unit class, of \( x \), written \( \{x\}_E \), to be the class of \( y \) such that \( y \) is identical \( E \) to \( x \):

\[
\{x\}_E =_{df} \{ y \mid y =_E x \}
\]

Note here that we’ve introduced a new functional term by way of a defined class abstraction term.

(373) **Theorem:** Modally Strict Facts About Singletons. By theorem (230.1), we know that \( y =_E z \) just in case \( y \) and \( z \) are both ordinary objects that necessarily exemplify the same properties. So if \( z \) is an abstract object, \( y =_E z \) is false. Hence it follows that if \( z \) is abstract, the natural singleton of \( z \) is the empty class:

(1) \( A!z \rightarrow [z]_E = \emptyset \)

Consequently, if \( x \) and \( y \) are distinct abstract individuals, then both \( \{x\}_E \) and \( \{y\}_E \) are identical to the empty class and so identical. Thus, the principle, \( x \neq z \rightarrow \{x\}_E \neq \{z\}_E \), fails to hold generally:

(2) \( \neg \forall x \forall z (x \neq z \rightarrow \{x\}_E \neq \{z\}_E) \)

However, (3) the natural singletons of ordinary objects aren’t identical with the empty class:

(3) \( O!x \rightarrow (\{x\}_E \neq \emptyset) \)

Moreover, the principle (4) that distinct ordinary objects have distinct natural singletons is provable, and can be expressed as follows, where both \( u \) and \( v \) are restricted variables ranging over ordinary objects:

(4) \( O!x \& O!z \rightarrow (x \neq z \rightarrow \{x\}_E \neq \{z\}_E) \)

(374) ★**Theorem:** The Natural Singletons of Ordinary Objects. It may be of interest that there is a non-modally strict proof of the fact that an ordinary object is the sole member of its natural singleton:

\( O!x \rightarrow \forall y (y \in \{x\}_E \equiv y = x) \)

In general, when \( \kappa \) signifies an ordinary object, the term \( \{\kappa\}_E \) behaves as expected.\(^{228}\)

\(^{228}\)Thus, the reconstruction of natural classes (logical sets), in a system with no primitive notions of set or membership and no axioms asserting the existence of sets, implies that natural singletons are well-behaved only on the ordinary objects. To properly challenge this result, one should
Exercise: Is the fact that \( y =_E x \rightarrow \Box y =_E x \) (231.1) sufficient for constructing a modally strict proof of this theorem?

(375) Theorems: Existence of Natural Pair Classes. If we use \( =_E \), we may prove the existence of natural pair classes; for any objects \( x \) and \( z \), there is a (unique) class whose members are all and only those individuals \( y \) that are either identical \( E \) to \( x \) or identical \( E \) to \( z \):

\[
(1) \ \exists c \forall y \ (y \in c \equiv y =_E x \lor y =_E z) \\
(2) \ \exists ! c \forall y \ (y \in c \equiv y =_E x \lor y =_E z)
\]

Exercise. Recall the discussion Remark (333) where we used restricted variables to define the natural pair class of ordinary objects \( u, v \), i.e., \( \{u, v\}_E \), as \( \forall c \forall y \ (y \in c \equiv y =_E u \lor y =_E v) \). Now suppose we hadn't used restricted variables to define \( \{u, v\}_E \). Suppose, instead, that we had defined the natural pair class of \( x \) and \( z \), i.e., \( \{x, z\}_E \), for arbitrary objects \( x \) and \( z \), as \( \{y \mid y =_E x \lor y =_E z\} \). Would this have made a difference? Determine the conditions under which \( \{y \mid y =_E x \lor y =_E z\} \downarrow \), and then identify the members of \( \{x, z\}_E \) when (a) one of \( x \) and \( z \) is abstract and the other is ordinary, and (b) both \( x \) and \( z \) are abstract. Show that when \( x \) and \( z \) are ordinary objects, the natural pair class \( \{x, z\}_E \) behaves classically.

(376) Theorems: Natural Adjunction. It is a theorem that there is a (unique) class \( c \) whose elements are all and only those objects that are either the members of a given class \( c' \) or identical \( E \) to some given object \( x \):

\[
(1) \ \forall c' \exists c \forall y \ (y \in c \equiv y \in c' \lor y =_E x) \\
(2) \ \forall c' \exists ! c \forall y \ (y \in c \equiv y \in c' \lor y =_E x)
\]

present an alternative background theory of abstract objects, define the notion of set, and prove that singletons of abstract objects behave differently. Only then can we compare the two theories to determine what significant philosophical theorems are lost by implying that natural singletons of abstract objects do behave classically.

It should also be mentioned that the present theory offers a second analysis of singletons. They need not be reconstructed as natural singletons. If one’s view about singletons is part of some mathematical set theory in which sets and set membership are primitive (i.e., part of some axiomatic system of theoretical mathematics), then object theory would not identify those objects along the lines indicated above. Instead, it would identify those singletons as abstract objects whose encoded properties are the ones attributed to them in the set theory in question. Such an identification would be part of the treatment of theoretical mathematics in Chapter 15. On that analysis, each distinct axiom system for characterizing a primitive notion of set membership (i.e., for each system that leads to a distinct body of theorems) yields a different (abstract) membership relation. If a set theory \( T \) attributes classical properties to singleton sets, then object theory will identify the singletons described by \( T \) as abstract objects that encode their mathematical properties and so the singletons described by \( T \) encode those classical properties.
Exercise. Find and prove a connection between $\{y \mid y \in c' \vee y =_E x\}$ and $c'$ when $x$ is abstract. Show that $\{y \mid y \in c' \vee y =_E x\}$ behaves classically when $x$ is ordinary.

(377) Exercises: Anti-Extensions. Let us say that $x$ is an anti-extension of property $G$ if and only if $x$ is an abstract object that encodes exactly the properties $F$ that are exemplified by all and only those objects that fail to exemplify $G$. Prove that for any $G$, there is a unique anti-extension of $G$, and define $\overline{c}G$ as the anti-extension of $G$. Show $\overline{c}G = \epsilon \overline{G}$. Formulate and prove some interesting theorems about anti-extensions.

10.7 Abstraction via Equivalence Conditions

(378) Remark: Logical Objects Abstracted from Equivalence Conditions on Relations. We now observe a general pattern that has emerged in the previous two sections. Let $\alpha, \beta$ be distinct $n$-place relation variables, for some $n$, and consider any formula $\phi$ in which there are free occurrences of $\alpha$ and free occurrences of $\beta$. Let us write $\phi(\gamma, \delta)$ for the result of simultaneously substituting $\gamma$ for the free occurrences of $\alpha$ and $\delta$ for the free occurrences of $\beta$, where $\gamma$ and $\delta$ are any two $n$-place relation variables, so that $\phi(\alpha, \beta)$ just is $\phi$. Then we say that such a formula $\phi$ is an equivalence condition on $n$-place relations whenever the following are all provable:

\begin{align*}
\phi(\alpha, \alpha) & \quad \text{(Reflexivity)} \\
\phi(\alpha, \beta) \to \phi(\beta, \alpha) & \quad \text{(Symmetry)} \\
\phi(\alpha, \beta) \to (\phi(\beta, \gamma) \to \phi(\alpha, \gamma)) & \quad \text{(Transitivity)}
\end{align*}

For example, it is easy to show that the formulas $q \equiv p$ is an equivalence condition on propositions, and that $\forall z(Fz \equiv Gz)$ is an equivalence condition on properties, i.e., to prove:

- $q \equiv q$
  
  $(q \equiv p) \to (p \equiv q)$
  
  $((q \equiv p) \& (p \equiv r)) \to q \equiv r$

- $\forall z(Fz \equiv Fz)$
  
  $\forall z(Fz \equiv Gz) \to \forall z(Gz \equiv Fz)$
  
  $(\forall z(Fz \equiv Gz) \& \forall z(Gz \equiv Hz)) \to \forall z(Fz \equiv Hz)$

Intuitively speaking, an equivalence condition with free $n$-place relation variables $\alpha, \beta$ partitions the domain of $n$-place relations over which $\alpha, \beta$ range in much the same way that an equivalence relation on individuals partitions the domain of individuals. The formula $q \equiv p$ partitions the domain of propositions into mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive cells of materially equivalent propositions. The formula $\forall z(Fz \equiv Gz)$ partitions the domain of properties
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into mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive cells of materially equivalent properties.

We can now observe that the definitions of truth-values and extensions of properties (i.e., classes) are both based on instances of comprehension for abstract objects involving equivalence conditions:

- We used the equivalence condition \( q \equiv p \) on propositions in (281) to define \( \text{TruthValueOf}(x, p) \).
- We used the equivalence condition \( \forall z(Fz \equiv Gz) \) on properties in (307.1) to define \( \text{ExtensionOf}(x, G) \).

These definitions were in turn used to define the canonical objects \( \phi p \) and \( \epsilon G \), respectively. This process can be generalized, as the next series of definitions and theorems show.

(379) Definitions: Abstractions from Equivalence Conditions. For the next sequence of definitions and theorems we adopt the following conventions:

- Let \( \varphi(q, p) \) be any equivalence condition on propositions.
- Let \( \psi(F, G) \) be any equivalence condition on properties.

Then we can define (1) \( x \) is the \( \varphi \)-abstraction of \( p \) if and only if \( x \) encodes all and only the properties \( \lambda yq \) such that \( q \) is some proposition \( \varphi \)-equivalent to \( p \); and (2) \( x \) is the \( \psi \)-abstraction of \( G \) if and only if \( x \) encodes exactly the properties that are \( \psi \)-equivalent to \( G \):

(1) \( \varphi \)-AbstractionOf \((x, p) \equiv_{df} A!x & \forall F(xF \equiv \exists q(\varphi(q, p) & F = [\lambda yq])) \)
(2) \( \psi \)-AbstractionOf \((x, G) \equiv_{df} A!x & \forall F(xF \equiv \psi(F, G)) \)

(380) Theorems: Existence of Unique Abstractions. Where \( \varphi \) and \( \psi \) are equivalence conditions of the kind just defined, the Strengthened Comprehension Principle for Abstract Objects (247) yields the existence of a unique abstraction:

(1) \( \exists !x(\varphi \text{-AbstractionOf}(x, p)) \)
(2) \( \exists !x(\psi \text{-AbstractionOf}(x, G)) \)

So by (249), we can prove that the corresponding canonical descriptions are significant:

(3) \( ix(\varphi \text{-AbstractionOf}(x, p)) \downarrow \)
(4) \( ix(\psi \text{-AbstractionOf}(x, G)) \downarrow \)
(381) **Definitions:** Notation for Abstractions of Equivalence Conditions. Where \( \phi \) and \( \psi \) are equivalence conditions on propositions and properties, respectively, we may introduce notation for the \( \phi \)-abstraction of \( p \) and the \( \psi \)-abstraction of \( G \):

\[
(1) \quad \hat{p}_\phi =_{df} \lambda x (\phi - \text{AbstractionOf}(x, p))
\]

\[
(2) \quad \hat{G}_\psi =_{df} \lambda x (\psi - \text{AbstractionOf}(x, G))
\]

Intuitively, for any equivalence condition on propositions or properties, our theory distinguishes a canonical logical object for each cell of the partition it induces. For any proposition \( p \), \( \hat{p}_\phi \) encodes all and only the propositions \( q \) such that \( \phi(q, p) \) and, for any property \( G \), \( \hat{G}_\psi \) encodes all and only the properties \( F \) such that \( \psi(F, G) \).

(382) ★**Theorems:** Frege’s Principle for Abstractions. Our results now justify one classical form of definition by abstraction, since the above definitions and theorems yield the following non-modally strict theorems, where \( \phi \) and \( \psi \) are equivalence conditions on propositions and properties, respectively:

\[
(1) \quad \hat{p}_\phi = \hat{p}_\psi \equiv \phi(p, q)
\]

\[
(2) \quad \hat{F}_\psi = \hat{G}_\psi \equiv \psi(F, G)
\]

Finally, note that Frege’s ‘Julius Caesar problem’ doesn’t arise for any abstractions defined along the above lines. The conditions \( \hat{p}_\phi = x \) and \( \hat{F}_\psi = x \) are defined for every \( x \). These are simply instances of definition (23.1). We’ve not introduced \( \hat{p}_\phi \) and \( \hat{F}_\psi \) as primitive notions and stipulated (1)★ and (2)★ as axioms. Rather, we’ve defined \( \hat{p}_\phi \) and \( \hat{F}_\psi \) in terms of canonical descriptions. The identity conditions of \( \hat{p}_\phi \) and \( \hat{F}_\psi \), with respect to any other object \( x \), have been defined independently.

### 10.8 Abstraction via Equivalence Relations

We now turn from abstractions over equivalence conditions on relations to abstractions over equivalence relations on individuals.

#### 10.8.1 Directions and Shapes

We begin by analyzing directions and shapes as natural mathematical objects (in a later chapter, we’ll analyze those directions and shapes that have been systematized by some mathematical theory). We shall be assuming only an ordinary, pretheoretic understanding of the properties *being a line* and *being a figure*, as well as an ordinary, pretheoretic understanding of the relations *being
parallel to and being similar to. We may assume only that these apply to concrete objects not to the idealizations of geometry and, for now, avoid the theoretical axioms of geometrical theories in what follows.\(^{229}\)

**Remark:** Pretheoretic Conception of Lines. Consider the pretheoretic property *being a line* familiar to us from ordinary language. In what follows, we use \(L\) to denote this property (note that, up to now, we have used \(L\) for a different purpose, namely, as an abbreviation for the property \(\forall x E!x \rightarrow E!x\)). We don’t actually make use of any assumptions governing this property other than the assumptions governing the relation of *being parallel to* described in this Remark.\(^{230}\)

Now the ordinary 2-place relation *being parallel to* (written ‘∥′ using infix notation), is an equivalence relation restricted to individuals that exemplify the property *being a line*. That is, we assume the following principles governing *being a line* and *being parallel to*:

\[
Lx \rightarrow x \parallel x
\]

\[
Lx \land Ly \rightarrow (x \parallel y \rightarrow y \parallel x)
\]

\[
Lx \land Ly \land Lz \rightarrow (x \parallel y \land y \parallel z \rightarrow x \parallel z)
\]

\(^{229}\)We are assuming one can distinguish the pretheoretic properties and relations such as *being a line*, *being a figure*, *being parallel to*, *being similar to*, etc., from their theoretical counterparts. Whereas the theoretical counterparts are governed by the axioms of some implicit or explicit mathematical theory, the pretheoretic properties and relations are not. For now, we shall discuss only the pretheoretic properties and relations, as referenced in ordinary, everyday language.

By contrast, the theoretical counterparts will be subject to our analysis of the relations of theoretical mathematics in Chapter 15. In that later chapter, we assert the existence of abstract relations (including abstract properties) in addition to abstract individuals. Abstract relations will be distinguished from ordinary relations; the former, but not the latter, may encode properties of relations. Similarly, abstract properties will be distinguished from ordinary properties; the former may encode properties of properties. In Chapter 15, theoretical mathematical properties axiomatized in some mathematical theory, such as *being a number*, *being a set*, and *being a line*, will be identified as particular abstract properties (relative to the theory in question).

\(^{230}\)I take it, however, that the pretheoretic property *being a line* is governed by the principles that (ordinary) lines are concrete objects (i.e., \(\forall x (Lx \rightarrow E!x)\)) and that it is possible that lines exist (i.e., \(\exists x Lx\)). From the latter it follows by BF\(^{(167.3)}\) that there exist objects \(x\) that are possibly lines (e.g., from the fact that it is possible there exists a vertical line running along the right edge of the text on this page, it follows that there is an \(x\) such that possibly \(x\) is a vertical line running along the right edge of the text on this page). I also suppose that the pretheoretic property *being a line* allows for lines that consist of discrete parts (e.g., a line of people) and for lines that are continuous at a certain level of granularity (e.g., a line of ink on paper). Finally, I take it that, pretheoretically, lines have some (approximate) physical length and (average) thickness. Of course, if the reader finds any of this controversial, she is entitled to ignore it. Strictly speaking, none of these pretheoretic claims are needed for understanding the analysis that follows. But I take it that Frege’s example of a particular line, the Earth’s axis, is an abstraction and would be analyzed as a theoretical entity of science, and hence as an abstract object, not an ordinary one.
Let us also assume that $Lx$ is a restriction condition, as defined in (330), but a *rigid* restriction condition, as defined in (334). Since $Lx$ is a restriction condition, we’ll be assuming that $\vdash \exists x Lx$, and for present purposes, we may suppose that such a theorem is not a modally strict one.

Then, over the course of the next few items, we may use the variables $u, v$ as non-rigid restricted variables ranging over lines (we continue to use the variables $x, y, z$ as variables for any kind of object). Hence, the principles displayed immediately above may be written as follows:

$$\forall u (u \parallel u)$$
$$\forall u \forall v (u \parallel v \implies v \parallel u)$$
$$\forall u \forall u' \forall u'' (u \parallel u' \land u' \parallel u'' \implies u \parallel u'')$$

So let us extend object theory for the moment with these assumptions.

(384) **Lemma:** Fact About *Being Parallel To*. From the assumption that *being parallel to* is an equivalence relation on lines, we can establish that for any two lines $u$ and $v$, the properties *being a line parallel to* $u$ and *being a line parallel to* $u'$ are materially equivalent if and only if $u$ is parallel to $u'$:

$$\forall u \forall u' (\forall z ([\lambda vv \parallel u] z \equiv [\lambda vv \parallel u'] z) \equiv u \parallel u')$$

This fact plays a key role in what follows.

(385) **Definition:** Directions of Lines. We may define: $x$ is a *direction* of line $u$ just in case $x$ is an extension of the property *being a line parallel to* $u$:

$$\text{DirectionOf}(x, u) \equiv_{df} \text{ExtensionOf}(x, [\lambda vv \parallel u])$$

By our conventions in (332.1) and (331.4), this abbreviates:

$$\text{DirectionOf}(x, y) \equiv_{df} Ly \land \text{ExtensionOf}(x, [\lambda z Lz \land z \parallel y])$$

(386) **Theorems:** The Existence of Directions. It now follows that (.1) every line has a direction; and (.2) every line has a unique direction:

(.1) $\forall u \exists x \text{DirectionOf}(x, u)$

(.2) $\forall u \exists! x \text{DirectionOf}(x, u)$

(387) **Theorem:** The Direction of Line Exists.

$$\forall u (\exists x \text{DirectionOf}(x, u) \downarrow)$$
Note that the present theorem, (386.1), and (386.2) abbreviate quantified conditionals, since the free variable $u$ is restricted. Consequently, these theorems don’t presuppose the existence of ordinary lines.

(388) **Definition:** The Direction of Line $u$. Given our conventions for free restricted variables in definitions, we may introduce the following notation for the direction of line $u$:

$$\vec{u} =_{df} \text{directionOf}(x, u)$$

The expression $\vec{r}$ is significant whenever $r$ is significant and known to be a line, either by hypothesis or by proof.

(389) ★**Theorem:** Fregean Biconditional for Directions. It now follows that for any two lines $u$ and $v$, the direction of $u$ is identical to the direction of $v$ iff $u$ and $v$ are parallel:

$$\forall u \forall v (\vec{u} = \vec{v} \equiv u \parallel v)$$

We have therefore established the Fregean biconditional principle for directions (Frege 1884, §65).

(390) **Definition:** Directions. A *direction* is any object that is a direction of some line:

$$\text{Direction}(x) \equiv_{df} \exists u \text{directionOf}(x, u)$$

Cf. Frege 1884, §66.

(391) **Theorem:** Conditional Existence of Directions. It now follows that if lines exist, then directions exist:

$$\exists y Ly \rightarrow \exists x \text{Direction}(x)$$

Since we’ve assumed that $Ly$ is a restriction condition, then we get $\vdash \exists y Ly$ for free. Otherwise, the proof that directions exists awaits upon the assumption that lines exists.

(392) **Remark:** Pretheoretic Conception of Shapes. Consider the pretheoretic property *being a figure* and the pretheoretic relation *being similar to*, where the latter is written ~ in infix notation. Assume *being a figure* is a restriction condition, but not a rigid one, and that ~ is an equivalence relation among figures, i.e., where $u, v$ now range over figures, that:

$$\forall u (u \sim u)$$

$$\forall u \forall v (u \sim v \rightarrow v \sim u)$$

$$\forall u \forall u' \forall u'' (u \sim u' \& u' \sim u'' \rightarrow u \sim u'')$$
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We may then apply our theory by abstracting over similar figures to define shapes.

(393) Lemma: Fact About Similarity. By the same reasoning we used in (384), we know that for any two figures $u$ and $v$, the properties being a figure similar to $u$ and being a figure similar to $v$ are materially equivalent if and only if $u$ is similar to $v$:

$$\forall u \forall u' (\forall z ([\lambda vv \sim u] z \equiv [\lambda vv \sim u'] z) \equiv u \sim u')$$

We now derive a Frege-style analysis of shapes.

(394) Definition: Shapes of Figures. Given the principles in the preceding remark, we may define: $x$ is a shape of figure $u$ just in case $x$ is an extension of the property being a figure similar to $u$:

$$\text{ShapeOf}(x,u) \equiv \text{df} \text{ExtensionOf}(x,[\lambda vv \sim u])$$

(395) Theorems: The Existence of Shapes. It now follows that (.1) every figure has a shape; and (.2) every figure has a unique shape:

(1) $\forall u \exists x \text{ShapeOf}(x,u)$

(2) $\forall u \exists ! x \text{ShapeOf}(x,u)$

(396) ★Theorems: The Shape of $u$ Exists.

$$\forall u (\exists x \text{ShapeOf}(x,u) \Downarrow)$$

Again, this theorem, (395.1), and (395.2) are quantified conditionals, given the presence of the free restricted variable $u$.

(397) Definition: The Shape of a Figure. We are therefore justified in introducing the following notation for the shape of figure $u$:

$$\tilde{u} = \text{df} \exists x \text{ShapeOf}(x,u)$$

Given the free restricted variable $u$ in this definition, we our conventions in (333) are in effect.

(398) ★Theorem: Fregean Biconditional for Shapes. It now follows that for any two figures $u$ and $v$, the shape of $u$ is identical to the shape of $v$ iff $u$ and $v$ are similar:

$$\forall u \forall v (\tilde{u} = \tilde{v} \equiv u \sim v)$$

(399) Definition: Shapes. A shape is any object that is a shape of some figure:

$$\text{Shape}(x) \equiv \text{df} \exists u \text{ShapeOf}(x,u)$$
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(400) Theorem: Conditional Existence of Shapes. It now follows that if figures exist, then shapes exist. Where \( P \) denotes the property being a figure, we have:

\[
\exists y P y \rightarrow \exists x \text{Shape}(x)
\]

This theorem parallels that of theorem (391).

10.8.2 General Abstraction via Equivalence Relations

In this subsection, we revert to using \( w \) as an unrestricted individual variable. Hence \( x, y, z, w \) are all unrestricted individual variables.

(401) Definition: Equivalence Relations. Let \( F \) be a 2-place relation variable. Then we say that \( F \) is an equivalence relation on individuals if and only if \( F \) is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive:

\[
\text{Equivalence}(F) \equiv_{df} \forall x Fxx & \forall x \forall y (Fxy \rightarrow Fyx) & \forall x \forall y \forall z (Fxy \& Fyz \rightarrow Fxz)
\]

(402) Theorem: Example of an Equivalence Relation. It is straightforward to establish that the relation of exemplifying the same properties is an equivalence relation:

\[
\text{Equivalence}(\lambda xy \forall F (Fx \equiv Fy))
\]

(403) Metatheorem: \( \text{Equivalence}(F) \) is a Restriction Condition. By the definition of a restriction condition in (330) and the fact that \( \text{Equivalence}(F) \) has a single free variable, the metatheorem is established by the following two facts:

1. \( \vdash_{\square} \exists F(\text{Equivalence}(F)) \)
2. \( \vdash_{\square} \text{Equivalence}(\Pi) \rightarrow \Pi \downarrow \), where \( \Pi \) is any 2-place relation term

Since \( \text{Equivalence}(F) \) is a restriction condition on relations, we henceforth use \( \bar{R} \) as a restricted variable ranging over equivalence relations.

(404) Lemmas: Fact About Equivalence Relations. (.1) For any equivalence relation \( \bar{F} \), the properties bearing \( \bar{F} \) to \( x \) and bearing \( \bar{F} \) to \( y \) are materially equivalent if and only if \( x \) bears \( \bar{F} \) to \( y \):

\[
(.1) \quad \forall \bar{F}(\forall w (\lambda z \bar{F}zx [w \equiv [\lambda z \bar{F}zy]w]) \equiv \bar{F}xy)
\]

Note also that (.2) for any equivalence relation \( \bar{F} \), the individuals that bear \( \bar{F} \) to \( x \) are precisely the individuals to which \( x \) bears \( \bar{F} \), i.e.,

\[
(.2) \quad \forall \bar{F}\forall y ([\lambda z \bar{F}zx]y \equiv [\lambda z \bar{F}xz]y)
\]
As a fact about properties, (.2) says that \( \lambda z \bar{F}zx \) is materially equivalent to \( \lambda z \bar{F}xz \). Hence, (.3) for any 2-place equivalence relation \( \bar{F} \), the properties materially equivalent to \( \lambda z Fzx \) are precisely the properties materially equivalent to \( \lambda z \bar{F}xz \), i.e.,

\[
(3) \forall \bar{F} \forall G (\forall y (Gy \equiv [\lambda z \bar{F}zx]y) \equiv \forall y (Gy \equiv [\lambda z \bar{F}xz]y))
\]

(405) **Definition:** Abstractions from Equivalence Relations. Where \( \bar{F} \) is any equivalence relation, we say that \( w \) is an \( \bar{F} \)-abstraction of \( x \) just in case \( w \) is an extension of the property \( [\lambda z \bar{F}zx] \):

\[
\bar{F} - \text{AbstractionOf}(w, x) \equiv_{df} \text{ExtensionOf}(w, [\lambda z \bar{F}zx])
\]

(406) **Theorems:** The Existence of \( \bar{F} \)-Abstractions. It now follows that for every equivalence relation \( \bar{F} \), (.1) there is an \( \bar{F} \)-abstraction of individual \( x \); (.2) there is a unique \( \bar{F} \)-abstraction of individual \( x \); and (.3) the \( \bar{F} \)-abstraction of individual \( x \) exists:

\[
(1) \forall \bar{F} \exists w \bar{F} - \text{AbstractionOf}(w, x)
\]

\[
(2) \forall \bar{F} \exists! w \bar{F} - \text{AbstractionOf}(w, x)
\]

\[
(3) \forall \bar{F} (\exists w \bar{F} - \text{AbstractionOf}(w, x) \downarrow)
\]

These are all really quantified conditionals, given that \( \bar{F} \) is a free restricted variable ranging over equivalence relations.

(407) **Definition:** Notation for the \( \bar{F} \)-Abstraction of \( x \). Whenever \( \bar{F} \) is an equivalence relation, we notate the \( \bar{F} \)-abstraction of \( x \) as follows:

\[
\hat{x}_{\bar{F}} \equiv_{df} \bar{F} - \text{AbstractionOf}(w, x)
\]

Cf. Frege 1884, §68.

(408) ★**Theorem:** The Fregean Biconditional for Definition by Abstraction. To establish that the \( \bar{F} \)-abstraction of \( x \) is indeed defined by classical abstraction over an equivalence relation, we prove that it obeys the classical principle, namely, that for any equivalence relation \( \bar{F} \), the \( \bar{F} \)-abstraction of \( x \) is identical to the \( \bar{F} \)-abstraction of \( y \) if and only if \( x \) bears \( \bar{F} \) to \( y \):

\[
\forall \bar{F} (\hat{x}_{\bar{F}} = \hat{y}_{\bar{F}} \equiv \bar{F}xy)
\]

Thus, the classical principle used for ‘definitions by abstraction’ falls out as a theorem. This theorem and the theorems in (382)★ justify the practice of definition by abstraction.\(^{231}\)

\(^{231}\)See Mancosu 2017 for a comprehensive history of this practice in mathematics.
Chapter 11

Platonic Forms

(409) Remark: Platonic Forms. Plato is well-known for having postulated Forms to explain why it is that, despite an ever-changing reality, we can truly say that different objects have something in common, such as when we say that distinct objects $x$ and $y$ are both red spheres, or beautiful paintings, virtuous persons, etc. Plato thought that since concrete objects are always undergoing change and have many of their characteristics only temporarily, there must be something that is universal and unchanging if we can truly say that different objects are both $F$. Plato called the aspects of reality that are universal and unchanging the Forms and supposed that objects acquire their characteristics by participating in, or partaking of, these Forms.

Plato’s fundamental principle about the Forms is the One Over Many Principle. This principle is most famously stated in Parmenides 132a, and though we shall discuss it in more detail in what follows, a study of the seminal papers in Plato scholarship suggests that the following statement of the principle is accurate:232

(OM) One Over Many Principle
If $x$ and $y$ are both $F$, then there exists something that is the Form of $F$, or $F$-ness, in which they both participate.

In this principle, we are to substitute predicate nouns or adjectives for the symbol ‘$F$’, so that we have instances like the following:

If $x$ and $y$ are both human, then there exists something that is the Form of humanity, or humanness, in which they both participate.

If $x$ and $y$ are both red, then there exists something that is the Form of redness in which they both participate.

232See, e.g., Vlastos 1954, principles (A1) and (B1); Vlastos 1969, principle (1); and Strang 1963, principle (OM).
Though ‘The Form of $F$’ and ‘$F$-ness’ are two traditional ways of referring to the same thing, we must remember that in the expression ‘$F$-ness’, the letter ‘$F$’ is representing an arbitrary predicate noun or adjective and must be replaced by such an expression to produce a term denoting a Form. By contrast, in the theoretical/technical expression ‘The Form of $F$’, the symbol ‘$F$’ is a variable ranging over properties and so requires that ‘$F$’ be replaced by a gerund or abstract noun to yield a term denoting a Form.\footnote{For example, we may substitute ‘human’ for ‘$F$’ to produce the term ‘humanness’ (i.e., ‘humanity’) and substitute ‘red’ for ‘$F$’ to produce the term ‘redness’. But we must substitute ‘being human’ or ‘humanity’ for ‘$F$’ to produce the term ‘The Form of Being Human’ or ‘The Form of Humanity’, and must substitute ‘being red’ or ‘redness’ to produce the term ‘The Form of Being Red’ or ‘The Form of Redness’. A good rule of thumb is that if the symbol ‘$F$’ is being used in a natural language context, such as when we say ‘$x$ is $F$’, then the symbol ‘$F$’ may be replaced by a predicate noun or adjective, but when the symbol ‘$F$’ is being used in a theoretical/technical or formal context, then the symbol ‘$F$’ is being used as a variable ranging over properties.}

Now questions about (OM) immediately arise:

- What is $\text{The Form of } F$?
- What is participation?
- Is (OM) to be regarded as an axiom or can it be derived from more general principles?

To answer these questions, some philosophers have been tempted to identify $\text{The Form of } F$ with the property $F$ and to analyze: an object $x$ participates in, or partakes of, The Form of $F$ just in case $x$ exemplifies $F$. We can formulate these analyses as follows:

\begin{align*}
\text{(A) } & \text{The Form of } F =_{df} F \\
\text{(B) } & \text{ParticipatesIn}(x,F) =_{df} Fx
\end{align*}

Given (A) and (B), there is a natural formal representation of (OM):

\begin{align*}
\text{(C) } & (Fx & Fy & x \neq y) \rightarrow \exists G (G = F & Gx & Gy)
\end{align*}

This formula is a simple theorem of the second-order predicate calculus with identity.\footnote{Suppose $Fx & Fy & x \neq y$. Then by $\&E$ we have $Fx & Fy$. Moreover, the laws of identity yield $F = F$. Hence, by $\&I$, we obtain $F = F & Fx & Fy$. Hence, by $\exists I$, it follows that $\exists G (G = F & Gx & Gy)$.} So, (A), (B) and (C) provide answers, respectively, to the bulleted questions above.

Of course, some philosophers (e.g., the followers of Quine, nominalists, logical positivists, etc.) would object that the above analysis assumes second-order logic and its ontology of properties. But object theory has a theory of properties as rigorous as any mathematical theory and so provides a precise framework in which the above analysis can be put forward.
Despite its precision, however, analysis (A) – (C) is problematic as a theory of Platonic Forms. We can begin to see why by considering a passage in Vlastos (1954), where he reformulates Plato’s One Over Many Principle, as it occurs in *Parmenides* 132a1–b2 (1954, 320):

This is the first step of the Argument, and may be generalized as follows:

\[(A_1)\] If a number of things, \(a, b, c\) are all \(F\), there must be a single Form, 

\(F\)-ness, in virtue of which we apprehend \(a, b, c\), as all \(F\).

Here ‘\(F\)’ stands for any discernible character or property. The use of the same symbol, ‘\(F\)’, in ‘\(F\)-ness,’ the symbolic representation of the “single Form,”[5] records the identity of the character discerned in the particular (“large”) and conceived in the Form (“Largeness”) through which we see that this, or any other, particular has this character.

The footnote numbered 5 in this passage is rather interesting, for it includes the claim “That \(F\) and \(F\)-ness are logically and ontologically distinct is crucial to the argument” (1954, 320). So Vlastos is distinguishing the Form of \(F\) from the property \(F\), though in other passages, he calls the property \(F\) “the predicative function of the same Form” (1954, note 39).

Geach (1956) also balks at the suggestion that, for Plato, the Form of \(F\) is the attribute or property \(F\), at least in connection with Forms corresponding to ‘kind terms’ such as ‘man’ and ‘bed’. He notes (1956, 74):

Surely his [Plato’s] chosen way of speaking of these Forms suggests that for him a Form was nothing like what people have since called an “attribute” or a “characteristic.” The bed in my bedroom is to the Bed, not as a thing to an attribute or characteristic, but rather as a pound weight or yard measure in a shop to the standard pound or yard.

Geach thus takes the Form of \(F\) to be a “paradigm” individual that exemplifies \(F\) (1956, 76). In his paper, he uses variables \(x, y, \ldots\) to range over individuals.

235 In 1956, 76, Geach says that a *paradigm* \(F\) is something that is \(F\); it is a *standard* \(F\) insofar as it is an exemplar of \(F\) *par excellence*. But Geach’s suggestion is problematic; a alleged paradigm example of \(F\) has any number of properties that undermine that the suggestion that it is a paradigmatic exemplar. For suppose \(b\) is alleged to be a paradigm sphere. Then \(b\) will have a radius of a particular length \(l\), be constructed of a particular material \(m\), reflect light of a particular color \(c\), etc. None of these properties are representative of spheres generally and the fact that \(b\) exemplifies these specific properties tends to undermine the claim that it is paradigmatic.

Intuitively, what Geach intends, is that the paradigm sphere, in so far as it is to serve as the Form of Sphericity, should be something abstracted from properties not strictly implied by being a sphere (like having a radius of a particular length \(l\), being constructed of a particular material \(m\), reflecting light of a particular color \(c\)), while exemplifying all and only the properties necessarily implied by being a sphere. This understanding of a paradigm, as something that ‘has’, in the sense of encodes, all and only the properties necessarily implied by being a sphere, will be captured by the ‘thick’ conception of the Forms discussed in the Section 11.2. Consequently, we postpone further discussion of this issue until then, and specifically until Remark (439).
(including Forms), and uses a different style of variable, namely $F, G, \ldots$, for properties (or attributes). Similarly, Strang (1963, 148) formulates a version of (OM) by using the notation ‘$A$’ to refer to the property $A$ and ‘$F(A)$’ to refer to a Form of $A$ (“Given any set of $A$’s, they participate in one and the same $F(A)$”).

Allen (1960) offers a second reason why analysis (A) – (C) should not be adopted, namely, it doesn’t make sense of a principle to which Plato often appeals:

**(SP) Self-Predication Principle**

The Form of $F$ is $F$.

Allen explicitly notes (1960, 148):^236

Plato obviously accepts the following thesis: some (perhaps all) entities which may be designated by a phrase of the form “the $F$ Itself,” or any synonyms thereof, may be called $F$. So the Beautiful Itself will be beautiful, the Just Itself just, Equality equal.[3]

Allen assumed these facts in the following lines from the opening passage of his article (1960, 147):

The significance—or lack of significance—of Plato’s self-predicative statements has recently become a crux of scholarship. Briefly, the problem is this: the dialogues often use language which suggests that the Form is a universal which has itself as an attribute and is thus a member of its own class, and, by implication, that it is the one perfect member of that class. The language suggests that the Form has what it is: it is self-referential, self-predicable.

Now such a view is, to say the least, peculiar. Proper universals are not instantiations of themselves, perfect or otherwise. Oddness is not odd; Justice is not just; Equality is equal to nothing at all. No one can curl up for a nap in the Divine Bedsteadity; not even God can scratch Doghood behind the Ears.

The view is more than peculiar; it is absurd. …

With this, we are in a position to appreciate a later passage about (SP) in this same paper. Allen writes (1960, 148–9):

But this thesis [SP] does not, by itself, imply self-predication; for that, an auxiliary premise is required. This premise is that a function of the type “… is $F$” may be applied univocally to $F$ particulars and to the $F$ Itself, so that when (for example) we say that a given act is just, and that Justice is just, we are asserting that both have identically the same character. But

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^236 The footnote numbered 3 in the following quotation provides his documentation. Allen cites the following passages where Plato offers a version of the claim in question: Protagoras, 330c, 331b; Phaedo, 74b, d, 100c; Hippias Major, 289c, 291e, 292e, 294a-b; Lysis, 217a; Symposium, 210e-211d.
this premise would be false if the function were systematically equivocal, according as the subject of the sentence was a Form or a particular. In that case, to say that Justice is just and that any given act is just would be to say two quite different (though perhaps related) things, and the difficulties inherent in self-predication could not possibly arise. ...I propose to show that functions involving the names of Forms exhibit just this kind of ambiguity.

Though I do not endorse many of the subsequent conclusions Allen draws in his paper, the conclusion in the above passage strikes me as insightful. The idea that there is ambiguity in predication and, indeed, that Plato saw the ambiguity, has been picked up by other Plato scholars, notably Frede (1967) and Meinwald (1992).

Thus, the problem with the analysis (A) – (C) above is that it doesn’t really make sense of Plato’s text: it doesn’t distinguish the property $F$ from The Form of $F$ and it can’t make sense of the Self-Predication Principle. Vlastos’ suggestion that the property $F$ and the Form of $F$ are ontologically as well as logically distinct, and Allen’s suggestion that the language in the Self-Predication Principle involves a systematic ambiguity, are central to the analyses developed in this chapter.

Object theory distinguishes the property $F$ from the abstract, logical individuals encoding $F$ that might serve as The Form of $F$. Two such individuals immediately come to mind: (1) the abstract object that encodes just $F$ and no other properties, and (2) the abstract object that encodes all and only the properties necessarily implied by $F$. The former offers a ‘thin’ conception on which The Form of $F$ is the ‘pure’, objectified form of the property $F$ (‘thin’ in the sense that it encodes a single property and ‘pure’ in the sense that it encodes no other property). The latter offers a ‘thick’ conception on which The Form of $F$ encodes exactly what all $F$-exemplifiers necessarily exemplify in virtue of exemplifying $F$, i.e., those properties $G$ such that $\Box \forall x(Fx \rightarrow Gx)$. The thin conception of Forms was developed in Zalta 1983 (Chapter II, Section 1), whereas the thick conception was developed in Pelletier & Zalta 2000. These conceptions are discussed below in some detail, in Sections 11.1 and 11.2, respectively. Though the thick conception may be a more considered and scholarly approach to Plato, the thin conception is not without interest, for it already yields theorems that provide plausible readings of (OM) and (SP).

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237 For a more complete history of Plato scholarship in which it is proposed that there is an ambiguity in predication, see the Appendix to Pelletier & Zalta 2000.
11.1 The Thin Conception of Forms

(410) **Definition:** A Thin Form of $G$. Intuitively, an individual $x$ is a thin Form of property $G$ if and only if $x$ is an abstract object, $G$ exists, and $x$ encodes just the property $G$:

$$\text{ThinFormOf}(x, G) \equiv_{df} A!x \& G \downarrow \& \forall F (xF \equiv F = G)$$

Recall here that we are assuming Convention (17.2). Thus, where $\Pi$ is an property term, $\text{ThinFormOf}(x, \Pi)$ is false, for any $x$, when $\neg \Pi \downarrow$.

(411) **Theorems:** There Exists a (Unique) Thin Form of $G$.

(1) $\exists x (\text{ThinFormOf}(x, G))$

(2) $\exists! x (\text{ThinFormOf}(x, G))$

(3) $\forall x (\text{ThinFormOf}(x, G)) \downarrow$

(412) **Definition:** Notation for the Thin Form of $G$. We may therefore introduce notation, $a_G$, to designate the thin Form of $G$:

$$a_G =_{df} \forall x (\text{ThinFormOf}(x, G))$$

**Exercise.** Explain why the inferential role of the above definition-by-=$=$ guarantees, for any property term $\Pi$, that $a_\Pi = \forall x (\text{ThinFormOf}(x, \Pi))$ is a theorem if $\Pi \downarrow$, and $\neg a_\Pi \downarrow$ is a theorem otherwise.

(413) **Theorem:** The Thin Form of $G$ Is Canonical. It now follows that the thin Form of $G$ is identical to the abstract object that encodes exactly the properties identical to $G$:

$$a_G = \forall x (A!x \& \forall F (xF \equiv F = G))$$

So $a_G$ is a canonical individual.

(414) **Remark:** $a_G$ is Strictly Canonical. Given metadefinition (257.1), it can be shown that $F = G$ is a rigid condition on properties:

$$\vdash \forall F (F = G \rightarrow \Box F = G)$$

Given that $a_G$ is canonical (413), the rigidity of the condition $F = G$ tells us that $a_G$ is (identical to) a strictly canonical individual, as this was defined in (257.2). So the theorems in (258) apply to $a_G$.

(415) **Theorems:** Facts About the Thin Form of $G$. It now follows, by modally strict proofs, that: (.1) the thin Form of $G$ is abstract and encodes all and only the properties identical to $G$; and (.2) the thin Form of $G$ is a thin Form of $G$: 
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(.1) \( A!a_G \& \forall F(a_G F \equiv F = G) \)

(.2) \( \text{ThinFormOf}(a_G, G) \)

The interesting fact about (.2) is that it is derived without appeal to (145.2)*.

(416) **Theorem:** A Thin Form of \( G \) Encodes \( G \). It is a simple consequence of definition (410) that if \( x \) is a thin Form of \( G \), then \( x \) encodes \( G \):

\[ \text{ThinFormOf}(x, G) \rightarrow xG \]

(417) **Definition:** Participation. We now say that \( y \) participates in \( x \) if and only if there is a property \( F \) such that \( x \) is a thin Form of \( F \) and \( y \) exemplifies \( F \):

\[ \text{ParticipatesIn}(y, x) \equiv \exists F(\text{ThinFormOf}(x, F) \& Fy) \]

Cf. Zalta 1983 (42).238 This definition will be refined in Section 11.2, where we discuss the thick conception of Forms and distinguish two kinds of participation corresponding to the two kinds of predication. But the above definition serves well enough for our purposes in the present section.

(418) **Lemma:** Thin Forms, Predication, and Participation. It is an immediate consequence of the previous definition that if \( x \) is a thin Form of \( G \), then an individual \( y \) exemplifies \( G \) iff \( y \) participates in \( x \):

\[ \text{ThinFormOf}(x, G) \rightarrow \forall y(Gy \equiv \text{ParticipatesIn}(y, x)) \]

(419) **Theorem:** The Equivalence of Exemplification and Participation. It is now a consequence that an object \( x \) exemplifies a property \( G \) iff \( x \) participates in the thin Form of \( G \):

\[ Gx \equiv \text{ParticipatesIn}(x, a_G) \]

This theorem verifies that, under our analysis, Plato’s notion of participation is equivalent to the modern notion of exemplification.

(420) **Theorem:** The One Over the Many Principle. As noted in Remark (409), Plato’s most important principle governing the Forms is (OM): if there are two distinct individuals exemplifying \( G \), then there exists something that is the Form of \( G \) in which they both participate. (OM) is validated by the following theorem:

\[ Gx \& Gy \& x \neq y \rightarrow \exists z(a_G \& \text{ParticipatesIn}(x, z) \& \text{ParticipatesIn}(y, z)) \]

---

238In Zalta 1983, \( \text{ParticipatesIn}(y, x) \) was defined as: \( \exists F(xF \& Fy) \). By reformulating the definition as we’ve done in here, an object participates only in those abstract objects that are thin Forms.
So we’ve preserved the main principle of Plato’s theory without collapsing the distinction between the property $G$ and the thin Form of $G$.

(421) **Theorems:** Facts About Thin Forms. Consider the property *being ordinary*, $O!$. It follows that (.1) the thin Form of $G$ fails to exemplify $O!$:

$\neg O!a_G$

Since (.1) holds for every $G$, by GEN, it follows that (.2) the thin Form of $O!$ fails to exemplify $O!$:

$\neg O!a_O$

(.2) will play a role in the Remark that follows the next theorem.

(422) **Theorem:** The Thin Form of $G$ Encodes $G$ and a Unique Property.

(.1) $a_GG$

This is an encoding formula in which the individual term, $a_G$, is complex. It also follows that the Thin Form of $G$ encodes exactly one property:

(.2) $\exists !H a_{GH}$

(423) **Remark:** The ‘Self-Predication’ Principle. Recall that (SP) was formulated in Remark (409) as “The Form of $G$ is $G$”. As we saw in that remark, Allen (1960) suggests that in Plato’s work, the context “… is $G$” does not apply univocally to both individuals and the Form of $G$. Furthermore, as noted in Section 1.3, Meinwald (1992, 378) argues that the second half of Plato’s Parmenides leads us “to recognize a distinction between two kinds of predication, marked … by the phrases ‘in relation to itself’ (pros heauto) and ‘in relation to the others’ (pros ta alla).” (Intuitively, the Form of $F$ is $F$ in relation to itself, but ordinary things that exemplify $F$ are $F$ in relation to some other thing, namely, the Form of $F$.) Thus, Meinwald also takes (SP) to exhibit an ambiguity, and she suggests that it is true only if interpreted as a pros heauto predication.

Once we represent pros heauto predications as encoding predications and represent pros ta alla predications as exemplification predications, the ambiguity in (SP) can be resolved within the present system. The pros heauto reading is $a_GG$, i.e., the thin Form of $G$ encodes $G$. This is derivable as theorem (422.1) and hence true. The pros ta alla reading is $Ga_G$, i.e., the thin Form of $G$ exemplifies $G$. We can prove in object theory that this is not generally true, since a counterexample is derivable. Indeed, we’ve already seen the counterexample, namely theorem (421), which asserts that $\neg O!a_O$. The thin Form of *being ordinary* fails to exemplify *being ordinary*. Hence $\neg \forall F Fa_F$.

Note also that $\neg Ga_G$ follows from the assumption that $G$ is a concreteness-entailing property. A property $F$ is concreteness-entailing just in case $\Box \forall x (Fx \rightarrow$
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$E!x)$. Intuitively, one might suppose that the following are such properties: being extended in spacetime, being colored, having mass, being human, etc. (Indeed, the property being concrete ($E!$) is provably concreteness-entailing.) So one can prove that if $G$ is concreteness-entailing, then $\neg G$.\(^{239}\)

Although we’ve now seen that the general form of (SP) is provably false when we represent the copula ‘is’ as exemplification, we shall see that there are special cases where, for some properties $F$, $a_F$ does provably exemplify $F$.

(424) **Definition:** Thin Forms. We define: $x$ is a thin Form if and only if $x$ is a thin Form of $F$, for some $F$:

$$\text{ThinForm}(x) \equiv_{df} \exists F (\text{ThinFormOf}(x, F))$$

(425) **Theorem:** A Fact About Thin Forms. Clearly, the thin Form of $G$ is a thin Form:

$$\text{ThinForm}(a_G)$$

By GEN, this holds for any property $G$.

(426) **Remark:** Thin Forms Aren’t Paradoxical. One might wonder whether there is some Russell-style paradox lurking here: is there a property corresponding to the expression “being a thin Form that doesn’t participate in itself” and if so, is there a thin Form of this property? To consider these questions, note that the condition $\text{ThinForm}(x)$ is defined as $\exists G (\text{ThinFormOf}(x, G))$, and this in turn is defined as:

$$\exists G (\lambda x \text{ThinForm}(x) \land \forall F (xF \equiv F = G))$$

The above formula not only has $xF$ as an encoding formula subterm, but also has the encoding formulas subterms that $F = G$ has by convention (given the definition of property identity). Thus, $[\lambda x \text{ThinForm}(x)] \downarrow$ isn’t an instance of axiom (39.2). Nor does the Comprehension Principle for Properties (189.2) have, as an instance, $\exists F \forall x (Fx \equiv \text{ThinForm}(x))$.

Second, even if one could consistently assert $\exists F \forall x (Fx \equiv \text{ThinForm}(x))$, a Russell-style paradox requires that the system assert the following existence claim:

$$\text{(8) } \forall x (Fx \equiv \text{ThinForm}(x) \land \neg \text{ParticipatesIn}(x, x))$$

\(^{239}\)Assume that $P$ is a concreteness-entailing property and, for reductio, that $Pa_P$. Now since $P$ is concreteness-entailing, it follows from the definition by the T-schema that $\forall x (Px \rightarrow E!x)$. Hence $Pa_P \rightarrow E!a_P$. Since $Pa_P$ is our reductio assumption, it follows that $E!a_P$. But by by (415.1), we know $\lambda a_P$, which by definition (22.2) is the claim $[\lambda x \neg E!x]a_P$. By Rule $\bar{\Delta}$ C (182.1.a), it follows that $\neg \exists E!a_P$, i.e., $\square \neg E!a_P$. By the T schema, this implies $\neg E!a_P$, at which point we’ve reached a contradiction.
For if there were such a property, say $P$, then $a_P$ would exist and one could derive the Russell-style paradox by showing that $a_P$ participates in itself if and only if it doesn’t. But here again, (8) is not an axiom, since the definientia of both $ThinForm(x)$ and $ParticipatesIn(x, y)$ contain encoding formula subterms. So $[\lambda xy ParticipatesIn(x, y)] \downarrow$ is not a legitimate instance of (39.2), nor is the following an instance of Comprehension for Properties (189.1):

$$\exists R \forall x \forall y (Rxy \equiv ParticipatesIn(x, y))$$

Consequently, the conjunction $ThinForm(x) \& ParticipatesIn(x, x)$ cannot be used in (39.2) or (189.1) to assert the existence of a property.

(427) **Theorems:** Facts About Thin Forms and Platonic Being. Suppose that instead of reading the defined predicate $A!$ as being abstract, we temporarily read it as Platonic Being. Then we can prove: (.1) Thin Forms exemplify Platonic Being (in ambiguous natural language, “Thin Forms are Platonic Beings”); (.2) thin Forms exemplify any property necessarily implied by Platonic Being; (.3) the thin Form of Platonic Being exemplifies Platonic Being; (.4) thin Forms participate in the thin Form of Platonic Being; and (.5) if $F$ is necessarily implied by Platonic Being, then thin Forms participate in the thin Form of $F$:

(1) $ThinForm(x) \rightarrow A!x$

(2) $\Box \forall y (A!y \rightarrow Fy) \rightarrow (ThinForm(x) \rightarrow Fx)$

(3) $A!a_{A!}$

(4) $ThinForm(x) \rightarrow ParticipatesIn(x, a_{A!})$

(5) $\Box \forall y (A!y \rightarrow Fy) \rightarrow (ThinForm(x) \rightarrow ParticipatesIn(x, a_F))$

(428) **Theorems:** Thin Forms and Participation. (.1) There exists a thin Form that participates in itself; and (.2) there exists a thin Form that doesn’t participate in itself:

(1) $\exists x (ThinForm(x) \& ParticipatesIn(x, x))$

(2) $\exists x (ThinForm(x) \& \neg ParticipatesIn(x, x))$

Note that (1) answers the question of whether there are any Forms that can participate in themselves in the positive. Also, we can’t abstract out a Russell-style paradoxical property from (2), for the reasons noted in (426).

(429) **Remark:** The Third Man Argument. Plato puts forward an argument in Parmenides (132a) that has come to be known as the Third Man Argument (TMA). This argument raises a concern as to whether the theory of Forms involves an infinite regress. As Vlastos (1954, 321) develops the argument, Plato appears to draw an inference from (A1) to (A2), both of which are supposed to be instances of (OM):
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(A1) If a number of things, $a, b, c$ are all $F$, there must be a single Form, $F$-ness, in virtue of which we apprehend $a, b, c$, as all $F$.

(A2) If $a, b, c$, and $F$-ness are all $F$, there must be another Form, $F_1$-ness, in virtue of which we apprehend $a, b, c$, and $F$-ness as all $F$.

If this inference is valid and $F_1$-ness is distinct from $F$-ness, then it raises the concern that the inference is only the first step of a regress that commits Plato to an infinite number of Forms corresponding to the single property $F$. But Vlastos then notes that for the inference from (A1) to (A2) to be valid, there seems to be two implicit assumptions, the Self-Predication Principle (SP) discussed earlier and the following:

(NI) Non-Identity Principle
If $x$ is $F$, $x$ is not identical with The Form of $F$.

Vlastos then observes (1954, 326) that these two tacit assumptions are jointly inconsistent. This was a trenchant observation, for if the two claims are formally represented as:

(SP') $Fa_F$
(NI') $Fx \rightarrow x \neq a_F$

then the inconsistency becomes manifest; we can instantiate $a_F$ into a universal generalization of (NI') to obtain $Fa_F \rightarrow a_F \neq a_F$, and this, together with (SP'), yields the odious conclusion that $a_F \neq a_F$. Of course, the inconsistency of (SP') and (NI') involves a system in which there are: (a) principles that assert the existence and uniqueness of $a_F$ and (b) principles governing (terms defined by) definite descriptions in general, and $a_F$ in particular.

The literature that developed in response to Vlastos 1954 focused on (a) how to reformulate TMA so as to avoid the above inconsistency, and (b) whether there is textual support for the revised version of TMA. This literature included the papers Sellars 1955, Geach 1956, with rejoinders in Vlastos 1955 and 1956. Vlastos 1969 (footnote 2) includes a list of papers that were subsequently published on TMA, though see Cohen 1971, Meinwald 1992, and Pelletier & Zalta 2000 for further discussion and additional bibliography.

We conclude our discussion of TMA, as well as this section on the thin conception of the Forms, by noting that both of the tacit assumptions that Vlastos formulated for TMA, as he understood them, are provably false on the present theory. We've already seen that the above reading (SP') of (SP) has a counterexample. Object theory also implies that the reading (NI') of (NI) has a counterexample. By (427.3), we know $A!a_{A!}$, and by the logical propriety of $a_{A!}$ and the reflexivity of identity (118.1), we know $a_{A!} = a_{A!}$. But the conjunction of these two conclusions, $A!a_{A!} \& a_{A!} = a_{A!}$ is a counterexample to (NI'),
as formally represented above. Hence, we shouldn’t accept either of the two tacit assumptions that Vlastos thought were needed for TMA, at least not if the predication involved in (SP) and in the antecedent of (NI) are understood as exemplification predications.

11.2 The Thick Conception of Forms

(430) Remark: The Need for a Thick Conception of the Forms. We’ve seen how our work thus far validates (a) the view that truly predicating $F$ of a Form of $F$ is different from truly predicating $F$ of ordinary things, and (b) Meinwald’s (1992) idea that in the Parmenides, Plato is attempting to get his audience (i) to appreciate a distinction in predication, namely, between saying that $x$ is $G$ pros heauto (i.e., in relation to itself) and saying that $x$ is $G$ pros ta alla (i.e., in relation to the others), and (ii) to recognize that the Self-Predication principle (SP) is generally true only if read as a pros heauto predication. We’ve also seen that, in object theory, where encoding predication formally represents pros heauto predication and the Form of $G$ is conceived as the ‘thin’ abstract object that encodes just the single property $G$, (SP) is preserved as theorem (422.1), which asserts that the Form of $G$ encodes $G$.

In what follows, however, we consider some new data that our analysis thus far doesn’t accommodate. According to Meinwald, there are also true pros heauto predications such as “The Form of $G$ is $F$”, where $F$ is a property distinct from $G$. Meinwald lists the following such claims as ones Plato would endorse (1992, 379):

- The Just is virtuous (pros heauto).
- Triangularity is three-sided (pros heauto).
- Dancing moves (pros heauto).

She explains these as follows (1992, 379–80):

We’re indebted to F. Jeffry Pelletier for his critical contributions to Pelletier & Zalta 2000. The thick conception of Forms was first developed in that paper; Jeff recognized that the Plato scholars had developed a view of the Forms that called for a thick conception. Many of the ideas in what follows were first developed in that paper.

We remind the reader again that Meinwald (1992, 381) relates the two kinds of predication in the Parmenides to the kath' hauto and pros allo uses of ‘is’ in the Sophist, as these are distinguished in Frede 1967, 1992.

Meinwald writes:

- It is clear that such sentences come out true in Plato’s work, as well as fitting our characterizations of predication of a subject in relation to itself.

Unfortunately, though, Meinwald doesn’t identify any passages where Plato discusses examples like the ones to follow.

In the following quotation, Meinwald refers to a tree predication. The tree in question is a
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The Just is Virtuous

holds because of the relationship between the natures associated with its subject and predicate terms: Being virtuous is part of what it is to be just. Or we can describe predication as holding because Justice is a kind of Virtue. If we assume that to be a triangle is to be a three-sided plane figure (i.e., that Triangle is the species of the genus Plane Figure that has the differentia Three-Sided), then

Triangularity is three-sided.

holds too. We can also see that

Dancing moves.

is a true tree predication, since Motion figures in the account of what Dancing is.

Clearly, if the Form of G is identified as it was in the preceding section, i.e., as the abstract object that encodes G and no other property, then we cannot as yet interpret the above pros heauto predications as encoding predications about the Forms in question. For on such a ‘thin’ conception, the Form of Justice, $a_J$, encodes only the property being just ($J$) and so does not encode the distinct property being virtuous ($V$). Similarly, the Form of Triangularity ($a_T$) encodes only the property being triangular ($T$) and not the distinct property being three-sided ($3S$), and so isn’t three-sided pros heauto. And similarly for the Form of Dancing.

However, on the thick conception, the Form of G is the abstract object that encodes all the properties necessarily implied by G, i.e., encodes all and only the properties $F$ such that, necessarily, anything that exemplifies $G$ exemplifies $F$. In what follows, we shall introduce the functional term $\Phi_G$ to designate this thick Form of G. So if the Form of Justice ($\Phi_J$) encodes all of the properties necessarily implied by being just, then from the premise that being virtuous ($V$) is necessarily implied by being just, it follows that $\Phi_J$ encodes $V$. Thus, the encoding claim $\Phi_J V$ (“the Form of Justice encodes being virtuous”) provides a reading of the pros heauto predication “The Just is virtuous”.

Similarly, from the facts that:

*Being triangular necessarily implies being three-sided.*

*Dancing necessarily implies being in motion.*
it follows, on the thick conception of the Forms of Triangularity ($\Phi_T$) and Dancing ($\Phi_D$), that:

The Form of Triangularity encodes being three-sided.
$\Phi_T \exists S$

The Form of Dancing encodes being in motion.
$\Phi_D \exists M$

So the thick conception of the Forms is distinguished from the thin conception by the fact that it can provide an analysis of pros heauto predications of the form “The Form of $G$ is $F$” when supplemented by facts about property implication and property distinctness. Under the thin conception, we cannot derive $G \Rightarrow F$ given the premises that $F$ is distinct from $G$ and necessarily implied by $G$. Under the thick conception, we can derive $\Phi_G F$ from the conjunction of $F \neq G$ and $G$ necessarily implies $F$. These derivations, we suggest, are the best way to understand and represent the conditions under which “The Form of $G$ is $F$ pros heauto” is true.

(431) Definition: Property Implication and Equivalence. To define the thick conception of Plato’s Forms, we need some preliminary definitions. We first define $G$ necessarily implies $F$, written ‘$G \Rightarrow F$’, as: necessarily, everything that exemplifies $G$ exemplifies $F$:

$G \Rightarrow F \equivdf F \downarrow \& G \downarrow \& \Box \forall x (Gx \rightarrow Fx)$

Thus, the claim being triangular necessarily implies being three-sided is defined to mean that being triangular and being three-sided both exist, and necessarily, any object exemplifying the former exemplifies the latter. In the usual manner, we may not formulate instances of this definition by uniformly replacing $G$ or $F$ with property terms in which $x$ occurs free.

Clearly, we need to add the existence clauses to the definiens so that a claim of the form $\Pi \Rightarrow \Pi'$ will be provably true when $\neg \Pi \downarrow$, since it would immediately follow that $\neg \Pi x$ by axiom (39.5.a), thereby implying $\Pi x \rightarrow \Pi' x$, which by GEN and RN yields $\Box \forall x (\Pi x \rightarrow \Pi' x)$. Without the existence clause $\Pi \downarrow$ in the definiens, the claim $\Pi \Rightarrow \Pi'$ would be provably true when $\neg \Pi' \downarrow$, $\Pi \downarrow$, and $\Pi$ is necessarily unexemplified (i.e., $\Box \forall x \neg \Pi x$), for in that case, it would again follow that $\neg \Pi x$ (this time by the T schema and $\forall E$), again implying $\Pi x \rightarrow \Pi' x$ and yielding $\Box \forall x (\Pi x \rightarrow \Pi' x)$.

We also say that properties $G$ and $F$ are necessarily equivalent just in case they necessarily imply each other:
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(2) \( G \iff F \equiv df \ G \Rightarrow F \land F \Rightarrow G \)

Of course, when reasoning with (.1) and (.2), we can ignore the existence clauses as long as significant terms are in play.

(432) Theorems: Facts About Necessary Equivalence. As simple consequences of the preceding definitions, we have (.1) \( G \) and \( F \) are necessarily equivalent just in case necessarily, all and only the individuals exemplifying \( G \) exemplify \( F \); (.2) necessarily equivalence is a reflexive, symmetric, and transitive condition; and (.3) properties are necessarily equivalent if and only they necessarily imply the same properties:

(.1) \( G \iff F \equiv \Box \forall x(Gx \equiv Fx) \)

(.2) \( \iff \) is an equivalence condition:

(a) \( G \iff G \) \hspace{1cm} (\iff \text{is reflexive})

(b) \( G \iff F \rightarrow F \iff G \) \hspace{1cm} (\iff \text{is symmetric})

(c) \( (G \iff F \land F \iff H) \rightarrow G \iff H \) \hspace{1cm} (\iff \text{is transitive})

(.3) \( G \iff F \equiv \forall H(G \Rightarrow H \equiv F \Rightarrow H) \)

Moreover, recall that by definition (198.1), a property \( F \) is necessary just in case \( \Box \forall xFx \), and by definition (198.2), a property \( F \) is impossible just in case \( \Box \forall x \neg Fx \). Then we have: (4) if \( G \) and \( F \) are necessary properties, then \( G \) and \( F \) are necessarily equivalent; and (5) if \( G \) and \( F \) are impossible properties, then \( G \) and \( F \) are necessarily equivalent:

(4) \( \text{Necessary}(G) \land \text{Necessary}(F) \) \rightarrow G \iff F

(5) \( \text{Impossible}(G) \land \text{Impossible}(F) \) \rightarrow G \iff F

(433) Definition: A (Thick) Form of \( G \). We define: \( x \) is a Form of \( G \) iff \( x \) is an abstract object, \( G \) exists, and \( x \) encodes all and only the properties necessarily implied by \( G \):

\[ \text{FormOf}(x,G) \equiv df \ A!x \land G_\downarrow \land \forall F(xF \equiv G \Rightarrow F) \]

Note that the existence clause \( G_\downarrow \) is still needed in the definiens, notwithstanding its presence in the definiens of \( G \Rightarrow F \). Without it, one could prove that \( \text{FormOf}(x,\Pi) \) when \( \Pi \) is an empty property term and \( x \) is assigned the null object.\(^{244}\)

(434) Theorems: There Exists a (Unique) Form of \( G \).

\(^{244}\) Suppose we had defined: \( \text{FormOf}(x,G) \equiv df \ A!x \land \forall F(xF \equiv G \Rightarrow F) \). Then following theorem would be licensed by the definition, where \( a_\varnothing \) is the null object and \( \Pi \) is any empty property term:

\[ \text{FormOf}(a_\varnothing,\Pi) \equiv (A!a_\varnothing \land \forall F(a_\varnothing F \equiv \Pi \Rightarrow F)) \]
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(1) \( \exists x \text{FormOf}(x, G) \)

(2) \( \exists ! x \text{FormOf}(x, G) \)

(3) \( \text{ixFormOf}(x, G) \)

(435) Definition: Notation for the Form of \( G \). Given the previous theorem, we introduce the notation \( \Phi_G \) to designate The Form of \( G \):

\[
\Phi_G =_{df} \text{ixFormOf}(x, G)
\]

(436) Theorem: The Form of \( G \) is Canonical. It follows that the Form of \( G \) is identical to the abstract object that encodes all and only the properties necessarily implied by \( G \):

\[
\Phi_G = \text{ix}(\forall x \& \forall F (x F \equiv G \Rightarrow F))
\]

(437) Remark: The Form of \( G \) is Strictly Canonical. Note that the condition \( G \Rightarrow F \) is a rigid condition on properties, as this was defined in (257.1):

\[
\vdash \forall F (G \Rightarrow F \Rightarrow \Box G \Rightarrow F)
\]

Since \( \Phi_G \) is canonical (436) and \( G \Rightarrow F \) is a rigid condition on properties, we know that \( \Phi_G \) is (identical to) a strictly canonical individual, as this was defined in (257.2). So the theorems in (258) apply to \( \Phi_G \).

(438) Theorems: Facts About \( \Phi_G \). It now follows, by modally strict reasoning, that: (1) The Form of \( G \) is abstract and encodes exactly the properties \( F \) necessarily implied \( G \); and (2) The Form of \( G \) is a Form of \( G \):

(1) \( \forall ! \Phi_G \& \forall F (\Phi_G F \equiv G \Rightarrow F) \)

(2) \( \text{FormOf}(\Phi_G, G) \)

Now by definition of \( \Rightarrow \), it is a modally strict theorem that:

\[
\Pi \Rightarrow F \equiv (\Pi \downarrow \& F \downarrow \& \Box \forall z (\Pi z \rightarrow Fz))
\]

So it would follow by a rule of substitution that:

(8) \( \text{FormOf}(\alpha_{\phi}, \Pi) \equiv (\alpha_! \alpha_{\phi} \& \forall F (\alpha_{\phi} F \equiv \Pi \downarrow \& F \downarrow \& \Box \forall z (\Pi z \rightarrow Fz))) \)

One could then derive \( \text{FormOf}(\alpha_{\phi}, \Pi) \) by deriving the right-side of (8). Clearly, \( \alpha_! \alpha_{\phi} \). So, by GEN, it remains to show:

(ξ) \( \alpha_{\phi} F \equiv \Pi \downarrow \& F \downarrow \& \Box \forall z (\Pi z \rightarrow Fz) \)

But, this is easy to establish, since both sides are provably false. It is a fact that \( \neg \alpha_{\phi} F \), by (263.3) and (260.1). And since \( \neg \Pi \downarrow \) by assumption, the right-side of (ξ) is false.

So, without the clause \( G \downarrow \) in the definiens of \( \text{FormOf} \), we could prove \( \text{FormOf}(\alpha_{\phi}, \Pi) \) when \( \neg \Pi \downarrow \).
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It follows a fortiori from the second conjunct of (1) that \((G \Rightarrow F) \rightarrow \Phi_G F\). So by (64.10), \(G \Rightarrow F \vdash \Phi_G F\). And by (64.7), \(F \neq G, G \Rightarrow F \vdash \Phi_G F\). Thus, our theorems validate the distinguishing feature of the thick conception of the Forms discussed at the end of Remark (430).

**Remark:** Thick Forms as Paradigms. It is worth pausing to note the sense in which the thick conception of Forms validates Geach’s suggestion that Forms are paradigms. Let \(S\) denote the ordinary property being spherical that we pre-theoretically use to characterize concrete objects, and consider the Form of Being Spherical, \(\Phi_S\). On the thick conception, \(\Phi_S\) encodes having a radius of some particular length, since that is implied by being spherical, although there isn’t a particular length \(l\) such that \(\Phi_S\) encodes being of length \(l\). Similarly, \(\Phi_S\) encodes being constructed of some particular material, since that is implied by being spherical, but there won’t be a particular material \(m\) such that \(\Phi_S\) encodes being constructed of material \(m\). And so on. Properties not strictly implied by \(G\) aren’t encoded by the (thick) Form of \(G\). The above conception avoids the problem, discussed in footnote 235, that afflicts Geach’s suggestion that the Form of \(G\) is a paradigm exemplifier of \(G\), since a paradigm \(G\)-exemplifier exemplifies properties not implied by \(G\) And, clearly, since encoding is a mode of predication, there is a sense in which the (thick) Form of \(G\) has just those properties necessarily implied by \(G\).

**Definitions:** Two Kinds of Participation. We may introduce two kinds of participation to correspond to the two kinds of predication. We say: (1) an object \(y\) participates pros ta alla in \(x\) (written \(\text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{pta}}(y, x)\)) if there is a property \(F\) such that \(x\) is a Form of \(F\) and \(y\) exemplifies \(F\), and (2) an object \(y\) participates pros heauto in \(x\) (written \(\text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{ph}}(y, x)\)) if there is a property \(F\) such that \(x\) is a Form of \(F\) and \(y\) encodes \(F\):

1. \(\text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{pta}}(y, x) \equiv \exists F(\text{FormOf}(x, F) \& Fy)\)
2. \(\text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{ph}}(y, x) \equiv \exists F(\text{FormOf}(x, F) \& yF)\)

**Lemmas:** Forms, Predication, and Participation. It is an immediate consequence of the previous definitions that (1) if \(x\) is a Form of \(G\), then every individual \(y\) is such that \(y\) exemplifies \(G\) if and only if \(y\) participates_{pta} in \(x\); (2) if \(x\) is a Form of \(G\), then every individual \(y\) is such that if \(y\) encodes \(G\), then \(y\) participates_{ph} in \(x\):

1. \(\text{FormOf}(x, G) \rightarrow \forall y(Gy \equiv \text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{pta}}(y, x))\)
2. \(\text{FormOf}(x, G) \rightarrow \forall y(yG \rightarrow \text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{ph}}(y, x))\)
(442) **Remark:** Why the Consequent of (441.2) is not a Quantified Biconditional. One might wonder why the consequent of (441.2) is just a quantified conditional and not a quantified biconditional. Specifically, when $\text{FormOf}(x, G)$, why doesn’t $\text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{sh}}(y, x)$ imply $yG$? The key fact behind an answer to this question is that the Forms of distinct, but necessarily equivalent, properties are identical to one another, and this creates the conditions for a counterexample to the right-to-left direction of the consequent of (441.2). This was reported in Fitelson & Zalta 2007.\textsuperscript{245} An extended discussion is required to fully document such a counterexample.

Consider the following two properties:

$$P = [\lambda x \ Qx \ & \neg Qx] \quad (Q \text{ any property})$$

$$T = [\lambda x \ Bx \ & \forall y (Sxy \equiv \neg Syy)] \quad (B \text{ any property}, S \text{ any relation})$$

If, say, $Q$ is *being round*, $B$ is *being a barber*, and $S$ is the relation $x$ *shaves* $y$, then $P$ is the property *being round and not round* while $T$ is the property *being a barber who shaves all and only those individuals that don’t shave themselves*. It is reasonable to assert that these are distinct properties, i.e., that $P \neq T$.\textsuperscript{246} But note that $P$ and $T$ are both provably impossible properties, for it is straightforward to show:

$$\square \forall x \neg P x$$

$$\square \forall x \neg T x$$

Hence by (432.5), it follows that $P$ and $T$ are necessarily equivalent, and so by (432.3), that $P$ and $T$ necessarily imply the same properties, i.e.,

$$\forall F (P \Rightarrow F \equiv T \Rightarrow F)$$

Now consider the following two instances of theorem (434.1):

$$\exists x \text{FormOf}(x, P)$$

$$\exists x \text{FormOf}(x, T)$$

Let $b$ and $c$ be such objects, respectively, so that we know $\text{FormOf}(b, P)$ and $\text{FormOf}(c, T)$. By definition (433), we know all of the following, among other things:

\textsuperscript{245}The counterexample described in that paper was discovered computationally, using prover9.

\textsuperscript{246}There are various pretheoretic reasons one might give for this: (a) the informal argument that shows an object couldn’t possibly exemplify $P$ must appeal to the property $Q$ rather than to the property $B$ and the relation $S$, whereas the informal argument that shows an object couldn’t possibly exemplify $T$ must appeal to $B$ and $S$ rather than to $Q$; and (b) one can tell a story about an object that is $T$ without thereby telling a story about an object that is $P$.\textsuperscript{245}
\[ \text{(A)} \quad A！\text{b} \]
\[ \text{(B)} \quad \forall F(b F \equiv P \Rightarrow F) \]
\[ \text{(C)} \quad A！\text{c} \]
\[ \text{(D)} \quad \forall F(c F \equiv T \Rightarrow F) \]

Despite the fact that \( P \neq T \), it can be shown that \( b \) and \( c \) are identical, and this is crucial to the construction of our counterexample. To show that \( b \) and \( c \) are identical, it suffices, by (A), (C), and (242), to show \( \forall F(b F \equiv c F) \). But this last claim follows straightforwardly from (A), (B) and (D). Hence by definition of abstract object identity, we’ve established:

\[ \text{(G)} \quad b = c \]

Now to see how this leads to a counterexample to (ζ), consider the fact that by the Comprehension Principle for Abstract Objects (53), there is an abstract object that encodes just \( T \) and no other properties:

\[ \exists x(A！x \& \forall F(x F \equiv F = T)) \]

This is, of course, the thin Form of \( T \), but let’s not get distracted by that at the moment. Let \( d \) be such an object, so that we know:

\[ \text{(H)} \quad A！d \& \forall F(d F \equiv F = T) \]

Now we can show that the following elements of the counterexample to (ζ) are all true:

(i) \( \text{FormOf}(b, P) \)

(ii) \( \text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{th}}(d, b) \)

(iii) \( \neg dP \)

(i) is already known. To show (ii), i.e., \( \text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{th}}(d, b) \), we have to show:

\[ \exists F(\text{FormOf}(b, F) \& d F) \]

By \( \exists I \), it suffices to show \( \text{FormOf}(b, T) \& d T \). But \( \text{FormOf}(c, T) \) is already known, and from (G) we know \( b = c \). Hence \( \text{FormOf}(b, T) \), by Rule \( =E \). Moreover, \( d T \) follows immediately from (H), by instantiating the second conjunct of (H) to \( T \) and applying the reflexivity of identity. So \( \exists F(\text{FormOf}(b, F) \& d F) \). It remains to show (iii), i.e., \( \neg d P \). Note that from the right conjunct of (H), it follows that \( d P \equiv P = T \). But by hypothesis, \( P \neq T \). Hence, \( \neg dP \).

Thus, we’ve established the elements of the counterexample to (ζ). Consequently, under the reasonable hypothesis that there are distinct, impossible properties, \( \text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{th}}(y, x) \) doesn’t imply \( y G \) when \( \text{FormOf}(x, G) \).
Exercise: Show that $\text{ThinFormOf}(x, G) \rightarrow \forall y (y G \equiv \text{ParticipatesIn}(y, x))$ is a theorem when $\text{ThinFormOf}$ is defined as in (410) and $\text{ParticipatesIn}$ is defined as in (417).

(443) Theorems: Exemplification, Participation$_{\text{PTA}}$, Encoding, and Participation$_{\text{PH}}$. It is now a consequence that (.1) $x$ exemplifies $G$ iff $x$ participates$_{\text{PTA}}$ in The Form of $G$; and (.2) if $x$ encodes $G$, then $x$ participates$_{\text{PH}}$ in the Form of $G$:

(1) $Gx \equiv \text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{PTA}}(x, \Phi_G)$

(2) $xG \rightarrow \text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{PH}}(x, \Phi_G)$

The discussion in Remark (442) explains why (.2) is a conditional and not a bi-conditional. Note also that these theorems are modally strict, despite the fact that they are conditionals in which a term defined by a rigid definite description appears in one of the conditions.

(444) Theorem: $\text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{PTA}}$ Fact. It is a consequence of the foregoing definitions that if $y$ participates$_{\text{PTA}}$ in $x$, then $y$ exemplifies every property $x$ encodes:

$$\text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{PTA}}(y, x) \rightarrow \forall F (xF \rightarrow Fy)$$

(445) Theorems: Two Versions of the One Over Many Principle. (OM) may now be derived in two forms: (.1) if there are two distinct individuals exemplifying $G$, then there exists something that is (identical to) the Form of $G$ in which they both participate$_{\text{PTA}}$; (.2) if there are two distinct individuals encoding $G$, then there exists something that is (identical to) the Form of $G$ in which they both participate$_{\text{PH}}$:

(1) $Gx & Gy & x \neq y \rightarrow \exists z (z = \Phi_G & \text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{PTA}}(x, z) & \text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{PTA}}(y, z))$

(2) $xG & yG & x \neq y \rightarrow \exists z (z = \Phi_G & \text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{PH}}(x, z) & \text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{PH}}(y, z))$

So we’ve preserved the main principle of Plato’s theory not only in a version that governs exemplification and participation$_{\text{PTA}}$, but also in a version that governs encoding and participation$_{\text{PH}}$.

(446) Theorems: Facts About (the Form of) Being Ordinary. Consider the property being ordinary, $O!$. It follows that (.1) the Form of $G$ fails to exemplify $O!$; (.2) the Form of $O!$ fails to exemplify $O!$; and (.3) for some property $G$, the Form of $G$ fails to exemplify $G$:

(1) $\neg O! \Phi_G$

(2) $\neg O! \Phi_{O!}$
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(.3) $\exists G \neg G \Phi$

The first two are the counterparts of theorems (421.1) and (421.2) governing the thin conception of Forms. (.3) can be stated in an equivalent form: it isn’t universally the case that $\Phi$ is $G$ pros ta alla. Thus, an observation similar to the one discussed in Remark (423) holds for the thick conception of Forms: (446.3) establishes that the exemplification reading of (SP) fails to be universally true.

(447) Theorem: The Form of $G$ is $G$ Pros Heauto.

$\Phi \equiv G$

Thus, the reading of the Self-Predication Principle (SP) discussed in (422.1) also holds for $\Phi$.

(448) Definition: Forms. Forms, under the thick conception, are defined in the same general way as under the thin conception: $x$ is a Form if and only if $x$ is a Form of $G$, for some $G$:

$\text{Form}(x) \equiv df \exists G (\text{FormOf}(x,G))$

(449) Theorems: Some Facts About Forms. (.1) The Form of $G$ is a Form; (.2) there exists a Form that doesn’t participate in itself; and (.3) every Form participates in itself:

(.1) $\text{Form}(\Phi_G)$

(.2) $\exists x (\text{Form}(x) \& \neg \text{ParticipatesIn}_{PTA}(x,x))$

(.3) $\forall x (\text{Form}(x) \rightarrow \text{ParticipatesIn}_{PTA}(x,x))$

As an exercise, explain why the existence of Forms that don’t participate in themselves doesn’t give rise to paradox.

(450) Theorems: Facts About ‘Self-Predication’ Pros Ta Alla and Self-Participation. Again, if we suppose that the property being abstract is the property Pla-tonic Being, then we have the following theorems: (.1) The Form of Pla-tonic Being exemplifies Pla-tonic Being; (.2) The Form of Pla-tonic Being participates in itself; (.3) there exists a Form that participates in itself; (.4) if Pla-tonic Being necessarily implies $H$, then for every property $G$, The Form of $\Phi_G$ exemplifies $H$; hence, (.5) if Pla-tonic Being necessarily implies $H$, then The Form of $\Phi_H$ exemplifies $H$. Moreover, (.6) if Pla-tonic Being necessarily implies the negation of $H$, then for every property $G$, $\neg H \Phi_G$, and hence (.7) if Pla-tonic Being necessarily implies the negation of $H$, then $\neg H \Phi_H$:

(.1) $A! \Phi_A$

(.2) $\text{ParticipatesIn}_{PTA}(\Phi_A, \Phi_A)$
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(3) \( \exists x (\text{Form}(x) \& \text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{PTA}}(x,x)) \)

(4) \( (A! \Rightarrow H) \rightarrow \forall G (H \Phi_G) \)

(5) \( (A! \Rightarrow H) \rightarrow H \Phi_H \)

(6) \( (A! \Rightarrow \overline{H}) \rightarrow \forall G (\neg H \Phi_G) \)

(7) \( (A! \Rightarrow \overline{H}) \rightarrow \neg H \Phi_H \)

Theorem (.1) is a special case where a Form, namely The Form of Platonic Being, unconditionally exemplifies its defining property \( \text{pros ta alla} \). This immediately implies (.2), that this Form participates \( \text{PTA} \) in itself. (.3) is then an immediate consequence of (.2). As an example of (.4), we now know that if \text{Platonic Being} implies \text{being at rest}, then for every property \( G, \Phi_G \) exemplifies \text{being at rest}. In particular, (.5) if \text{Platonic Being} implies \text{being at rest} \( (R) \), then The Form of necessarily failing to reflect light, \( \Phi_R \), exemplifies \text{being at rest}. This constitutes a conditional ‘self-predication’ \( \text{pros ta alla} \). Note also that theorem (.7) is a simple consequence of (.6); as an example of (.7), if \text{Platonic Being} necessarily implies \text{not being extended} \( (E) \), then The Form of \text{being extended}, \( \Phi_E \), fails to exemplify \text{being extended}.

(451) Theorems: Necessary Implication and Participation.

(1) \( (A! \Rightarrow H) \rightarrow \forall G (\text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{PTA}}(\Phi_G, \Phi_H)) \)

(2) \( (G \Rightarrow H) \rightarrow \text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{PTA}}(\Phi_G, \Phi_H) \)

As an example of (.1), if \text{being abstract} necessarily implies \text{being at rest} \( (R) \), then for any \( G, \) The Form of \( G \) participates \( \text{PTA} \) in The Form of Rest \( \Phi_R \). As an example of (.2), if \text{being just} \( (J) \) necessarily implies \text{being virtuous} \( (V) \), then The Form of Justice, \( \Phi_J \), participates \( \text{PTA} \) in The Form of Virtue, \( \Phi_V \); and if \text{being a triangle} \( (T) \) necessarily implies \text{being three-sided} \( (3S) \), then \( \Phi_T \) participates \( \text{PTA} \) in \( \Phi_{3S} \). These last examples of (.2) show that given certain modal facts about properties, the data that Meinwald adduces for a thick conception of Forms, described in (430), become derivable.

(452) Remark: Platonic Analysis and Derivation of a Syllogism. Our definitions of participation and our definition of The Form of \( G \) offers a Platonic analysis of a classic form of syllogism. Consider:

Humans are mortal.
Socrates is a human.

Socrates is mortal.
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On a Platonic analysis of this argument, the conclusion is validly derivable from the premises. Both the minor premise ('Socrates is a human') and the conclusion can be analyzed as asserting that Socrates participates in a certain Form. The major premise ('Humans are mortal') can be analyzed as asserting that The Form of Humanity is mortal pros heauto. Formally, where 's' denotes Socrates, 'H' denotes being human, and 'M' denotes being mortal, these analyses can be captured as follows:

\[ \Phi_H M \]
\[ \text{ParticipatesIn}(s, \Phi_H) \]
\[ \frac{}{\text{ParticipatesIn}(s, \Phi_M)} \]

It is straightforward to show that the conclusion follows from the premises. By the second conjunct of theorem (438.1), the first premise implies that \( H \Rightarrow M \), i.e., \( \square \forall x(Hx \rightarrow Mx) \). By the T schema, we may infer \( \forall x(Hx \rightarrow Mx) \). By theorem (443.1), the second premise of the argument implies \( Hs \). Hence, it follows that \( Ms \). But, again by theorem (443.1), it now follows that \( \text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{PTA}}(s, \Phi_M) \).

Remark: The Non-Identity Principle. Recall that in the section on the thin conception of the Forms, in Remark (429), we noted Vlastos’s claim that the following principle was implicitly presupposed in the Third Man Argument:

\( (\text{NI}) \) \hspace{10pt} \text{Non-Identity Principle}

If \( x \) is \( F \), \( x \) is not identical with The Form of \( F \).

We’ve already discussed a version of (NI) in connection with the thin conception of Forms. We leave it as an exercise for the reader to explain why, on the thick conception of Forms, object theory not only rejects \( Fx \rightarrow x \neq \Phi_F \) but also \( xF \rightarrow x \neq \Phi_F \). Instead we consider the corresponding versions of (NI) when the antecedent is formally represented by the two different forms of participation. For then we obtain:

\( (\text{NIa}) \) \hspace{10pt} If \( x \) participates in The Form of \( F \), \( x \) is not identical with that Form.

\[ \text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{PTA}}(x, \Phi_F) \rightarrow x \neq \Phi_F \]

\( (\text{Nlb}) \) \hspace{10pt} If \( x \) participates in The Form of \( F \), \( x \) is not identical with that Form.

\[ \text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{PH}}(x, \Phi_F) \rightarrow x \neq \Phi_F \]

\[ \text{Remark: The Non-Identity Principle.} \]

This discussion corrects an error in Pelletier & Zalta 2000. In that paper, we analyzed the major premise as \( \text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{PH}}(\Phi_H, \Phi_M) \), mistakenly believing that this implied that \( \Phi_M \), i.e., that this implied that The Form of Humanity is mortal pros heauto. But the discussion in (442) explains why this is an error. The error is corrected in the analysis above: “Humans are mortal” is analyzed as the claim that The Form of Humanity is mortal pros heauto. Given this as a premise, we may infer via the second conjunct of theorem (438.1) that \( H \Rightarrow M \).
It is interesting to consider why both claims are rejected by the present theory.

To disprove (NIa), we produce an $x$ and $F$ such that $\text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{PTA}}(x, \Phi_F)$ and $x = \Phi_F$. But let $x$ be $\Phi_{A!}$ and $F$ be $A!$. Then $\text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{PTA}}(\Phi_{A!}, \Phi_{A!})$, by (450.2), and since $\Phi_{A!} \downarrow$, Rule =I yields $\Phi_{A!} = \Phi_{A!}$.

To disprove (NIb), we produce an $x$ and $F$ such that $\text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{PTA}}(x, \Phi_F)$ and $x = \Phi_F$. But let our witnesses be $\Phi_G$ and $G$. Then $\text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{PTA}}(\Phi_G, \Phi_G)$, by (447), and since $\Phi_G \downarrow$, Rule =I yields $\Phi_G = \Phi_G$.

Since the object-theoretic analysis of Plato’s Forms entails the rejection of (SPA) and all the forms of (NI), the Third Man Argument is gone for good.
Chapter 12

Situations, Worlds, Times, and Stories

In this chapter we develop the theory of situations, worlds (both possible and impossible), moments of time, and world-states. Along the way we introduce three kinds of world-indexed objects: world-indexed truth-values, classes and relations. In what follows, we do not distinguish propositions and states of affairs. Indeed, we shall often refer to 0-place relations as states of affairs, since that more closely follows the traditional language of situation theory.

12.1 Situations

(454) Remark: On the Nature of Situations. In a series of papers (1980, 1981a, 1981b) that culminated in their book of 1983, Barwise and Perry argued against views that were widely held in the field of natural language semantics. Here are some of the widely held views that they criticized: (a) that possible worlds, taken as primitive, constitute a fundamental semantic domain for interpreting natural language, (b) that properties (and relations) are analyzable as functions from possible worlds to sets of (sequences of) individuals, (c) that the denotation of a sentence is a truth-value, and (d) that the denotation of a sentence shifts when the sentence appears in indirect, intensional contexts. Barwise and Perry suggested that a better semantic theory of language could be developed if possible worlds were replaced with situations, i.e., parts of the world in which one or more states of affairs hold, where states of affairs consist of objects standing in relations.

Barwise and Perry (1984, 23) subsequently realized that their book of 1983 offered a model of situations rather than a theory of them and, consequently, changed the direction of their research. In their early attempts to develop a
theory of situations, they brought to bear certain intuitions they had previously had about the nature of situations. The fundamental intuition never wavered (Barwise 1985, 185):

By a situation, then, we mean a part of reality that can be comprehended as a whole in its own right—one that interacts with other things. By interacting with other things, we mean that they have properties or relate to other things. They can be causes and effects, for example, as when we see them or bring them about. Events are situations, but so are more static situations, even eternal situations involving mathematical objects. We use $s, s', s'', ...$ to range over real situations. There is a binary relation $s \models \sigma$, read "$\sigma$ holds in $s$", that holds between various situations $s$ and states of affairs $\sigma$; that is, situations and states of affairs are the appropriate arguments for this relation of holding in.

One of the guiding intuitions was the distinction between the internal and external properties of situations. In Barwise and Perry 1981b (388), we find:

Situations have properties of two sorts, internal and external. The cat’s walking on the piano distressed Henry. Its doing so is what we call an external property of the event. The event consists of a certain cat performing a certain activity on a certain piano; these are its internal properties.

This distinction between the internal and external properties appears throughout the course of publications on situation theory. For example, Barwise writes (1985, 185):

If $s \models \sigma$, then the fact $\sigma$ is called a fact of $s$, or more explicitly, a fact about the internal structure of $s$. There are also other kinds of facts about $s$, facts external to $s$, so the difference between being a fact that holds in $s$ and a fact about $s$ more generally must be borne in mind.

And in Barwise 1989a (263–4), we find:

The facts determined by a particular situation are, at least intuitively, intrinsic to that situation. By contrast, the information a situation carries depends not just on the facts determined by that situation but is relative to constraints linking those facts to other facts, facts that obtain in virtue of other situations. Thus, information carried is not usually (if ever) intrinsic to the situation.

The objects which actual situations make factual thus play a key role in the theory. They serve to characterize the intrinsic nature of a situation.

Interestingly, the intuitive distinction between the intrinsic, internal properties of a situation and its extrinsic, external properties, never made it to the level of theory; situation theorists never formally regimented the distinction.
However, we take it to be the key to the analysis of situations in what follows. If we identify a situation \( s \) to be an abstract object that encodes only properties of the form \( \lambda y \, p \) (where \( p \) is some state of affairs or proposition), so that we can say \( p \) is \textit{encoded in} \( s \) whenever \( s \) encodes \( \lambda y \, p \), then the intrinsic, internal properties of \( s \) are its encoded properties, while the extrinsic, external properties of \( s \) will be any exemplification facts about \( s \) or any logical or natural-law-based exemplification generalizations either about \( s \) or about the relations in the states of affairs encoded in \( s \).

This analysis of situations was worked out originally in Zalta 1993. In what follows, we reprise the most important definitions and theorems from that paper, as well as many new ones. Readers familiar with the classical works of situation theory in the Barwise & Perry tradition should note that the \textit{infons} of later situation theory:

\[
\langle \langle R^n, a_1, \ldots, a_n; 1 \rangle \rangle
\]

\[
\langle \langle R^n, a_1, \ldots, a_n; 0 \rangle \rangle
\]

are simply states of affairs in which objects \( a_1, \ldots, a_n \) do or do not stand in relation \( R^n \), depending on whether the polarity is 1 or 0. Thus, we have no need of infon notation, since we not only have the standard notation \( R^n a_1 \ldots a_n \) and \( \neg R^n a_1 \ldots a_n \) but also the \( \lambda \)-notation \( \lambda R^n a_1 \ldots a_n \) and \( \lambda \neg R^n a_1 \ldots a_n \), both of which denote states of affairs. Moreover, we shall represent the following situation-theoretic claims asserting that an infon holds in situation \( s \):

\[ s \models \langle \langle R^n, a_1, \ldots, a_n; 1 \rangle \rangle \]

\[ s \models \langle \langle R^n, a_1, \ldots, a_n; 0 \rangle \rangle \]

more simply as follows:

\[ s \models R^n a_1 \ldots a_n \]

\[ s \models \neg R^n a_1 \ldots a_n \]

These claims will be defined, respectively, as:

\[ s[\lambda y \, R^n a_1 \ldots a_n] \]

\[ s[\lambda y \, \neg R^n a_1 \ldots a_n] \]

We shall, on occasion, point out (a) where axioms central to situation theory are derived as theorems, and (b) where unsettled questions of situation theory, as collated in Barwise 1989a, are settled by a theorem of object theory. Note that our work thus far has already resolved Choices 14–17 in Barwise 1989a (270–1). The Comprehension Principle for Propositions (i.e., states of affairs), derived as theorem (192), guarantees that we can freely form states of affairs.
out of any objects and relations (Choice 14); that not every state of affairs is basic (Choice 15, Alternative 15.2); that there is a rich algebraic structure on the space of states of affairs (Choice 16); and that every state of affairs has a dual (Choice 17). Moreover, theorem (265.3) resolves Choice 13 in favor of Alternative 13.2: for each property \( F \), there are distinct abstract objects \( a, b \) such that \([\lambda Pa] = [\lambda Pb] \). In such cases, the states of affairs \([\lambda Pa] \) and \([\lambda Pb] \) are identical, but it is not the case that \( a = b \). In Barwise 1989a (270), Alternative 13.2 is in effect when \( \langle\langle R, a; i \rangle\rangle = \langle\langle S, b; j \rangle\rangle \) fails to imply \( R = S, a = b, \) and \( i = j \).

**Definition:** Situations. Using the notion of propositional property defined in (270), we may say that \( x \) is a situation just in case \( x \) is an abstract object that encodes only propositional properties:

\[
\text{Situation}(x) \equiv_{df} A!x \& \forall F(xF \rightarrow \text{Propositional}(F))
\]

By the definition (270), it follows that a situation is an abstract object \( x \) such that every property \( F \) that \( x \) encodes is a property of the form \([\lambda y p] \), for some proposition \( p \). Note that the above definition of situation decides Choice 9 in Barwise 1989a (267) since it is easy to show that there objects (e.g., ordinary objects and abstract objects that encode non-propositional properties) that are not situations. Note that \( \text{Situation}(\kappa) \) implies \( \kappa \downarrow \), for any individual term \( \kappa \).

As a simple example of a situation, let \( R \) be any relation, and \( a \) and \( b \) be any objects, and consider the following instance of the Comprehension Principle for Abstract Objects (53):

**Example:**

\[
\exists x(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv F = [\lambda y \text{Rab}] \lor F = [\lambda y \neg \text{Rba}]))
\]

Let \( c \) be such an object. Clearly, it is provable that \( c \) encodes just the properties \([\lambda y \text{Rab}] \) and \([\lambda y \neg \text{Rba}] \). So every property \( c \) encodes is a propositional property. Hence, \( c \) is a situation; intuitively, \( c \) is the ‘smallest’ situation that encodes \([\lambda y \text{Rab}] \) and \([\lambda y \neg \text{Rba}] \).

**Theorem:** Some Known Situations. Given our definitions, it follows that truth-values are situations:

\[
\text{TruthValue}(x) \rightarrow \text{Situation}(x)
\]

From this and the theorems that \( \text{TruthValue}(op) (294) \star, \text{TruthValue}(\top) (297.1) \star \), and \( \text{TruthValue}(\bot) (297.2) \star \), we can infer, as non-modally strict theorems, that \( op, \top, \) and \( \bot \) are all situations!

**Lemma:** Rigidity of \( \text{Situation}(x) \). The following lemmas prove useful.

(.1) \( x \) is a situation if and only if necessarily \( x \) is a situation; (.2) possibly \( x \) is a situation if and only if \( x \) is a situation; (.3) possibly \( x \) is a situation if and only if necessarily \( x \) is a situation; and (.4) actually \( x \) is a situation if and only if \( x \) is a situation:
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(.1) \( \text{Situation}(x) \equiv \Box \text{Situation}(x) \)

(.2) \( \Diamond \text{Situation}(x) \equiv \text{Situation}(x) \)

(.3) \( \Diamond \text{Situation}(x) \equiv \Box \text{Situation}(x) \)

(.4) \( s \text{Situation}(x) \equiv \text{Situation}(x) \)

Note that by applying GEN to the left-to-right direction of (.1), it we know that \( \vdash \Box \forall x (\text{Situation}(x) \equiv \Box \text{Situation}(x)) \). Hence \( \text{Situation}(x) \) is a rigid condition on objects, as defined in (257.1).

Thus, \( \text{Situation}(x) \) not only meets the definition of a restriction condition, as defined in (330), but also that of a rigid restriction condition, as defined in (334). \( \text{Situation}(x) \) is a restriction condition because it has a single free variable, it is non-empty (i.e., we know \( \exists x \text{Situation}(x) \)), and it has existential import, i.e., \( \text{Situation}(\kappa) \rightarrow \kappa \downarrow \) (exercise). So, we may henceforth use the symbols \( s, s', s'', \ldots \) as rigid restricted variables ranging over situations and \( s_1, s_2, s_3, \ldots \) as constants denoting situations. And, given our discussion of reasoning with restricted variables in (334) and (335), we can both (a) assert theorems and instantiate modal principles with with free situation variables, and (b) reason with bound and free occurrences of these variables. See Remark (460) below.

From the fact that there are situations, we also know that the quantifiers binding the restricted variable \( s \), \( \forall s \) and \( \exists s \), behave classically in the sense that \( \forall s \varphi \rightarrow \exists s \varphi \) is a theorem; cf. Remark (336). Moreover, from the fact that \( \text{Situation}(\kappa) \rightarrow \kappa \downarrow \), for any individual term \( \kappa \), we may use the variable \( s \) in the definiens and definiendum of a definition-by-\( \equiv \) without having to add existence clauses to the definiens; for any instance of the definition in which a provably empty term has been uniformly substituted for \( s \), the negation of the definiendum is provable.

(458) Definition: Truth In a Situation. Recall that in (289) we defined: \( x \) encodes \( p \), written \( x \Sigma p \), just in case \( x \) exists and encodes \( \lambda y p \). We now say that proposition \( p \) is true in \( x \), written \( x \models p \), just in case \( x \) is a situation that encodes \( p \):

\[
x \models p \equiv_{df} \text{Situation}(x) \& x \Sigma p
\]

Given our conventions in (332.1), we may use restricted variables to recast the above definition by saying that \( p \) is true in \( s \) just in case \( s \) encodes \( p \):

\[
s \models p \equiv_{df} s \Sigma p
\]

Note that there are other ways to read this definition. If we regard 0-place relations as states of affairs, then the variable \( p \) ranges over such states and we may then read \( 's \models p' \) in situation-theoretic terms as follows:
State of affairs \( p \) holds in situation \( s \)

State of affairs \( p \) is a fact in situation \( s \)

Situation \( s \) makes \( p \) true

Finally, note that in what follows, we always read ‘\(|\)’ with smallest possible scope. So, for example, \( x \models p \rightarrow p \) is to be parsed as \( (x \models p) \rightarrow p \) rather than \( x \models (p \rightarrow p) \) and \( s \models q \land \lnot q \) is to be parsed as \( (s \models q) \land \lnot q \).

(459) Lemma: Truth in a Situation and Encoding. Whenever \( x \) is a situation, then \( p \) is true in \( x \) if and only if \( x \) encodes being such that \( p \):

\[
\text{Situation}(x) \rightarrow ((x \models p) \equiv x[\lambda y \ p])
\]

Using restricted variables, this can be expressed as \( (s \models p) \equiv s[\lambda y \ p] \).

(460) Remark: Rule RN and Restricted Variables. Readers who skipped the discussion of reasoning with restricted variables in (334) and (335) may find the following discussion useful. It is extremely important to remember that when reasoning with rigid restricted variables, we are making use of the extended rules RN and RA justified in (335.1.a) and (335.1.b), respectively. For example, as we just saw, we can express (459) using restricted variables as:

\[
\text{(A)} \quad (s \models p) \equiv s[\lambda y \ p]
\]

But whereas (B) does follow from (A), it doesn’t follow by the Rule RN formulated in (69), but by the expanded version in (335):

\[
\text{(B)} \quad \Box((s \models p) \equiv s[\lambda y \ p])
\]

Though (B) is in fact a theorem, it isn’t provable by a single application of RN to (A). To see why this inference isn’t valid, consider first that when we eliminate the restricted variable, then (B) is given a conditional interpretation and so asserts:

\[
\text{(C)} \quad \text{Situation}(x) \rightarrow \Box((x \models p) \equiv x[\lambda y \ p])
\]

But, clearly, (C) is not derivable from (459) by Rule RN (69). However, as we noted, (B), i.e., (C), is a theorem:

*Proof. Assume \( \text{Situation}(x) \). So by (457.1), \( \Box \text{Situation}(x) \). Moreover, since (459) is a modally strict theorem, we can apply Rule RM (157.1) to conclude:

\[
\Box \text{Situation}(x) \rightarrow \Box((x \models p) \equiv x[\lambda y \ p])
\]

Hence \( \Box((x \models p) \equiv x[\lambda y \ p]) \). So by conditional proof, (C), i.e., (B).
The key fact about this reasoning is that in order to derive (B), we had to appeal to the left-to-right direction of theorem (457.1), which tells us that if $x$ is a situation, then necessarily $x$ is a situation. Our expanded rule RN, proved in (335.1.a), tells us that when we have a rigid restricted variable, then we can assume that it ranges over objects that necessarily satisfy the restriction condition on the variable whenever they satisfy the condition. For further discussion, see Remarks (331), (334), and (335).

(461) **Lemmas:** Rigidity of Truth In a Situation. Our definitions and theorems also guarantee that: (.1) $p$ is true in $s$ if and only if it is necessary that $p$ is true in $s$; (.2) it is possible that $p$ is true in $s$ if and only if $p$ is true in $s$; (.3) it is possible that $p$ is true in $s$ if and only if it is necessary that $p$ is true in $s$; (.4) actually $p$ is true in $s$ if and only if $p$ is true in $s$; and (.5) $p$ fails to be true in $s$ if and only if necessarily $p$ fails to be true in $s$:

$\begin{align*}
(1) & \quad s \models p \equiv \Box s \models p \\
(2) & \quad \Diamond s \models p \equiv s \models p \\
(3) & \quad \Diamond s \models p \equiv \Box s \models p \\
(4) & \quad s \models p \equiv s \models p \\
(5) & \quad \neg s \models p \equiv \neg s \models p
\end{align*}$

The proof of (.1) in the Appendix is in two parts. First, we prove the claim by eliminating the restricted variable. Then we show how to prove the claim as it is stated above with restricted variables, by making use of what we learned in Remark (460) and in our discussion of reasoning with restricted variables in (334) and (335).

(462) **Theorem:** Situation Identity. A fundamental fact concerning situation identity is now derivable, namely, that situations $s$ and $s'$ are identical if and only if they make the same propositions true:

$s = s' \equiv \forall p(s \models p \equiv s' \models p)$

This decides Choice 5 in Barwise 1989a (264) in favor of Alternative 5.1.

(463) **Definition:** Parts of Situations. We say that situation $s$ is a part of situation $s'$, written $s \sqsubseteq s'$, just in case every proposition true in $s$ is true in $s'$:

$s \sqsubseteq s' \equiv_{df} \forall p(s \models p \rightarrow s' \models p)$

This definition determines Choice 2 in Barwise 1989a (261), since it requires that every part of a situation be a situation. By our conventions for using free restricted variables in definitions-by-$\equiv$ (332.2), the above definition is short for:
\[ x \preceq y \equiv_{df} \text{Situation}(x) \& \text{Situation}(y) \& \forall p(x \models p \rightarrow y \models p) \]

(464) **Theorems:** *Part of* is a Partial Order on Situations. *Part of* is reflexive, anti-symmetric, and transitive on the situations:

1. \( s \preceq s \)
2. \( s \preceq s' \& s \neq s' \rightarrow \neg(s' \preceq s) \)
3. \( s \preceq s' \& s' \preceq s'' \rightarrow s \preceq s'' \)

Whereas a partial ordering of situations by \( \preceq \) is assumed in situation theory (cf. Barwise 1989b 185; 1989a, 259), such an ordering falls out as a theorem of object theory.

(465) **Theorems:** Parts and Identity. Two other constraints on the identity of situations are derivable, namely, (.1) that situations \( s \) and \( s' \) are identical if and only if each is part of the other, and (.2) that situations \( s \) and \( s' \) are identical if and only if they have the same parts:

1. \( s = s' \equiv s \preceq s' \& s' \preceq s \)
2. \( s = s' \equiv \forall s''(s'' \preceq s \equiv s'' \preceq s') \)

In the usual way, when \( s \preceq s' \) and \( s \neq s' \), it may be useful to say that \( s \) is a proper part of \( s' \).

(466) **Definition:** Persistency. In situation theory, a state of affairs \( p \) is persistent if and only if whenever \( p \) holds in a situation \( s \), \( p \) holds in every situation \( s' \) of which \( s \) is a part:

\[ \text{Persistent}(p) \equiv_{df} \forall s(s \models p \rightarrow \forall s'(s \preceq s' \rightarrow s' \models p)) \]


(467) **Theorem:** Propositions are Persistent. The following is therefore an immediate consequence of the definitions of \( \preceq \) and Persistent:

\[ \forall p \text{Persistent}(p) \]

Thus, our theory implies Alternative 6.1 at Choice 6 in Barwise 1989a (265).

(468) **Definitions:** Null and Trivial Situations. We define: (.1) \( x \) is a null situation if and only if \( x \) is a situation and no propositions are true in \( x \), and (.2) \( x \) is a trivial situation iff \( x \) is a situation and every proposition is true in \( x \):

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248 By its very set-up, our theory assumes Alternative 11.1 of Choice 11 (Barwise 1989a, 268): no relations are perspectival. The argument places of a relation are now allowed to vary and so if a relation \( R \) is a constituent of a state of affairs that is true in situation \( s \), then \( R \) has the same argument places in any situation \( s' \) of which \( s \) is a part.
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(.1) $\text{NullSituation}(x) \equiv_{df} \text{Situation}(x) \& \lnot \exists p(x \vdash p)$

(.2) $\text{TrivialSituation}(x) \equiv_{df} \text{Situation}(x) \& \forall p(x \vdash p)$

**Theorems:** Existence and Uniqueness of Null and Trivial Situations. It is now easily established that (.1) that there is a unique null situation and (.2) that there is a unique trivial situation:

(.1) $\exists! x \text{NullSituation}(x)$

(.2) $\exists! x \text{TrivialSituation}(x)$

Consequently, it follows, by a modally strict proof (.3) that the null situation exists, and (.4) that the trivial situation exists:

(.3) $\Downarrow ix \text{NullSituation}(x)$

(.4) $\Downarrow ix \text{TrivialSituation}(x)$

**Definitions:** Notation for The Null Situation and The Trivial Situation. We now introduce:

(.1) $s_\emptyset =_{df} ix \text{NullSituation}(x)$

(.2) $s_V =_{df} ix \text{TrivialSituation}(x)$

In the notation $s_\emptyset$ and $s_V$, we use a boldface, italic $s$ as part of the name. This boldface, italic $s$ is to be distinguished from the (nonbold, italic) restricted variable $s$. The reason for this should be clear: expressions such as $s_\emptyset$ and $s_V$ (with nonbold italic $s$) should be used only when we are introducing functional terms having denotations the vary with the value of $s$. By contrast, we are here introducing new names for distinguished objects.

**Theorems:** Facts About $s_\emptyset$ and $s_V$. It is now to be established that (.1) if $x$ is a null situation $x$ is necessarily so, and (.2) if $x$ is a trivial situation, $x$ is necessarily so:

(.1) $\text{NullSituation}(x) \rightarrow \Box \text{NullSituation}(x)$

(.2) $\text{TrivialSituation}(x) \rightarrow \Box \text{TrivialSituation}(x)$

From these, we may produce modally strict proofs of the following:

(.3) $\text{NullSituation}(s_\emptyset)$

(.4) $\text{TrivialSituation}(s_V)$
Theorems: Further Facts About Null and Trivial Situations. Recall that we defined the null object \( a_\varnothing \) in (262.1) as \( \text{ixNull}(x) \), where \( \text{Null}(x) \) was defined in (260.1) as \( A!x \& \neg \exists FxF \). Recall that we also defined the universal object \( a_V \) in (262.2) as \( \text{ixUniversal}(x) \), where \( \text{Universal}(x) \) was defined in (260.2) as \( A!x \& \forall FxF \). It then follows that: (.1) \( \text{NullSituation}(x) \equiv \text{Null}(x) \); (.2) the null situation is identical to the null object; and (.3) the trivial situation is not identical to the universal object:

\[
\begin{align*}
(.1) & \quad \text{NullSituation}(x) \equiv \text{Null}(x) \\
(.2) & \quad s_\varnothing = a_\varnothing \\
(.3) & \quad s_V \neq a_V
\end{align*}
\]

The proof of (.3) is especially interesting, since to show that the trivial situation and the universal object fail to be identical, we must find a property that one encodes that the other doesn’t. Since the universal object encodes every property whatsoever and the trivial situation encodes all and only propositional properties, we know the former encodes every property the latter encodes. So one has to show there is a property that the universal object encodes that the trivial situation doesn’t. It suffices to prove the existence of a property that is not a propositional property, and the proof of (.3) is interesting because it does just that.

Metadefinition: Conditions on Propositional Properties. In what follows, let us say that \( \varphi \) is a condition on propositional properties if and only if there is a modally strict proof that every property such that \( \varphi \) is a propositional property, i.e.,

\[
\varphi \text{ is a condition on propositional properties if and only if } \vdash \Box \forall F (\varphi \rightarrow \text{Propositional}(F))
\]

Though the definiens does have degenerate cases (e.g., a formula \( \varphi \) that is necessarily false, such as \( F \neq F \), counts as a condition on propositional properties), it does avoid obvious counterexamples.249

Theorems: An Important Equivalence. Whenever \( \varphi \) is a condition on propositional properties, then \( x \) is a situation that encodes all and only the

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249For example, let \( \psi \) be the condition \( F = F \& \neg Pa \), where \( Pa \) is some modally fragile (i.e., contingently true) fact asserted as an axiom. Then there is a proof that \( \psi \rightarrow \text{Propositional}(F) \) (since \( \neg Pa \) is derivable given the axiom \( Pa \), \( \neg \psi \) is derivable by \( \lor I \) and (89.5.c); so \( \psi \rightarrow \text{Propositional}(F) \), by (78.3)). So, by GEN, \( \forall F (\psi \rightarrow \text{Propositional}(F)) \). But we can’t apply RN to obtain a proof of \( \Box \forall F (\psi \rightarrow \text{Propositional}(F)) \) since the derivation appeals to the contingently true fact \( Pa \) and so fails to be modally strict. This squares with our intuition that \( \psi \) shouldn’t count as a condition on propositional properties: at worlds where \( Pa \) is indeed false, every ordinary, non-propositional property is such that \( \psi \).
properties $F$ such that $\varphi$ if, and only if, $x$ is an abstract object that encodes all and only the properties $F$ such that $\varphi$:

$$(\text{Situation}(x) \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi)) \equiv (A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi)),$$

provided $\varphi$ is a condition on propositional properties in which $x$ doesn’t occur free.

This theorem makes it easier to derive comprehension conditions for situations.

(475) Theorems: Comprehension Conditions for Situations. Where $\varphi$ is a condition on propositional properties in which $x$ doesn’t occur free, there exists a (unique) situation $x$ that encodes all and only those properties $F$ such that $\varphi$:

(1) $\exists x(\text{Situation}(x) \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi))$, provided $\varphi$ is a condition on propositional properties in which $x$ doesn’t occur free

(2) $\exists! x(\text{Situation}(x) \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi))$, provided $\varphi$ is a condition on propositional properties in which $x$ doesn’t occur free

Thus, whereas the classic works in situation theory (e.g., Barwise and Perry 1983, 7–8; Barwise 1989a, 261) assume the existence of situations, object theory yields, as theorems, existence principles that comprehend the domain of situations.

Notice also that with these theorems, we have developed a precise theory of situations, since (.1) and (462), respectively, constitute fully general comprehension and identity principles for situations.

(476) Theorems: Canonical Situation Descriptions. It now follows that when $\varphi$ is a condition on propositional properties, there exists something which is the situation that encodes exactly the properties $F$ such that $\varphi$:

(1) $i x(\text{Situation}(x) \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi)) \downarrow$, provided $\varphi$ is a condition on propositional properties in which $x$ doesn’t occur free

Moreover, it is straightforward to show:

(2) $i x(\text{Situation}(x) \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi)) = i x(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi))$, provided $\varphi$ is a condition on propositional properties in which $x$ doesn’t occur free

Hence, when $\varphi$ is a condition on propositional properties, we may say that descriptions of the form $i x(\text{Situation}(x) \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi))$ and $i x \forall F(sF \equiv \varphi)$ are canonical situation descriptions. If permitted a modest abuse of language, we may say that these canonical descriptions denote canonical situations (cf. (250)).

(477) Theorems: Canonical Situations and Rigid Conditions on Properties. Since we’ve defined what it is for $\varphi$ to be a condition on propositional properties (473) and what it is for $\varphi$ to be a rigid condition on properties (257.1),
we may combine the two to talk about formulas \( \varphi \) that are rigid conditions on propositional properties. Consequently, whenever \( \varphi \) is a rigid condition on propositional properties, then it is a modally strict fact that if something is identical to a canonical situation, then it encodes exactly the properties such that \( \varphi \):

\[
y = \mathsf{isVF}(sF \equiv \varphi) \rightarrow \forall F(yF \equiv \varphi), \text{ provided } \varphi \text{ is a rigid condition on propositional properties in which } x \text{ isn’t free.}
\]

(478) **Metadefinitions:** Strict Canonicity and Situations. Given the preceding results, we say that \( \mathsf{isVF}(sF \equiv \varphi) \) is a strictly canonical situation description whenever \( \varphi \) is a rigid condition on propositional properties. In the usual way, we sometimes abuse language to say that \( \mathsf{isVF}(sF \equiv \varphi) \) is a strictly canonical situation.

**Exercises:**

1. Show that \( \circ p \) (285), \( \top \) (296.1), and \( \bot \) (296.2) are (identical to) canonical situations.

2. Consider the following situation description:

\[
\mathsf{isVF}(sF \equiv [\lambda y \, Rab] \lor F = [\lambda y \, \neg Rba])
\]

(a) Show that this is a canonical situation description; i.e., show that the condition \( F = [\lambda y \, Rab] \lor F = [\lambda y \, \neg Rba] \) is a condition on propositional properties. (b) Show that this is a strictly canonical situation description.

3. Show that \( \circ p, \top, \text{ and } \bot \) are not (identical to) strictly canonical situations.

(479) **Exercises:** A Bounded Lattice of Situations. Let us define binary join (\( \lor \)) and meet (\( \land \)) operations on situations as follows: \( s' \lor s'' \) is the situation \( s \) that encodes a property \( F \) just in case \( F \) is encoded by \( s' \) or encoded by \( s'' \), while \( s' \land s'' \) is the situation that encodes a property \( F \) just in case \( F \) is encoded by \( s' \) and encoded by \( s'' \). Note that in the following formal representations, the symbol \( \lor \), which has heretofore been used as a binary, formula-forming operation symbol for disjunction, is also being used for the join operation on situations; the context should always make it clear which way the symbol is intended, since when used as a join operation, \( \lor \) is a binary term-forming operation symbol that connects two individual terms:

\[
s' \lor s'' =_{df} \mathsf{isVF}(sF \equiv s'F \lor s''F)
\]

\[
s' \land s'' =_{df} \mathsf{isVF}(sF \equiv s'F \land s''F)
\]

To confirm that \( s' \lor s'' \) and \( s' \land s'' \) are (identical to) canonical situations, one has to show:
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- when $\varphi$ is $s'F \lor s''F$, then $\vdash \Box \forall F (\varphi \to \text{Propositional}(F))$
- when $\varphi$ is $s'F \& s''F$, then $\vdash \Box \forall F (\varphi \to \Box \varphi)$

We leave this as an exercise. Furthermore, to confirm that $s' \lor s''$ and $s' \land s''$ are (identical to) strictly canonical situations, one has show, respectively, that:

- when $\varphi$ is $s'F \lor s''F$, then $\vdash \Box \forall F (\varphi \to \Box \varphi)$
- when $\varphi$ is $s'F \& s''F$, then $\vdash \Box \forall F (\varphi \to \Box \varphi)$

We shall leave it as an exercise for the reader to prove that the following laws for join and meet, which characterize lattices algebraically, are derivable as modally strict theorems governing situations:

\[
\begin{align*}
s \lor s &= s \\
s \land s &= s & \text{(Laws of Idempotence)} \\
s' \lor s' &= s' \lor s \\
s' \land s' &= s' \land s & \text{(Laws of Commutativity)} \\
s \lor (s' \lor s'') &= (s \lor s') \lor s'' \\
s \land (s' \land s'') &= (s \land s') \land s'' & \text{(Laws of Associativity)} \\
s \lor (s \land s') &= s \\
s \land (s \lor s') &= s & \text{(Laws of Absorption)}
\end{align*}
\]

We leave it as a further exercise to show that the situations form a **bounded** lattice, i.e., that $s_\varnothing$ and $s_V$ serve as the identity elements for $\lor$ and $\land$, respectively, i.e., that:

\[
\begin{align*}
s \lor s_\varnothing &= s \\
s \land s_V &= s
\end{align*}
\]

These, too, are derivable as modally strict theorems.

We leave the proofs of the above as exercises because later we shall encounter analogous but even more general results. The study of (Leibnizian) concepts in Chapter 13 will establish that there are operations $\oplus$ and $\otimes$ that structure the (Leibnizian) concepts (and the domain of abstract objects generally) as a bounded lattice and, indeed, a Boolean algebra.

(480) **Definition:** Actual Situations. We say that a situation $s$ is **actual** iff every proposition true in $s$ is true:

250In the following cases, it suffices to show $\varphi \to \Box \varphi$, by GEN. In the first case, assume $\varphi$, i.e., $s'F \lor s''F$. Reasoning by cases: (a) If $s'F$, then $\Box s'F$, by (51). So by $\lor I$, $\Box s'F \lor \Box s''F$. By (158.15), $\Box(s'F \lor s''F)$. Hence $\Box \varphi$. (b) If $s''F$, then by analogous reasoning, $\Box \varphi$.

In the second case, assume $\varphi$, i.e., $s'F \& s''F$. Then by &E, both $s'F$ and $s''F$. Thus, both $\Box s'F$ and $\Box s''F$, given (51). Hence, by &I and (158.3), $\Box(s'F \& s''F)$, i.e., $\Box \varphi$. 

\[ \text{Actual}(s) \equiv_{df} \forall p (s \models p \rightarrow p) \]

Note here that an actual situation has been defined in terms of truth, without using the actuality operator. See Remark (482) below.

(481) Theorem: Some Actual Situations Might Not Be Actual. It is a consequence of our definition of Actual that some actual situations might fail to be actual:

\[ \exists s (\text{Actual}(s) \& \Diamond \neg \text{Actual}(s)) \]

The proof of this theorem identifies a witness (i.e., a situation) in which a contingent truth is true. Of course, if \( s \) is a situation that is actual because every proposition true in \( s \) is a necessary truth, then \( s \) couldn’t fail to be an actual situation.

(482) Remark: Actual vs. Actual* Situations. In (480), we defined an actual situation \( s \) to be one such that every proposition true in \( s \) is true. We did not use an actuality operator in the definiens. This is partly a gesture to the tradition: the actuality of a situation hasn’t traditionally been defined in terms of an actuality operator.

But one could say that a situation \( s \) is actual* just in case every proposition true in \( s \) is actually true:

\[ \text{Actual}^*(s) \equiv_{df} \forall p (s \models p \rightarrow A p) \]

Given such a definition, a theorem emerges that stands in contrast to the fact that actual situations that might not be actual (481). For it is provable that every actual* situation is necessarily actual*:

\[ \text{Actual}^*(s) \rightarrow \Box \text{Actual}^*(s) \]

The proof is left to a footnote.\(^{251}\) In what follows, we shall work primarily with the notion of an actual situation. It is important to keep in mind how it differs from the notion of an actual* situation. In particular, we shall use the notion of an actual situation to define an actual world, and so some of the theorems governing this notion may not be subject to modally strict proofs.

(483) Theorems: Actual and Nonactual Situations. It is an immediate consequence that there are both actual and nonactual situations:

\(^{251}\) Assume Actual*(s), i.e.,

\[ \forall p (s \models p \rightarrow A p) \]

We have to show \( \Box \forall p (s \models p \rightarrow A p) \). By BF (167.1), it suffices to show \( \forall p (s \models p \rightarrow A p) \). By GEN, it suffices to show \( \Box (s \models p \rightarrow A p) \), i.e., \( \Box (\neg s \models p \vee A p) \). By (158.15), it suffices to show:

\[ \Box (\neg s \models p \vee A p) \]

But by (\( 8 \)), we know \( s \models p \rightarrow A p \), i.e., \( \neg s \models p \vee A p \). So we can show (\( \xi \)) by disjunctive syllogism from this last fact. If \( \neg s \models p \), then it follows by (461.5), \( \Box (\neg s \models p \vee A p) \). Hence (\( \xi \)), by \( \lor I \). If \( A p \), then \( \Box A p \), by (46.1). Hence (\( \xi \)), by \( \lor I \).
12.1. SITUATIONS

(.1) \( \exists s \text{Actual}(s) \)

(.2) \( \exists s \, \neg \text{Actual}(s) \)

The theory therefore decides Choice 4 in Barwise 1989a (262) in favor of Alternative 4.2. Note, moreover, that some propositions are not true in any actual situation:

(.3) \( \exists p \forall s \,(\text{Actual}(s) \rightarrow \neg s \models p) \)

(484) Lemma: Embedding Situations in Another Situation. Where \( s' \) and \( s'' \) are any situations, there exists a situation of which both are a part:

\[ \exists s (s' \sqsubseteq s \land s'' \sqsubseteq s) \]

It is tempting to call any such \( s \) an upper bound on \( s' \) and \( s'' \), but as noted earlier, we are going to postpone further discussion of algebraic notions until Chapter 13, when we discuss (Leibnizian) concepts.

(485) Theorems: Facts About Actual Situations. (.1) If \( p \) is true in an actual situation \( s \), then \( s \) exemplifies being such that \( p \), and (.2) for any two actual situations, there exists an actual situation of which both are a part:

(.1) \( \text{Actual}(s) \rightarrow (s \models p \rightarrow [\lambda y \, p]) \)

(.2) \( (\text{Actual}(s') \land \text{Actual}(s'')) \rightarrow \exists s (\text{Actual}(s) \land s' \sqsubseteq s \land s'' \sqsubseteq s) \)

(.2) establishes what Barwise (1989b, 235) calls the Compatibility Principle.

(486) Definition: Consistency. A situation \( s \) is consistent iff there is no proposition \( p \) such that both \( p \) is true in \( s \) and \( \neg p \) is true in \( s \):

\[ \text{Consistent}(s) \equiv \text{df} \neg \exists p (s \models p \land s \models \neg p) \]

(487) Remark: Types of Consistency. We take the preceding definition of consistency to be a standard one.\(^{252}\) However, it is interesting to consider how the above definition differs from the suggestion that a situation \( s \) is consistent just in case there is no proposition \( p \) such that the contradiction \( p \land \neg p \) is true in \( s \):

\[ \text{Consistent}'(s) \equiv \text{df} \neg \exists p (s \models (p \land \neg p)) \]

It is important to recognize that \( \text{Consistent} \) and \( \text{Consistent}' \) are independent conditions; there are situations \( s \) such that \( \text{Consistent}(s) \) and \( \neg \text{Consistent}'(s) \), and there are situations \( s' \) such that \( \text{Consistent}'(s') \) and \( \neg \text{Consistent}(s') \).

To see the former, let \( q_1 \) be any proposition and let \( s_1 \) be the following situation:

\(^{252}\)Our definition is clearly an object-theoretic counterpart of the classical syntactic definition of a consistent set of sentences \( \Gamma \). For example, in Enderton 1972, 128 (= 2001, 134), we find that a set of sentences \( \Gamma \) is consistent iff there is no formula \( \varphi \) such that both \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi \) and \( \Gamma \vdash \neg \varphi \).
is\forall F(sF \equiv F = [\lambda y \ q_1 \& - q_1])\]

Clearly, $s_1$ is (identical to) a canonical situation; it encodes just one property, namely $[\lambda y \ q_1 \& - q_1]$, and so every property it encodes is a propositional property. Moreover, it is (identical to) a strictly canonical situation, as this was defined in (478); if we let $\varphi$ be the formula $F = [\lambda y \ q_1 \& - q_1]$, then there is a modally strict proof that $\forall F(\varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi)$. So by theorem (477), it follows that $s_1$ encodes a single property, namely, $[\lambda y \ q_1 \& - q_1]$. Hence, a single proposition, namely $q_1 \& - q_1$, is true in $s_1$. Now since every proposition is provably distinct from its negation, it follows that $\text{Consistent}(s_1)$, i.e., there is no proposition $p$ such that $s_1 \vdash p$ and $s_1 \vdash -p$. However, clearly, $-\text{Consistent}'(s_1)$, since there is a proposition $p$, namely $q_1$, such that $s_1 \vdash (p \& -p)$.

Now to see that there are situations $s'$ such that $\text{Consistent}'(s')$ and $-\text{Consistent}(s')$, first note that by (215), we know $\exists p \text{ Contingently True}(p)$. Suppose $q_2$ is such a proposition, so that by definition (211.1), we know both $q_2$ and $\Diamond -q_2$.

Now let $s_2$ be the following situation:

is\forall F(sF \equiv F = [\lambda y \ q_2] \lor F = [\lambda y \ -q_2])

Again, $s_2$ is (identical to) a strictly canonical situation (exercise). So, by (477), $s_2$ encodes just two properties: $[\lambda y \ q_2]$ and $[\lambda y \ -q_2]$. Thus, only propositions $q_2$ and $-q_2$ are true in $s_2$. But, from what we know about $q_2$, it is easy to show that there is no proposition $p$ such that $q_2 = (p \& -p)$, and that there is no proposition $p$ such that $-q_2 = (p \& -p)$.253 Hence, it follows that $\text{Consistent}'(s_2)$, since there is no proposition $p$ such that $s_2 \vdash (p \& -p)$. But $-\text{Consistent}(s_2)$, since there is a proposition $p$, namely, $q_2$, such that both $s_2 \vdash p$ and $s_2 \vdash -p$.

Thus, $\text{Consistent}$ and $\text{Consistent}'$ are independent notions. However, as we shall see, the notions are equivalent with respect to actual and possibly actual situations.

(488) Theorem: Actual Situations are Consistent. If a situation $s$ is actual, then it is consistent:

$\text{Actual}(s) \rightarrow \text{Consistent}(s)$

Thus, we’ve derived what Barwise (1989b, 235) calls the Coherency Principle for actual situations. (We’ll introduce a different notion of coherency below.)

Exercise: Using the definition of consistent’ in Remark (487), show (a) that actual situations are consistent’ and (b) that if $s$ is actual, then $s$ is consistent if and only if $s$ is consistent’.

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253There can’t be a propositions $p$ such that $q_2 = (p \& -p)$ since $q_2$ is true by hypothesis. Moreover, there can’t be a proposition $p$ such that $-q_2 = (p \& -p)$ since we know both $\Diamond -q_2$ (by hypothesis) and $-\Diamond (p \& -p)$ (by theorem).
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(489) **Lemmas**: Facts About Consistency. Note also that: (.1) a situation \( s \) fails to be consistent if and only if \( s \) necessarily fails to be consistent; and (.2) a situation \( s \) is possibly consistent if and only if \( s \) is consistent:

\[ \neg \text{Consistent}(s) \equiv \Box \neg \text{Consistent}(s) \]

\[ \Diamond \text{Consistent}(s) \equiv \text{Consistent}(s) \]

(490) **Definition**: Possible Situations. We say that a situation \( s \) is possible iff it is possible that \( s \) is actual:

\[ \text{Possible}(s) \equiv_{df} \Diamond \text{Actual}(s) \]

(491) **Theorem**: Facts About Possible Situations. Clearly, (.1) if a situation \( s \) is actual, then it is possible; and (.2) if some impossible proposition \( p \) is true in \( s \), then \( s \) is not possible:

\[ \text{Actual}(s) \rightarrow \text{Possible}(s) \]

\[ \exists p((s \models p) \& \neg \Diamond p) \rightarrow \neg \text{Possible}(s) \]

(492) **Theorems**: Consistency and Possible Situations. (.1) Possible situations are consistent; and (.2) there are situations that are consistent but not possible:

\[ \text{Possible}(s) \rightarrow \text{Consistent}(s) \]

\[ \exists s(\text{Consistent}(s) \& \neg \text{Possible}(s)) \]

One can see why (.2) is a theorem by considering situation \( s_1 \) discussed in Remark (487), in which a single proposition, namely \( q_1 \& \neg q_1 \), is true. \( s_1 \) is consistent, for inconsistency requires that at least two propositions be true in \( s_1 \), namely, some proposition and its (distinct) negation. But \( s_1 \) is not possible; it couldn’t be the case that every proposition true in \( s_1 \) is true. A fuller proof is in the Appendix.

**Exercise**: Using the definition of consistent’ in Remark (487), show (a) that possible situations are consistent’ and (b) that if \( s \) is possible, then \( s \) is consistent if and only if \( s \) is consistent’.

(493) **Lemmas**: Facts About Situations That Make True All and Only Truths. We may import and export the classical connectives on the basis of the following theorems. (.1) If all and only true propositions are true in \( s \), then for every proposition \( q \), \( \neg q \) is true in \( s \) if and only if it is not the case that \( q \) is true in \( s \); and (.2) if all and only true propositions are true in \( s \), then for every proposition \( q \), \( q \rightarrow r \) is true in \( s \) if and only if, if \( q \) is true in \( s \) then \( r \) is true in \( s \):

\[ \forall p(s \models p \equiv p) \rightarrow \forall q((s \models \neg q) \equiv \neg (s \models q)) \]
\((2)\) \(\forall p (s \models p \equiv p) \rightarrow \forall q \forall r ((s \models q \rightarrow r) \equiv ((s \models q) \rightarrow (s \models r)))\)

Now if we switch to theorem schemata, so as not to have to worry about captured variables, we have \((.3)\) if all and only true propositions are true in \(s\), then every \(\alpha\)-is-such-that-\(\varphi\) is true in \(s\) if and only if, every \(\alpha\) is such that \(\varphi\)-is-true-in-\(s\):\(^{254}\)

\[(.3) \forall p (s \models p \equiv p) \rightarrow ((s \models \forall \alpha \varphi) \equiv \forall \alpha (s \models \varphi))\]

Clearly if we let \(\varphi\) be the variable \(q\), then \((.3)\), GEN, and \((39.3)\) imply that if all and only true propositions are true in \(s\), then for every proposition \(q\), \(\forall \alpha q\) is true in \(s\) iff for every \(\alpha\), \(q\) is true in \(s\).

Turning now to modality, we switch back to variables ranging over propositions. We now show that if \(s\) makes true all and only true propositions, then modal operator can only be exported from, not imported into, a truth-in-\(s\) context. For the existence of contingently true propositions undermines the importation. We thus have following theorems: \((.4)\) if all and only true propositions are true in \(s\), then if necessarily-\(q\) is true in \(s\), then necessarily \(q\)-is-true-in-\(s\); and \((.5)\) if all and only true propositions are true in \(s\), then for some proposition \(q\), then necessarily, \(q\) is true in \(s\) while it is not the case that \(\Box q\) is true in \(s\):

\[(.4) \forall p (s \models p \equiv p) \rightarrow \forall q ((s \models \Box q) \rightarrow \Box (s \models q))\]

\[(.5) \forall p (s \models p \equiv p) \rightarrow \exists q (\Box (s \models q) \& \neg (s \models \Box q))\]

**Exercise:** Determine whether the following is provable and, if so, whether there is a modally strict proof: \(\forall p (s \models p \equiv p) \rightarrow \forall q ((s \models \forall q) \equiv \forall (s \models q))\).

Finally, we establish that \((.6)\) there is a situation that makes true all and only true propositions:

\[(.6) \exists \exists p (s \models p \equiv p)\]

Situations that *might* make true all and only truths will prove to be important in the next section.

\(^{254}\)If we had formulated \((.3)\) as:

\(\forall p (s \models p \equiv p) \rightarrow ((s \models \forall q \equiv \forall \alpha (s \models q))\)

and then universally generalized on \(q\), then even though \(\varphi\) \(\downarrow\) holds for every formula \(\varphi\), the only formulas we could substitute for \(\forall q\) are those in which \(\alpha\) doesn’t occur free. So if a formula \(\varphi\) has \(\alpha\) free, we’d have to switch to an alphabetic variable of the above, e.g.,

\(\forall p (s \models p \equiv p) \rightarrow ((s \models \forall q \equiv \forall \beta (s \models q))\)

and universally generalize on \(q\) in order to instantiate to \(\varphi\). But by formulating \((.3)\) as in the text, the theorem holds straightaway for any formula.
12.2 Possible Worlds

(494) Remark: On the Nature of Possible Worlds. It is only relatively recently that philosophers and logicians have started to think seriously and systematically about the nature of possible worlds. Of course, Leibniz mentioned them in both his *Theodicy* (T 128 = G.vi 107) and in the *Monadology* §53 (PW 187 = G.vi 615–616). But it is reasonable to be skeptical about Leibniz’s conception of possible worlds. Stalnaker nicely formulates the skeptic’s attitude in the following passage (1976, 65):\(^{255}\)

> According to Leibniz, the universe—the actual world—is one of an infinite number of possible worlds existing in the mind of God. God created the universe by actualizing one of these possible worlds—the best one. It is a striking image, this picture of an infinite swarm of total universes, each by its natural inclination for existence striving for a position that can be occupied by only one, with God, in his infinite wisdom and benevolence, settling the competition by selecting the most worthy candidate. But in these enlightened times, we find it difficult to take this metaphysical myth any more seriously than the other less abstract creation stories told by our primitive ancestors. Even the more recent expurgated versions of the story, leaving out God and the notoriously chauvinistic thesis that our world is better than all the rest, are generally regarded, at best, as fanciful metaphors for a more sober reality.

So let’s, for the moment, suspend judgment about Leibniz’s conception of possible worlds, and instead focus next on Wittgenstein’s famous characterization of the actual world in the opening lines of his *Tractatus* (1921), where we find the claims “The world is all that is the case” and “The world is the totality of facts, not of things” (1921, 7, Propositions 1 and 1.1). It is unclear whether Wittgenstein had a view about nonactual possible worlds; subsequent propositions in the *Tractatus* mention possible states of affairs but the text doesn’t explicitly say whether any are so total and complete as to constitute a possible world (see, e.g., Propositions 2.012, 2.0124, and 2.013 in the *Tractatus*). Interestingly, Carnap (1947, 9) interpreted Wittgenstein’s text as if some are.

In what follows, we shall be attempting to prove theorems about the nature of possible worlds; we shall not be interested in models of them. We take it that possible worlds are none of the following: (a) complete and consistent sets of sentences, of the kind described in Lindenbaum’s Lemma (Tarski 1930, 34, fn. ‡), (b) state descriptions, as defined by Carnap (1947, 9), (c) model sets, as defined by Hintikka (1955), (d) variable assignments agreeing on the values of

\(^{255}\)One shouldn’t conclude on the basis of this passage that Stalnaker is a possible worlds skeptic, since he goes on to employ possible worlds in his work on the analysis of counterfactual conditionals. He just takes them to be properties of a special kind. See the discussion below.
the individual variables, as defined by Kripke (1959, 2–3), or (e) Tarski models, as put to use in Montague 1960. Similarly, I take the following works to contain mathematical models, not theories, of possible worlds: (f) Pollock 1967 (317), in which a possible world is identified as any set of states of affairs that is maximal and consistent, (g) Quine 1968 (14–16), in which possible worlds are identified with sets of quadruples of real numbers representing the coordinates of spacetime points occupied by matter, (h) Cresswell 1972a (6), in which possible worlds are identified as sets of basic particular situations, (i) Adams 1974 (225), in which talk of possible worlds is reduced to talk about maximal, consistent sets of propositions (‘world-stories’), and (j) Menzel 1990 (371ff), in which appropriately structured Tarski models represent possible worlds in virtue of having the modal property possibly being a representation of the way things are. The proposals mentioned in (a) – (j) fail to be theories of possible worlds because possible worlds, whatever they are, are not mathematical objects. They are not sets of formal sentences, sets of propositions, sets of states of affairs, formal models, model sets, or assignments to variables. Of course, for some purposes, these mathematical objects might serve to represent possible worlds, but our interest is in the worlds as objects in their own right.

Although the notion of possible world gained currency in the 1950s, the philosophers and logicians in that decade weren’t especially interested their nature as entities in their own right. Copeland (2006, 381) describes a letter from Carew Meredith to Arthur Prior, dated 10 October 1956, in which Meredith uses the term ‘possible world’ when demonstrating how to falsify a certain formula. Copeland also describes a 1957 lecture handout from Timothy Smiley at the University of Cambridge, which indicates that necessary truths are true in all ‘possible worlds’, and a proposition is possible if it is true in some ‘possible world’ (2002, 121; 2006, 385; quotes in the original).

Moreover, Hintikka (1957, 61–62) suggested that models and model sets:

\[
... \text{correspond to the different situations we want to consider in modal}
\]

\[\text{256} \text{The physicist Mark Tegmark (2008) asserts that the physical universe is a mathematical structure. Of course, this modern-day Pythagoreanism requires an analysis of what a mathematical structure is, something Tegmark doesn’t provide. By contrast, we shall analyze mathematical structures as certain abstract objects. See Chapter 15. Hence, even if Tegmark is right about what the physical universe is, the present theory offers a further analysis of the mathematical structure in question.}

\[\text{For the present purposes, however, it suffices to note that Tegmark’s conception of a physical universe as a mathematical structure doesn’t lead to a theory of worlds as mathematical structures. Possible worlds are objects whose identity is, in part, tied to the non-mathematical propositions that are true or false at them; mathematical structures are just not the kind of thing at which non-mathematical propositions can be true or false.}

\[\text{257} \text{In Copeland 2002, footnote 25, and again in Copeland 2006, footnote 18, we find an acknowledgment to David Shoesmith for providing a copy of the lecture handout. I’ve not been able to acquire a copy.}\]
12.2. POSSIBLE WORLDS

logic, and they are interconnected, in the first place, by a rule saying (roughly) that whatever is necessarily true in the actual state of affairs must be (simply) true in all the alternative states of affairs.

The text doesn’t make it clear whether “alternative states of affairs” can be partial (i.e., similar to situations) or are always total (and hence alternative possible worlds). Finally, though Kripke (1959) interprets modal logic in terms of a set of alternative assignments to variables, he then says (1959, 2):

> The basis of the informal analysis which motivated these definitions is that a proposition is necessary if and only if it is true in all “possible worlds”. (It is not necessary for our present purposes to analyze the notion of a “possible world” any further.)

These invocations of possible worlds played an important role in the development of the semantics of modal logic in the early 1960s (Kripke 1963a, 1963b; Prior 1963). In all of these cases, however, it is fair to say that modal logicians weren’t yet interested in the nature of the possible worlds, even though they thought that some such notion helps us to understand formal frameworks for interpreting modal language.

The study of the nature of possible worlds began in earnest when Lewis (1968) introduced axioms governing worlds. Though Lewis was, in the 1968 paper, primarily interested in formulating his ‘counterpart theory’ of possibilities, his axioms used variables ranging over worlds and implicitly defined properties he took worlds to have. His work gave rise to the goal of precisely specifying the nature of possible worlds, however, and theories of them were subsequently developed in a variety of other works, including Lewis 1973; Plantinga 1974, 1976; Fine 1977; Chisholm 1981; Zalta 1983; Pollock 1984; Lewis 1986; Armstrong 1989, 1997; and Stalnaker 2012.

Interestingly, Stalnaker’s position, until 2012, was that one can assume the existence of possible worlds in semantic analysis without endorsing any particular theory about their nature. In 1984 (Chapter 3), the final paragraph of his 1976 paper is revised and expanded, to include the following (57):

> …the moderate realism I want to defend need not take possible worlds to be among the ultimate furniture of the world. Possible worlds are primitive notions of the theory, not because of their ontological status, but because it is useful to theorize at a certain level of abstraction, a level that brings out what is common in a certain range of otherwise diverse activities. The concept of possible worlds that I am defending is not a metaphysical conception, although one application of the notion is to provide a framework for metaphysical theorizing. The concept is a formal or functional notion, like the notion of individual presupposed by the semantics for extensional quantification theory. …

Similarly, a possible world is not a particular kind of thing or place. The theory leaves the nature of possible worlds as open as extensional semantics leaves the nature of individuals. A possible world is what truth is relative to, what people
It is worthwhile recalling a famous passage in the work of David Lewis that contains a kind of *credo* and justification for the belief in possible worlds (Lewis 1973, 84):

I believe that there are possible worlds other than the one we happen to inhabit. If an argument is wanted, it is this. It is uncontroversially true that things might be otherwise than they are. I believe, and so do you, that things could have been different in countless ways. But what does this mean? Ordinary language permits the paraphrase: there are many ways things could have been besides the way they actually are. On the face of it, the sentence is an existential quantification. It says that there exist many entities of a certain description, to wit ‘ways things could have been’. I believe things could have been in countless ways; I believe permissible paraphrases of what I believe; taking the paraphrase at its face value, I therefore believe in the existence of entities that might be called ‘ways things could have been’. I prefer to call them possible worlds.

Lewis, in a later work, offers a further justification for belief in possible worlds. He writes (1986, 3):

> Why believe in a plurality of worlds? – Because the hypothesis is serviceable, and that is a reason to think that it is true. The familiar analysis of necessity as truth at all possible worlds was only the beginning. In the last two decades, philosophers have offered a great many more analyses that make reference to possible worlds, or to possible individuals that inhabit possible worlds. I find that record most impressive. I think it is clear that talk of possibilia has clarified questions in many parts of the philosophy of logic, mind, of language, and of science – not to mention metaphysics itself. Even those who officially scoff often cannot resist the temptation to help themselves abashedly to this useful way of speaking.

And on the page before, Lewis states what seems to be the most important principle governing worlds, namely, “. . . absolutely every way that a world could possibly be is a way that some world is” (1986, 2, [emphasis in the original]).

It is not surprising that Lewis’ suggestion, that possible worlds are physically-disconnected concrete entities inhabiting some logical space, was controversial. Van Inwagen 1986 (185–6) contrasts two of the leading conceptions of worlds that emerged:

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*But in 2012 (8), Stalnaker puts forward the suggestion that possible worlds are properties, i.e., *ways a world might be*. So a possible world is “the kind of thing that is, or can be, instantiated or exemplified” (2012, 8).*
Lewis did not content himself with saying that there were entities properly called ‘ways things could have been’; . . . He went on to say that what most of us would call ‘the universe’, the mereological sum of all the furniture of earth and the choir of heaven, is one among others of these ‘possible worlds’ or ‘ways things could have been’, and that the others differ from it “not in kind but only in what goes on in them” (Lewis 1973, 85).

Whether or not the existence of a plurality of universes can be so easily established, the thesis that possible worlds are universes is one of the two ‘concepts of possible worlds’ that I mean to discuss. . . . The other concept I shall discuss is that employed by various philosophers who would probably regard themselves as constituting the Sensible Party: Saul Kripke, Robert Stalnaker, Robert Adams, R.M. Chisholm, John Pollock, and Alvin Plantinga.[3] These philosophers regard possible worlds as abstract objects of some sort: possible histories of the world, for example, or perhaps properties, propositions or states of affairs.

Van Inwagen goes on to call Lewis a ‘concretist’ about worlds while the members of the ‘Sensible Party’ are called ‘abstractionists’. The main difference between these two conceptions is whether worlds are to be defined primarily in terms of a part-whole relation (concretists) or in terms of the propositions true at them (abstractionists).

Given this opposition, it seems that the abstractionist conception is a kind of generalization of Wittgenstein’s view of the actual world in the Tractatus, mentioned above. But Menzel (2015) notes that there is a third important conception of worlds, namely, the ‘combinatorialist’ conception, on which possible worlds are taken to be “recombinations, or rearrangements, of certain metaphysical simples,” where “both the nature of simples and the nature of recombination vary from theory to theory” (Section 2.3). This view is exhibited in the work of Quine, Cresswell, and Armstrong, op. cit.. On Menzel’s analysis, Wittgenstein’s view is more closely allied with the combinatorialist conception than the abstractionist one.259 Of course, if one defines actualism in some

259See again Menzel 1990, where a way that philosophers might do without possible worlds altogether is suggested. Menzel develops a homophonic interpretation of modal language that may suffice for the purposes of analyzing our modal beliefs. Menzel suggests that we use certain Tarski models to represent the possible worlds of Kripke models and then he attributes modal properties to them. On Menzel’s proposal, a Tarski model meeting certain conditions could have represented the world as it would have been had things been different. One could put the view more simply as follows: each such Tarski model might have been a model of the actual world. So not only does Menzel avoid claiming that Tarski models are possible worlds, strictly speaking he also avoids the claim that the former represent the latter, since on his view, we can simply rest with the primitive modal properties of Tarski models and thereby provide a precise, but homophonic, interpretation of modality.

Linsky and I (1994, 444) raised some concerns about this interesting suggestion. I only add here that if Menzel’s goal of doing without possible worlds is to avoid the committment to ‘possible but non-actual objects’, then the theory of possible worlds developed below achieves this goal, given
other way (i.e., other than by eschewing possible but non-actual objects), then the present theory might fail to be actualist.

With these introductory remarks, we may turn to the subtheory of possible worlds that is developed in object theory. I take the theory described below to be unique in that the principles governing worlds are precisely derived as theorems rather than stipulated as axioms. Some of the theorems below may already be familiar, having appeared in Zalta 1983 (78–84), 1993, Fitelson & Zalta 2007, Bueno, Menzel & Zalta 2014, and Menzel & Zalta 2014. Many of these theorems have been reworked and enhanced in several ways. Moreover, the theorems now have greater significance, since object theory now asserts that every formula signifies a proposition (105.2), including those with encoding subformulas or encoding formulas as subterms. So when the theory implies, for an arbitrary possible world \( w \), that \( w \) is maximal (i.e., implies that for every proposition \( p \), either \( p \) is true at \( w \) or \( \neg p \) is true at \( w \)), every formula can be instantiated for the universal quantifier over all propositions.\(^{260}\)

Even with these improvements, the basic idea has remained the same: possible worlds are defined to be situations of a certain kind and, hence, abstract individuals.\(^{261}\) Thus, our conception of worlds can be traced back to Wittgenstein, but with the added insight about the distinction between the internal and external properties of situations discussed in Remark (454). The Tractarian conception “the world is all that is the case” will be validated by the theorem that \( p \) is true if and only if \( p \) is true at the actual world (518)*, since this theorem implies that the actual world encodes all that is the case. The Tractarian conception will be preserved in our definition of a world (495) as a situation \( s \) that might be such that all and only true propositions are true in \( s \), since this definition implies that a possible world is a situation that might be such that it encodes everything that is the case.

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\(^{260}\)When we move to typed object theory in Chapter 15, there will be some formulas that denote nothing. For example, the definite description \( \phi(p \& \neg p) \), where \( p \) is a proposition variable, becomes expressible. This description is both a term and a formula. As a term it denotes nothing, but as a formula, it has truth conditions. So, in what follows, when we remark upon the fact that a theorem of world theory expressed with propositional variables holds for arbitrary formulas, this only applies to second-order object theory. In typed object theory, we can instantiate such theorems only to significant formulas.

\(^{261}\)Our theory therefore reconciles situation theory and world theory. In the early 1980s, situation theory was thought to be incompatible with world theory. See the early publications of Barwise and Perry, \textit{op. cit.}
an object \( x \) is a *possible world* iff \( x \) is a situation possibly such that all and only the propositions \( x \) encodes are true:

\[
\text{PossibleWorld}(x) \equiv \text{df} \quad \text{Situation}(x) & \land \forall p(x \Sigma p \equiv p)
\]

Let us continue to use \( s, s', s'', \ldots \) as restricted variables for situations. Now recall that we can say that \( p \) is *true in* \( s \), written \( s \models p \), whenever \( s \Sigma p \). Then we may simplify the above definition to:

\[
\text{PossibleWorld}(s) \equiv \text{df} \quad \forall p(s \models p \equiv p)
\]

That is, a situation \( s \) is a possible world just in case it might be such that all and only the propositions true in \( s \) are true. Remember here that the definiens, \( \forall p(s \models p \equiv p) \), is to be parsed \( \forall p((s \models p) \equiv p) \). Note that our definition decides Choice 3 in Barwise 1989a (261) in favor of Alternative 3.1: worlds are situations.

The question may arise, why haven’t we defined possible worlds as maximal and consistent situations? We take up this question in (505), after we formulate the definition of *maximality* and prove, in (503) and (500) below, that possible worlds are maximal and consistent.

**Theorem**: Rigidity of *PossibleWorld*(\( x \)). Our definitions imply that (.1) \( x \) is a possible world if and only if necessarily \( x \) is a possible world; (.2) possibly \( x \) is a possible world if and only if \( x \) is a possible world; and (.3) possibly \( x \) is a possible world if and only if necessarily \( x \) is a possible world; and (.4) actually \( x \) is a possible world if and only if \( x \) is a possible world:

\[
(\text{.1}) \quad \text{PossibleWorld}(x) \equiv \Box \text{PossibleWorld}(x)
\]

\[
(\text{.2}) \quad \Diamond \text{PossibleWorld}(x) \equiv \text{PossibleWorld}(x)
\]

\[
(\text{.3}) \quad \Diamond \text{PossibleWorld}(x) \equiv \Box \text{PossibleWorld}(x)
\]

\[
(\text{.4}) \quad \Box \Diamond \text{PossibleWorld}(x) \equiv \text{PossibleWorld}(x)
\]

**Remark**: Restricted Variables for Possible Worlds. *PossibleWorld*(\( x \)) is not only a restriction condition in the sense of (330) but a rigid restriction condition in the sense of (334). We haven’t yet shown that *PossibleWorld*(\( x \)) is a restriction condition, but this will become apparent in what follows. We have shown, in effect, that *PossibleWorld*(\( x \)) is a rigid condition, since if we apply GEN to the left-to-right direction of (496.1), then we know:

\[
\vdash \forall x(\text{PossibleWorld}(x) \rightarrow \Box \text{PossibleWorld}(x))
\]

So let \( w, w', w'', \ldots \) be rigid, restricted variables that range over the objects \( x \) such that *PossibleWorld*(\( x \)). Since this is a well-defined condition, we may use
these variables according to the conventions described in (331), (332), (333), (334), and (335).

Note that our possible world variables present us with two interpretive options: we may regard them either as singly-restricted variables ranging over objects \( x \) such that \( \text{PossibleWorld}(x) \) or we may regard them as doubly restricted variables that range over the situations \( s \) such that \( \text{PossibleWorld}(s) \). We are free to exercise either option when it is convenient to do so.

First, by regarding \( w, w', \ldots \) as doubly restricted variables that range over situations, we can immediately regard notions defined with respect to situations (using a free restricted variable \( s \)) as defined with respect to possible worlds \( w \). For example, since \( \text{Consistent}(s) \) is defined with respect to situations (486), the claim \( \text{Consistent}(w) \) doesn’t need to be defined. See the next Remark (498) for another example.

Second, we now have two ways of eliminating the bound restricted variable \( w \). Let us focus just on the variable-binding sentence-forming operators.\(^{262}\) Then if \( w \) is interpreted as singly restricted, then we may expand the claims:

(A) \( \forall w \text{Consistent}(w) \)

(B) \( \exists w \text{Actual}(w) \)

as the claims:

(C) \( \forall x (\text{PossibleWorld}(x) \rightarrow \text{Consistent}(x)) \)

(D) \( \exists x (\text{PossibleWorld}(x) \& \text{Actual}(x)) \)

But if \( w \) is interpreted as doubly restricted, i.e., as a restricted variable ranging over situations \( s \) such that \( \text{PossibleWorld}(s) \), then (A) and (B) may be interpreted as:

(E) \( \forall s (\text{PossibleWorld}(s) \rightarrow \text{Consistent}(s)) \)

(F) \( \exists s (\text{PossibleWorld}(s) \& \text{Actual}(s)) \)

Of course (E) and (F) have bound restricted variables which in turn may be eliminated.\(^{263}\)

\(^{262}\)Of course, the definite description \( \lambda \forall\) becomes significant whenever we know \( \exists \lambda \forall \). However, we’ll rarely use \( \lambda \)-expressions of the form \( [\lambda s \phi] \) and \( [\lambda w \phi] \), at least not until we prove that they are significant. These are shorthand for \( [\lambda x \text{Situation}(x) \& \phi] \) and \( [\lambda x \text{PossibleWorld}(x) \& \phi] \), respectively. The \( \lambda \) in these expressions bind variables in encoding formula subterms, namely, the ones that are subterms of \( \text{Situation}(x) \) and \( \text{PossibleWorld}(x) \). It is an open research question as to whether these \( \lambda \)-expressions are provably significant.

\(^{263}\)In the usual way, (E) and (F) expand to:

\( \forall x (\text{Situation}(x) \rightarrow (\text{PossibleWorld}(x) \rightarrow \text{Consistent}(x))) \)

\( \exists x (\text{Situation}(x) \& \text{PossibleWorld}(x) \& \text{Actual}(x)) \)

Note, however, that we shall not have occasion to regard (A) and (B), respectively, as short for the above, since the clause \( \text{Situation}(x) \) is redundant in both.
Third, by treating (A) and (B) as shorthand, respectively, for (E) and (F) instead of as shorthand for (C) and (D), we can often simplify the reasoning process: the consequences of (E) and (F) obtained by Rules \( \forall E \) and \( \exists E \), for example, will involve terms that are known or assumed to rigidly refer to situations.

Consequently, in what follows, we sometimes prefer to reason as if our restricted variables for possible worlds are doubly restricted. Of course, in some cases, we continue to reason by eliminating the possible world variables in the usual way, as singly restricted. We do this on those occasions when it clarifies the reasoning using a principle (axiom, theorem, or definition) for which it may not be immediately evident how it applies to restricted variables.

Moreover, in what follows, the reader may encounter a series of principles (i.e., definitions and theorems) in which (a) the definition introduces some new notion defined on situations using the variable \( s \) while (b) the subsequent theorem governs possible worlds and is stated using the variable \( w \). The reason for this should now be clear: in general, we always choose the variable, restricted or otherwise, that is the most appropriate for the occasion, i.e., the variable that either (i) yields the simplest formulation of the definition and the simplest statement of the theorem (without compromising generality), or (ii) minimizes the amount of reasoning that has to be done to prove the theorem (thereby minimizing the chances of introducing reasoning errors and maximizing the clarity of the justification).

(498) **Remark**: Truth At A Possible World. In the previous Remark, we noted that if possible world variables are interpreted as doubly restricted, i.e., as ranging over situations \( s \) such that \( \text{PossibleWorld}(s) \), then notions defined on situations apply to possible worlds without having to be redefined. An important example is the notion of truth in a situation, i.e., \( s \models p \). By interpreting \( w \) as a doubly restricted variable, one can see that \( w \models p \) is defined. Note, however, that whereas we read \( s \models p \) as ‘\( p \) is true in \( s \)’, we shall, for historical reasons, read \( w \models p \) as ‘\( p \) is true at \( w \)’. Thus, truth at a possible world is simply a special case of the notion truth in a situation. Moreover, since worlds are a special type of situation, it follows by theorem (459) that \( w \models p \) is equivalent to \( w[\lambda y p] \). Hence, when a proposition \( p \) is true at \( w \), the property \( [\lambda y p] \) characterizes \( w \) by way of an encoding predication.

(499) **Theorem**: Possible Worlds Are Possible Situations. It is now straightforward to show that possible worlds are possible situations:

\[
\text{Possible}(w)
\]

The reader is encouraged to think twice about this theorem. It is not a triviosity; the claim to be established is not a tautology of the form \( (\varphi \land \psi) \rightarrow \varphi \). We’re not proving \( \text{Possible}(s) \land \text{World}(s) \rightarrow \text{Possible}(s) \). A second look reveals...
that, given the definition of $\text{Possible}(s)$ (490) as $\text{Actual}(s)$, the theorem captures a fundamental intuition about possible worlds, namely, that they each world might have been actual. This claim is so fundamental to our conception of possible worlds that we tend to overlook the suggestion that it is capable of proof. And, just as importantly, we’ve haven’t applied a primitive notion of possibility to the primitive notion of possible world to make the claim. It is a mistake to use a primitive notions of possibility, actuality, and possible worlds to simply assert that possible worlds might have been actual. Such a move borders on nonsense, since primitive possible world talk was introduced to interpret primitive modal talk, and so to use primitive modal talk to make pronouncements about the modal properties of possible worlds seems misguided. In the present treatise, $\diamond$ is defined in terms of the only modal primitive ($\square$), as are possible worlds. And actual, understood traditionally as a condition that applies to possible worlds when every proposition they make true is true, is is defined as well. So, this theorem has greater significance than meets the eye.

(500) **Theorem:** Possible Worlds Are Consistent and Non-Trivial. Clearly, (.1) possible worlds are consistent, and (.2) non-trivial situations:

(1) $\text{Consistent}(w)$

(2) $\neg\text{TrivialSituation}(w)$

**Exercises:** (a) Prove that possible worlds are consistent”, as the latter was defined in Remark (487). (b) Prove that possible worlds are not null situations, as the latter were defined in (468.1).

(501) **Lemmas:** Rigidity of Truth At a Possible World. It is straightforward to establish that (.1) $p$ is true at $w$ if and only if necessarily $p$-is-true-at-$w$; (.2) possibly $p$-is-true-at-$w$ if and only if $p$ is true at $w$; (.3) possibly $p$-is-true-at-$w$ if and only if necessarily $p$-is-true-at-$w$; (.4) actually $p$-is-true-at-$w$ if and only if $p$ is true at $w$; and (.5) $p$ fails to be true-at-$w$ if and only if necessarily $p$ fails to be true-at-$w$:

(1) $w \models p \equiv \square w \models p$

(2) $\diamond w \models p \equiv w \models p$

(3) $\diamond w \models p \equiv \square w \models p$

(4) $\diamond w \models p \equiv w \models p$

(5) $\neg w \models p \equiv \square \neg w \models p$

(502) **Definition:** Maximality. A situation $s$ is maximal iff for every proposition $p$, either $p$ is true in $s$ or $\neg p$ is true in $s$: 
Maximal\( (s) \equiv_{df} \forall p (s \models p \lor s \models \neg p) \)

**Theorem:** Possible Worlds Are Maximal.

Maximal\( (w) \)

We've therefore now established that possible worlds are maximal and consistent.

**Theorem:** Maximality, Possible Worlds, and Possibility.

1. \( \text{Maximal}(s) \rightarrow \square \text{Maximal}(s) \)

2. \( \text{PossibleWorld}(s) \equiv \text{Maximal}(s) \& \text{Possible}(s) \)

**Remark:** Possible Worlds as MaxCon Situations. It would serve well to remark upon the difference between defining possible worlds as in (495) and defining them as maxcon situations, i.e., as situations that are maximal, consistent, and consistent*. The simple answer is that the definitions aren’t equivalent; whereas situations satisfying (495) are maxcon, it doesn’t follow that situations that are maxcon satisfy (495). To see this, consider a maxcon situation in which (it is true that) Socrates might have been a chunk of rock or might have had different parents. If certain essentialist principles are true and it is a metaphysical fact that Socrates couldn’t have been a chunk of rock and couldn’t have had different parents, then a maxcon situation in which Socrates is a chunk of rock or had different parents is one that fails to be a possible world in the sense of (495). In other words, there may be modal facts that place constraints on what maxcon situations are possible worlds. (495) defines possible world in a way that respects those modal truths, should there be any.

Moreover, theorem (504.2) shows that definition (495) implies that a situation is a possible world if and only if it is maximal and might have been actual, where the modality ‘might’ is metaphysical possibility. This is not captured by saying that that possible worlds are situations that are maximal and free of contradictions. Finally, the body of theorems derivable from (495) and its supporting definitions provide evidence of its power and correctness. This evidence will continue to accumulate as we go.

**Definition:** Necessary Implication and Necessary Equivalence. We say that \( p \) necessarily implies \( q \), written \( p \Rightarrow q \), just in case necessarily, if \( p \) then \( q \):

1. \( p \Rightarrow q \equiv_{df} \square(p \rightarrow q) \)

We also say that \( p \) and \( q \) are necessarily equivalent, written \( p \Leftrightarrow q \), just in case both \( p \) necessarily implies \( q \) and \( q \) necessarily implies \( p \):

2. \( p \Leftrightarrow q \equiv_{df} (p \Rightarrow q) \& (q \Rightarrow p) \)
Clearly, then, we have extended the notions of necessary implication and necessary equivalence, defined in (431.1) and (431.2), respectively, so that they apply to propositions as well as properties.

(507) **Theorem:** Necessary Equivalence and Necessary Material Equivalence. It is therefore a simple consequence of the previous definition that \( p \) and \( q \) are necessarily equivalent if and only if necessarily, \( p \) is materially equivalent to \( q \):

\[
p \leftrightarrow q \equiv \Box(p \equiv q)
\]

(508) **Lemmas:** Facts About Situations. Let us now use \( p_1, \ldots, p_n \) (which we’ve heretofore taken to be constants) as variables ranging over propositions. Then we may establish two helpful lemmas about situations. (.1) if \( p_1, \ldots, p_n \) are all true in situation \( s \) and the conjunction of \( p_1, \ldots, p_n \) implies \( q \), then if all and only true propositions are true in \( s \), then \( q \) is true in \( s \):

\[
(.1) (s \models p_1 \land \cdots \land p_n \land ((p_1 \land \cdots \land p_n) \rightarrow q)) \rightarrow (\forall p (s \models p \equiv p) \rightarrow s \models q)
\]

Since this is a modally strict theorem, the Rule of Necessitation (RN) applies. Hence the necessitation of (.1) is a theorem. So by the K axiom and other principles of modality, we can establish: (.2) if necessarily \( p_1 \)-is-true-in-\( s \) and \( \ldots \) and necessarily \( p_n \)-is-true-in-\( s \) and \( p_1 \land \cdots \land p_n \) necessarily implies \( q \), then necessarily, \( q \)-is-true-in-\( s \) when all and only truths are true in \( s \):

\[
(.2) (\Box s \models p_1 \land \cdots \land \Box s \models p_n \land ((p_1 \land \cdots \land p_n) \Rightarrow q)) \rightarrow \\
\Box(\forall p (s \models p \equiv p) \rightarrow s \models q)
\]

(509) **Definition:** Modal Closure, i.e., Closure Under Necessary Implication. We now say that a situation \( s \) is modally closed or closed under necessary implication if and only if, for any propositions \( p_1, \ldots, p_n \) and \( q \), if each of \( p_1, \ldots, p_n \) is true in \( s \) and \( q \) is necessarily implied by the conjunction \( p_1 \land \cdots \land p_n \), then \( q \) is also true in \( s \):

\[
\text{ModallyClosed}(s) \equiv_{df} \forall p_1 \ldots \forall p_n (s \models p_1 \land \cdots \land s \models p_n \land ((p_1 \land \cdots \land p_n) \Rightarrow q)) \rightarrow s \models q
\]

Though one might suggest that it is the notion of truth in a situation that is modally closed when the definiens obtains, it does no harm if we speak as situations are objects that are, or are not, modally closed.

(510) **Theorem:** Possible Worlds are Modally Closed. From (508) and (509), it follows that possible worlds are modally closed:

\[
\text{ModallyClosed}(w)
\]
(511) **Corollary:** Negation Coherence of Truth At A World. We may now establish that truth-at-a-world is a condition that for which the negation behaves classically. (.1) \( \neg p \) is true at \( w \) if and only if it is not the case that \( p \) is true at \( w \), and (.2) \( p \) is true at \( w \) if and only if it is not the case that \( \neg p \) is true at \( w \):

\[
\begin{align*}
(1) & \quad w \models \neg p \equiv \neg w \models p \\
(2) & \quad (w \models p) \equiv \neg w \models \neg p
\end{align*}
\]

These facts show that negation is coherent with respect to truth at a possible world. Furthermore, we may universally generalize (.1) and (.2) with respect to \( p \) and since we know, for any formulas \( \varphi \) and \( \psi \), that \( \varphi \downarrow \) and \( \psi \downarrow \) (105.2), we obtain theorem schemata by substituting \( \varphi \) for \( p \) in (.1) and (.2), keeping in mind the proviso for typed object theory mentioned in footnote 260.

(512) **Remark:** Situations, Worlds, Propositions, and Double Negation. Note that when we consider situations only (and not possible worlds), then \( s \models q \) and \( s \models \neg \neg q \) are not provably equivalent. To see this, recall that since \( s \) is a situation, \( s \models q \) is equivalent, by theorem (459), to \( s[\lambda y \; q] \), and \( s \models \neg \neg q \) is equivalent to \( s[\lambda y \; \neg \neg q] \). But since our theory doesn’t imply that \( [\lambda y \; \neg \neg q] = [\lambda y \; q] \), we cannot infer \( s[\lambda y \; q] \) from \( s[\lambda y \; \neg \neg q] \), or vice versa. Clearly, both \( [\lambda y \; q] \) and \( [\lambda y \; \neg \neg q] \) exist and it is provable that each necessarily implies the other, in the sense of (431.1). But situations aren’t closed under necessary implication: from the facts that \( sF \) and \( \Box \forall x (Fx \equiv Gx) \), it doesn’t follow that \( sG \). However, possible worlds are provably closed under necessary implication. So \( w \models q \) is provably equivalent to \( w \models \neg \neg q \).

(513) **Theorem:** There is a Unique Actual World. We first prove (.1) there exists a possible world that makes true all and only true propositions. Then we establish (.2) there is a unique actual world:

\[
\begin{align*}
(1) & \quad \exists w \forall p (w \models p \equiv p) \\
(2) & \quad \exists ! w \text{Actual}(w)
\end{align*}
\]

Since these theorem imply, a fortiori, that there are possible worlds, we know that the restricted quantifiers \( \forall w \) and \( \exists w \) behave classically in the sense that \( \forall w \varphi \rightarrow \exists w \varphi \); cf. Remark (336).

Since both (.1) and (.2) are modally strict, it follow by RN that both are necessary truths. The necessitation of (.1), \( \Box \exists w \forall p (w \models p \equiv p) \), intuitively asserts, in terms of semantically primitive possible worlds, that at every semantically primitive possible world \( w \), there is a object-theoretic possible world \( w' \) that encodes a proposition \( p \) if and only if \( p \) is true at \( w \). The necessitation of (.2), \( \Box \exists ! w \text{Actual}(w) \), intuitively asserts, in terms of semantically primitive possible worlds, that at every semantically primitive possible world \( w \), there is an object-theoretic possible world \( w' \) that is actual with respect to \( w \), i.e., by definition
of actual (480), that every proposition \( w' \) encodes is true at \( w \).\(^{264}\) So whereas theorem (499) is a universal claim that implies each possible world might have been actual, the proof of (.1) and (.2) actually gives a method for constructing, in any modal context, the object-theoretic possible world that encodes all and only the truths of that context.

After a short digression concerning another way in which the present theorem has significance, we'll work our ways towards a definition of a new term that refers to the unique object that is an actual world.

\((514)\) **Remark:** On the Uniqueness of the Actual World. On the present theory, the claim that there is a unique actual world is provable, necessary, and known \textit{a priori}. By contrast, on the concretist conception of possible world, the claim that there is a unique actual world appears to be a contingent fact, known only \textit{a posteriori} and hence, not susceptible to proof. It may be that nothing like the previous theorem is available to one adopting the concretist conception of possible world.

Moreover, as far as I can tell, philosophers who’ve adopted a traditional abstractionist theory of possible worlds can offer a proof of the existence of a \textit{unique} actual world only if they adopt the requirement that propositions are identical when necessarily equivalent, i.e., that \( \square(p \equiv q) \rightarrow p = q \). For if one allows that there are necessarily equivalent propositions that are distinct from any given proposition, then when possible worlds are identified as maximal and possible propositions (or states of affairs), one can prove the existence of multiply distinct actual worlds, at least given the following standard definition: \( p \) is a possible world \textit{iff} (i) \( \forall q((p \Rightarrow q) \lor (p \Rightarrow \neg q)) \) and (ii) \( \Box p \).\(^{265}\) For suppose (a) \( p_1 \) is such a possible world, and (b) \( p_1 \) is actual, either in the sense that \( p_1 \) is true or in the sense that every proposition necessarily implied by \( p_1 \) is true. Then consider any proposition \( p_2 \) that is necessarily equivalent to \( p_1 \) (in the sense that \( p_1 \Leftrightarrow p_2 \)) but \textit{distinct} from \( p_1 \). Then it follows that \( p_1 \) and \( p_2 \) necessarily imply the same propositions.\(^{266}\) So since \( p_1 \) satisfies clause (i), so

\(^{264}\)Of course, it is also true, and derivable, that at each semantically primitive possible world \( w \), there is a object-theoretic possible world \( w' \) that encodes a proposition \( p \) just in case it is actually the case that \( p \). But this is not what these theorems assert. Once we form the description \( \text{Actual}(w) \), its denotation will the object-theoretic possible world \( w \) such that it is actually the case that every proposition \( w \) makes true is true.

\(^{265}\)Clause (i) is a maximality condition and clause (ii) guarantees metaphysical possibility. Since possible worlds aren’t sets, I’ve put aside the suggestion that the existence of a unique actual world is provable on the grounds that one can prove the existence of a unique set of propositions that is both maximal and possible. This is not an alternative theory of possible worlds but rather a model of them, for reasons mentioned previously.

\(^{266}\)The proof is a variant of left-to-right direction of (432.3). Assume \( p_1 \Leftrightarrow p_2 \). Then by (507), we know both:

\((\varphi)\) \( \square(p_1 \rightarrow p_2) \)

\((\xi)\) \( \square(p_2 \rightarrow p_1) \)
does \( p_2 \) (exercise). Moreover, if \( p_1 \) is actual in the sense of being true, so is \( p_2 \), and if \( p_1 \) is actual in the sense that every proposition necessarily implied by \( p_1 \) is true, then so is \( p_2 \). So, there are two distinct actual worlds on this theory. The abstractionist can either derive the existence of a unique actual world by collapsing necessarily equivalent propositions or both allow for distinct but necessarily equivalent propositions and give up the claim that there is a unique actual world. Such a dilemma is not faced on the present theory. For a fuller discussion, see Zalta 1988 (73–4), 1993 (393–94), and McNamara 1993. A similar dilemma faces anyone who takes possible worlds to be properties without requiring the doubtful principle that 
\[ \Box \forall x (Fx \equiv Gx) \rightarrow F \equiv G. \]

(515) Theorem: A Significant Description. It follows immediately from (513.2) that the actual world exists:

\[ rwActual(w) \downarrow \]

The proof of this theorem is modally strict because it rests on (174.2), not on (144.2)★.

(516) Definition: The Actual World. Since we know that the actual world exists, we can name it:

\[ w_{ \alpha } \overset{df}{=} rwActual(w) \]

Note that the new constant symbol \( w_{ \alpha } \) is a boldface, italic \( w \) decorated by a Greek \( \alpha \); this highlights the special character of the object denoted as the first among possible worlds. We do not use a plain italic \( w \), for the resulting symbol would be conventionally used as a special variable whose value would depend on the value of \( w \).

(517) ★Theorems: The True and The Actual World. Recall that we defined The True (\( \top \)) in (296.1) as the abstract object that encodes all and only those properties \( F \) of the form \( \lambda y \, p \) for some true proposition \( p \). It may come as a surprise that The True is identical with the actual world:

\[ .1 \quad \top = w_{ \alpha } \]

We have therefore derived a fact about The True and the actual world suggested by Dummett in the following passage (1981, 180):

If we take seriously Frege’s manner of speaking in ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’, the True must contain within itself the referents of the parts of all true sentences, and will admit a decomposition corresponding to each true
sentence. It thus becomes, in effect, an immensely complex structure, as it were the single all-inclusive Fact, which is how Kluge conceives of it, making it virtually indistinguishable from the world.

Moreover, from (1.1), (300.1)⋆, (303.3), and the definition of an extension of a proposition (301), it follows that (2) a proposition \( p \) is true if and only if the actual world \( w_a \) is the extension of \( p \):

\[
(2) \quad p \equiv w_a = \text{ExtensionOf}(x,p)
\]

This is an important and unheralded principle that relates true propositions, the actual world, and the extensions of propositions.

(518) ★Theorem: Truth and Truth At the Actual World. A proposition \( p \) is true iff \( p \) is true at the actual world:

\[
p \equiv w_a \models p
\]

The proof shows that an earlier fact about The True (300.3)⋆, namely \( p \equiv \top \Sigma p \), can be transformed, to take on new significance. This theorem is another case where the non-modal strictness of the conditional results from the fact that the truth of one side varies from modal context to modal context, while the truth of the other side does not.

(519) Theorem: The Actual World Is a Possible World and Maximal. While it is trivial to prove that \( w_a \) is both a possible world and maximal from (145.2)★ and (503), the claims in fact have modally strict proofs:

\[
(1) \quad \text{PossibleWorld}(w_a)
\]
\[
(2) \quad \text{Maximal}(w_a)
\]

By contrast, \( \text{Actual}(w_a) \) isn’t a modally strict theorem, although it is easy to prove it by non-modally strict means. However, we’ll soon establish, by modally strict means, that \( w_a \) is actual∗, in the sense defined in Remark (482).

(520) Theorem: True at the Actual World and Actually True. The theorems in (519) allow us to prove a modally strict counterpart of (518)★, namely, that \( p \) is true at the actual world if and only if it is actually the case that \( p \):

\[
w_a \models p \equiv \alpha p
\]

Note that the left-to-right direction of this theorem implies, by GEN, that \( \forall p(w_a \models p \rightarrow \alpha p) \). So given the notion of \( \text{Actual}^\ast \) defined in Remark (482), it follows that \( \text{Actual}^\ast(w_a) \) is a modally strict theorem.

(521) ★Theorem: Possible Worlds Other Than \( w_a \) Aren’t Actual. It follows immediately that possible worlds other than \( w_a \) fail to be an actual world:
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\[ w \neq w_a \rightarrow \neg \text{Actual}(w) \]

**Exercise.** Develop a modally strict proof of \( w \neq w_a \rightarrow \neg \text{Actual}(w) \).

(522) ★**Theorem:** Parts of the Actual World. Actual situations are part of the actual world:

\[ \text{Actual}(s) \equiv s \leq w_a \]

Cf. Barwise 1989a (261), where actual situations are defined to be the ones that are part of the actual world.

(523) ★**Theorems:** Facts About the Actual World. (1) A proposition \( p \) is true at the actual world iff the actual world exemplifies being such that \( p \). Moreover, (2) a proposition \( p \) is true iff the proposition the-actual-world-exemplifies-being-such-that-\( p \) is true at the actual world:

1. \( w_a \models p \equiv [\lambda y \ p]w_a \)
2. \( p \equiv w_a \models [\lambda y \ p]w_a \)

(2) is especially interesting because when \( p \) is true, we may derive from (2) a statement of the form \( [\lambda y \ p]w_a \) is true at \( w_a \). And when \( \neg p \) is true, then (2) implies that \( [\lambda y \neg p]w_a \) is true at \( w_a \). So, in either case, \( w_a \) is nonwellfounded in the above sense: a fact of the form \( \varphi(w_a) \) is true at \( w_a \). Thus, (1) and (2) decide Choices 8 (266) and 10 (268) in Barwise 1989a: situations can be constituents of facts and at least some situations are nonwellfounded.

(524) **Lemmas:** Some Basic Facts About Modality, Situations, Possible Worlds, and Truth At. (1) If it is possible that \( p \), then there might be a possible world at which \( p \) is true; (2) if there might be a possible world at which \( p \) is true, then there is a possible world at which \( p \) is true; (3) if \( p \) is true, then for all situations \( s \), if all and only true propositions are true in \( s \) then \( p \) is true in \( s \); (4) if \( p \) is necessarily true, then it is necessary that for all situations \( s \), if all and only true propositions are true in \( s \), \( p \) is true in \( s \); (5) if necessarily every situation is such that \( \varphi \), then every situation is necessarily such that \( \varphi \); (6) if \( p \) is true at every possible world \( w \), then it is necessarily so; and (7) if the claim that \( p \) is true at every possible world is necessary, then \( p \) is necessary:

1. \( \Diamond p \rightarrow \Diamond \exists w (w \models p) \)
2. \( \Diamond \exists w (w \models p) \rightarrow \exists w (w \models p) \)
3. \( p \rightarrow \forall s (\forall q (s \models q \equiv q) \rightarrow s \models p) \)
(4) $\Box p \rightarrow \Box \forall s(\forall q(s \models q \equiv q) \rightarrow s \models p)$

(5) $\Box \forall q \rightarrow \forall s \Box q$

(6) $\forall w(w \models p) \rightarrow \Box \forall w(w \models p)$

(7) $\Box \forall w(w \models p) \rightarrow \Box p$

These lemmas are used to simplify the proofs of the fundamental theorems of possible world theory, to which we now turn. Note that (.5) establishes that the Converse Barcan Formula (167.2) holds when restricted to situations.

(525) Theorems: Fundamental Theorems of Possible World Theory. The foremost principles of possible world theory are that (.1) it is possible that $p$ iff there is a possible world at which $p$ is true; (.2) it is necessary that $p$ iff $p$ is true at all possible worlds; (.3) it is not possible that $p$ iff there is no possible world at which $p$ is true; and (.4) it is not necessary that $p$ iff there is a possible world at which $p$ fails to be true:

(1) $\Diamond p \equiv \exists w(w \models p)$

(2) $\Box p \equiv \forall w(w \models p)$

(3) $\neg \Diamond p \equiv \neg \exists w(w \models p)$

(4) $\neg \Box p \equiv \exists w(\neg w \models p)$

In the Appendix, there is a proof of (.1) that makes use of (524.1) and (524.2). In addition, there are two proofs of (.2), one that makes use of (524.4) – (524.7) and a simpler one that makes use of (.1). The proofs of (.3) and (.4) are left as simple exercises.

Note that (.1) is a strengthened version of the claim that every way that a world could possibly be is a way that some world is (Lewis 1986, 2, 71, 86). When we analyze ways a possible world might be as possibly true propositions, then Lewis’s principle is the left-to-right direction of (.1). For a fuller discussion, see Menzel & Zalta 2014.

(526) Theorem: Facts about Modality and the Existence of Possible Worlds: (.1) $p$ is necessary if and only if there exists a possible world where $p$ is necessary; (.2) $p$ is necessary if and only if at every possible world, $p$ is necessary; (.3) $p$ is possible if and only if there exists a possible world where $p$ is possible; and (.2) $p$ is possible if and only if at every possible world, $p$ is possible:

(1) $\Box p \equiv \exists w(w \models \Box p)$

(2) $\Box p \equiv \forall w(w \models \Box p)$

(3) $\Diamond p \equiv \exists w(w \models \Diamond p)$
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(4) \( \Diamond p \equiv \forall w (w \models \Diamond p) \)

(527) Theorem: Truth At A World and the Connectives, Quantifiers, and Modal Operators. Since we already know how truth-at-a-world behaves with respect to negation (511), we begin by examining how it behaves with respect to the other connectives. (.1) \( p \& q \) is true at a possible world \( w \) if and only if both \( p \) is true at \( w \) and \( q \) is true at \( w \); (.2) if \( p \) is true at a possible world, and the conditional \( p \rightarrow q \) is true at that possible world, then \( q \) is true at that possible world; (.3) \( p \lor q \) is true at a possible world \( w \) if and only if either \( p \) is true at \( w \) or \( q \) is true at \( w \); (.4) \( p \equiv q \) is true at a possible world \( w \) if and only if: \( p \) is true at \( w \) if and only if \( q \) is true at \( w \):

(1) \( w \models (p \& q) \equiv ((w \models p) \& (w \models q)) \)
(2) \( w \models (p \rightarrow q) \equiv ((w \models p) \rightarrow (w \models q)) \)
(3) \( w \models (p \lor q) \equiv ((w \models p) \lor (w \models q)) \)
(4) \( w \models (p \equiv q) \equiv ((w \models p) \equiv (w \models q)) \)

Clearly, we may universally generalize on the variables \( p \) and \( q \) in (.1) – (.4). So since \( \phi \downarrow \) and \( \psi \downarrow \), for any formulas \( \phi \) and \( \psi \) (105.2), the above hold for any formulas \( \phi \) and \( \psi \) that may be uniformly substituted for \( p \) and \( q \), respectively, keeping in mind the proviso for typed object theory mentioned in footnote 260.

Next, we show that the quantifiers work similarly, except now it makes sense to formulate these claims, in the first instance, as schemata. (For the reasons, see footnote 254.) (.5) it is true at \( w \) that every \( \alpha \) is such that \( \phi \) if and only if every \( \alpha \) is such that it is true at \( w \) that \( \phi \), and (.6) it is true at \( w \) that some \( \alpha \) is such that \( \phi \) if and only if some \( \alpha \) is such that it is true at \( w \) that \( \phi \):

(5) \( (w \models \forall \alpha \phi) \equiv \forall \alpha (w \models \phi) \)
(6) \( (w \models \exists \alpha \phi) \equiv \exists \alpha (w \models \phi) \)

Now, switching back to propositional variables, it is easy to establish:

(7) \( (w \models \Box p) \rightarrow \Box w \models p \)

267 If we use recent theorems to simplify the proof of (493.5), we obtain the following proof of (8). Since there are contingently true propositions (215.1), let \( r \) be such, so that we know by (211.1) and facts about modality that:

(A) \( r \)
(B) \( \neg \Box r \)

By \( \top \Diamond \), (A) implies \( \Diamond r \), and so a fundamental theorem of possible worlds (525.1) implies \( \exists w (w \models r) \). Suppose \( w_1 \) is such a possible world, so that we know \( w_1 \models r \). Then by (501.1), \( \Box w_1 \models r \). So by \&I and \( \exists \), it remains only to show \( \neg w_1 \models \Box r \). Suppose, for reductio, \( w_1 \models \Box r \). Then \( \exists w (w \models \Box r) \). So by (526.2), \( \Box r \), which contradicts (B).
\[(.8) \exists w \exists p ((\Box w \models p) \& \neg w \models \Box p)\]
\[(.9) (\Diamond w \models p) \rightarrow w \models \Diamond p\]
\[(.10) \exists w \exists p ((w \models \Diamond p) \& \neg \Diamond w \models p)\]

**Exercise:** In light of the Exercise at the end of (493), determine whether there is a proof of the following:
\[(w \models \Diamond p) \equiv \Diamond w \models p\]
If there is a proof, indicate whether or not it is modally strict. If you can't find a proof of the biconditional, can you find a proof of at least one direction?

**Exercise:** Show that possible worlds are *consistent* iff and they are *consistent*.

**Remark:** Reconciling Lewis Worlds with Possible Worlds. There is a way to reconcile, at least to some extent, the present theory of possible worlds with Lewis’s conception of possible worlds. Note that the present theory of possible worlds doesn’t tell us which ordinary objects are concrete at which worlds. But we may define:

- \(x\) is a *physical universe at \(w\)* if and only if (a) \(x\) is concrete at \(w\), (b) every object \(y\) that is concrete at \(w\) is a part of \(x\), and (c) \(x\) exemplifies exactly the propositional properties \([\lambda y \ p]\) such that \(p\) is true at \(w\).

If given a part-whole relation \(\subseteq\) for concrete objects, one could formalize this definition as follows:\(^{268}\)

\[
\text{PhysicalUniverseAt}(x, w) =_{df} \]
\[
w \models E x \& \forall y (w \models E y \rightarrow y \subseteq x) \& \forall p([\lambda y \ p]x \equiv w \models p)
\]

Given this definition and the assumption that \(\subseteq\) obeys a standard mereological principle, namely, that for any two objects \(x, y\) that are concrete at \(w\) there is an object \(z\) that is concrete at \(w\) of which \(x\) and \(y\) are a part, one might reasonably assert that for each possible world \(w\) at which there are concrete objects, there is a universe at \(w\), i.e.,

\[
\forall w (w \models \exists x E! x \rightarrow \exists y \text{PhysicalUniverseAt}(y, w))
\]

\(^{268}\)It is important to understand why the third conjunct is included in the definition of \(\text{PhysicalUniverseAt}(x, w)\). Without this clause, a physical universe at \(w\) would be defined solely in terms of the objects that are concrete at \(w\). Consider the case in which there are two possible worlds \(w_1\) and \(w_2\) such that (i) exactly the same objects are concrete at \(w_1\) and \(w_2\) and (ii) different propositions are true at \(w_1\) and \(w_2\). Thus, as we know, clause (ii) implies \(w_1 \neq w_2\). But without the third clause in the definition, any physical universe at \(w_1\) would be identified with any physical universe at \(w_2\), since they have the same concrete parts. Of course, Lewis doesn’t worry about such a result, since individuals are all world bound; his view doesn’t allow for different possible worlds with exactly the same individuals. But it would be a problem for the above reconstruction of Lewis worlds without the third clause in the definition.
Furthermore if $\sqsubseteq$ obeys the principle that for each $w$ there is at most one concrete object at $w$ for which every concrete object at $w$ is a part, then it would follow that for each possible world $w$ at which there are concrete objects, there is a unique universe at $w$, i.e.,

$$\forall w (w \models \exists x E! x \rightarrow \exists! y \text{PhysicalUniverseAt}(y, w))$$

Indeed, from these claims, one should be able to prove that if there is a physical universe for $w$, there is a unique physical universe for $w$, i.e.,

$$\exists x \text{PhysicalUniverseAt}(x, w) \rightarrow \exists! x \text{PhysicalUniverseAt}(x, w)$$

Now if one were to analyze Lewis’s notion of a possible world as a physical universe, then principles akin to those that govern his theory of possible worlds would govern universes. For it would follow, if one assumes the existence of concrete objects, that there is a universe for the actual world, and that universes at other possible worlds are no different in kind from the universe of the actual world – all universes are ordinary objects. Whereas Lewis holds that there are universes just like our own but which are different mereological sums of concrete objects, the above analysis yields that there are universes just like our own but which are different mereological sums of ordinary objects. This reconciles, at least to some extent, the Lewis conception of possible worlds with the present one.

(529) Theorems: Existence of Non-Actual Possible Worlds. The Fundamental Theorems imply: (.1) if some proposition is contingently true, then there exists a nonactual possible world; (.2) if some proposition is contingently false, then there exists a nonactual possible world:

(529.1) $\exists p (\text{ContingentlyTrue}(p)) \rightarrow \exists w (\neg \text{Actual}(w))$

(529.2) $\exists p (\text{ContingentlyFalse}(p)) \rightarrow \exists w (\neg \text{Actual}(w))$

So the existence of nonactual possible worlds depends upon there being a contingent truth or a contingent falsehood.

From (.1) and (215.1) ("there are contingent truths"), or from (.2) and (215.2) ("there are contingent falsehoods"), it immediately follows that (.3) there are nonactual possible worlds, and hence, that (.4) there are at least two possible worlds:

(530) Remark: Nonactual Possible Worlds. Our results show not only that our theory implies a claim stronger than Alternative 1.2 ("There may be more than
one world”) in Barwise 1989a (260), but also that those philosophers who have claimed that there are nonactual possible worlds are provably correct. These results derive from axiom (45.4), since the proofs of (529.3) and (529.4) rest on (215.1), which in turn depends on (45.4). Thus, a Humean could accept an interesting fragment the above theory of possible worlds as long as she rejects axiom (45.4). Without axiom (45.4), we can’t derive the existence of nonactual possible worlds, though the Fundamental Theorems (525.1) – (525.4) remain derivable and true (see Menzel & Zalta 2014). Given the many theorems in which (45.4) has proved its worth, theory comparison is in order should one balk at its acceptance.269

(531) Remark: Iterated Modalities. It is worth spending some time showing that we can derive the correct possible worlds analysis of iterated modalities within the language of object theory itself. Let us represent the fact that Obama might have had a son who might have become president as:

\( (\psi) \Diamond \exists x (Sxo \& \Diamond Px) \)

We now proceed to show that object theory yields the following possible worlds analysis of \( \psi \), namely:

\( (\psi) \exists w \exists x ((w \models Sxo) \& \exists w'(w' \models Px)) \)

This asserts that for some possible world \( w \), there is an object \( x \) such that (a) \( x \) is a son of Obama at \( w \) and (b) at some possible world \( w' \), \( x \) is president.

To establish that \( (\psi) \) follows from \( (\varphi) \), note that by BF\( \Diamond (167.3) \), \( (\varphi) \) is equivalent to: there is an object \( x \) such that, possibly, both \( x \) is Obama’s son and possibly \( x \) is president, i.e.,

\( \exists x \Diamond (Sxo \& \Diamond Px) \)

Suppose \( b \) is such an object, so that we know:

\( \Diamond (Sbo \& \Diamond Pb) \)

This is equivalent, by Fundamental Theorem (525.1), to:

\( \exists w (w \models (Sbo \& \Diamond Pb)) \)

Suppose \( w_1 \) is such a world, so that we know:

\( w_1 \models (Sbo \& \Diamond Pb) \)

269Later, in the theory of natural numbers derived in Chapter 14, we assert an even stronger axiom, namely, that for any property \( G \), if some natural number numbers \( G \), then there might have been a concrete object that fails to exemplify \( G \). This material mode claim helps us to prove that every natural number has a successor, and we’ll see how to justify it by linking it to a formal mode claim that philosophers and logicians already accept, namely, that “the domain (of individuals) might be of any size”. See (793).
By (527.1), we know that this last fact implies and, indeed, is equivalent to:

$$(\vartheta) \ (w_1 \models S_{bo}) \land (w_1 \models \Box Pb)$$

Now it is important to recognize that to analyze the modal operator in the right conjunct of $$(\vartheta)$$ in terms of possible worlds, we may not immediately appeal to an instance of Fundamental Theorem (525.1) to substitute $$\exists w (w \models Pb)$$ for $$\Box Pb$$ in the right conjunct of $$(\vartheta)$$.

Instead, we next infer $$\exists w (w \models \Box Pb)$$ from the second conjunct of $$(\vartheta)$$. Then, by Fundamental Theorem (525.1), it follows that $$\Box \Box Pb$$, which by (165.8) is equivalent to $$\Box Pb$$. So, again, by Fundamental Theorem (525.1), we know that $$\exists w' (w' \models Pb)$$. So let us put together this last fact with the first conjunct of $$(\vartheta)$$, to obtain:

$$(w_1 \models S_{bo}) \land \exists w' (w' \models Pb)$$

From this it follows that:

$$\exists x ((w_1 \models S_{xo}) \land \exists w' (w' \models Px))$$

And by a second application of $$\exists I$$, we obtain:

$$(\psi) \ \exists w \exists x ((w \models S_{xo}) \land \exists w' (w' \models Px))$$

Thus, in our system, $$(\psi)$$ implies its classic, possible-worlds truth conditions.

Of course, before it is fair to call $$(\psi)$$ truth conditions for $$(\varphi)$$, we have to show that $$(\psi)$$ is equivalent to $$(\varphi)$$. It remains, therefore, to derive $$(\varphi)$$ from $$(\psi)$$. Here is a sketch of a modally strict proof:

1. $$\exists w \exists x ((w \models S_{xo}) \land \exists w' (w' \models Px))$$  \hspace{1cm} (\psi)
2. $$w_2 \models S_{co} \land \exists w' (w' \models Pc)$$  \hspace{1cm} Premise for $$\exists E$$, $$w_2$$ and $$c$$ arbitrary
3. $$w_2 \models S_{co} \land \Box Pc$$  \hspace{1cm} From (2), by Fund. Thm. (525.1)
4. $$\Box \Box Pc$$  \hspace{1cm} From 2nd conjunct of (3), by (45.3)
5. $$\forall w (w \models \Box Pc)$$  \hspace{1cm} From (4), by (525.2)
6. $$w_2 \models \Box Pc$$  \hspace{1cm} From (5), by $$\forall E$$
7. $$w_2 \models (S_{co} \land \Box Pc)$$  \hspace{1cm} From 1st conjunct (2), (6), by (527.1)
8. $$\exists w (w \models (S_{co} \land \Box Pc))$$  \hspace{1cm} From (7), by $$\exists I$$
9. $$\Box (S_{co} \land \Box Pc)$$  \hspace{1cm} From (8), by (525.1)
10. $$\exists x (S_{xo} \land \Box Px)$$  \hspace{1cm} From (9), by $$\exists I$$
11. $$(\varphi)$$  \hspace{1cm} From (10), by CBF$$\Box$$ (167.4)

This example therefore shows us how to use the Fundamental Theorems to interderive, within object theory, ordinary modal propositions with iterated

\textsuperscript{270}The reason we cannot use a Rule of Substitution to substitute $$\exists w (w \models Pb)$$ for $$\Box Pb$$ on the basis of the fact that $$\sigma \Box Pb \equiv \exists w (w \models Pb)$$ is that $$\Box Pb$$ is not a subformula of $$w_1 \models \Box Pb$$. If we expand the latter by its definition to $$w_1 [\lambda y \Box Pb]$$, then it becomes clear why $$\Box Pb$$ is not one of its subformulas.
modalities and their classical possible-world truth conditions.\footnote{The example discussed in this Remark was chosen because it has a form that is relevantly similar to an example that has figured prominently in the literature. In McMichael 1983 (54), we find:}

It is not too far off the mark to suggest that in addition to the Fundamental Theorems, the keys to the equivalence of ($\varphi$) and ($\psi$) are, for the left-to-right direction, the Barcan Formula ($\forall x \Box \varphi \rightarrow \Box \forall x \varphi$) and S4\footnote{The example discussed in our Remark further simplifies McMichael’s example in two ways: (1) we have eliminated the conjunct $S’x$, and (2) we’ve made the embedded modal claim into a positive statement instead of a negative one. Thus, it should be clear that our simplifications of the example have not changed its essential features. If one represents McMichael’s original example without the simplifications, the proof that the modal claim and its possible-worlds truth conditions are equivalent goes basically the same way, though the details do become more complex.} ($\Diamond \varphi \rightarrow \Diamond \Box \varphi$), and for the right-to-left direction, the 5 schema ($\Diamond \varphi \rightarrow \Box \Diamond \varphi$) and the Converse Barcan Formula ($\Box \forall x \varphi \rightarrow \forall x \Box \varphi$).

**Theorem:** A Useful Equivalence Concerning Worlds and Objects. The following will prove to be a useful consequence of our theory of possible worlds when we investigate Leibniz’s modal metaphysics: a proposition $p$ is true at a world $w$ iff the proposition that $x$ exemplifies being such that $p$ is true at $w$:

$$w \models p \equiv w \models [\lambda y \; p]x$$

This theorem plays a role in the development of the theory of Leibnizian concepts in Chapter 13.

**Theorem:** Possible Worlds and \textit{Ex Contradictione Quodlibet}. We now prove a few theorems about possible worlds that will stand in contrast to theorems in Section 12.4 about impossible worlds. Note that it follows immediately from (500) by GEN that every possible world is consistent. By applying definitions and quantification theory to this universal claim, it can be transformed into the equivalent claim that there is no possible world $w$ and proposition $p$ such that $p$ and $\neg p$ are both true at $w$. It also follows that there is no possible world $w$ and proposition $p$ such that $p$ and $\neg p$ are true at $w$:

$$\Box \exists x \forall y (Sxy \land S’x \land \neg S’x)$$

Then where $Sxy$ represents $x$ is a son of $y$, $S’x$ represents $x$ is a senator, and $k$ represents Kennedy, we could represent this example as:

$$\Diamond \exists x (Sxk \land S’x \land \neg S’x)$$

The example discussed in our Remark further simplifies McMichael’s example in two ways: (1) we have eliminated the conjunct $S’x$, and (2) we’ve made the embedded modal claim into a positive statement instead of a negative one. Thus, it should be clear that our simplifications of the example have not changed its essential features. If one represents McMichael’s original example without the simplifications, the proof that the modal claim and its possible-worlds truth conditions are equivalent goes basically the same way, though the details do become more complex.
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(.1) \(\neg \exists w \exists p (w \models (p \& \neg p))\)

If we recall Remark (487), where we discussed the notion of Consistency* and showed that it is independent of the notion of Consistency, then the above theorem can easily be transformed into the claim: every world is consistent*.

This theorem has interesting consequences related to the traditional logical law *ex contradictione quodlibet*, which is almost always formulated in the formal mode as: every formula \(\varphi\) is derivable from a contradiction of the form \(\varphi \& \neg \varphi\), i.e., \(\varphi \& \neg \varphi \Rightarrow \psi\). This formal principle clearly governs our system. However, when we formulate *ex contradictione quodlibet* in the material mode so that it applies to propositions, it becomes the easily-established theorem \((p \& \neg p) \Rightarrow q\). Hence by the fact that possible worlds are modally closed and the definition of modal closure, it follows that (.2) if some proposition is \(p\) is such that \(p \& \neg p\) is true at possible world \(w\), then every proposition is true at \(w\):

(.2) \(\exists p (w \models (p \& \neg p)) \rightarrow \forall q (w \models q)\)

(.2) easily follows from the fact that negation of its antecedent is implied by (.1). Since every formula signifies a proposition, (.2) immediately yields the schema \(w \models (\varphi \& \neg \varphi) \rightarrow w \models \psi\).

(534) **Theorem:** Disjunctive Syllogism Holds at a Possible World. (.1) If \(p \lor q\) is true at \(w\) and \(\neg p\) is true at \(w\), then \(q\) is true at \(w\):

\[(w \models (p \lor q) \& (w \models \neg p)) \rightarrow w \models q\]

Since every formula is significant, this theorem implies that the following schema holds: \((w \models (\varphi \lor \psi) \& (w \models \neg \varphi)) \rightarrow w \models \psi\). Thus, disjunctive syllogism holds both as an object-theoretic claim about propositions and worlds and as a metatheoretic schema about formulas and worlds.

(535) **Remark:** Final Observations on the Theory of Possible Worlds. The foregoing theory of possible worlds requires none of Leibniz’s theological doctrines, such as his claims about what goes on in God’s mind or his theodicy to explain the existence of evil. Indeed, I think Stalnaker’s severe judgment (1976, 65), which we quoted at the beginning of this section, should be re-evaluated in light of the foregoing analysis. Leibniz’s structural vision about the space of worlds is no mere metaphor. It has been reconstructed as a scientifically and mathematically precise theory, and grounds the different analyses invoking possible worlds which Stalnaker developed in his own work.

As we’ve seen, worlds are objects that can be abstracted from ordinary predication and possibility, and it doesn’t matter whether we take the locus of predication and possibility to be the physical world, our minds, or language. One

\[\text{From the premise } \varphi \& \neg \varphi, \text{ we may infer both } \varphi \text{ and } \neg \varphi, \text{ by } \&E. \text{ From } \varphi, \text{ we may infer } \varphi \lor \psi, \text{ by } \lor I. \text{ But from } \varphi \lor \psi \text{ and } \neg \varphi \text{ it follows that } \psi, \text{ by disjunctive syllogism (87.4.b).}\]
need only accept that there is in fact a corpus of ordinary predications and possibilities, that within this corpus there are special patterns of propositions, and that possible worlds are nothing more than those patterns.

As abstractions, possible worlds have an intrinsic nature, defined by their encoded properties. As noted previously, the propositions that are true at world \( w \) characterize \( w \). That is, if \( w \models p \), then \( w \) is such that \( p \), in the sense that \( w \) encodes \( \lambda y \, p \). Possible worlds, as we’ve defined them, don’t model or represent anything, despite being abstract; they are not ersatz worlds (Lewis 1986, 136ff). Possible worlds just are abstract logical objects characterized by the propositions true at them.\(^{273}\)

Finally, note that once we extend our system by adding particular contingent truths,\(^{274}\) we do not require any special, further evidence for believing in the existence of each nonactual possible world implied by (525.1). Epistemologically, we don’t have to justify our knowledge of each possible world or provide some information pathway from each world back to us that explains and justifies our belief in its existence. Instead, given contingently true propositions as data, we can cite (525.1) as the principle that guarantees the existence of the relevant nonactual worlds and thereby justify our belief in them. In turn, the justification of (525.1) rests on the fact that it is derivable from a very general theory with both inferential and explanatory power. Moreover, the justification also goes in the other direction: the theory itself receives justification from the fact that the above principles governing possible worlds are derivable from it.

### 12.3 World-Indexed Objects and Relations

#### 12.3.1 World-Indexed Truth-Values

(536) **Definition:** Truth-Value At \( w \) Of \( p \). We may now revise and enhance definition *truth-value of \( p \) \(^{(281)}\)* by relativizing it to possible worlds. We define: \( x \) is a *truth-value-at-\( w \) of \( p \) \(^{(281)}\)* if and only if \( x \) is an abstract object that encodes all and only those properties that are propositional properties constructed from

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\(^{273}\)Lewis would count the notion of a possible world that Wittgenstein employs in such claims as “The world is all that is the case” and “The world is the totality of facts, not of things” (1921, 7, Propositions 1 and 1.1) as ersatz (1986, Chapter 3). But it is hard to understand why possible worlds characterized in terms of the propositions true at them should be thought representations and thereby ersatz. The possible worlds characterized in the present text are not ersatz, given the facts just noted in the text. It bears emphasizing that encoding is a mode of predication, and so when \( w \models p \) and *being such that \( p \) is* thereby predicated of \( w \), the property in question characterizes \( w \). So \( w \) is such that \( p \), and doesn’t represent something that is such that \( p \).

\(^{274}\)I am referring here to such claims such as: Obama doesn’t have a son but might have, Obama has two daughters but might not have, there aren’t million carat diamonds but there might have been, etc.
propositions \( q \) such that at \( w \), \( q \) is materially equivalent to \( p \):

\[
\text{TruthValueAtOf}(x, w, p) \equiv \text{df} A!x \& \forall F (xF \equiv \exists q (w \models (q \equiv p) \& F = [\lambda y q]))
\]

Although a truth-value-at-\( w \) of \( p \) is a situation (exercise), we use our standard unrestricted variables \( x, y, \ldots \) instead of \( s, s', \ldots \) so as to match the presentation of unrelativized truth-values of propositions in (281).

(537) Theorems: Unique Existence of Truth-Values-at-Worlds of Propositions. It now follows that: (.1) there is a unique truth-value-at-\( w \) of \( p \), and (.2) the truth-value-at-\( w \) of \( p \) exists:

(1) \( \exists ! x \text{TruthValueAtOf}(x, w, p) \)

(2) \( i x \text{TruthValueAtOf}(x, w, p) \)

Recall that since these theorems involve the free restricted variable \( w \), they are implicitly conditionals. Though since we’ve proved the existence of possible worlds, we can derive unconditional existence claims.

(538) Definition: Notation for The Truth-Value-At-\( w \) Of \( p \). Given (537.2) and our conventions for definitions, we may introduce notation to designate the truth-value-at-\( w \) of \( p \):

\[
\circ_w p = \text{df} i x \text{TruthValueAtOf}(x, w, p)
\]

This introduces \( \circ_w p \) as a binary functional term with free variable \( p \) and free restricted variable \( w \). Hence, given our conventions for definitions and restricted variables (333) an expression of the form \( \circ_w \Pi \) is significant when \( \Pi \) is any 0-place term in which \( x \) isn’t free and \( \kappa \) is known to be a possible world, either by proof or by hypothesis.275

(539) Theorems: Strict Canonicity of \( \circ_w p \). In the usual way, it follows that \( \circ_w p \) is (identical to) a canonical object, i.e., that:

(1) \( \circ_w p = i x (A!x \& \forall F (xF \equiv \exists q (w \models (q \equiv p) \& F = [\lambda y q]))) \)

Now if we let \( \varphi \) be \( \exists q (w \models (q \equiv p) \& F = [\lambda y q]) \), then it follows that \( \varphi \) is a rigid condition on properties, as this was defined in (257.1), for the following is established by modally strict means:

\[275\text{This is explained by the fact that the above definition abbreviates:} \]

\[
\circ_y \varphi = \text{df} i x \text{PossibleWorld}(y) \& i x \text{TruthValueAtOf}(x, y, p)
\]

So if \( y \) is replaced by a term \( x \) that fails to denote a possible world, then \( \text{PossibleWorld}(x) \) fails and so no \( x \) satisfies the condition \( \text{PossibleWorld}(y) \& \text{TruthValueAtOf}(x, y, p) \). In that case, the definiens would fail to be significant and, hence, so would the definiendum, by the Rule of Definition by Identity (74).
So \( \circ_w p \) is strictly canonical, by (257.2), and is subject to theorem (258.2). It is then easy to establish, as a modally strict theorem, that (.3) \( \circ_w p \) is an abstract object that encodes exactly the properties \( F \) constructed out of propositions that are equivalent to \( p \) at \( w \), and (.4) \( \circ_w p \) is a truth-value-at-\( w \) of \( p \):

\[
.3 \quad A ! \circ_w p \& \forall F (\circ_w p F \equiv \exists q (w \models (q \equiv p) \& F = [\lambda y q]))
\]

\[
.4 \quad \text{TruthValueAtOf}(\circ_w p, w, p)
\]

Finally, it follows relatively quickly from the second conjunct of (.3) that (.5) the truth-value-at-\( w \) of \( p \) encodes \( p \):

\[
.5 \quad \circ_w p \Sigma p
\]

(540) Definitions: The-True-at-\( w \) and The-False-at-\( w \). We define: (.1) The True-at-\( w \) (\( \top_w \)) to be the abstract object that encodes exactly the properties \( F \) of the form \([\lambda y q]\) constructed from some proposition \( q \) true at \( w \); (.2) The False-at-\( w \) (\( \bot_w \)) to be the abstract object that encodes exactly the properties \( F \) of the form \([\lambda y q]\) constructed from some proposition \( q \) false at \( w \):

\[
.1 \quad \top_w = \text{df} \, (A ! x & \forall F (xF \equiv \exists q (w \models q & F = [\lambda y q])))
\]

\[
.2 \quad \bot_w = \text{df} \, (A ! x & \forall F (xF \equiv \exists q (w \models \neg q & F = [\lambda y q])))
\]

Given the free restricted variable \( w \) in these definitions, we may regard \( \top_w \) and \( \bot_w \) as significant only when \( \kappa \) is known to be a possible world, by hypothesis or proof.

(541) Theorems: Strict Canonicity of The-True-at-\( w \) and The-False-at-\( w \). By definition, \( \top_w \) and \( \bot_w \) are (identical to) canonical individuals. We now show that both of them are (identical to) strictly canonical individuals. When \( \varphi \) is \( \exists q (w \models q & F = [\lambda y q]) \), then (.1) \( \varphi \) is a rigid condition on properties, as this was defined in (257.1):

\[
.1 \quad \forall F (\varphi \to \Box \varphi), \text{ where } \varphi \text{ is } \exists q (w \models q & F = [\lambda y q])
\]

And when \( \psi \) is \( \exists q (w \models \neg q & F = [\lambda y q]) \), it also follows that (.2) \( \psi \) is a rigid condition on properties:

\[
.2 \quad \forall F (\psi \to \Box \psi), \text{ where } \psi \text{ is } \exists q (w \models \neg q & F = [\lambda y q])
\]

So by (257.2), \( \top_w \) and \( \bot_w \) are (identical to) strictly canonical individuals. Hence, they are subject to theorem (258.2) and so can be instantiated into their own defining descriptions by modally strict proofs:
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(.3) $A!\top_w \& \forall F (\top_w F \equiv \exists q (w \models q \& F = [\lambda y \ q]))$

(.4) $A!\bot_w \& \forall F (\bot_w F \equiv \exists q (w \models \neg q \& F = [\lambda y \ q]))$

(542) Theorems: Facts About The-True-at-$w$ and The-False-at-$w$. Recall definition (289), in which we stipulated that an object $x$ encodes a proposition $p$ ($x \Sigma p$) just in case $x$ exists and encodes $[\lambda y \ p]$. Furthermore, recall definition (458), in which we stipulated that a proposition $p$ is true in $x$ ($x \models p$) just in case $x$ is a situation and $x \Sigma p$. We noted in (498) that truth at a world is a special case of truth in a situation. Consequently it follows from the definitions in (540) that (.1) The-True-at-$w$ encodes a proposition $p$ if and only if $p$ is true at $w$; (.2) The-False-at-$w$ encodes a proposition $p$ if and only if $\neg p$ is true at $w$; and (.3) The-True-at-$w$ just is $w$:

(.1) $\top_w \Sigma p \equiv w \models p$

(.2) $\bot_w \Sigma p \equiv w \models \neg p$

(.3) $\top_w = w$

Note that (.3) is not only more general than the fact that $\top = w$ (517.1)* but is, by contrast, a modally strict theorem. We cannot use (.3), however, to produce a modally strict proof of $\top = w$. The following argument is not modally strict:

By instantiating (.3) to $w$, we may conclude $\top_w = w$. But then, one can independently establish $\top_w = \top$ (exercise). Hence, by substitution of identicals, $\top = w$.

Any proof of the middle step (the one left as an exercise) would have to appeal to modally fragile axioms and *-theorems to draw any conclusions about what properties $\top$ encodes. That’s because $\top$ is not strictly canonical, and so only theorem (251)*, not (258.2), can be used to determine the properties it encodes. Nevertheless, the argument displayed above is a perfectly-good non-modally strict derivation of (517.1)*.

(543) Theorems: Truth at $w$, The Truth-Value-at-$w$ of $p$, and The True at $w$.

(.1) $p$ is true at $w$ if and only if the truth-value-at-$w$ of $p$ is The-True-at-$w$; and

(.2) $p$ is false at $w$ if and only if the truth-value-at-$w$ of $p$ is The-False-at-$w$.

(.1) $w \models p \equiv \circ_w p = \top_w$

(.2) $w \models \neg p \equiv \circ_w p = \bot_w$

(544) Theorems: World-Indexed Truth-Values and Modalities. It now follows that: (.1) $p$ is necessary if and only if for every world $w$, the truth-value-at-$w$ of $p$ is (identical to) The-True-at-$w$; (.2) $p$ is necessarily false if and only if for
every world \( w \), the truth-value-at-\( w \) of \( p \) is The-False-at-\( w \); (.3) \( p \) is possible if and only if for some world \( w \), the truth-value-at-\( w \) of \( p \) is The-True-at-\( w \); and (.4) \( p \) is possibly false if and only if for some world \( w \), the truth-value-at-\( w \) of \( p \) is The-False-at-\( w \):

\[
\begin{align*}
(1) & \Box p \equiv \forall w (\circ_w p = \top_w) \\
(2) & \Box \neg p \equiv \forall w (\circ_w p = \bot_w) \\
(3) & \Diamond p \equiv \exists w (\circ_w p = \top_w) \\
(4) & \Diamond \neg p \equiv \exists w (\circ_w p = \bot_w)
\end{align*}
\]

### 12.3.2 World-Indexed Extensions

(545) **Definitions:** An Extension at a World of a Property. We may now relativize definition (307.1) as follows: \( x \) is an extension at \( w \) of \( G \) if and only if \( x \) is abstract, \( G \) exists, and \( x \) encodes just those properties \( F \) such that at \( w \), \( F \) is materially equivalent to \( G \):

\[
\text{ExtensionAtOf}(x, w, G) \equiv \exists ! x \exists y (xF = xG \land \forall Fy (Fy = Gy))
\]

It is important here not to think of an extension at \( w \) of \( G \) as an extension of the property \( G \)-at-\( w \). We'll introduce such world-indexed properties as \( G \)-at-\( w \) later and it will become clear, if only as an exercise, why an extension of the property \( G \)-at-\( w \) (which encodes the properties \( F \) that in fact are materially equivalent to \( G \)-at-\( w \)), as defined in (307.1) is not an extension-at-\( w \) of \( G \) (which encodes the properties \( F \) that, at \( w \), are materially equivalent to \( G \) at \( w \)).

(546) **Theorem:** The Extension at \( w \) of a Property Exists. It now follows that (.1) there exists a unique extension-at-\( w \) of \( G \), and hence, that (.2) the extension at \( w \) of \( G \) exists:

\[
\begin{align*}
(1) & \exists ! x \text{ExtensionAtOf}(x, w, G) \\
(2) & x \text{ExtensionAtOf}(x, w, G) \downarrow
\end{align*}
\]

Since both \( w \) and \( G \) are free variables in these theorems, it follows by GEN, that the latter hold for all properties and worlds.

(547) **Definition:** Notation for the Extension-at-\( w \) of \( G \). We may therefore introduce notation for the extension-at-\( w \) of \( G \) as follows:

\[
\epsilon_w G = \exists ! x \text{ExtensionAtOf}(x, w, G)
\]
Since the existence $G$ is built into the definition of $\text{ExtensionAtOf}(x,w,G)$ and this definition uses the restricted variable $w$, expressions of the form $\epsilon_w\Pi$ are binary functional terms that are significant only when it is known, by proof or by hypothesis, that $\kappa$ is a possible world and $\Pi$ is a significant 1-place relation term.

(548) Theorems: Strict Canonicity of $\epsilon_wG$. By now well-established reasoning, (.1) $\epsilon_wG$ is (identical to) a canonical object:

$$(.1) \epsilon_wG = \exists x(\exists ! x & \forall F(xF \equiv w \land \forall y(Fy \equiv Gy)))$$

If we now let $\varphi$ be $w \land \forall y(Fy \equiv Gy)$, then it follows that (.2) $\varphi$ is a rigid condition on properties, as this was defined in (257.1):

$$(.2) \forall F(w \land \forall y(Fy \equiv Gy) \rightarrow \Box w \land \forall y(Fy \equiv Gy))$$

So we know that $\epsilon_wG$ is strictly canonical, by (257.2). Hence, it is subject to theorem (258.2). It is therefore easy to establish, by modally strict means, that (.3) $\epsilon_wG$ is an abstract object that encodes exactly those properties $F$ such that at $w$, $F$ is materially equivalent to $G$, and (.4) $\epsilon_wG$ is an extension at $w$ of $G$:

$$(.3) A \exists ! \epsilon_wG & \forall F(\epsilon_wGF \iff w \land \forall z(Gz \equiv Hz))$$

$$(.4) \text{ExtensionAtOf}(\epsilon_wG,w,G)$$

Finally, it follows relatively quickly from the second conjunct of (.3) that (.5) the extension of $G$-at-$w$ encodes $G$:

$$(.5) \epsilon_wGG$$

This is an encoding claim in which the individual term is the restricted functional term $\epsilon_wG$.

(549) Theorem: World-Indexed Pre-Law V and World-Indexed Law V. It now follows that (.1) if $x$ is an extension-at-$w$ of $G$ and $y$ is an extension-at-$w$ of $H$, then $x = y$ if and only if at $w$, $G$ and $H$ are materially equivalent; and (.2) the extension-at-$w$ of $F$ is identical to the extension-at-$w$ of $G$ if and only if, at $w$, $F$ and $G$ are materially equivalent:

$$(.1) (\text{ExtensionAtOf}(x,w,G) \& \text{ExtensionAtOf}(y,w,H)) \rightarrow (x = y \iff w \land \forall z(Gz \equiv Hz))$$

$$(.2) \epsilon_wF = \epsilon_wG \equiv w \land \forall z(Fz \equiv Gz)$$

So though Frege's Basic Law V (322)★ is not modally-strict, its world-indexed version is.

(550) Remark: Suggestions for Further Research. Define: $x$ is, at $w$, a class of $Gs$ if and only if $x$ is an extension-at-$w$ of $G$. Then define world-indexed membership: $y$ is, at $w$, an element of $x$ iff $x$ is, at $w$, a class of $Gs$ and, at $w$, $Gy$: 
\[ y \in_w x \equiv_{df} \exists G (\text{ClassOfAt}(x, w, G) \& w \models G y) \]

Though we shall not develop these ideas further, the reader should consider formulating and proving some interesting claims regarding \( y \in_w x \), as well as defining further notions (such as the class, at \( w \), of \( G \)-s) and proving facts about them.

### 12.3.3 World-Indexed Relations

**Theorems:** World-Relative Relations. Before we introduce world-indexed relations, we first establish that if being an \( x \) such that \( \varphi \) exists, then being an \( x \) such that, at \( w \), \( \varphi \) is true exists:

\[(.1) \, [\lambda x \varphi] \downarrow \rightarrow [\lambda x w \models \varphi] \downarrow\]

\([\lambda x w \models \varphi]\) isn’t yet what we shall call a world-indexed relation; instead, we might called it a world-relative relation. As (.1) shows, world-relative relations exist only conditionally. We’ll define world-indexed relations in (552); these will exist unconditionally for every relation. Note that (.1) generalizes to:

\[(.2) \, [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi] \downarrow \rightarrow [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n w \models \varphi] \downarrow \quad (n \geq 0)\]

Let us then single-out a special class of world-relative relations that provably exist, namely, being an \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) such that, at \( w \), \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) exemplifies \( F \):

\[(.3) \, [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n w \models F x_1 \ldots x_n] \downarrow \quad (n \geq 0)\]

Note that when \( n \geq 1 \), (.3) isn’t an instance of axiom (39.2); the initial \( \lambda \) binds variables in an encoding formula subterm, namely, the \( x_i \) that occur free in \( w \models F x_1 \ldots x_n \). By the Encoding Formula Convention (17.3), \( w \models F x_1 \ldots x_n \) is an encoding formula subterm of this \( \lambda \)-expression, for if we completely expand this defined notation into primitive notation, we find that the encoding formula \( w[\lambda z F x_1 \ldots x_n] \) is a term used one of the definientia at the end of the chain of definitions.\(^{277}\)

**Definitions:** World-Indexed Relations. We now define the world-indexed relation \( F^w_n (F^n-\text{at-}w) \) as the world-relative relation \([\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n w \models F^n x_1 \ldots x_n]:\)

\[ F^w_n \equiv_{df} [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n w \models F^n x_1 \ldots x_n] \quad (n \geq 0)\]

\(^{276}\)I’m indebted to Daniel Kirchner for noting (personal communication: 5 March 2020) this important consequence of the theorem he contributed, which was reported in (268).

\(^{277}\)The encoding formula \( w \models F x_1 \ldots x_n \) is defined as \( \text{Situation}(w) \& w \Sigma F x_1 \ldots x_n \) (458). The second conjunct, \( w \Sigma F x_1 \ldots x_n \), of the definiens is, in turn, defined as \( w \downarrow \& w[\lambda z F x_1 \ldots x_n] \) (289). So \( w[\lambda z F x_1 \ldots x_n] \) counts as an encoding formula subterm of \([\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n w \models F x_1 \ldots x_n] \).
Thus to every relation $F$ there corresponds a world-indexed version $F_w$ for every possible world $w$. Thus, we prove the existence of world-indexed relations in the object language, and have no need to postulate them in the metalanguage (cf. Williamson 2013, 237).

(553) **Definition:** Rigid and Rigidifying Relations. To formulate and prove an important group of theorems, let us say that a relation $F^n$ is rigid if and only if necessarily, for any objects $x_1, \ldots, x_n$, if $x_1 \ldots x_n$ exemplify $F^n$, then necessarily $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ exemplify $F^n$:

(1) $Rigid(F^n) \equiv def F^n \downarrow \& \Box \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n (F^n x_1 \ldots x_n \rightarrow \Box F^n x_1 \ldots x_n) \quad (n \geq 0)$

In the 0-place case, the definition stipulates that $Rigid(p) \equiv def p \downarrow \& \Box (p \rightarrow \Box p)$.

Moreover, where $n \geq 0$, let us say that $F^n$ rigidifies $G^n$ just in case $F^n$ is rigid and is exemplified by exactly the same objects as $G^n$:

(2) $Rigidifies(F^n, G^n) \equiv def Rigid(F^n) \& \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n (F^n x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv G^n x_1 \ldots x_n) \quad (n \geq 0)$

In the 0-place case, $Rigidifies(p, q)$ just in case $Rigid(p)$ and $p$ is materially equivalent to $q$.

(554) **Theorem:** Every Property Has a Rigidification. We first prove some lemmas. (1) $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ exemplify $F$-at-$w$ if and only if $F^n x_1 \ldots x_n$ is true at $w$:

(1) $F^n x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv w \models F^n x_1 \ldots x_n \quad (n \geq 0)$

It then easily follows that (2) $G^n_w$ is rigid:

(2) $Rigid(G^n_w) \quad (n \geq 0)$

But an even more interesting theorem is implied, namely, that some property rigidifies $G^n$.

(3) $\exists F^n (Rigidifies(F^n, G^n)) \quad (n \geq 0)$

Note that (3) can’t be inferred immediately from (2)! One can’t use $G^n_w$ where $w$ is a fixed, but arbitrary, possible world to rigidify $G$. If you suppose $G^n_w$ with $w = w_{\alpha}$ is the witness to (3), then the proof that $G^n_{w_{\alpha}}$ is materially equivalent to $G$ would fail to be modally strict. Nor would one be able to produce a relation that rigidifies $G$ within an arbitrary modal context. Interestingly, though, the proof of (3) does make use of $G^n_w$, but its use has to be set up properly.

By RN and GEN, it follows from (3) that $\forall G \Box F^n (Rigidifies(F^n, G^n))$. We’ll show in the discussion of (555.3) below that (3) is a non-schematic version of an axiom formulated by Gallin (1975, 77).

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Credit goes to Daniel Kirchner for noting (personal communication: 5 March 2020) that the following is a consequence of the Kirchner Theorem, reported in (268). In previous versions of object theory, this was taken as an axiom.
Note that the (.3) isn’t derivable from the fact that every relation \(G^n\) has an actualized version \([\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n. \forall x_1 \ldots x_n (\Diamond F x_1 \ldots x_n \rightarrow \Box F x_1 \ldots x_n)]\) that rigidifies \(G^n\). We can see why if we consider the fact, noted above, that the present theorem holds necessarily for any property \(G\). Now if we think semantically for the moment in terms of primitive possible worlds, this last fact means that for any possible world \(w\) and any relation \(G^n\), there is a relation \(F^n\) whose exemplification extension at every possible world is the exemplification extension of \(G^n\) at \(w\). By contrast, \([\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n. \forall x_1 \ldots x_n (\Diamond F x_1 \ldots x_n \rightarrow \Box F x_1 \ldots x_n)]\) is a relation whose exemplification extension at every possible world is the exemplification extension of \(G^n\) at the actual world.

(555) Theorems: Equivalent Notions of Rigid Relations. Where \(n \geq 0\), it is provable that (.1) the claim, (a) necessarily, for all objects \(x_1, \ldots, x_n\), if \(x_1, \ldots, x_n\) exemplify \(F^n\), then necessarily \(x_1, \ldots, x_n\) exemplify \(F^n\), is equivalent to the claim, (b) for all objects \(x_1, \ldots, x_n\), if possibly \(x_1, \ldots, x_n\) exemplify \(F^n\), then necessarily \(x_1, \ldots, x_n\) exemplify \(F^n\); and (.2) the claim, (a) necessarily, for all objects \(x_1, \ldots, x_n\), if \(x_1, \ldots, x_n\) exemplify \(F^n\), then necessarily \(x_1, \ldots, x_n\) exemplify \(F^n\), is equivalent to the claim, (b) for all objects \(x_1, \ldots, x_n\), either necessarily \(x_1, \ldots, x_n\) exemplify \(F^n\) or necessarily \(x_1, \ldots, x_n\) fail to exemplify \(F^n\):\

(1) \(\Box \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n (F x_1 \ldots x_n \rightarrow \Diamond F x_1 \ldots x_n) \equiv \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n (\Diamond F x_1 \ldots x_n \rightarrow \Box F x_1 \ldots x_n)\)\

(2) \(\Box \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n (F x_1 \ldots x_n \rightarrow \Diamond F x_1 \ldots x_n) \equiv \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n (\Diamond F x_1 \ldots x_n \vee \Box \neg F x_1 \ldots x_n)\)

Thus, it immediately follows from (.2), given definition (553.1), that (.3) \(F^n\) is rigid if and only if for all objects \(x_1, \ldots, x_n\), either necessarily \(x_1, \ldots, x_n\) exemplify \(F^n\) or necessarily \(x_1, \ldots, x_n\) fail to exemplify \(F^n\):\

(3) \(\text{Rigid}(F^n) \equiv \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n (\Box F x_1 \ldots x_n \vee \Box \neg F x_1 \ldots x_n)\)

(.3) is the definition of a rigid relation given in Montague 1974 (132) and in Gallin 1975 (77). Thus, theorem (554.3) captures the intuition underlying the axiom Extensional Comprehension formulated by Gallin (1975, 77).\(^{279}\)

(556) Remark: The Extension of \(G\)-at-\(w\) vs. the Extension-at-\(w\) of \(G\). Where \(G\) is any \(1\)-place property, we know that \(G\)-at-\(w\) (\(G_w\)) exists and that its extension

\(^{279}\)As noted previously, by applying RN and then GEN to (554.3), we obtain: 
\(\forall G^n \exists F^n (\text{Rigid}(F^n, G^n))\)

So by definition (553.2), this is equivalent to:

(9) \(\forall G^n \exists F^n (\text{Rigid}(F^n) \& \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n (F^n x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv G^n x_1 \ldots x_n))\)

Now in Gallin (1975, 77), the statement of (typed) extensional comprehension is:

\[\Box \exists f_n [R_n (t) \land \forall x^0 \ldots x^{n-1} [x^0 \ldots x^{n-1} \rightarrow A]],\]

where \(\sigma\) is the type of an \(n\)-place relation among objects of arbitrary types, all the other expressions are appropriately typed, and \(t\) doesn’t occur free in \(A\). Though (9) is not a schema, it is a version of Gallin’s principle that holds for \(n\)-place relations among individuals. In Cocchiarella 1988 (54), we find a similar, but non-modal, statement of what he calls the principle of rigidity.
12.4. IMPOSSIBLE WORLDS

$\epsilon G_w$ exists. Furthermore, we know that the extension-at-$w$ of $G$ ($\epsilon_w G$) exists. By applying definitions and theorems, we know:

$$\epsilon G_w = \exists x (A!x \& \forall F (xF \equiv \forall z (Fz \equiv G_w z)))$$

$$\epsilon_w G = \exists x (A!x \& \forall F (xF \equiv w \models \forall z (Fz \equiv G z)))$$

Intuitively, $\epsilon G_w$ and $\epsilon_w G$ are distinct. If a property $F$ is in fact materially equivalent to $G$-at-$w$, but not materially equivalent, at $w$, to $G$, then $\epsilon G_w$ encodes $F$ while $\epsilon_w G$ does not. And vice versa, if $F$ is, at $w$, is materially equivalent to $G$, but is not in fact materially equivalent to $G$-at-$w$, then $\epsilon_w G$ encodes $F$ while $\epsilon G_w$ does not.

**Exercise:** Prove $\exists G \exists w (\epsilon G_w \neq \epsilon_w G)$. [Hint: Use (219.1).]

Now consider that where $p$ is any proposition, then we know that $p$-at-$w$ (i.e., $p_w$) exists and that the truth-value-of-$p$-at-$w$ ($\circ p_w$) exists. And we know that the truth-value-at-$w$ of $p$ ($\circ w p$) exists. By applying definitions and theorems, we know:

$$\circ p_w = \exists x (A!x \& \forall F (xF \equiv \exists q ((q \equiv p_w) \& F = [\lambda y q])))$$

$$\circ w p = \exists x (A!x \& \forall F (xF \equiv \exists q (w \models (q \equiv p) \& F = [\lambda y q])))$$

Intuitively, $\circ p_w$ and $\circ w p$ are distinct. If a proposition $q$ is in fact materially equivalent to $p$-at-$w$, but not materially equivalent, at $w$, to $p$, then $\circ p_w$ encodes $q$ while $\circ w p$ does not. And vice versa, if $q$ is, at $w$, is materially equivalent to $p$, but is not in fact materially equivalent to $p$-at-$w$, then $\circ w p$ encodes $q$ while $\circ p_w$ does not.

**Exercise:** Prove $\exists p \exists w (\circ p_w \neq \circ w p)$.

12.4 Impossible Worlds


\(^{280}\)See also Nolan 2013, Krakauer 2013, and Jago 2013, which also focus on impossible worlds. However, these recent works don’t consider the theory of impossible worlds developed in Zalta 1997a, which we further refine and develop here.
Though a variety of reasons have been given for postulating such impossible worlds, not all of those reasons are, from an object-theoretic perspective, convincing. For example, impossible worlds are often invoked to solve problems that arise when philosophers represent propositions as functions from possible worlds to truth-values (or as sets of possible worlds). Such representations, as is well known, identify propositions that are necessarily equivalent; if propositions $p$ and $q$ are just functions from worlds to truth-values, then they can’t be distinguished when they have the same truth-value at every possible world. As a result, if one represents a belief as a relation between a person and a proposition so-conceived, then if $x$ believes $p$, and $p$ is necessarily equivalent to $q$, then $x$ believes $q$. This just follows by the substitution of identicals and the identity of $p$ and $q$. Such a result flies in the face of the data.\(^{281}\) To solve this problem, it has been suggested that we can distinguish necessarily equivalent propositions if we consider their truth-values at impossible worlds. In effect, the suggestion is to represent propositions as functions from worlds generally, i.e., both possible and impossible worlds, to truth-values.

But, from the present perspective, we need not invoke impossible worlds to distinguish necessarily equivalent propositions. Object theory already has that capability; our theory of propositions doesn’t collapse necessarily equivalent propositions. Thus, one can use the present theory of propositions to represent beliefs without incurring the result that one believes everything that is necessarily equivalent to what one believes.

Philosophers have also invoked impossible worlds to explain both impossibilities in fiction specifically and thoughts about impossible objects generally. But as the discussion in Section 12.6 will show, we can analyze such fictions and thoughts without invoking impossible worlds.

From an object-theoretic perspective, the best case for impossible worlds comes from:

(A) the analysis of counterfactual and subjunctive conditionals with impossible antecedents, and

(B) the study of paraconsistent logic.

As to (A), consider the following sentences, which are clearly true:

- If Frege’s system had been consistent, he would have died a happier man.
- If there were a set of all non-self-membered sets, it would be a member of itself iff not a member of itself.

\(^{281}\)Not only are there numerous examples of believing $p$ without believing propositions necessarily equivalent to $q$, the problem of logical omniscience arises for this understanding of propositions. See Hintikka 1975 for a discussion of the problem and the suggestion that impossible worlds solve the problem.
The first example is a counterfactual conditional. On the standard analysis, such conditionals are true just in case the consequent is true at the closest possible world where the antecedent is true (Stalnaker 1968, Lewis 1973). But the antecedent of the example is true at no possible world, since one can derive a contradiction from Frege’s axioms and thereby demonstrate his system’s inconsistency. This inconsistency is not contingent; there is no possible world where the particular axioms of Frege’s system are consistent. Hence, the antecedent of the above counterfactual conditional describes an impossibility and so the standard analysis implies that the sentence is false, thereby failing to preserve its truth-value.

It has been suggested that this problem might be solved if we amend the analysis so that if counterfactual conditionals are considered true just in case the consequent is true at the closest world (possible or impossible) where the antecedent holds.

The second case is a subjunctive conditional, and there are lots of similar examples, such as, “if four were prime, it would be divisible only by itself and one”. Again, on the standard analysis of the truth conditions of such subjunctive conditionals, on which the consequent holds in the closest possible world where the antecedent holds, the sentence turns out to be false, contrary to intuition. But though there is no possible world where something is a set of all non-self-membered sets or where four is prime, it is claimed that there are impossible worlds where these propositions are true. Of course, these claims are typically just assumed rather than proved to be true. By amending the analysis so that the truth conditions become “the consequent holds at the closest world (possible or otherwise) where the antecedent holds”, we seem to get correct truth conditions for the subjunctive conditional, assuming that the notion of an impossible world is sufficiently clear.

Concerning (B), the suggestion that paraconsistent logic governs impossible worlds is persuasive. Paraconsistent logic weakens classical logic so that an arbitrary proposition can’t be derived from the contradiction \( p \& \neg p \); thus, the principle ex contradictione (sequitur) quodlibet fails for such a logic. On the analysis developed below, we can see why one might think there is a connection between paraconsistent logic and impossible worlds: from the fact that \( p \& \neg p \) is true at an impossible world, it doesn’t follow that every proposition is true at that world.

Of course, once one accepts that impossible worlds help us to understand

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282 Of course, one could try to ‘paraphrase away’ the description “Frege’s system”, by interpreting “Frege’s system” as the non-rigid description “the system Frege developed”, so that the sentence in question implies: if Frege had developed a consistent system, he would have died a happier man. Here, the antecedent is possibly true; there are possible worlds where Frege developed a consistent system. But that is not what the original sentence implies. The paraphrase is not an accurate one; it just misrepresents what the original sentence means. If this is not convincing, just change the example to: if the system Frege in fact developed had been consistent, he would have died a happier man.
the data presented by (A) and (B), the question arises, what are impossible worlds exactly? Too frequently, the answer is given by switching to modeling impossible worlds as sets of propositions. But it important not to mistake the entities being modeled for the entities doing the modeling. A world, whether possible or impossible, is not a set of propositions. The propositions in a set don’t characterize that set, whereas the propositions true in a world, possible or impossible, characterize the world.

In what follows, however, we develop a series of definitions and theorems that show impossible worlds to be abstract objects, indeed situations, characterized by the propositions true at them. Moreover, the most important principles governing impossible worlds are derived as theorems, such as the fundamental theorem that for every way a world couldn’t possibly be, there is a non-trivial impossible world that is that way; this is proved in (567) below. I don’t know of any other theory of impossible worlds that yields similar consequences.

The reader may wish to consult Zalta 1997a for a more detailed motivation of impossible worlds than the one just presented. The work below revises, corrects, and enhances the theorems and proofs first developed there.

(558) **Definition:** Impossible Worlds. In what follows, we continue to use the variables \( s, s', s'', \ldots \) as rigid restricted variables ranging over situations (455). Recalling the definition of \( \text{Maximal}(s) \) (502) and the definition of \( \text{Possible}(s) \) (490), we may say that a situation \( s \) is an impossible world just in case \( s \) is maximal and not possible:

\[
\text{ImpossibleWorld}(s) \equiv \text{Maximal}(s) \& \neg \text{Possible}(s)
\]

Eliminating the restricted variable, this becomes:

\[
\text{ImpossibleWorld}(x) \equiv \text{Situation}(x) \& \text{Maximal}(x) \& \neg \text{Possible}(x)
\]

In this definition, maximality is a necessary condition. We take it that only those situations that are maximal are correctly considered to be worlds. Situations that are maximal and possible are (provably) possible worlds (504), while situations that are maximal and impossible are impossible worlds by definition. A situation that isn’t maximal has no legitimate claim to being called a ‘world’.

(559) **Definition:** Truth at an Impossible World. Since \( \text{ImpossibleWorld}(s) \) and \( \text{ImpossibleWorld}(x) \) are well-defined conditions, we may introduce \( i, i', i'', \ldots \) as restricted variables ranging over situations meeting the condition. Thus, at

\[283\]One way to question the arguments in Nolan 2013, Krakauer 2013, and Jago 2013, is to enquire whether their preferred theories of impossible worlds can yield the basic principles about impossible worlds as theorems, in the manner of Zalta 1997a and below.
our convenience, we may take these variables to be either singly restricted or doubly restricted, as discussed in Remark (497) for the case of the variables \( w, w', w'', \ldots \). As a result, notions defined on situations \( s \) may be applied to impossible worlds \( i \) without having to be redefined. An important example is the notion of truth in a situation, i.e., \( i \models p \). By interpreting \( i \) as a doubly restricted variable, we may henceforth suppose that \( i \models p \) is defined. We shall read \( i \models p \) as ‘\( p \) is true at \( i \)’. Thus, truth at an impossible world is simply a special case of the notion truth in a situation.

Note that if \( x \) is an impossible world, then it is a situation and so by definition (458) and theorem (89.8.i), \( x \models p \equiv x \Sigma p \). Moreover, if \( x \) is an impossible world, then the fact that it is a situation implies \( x \) is abstract. So by similar reasoning, \( x \Sigma p \equiv x[\lambda y \ p] \). Hence, when \( x \) is a situation, \( x \models p \equiv x[\lambda y \ p] \). Using our restricted variable \( i \), these facts become: \( i \models p \equiv i \Sigma p \), \( i \Sigma p \equiv i[\lambda y \ p] \), and hence \( i \models p \equiv i[\lambda y \ p] \). Hence, when a proposition \( p \) is true at \( i \), the property \([\lambda y \ p] \) characterizes \( i \) by way of an encoding predication.

(560) **Theorem:** Identity of Impossible Worlds. Since impossible worlds are a species of situation, it follows that \( i = i' \) iff all and only the propositions true at \( i \) are true at \( i' \):

\[
i = i' \iff \forall p (i \models p \equiv i' \models p)
\]

(561) **Theorem:** \( s_V \) is an Impossible World. Recall that in (470.2), \( s_V \) was defined as \( \text{xTrivialSituation}(x) \), where \( \text{TrivialSituation}(x) \) was defined in (468.2) as a situation \( x \) in which every proposition \( p \) is true. In (471.4), we gave a modally strict proof that \( \text{TrivialSituation}(s_V) \). It is now provable as a modally strict theorem that \( s_V \) is an impossible world:

\[\text{ImpossibleWorld}(s_V)\]

Since this theorem implies that there are impossible worlds, we know the quantifiers \( \forall i \) and \( \exists i \) behave classically, in the sense that \( \forall i p \rightarrow \exists i q \); cf. Remark (336).

(562) **Theorem:** The False is an Impossible World That Isn’t Trivial. Recall the definition of The False (\( \bot \)) in (296.2). It follows from non-modally strict theorems that The False is a non-trivial impossible world:

\[\text{ImpossibleWorld}(\bot) \& \neg \text{TrivialSituation}(\bot)\]

So there are non-trivial impossible worlds. Since \( \bot \) is an impossible world at which every falsehood is true, we might take the liberty of referring to it as the worst of all impossible worlds! By comparison, \( s_V \) has a saving grace, for though every false proposition is true there, every true proposition is true there as well.
Theorem: There Are Non-Trivial Impossible Worlds. Though the previous theorem establishes that there are non-trivial impossible worlds, it did so by a non-modally strict proof. But there is modally strict proof that there are non-trivial impossible worlds:

\[ \exists i (\neg \text{TrivialSituation}(i)) \]

The proof in the Appendix appeals to an instance of the Comprehension Principle for Situations which asserts \[ \exists s \forall F (sF \equiv \exists q (\neg q \& F = [\lambda y q])) \]. In other words, the proof goes by way of a situation which is identified by the fact that it encodes all the falsehoods, but which, unlike \( \bot \), is not identified via a description that ties its properties to the propositions that are in fact false. Rather, we pick an arbitrary witness to the instance of the Comprehension Principle for Situations and reason with respect to that witness.

Exercise: In (540.2) we defined \( \bot_w \) as The False at \( w \). Develop a modally strict proof that, for any possible world \( w \), \( \bot_w \) is a non-trivial impossible world.

Theorem: Not All Impossible Worlds Are Modally Closed. It also follows that not all impossible worlds are modally closed, i.e., closed under necessary implication:

\[ \neg \forall i \text{ModallyClosed}(i) \]

This theorem is modally strict. We can give a simpler, though non-modally strict proof of this result by pointing to \( \bot \). It is a known impossible world and by appealing to (158.2), the definition of \( \Rightarrow \), and the non-modally strict theorems (300.4)\( \star \) and (300.5)\( \star \), one can easily establish that there are propositions \( p \) and \( q \) such that \( p \Rightarrow q \), \( \bot \models p \), and \( \neg \bot \models q \); let \( p \) be any necessary falsehood and \( q \) be any truth.

Definition: The \( p \)-Extension of Situation \( s \). We define the \( p \)-extension of situation \( s \), written \( s^{+p} \), as the (canonical) situation that encodes not only the properties that \( s \) encodes but also the property \([\lambda y p]\):

\[ s^{+p} =_{df} s^F \forall (s^F \equiv (sF \lor F = [\lambda y p])) \]

Clearly, \( s^{+p} \) is a canonical situation (476), since when \( \varphi \) is \( sF \lor F = [\lambda y p] \), it is easily provable that \( \forall F (\varphi \rightarrow \text{Propositional}(F)) \). Note that the expression \( s^{+p} \) is a binary functional term that involves two variables: the situation that \( s^{+p} \) denotes depends on the value of \( s \) and \( p \). Since every 0-place relation term \( \Pi^0 \) is significant, we may regard \( \kappa^{+\Pi^0} \) as significant whenever \( \kappa \) is an individual term that is known, by hypothesis or by proof, to be such that \( \text{Situation}(\kappa) \). For example, substituting \( \bot \) for \( s \) and \( p_0 \) for \( p \) (where \( p_0 \) is \( \forall x (E!x \rightarrow E!x) \)) produces \( \bot^{+p_0} \), which is provably a situation in which every false proposition is true and \( p_0 \) is true.
12.4. IMPOSSIBLE WORLDS

(566) Lemmas: The $p$-Extension of $s$ is Strictly Canonical. Where $\varphi$ is the formula $sF \lor F = [\lambda y \varphi]$, it follows that (.1) every property such that $\varphi$ is necessarily such that $\varphi$:

$$(.1) \forall F((sF \lor F = [\lambda y \varphi]) \rightarrow \Box(sF \lor F = [\lambda y \varphi]))$$

Hence $s^p$ is a strictly canonical situation and so it is a modally strict consequence of (565) and (258.2) that (.2) the $p$-extension of $s$ encodes a property $F$ if and only if either $s$ encodes $F$ or $F$ just is $[\lambda y \varphi]$:

$$(.2) \forall F(s^pF \equiv sF \lor F = [\lambda y \varphi])$$

Thus, it immediately follows that: (.3) if a proposition is true in $s$ it is true in the $p$-extension of $s$, (.4) $p$ is true in the $p$-extension of $s$, and (.5) $q$ is true in $s^p$ if and only if $q$ is true in $s$ or $q$ is identical to $p$:

$$(.3) s \models q \rightarrow s^p \models q$$

$$(.4) s^p \models p$$

$$(.5) \forall q(s^p \models q \equiv (s \models q \lor q = p))$$

(567) Theorem: Fundamental Theorem of Impossible Worlds. The most important fact about impossible worlds is that if it is not possible that $p$, then there is a non-trivial impossible world at which $p$ is true:

$$\neg \Box p \rightarrow \exists i(\neg \text{TrivialSituation}(i) & i \models p)$$

cf. Zalta 1997a, 647. If we borrow a turn of phrase from Lewis (1986, 2), we might read the above as: every way a world couldn’t possibly be is a way some non-trivial impossible world is. Indeed, Nolan (1997, 542) suggests that a ‘comprehension’ principle governing impossible worlds should assert: for every proposition which cannot be true, there is an impossible world where that proposition is true. The present theorem clearly validates this principle, but not by stipulating it.

The proof of the above theorem in the Appendix corrects an error in the proof of the corresponding theorem in Zalta 1997a.\footnote{In Zalta 1997a (647–8), we correctly asserted, but incorrectly proved, the theorem that $\neg \Box p \rightarrow \exists i(\neg \text{TrivialSituation}(i) & i \models p)$. In that theorem, $s_u$ is the universal situation (i.e., the trivial situation we’re now calling $\#_V$, in which every proposition is true). The proof developed in 1997a correctly established that $\neg \Box p$ implies that there is a situation $s$ which is maximal, not possible, and in which $p$ is true. But the proof that $s$ is distinct from $s_u$ contained an assumption that appeared correct but that wasn’t in fact provable, namely, that the impossible proposition $p$ mentioned in the antecedent is distinct from the proposition $p \land \neg p$. The general claim that $q \equiv (q \land \neg q)$ is certainly provable whenever $q$ is a necessary, true, or even possible proposition. (For example, suppose $\Box q$, and assume for reductio that $q = (q \land \neg q)$. Then $\Box(q \land \neg q)$, which contradicts the fact...}
The strategy of the proof in the Appendix is as follows: assume \(\neg \Box p\); cite (513.1), i.e., that some possible world encodes all the truths; consider an arbitrary such possible world and then show that its \(p\)-extension is a non-trivial impossible world where \(p\) is true.

(568) Theorems: Ex Contradictione Quodlibet Fails for Impossible Worlds. Recall that we established, in (533.2), that the law ex contradictione quodlibet governs possible worlds. Formulated in the material mode, the law asserts: \(w \models (p \& \neg p) \rightarrow w \models q\). But by reasoning from (563), we can show that this law fails for impossible worlds, i.e., we can show: (1) there are impossible worlds \(i\) and propositions \(p\) and \(q\) such that \((p \& \neg p)\) is true at \(i\) but \(q\) fails to be true at \(i\):

(1) \(\exists i \exists p \exists q (i \models (p \& \neg p) \& \neg i \models q)\)

Clearly, then, ex contradictione quodlibet fails for impossible worlds, as it does for situations generally.

Moreover, we can also reason from the fundamental theorem for impossible worlds (567) to show that a variant version of ex contradictione quodlibet fails for impossible worlds, i.e., that (2) there are impossible worlds \(i\) and propositions \(p\) and \(q\) such that both \(p\) and \(\neg p\) are true at \(i\) but \(q\) fails to be true at \(i\):

(2) \(\exists i \exists p \exists q (i \models p \& i \models \neg p \& \neg i \models q)\)

This variant of ex contradictione quodlibet thus fails for impossible worlds, as it does for situations generally. The point, however, is that both (1) and (2) identify worlds that validate paraconsistent logics in which ex contradictione quodlibet fails.

(569) Theorem: Disjunctive Syllogism Fails for Impossible Worlds. A version of disjunctive syllogism (87.4.b) governs possible worlds and propositions, for we established in (534) that: \((w \models (p \lor q) \& (w \models \neg p)) \rightarrow w \models q\). However, disjunctive syllogism fails for impossible worlds; there are impossible worlds \(i\) and propositions \(p\) and \(q\) such that \(p \lor q\) and \(\neg p\) are true at \(i\) but \(q\) fails to be true at \(i\):

\[ \exists i \exists p \exists q (i \models (p \lor q) \& i \models \neg p \& \neg i \models q) \]
12.5. MOMENTS OF TIME AND WORLD-STATES

Clearly, not only does disjunctive syllogism fail for impossible worlds but it also fails generally for situations. In any case, we have now shown that there are (impossible) worlds that validate logics in which disjunctive syllogism fails.

12.5 Moments of Time and World-States

Remark: An Outline. The definitions and theorems governing possible worlds that were developed in Section 12.2 can be adapted in a natural way to systematize moments of time and world-states. The simplest way to do this is to add to our language a primitive omnitemporality operator □ (it is always the case that, or more simply always) and stipulate that formulas of the form □ϕ are well-formed. The dual operator, ♦ (it is sometime the case that, or more simply sometime) can then be defined:

\[ ♦ϕ \equiv \neg □\neg ϕ \]

Using this last definition, we can say that a situation s is a moment of time just in case sometime, all and only true propositions are true in s:

\[ \text{MomentOfTime}(s) \equiv ♦∀p (s |– p \equiv p) \]

Similarly, a situation s is a possible-world-state just in case possibly, sometime, all and only true propositions are true in s:

\[ \text{PossibleWorldState}(s) \equiv ^\diamond ∀p (s |– p \equiv p) \]

Clearly, these definitions are analogous to the definition of possible world.

Alternatively, instead of a primitive omnitemporality operator, one could add the standard two tense operators of minimal tense logic to our language:

\[ H (\text{it was always the case that}) \]
\[ G (\text{it will always be the case that}) \]

The dual operators \( Pϕ \) (‘it was once the case that \( ϕ \)’) and \( Fϕ \) (‘it will at some point be the case that \( ϕ \)’) are then defined as follows:

\[ Pϕ \equiv \neg H \neg ϕ \]
\[ Fϕ \equiv \neg G \neg ϕ \]

Then one can either define □ϕ:

\[ □ϕ \equiv Hϕ \& ϕ \& Gϕ \]

and define ♦ϕ as we did above, or define ♦ϕ more directly, as:

\[ ♦ϕ \equiv PFϕ \vee ϕ \vee Fϕ \]
No matter which of these ways we choose to define $\Diamond \varphi$, we would be in a position to formulate the definitions of moment of time and world-state given above. However, in a system with the two tense operators $\mathcal{H}$ and $\mathcal{G}$, one can define past and future moments of time:

$$\text{PastMoment}(s) \equiv_{df} \forall p(s \models p \equiv p)$$

$$\text{FutureMoment}(s) \equiv_{df} \forall p(s \models p \equiv p)$$

Of course, the above developments would require some changes to certain defined notions of the theory. For example, one would have to redefine ordinary and abstract objects as:

$$O! \equiv_{df} [\lambda x \Diamond \mathcal{E}!x]$$

$$A! \equiv_{df} [\lambda x \neg \Diamond \mathcal{E}!x]$$

Thus, an abstract object would be defined as not the kind of thing that could ever be concrete.

One would also need to redefine identity for individuals and properties as follows:

$$x \equiv y \equiv_{df} (O!x \& O!y \& \Box \forall F(xF \equiv yF)) \lor (A!x \& A!y \& \Box \forall F(xF \equiv yF))$$

$$F^1 = G^1 \equiv_{df} \Box \forall x(xF^1 \equiv xG^1)$$

The rest of the definitions for the language of object theory can remain the same, though some may take on new significance in light of the above.

The point of revising our system in the above manner would be to derive interesting and important theorems that govern times and world-states. For example, one might want to derive the claims: (.1) sometime $p$ if and only if $p$ is true at some moment of time; (.2) it is always the case that $p$ if and only if $p$ is true at every moment of time; (.3) possibly, sometime $p$ if and only if $p$ is true at some world-state; and (.4) it is necessarily always the case that $p$ if and only if $p$ is true at every world-state:

$$(.1) \Diamond p \equiv \exists x(\text{MomentOfTime}(x) \& x \models p)$$

$$(.2) \Box p \equiv \forall x(\text{MomentOfTime}(x) \to x \models p)$$

$$(.3) \Diamond \Box p \equiv \exists x(\text{PossibleWorldState}(x) \& x \models p)$$

$$(.4) \Box \Box p \equiv \forall x(\text{PossibleWorldState}(x) \to x \models p)$$

$^{285}$Strictly speaking, the analogue for definition (23.2) of property identity would be:

$$\Pi = \Pi' \equiv_{df} \Pi \models \forall \varphi \varphi \models \Pi \models \forall \varphi \varphi$$

where $\varphi$ is any individual variable that doesn’t occur free in $\Pi$ or $\Pi'$.

But the simpler formulation given on the third line below suffices to make the point.
There are, in addition, many other interesting theorems that one might want to derive, such as that there is a unique present moment, that moments of time and world-states are consistent, etc.

Of course, to derive theorems such as the above, our axioms and deductive system would have to be revised. Though the changes to the language are simple enough, the changes to the axioms and deductive system require much more care. One can’t simply add the S5-type axioms to govern the omnitemporality operator $\blacksquare$, or simply add the axioms of minimal tense logic govern $\mathcal{H}$ and $\mathcal{G}$. Other axioms are needed and a host of subtle issues arise and have to be addressed. A few moments’ reflection about the issues involved may lead one to see that it is probably easier to accommodate the single omnitemporality operator $\blacksquare$ than it is to accommodate the $\mathcal{H}$ and $\mathcal{G}$ operators. We conclude this chapter with a discussion of some of the more important points to consider.

Note first that the actuality operator $\mathcal{A}$ takes on new significance when one adds tense operators to our system. A formula of the form $\mathcal{A}\phi$ must be read as ‘it is actually now the case that $\phi$’ or ‘actually, now $\phi$’. The axiom (43)$\star$, i.e., $\mathcal{A}\phi \equiv \phi$, becomes both a modally fragile as well as a temporally fragile axiom.\(^{286}\)

In order to assert axioms for the tensed system, one has to carefully define temporal closures and make sure that no temporal closures of axiom (43)$\star$ are asserted as axioms. Moreover, a modified version of (45.4) has to be asserted, namely:

$$\diamondsuit \exists x (E!x & \neg \mathcal{A}E!x)$$

This asserts that possibly, sometime, there exists a concrete object that fails actually now to exemplify being concrete.

Clearly, we must accordingly think of the contingently concrete individuals as those individuals that exemplify being concrete and that possibly, sometime, fail to exemplify being concrete. So the formula $\exists x (E!x \& \diamondsuit \neg E!x)$ asserts that contingently concrete individuals exist. And $\exists x (\neg E!x \& \diamondsuit E!x)$ asserts that contingently non-concrete individuals exist.

We already mentioned above that if $\blacksquare$ is primitive, one would add the tensed S5 axioms, and if $\mathcal{H}$ and $\mathcal{G}$ are primitive, one would add the axioms of minimal tense logic. However, one must also introduce axioms that govern the interaction of the actuality operator and the tense operators, as well as axioms that govern the interaction of the tense operators and modal operators. For example, if $\blacksquare$ is primitive, one might add:

$$\mathcal{A}\phi \rightarrow \Box \blacksquare \mathcal{A}\phi$$

\(^{286}\)Similarly, the definite description operator $\mathcal{I}$ has a new significance; the denotation of a definite description such as $\mathcal{I}x\phi$ becomes the object, if there is one, that satisfies $\phi$ at the world-time pair $(w_0, t_0)$. So we would need to read the description as ‘the $x$ now in fact such that $\phi$’.
The first is the temporal analogue of (46.1). It asserts: if actually, now \( \varphi \), then it is necessarily, always the case that actually, now \( \varphi \). The second is the temporal analogue of (46.2). It asserts: necessarily, always \( \varphi \) if and only if it is actually, now the case that necessarily, always \( \varphi \). The third axiom tells us that the necessity operator and omnitemporality operator commute. Of course, different axioms will be needed if one starts with the two operators of minimal tense logic, \( \mathcal{H} \) and \( \mathcal{G} \). The only axiom for complex terms that needs modification is (49), but it is obvious where the \( \square \) has to be placed. Similarly, the closures of the following revised axiom for the rigidity of encoding (51) are needed:

\[
xF \rightarrow \square \square xF
\]

Finally, the Comprehension Axiom for Abstract Objects (53) will remain the same.

The most interesting and subtle revisions that would be needed are those that concern the deductive system. One important notion that has to be introduced is that of modally and temporally strict derivation (or proof), i.e., one that doesn’t depend on axiom (43)\( \star \). Moreover, one has to justify metarules of inference for the tense operators that correspond to the Rule of Necessitation. To state those metarules, one may need also need to define a temporally strict derivation (or proof).

Thus, the addition of temporal operators raises a number of questions about how to formulate, in the simplest way, a deductive system that both (a) accommodates the tense operators and (b) allows for reasoning with modally fragile axioms, temporally fragile axioms, and contingent premises. We leave those questions for another occasion. It should be clear, however, that the resulting system should yield proofs of the interesting and important theorems listed above and, moreover, ones that closely parallel the proofs of the analogous theorems governing possible worlds.

12.6 Stories and Fictional Individuals

We now explore the suggestion that stories, like possible worlds and impossible worlds, are a species of situations and then analyze the notions of character and fictional character in terms of stories. For the purposes of this section only, we assume that our language includes a variety of familiar individual constants, including proper names, historical names, names of stories, and names of fictional characters. In this section we omit discussion of the data involving fictional properties (e.g., being a unicorn, being a hobbit) and fictional relations.
(e.g., *absolute simultaneity*). We shall, in a later chapter, analyze fictional properties and fictional relations as higher-order abstracta and, in particular, as abstract properties and abstract relations. These latter will be systematized in Chapter 15 (Typed Object Theory and Its Applications) and so we’ll reserve the analysis of fictional properties and relations for that chapter.

### 12.6.1 Data and Methodology

(571) **Remark:** Data To Be Explained. We will assume four bodies of data, all of which are expressed in natural language:

(A) a body of pre-theoretic *truths* about stories and characters that would become falsehoods if prefaced by a locution of the form ‘In the story’ or ‘According to the story’;

(B) a body of true claims about the world that are taken to be true when authors use them in the context of a story;

(C) a body of pre-theoretic truths that have the form ‘In the story $s$, . . . ’ or ‘According to the story $s$, . . . ’; and

(D) a body of pre-theoretic judgments about what logically follows from the truths in (A), (B), and (C).

Examples of (A) are:

(.1) (a) *The Iliad* is a story.
       (b) *Crime and Punishment* is a story.
       (c) *The Brother Karamazov* is a story.
       (d) *A Study in Scarlet* is a story.

(.2) (a) Homer authored *The Iliad*.
       (b) Dostoyevsky authored *Crime and Punishment*.
       (c) Conan Doyle authored *A Study in Scarlet*.

(.3) Homer authored *The Iliad* before Dostoyevsky authored *Crime and Punishment*.

(.4) (a) Porphyry is an original character of *Crime and Punishment*.
       (b) Sherlock Holmes is an original character of *A Study in Scarlet*.

(.5) (a) Porphyry is a fictional character.
       (b) Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character.

(.6) (a) Porphyry is a fictional detective.
       (b) Holmes is a fictional detective.
(7) (a) London is a character of *A Study in Scarlet*.
(b) London isn’t an original character of *A Study in Scarlet*.
(c) London isn’t a fictional character.
(d) The London of *A Study in Scarlet* is an original character of *A Study in Scarlet*.
(e) The London of *A Study in Scarlet* is a fictional character.
(f) The London of *A Study in Scarlet* is a fictional city.
(g) London is not identical to the London of *A Study in Scarlet*.

(8) *Crime and Punishment* is a fiction, not a false story.

(9) Sherlock Holmes is more famous than Porphyry.

Examples of (B) are:

(10) (a) St. Petersburg is a city.
(b) Baker Street is in London.

Note that (a) remains true when prefaced by ‘In *Crime and Punishment*’ but not when prefaced by ‘In *The Iliad*’, and that (b) remains true when prefaced by ‘According to *A Study in Scarlet*’ but not when prefaced by ‘According to *The Brothers Karamazov*’.

Examples of (C) are:

(11) (a) In *The Iliad*, Achilles fought Hector.
(b) According to *Crime and Punishment*, Raskolnikov kills a pawnbroker.
(c) According to *A Study in Scarlet*, Holmes is a detective.
(d) According to *A Study in Scarlet*, Holmes might have been a violinist.
(e) According to *Crime and Punishment*, Porphyry is a detective.
(f) In *A Study in Scarlet*, London is a city.

Examples of (D) are:

(12) *The Iliad* is a story.
Therefore, there are truths according to *The Iliad*.

(13) *Crime and Punishment* is a story.
Therefore, something authored *Crime and Punishment*.

(14) In *Crime and Punishment*, Porphyry is a detective.
Porphyry is an original character of *Crime and Punishment*.
Therefore, Porphyry is a fictional detective.

(15) London is a real city.
Therefore, London is not a fictional city.
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(.16) London is a real city.
   London is a character of *A Study in Scarlet*.
   *A Study in Scarlet* is a fiction.
   Therefore, some characters of a fiction are real.

(.17) The London of *A Study in Scarlet* is an original character of *A Study in Scarlet*.
   In *A Study in Scarlet*, London is a city.
   Therefore, the London of *A Study in Scarlet* is a fictional city.

(.18) London is a real city.
   The London of *A Study in Scarlet* is a fictional city.
   Therefore, London is not (identical to) the London of *A Study in Scarlet*.

(.19) Augustus Caesar worshipped Jupiter.
   Jupiter is a fictional character.
   Fictional characters aren’t real.
   Therefore, Augustus Caesar worshipped an object that isn’t real.

(.20) Sherlock Holmes inspires some criminologists.
   Sherlock Holmes is fictional.
   Therefore, a fictional object inspires some criminologists.

(572) Remark: Methodology. Our methodology is to proceed in three stages:

(I) We introduce new theoretical notions (both primitive and defined) into object theory; these are notions needed for the analysis the data.

(II) The data in (A), (B), and (C) of (571) are then analyzed by representing them in object theory using the notions introduced in (I). As part of the analysis, we index the names of the *original* characters of a story with the name of that story. The data, as analyzed in object theory, may then be used either as (modally fragile) premises and conclusions of arguments representable in object theory or as axioms of object theory. For simplicity, we usually take them to be (modally fragile) premises or conclusions within a derivation.

(III) We then show how the judgments of logical consequence in (D) of (571) are validated as *derivations* in object theory, i.e., we show, for each argument in (D), that the analysis of the conclusion is derivable from the analyses of the premises.

As to (I), we shall need three primitive, theoretical notions. We leave a full analysis of these notions for some other occasion since, for the most part, an
exact axiomatization isn’t essential to the analysis presented below. Instead, we make only a few minimal assumptions about the primitives introduced.

The three primitive theoretical notions required for the treatment of fiction are:

- a 2-place *authorship* relation (‘A’) among individuals
  ‘Axy’ asserts ‘x authors y’
- a binary *temporal precedence* operation (‘<’) on propositions
  ‘p < q’ asserts ‘p occurred before q occurred’ or ‘p temporally precedes q’
- relevant entailment (‘R’) among propositions
  p₁,…,pₙ ⊢ R q indicates that q is relevantly implied by p₁,…,pₙ

For the purposes of this chapter, we may regard formulas of the form Axy and p < q as propositional formulas. While ‘A’ can clearly be added to our language as a distinguished 2-place relation term, we leave it to the reader to determine how best to extend the language and system of object theory with the binary operation on propositions <. Similarly, we leave it open as to how to specify the metatheoretic, derivability relation ⊢ R among propositions.

The following, minimal understanding of our three new primitives is all that will be required:

- **Authorship.** We rely on the intuition that an individual x may author a story y by way of a story-telling, where a story-telling can take place either by oral narration, by writing down sentence-tokens on paper, by using a keyboard to configure electronic bits in a computer drive that represent sentences, etc. Clearly, then, (.1) if x authors something, then x is a concrete object, and (.2) if something authors y, then y might not have been authored. We therefore employ the following two assumptions about *authorship*:

  1. \( \exists y Axy \rightarrow E!x \)
  2. \( \exists x Axy \rightarrow \Diamond \neg \exists x Axy \)

  (.2) simply captures the fact that authorship is a contingent relation.

- **Temporal Precedence.** Intuitively, p < q simply has to represent the meaning of the adverb ‘before’ in the following ordinary sentences:

  287\(^\text{Formally, the temporal precedence operator among propositions can be understood in terms of temporal precedence among moments of time. Where } t <_T t' \text{ is a relation on times that holds whenever time } t \text{ precedes time } t', \text{ then } p < q \text{ holds just in case:} \)

  \[ \exists t \exists t'(t <_T t' \land t \models p \land \neg \exists t''(t'' <_T t \land t'' \models p) \land t' \models q \land \neg \exists t'''(t''' <_T t' \land t''' \models q)) \]

  In other words, p before q just in case there are times t and t’ such that t precedes t’, p occurs at t but at no earlier time, and q occurs at t’ but at no earlier time.
Caesar crossed the Rubicon before Washington crossed the Delaware. Homer authored *The Iliad* before Proust authored *Remembrance of Things Past*.

If we ignore the past tense of the verbs and use obvious abbreviations, then the former would be represented formally as $Ccr < Cwd$ and the second would be represented formally as $Ahi < Apr$.

Relevant Entailment. In what follows, we shall assume both of the following:

(a) The story operator, ‘In s’ or ‘According to s’, is closed under relevant entailment, i.e., that if $q$ is relevantly implied by $p_1, \ldots, p_n$ and the $p_i$ $(1 \leq i \leq n)$ are all true in story $s$, then $q$ is true in story $s$, and

(b) $\beta$-Conversion and its associated theorems and rules are part of the logic of relevant entailment, so that the story operator is closed under relevant entailment and we can reason using $\beta$-Conversion (and its associated theorems and rules) within the scope of the story operator. For example, from the fact that ‘In story $s$, $Rab$, we may infer both ‘In story $s$, $a$ exemplifies $[\lambda x Rxb]$’ and ‘In story $s$, $b$ exemplifies $[\lambda x Rax]$’.

Intuitively, as we listen to, or read, a narrative, we don’t infer all the logical consequences of the propositions signified by the sentences explicitly uttered or contained in the narrative, but instead infer only the consequences that are, in some sense, ‘relevant’ to forming a common sense understanding of the story being narrated (Parsons 1980, 175–82). Which consequences are relevant is highly contextual and depends on a number of factors, including the context in which the story is narrated by the author, the context in which the hearer or reader becomes acquainted with the narrative, the cognitive state of the hearer or reader, how well the hearer or reader can pick up allusions, etc.

We recognize, in what follows, that there may be no general agreement as to which propositions are true in a story. Such lack of agreement won’t matter, however, since we assume only that there are at least some true judgments of the form ‘In story $s$, $p’ or ‘$p$ is true according to story $s’’. Our analysis is therefore directed at target sentences we may assume to be true; if the reader denies
that the particular examples we’ve chosen are true, he or she may simply substi-
tute others. So when we say that the story operator is closed under relevant
etailment, the reader may substitute any sentences of the form ‘In story s,
p’ they judge to be true and close the resulting story operator under relevant
etailment.

This understanding of our three, new primitive notions should suffice for a
basic analysis of fiction within object theory.\textsuperscript{289}

12.6.2 New Principles For Analyzing Fiction

We therefore first implement (I) in (572), by introducing new definitions, ax-
ions, and theorems of object theory.

\textbf{(573) Definition:} Stories and Truth in a Story. In what follows, we take the
variables \(x,y,z\) to be unrestricted. We now say that (.1) \(x\) is a \textit{story} just in case
\(x\) is a non-null situation that is authored:

\(\text{Story}(x) \equiv_{df} \text{Situation}(x) & \exists p(x[\lambda y p]) & \exists y \text{Ayx}\)

This definition does \textit{not} limit the notion of a story to fictions. Given the above
definition, someone’s testimony (whether true or false) in a court of law would
constitute a story, as would a reporter’s news article (again, whether true or
false), among other examples. Any authored narrative constitutes a story.

Since stories are situations, the defined notion of ‘truth in a situation’ (\(\models\))
may be used as the analysis of ‘truth according to a story’. Thus, we say that
(.2) \(p\) \textit{is true in story} \(s\) (or \textit{According to} \(s\), \(p\)), written \(s \models p\), just in case \(s\) encodes
being such that \(p\):

\(s \models p \equiv_{df} s[\lambda x p]\)

We shall later apply these definitions by using them to represent the data. In
what follows, we do not positively assert the existence of stories, since that is
a contingent matter, though we could positively assert \textit{a priori} the existence
of possible stories. But we shall suppose, in what follows, that the general
assumption \(\exists x \text{Story}(x)\) is consistent with object theory.

\textbf{(574) Theorem:} Consequences of the Contingency of Authorship. Our
assumption in (572.1) that, for any \(y\), if something authors \(y\) then it is possible
that nothing authors \(y\), implies that stories are not necessarily stories:

\(\forall y(\exists x \text{Axy} \rightarrow \diamond \neg \exists x \text{Axy}) \rightarrow \forall z(\text{Story}(z) \rightarrow \neg \Box \text{Story}(z))\)

\textsuperscript{289}For further discussion of our new primitives, see Zalta 1983 (Chapter IV), Zalta 1988 (124–
125), and 2000c (Section 4).
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A proof is in the Appendix.

(575) Remark: Concerning the Contingency of Story Existence. One simple way to address this contingency is to define a possible story as a non-null situation that might have been authored by someone:

\[ \text{PossibleStory}(x) \equiv_{df} \text{Situation}(x) \& \exists p(x[p]) \& \diamond \exists y Ayx \]

We leave it as an exercise to show that \( \text{PossibleStory}(x) \rightarrow \Box \text{PossibleStory}(x) \). So \( \text{PossibleStory}(x) \) is a rigid restriction condition, whereas \( \text{Story}(x) \) is not. It is therefore important, when using restricted variables to range over stories or possible stories, to remember that restricted variables over stories won’t be rigid.

Let us assume, then, that \( \text{Story}(x) \) and \( \text{PossibleStory}(x) \) are restriction conditions and therefore repurpose the variables \( s, s', \ldots \) to range over stories or possible stories, as needed.

However, it is important to be aware of an important consequence of working with the notion of a story. For if we operate under assumption (572.1), then a claim of the form \( \text{Story}(\sigma) \), if taken as an axiom, has to be marked as modally fragile. Intuitively, the fact that something is a story depends on a contingency, namely, that the author of the story has engaged in behavior that constitutes a storytelling. So there are two ways to regard true claims of the form “According to the story, \( p \)”. On the one hand, one might regard them as contingently true, on the grounds that since authorship is a modally fragile relation, any truths that depend on that relation are themselves modally fragile. On the other hand, one might suppose that when an author tells a story in which they introduce new proper names of characters, they are emphatically changing the expressive power of the language. As such one might regard “According to the story, \( p \)” as a necessary fact about the language with the new expressive power. It doesn’t matter, for our purposes, whether one regards “According to the story, \( p \)” as modally fragile or as necessary. But if one regards them as modally fragile premises or axioms, then anything derived from them is modally fragile (and marked as such, so as to avoid inappropriate uses of Rule RN).

(576) Theorem: A Rigid Condition and a Strictly Canonical Description. Let \( \varphi \) be \( \exists p(s \models p \& F = [\lambda z p]) \), where \( s \) is any situation. Then we can establish, as a modally strict theorem, that \( \forall \varphi(p \rightarrow \Box \varphi) \), i.e., that:

\[ \forall F(\exists p(s \models p \& F = [\lambda z p]) \rightarrow \Box \exists p(s \models p \& F = [\lambda z p])) \]

So by (257.1), the formula \( \exists p(s \models p \& F = [\lambda z p]) \) is a rigid condition on properties. Hence, the description \( ix(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \exists p(s \models p \& F = [\lambda z p]))) \) denotes a strictly canonical abstract object. Note, however, that if we instantiate this modally strict theorem to a particular story, say \( s_1 \), where the claim \( \text{Story}(s_1) \) is modally fragile, then the resulting instance fails to be modally strict.
Theorem: The Identity of Stories and Possible Stories. From our definitions, it follows that, for any (possible) story $s$, $s$ is the abstract object that encodes just the propositional properties $[\lambda y \ p]$ such that $p$ is true in $s$:

$$\forall s (s = \tau x (\exists ! x & \forall F (xF \equiv \exists p (s \models p & F = [\lambda y \ p])))$$

Thus, stories can be identified as strictly canonical abstract objects. In other words, insofar as there is a body of truths of the form $s |\!| = p$ for story $s$, we have a principled way of identifying $s$. But, as noted previously, there may be no general agreement about which propositions are true according to a given story. Nevertheless, the present view is that talk about a story presupposes that there is some body of sentences true in that story. Moreover, it is important to remember that while the general claim displayed above is a modally strict theorem, the data that becomes represented by formulas of the form $s |\!| = p$ may be regarded either as modally fragile premises or axioms, or as necessary, depending on whether one takes the author to have changed the expressive power of the language so as to create a new language. One might regard the contingent acts of storytelling as giving rise to necessary facts about new languages with increased expressive power.

Definition: Characters of Stories. For the purposes of this section, it suffices to say that $x$ is a character of $s$ just in case there is some property that $x$ exemplifies according to $s$:

$$\text{CharacterOf}(x, s) \equiv_{df} x \downarrow & \exists F (s |\!| = Fx)$$

Though this definition will need to be refined to handle a special case (see below), note that it allows real objects to be characters of stories. For suppose we’re given the claims: (a) in *A Study in Scarlet*, Baker Street exemplifies the property of being located in London, i.e., $s |\!| = [\lambda x \ Lx]b$, and (b) in *A Study in Scarlet*, London exemplifies the property of being the location of Baker Street, i.e., $s |\!| = [\lambda x Lbx]$. Then it follows from (a) that there is a property that Baker Street exemplifies in *A Study in Scarlet*, i.e., $\exists F (s |\!| = Fb)$, and it follows from (b) that there is a property that London exemplifies in *A Study in Scarlet*, i.e., $\exists F (s |\!| = Fl)$. Hence, by the above definition, it follows, respectively, that Baker Street is a character of *A Study in Scarlet*, i.e., $\text{CharacterOf}(b, s)$, and that London is a character of *A Study in Scarlet*, i.e., $\text{CharacterOf}(l, s)$.

Of course, if one treats occurrences of ‘London’ and ‘Baker Street’ in *A Study in Scarlet* as denoting original, fictional characters, namely ‘The London of *A Study in Scarlet*’ and ‘The Baker Street of *A Study in Scarlet*’, respectively, then we may not conclude anything about London and Baker Street; they are not characters of *A Study in Scarlet*, though of course they exemplify some properties that the fictional characters encode. We explore the details of this in the next subsection.
For most purposes and most cases of classical fiction, the above definition of *CharacterOf* suffices. But if one wants to forestall the problem of named characters that are distinct but indiscernible, the above definition has to be refined a bit. We leave this to a later chapter.\(^{290}\)

(579) **Definition:** Original Characters. An *original character* of story \(s\) is a character of \(s\) that is abstract and that is not a character of any story authored before \(s\) was authored:

\[
\text{OriginalCharacterOf}(x, s) \equiv_{df} \text{CharacterOf}(x, s) \land A!x \land \\
\forall y \forall z \forall s' ((Azs' < Ays) \rightarrow \neg \text{CharacterOf}(x, s'))
\]

(580) **Axiom:** Identity of Original Characters. We now stipulate that if an object \(x\) is an original character of \(s\), then \(x\) encodes exactly those properties that \(x\) exemplifies according to \(s\):

\[
\text{OriginalCharacterOf}(x, s) \rightarrow x \equiv y (A!y \land \forall F (yF \equiv s \models F))
\]

Intuitively, if Raskolnikov is an original character of *Crime and Punishment*, then Raskolnikov is the abstract object that encodes just the properties \(F\) such that Raskolnikov exemplifies \(F\) according to *Crime and Punishment*.

(581) **Theorem:** Another Rigid Condition and Strictly Canonical Description. It is straightforward to establish, where \(\varphi\) is any condition on properties, that for all properties \(F\), if \(\varphi\) is true in story \(s\), then necessarily, \(\varphi\) is true in story \(s\), i.e.,

\[
\forall F (s \models \varphi \rightarrow \Box s \models \varphi)
\]

Hence, by now familiar reasoning, \(s \models \varphi\) is a rigid condition on properties and \(\forall x (A!x \land \forall F (xF \equiv s \models F))\) is a strictly canonical object.

(582) **Definition:** Fictional Characters. We say that an object is a fictional character just in case it is an original character of some story:

\[
\text{Fictional}(x) \equiv_{df} \exists s \text{OriginalCharacterOf}(x, s)
\]

\(^{290}\)The issue here is similar to the problem of named indiscernibles in mathematics, e.g., \(i\) and \(-i\) in complex number theory. Nodelman & Zalta 2014 (52) forestall the issue by defining ‘*x is an element of the structure \(T\)* (or ‘*x is an object of theory \(T\)*’) as: it is true in \(T\) that every \(y\) that is \(T\)-distinct from \(x\) is distinguishable from \(x\) by some property. This utilizes a special abstract relation \(\equiv_T\), for each theory \(T\). Similarly, once we have developed typed object theory in Chapter 15, we may introduce, for each story \(s\), a special abstract relation of identity, \(=s\). Then we can refine the above definition to read:

\[
\text{CharacterOf}(x, s) \equiv_{df} s \models \forall y (\exists x \land \forall F (Fx \land \neg Fy))
\]

In other words, \(x\) is a character of \(s\) just in case it is true in \(s\) that for every individual \(y\) that distinct \(x\) from \(x\), \(x\) is exemplification distinguishable from \(y\) by some property. A fuller discussion of this definition is left for Chapter 15.
Again, intuitively, if we assume that that Raskonikov is an original character of *Crime and Punishment*, then this definition lets us infer that Raskolnikov is a fictional character.

(583) **Definition:** *Fictional G*s. We say that *x* is a *fictional G* just in case *x* is an original character of a story according to which *x* exemplifies *G*:

\[
\text{Fictional-}G(x) \equiv \exists s (\text{OriginalCharacterOf}(x, s) \& s \models G x)
\]

(584) **Definition:** Fictions vs. True and False Stories. We now distinguish between true stories, false stories, and fictions (i.e., fictional stories). The technical notions defined here may differ from the ordinary, everyday concept of fiction, since the everyday concept often classifies false stories as fictions; narratives that contains a false proposition (e.g., as in false testimony) are often labeled as ‘fictions’. But as we shall use the term here, a fiction is not simply a non-null, authored situation that encodes a false proposition; in addition, at least one of its characters must be a fictional character. By contrast, none of the characters in true and false stories may be fictional.

Thus, we define: (.1) a story *s* is **true** just in case every proposition true in *s* is true and no character of *s* is a fictional character; (.2) a story *s* is **false** just in case some proposition true in *s* fails to be true and no character of *s* is a fictional character; and (.3) a story *s* is a **fiction** just in case some character of *s* is a fictional character:

\[
\begin{align*}
(1) \text{True}(s) & \equiv df \forall p(s \models p \rightarrow p) \& \neg \exists x (\text{CharacterOf}(x, s) \& \text{Fictional}(x)) \\
(2) \text{False}(s) & \equiv df \exists p(s \models p \& \neg p) \& \neg \exists x (\text{CharacterOf}(x, s) \& \text{Fictional}(x)) \\
(3) \text{Fiction}(s) & \equiv df \exists x (\text{CharacterOf}(x, s) \& \text{Fictional}(x))
\end{align*}
\]

As noted above, these technical notions may differ from the ordinary, everyday concepts. That’s because we’re interested primarily in the ontological status of stories; we’re not as much interested in the context in which the story is told (e.g., whether it is explicitly being put forward as a ‘fiction’) or the popular use of the term ‘fiction’ to label a narrative that contains a falsehood.

The present view is based on the idea that one can’t simultaneously assert that a story *s* is both false and a fiction. Of course, many stories are popularly held to be both false and fictions, but here we are drawing a distinction between a false story, something that is truth-apt, and a fiction, something that isn’t. Here is a rule of thumb. Suppose a name κ of a known concrete object *y* is used in the storytelling of *s* to name the main character of *s*. And suppose, further, that there is some claim *p* that is true in *s* but that isn’t true simpliciter, and that *s* has no other obvious fictional characters. Then *s* is a false story if and only if κ, as used in the *s*, is a name of the concrete object *y*. Alternatively
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$s$ is a fiction if and only if $\kappa$, as used in $s$, is a name of the fictional object ‘the $\kappa$ of $s$’. For example, consider a story, say $s_1$, in which (a) the term ‘Richard Nixon’ is used in the storytelling of $s_1$ to name the main character of $s_1$, (b) $s_1$ encodes a false proposition (say, that ‘Nixon was born in Delaware’), and (c) none of the other characters of $s_1$ is fictional. Then, we should take $s_1$ to be a false story if and only if we take ‘Richard Nixon’, as used in the storytelling of $s_1$, to denote the historical person who was the 37th President of the U.S.. On the other hand, we should take $s_1$ to be a fiction if and only if we take ‘Richard Nixon’, as used in the storytelling of $s_1$, to denote an original, fictional character describable as ‘the Richard Nixon of $s_1$’. But we shouldn’t regard $s_1$ as both a false story and a fiction.

12.6.3 Analysis of the Data

In this subsection, we implement step (II) of (572), by analyzing the data in (A), (B), and (C) of (571) in terms of the principles developed in the previous subsection.

(585) Remark: Analyses of the (A) Examples. In what follows, we analyze the (A) examples of (572). In cases where there are multiple examples with the same form, we give only one example and then produce the analysis. When we introduce a new constant to represent the name of an original character in story $s$, we index the constant to the name of $s$. The new constants used as abbreviations in what follows should be obvious.

Examples of (A) are:

(.1) (a) *The Iliad* is a story.
   \( \text{Story}(i) \)

(.2) (a) Homer authored *The Iliad*.
   \( \text{Ahi} \)

(.3) Homer authored *The Iliad* before Dostoyevsky authored *Crime and Punishment*.
   \( \text{Ahi} < \text{Adc} \)

(.4) (a) Porphyry is an original character of *Crime and Punishment*.
   \( \text{OriginalCharacterOf}(p,c) \)

(.5) (a) Porphyry is a fictional character.
   \( \text{Fictional}(p_i) \)

(.6) (a) Porphyry is a fictional detective.
   \( \text{Fictional-D}(p_i) \)
(a) London is a character of *A Study in Scarlet*.
    \[\text{Character}(l,s)\]

(b) London isn’t an original character of *A Study in Scarlet*.
    \[\neg \text{OriginalCharacterOf}(l,s)\]

(c) London isn’t a fictional character.
    \[\neg \text{Fictional}(l)\]

(d) The London of *A Study in Scarlet* is an original character of *A Study in Scarlet*.
    \[\text{OriginalCharacterOf}(l,s,s)\]

(e) The London of *A Study in Scarlet* is a fictional character.
    \[\text{Fictional}(l,s,s)\]

(f) The London of *A Study in Scarlet* is a fictional city.
    \[\text{Fictional-C}(l,s)\]

(g) London is not identical to the London of *A Study in Scarlet*.
    \[l \neq l_s\]

(8) *Crime and Punishment* is a fiction, not a false story.
    \[\text{Fiction}(c) \& \neg \text{False}(c)\]

(9) Sherlock Holmes is more famous than Porphyry.
    \[\text{Mh}_p\]

Example (9) is interesting when compared to the superficially analogous sentence ‘Sherlock Holmes is smarter than Porphyry’. For an analysis of claims like the latter, see Zalta 2000c (130–138).

(586) Remark: Analyses of the (B) and (C) Examples. We now follow a similar procedure for analyzing the (B) and (C) examples of (572).

Examples of (B) are:

(.10) (a) St. Petersburg is a city.
    \[\text{Cs}\]

(b) Baker Street is in London.
    \[\text{Ibl}\]

Both (a) and (b), as analyzed, are simple truths that remain true when prefaced by \(c \models\) and \(s \models\), respectively, as long as the names ‘St. Petersburg’, ‘Baker Street’, and ‘London’ are used in the storytelling to refer, in the usual way, to the well-known cities and street in Russia and England.

Examples of (C) are:
(.11) (a) In *The Iliad*, Achilles fought Hector.
\[ i \models Fa_i h_i \]

(b) According to *Crime and Punishment*, Raskolnikov kills a pawnbroker.
\[ c \models \exists x (P x \land Kr_c x) \]

(c) According to *A Study in Scarlet*, Holmes is a detective.
\[ s \models Dh_s \]

(d) According to *A Study in Scarlet*, Holmes might have been a violinist.
\[ s \models \diamond Vh_s \]

(e) According to *Crime and Punishment*, Porphyry is a detective.
\[ c \models Dp_c \]

(f) In *A Study in Scarlet*, London is a city.
\[ s \models Cl \]
\[ s \models Cl_s \]

Note that (.11.f) is ambiguous and can therefore be represented in one of two ways. In the first reading, ‘London’ in the data is interpreted as denoting the real city, while in the second reading, it is interpreted as denoting the fictional object: the London of *A Study in Scarlet*.

The reader may add to the foregoing any of her favorite examples that are representable in the present language of object theory. With a richer language, a wider variety of examples becomes representable.

### 12.6.4 Validating Judgments of Logical Consequence

(587) **Derivations:** Argument Representations. We now implement stage III of our methodology, as described in (572). We reproduce the arguments in (D) of (571) and, in each case, provide the formal representation of the argument as a valid derivation of object theory. It suffices, in what follows, to represent the ordinary claim ‘σ is real’ as \( E\sigma \):

(.12) *The Iliad* is a story.
Therefore, there are propositions that are true according to *The Iliad*.

\[ \text{Story}(i) \vdash \exists p (i \models p) \]

(.13) *Crime and Punishment* is a story.
Therefore, something authored *Crime and Punishment*.

\[ \text{Story}(c) \vdash \exists x Ax_c \]
(14) In Crime and Punishment, Porphyry is a detective. Porphyry is an original character of Crime and Punishment. Therefore, Porphyry is a fictional detective.

\[ c \models Dp, \text{OriginalCharacterOf}(p, c) \vdash \text{Fictional-D}(p) \]

(15) London is a real city. Therefore, London is not a fictional city.

\[ [\lambda x E!x & Cx]l \vdash \neg \text{Fictional}(l) \]

(16) London is a real city. London is a character of A Study in Scarlet. A Study in Scarlet is a fiction. Therefore, some characters of a fiction are real.

\[ [\lambda x E!x & Cx]l, \text{CharacterOf}(l,s_1), \text{Fiction}(s_1) \vdash \exists x \exists s (\text{CharacterOf}(x,s) & \text{Fiction}(s) & E!x) \]

(17) The London of A Study in Scarlet is an original character of A Study in Scarlet. In A Study in Scarlet, London is a city. Therefore, the London of A Study in Scarlet is a fictional city.

\[ \text{OriginalCharacterOf}(l,s), s \models CL, \vdash \text{Fictional-C}(l) \]

(18) London is a real city. The London of A Study in Scarlet is a fictional city. Therefore, London is not (identical to) the London of A Study in Scarlet.

\[ [\lambda x E!x & Cx]l, \text{Fictional-C}(l) \vdash l \neq l_s \]

(19) Augustus Caesar worshipped Jupiter. Jupiter is a fictional character. Fictional characters aren't real. Therefore, Augustus Caesar worshipped an object that isn't real.\(^{291}\)

\[ WcJ, \text{Fictional}(j), \forall x (\text{Fictional}(x) \rightarrow \neg E!x) \vdash \exists x (Wcx & \neg E!x) \]

(20) Sherlock Holmes inspires some criminologists. Sherlock Holmes is fictional. Therefore, a fictional object inspires some criminologists.

\[ \exists x (Cx & Ihx), \text{Fictional}(h) \vdash \exists x \exists y (\text{Fictional}(x) & Cy & Ixy) \]

\(^{291}\)For this example, we may assume that ‘Jupiter’ is a name derived from some given text cataloguing Roman myths, e.g., Ovid’s Metamorphoses. But, in the representation, we suppress the index to ‘m’.
Notice that in (.17), the second premise is disambiguated by interpreting ‘Lon-
don’ as denoting the London of \textit{A Study in Scarlet} \((l)\); the representation of this premise is the second one given in (586.11.f). That’s because the first premise provides a context that makes it clear we are to read ‘London’ as denoting a fictional character.

We leave the derivations, in each case, as a simple exercise.

\textbf{(588) Derivations:} Theoretical Consequences of Principles. The foregoing derivations are all representations of arguments drawn from ordinary language. We now examine some derivations in which theoretical conclusions are drawn from the premises:

\begin{enumerate}
\item In \textit{A Study in Scarlet}, Holmes is a detective.
  Holmes is an original character of \textit{A Study in Scarlet}.
  Therefore, Holmes encodes being a detective.

\[
 s \models Dh, \text{ OriginalCharacterOf}(h,s) \vdash h, D
\]

A proof is in the Appendix. If we appeal to our assumption that the story operator is closed under relevant entailment and that this implies \(\beta\)-Conversion holds within its scope. Thus, we may infer, from \(s \models Rab\), that both \(s \models [\lambda x Rx b] a\) and \(s \models [\lambda x Rx b] b\). Then the following is derivation is valid, in which the conclusion is a binary encoding claim of the form \(xyR\):

\item In \textit{The Iliad}, Achilles fought Hector.
  Achilles is an original character of \textit{The Iliad}.
  Hector is an original character of \textit{The Iliad}.
  Therefore, Achilles and Hector encode the relation of fighting.

\[
 s \models Fh, w, \text{ OriginalCharacterOf}(h,s), \text{OriginalCharacterOf}(w,s) \vdash h, w, F
\]

We conclude this subsection by mentioning that binary encoding claims of the form \(xyR\) will also play a role in the analysis of theoretical mathematics and will be used again in Chapter 15.

\section*{12.6.5 Final Issues Concerning Fictional Individuals}

The theory of fiction raises a host of thorny philosophical problems. One issue that has been the subject of much debate is how to identify a fictional character when that fictional character reappears in a series of novels. Another is how to identify what appear to be distinct fictional characters within a story that leaves them indiscernible. A third is how to draw comparisons among fictional characters. In all of these problems, philosophers appear to have very strong intuitions about the facts of the case and often judge that some theory of fiction just can’t be correct since it is inconsistent with what their intuitions
tell them are the facts of the case. My guess is that in most of these case, our intuitions are just not fine-grained enough and are way too crude for us to put much stock in them. Rather, the way forward is to draw distinctions, formulate definitions, and test whether the theoretical conclusions they yield lead us to a more refined understanding of the problem at hand.

I’m going to leave this work for another occasion, since the issues are so complex that they would draw us too far afield. I suspect that object theory, at the very least, gives us a precise framework for drawing distinctions, formulating definitions, and testing theoretical conclusions. So, to close this chapter, I plan to briefly discuss only one problem, namely, the sense in which fictional characters might have existed.

(589) Remark: Possibility and Fictional Characters. Suppose fictional character \( x \) originates in some story, say \( s \). Then \( x \) is abstract and encodes the properties attributed to \( x \) in \( s \). However, we commonly suppose that \( x \) might have existed (or might have been real). To suppose this is to suppose that, at some possible world \( w \), there is an object \( y \) that exemplifies at \( w \) the properties attributed to \( x \) in \( s \). But consider the fact that in *The Iliad*, Achilles fought Hector. So to suppose that Achilles might have existed would be to suppose that, at some possible world \( w \), an object \( y \) exemplifies at \( w \) the properties attributed to Achilles in *The Iliad*. But one of those properties is fighting Hector. But if we’ve also identified Hector as an abstract object (given that he, too, originated in *The Iliad*, then by exemplifying fighting Hector at \( w \), it would follow that there is an abstract object \( z \) that is identical to Hector and such that at \( w \), \( y \) exemplifies fighting \( z \).

This result seems rather puzzling. What it shows is we can’t rest with saying that some particular fictional object in story \( s \) might have existed; rather we have to say that all the fictional characters of \( s \) might have jointly existed, in the sense that, for any fictional characters \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) of story \( s \), there is a possible world \( w \) and objects \( y_1, \ldots, y_n \) such that each of the \( y_1, \ldots, y_n \) exemplify at \( w \), respectively, all of the properties attributed to \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \).

While this seems to be a step closer to what we want, there is still the problem: what specifically do we say about the property of fighting Hector. If \( y_1 \) and \( y_2 \) exemplify, at \( w \), exactly the properties attributed, respectively, to Achilles and Hector in *The Iliad*, then we need \( y_1 \) to exemplify at \( w \) the property of fighting \( y_2 \), and \( y_2 \) to exemplify at \( w \) the property of having been fought by \( y_1 \).

To finesse this issue, let us say:

A fictional story \( s \) is true at \( w \) if and only if whenever \( \kappa_1, \ldots, \kappa_n \) are such that, for each \( 1 \leq i \leq n \), OriginalCharacterOf(\( \kappa_i, s \)), then there are ordinary objects \( y_1, \ldots, y_n \) such that for every formula \( \varphi \), if \( s \models \varphi \) then \( w \models \varphi' \), where \( \varphi' \) is the result of substituting \( y_i \) for \( \kappa_i \) in \( \varphi \).
A fictional story is possibly true if and only if there is a world \( w \) such that \( s \) is true at \( w \).

Given these definitions, we can, of any particular fictional character \( x \) of \( s \), that \( x \) might have existed just in case \( s \) is possibly true.
Chapter 13

Concepts

It is not always clear what is meant when philosophers talk about concepts. In this chapter, we define a notion of concept governed by a variety of interesting theorems, many of which represent principles that intuitively characterize this notion. Furthermore, some of the theorems that we derive look very similar to principles that Leibniz adopted in his work. Though many philosophers have supposed that Leibnizian concepts, like Plato’s Forms, are to be analyzed as properties, the theorems below establish that Leibnizian principles about concepts fall out very naturally when the latter are analyzed as abstract individuals. Indeed, in (656) and (710) below, we explain difficulties that would arise if one were to analyze Leibnizian concepts as properties.

Thus, in what follows Leibnizian concepts are to be distinguished from Fregean concepts, which are taken to be properties in Chapter 14 (see the opening lines of Section 14.2, where this is justified). But whether or not one agrees that the following theorems constitute a good interpretation of Leibniz, we take it that they constitute an interesting and compelling philosophical theory of concepts in their own right.

(590) Remark: Leibnizian Concepts. Over the course of his life, Leibniz developed three different strands of his theory of concepts:

- a non-modal ‘calculus’ of concepts,
- a concept containment theory of truth, and
- a modal metaphysics of complete, individual concepts.

We discuss these in turn.

To modern eyes, Leibniz’s so-called ‘calculus’ of concepts is really an algebra, though Leibniz probably used ‘calculus’ in the sense of calculus ratiocinator, a general framework for reasoning. He produced fragments of this algebra
throughout his life, but only in his late works (1690a, 1690b) did he explicitly introduce a primitive operation symbol (which we shall write as $\oplus$) so that he could write $A \oplus B$ to denote the sum of concepts $A$ and $B$.\textsuperscript{292} He also introduced the notions of concept containment and concept inclusion, so that he could say that the concept $A \oplus B$ contains both the concepts $A$ and $B$, and that both $A$ and $B$ are included in $A \oplus B$. Some of the key principles that emerge from this fragment of Leibniz’s work are: that concept addition is idempotent, commutative, and associative; that concept containment and inclusion are reflexive, anti-symmetric, and transitive; that if concept $A$ is included in concept $B$, then there is a concept $C$ such that $A \oplus C = B$; and that if $A$ is included in $B$, then $A \oplus B = B$.

Leibniz advocated a concept containment theory of truth throughout his life, though he often expressed it in terms of concept inclusion. Here is a classic statement, from his correspondence with Arnauld (June 1686, LA 63, G.ii 56):

\ldots in every true affirmative proposition, necessary or contingent, universal or particular, the concept of the predicate is in a sense included in that of the subject; the predicate is present in the subject.

Stated in terms of containment, this becomes the claim that in a true subject-predicate statement, the concept of the subject contains the concept of the predicate. In what follows, we shall analyze the concept of a predicate in the material mode, as the concept of a property. Moreover, we shall define the concepts of such subjects as ‘Alexander’ and ‘every person’ as they occur in the sentences ‘Alexander is rational’ and ‘Every person is rational’. We show that from the modern analysis of the claim that Alexander is rational, one can derive our analysis of the Leibnizian claim that the concept of Alexander contains the concept of being rational. Moreover, we then show that from the modern analysis of the claim that every person is rational, one can derive our analysis of the Leibnizian claim that the concept every person contains the concept of being rational.

In middle and late period works (Discourse on Metaphysics (1686), Theodicy (1709), and The Monadology (1714)), Leibniz developed a modal metaphysics of individual concepts that he used to analyze modal facts about individuals in terms of facts about various individual concepts that appear at other possible worlds. Some fundamental principles underlying Leibniz’s view are:

- If an ordinary individual $u$ is $F$ but might not have been $F$, then (i) the individual concept of $u$ contains the concept of $F$, and (ii) there is an individual concept that: (a) is a counterpart of the concept of $u$, (b) fails to contain the concept of $F$, and (c) appears at some other possible world.

\textsuperscript{292}Prior to those works, Leibniz indicated concept addition by concatenating the symbols for two concepts.
• If an ordinary individual $u$ isn’t $F$ but might have been $F$, then (i) the individual concept of $u$ fails to contain the concept of $F$, and (ii) there is an individual concept that: (a) is a counterpart of the concept of $u$, (b) contains the concept of $F$, and (c) appears at some other possible world.

Although Leibniz never actually states these principles explicitly, they are implicit in the views he expressed. As part of our goal of analyzing and unifying the various components of Leibniz’s theory of concepts, we shall formalize and prove the above fundamental principles of Leibniz’s modal metaphysics of concepts. The formalizations and derivations that we construct in analyzing Leibniz’s theory realize, at least in part, his idea of *calculus ratiocinator*, though we won’t argue for this here.

The developments that follow revise and enhance the work in Zalta 2000a in numerous ways. The discussion and procession of theorems has been revised, and the statement of the theorems and their proofs have been improved. Though a comparison of our work below with other work in the secondary literature on Leibniz would be useful, it is not attempted here. I shall, however, note that some commentators treat only Leibniz’s nonmodal calculus of concepts and not the modal metaphysics of individual concepts, while others treat only the modal metaphysics of individual concepts and not the nonmodal calculus. Although Lenzen (1990) treats both, his work provides us with a *model* of Leibnizian concepts within set theory; it does not provide a *theory* of concepts. By contrast, the following reconstruction makes no set-theoretic assumptions, unlike most of the works in the secondary literature just cited. As mentioned previously, the work has significant philosophical interest in its own right, whether or not it constitutes a contribution to the secondary literature on Leibniz. That’s why ‘Leibnizian’ is sometimes used within parentheses.

**(591) Definition:** (Leibnizian) Concepts. The key idea underlying our analysis of (Leibnizian) concepts is that they are the abstract individuals. Consequently, we identify the property *being a concept* with the property *being abstract*:

\[ C! \equiv_A A! \]

Thus, all of the previous theorems about abstract individuals become theorems about (Leibnizian) concepts. Note also that in light of theorem (178.2), $C! x \rightarrow \Box C! x$. Hence, by GEN, we know $\forall x (C! x \rightarrow \Box C! x)$. So $C! x$ is a rigid condition, in the sense of (257.1). So we leave it as an exercise to show that $C! x$ is a rigid restriction condition in the sense of (334).

---


(592) Theorems: Immediate Equivalences and Identities. It is now a simple consequence of the previous definition that $x$ is a concept that encodes exactly the properties such that $\varphi$ if and only if $x$ is an abstract object that encodes exactly the properties such that $\varphi$:

$$\left(C!x \land \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi)\right) \equiv \left(A!x \land \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi)\right)$$

(593) Theorems: Concept Comprehension and Canonical Concept Descriptions. From the preceding theorems, we can easily prove that (.1) there is a concept that encodes exactly the properties $F$ such that $\varphi$; (.2) there is a unique concept that encodes exactly the properties $F$ such that $\varphi$; (.3) the individual that is a concept encoding exactly the properties such that $\varphi$ exists; and (.4) the concept that encodes exactly the properties such that $\varphi$ is identical to the abstract object that encodes exactly the properties such that $\varphi$:

1. $\exists x(C!x \land \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi))$, provided $x$ doesn’t occur free in $\varphi$
2. $\exists! x(C!x \land \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi))$, provided $x$ doesn’t occur free in $\varphi$
3. $\forall x(C!x \land \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi)) \downarrow$, provided $x$ doesn’t occur free in $\varphi$
4. $\forall x(C!x \land \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi)) = \forall x(A!x \land \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi))$, provided $x$ doesn’t occur free in $\varphi$

By (.3), any appropriate $\varphi$ can be used to formulate a canonical concept description of the form $\forall x(C!x \land \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi))$ and, by (.4), the concept so described is identical to a canonical abstract object. Henceforth all of the machinery for, and discussions of, canonical and strictly canonical descriptions, in (250) – (259), can be repurposed for concepts. These facts come into play on numerous occasions below.

(594) Remark: Restricted Variables and Canonical Concepts. Since we saw, in (591), that $C!x$ is a rigid restriction condition, we may introduce the variables $c,d,e,f,...$ as rigid restricted variables ranging over concepts (thus, we are repurposing $c$ from its use in Chapter 10 as a non-rigid restricted variable ranging over classes). So we assert theorems, and reason, with $c,d,...$ as free restricted variables, and employ our extended Rule RN (335).

We shall also use $c_1,c_2,...,d_1,d_2,...$, etc., as primitive constants introduced to pick out an arbitrary concept. Since it is clear that concepts exist, it follows that $\forall c \varphi \rightarrow \exists c \varphi$ and we hereafter assume it; cf. Remark (336). Moreover, when $\kappa$ is any restricted variable or primitive constant for an arbitrary concept, we may assume $\kappa \downarrow$ is axiomatic (39.2), that $\kappa$ can be instantiated into any universal claim, and that $\kappa = \kappa$ can be introduced by Rule =I.

With our rigid restricted variables for concepts, we may express (593.1) – (593.4) as follows, provided $c$ doesn’t occur free in $\varphi$:
By a modest abuse of language, we may say that the description \( \exists c \forall F (cF \equiv \varphi) \)

describes a canonical concept. Since canonical concepts are canonical abstract objects, the theorems governing the latter apply to the former. For example, it is straightforward to show that a version of the Abstraction Principle (253) applies to concepts, namely, the concept encoding all and only the properties such that \( \varphi \) encodes \( G \) if and only if \( G \) is such that \( \varphi \):

\[
\exists c \forall F (cF \equiv \varphi)) \equiv G \equiv \varphi^G_F, \text{ provided } c \text{ doesn’t occur free in } \varphi \text{ and } G \text{ is substitutable for } F \text{ in } \varphi
\]

For certain formulas \( \varphi \), we’ll be able to establish that the canonical concept is strictly canonical and so subject to a modally strict version of the above theorem schema.

**Theorems:** Identity. In LLP 131–132 (G.vii 236), Propositions 1 and 3, Leibniz uses the substitution of identicals to derive that the notion of identity, as it applies to concepts, is symmetrical and transitive. However, ‘=’ is defined in the present theory. Given theorems (118.1) – (118.3), it immediately follows that identity is reflexive, symmetrical, and transitive on the concepts. Hence, using our restricted variables, we have:

1. \( c = c \)
2. \( c = d \rightarrow d = e \)
3. \( c = d \land d = e \rightarrow c = e \)

Note that in Definition 1 of G.vii 236, Leibniz uses ‘\( \in \)' as the identity symbol. In LLP 131, the translation of of G.vii 236 includes the claims “‘A = B’ means that A and B are the same” and that “those terms are ‘the same’ . . . of which either can be substituted for the other wherever we please without loss of truth”.

### 13.1 The Calculus of Concepts

#### 13.1.1 Concept Addition

**Definition:** Concept Addition (Summation). To define concept addition or summation, let us say that concept \( c \) is a sum of concepts \( d \) and \( e \) if and only if \( c \) encodes all and only the properties encoded by either \( d \) or \( e \):
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\[ \text{SumOf}(c,d,e) \equiv_{df} \forall F (cF \equiv dF \lor eF) \]

To produce an example of our definition using modally strict reasoning, note that the following are instances of concept comprehension (593.1), where \( P, Q, \) and \( R \) are any arbitrarily chosen properties:

- \( \exists c \forall F (cF \equiv F = P) \)
- \( \exists c \forall F (cF \equiv F = P \lor F = Q) \)
- \( \exists c \forall F (cF \equiv F = P \lor F = Q \lor F = R) \)

Let \( c_1, c_2, \) and \( c_3 \), respectively, be arbitrary such objects. Since \( c_1 \) encodes just the property \( P \), \( c_2 \) encodes just the properties \( Q \) and \( R \), and \( c_3 \) encodes just the properties \( P \), \( Q \), and \( R \), it is an easy exercise to show \( \text{SumOf}(c_3, c_1, c_2) \).

(597) **Theorems**: The Sum of Concepts \( d \) and \( e \) Exists. In the usual manner, it follows that (.1) concepts \( d \) and \( e \) have a sum; (.2) concepts \( d \) and \( e \) have a unique sum; and (.3) the sum of concepts \( d \) and \( e \) exists:

1. \( \exists c \text{SumOf}(c,d,e) \)
2. \( \exists! c \text{SumOf}(c,d,e) \)
3. \( ic\text{SumOf}(c,d,e) \downarrow \)

It is worth mentioning that since \( d \) and \( e \) are restricted variables, these theorems are really shorthand for conditional existence claims. For example, (.1) is shorthand for \( (C!x \& C!y) \rightarrow \exists z (C!z \& \text{SumOf}(z,x,y)) \). But since we know that concepts exist, we can derive unconditional existence claims from them.

(598) **Definition**: The Sum of Concepts \( d \) and \( e \). By our last theorem, we are entitled to introduce the following notation for the concept that is the sum of concepts \( d \) and \( e \):

\[ d \oplus e \equiv_{df} ic\text{SumOf}(c,d,e) \]

Since there are free restricted variables occurring in the definition, it is important to remember the discussion in (333), in which we discuss the inferential role of definitions that employ free restricted variables. Given that discussion and the modally strict fact that \( C!x \rightarrow □C!x \) (mentioned previously in (591)), it should be clear that an expression of the form \( κ \oplus κ' \) is a binary functional term that is significant only when it is known, either by proof or by hypothesis, that \( C!κ \) and \( C!κ' \). Moreover, since concepts are just abstract individuals, it should also be clear that \( d \oplus e \) exists whenever \( d \) and \( e \) are any abstract objects.

(599) **Lemma**: Strict Canonicity of Sums. In the usual way, it is straightforward to show that \( d \oplus e \) is (identical to) a canonical concept:
(1) \( d \oplus e = \forall F (cF \equiv dF \lor eF) \)

If we let \( \varphi \) be the formula \( dF \lor eF \), then we may use definition (257.1) to establish, by modally strict means, the following universal claim, which therefore tells us (2) \( \varphi \) is a rigid condition on properties:

(2) \( \forall F ((dF \lor eF) \rightarrow \Box (dF \lor eF)) \)

Hence, \( d \oplus e \) is a strictly canonical concept, by (257.2). By theorem (258.2) and the definition of \( C! \), it follows that (3) the sum of \( d \) and \( e \) is a concept that encodes all and only the properties \( F \) such that either \( d \) encodes \( F \) or \( e \) encodes \( F \):

(3) \( C!(d \oplus e) \land \forall F (d \oplus eF \equiv dF \lor eF) \)

Note that the first conjunct of (3) is an exemplification formula consisting of a 1-place relation term \( C! \) and a complex individual term \( d \oplus e \). Moreover, it clearly follows from (3) by definition (596) that (4) \( d \oplus e \) is a sum of \( d \) and \( e \):

(4) \( \text{SumOf}(d \oplus e, d, e) \)

(1) – (4) are modally strict theorems used frequently in the proofs of subsequent theorems.

(600) Theorems: Concept Addition Forms a Semi-Lattice. It follows straightforwardly from the previous lemma that \( \oplus \) is idempotent, commutative, and associative:

(1) \( c \oplus c = c \)

(2) \( c \oplus d = d \oplus c \)

(3) \( (c \oplus d) \oplus e = c \oplus (d \oplus e) \)

In virtue of the last fact, we may leave off the parentheses in the expressions \( (c \oplus d) \oplus e \) and \( c \oplus (d \oplus e) \).

Thus, concept addition behaves in the manner that Leibniz prescribed. He took the first two of these theorems as axioms of his calculus, whereas we derive them as theorems.\(^{295}\) Unfortunately, he omitted associativity from his list of axioms for \( \ominus \); as Swoyer (1995, 1994) points out, it must be included for the proofs of certain theorems to go through.

(601) Remark: Concept Addition and Properties. We’ve analyzed concepts as abstract individuals and concept addition as a functional condition on concepts. Of course, Leibniz’s texts use variables for concepts that suggest that he

\(^{295}\) See LLP 132 (G.vii 237), Axioms 2 and 1, respectively. Other idempotency assertions appear in LLP 40 (G.vii 222), LLP 56 (C 366), LLP 85 (C 396), LLP 90 (C 235), LLP 93 (C 421), and LLP 124 (G.vii 230). Swoyer (1995, footnote 5) also cites C 260 and C 262. Lenzen (1990) cites GI 171 for idempotency. Other commutativity assertions appear in LLP 40 (G.vii 222), LLP 90 (C 235), and LLP 93 (C 421).
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conceived of concepts as properties. For example, in 1690a and 1690b, he uses variables \(A, B, \ldots, L, M, N\), etc., and he instantiates these variables with predicative expressions such as ‘triangle’, ‘trilateral’, ‘rational’, ‘animal’, etc. One may certainly try to reconstruct Leibnizian concepts as properties, but we now discuss an issue that arises for that analysis. On the property-theoretic analysis, concept addition is traditionally regarded as property conjunction, so that one would define:

\[
F + G =_{df} [\lambda x \, Fx \& Gx]
\]

So to derive (600.1) – (600.3) as theorems, one would have to derive:

\[
[\lambda x \, Fx \& Fx] = F
\]

\[
[\lambda x \, Fx \& Gx] = [\lambda x \, Gx \& Fx]
\]

\[
[\lambda x \, [\lambda y \, Fy \& Gy]]x \& Hx] = [\lambda x \, Fx \& [\lambda y \, Gy \& Hy]]x
\]

If one were to take properties to be identical when either materially (i.e., extensionally) equivalent, the above would be easy consequences. But such a definition of property identity is incorrect. Similarly, if one were to take properties to be identical when necessarily equivalent (i.e., by defining \(F = G\) as \(\Box \forall x(Fx \equiv Gx)\)), one would also obtain the above consequences. But, again, this definition is incorrect and the present theory doesn’t endorse it. We have formulated our system so that one can consistently assert that there are properties \(F\) and \(G\) such that both \(\Box \forall x(Fx \equiv Gx)\) and \(F \neq G\).

Thus, if one allows for distinct properties that are necessarily equivalent with respect to exemplification, then it is not clear how to derive the above property identities in absence of further axioms governing property identity. Our policy has been to eschew such axioms. The present theory offers precise conditions under which properties exist and precise conditions under which they are identical. The latter tell us exactly what we are asserting or need to prove when we assert or prove that properties \(F\) and \(G\) are either identical or distinct. But, we leave it as an open question, to be decided as the case may demand, whether the property identities displayed above are to be endorsed or not.

By understanding Leibnizian concepts as abstract individuals, one can derive (600.1) – (600.3) as theorems, but if one prefers the analysis of Leibnizian concepts as properties and takes properties seriously as intensional entities, then more work has to be done to derive the identities needed to show that property addition, as defined in this Remark, is idempotent, commutative, and associative. Moreover, it should also be noted that once concepts of properties are introduced in Section 13.2, where we define the concept of \(F\) (\(c_F\)), then the following instances of (600.1) – (600.3) bring us even closer to Leibniz’s texts:
\[c_F \oplus c_F = c_F\]
\[c_F \oplus c_G = c_G \oplus c_F\]

\[(c_F \oplus c_G) \oplus c_H = c_F \oplus (c_G \oplus c_H)\]

These results at least provide an interpretation of the Leibnizian texts in which he asserts concept addition is idempotent and commutative (and assumes associativity).

**Theorems:** Concept Addition and Identity. Leibniz proves two other theorems pertaining solely to concept addition and identity in LLP 133–4 (G.vii 238), Propositions 9 and 10:

\[(.1) \ c = d \rightarrow c \oplus e = d \oplus e\]
\[(.2) \ c = d \& e = f \rightarrow c \oplus e = d \oplus f\]

In the notes following Propositions 9 and 10 in LLP 133-134 (G.vii 238), Leibniz observes that counterexamples to the converses of these theorems can be produced. To produce a counterexample to the converse of (.1), first let \(P, Q,\) and \(R\) be any three distinct properties. We know there are such by (223.7). Then:

- let \(c_1\) be \(\forall F (cF \equiv F = P \lor F = Q \lor F = R)\)
- let \(c_2\) be \(\forall F (cF \equiv F = P \lor F = Q)\)
- let \(c_3\) be \(\forall F (cF \equiv F = R)\)

Then it is straightforward to show that \(c_1 \oplus c_3 = c_2 \oplus c_3\) and \(c_1 \neq c_2\), contrary to the converse of (.1).

Similarly, to produce a counterexample to the converse of (.2), first let \(P, Q, R,\) and \(S\) be any four distinct properties. We know there are such by (223.7). Then:

- let \(c_1\) be \(\forall F (cF \equiv F = P \lor F = Q)\)
- let \(c_2\) be \(\forall F (cF \equiv F = P)\)
- let \(c_3\) be \(\forall F (cF \equiv F = R \lor F = S)\)
- let \(c_4\) be \(\forall F (cF \equiv F = Q \lor F = R \lor F = S)\)

It is then easy to show that \(c_1 \oplus c_3 = c_2 \oplus c_4\) and \(c_1 \neq c_2\) (and, indeed, \(c_3 \neq c_4\)), contrary to the converse of (.2).
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13.1.2 Concept Inclusion and Containment

(603) Definitions: Inclusion and Containment. It is an algebraic fact that an idempotent, commutative, and associative operation on a domain induces a partial ordering on that domain. In the present case, concept addition induces the partial ordering of concept inclusion \((c \leq d)\) and a converse ordering of concept containment \((d \geq c)\). We’ll prove these facts below. Leibniz was aware of this connection and derives these facts for the case of concept inclusion. In Definition 3 of LLP 132 (G.vii 237), Leibniz defined both \(c \leq d\) and \(d \geq c\) as \(\exists e(c \oplus e = d)\).\(^{296}\) Moreover, in Propositions 13 and 14 of LLP 135 (G.vii 239), Leibniz derives both directions of the equivalence \(c \leq d \equiv c \oplus d = d\) as theorems.

In object theory, however, a deeper level of analysis of concept inclusion and concept containment is available. Once that analysis is formulated, it follows that inclusion and containment partially order the concepts; this is item (604) below. Moreover, Leibniz’s definition of inclusion in Definition 3 and the equivalence that he obtains via his Propositions 13 and 14 are both derivable from that analysis. These are theorems (607) and (608) below.

We begin by defining: \(c\) is included in \(d\) just in case \(d\) encodes every property \(c\) encodes. Formally:

\[
(1)\ c \leq d \equiv \forall F (cF \rightarrow dF)
\]

We shall see, in what follows, that this notion of concept inclusion is a generalization of the notion of part-of, which was defined on situations in (463).

Leibniz’s notion of concept containment is now just the converse of inclusion. Let us say that \(d\) contains \(c\) just in case \(c\) is included in \(d\):

\[
(2)\ d \geq c \equiv c \leq d
\]

Consequently, the theorems below are developed in pairs: one member of the pair governs concept inclusion and the other concept containment. However, in the Appendix, we prove the theorem only as it pertains to concept inclusion.

(604) Theorems: Concept Inclusion and Containment Are Partial Orders. It now follows that concept inclusion and containment are reflexive, anti-symmetric, and transitive. To show anti-symmetry, we use \(c \not\leq d\) to abbreviate \(\neg(c \leq d)\), and \(c \not\geq d\) to abbreviate \(\neg(d \geq c)\):

\(^{296}\)Strictly speaking, Leibniz didn’t use the existential quantifier in his definition of concept inclusion and containment. His definition reads as follows:

Definition 3. That \(A\) ‘is in’ \(L\), or, that \(L\) ‘contains’ \(A\), is the same as that \(L\) is assumed to be coincident with several terms taken together, among which is \(A\).

This is the translation in LLP 132 of the passage in G.vii 237. It is not entirely clear to me what ‘taken together’ means here, but our representation of this definition may capture at least one correct way of interpreting this passage.
(1) \(c \leq c\)  
\(c \geq c\)

(2) \(c \leq d \rightarrow (c \neq d \rightarrow d \not\leq c)\)  
\(c \geq d \rightarrow (c \neq d \rightarrow d \not\geq c)\)

(3) \(c \leq d \& d \leq e \rightarrow c \leq e\)  
\(c \geq d \& d \geq e \rightarrow c \geq e\)

See LLP 133 (= G.vii 238), Proposition 7, for Leibniz’s proof of the reflexivity of inclusion. See LLP 135 (= G.vii 240), Proposition 15, for Leibniz’s proof of the transitivity of inclusion. See also LLP 33 (= G.vii 218) for the reflexivity of containment.

(605) Theorems: Inclusion, Containment, and Identity. Leibniz proves in LLP 136 (G.vii 240), Proposition 17, that when concepts \(c\) and \(d\) are included, or contained, in each other, they are identical. Hence we have the more general theorem:

(1) \(c = d \equiv c \leq d \& d \leq c\)  
\(c = d \equiv c \geq d \& d \geq c\)

Two interesting further consequences of concept inclusion and identity are that (.2) concepts \(c\) and \(d\) are identical just in case the same concepts are included in \(c\) and \(d\), and (.3) concepts \(c\) and \(d\) are identical just in case \(c\) and \(d\) are included in the same concepts:

(2) \(c = d \equiv \forall e (e \leq c \equiv e \leq d)\)  
\(c = d \equiv \forall e (e \geq c \equiv e \geq d)\)

(3) \(c = d \equiv \forall e (c \leq e \equiv d \leq e)\)  
\(c = d \equiv \forall e (c \geq e \equiv d \geq e)\)

(606) Theorems: Inclusion and Addition. In LLP 33 (G.vii 218), Leibniz asserts ‘\(ab\) is \(a\)’ and ‘\(ab\) is \(b\)’. Here it looks as if \(ab\) is to be interpreted as \(a \oplus b\) and ‘is’ as containment. (This is an application of Leibniz’s containment theory of truth, which will be discussed below.) Thus, in our system, these claims become: the sum of \(c\) and \(d\) contains \(c\), and the sum of \(c\) and \(d\) contains \(d\). In each case, we state the inclusion version first, namely, (.1) \(c\) is included in the sum of \(c\) and \(d\), and (.2) \(d\) is included in the sum of \(c\) and \(d\):

(1) \(c \leq c \oplus d\)  
\(c \oplus d \geq c\)

(2) \(d \leq c \oplus d\)  
\(c \oplus d \geq d\)
Leibniz also notes that if \( c \) is included in \( d \), then the sum of \( e \) and \( c \) is included in the sum of \( e \) and \( d \):

\[
\begin{align*}
(3) \quad c \leq d & \rightarrow e \oplus c \leq e \oplus d \\
& \quad \text{and} \\
& \quad c \geq d \rightarrow e \oplus c \geq e \oplus d
\end{align*}
\]

See LLP 134 (G.vii 239), Proposition 12. See also LLP 41 (G.vii 223), for the version governing containment. Note that there is a counterexample to the converse of (.3). If we let \( e_1 \) and \( c_1 \) both be \( icVF(cF \equiv F = P) \), and let \( d_1 \) be \( icVF(cF \equiv F = Q \lor F = R) \), where \( P, Q, R \) are all pairwise distinct, then it is easy to show that \( e_1 \oplus c_1 \preceq e_1 \oplus d_1 \) and \( c_1 \npreceq d_1 \).

It also follows that \( c \oplus d \) is included in \( e \) if and only if both \( c \) and \( d \) are included in \( e \):

\[
\begin{align*}
(4) \quad c \oplus d \preceq e & \equiv c \preceq e \& d \preceq e \\
& \quad \text{and} \\
& \quad e \preceq c \oplus d \equiv e \preceq c \& e \preceq d
\end{align*}
\]

Leibniz notes a more economical form of the left-to-right direction of (.4). In LLP 136 (G.vii 240), Corollary to Proposition 15, he argues that if \( A \oplus N \) is in \( B \), then \( N \) is in \( B \). However, he proves the right-to-left direction of (.4) at LLP 137 (G.vii 241), Proposition 18.

Finally, we may prove that if \( c \) is included in \( d \) and \( e \) is included in \( f \), then \( c \oplus e \) is included in \( d \oplus f \):

\[
\begin{align*}
(5) \quad c \leq d \& e \leq f & \rightarrow c \oplus e \leq d \oplus f \\
& \quad \text{and} \\
& \quad c \geq d \& e \geq f \rightarrow c \oplus e \geq d \oplus f
\end{align*}
\]

See LLP 137 (= G.vii 241), Proposition 20.

**Exercise.** Find a counterexample to the converse direction of (.5).

### 13.1.3 Concept Inclusion, Addition, and Identity

The following theorems establish that our definitions of concept inclusion (containment), addition, and identity are related in the way required by Leibniz’s theory of concepts.

**Theorem:** Leibnizian Definition of Inclusion. Our efforts thus far imply that \( c \) is included in \( d \) if and only if, for some concept \( e \), the sum of \( c \) and \( e \) identical to \( d \):

\[
\begin{align*}
(607) \quad c \leq d & \equiv \exists e(c \oplus e = d) \\
& \quad \text{and} \\
& \quad c \geq d \equiv \exists e(c = d \oplus e)
\end{align*}
\]

If we have correctly understood Leibniz’s Definition 3, in LLP 132 = G.vii 237 (see footnote 296), then the proof of the inclusion version constitutes a derivation of his definition as a theorem.
Theorem: Leibniz’s Equivalence. Our work now allows us derive the principal theorem of Leibniz’s non-modal calculus of concepts; it governs concept identity, concept inclusion, and concept addition and asserts that \( c \) is included in \( d \) if and only if the sum of \( c \) and \( d \) is identical to \( d \):

\[
\begin{align*}
  c \leq d & \equiv c \oplus d = d \\
  c \geq d & \equiv c = c \oplus d 
\end{align*}
\]

See LLP 135 (G.vii 239), Propositions 13 and 14. The notions =, \( \oplus \), and \( \preceq \) are all defined and, other than the substitution of identicals (41), the axioms and theorems Leibniz used to prove this claim have all been derived as theorems.

Theorem: Leibniz’s Proposition 23. In LLP 140, Proposition 23 is stated as “Given two disparate terms, \( A \) and \( B \), to find a third term, \( C \), different from them and such that \( A \oplus B = A \oplus C \)” (cf. G.vii 243). We can capture this as follows: (.1) If \( c \) is not included in \( d \) and \( d \) is not included in \( c \), then there is a concept \( e \) such that (a) \( e \) is distinct from both \( c \) and \( d \) and (b) the sum of \( c \) and \( e \) is identical to the sum of \( c \) and \( d \). Formally:

\[
(c \not\preceq d \& d \not\preceq c) \rightarrow \exists e (e \neq c \& e \neq d \& c \oplus e = c \oplus d)
\]

As the first steps of the proof, assume the antecedent and then show that \( c \oplus d \) is a witness to the existential claim; since \( c \) and \( d \) each encodes a property the other doesn’t, \( c \oplus d \) will be distinct from both \( c \) and \( d \).

Note also the following consequence of our definitions, namely: (.2) \( c \) is included in \( d \) and \( d \) is not included in \( c \) if and only if some concept \( e \) not included in \( c \) is such that the sum of \( c \) and \( e \) is identical to \( d \):

\[
(c \preceq d \& d \not\preceq c) \equiv \exists e (e \not\preceq c \& c \oplus e = d)
\]

This allows for the degenerate case in which where \( c \) encodes no properties and \( d \) encodes one or more properties.

13.1.4 The Algebra of Concepts

In this section we first investigate the algebraic principles derivable from our theory of concepts and then consider the extent to which this algebra constitutes a mereology. To anticipate a bit, we show that concepts are structured not only as a bounded lattice, but also as a complete Boolean algebra bounded above (by a universal concept) and below (by a null concept). We then examine the extent to which our algebra of concepts obeys the principles of mereology when our notion of concept inclusion, \( x \preceq y \), is interpreted as: \( x \) is a part of \( y \).

Definition: Concept Multiplication (i.e., Concept Products). Recall that theorem (600) tells us that addition is idempotent, commutative, and associative on concepts and so forms a semi-lattice (following standard mathematical
practice). Over the course of the next several items, we show that concepts form not just a semi-lattice but a lattice. We define concept multiplication by saying that $c$ is a product of $d$ and $e$ just in case $c$ encodes all and only the properties that $d$ and $e$ encode in common:

$$\text{ProductOf}(c, d, e) \equiv \forall F (cF \equiv dF \& eF)$$

For example, where $P, Q, R$ are three, pairwise-distinct properties:

- let $c_1$ be $\forall F (cF \equiv F = P \lor F = Q)$
- let $c_2$ be $\forall F (cF \equiv F = Q \lor F = R)$
- let $c_3$ be $\forall F (cF \equiv F = Q)$

Since $c_1$ encodes just the properties $P$ and $Q$, $c_2$ encodes just the properties $Q$ and $R$, and $c_3$ encodes just the property $Q$, it is an easy exercise to show $\text{ProductOf}(c_3, c_1, c_2)$.

(611) Theorems: Existence of Products. In the usual way, we prove (.1) there exists a product of concepts $d$ and $e$; (.2) there exists a unique product of concepts $d$ and $e$; and (.3) the product of concepts $d$ and $e$ exists:

(.1) $\exists c \text{ProductOf}(c, d, e)$

(.2) $\exists! c \text{ProductOf}(c, d, e)$

(.3) $\forall c \text{ProductOf}(c, d, e)$

These are, strictly speaking, conditional existence claims, given the free restricted variables, though we know that since concepts exist, unconditional existence claims can be derived from (.1) – (.3).

(612) Definition: Notation for the Product of Concepts $d$ and $e$. Given our last theorem, we introduce notation for the product of concepts $d$ and $e$, as follows:

$$d \otimes e =_{df} \forall c \text{ProductOf}(c, d, e)$$

As in the case of $\oplus$, expressions of the form $\kappa \otimes \kappa'$ are significant only when it is known, either by proof or by hypothesis, that $C!\kappa$ and $C!\kappa'$.

(613) Lemmas: Strict Canonicity of Products. Given the definition of $\text{ProductOf}$, it is clear that that $d \otimes e$ is (identical to) a canonical concept, for any concepts $d$ and $e$:

(.1) $d \otimes e = \forall F (cF \equiv dF \& eF)$

Where $\varphi$ is the formula $dF \& eF$, we can establish the following universal claim by modally strict means and so it tells us that (.2) $\varphi$ is a rigid condition on properties:
Thus $d \otimes e$ is a strictly canonical concept, by (257.2). So we can use (258.2) to establish the modally strict theorem that (3.3) $d \otimes e$ is a concept that encodes just those properties $F$ such that both $dF$ and $eF$:

(3.3) $Cl d \otimes e & \forall F(d \otimes eF \equiv dF \& eF)$

As in the case of $\oplus$, the first conjunct of (2.2) is an exemplification formula consisting of a 1-place relation term $C!$ and a complex individual term $d \otimes e$. Finally, it follows that (4.4) $d \otimes e$ is a product of $d$ and $e$:

(4.4) $\text{ProductOf}(d \otimes e, d, e)$

(1) – (4) are modally strict theorems used in the proofs of subsequent theorems.

(614) Theorems: Concept Multiplication Forms a Semi-Lattice. It follows immediately from the previous lemma that when we restrict our attention to concepts, $\otimes$ is (1.1) idempotent, (2.2) commutative, and (3.3) associative:

(1.1) $c \otimes c = c$

(2.2) $c \otimes d = d \otimes c$

(3.3) $(c \otimes d) \otimes e = c \otimes (d \otimes e)$

Thus concept multiplication, like concept addition, behaves like an algebraic operation.

(615) Theorems: The Laws of Absorption. We may now prove that laws of absorption hold with respect to $\oplus$ and $\otimes$. They are (1.1) the sum of $c$ and the product of $c$ and $d$ is identical to $c$; and (2.2) the product of $c$ and the sum of $c$ and $d$ is identical to $c$:

(1.1) $c \oplus (c \otimes d) = c$

(2.2) $c \otimes (c \oplus d) = c$

From theorems (600.1) – (600.3), (614.1) – (614.3), and (1.1) – (2.2) above, we have that (a) $\oplus$ and $\otimes$ both are idempotent, commutative, and associative, and (b) the absorption laws hold. Hence, an algebraist would say that concepts and, hence, abstract objects generally, are structured as a lattice, with $\oplus$ as the join and $\otimes$ as the meet for the lattice.

(616) Theorems: A Bounded Lattice of Concepts. Indeed, with just a little bit more work, one can show that concepts, and thus abstract individuals generally, are structured as a bounded lattice.
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First, note that, by the definitions in (260), Null\(x\) holds whenever \(x\) is an abstract object \(x\) that encodes no properties, and Universal\(x\) holds whenever \(x\) is an abstract object that encodes every property. We showed that there is exactly one null object and exactly one universal object, and we introduced the notation \(a_\varnothing\) (262.1) for ixNull\(x\) and the notation \(a_\forall\) (262.2) for ixUniversal\(x\).

Since \(C!\) is defined as \(A!\), it follows that there is exactly one null concept and exactly one universal concept. So we may justifiably call \(a_\varnothing\) the null concept and call \(a_\forall\) the universal concept.

Consequently the facts proved in (263) allow us to show (.1) the sum of a concept \(c\) and the null concept just is \(c\); and (.2) the product of a concept \(c\) and the universal concept just is \(c\):

\[
\begin{align*}
(1) & \quad c \oplus a_\varnothing = c \\
(2) & \quad c \otimes a_\forall = c
\end{align*}
\]

Thus, \(a_\varnothing\) is the identity element for concept addition, and \(a_\forall\) is the identity element for concept multiplication:

**Exercise.** Show \(a_\varnothing\) constitutes a minimal element and \(a_\forall\) constitutes a maximal element in our lattice of concepts, i.e., show: \(\forall c(\forall a_\varnothing \leq c)\) and \(\forall c(c \leq a_\forall)\). [Note: These exercises anticipate some later theorems.]

Consequently, concepts and, hence, abstract objects generally, are structured as a bounded lattice.

Finally, note that (.3) the sum of \(c\) and the universal concept is just the universal concept, and (.4) the product of \(c\) and the null concept is just the null concept:

\[
\begin{align*}
(3) & \quad c \oplus a_\forall = a_\forall \\
(4) & \quad c \otimes a_\varnothing = a_\varnothing
\end{align*}
\]

Thus, no concept survives addition with \(a_\forall\) and no concept survives multiplication with \(a_\varnothing\).

(617) **Remark:** A Boolean Algebra. With just a few more definitions and theorems, we can show that (Leibnizian) concepts with concept addition and multiplication obey the principles of a Boolean algebra. This will occupy our attention over the course of the next few items.

We already know, relative to the domain of concepts, that \(\oplus\) and \(\otimes\) are idempotent, commutative, and associative, that the absorption laws for \(\oplus\) and \(\otimes\) hold, that \(a_\varnothing\) is an identity element for \(\oplus\), and that \(a_\forall\) is an identity element for \(\otimes\). So it remains only to show that: (i) \(\oplus\) distributes over \(\otimes\), (ii) \(\otimes\) distributes over \(\oplus\), and (iii) concept complementation, \(-c\), can be defined so that the complementation laws, \(c \otimes -c = a_\varnothing\) and \(c \oplus -c = a_\forall\), both hold. As we shall see, all of these fundamental axioms of Boolean algebra are theorems.
(618) **Theorems:** Distribution Laws. Since disjunction distributes over conjunction (89.6.b) and vice versa (89.6.a), it follows that (.1) \( \oplus \) distributes over \( \otimes \), and (.2) \( \otimes \) distributes over \( \oplus \):

(.1) \[ c \oplus (d \otimes e) = (c \oplus d) \otimes (c \oplus e) \]

(.2) \[ c \otimes (d \oplus e) = (c \otimes d) \oplus (c \otimes e) \]

(619) **Definition:** Complements. We say that \( c \) is a complement of \( d \) whenever \( c \) encodes exactly the properties that \( d \) fails to encode:

\[ \text{ComplementOf}(c,d) \equiv \forall F (cF \equiv \neg dF) \]

For example:

let \( c_1 \) be \( \forall F (cF \equiv F = P) \)

let \( c_2 \) be \( \forall F (cF \equiv F \neq P) \)

Since \( c_1 \) encodes just the property \( P \) and \( c_2 \) encodes all and only properties other than \( P \), it follows that \( \text{ComplementOf}(c_2,c_1) \).

**Exercise:** Show \( \text{ComplementOf}(c,d) \rightarrow \text{ComplementOf}(d,c) \), i.e., that complement of is symmetrical.

(620) **Theorems:** Facts About Complementation. In the usual way, it follows that (.1) there exists a complement of \( d \); (.2) there exists a unique complement of \( d \); and (.3) the complement of \( d \) exists:

(.1) \[ \exists c \text{ComplementOf}(c,d) \]

(.2) \[ \exists! c \text{ComplementOf}(c,d) \]

(.3) \[ ic \text{ComplementOf}(c,d) \downarrow \]

These existence claims are conditional on the fact that \( d \) is a concept, but since concepts exists, unconditional existence claims are derivable.

(621) **Definition:** The Complement of \( d \). Given our last theorem, we are entitled to introduce notation for the concept that is a complement of \( d \):

\[ -d \equiv_{df} ic \text{ComplementOf}(c,d) \]

Since \( d \) is a free restricted variable in this definition, an expression of the form \( -\kappa \) is significant only when it is known, either by proof or hypothesis, that \( C\kappa \).

(622) **Lemmas:** Strict Canonicity of Complements. It is a fact that (.1) \(-d \) is identical to a canonical concept:
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(.1) \(-d = \forall F(cF \equiv \neg dF)\)

Moreover, since the following universal claim is derivable by modally strict means, (.2) metatheoretically implies that \(\neg dF\) is a rigid condition on properties:

(.2) \(\forall F(\neg dF \rightarrow \Box \neg dF)\)

Hence, \(-d\) is a strictly canonical concept, by (257.2). So by (258.2), we can, by modally strict means, establish that (.3) \(-d\) is a concept that encodes all and only the properties that \(d\) fails to encode:

(.3) \(C! -d \& \forall F(\neg dF \equiv \neg dF)\)

Thus, it follows that (.4) \(-d\) is a complement of \(d\):

(.4) ComplementOf\((-d, d)\)

(.1) – (.4) are modally strict theorems used in the proofs of subsequent theorems.

(623) Theorems: Complementation Laws. The complementation laws are now theorems. They are (.1) the sum of \(c\) and the complement of \(c\) is the universal concept, and (.2) the product of \(c\) and the complement of \(c\) is the null concept:

(.1) \(c \oplus \neg c = a_V\)

(.2) \(c \otimes \neg c = a_\emptyset\)

We have now established the commutativity and associativity of \(\oplus\) and \(\otimes\), the distribution laws for \(\oplus\) over \(\otimes\) and for \(\otimes\) over \(\oplus\), the absorption laws, and the complementation laws. Thus, concepts and, hence, abstract objects generally, have the structure of a Boolean algebra.

(624) Theorems: Other Traditional Principles of Boolean Algebra. We close our discussion of the Boolean algebra of concepts by noting a few final theorems, namely, double complementation and the two De Morgan Laws. These are (.1) the complement of the complement of \(c\) just is \(c\); (.2) the sum of \(-c\) and \(-d\) is identical to the complement of the product of \(c\) and \(d\); and (.3) the product of \(-c\) and \(-d\) is identical to the complement of the sum of \(c\) and \(d\):

(.1) \(-\neg c = c\)

(.2) \(-c \oplus -d = -(c \otimes d)\)

(.3) \(-c \otimes -d = -(c \oplus d)\)

Exercises: Show that the following two principles, both of which have been used to axiomatize Boolean algebra, are derivable:
• \(-x \oplus y \oplus -x \oplus y\) = x \quad \text{(Huntington 1933a, Postulate 4.6)}

• \(-x \oplus y \oplus -x \oplus y\) = x \quad \text{(Robbins, reported in McCune 1997)}

(625) Exercises: Concept Difference and Overlap. In 1690a, Leibniz introduces concept subtraction (Theorems VIII – XII). He remarks, in a footnote, that “in the case of concepts, subtraction is one thing, negation another” (1690a, LLP 127). In Theorem IX, he introduces the notion of ‘communicating’ concepts, by which he seems to mean concepts that in some sense overlap. He then proves the theorem (Theorem X) that if \(N\) is the result of subtracting \(A\) from \(L\), then \(A\) and \(N\) are uncommunicating (i.e., don’t overlap).

**Exercise 1.** Define:

\[
\begin{align*}
(1) \quad \text{DifferenceOf}(c, d, e) & \equiv_{df} \forall F (cF \equiv dF \& \neg eF) \\
(2) \quad \text{Overlap}(c, d) & \equiv_{df} \exists F (cF \& dF)
\end{align*}
\]

Prove there is a unique concept that is the difference of \(d\) and \(e\), that the difference concept of \(d\) and \(e\) exists, and introduce a restricted term, \(d \ominus e\), for that concept:

\[
\begin{align*}
(3) \quad \exists! c \text{DifferenceOf}(c, d, e) \\
(4) \quad c \text{DifferenceOf}(c, d, e) \\
(5) \quad d \ominus e \equiv_{df} c \text{DifferenceOf}(c, d, e)
\end{align*}
\]

Show that \(d \ominus e\) is strictly canonical and prove, as a modally strict theorem, that \(d \ominus e\) is a concept that encodes all and only the properties \(F\) such that \(dF\) and not \(eF\):

\[
(6) \quad C! (d \ominus e \& \forall F (d \ominus e F \equiv dF \& \neg eF))
\]

Then prove Theorem X in Leibniz 1690a:

\[
(7) \quad d \ominus e = c \rightarrow \neg \text{Overlap}(e, c)
\]

and show that it is equivalent to:

\[
\neg \text{Overlap}(e, d \ominus e)
\]

Show that the difference of \(d\) and \(e\) is identical to the product of \(d\) and \(-e\), i.e., that:

\[
(8) \quad d \ominus e = d \otimes -e
\]

\[^{297}\text{The notion of overlap will play a role in later theorems and it will be officially defined in item (632.1). But it may prove instructive to get some practice in with this notion now.}\]
Formulate and prove other theorems governing concept difference and overlap, and determine whether other principles in Leibniz 1690a can be represented and derived. For example, while it is clear how to think about $d \ominus e$ when $e \leq d$, what happens when $e$ is not included in $d$?

**Exercise 2.** Consider the scenario in which $d$ and $e$ don’t overlap and, in particular, consider any three, pairwise distinct, properties, say $P$, $Q$, and $R$, and the following two objects:

$$d_1 = \forall F (cF \equiv F = P \lor F = Q)$$
$$e_1 = \forall F (cF \equiv F = R)$$

Give a systematic answer to the questions, what properties does $d_1 \ominus e_1$ encode, and what properties does $e_1 \ominus d_1$ encode?

**Exercise 3.** Consider the scenario in which $d$ is included in $e$ but not identical to $e$ and, in particular, consider:

$$d_2 = \forall F (cF \equiv F = P)$$
$$e_2 = \forall F (cF \equiv F = P \lor F = Q)$$

Identify $d_2 \ominus e_2$ and $e_2 \ominus d_2$ in terms of particular concepts we’ve already discussed.

**Exercise 4.** Finally, prove:

(9) $d = e \equiv (d \ominus e = e \ominus d)$

(10) $\text{Overlap}(c, d) \equiv c \ominus d \neq \emptyset$

(11) $\neg \text{Overlap}(c, d) \equiv c \ominus d = c$

(12) $\neg \exists e (c \ominus e = \emptyset)$

### 13.1.5 The Mereology of Concepts

**Remark:** Mereology. Now that we have established that concepts form a Boolean algebra, we consider the ways in which they constitute a mereology, i.e., the ways in which the notions of part and whole can be defined and applied to concepts. Though some authors take mereology to apply primarily to the domain of concrete individuals (e.g., Simons 1987, 4), others take it that mereology makes no assumptions about what kinds of entities have parts. Thus, Varzi (2015, §1) writes:

298However, in 1987 (169–171), Simons does offer a few brief thoughts about mereology and abstract objects.
... it is worth stressing that mereology assumes no ontological restriction on the field of ‘part’. In principle, the relata can be as different as material bodies, events, geometric entities, or spatio-temporal regions, ... as well as abstract entities such as properties, propositions, types, or kinds, ... .

... As a formal theory ... mereology is simply an attempt to lay down the general principles underlying the relationships between an entity and its constituent parts, whatever the nature of the entity, just as set theory is an attempt to lay down the principles underlying the relationships between a set and its members. Unlike set theory, mereology is not committed to the existence of abstracta: the whole can be as concrete as the parts. But mereology carries no nominalistic commitment to concreta either: the parts can be as abstract as the whole.

Moreover, it is often thought that the entities of a mereological domain are structured algebraically. Simons notes that “the algebraic structure of a full classical mereology is that of a complete Boolean algebra with zero deleted” (1987, 25). Consequently, since (a) mereological principles can be understood broadly as applying to abstract objects such as concepts, (b) concepts are abstract objects, and (c) the previous section shows that the domain of concepts is structured algebraically, it seems reasonable to investigate the extent to which concepts are provably governed by mereological principles.

Our discussion in the remainder of this section will be organized as follows. We begin by examining what happens when we interpret the mereological notion part of as the inclusion (⊆) condition on concepts. That is, we confirm that core mereological principles are preserved when we both (a) define c is a part of d just in case d encodes every property c encodes and (b) define proper part of in the usual mereological way. Then we examine a variety of consequences of our definitions and consider whether they are acceptable as mereological principles. Finally, we examine what mereological principles provably apply to non-null concepts, i.e., concepts that encode at least one property. We discover that while some questionable mereological principles apply to concepts generally, they do not apply to non-null concepts.

In what follows, we assume familiarity with the basic notions and principles of mereology. Systems of mereology are typically, though not always, formulated in one of two ways. Some systems take x is a part of y (x ⊆ y) as a primitive relation or as a relational condition that is, at a minimum, reflexive, anti-symmetric, and transitive. Others start with x is a proper part of y (x ≺ y) as the primitive relation (or relational condition) that is, at a minimum, irreflexive, asymmetric, and transitive. Little hangs on the choice of formu-

---

299A zero element is defined mereologically as an individual that is a part of every individual. It is often thought that there is no such zero element in a domain of concrete individuals.

300There are other ways of formulating a mereology, for example, by taking x overlaps y as a
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translation since it is a well-known fact that to every non-strict partial order (e.g., one based on $\preceq$) that is reflexive, anti-symmetric and transitive, there corresponds a strict partial order (e.g., one based on $\prec$) that is provably irreflexive, asymmetric, and transitive. To obtain $\prec$ when starting with $\preceq$, one defines $x \prec y$ as $x \preceq y \& x \neq y$. Then the irreflexivity, asymmetry, and transitivity of $\prec$ follow from facts about $\preceq$ and $\neq$. Alternatively, to obtain $\preceq$ when starting with $\prec$, one defines $x \preceq y$ as $x \prec y \lor x = y$. Then the reflexivity, anti-symmetry and transitivity of $\preceq$ follow from facts about $\prec$ and $\neq$. We begin by seeing how these ideas are confirmed in the present theory, under object-theoretic definitions of the notions involved.

(627) Remark: Part Of. Though mereology often takes part of as a primitive, we may define it object-theoretically and show that its core features are derivable. So let us re-introduce definition (603.1) but in such a way that the definiendum, $c \preceq d$, is to be read: concept $c$ is a part of concept $d$. Thus, the following definition now systematizes a different pretheoretical notion:

$$c \preceq d \equiv \forall F (cF \rightarrow dF) \quad (603.1)$$

There is no guarantee that $\preceq$ defines a relation on concepts. Nevertheless, $c \preceq d$ is a well-defined 2-place condition on concepts and, indeed, on abstract objects generally.

Given the above definition, the theorems in (604) guarantee that part of ($\preceq$) is reflexive, anti-symmetric and transitive with respect to the concepts:

(1) $c \preceq c$ \hfill (604.1)
A concept is a part of itself.

(2) $c \preceq d \rightarrow (c \neq d \rightarrow d \npreceq c)$ \hfill (604.2)
If a concept $c$ is a part of a distinct concept $d$, then $d$ is not a part of $c$.

(3) $c \preceq d \& d \preceq e \rightarrow c \preceq e$ \hfill (604.3)
If $c$ is part of $d$ and $d$ is part of $e$, then $c$ is part of $e$.

Thus, it is clear that the above definition of $\preceq$ captures the notion of improper part of.

Varzi (2015) notes that principles such as these “represent a common starting point of all standard [mereological] theories” (2015, §2.2). However, he primitive (Goodman 1951), or by taking $x$ is disjoint from $y$ as a primitive (Leonard and Goodman 1940). But these variations need not distract us in what follows. See Simons 1987, p. 48ff.

301There are several obstacles. The definition uses restricted variables, and so is shorthand for:

$$x \preceq y \equiv \forall F \left( \lambda x \lambda y xF \rightarrow yF \right)$$

So by the Convention for Encoding Formulas (17.3), $x \preceq y$ contains the encoding formula subterms $xF$ and $yF$. So the $\lambda$ in $\lambda x \lambda y x \leq y$ and in $\lambda c d c \preceq d$ binds variables in encoding formula subterms. So (39.2) doesn’t guarantee that these $\lambda$-expressions are significant.
notes later that “[n]ot just any partial ordering qualifies as a part-whole relation, though, and establishing what further principles should be added … is precisely the question a good mereological theory is meant to answer” (2015, §3). We shall return to this question below.

**Definitions:** Proper Part Of. We define proper part of in the usual way, though relative to the domain of concepts. We say concept \( c \) is a proper part of concept \( d \), written \( c < d \), just in case \( c \) is a part of \( d \) and \( c \) is not equal to \( d \):

\[
\text{Def: } c < d \equiv_{df} c \leq d \& c \neq d
\]

Warning! In what follows, we sometimes cite Simons’ classic text of 1987, which uses \(<\) and \(\ll\) for improper and proper parthood, respectively. Thus, our symbol \(\leq\) for improper parthood corresponds to his symbol \(<\), and our symbol \(<\) for proper parthood corresponds to his symbol \(\ll\). So it is important not to confuse our symbol for proper parthood (\(<\)) with his symbol for improper parthood (\(<\)).

**Theorems:** Principles of Proper Parthood. As expected, we can now derive that proper parthood is a strict partial ordering with respect to concepts. It immediately follows that (.1) \( c \) is not a proper part of itself; (.2) if \( c \) is a proper of \( d \) and \( d \) is a proper part of \( e \), then \( c \) is a proper part of \( e \); and (.3) if \( c \) is a proper part of \( d \), then \( d \) is not a proper part of \( c \):

\[
\begin{align*}
(\text{I}) & \quad c \not< c \\
(\text{T}) & \quad c < d \& d < e \to c < e \\
(\text{A}) & \quad c < d \to d \not< c
\end{align*}
\]

Simons notes that these principles “fall well short of characterizing the [proper] part-relation; there are many [strict] partial orderings which we should never call part-whole systems” (1987, 26). In what follows, we examine the extent to which our theorems conform to the accepted principles of part-whole systems, by considering the broader picture of how traditional mereological notions fare in the current setting.

**Definitions:** Bottom Element, Concepts With a Single Proper Part, and Atoms. Three of the most basic mereological issues are: (a) whether there exists an individual that is a part of every individual (i.e., whether there exists a ‘bottom’ or ‘zero’ element), (b) whether there are any individuals that have a single proper part (i.e., exactly one proper part), and (c) whether there exist any individuals that have no proper parts (i.e., whether there exist any ‘atoms’).

The traditional mereology of concrete individuals eschews the existence of bottom elements and individuals with exactly one proper part, though the existence of atoms is permitted. For example, Simons writes (1987, 13):
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... in normal set theory even two disjoint sets have an intersection, namely
the null set, whereas disjoint individuals precisely lack any common part.
Most mereological theories have no truck with the fiction of a null indi-
vidual which is part of all individuals, although it neatens up the algebra
somewhat.

Clearly, the preference Simons is describing seems reasonable when one sup-
poses, as he does, that mereology is restricted to the study of the part-whole
relation on concrete individuals. But that is not the case in the present context.

Similarly, traditional mereology eschews concrete wholes having a single
proper part. Simons rhetorically asks and then asserts, “How could an indi-
vidual have a single proper part? That goes against what we mean by ‘part’”
(1987, 26). Again, this view seems reasonable when mereology is limited to
the field of concrete objects. But it is worth noting that Varzi (2015, §3.1) com-
piles a list of objects with a single proper part that have been postulated by
philosophers.

By contrast, in our algebra of abstract individuals, it follows that there is
a unique bottom concept and that there are concepts having a single proper
part. Moreover, there are conceptual atoms. To see that these are facts, let us
begin by saying that (.1) \( c \) is a bottom concept just in case \( c \) is a part of every
concept; and (.2) \( c \) is an atom just in case \( c \) has no concepts as proper parts:

(1) \( \text{Bottom}(c) \equiv_{df} \forall d (c \leq d) \)

(2) \( \text{Atom}(c) \equiv_{df} \neg \exists d (d < c) \)

In these definitions, then, standard mereological notions have been adapted to
the present context (Simons 1987, 16; Varzi 2015, §3.4).

Part, and Atoms.} Recall that we relabeled \( a_\emptyset \) as the null concept (616). Since
modally-strict theorem (263.3), i.e., \( \text{Null}(a_\emptyset) \), implies that the null concept en-
codes no properties, we can now prove: (.1) the null concept is a bottom con-
cept; (.2) there is a unique bottom concept; (.3) the null concept is a proper
part of the Thin Form of \( G \) (\( a_G \)); and (.4) the thin Form of \( G \) has exactly one
proper part; (.5) bottom concepts are atoms; (.6) the null concept is an atom;
and (.7) there is exactly one atom:

(1) \( \text{Bottom}(a_\emptyset) \)

(2) \( \exists ! c \text{ Bottom}(c) \)

(3) \( a_\emptyset < a_G \)

(4) \( \exists ! d (d < a_G) \)
Later, we shall return to the discussion of bottom concepts, concepts with exactly one proper part, and atoms; if we study how part of behaves when restricted to non-null concepts (i.e., concepts that encode at least one property), then there are related notions of bottoms and atoms that do not yield the above consequences. To give a hint of what is to come, $a_\emptyset$ fails to be a non-null bottom (i.e., a non-null concept that is a part of every non-null concept) since it fails to be a non-null concept; indeed, there is no non-null bottom element. Moreover, $a_\emptyset$ fails to be a non-null atom (i.e., a non-null concept that has no proper parts), though as we shall see, there nevertheless are non-null atoms. But we shall discuss these ideas in more detail below, starting with item (638).

(632) Definitions: Mereological Overlap. In Exercise 1 of (625), we considered the following definition: $c$ overlaps $d$ whenever there is a property $F$ that both $c$ and $d$ encode:

$\text{Overlap}(c, d) \equiv \exists F (cF \land dF)$

Clearly, this is a natural understanding of overlap in our object-theoretic setting. However, readers familiar with texts on mereology will recognize that the standard definition of mereological overlap is different from (1). The standard mereological definition is that individuals $x$ and $y$ overlap whenever they have a common part (Simons 1987, 11, 28; Varzi 2015, §2.2). Let us formulate this latter definition in the present context by saying that $c$ overlaps $d$ just in case there is a concept $e$ that is a part of both concepts $c$ and $d$:

$\text{Overlap}^*(c, d) \equiv \exists e (e \leq c \land e \leq d)$

These two notions of overlap have some interesting consequences.

(633) Theorems: Overlap vs. Overlap*. We first observe that the notions of overlap and overlap* are not equivalent; (1) overlap implies overlap*, but (2) overlap* doesn’t imply overlap:

$\text{Overlap}(c, d) \rightarrow \text{Overlap}^*(c, d)$

$\exists c \exists d (\text{Overlap}^*(c, d) \land \neg \text{Overlap}(c, d))$

Clearly, since the null concept $a_\emptyset$ encodes no properties, it overlaps with nothing and so doesn’t overlap with itself. Hence it follows that (3) overlap is not reflexive:

$\neg \forall c \text{Overlap}(c, c)$
But, trivially, since every concept is a part of itself, (.4) overlap* is reflexive:

(.4) $\text{Overlap}^*(c, c)$

By contrast, both overlap and overlap* are symmetric:

(.5) $\text{Overlap}(c, d) \rightarrow \text{Overlap}(d, c)$

(.6) $\text{Overlap}^*(c, d) \rightarrow \text{Overlap}^*(d, c)$

More conclusively, though, whereas (.7) not all concepts overlap each other, (.8) all concepts overlap* each other:

(.7) $\neg \forall c \forall d \text{Overlap}(c, d)$

(.8) $\forall c \forall d \text{Overlap}^*(c, d)$

(.8) is a consequence of the definition of overlap* and the fact that the null concept, $\emptyset$, is a bottom element: since $\emptyset$ is a part of every concept, it is a common part of every two concepts. Given the mereological commitment to the definition of overlap as having a common part, a consequence such as (.8) makes it clear why traditional mereologists eschew a bottom element. Varzi thus notes that “[I]n general … mereologists tend to side with traditional wisdom and steer clear of (P.10) [which asserts the existence of a bottom element] altogether” (2015, §3.4). We shall see, however, that mereological overlap again becomes a useful condition when we turn our attention to the non-null concepts – mereological overlap doesn’t hold universally on that subdomain.

Let’s return, then, to the object-theoretic definition of overlap, whereby concepts overlap if they encode a common property. Then note that for arbitrary concepts $c$ and $d$, (.9) there is a concept $e$ that is a part of $d$ but which doesn’t overlap with $c$:

(.9) $\exists e (e \preceq d \& \neg \text{Overlap}(e, c))$

(The reason for ordering the free variables in this way will become apparent when we discuss supplementation principles below.) While it is straightforward to derive (.9) when $\emptyset$ is taken as a witness, the theorem also derivable when $d \ominus c$ is selected as the witness; see the proof in the Appendix. Furthermore, the theorem holds even in the degenerate case where the variables $c$ and $d$ take $\emptyset$ as their value; in this case, the witness is still $\emptyset$ (which is then identical to $d \ominus c$), since $\emptyset$ is a part of itself and fails to overlap with itself.

Finally, note that the principle which results when we replace $\preceq$ in (.9) with $<$ doesn’t hold for arbitrary concepts $c$ and $d$. We have:

(.10) $\neg \forall c \forall d \exists e (e < d \& \neg \text{Overlap}(e, c))$
I.e., \( \exists c \exists d \neg \exists e (e < d \& \neg \text{Overlap}(e, c)) \). To see this, consider any concept \( c \) as a witness to the first existential quantifier and consider \( a_{\emptyset} \) as a witness to the second. Then since \( a_{\emptyset} \) is an atom, it has no proper parts, i.e., \( \neg \exists e (e < a_{\emptyset}) \). A fortiori, \( \neg \exists e (e < a_{\emptyset} \& \neg \text{Overlap}(e, c)) \).

\[ (634) \textbf{Theorems:} \] Supplementation Principles. Both weak and strong supplementation principles of mereology trivially follow from (633.9). The weak supplementation principle of mereology is that if an individual \( x \) is a proper part of individual \( y \), then there exists an individual that is both a part of \( y \) and fails to overlap \( x \) (Varzi 2015, §3.1, item P.4). The strong supplementation principle is that if \( y \) fails to be a part of \( x \), then there is an individual that is a part of \( y \) and that fails to overlap \( x \) (Varzi 2015, §3.2, item P.5; Simons 1987, 29, SA5/SSP).

When we consider the domain of concepts, these become the theorems that (.1) if \( c \) is a proper part of \( d \), then there is a concept \( e \) such that \( e \) is a part of \( d \) and \( e \) fails to overlap \( c \), and (.2) if \( d \) fails to be a part of \( c \), then there is a concept \( e \) such that \( e \) is a part of \( d \) and fails to overlap \( c \):

\[
(1) \quad c < d \rightarrow \exists e (e \leq d \& \neg \text{Overlap}(e, c))
\]
\[
(2) \quad d \not< c \rightarrow \exists e (e \leq d \& \neg \text{Overlap}(e, c))
\]

Since the consequents of both of these conditionals are just instances of (633.9), both theorems follow trivially. Given that (.1) and (.2) are theorems independent of the truth of their antecedents, a mereologist will no doubt question whether overlap, as defined in (632.1), is a proper mereological notion. This is a fair question, though it will become clear that when restricted to the sub-domain of non-null concepts, this notion of overlap is a proper mereological notion and, indeed, becomes equivalent to the standard mereological notion.

However, note that the following variant of weak supplementation is a non-trivial theorem, namely, (.3) that if \( c \) is a proper part of \( d \), then there is a concept \( e \) that is a proper part of \( d \) that fails to overlap with \( c \):

\[
(3) \quad c < d \rightarrow \exists e (e < d \& \neg \text{Overlap}(e, c))
\]

We saw in (633.10) that the consequent of the above claim doesn’t hold for arbitrary concepts \( c \) and \( d \). So (.3) isn’t a theorem merely in virtue of the truth of the consequent. Note, however, that one can’t take the witness to the consequent to be \( d \ominus c \). For in the case where \( c \) is the null concept \( a_{\emptyset} \), it is not the case that \( d \ominus c < d \), since \( d \ominus c \) just is \( d \). So the proof of (.3) requires that the witness to the consequent be \( a_{\emptyset} \). Hence, one can argue that (.3) is not a true supplementation principle, since it is reasonable to suppose that \( a_{\emptyset} \) doesn’t supplement anything. As we shall see, however, when we restrict the variables in (.3) to non-null concepts, the resulting principle (647.3) does have claim to being a supplementation principle.
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(635) **Definition:** Underlap and Maximal Concepts. The object-theoretic notion of underlap is that $c$ and $d$ underlap just in case some concept encodes all the properties $c$ encodes as well as all the properties $d$ encodes. By contrast, in traditional mereology, two individuals underlap just in case there is an individual of which they are both a part. But we won't formalize and distinguish both notions of underlap since it turns out they are equivalent; the definiens of both definitions are theorems.\(^\text{302}\) Instead, we shall just work with the traditional, mereological notion of underlap, namely (.1) $c$ and $d$ underlap just in case there is a concept $e$ such that both $c$ and $d$ are a part of $e$:

(.1) $\text{Underlap}(c,d) \equiv_{df} \exists e (c \preceq e \land d \preceq e)$

Moreover, let us define (.2) a maximal concept to be any concept of which every concept is a part:

(.2) $\text{MaxConcept}(c) \equiv_{df} \forall d (d \preceq c)$

(636) **Theorem:** Maximal Concepts and Underlap. Clearly, it is provable that (.1) the universal object, $a_V$, is a maximal concept:

(.1) $\text{MaxConcept}(a_V)$

It is a well-known fact of mereology that if there exists a universal whole, of which every individual is a part, then every individual underlaps every individual.\(^\text{303}\) But even without a maximal concept, one can cite the sum $c \oplus d$ as a witness that verifies that (.2) underlap holds universally among concepts:

(.2) $\forall c \forall d \text{Underlap}(c,d)$

A proof of this claim appeared in footnote 302, where the equivalence of two concepts of underlap was discussed.

(637) **Remark:** Towards an Uncontroversial Mereology. We've now seen a variety of new theorems, with $\preceq$ considered as improper parthood. Some of those

\(^{302}\)The two definitions may be formalized as follows:

$$
\text{Underlap}_1(c,d) \equiv_{df} \exists e \forall F ((cF \lor dF) \rightarrow eF) \quad \text{(object-theoretic notion)}
$$

$$
\text{Underlap}_2(c,d) \equiv_{df} \exists e (c \leq e \land d \leq e) \quad \text{(mereological notion)}
$$

Then it is easy to show: $\text{Underlap}_1(c,d) \equiv \text{Underlap}_2(c,d)$. Both the ‘left’ and ‘right’ conditional hold by virtue of the truth of the consequent. (\(\rightarrow\)) To show $\text{Underlap}_1(c,d) \rightarrow \text{Underlap}_2(c,d)$, it suffices to show $\text{Underlap}_2(c,d)$. For the latter, it suffices to show that $c \oplus d$ is a witness to $\exists e (c \leq e \land d \leq e)$. But clearly, by (606.1) and (606.2), respectively, we know both $c \leq e \land d \leq e$. (\(\leftarrow\)) To show $\text{Underlap}_2(c,d) \rightarrow \text{Underlap}_1(c,d)$, it suffices to show $\text{Underlap}_1(c,d)$. For the latter, it suffices to show that $c \oplus d$ is a witness to $\exists e \forall F ((cF \lor dF) \rightarrow eF)$. So, by GEN, we need to show $(cF \lor dF) \rightarrow c \oplus dF$. But this follows, a fortiori from the second conjunct of (599.3), which in the present case, implies $c \oplus dF \equiv cF \lor dF$.

\(^{303}\)Cf. Varzi 2015, §2.2, where it is noted that "$Uxy$ is bound to hold if one assumes the existence of a ‘universal entity’ of which everything is part.”
theorems, so understood, preserve key mereological principles, while others may be thought doubtful as such. The main source of doubt arises from (the consequences of) the facts that the null concept $a_∅$ is a bottom concept that is a part of every concept and that the definition of overlap, which is stated in terms of encoding rather than in terms of the mereological notion of parthood, yields unexciting supplementation principles.

But as mentioned previously, one can sidestep these concerns by excluding the null concept from the algebra, so that it is no longer in the domain of the mereology. There are at least two ways in which this can be done. Varzi suggests (2015, §3.4) that one “treat the null item as a mere algebraic fiction” and revise the definition of parthood as follows:

$$\text{Genuine Parthood}$$
$$GP(x, y) \equiv_{df} x \leq y \& \exists z \neg(x \leq z)$$

To understand the suggestion better, note that the second conjunct of the definiens is equivalent to $\neg\forall z(x \leq z)$. Given that $\text{Bottom}(x, z)$ is defined as $\forall z(x \leq z)$, the above definition becomes: $x$ is a genuine part of $y$ iff $x$ is a part of $y$ and not a bottom element. Now in the present theory of concepts, we know that there is a unique bottom concept, namely, $a_∅$. So in the context of our theory, Varzi’s suggestion could be implemented by defining: $c$ is a genuine part of $d$ just in case $c$ is a part of $d$ other than $a_∅$ (or just in case $c$ is part of $d$ and $c$ encodes some property). Varzi then suggests a definition of ‘genuine overlap’ in terms of genuine parthood; in object theory, his definition would be implemented as follows: $c$ genuinely overlaps $d$ if and only if there is a concept $e$ that is a genuine part of both.

While this is a perfectly legitimate course to follow, in the present theory, it makes better sense to hold the notions of parthood and proper parthood fixed and consider how they behave on a subdomain, i.e., approach the matter by investigating how the defined notions of overlap, bottom, atom, etc., behave when restricted to the concepts that encode at least one property, i.e., with respect to non-null concepts. We now turn to a development of this idea.

(638) **Definition:** Non-null Concepts. Let us say that $x$ is a non-null concept, written $\text{Concept}^+(x)$, just in case $x$ is a concept and $x$ encodes some property:

$$\text{Concept}^+(x) \equiv_{df} C!x \& \exists FxF$$

Though we could just as well have said that a non-null concept is any concept other than the null concept $a_∅$, the above definition avoids the additional layer of complexity that would be contributed by using negation, identity, and $a_∅$ in the second conjunct of the definiens.

(639) **Theorem:** $\text{Concept}^+(x)$ is a Rigid Restriction Condition. Clearly, $\text{Concept}^+(x)$ is a restriction condition, as defined in (330): it has a single free variable, it is
a theorem that $\exists x \text{Concept}^+(x)$, and $\text{Concept}^+(x) \rightarrow \kappa \downarrow$. But to show that it is a rigid restriction condition we have to establish, as a modally strict theorem that necessarily, for any object $x$, if $\text{Concept}^+(x)$ then necessarily $\text{Concept}^+(x)$:

$$\forall x (\text{Concept}^+(x) \rightarrow \square \text{Concept}^+(x))$$

Since it is also clear that concepts $^+$ are concepts, we may introduce rigid (doubly) restricted variables $\xi, d, e, \ldots$ to range over concepts $^+$. These are doubly restricted because we may eliminate the variables in one of two ways, as discussed in (497). For example, we may regard $\forall \xi \phi(\xi)$ either as $\forall x (\text{Concept}^+(x) \rightarrow \phi)$ or as $\forall c (\text{Concept}^+(c) \rightarrow \phi)$.

(640) Definitions: Non-null Bottoms. Let us say that a non-null concept $\xi$ is a non-null bottom, written $\text{Bottom}^+(\xi)$, just in case $\xi$ is a part of every non-null concept:

$$\text{Bottom}^+(\xi) \equiv_{df} \forall d (\xi \preceq d)$$

(641) Theorems: Facts About Non-null Bottoms. The foregoing definition has the following consequences: (.1) The null concept is not a non-null bottom; and (.2) no non-null concept is a non-null bottom:

(.1) $\neg \text{Bottom}^+(\emptyset)$

(.2) $\neg \exists \xi \text{Bottom}^+(\xi)$

So the mereologist’s expectation that there be no bottom element is met when we restrict our attention to non-null concepts (cf. Simons 1987, 13, 25; Varzi 2015, §3.4).

(642) Definition: Non-null Atoms. Let us say that a non-null concept $\xi$ is a non-null atom, written $\text{Atom}^+(\xi)$, just in case $\xi$ has no non-null concepts as proper parts:

$$\text{Atom}^+(\xi) \equiv_{df} \neg \exists d (d \prec \xi)$$

(643) Theorems: Facts About Non-null Atoms and Proper Parthood for Non-null Concepts. We now have the following consequences: (.1) the Thin Form of $G$ is a non-null atom; (.2) no non-null concept is a unique proper part of a non-null concept; (.3) non-null atoms encode at most one property; and (.4) a non-null concept is a non-null atom if and only if it is a Thin Form:

(.1) $\text{Atom}^+(\text{a}_{G})$

(.2) $\neg \exists! d (d \prec \xi)$

(.3) $\text{Atom}^+(\xi) \rightarrow \forall F \forall G ((\xi F \& \xi G) \rightarrow F = G)$
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Atom^+(c) \equiv ThinForm(c)

Note that (.2) preserves Simon’s (1987, 26) intuition, mentioned earlier, that no mereological individual has a single proper part.

(644) Theorem: Overlap on Non-null Concepts Is Mereological. By restricting our attention to non-null concepts, it emerges that non-null concepts $c$ and $d$ overlap just in case there is a non-null concept $e$ that is a part of both:

$$Overlap(c, d) \equiv \exists e (e \leq c \land e \leq d)$$

Thus, the mereological definition of overlap becomes derivable as a theorem of the subtheory of non-null concepts. This merits a brief discussion.

(645) Remark: Object-Theoretic and Mereological Overlap on Non-null Concepts. The previous theorem shows that, when we restrict our attention to non-null concepts, the object-theoretic definition of overlap defined in (632.1) is equivalent to the traditional mereological definition of overlap defined in (632.2) as overlap^*. Consequently, as we complete our study of non-null concepts, we may regard object-theoretic overlap as a bona fide mereological notion.

Of course, lots of questions now arise. For example: (i) Which of the questionable mereological theorems about overlapping concepts can be preserved as bona fide mereological principles about overlapping non-null concepts? (ii) What mereological principles of supplementation hold with respect to non-null concepts? These and other questions will be investigated below.

(646) Theorems: Facts About Overlap and Non-null Concepts. (.1) Some non-null concepts overlap and some don’t; (.2) overlap is reflexive on the non-null concepts; (.3) overlap is symmetric on the non-null concepts; (.4) overlap is not transitive on the non-null concepts; (.5) it is not the case that for any non-null concepts $c$ and $d$, there is non-null concept $e$ that is a part of $d$ but which doesn’t overlap $c$; and (.6) it is not the case that for any non-null concepts $c$ and $d$, there is non-null concept $e$ that is a proper part of $d$ but which doesn’t overlap $c$:

(.1) $\exists e \exists d Overlap(c, d) \land \exists e \exists d \neg Overlap(c, d)$

(.2) $Overlap(c, c)$

(.3) $Overlap(c, d) \rightarrow Overlap(d, c)$

(.4) $\exists e \exists d \exists e (Overlap(c, d) \land Overlap(d, c) \land \neg Overlap(c, e))$

(.5) $\neg \forall e \exists d \exists e (e \leq d \land \neg Overlap(c, e))$

(.6) $\neg \forall e \exists d \exists e (e < d \land \neg Overlap(c, e))$
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Contrast (.1) with (633.7) and (633.8). If we consider concepts generally, then the object-theoretic overlap doesn't hold between every pair of concepts (633.7), while the mereological overlap does (633.7). But since object-theoretic overlap is equivalent to mereological overlap with respect to non-null concepts (644), (.1) reminds us that object-theoretic overlap is not trivial with respect to the non-null concepts.

(.5) is of interest because it contrasts with (633.9). The latter implies that for any two concepts \( c \) and \( d \), there is a concept \( e \) that is a part of \( d \) but which doesn't overlap with \( c \). But (.5) asserts that this fails to hold for non-null concepts; there are non-null concepts \( c \) and \( d \) such that every non-null part of \( d \) mereologically overlaps with \( c \). Since a principle like (633.9) doesn't hold for arbitrary non-null concepts \( c \) and \( d \), the way is now clear to prove non-trivial supplementation principles.

Note that (.6) shows that (633.10) remains a theorem when restricted to non-null concepts, albeit for a different reason. To see why (.6) holds, consider its equivalent form: \( \exists c \exists d \forall e (e \prec d \rightarrow \text{Overlap}(e, c)) \). Then as a witness to the first existential quantifier, take any non-null concept you please, say \( c_1 \). And as a witness to the second existential quantifier, pick an arbitrary property, say \( G \), and consider the Thin Form of \( G \), i.e., \( a_G \), which is clearly a non-null concept. Then, by GEN, it suffices to \( c < a_G \rightarrow \text{Overlap}(c, c_1) \). But this is provable by failure of the antecedent: since \( a_G \) is a non-null atom (643.1), it has no non-null concepts as proper parts, i.e., \( \neg c < a_G \), by definition (642).

\[\text{(1)} \quad c \prec d \rightarrow \exists e (e \leq d \& \neg \text{Overlap}(e, c)) \quad \text{(Weak Supplementation)}\]

\[\text{(2)} \quad d \nprec c \rightarrow \exists e (e \leq d \& \neg \text{Overlap}(e, c)) \quad \text{(Strong Supplementation)}\]

Cf. Varzi 2015, §3.1, P.4, and §3.2, P.5. Finally, note that we obtain the following when we restrict (634.3) to non-null concepts:

\[\text{(3)} \quad c \prec d \rightarrow \exists e (e < d \& \neg \text{Overlap}(e, c)) \]

This is slightly stronger than (1). Varzi (2015, §3.1, P.4') calls (3) proper supplementation. It is immune to the concern raised about (634.3); it is a true supplementation principle; the witness to the quantifier in the consequent is not the null concept, as in the proof of (634.3).

\[\text{(648) Exercises:} \quad \text{Consider the following questions (ranging from easy to hard), all of which arise by considering how previous definitions fare when (adjusted and) applied to non-null concepts:}\]
• Is there a maximal non-null concept, i.e., a \( \xi \) such that \( \forall d (d \leq \xi) \)?

• Consider the following mereological definition of concept summation (Simons 1987, 32, cf. SD7; Varzi 2015, §4.2, 39):

\[
\text{Sum}^*(\xi, d, e) \equiv d \land (\text{Overlap}(\xi, f) \equiv (\text{Overlap}(f, d) \lor \text{Overlap}(f, e))
\]

How does this mereological notion of concept summation relate to the object-theoretic notion we defined in (596) when the latter is restricted to non-null concepts? Are the two notions equivalent? If not, what distinctive theorems do the non-equivalent notions give rise to? For example, we established that every two concepts have a unique sum (597.2); does this hold for non-null concepts on the alternative definition of concept summation?

• What lattice-theoretic and algebraic facts are preserved when we restrict our attention to non-null concepts? What facts of this kind fail to hold with respect to non-null concepts? Are the non-null concepts structured in the way Simons says a ‘full classical mereology’ is structured, namely, as a “complete Boolean algebra with zero deleted” (1987, 25)?

• Finally, does the following complementation principle hold:

\[
\xi \not\leq d \rightarrow \exists e (f \leq e \equiv (f \leq \xi \land \neg \text{Overlap}(f, d)))
\]

(cf. Varzi 2015, §3.3, P.6)?

We leave the above as open questions for the interested reader to pursue.

13.2 Concepts of Properties and Individuals

In the subsections that follow, we describe: (a) concepts of properties, such as the concept of being a king, the concept of being red, etc., (b) concepts of ordinary individuals, such as the concept of Adam, the concept of Alexander, etc., and (c) generalized concepts, such as the concept of every human, the concept of something red, etc.

13.2.1 Concepts of Properties

(649) Definitions: Concepts of Properties. In (431) we defined, \( G \) necessarily implies \( F \), written \( G \Rightarrow F \), just in case \( \Box \forall x (Gx \Rightarrow Fx) \). Let us now say that \( c \) is a concept of \( G \) just in case \( c \) encodes exactly the properties necessarily implied by \( G \):

\[
\text{ConceptOf}(c, G) \equiv_d (G \downarrow \land \forall F (cF \equiv G \Rightarrow F))
\]
We assume our conventions for free restricted variables and for definitions by equivalence. The above definition makes it clear, for any property \(G\), any concept \(c\) such that \(\text{ConceptOf}(c, G)\) is an individual.

To develop a familiar example, suppose we have extended object theory by adding both the primitive property being human and some non-logical axioms that tell us what properties being human necessarily implies. For example, suppose we’ve added the axiom: being human necessarily implies being concrete, i.e., \(H \Rightarrow E!\). Then the definition tells us that \(\text{ConceptOf}(c, H)\) just in case \(\forall F (c F \equiv H \Rightarrow F)\), i.e., that \(c\) is a concept of being human just in case \(c\) encodes exactly the properties necessarily implied by being human. Thus, we would be able to derive that \(\text{ConceptOf}(c, H) \rightarrow cE!\).

(650) **Theorems:** Existence Conditions for Concepts of Properties. In the usual way, it follows that (.1) there is a concept of \(G\), (.2) there is a unique concept of \(G\), and (.3) the concept of \(G\) exists:

(.1) \(\exists c \text{ConceptOf}(c, G)\)

(.2) \(\exists! c \text{ConceptOf}(c, G)\)

(.3) \(\kappa \text{ConceptOf}(c, G)\)

(651) **Definition:** Notation for The Concept of \(G\). We may now introduce the notation \(c_G\) for the concept of \(G\):

\[c_G =_{df} \kappa \text{ConceptOf}(c, G)\]

Thus, \(c_G\) is a term-forming operator that takes 1-place relation terms as arguments. The boldface symbol ‘\(c\)’ in the expression ‘\(c_G\)’ is not a variable ranging over concepts and, hence, not a restricted variable. The only variable in the expression ‘\(c_G\)’ is the symbol ‘\(G\)’, though we may regard ‘\(c_G\)’ itself as a functional term that takes a concept as a value depending on the value assigned to ‘\(G\)’. And since the existence of \(G\) is built into the definition of \(\text{ConceptOf}(c, G)\), then if \(\Pi\) is any empty 1-place relation term, \(c_{\Pi}\) is empty as well.

(652) **Theorem:** The Concept of \(G\) is (Strictly) Canonical. By now familiar reasoning, \(c_G\) is (identical to) a canonical concept:

\[c_G = \kappa \forall F (c F \equiv G \Rightarrow F)\]

\(^{304}\)By our conventions for restricted variables, the definition expands to:

\[\text{ConceptOf}(x, G) =_{df} \exists! \kappa \text{ConceptOf}(c, G) \land \forall F (x F \equiv G \Rightarrow F)\]

Thus, for the definiendum to hold, both of the arguments of \(\text{ConceptOf}\) must be significant. So \(\text{ConceptOf}(x, \Pi)\) holds if and only if \(x\) and \(\Pi\) both exist, \(x\) is a concept, and \(x\) encodes all and only the properties necessarily implied by \(\Pi\).
Moreover, with theorem (437), we established, as a modally strict theorem, that for any property $F$, if $G$ necessarily implies $F$, then it is necessary that $G$ necessarily implies $F$, i.e., that $\forall F(G \Rightarrow F \Rightarrow \Box G \Rightarrow F)$. Thus, where $\varphi$ is $G \Rightarrow F$, this shows that $\varphi$ is a rigid condition on properties, by (257.1). So $c_G$ is (identical to) a strictly canonical concept, by (257.2).

(653) **Lemmas:** Facts About the Concept of $G$. Since $c_G$ is identical to a strictly canonical concept, we may use (258.2) to establish, by modally strict means, (1) for any property $F$, $c_G$ encodes $F$ if and only if $G$ necessarily implies $F$:

$$\forall F (c_G F \equiv G \Rightarrow F)$$

Moreover, since we can establish $G \Rightarrow G$ by modal predicate logic alone, it follows from (1) that:

$$c_G G$$

(654) **Theorem:** Identity of Sums. If we remember the definition of $\oplus$, then it is a simple consequence of the foregoing definitions that the sum of the concept of $G$ and the concept of $H$ is identical to the concept that encodes just the properties implied by $G$ or implied by $H$:

$$c_G \oplus c_H = \Box \forall F (cF \equiv G \Rightarrow F \lor H \Rightarrow F)$$

(655) **Metatheorems:** Reordering and Inclusion Chains. (1) It is a theorem that no matter how one reorders the sum of the concepts $c_{G_1}, \ldots, c_{G_n}$, the original sum and the reordered sum are identical:

$$\vdash c_{G_i} \oplus \ldots \oplus c_{G_{i-1}} \oplus c_{G_{i+1}} \oplus \ldots \oplus c_{G_{j-1}} \oplus c_{G_j} \oplus c_{G_{j+1}} \oplus \ldots \oplus c_{G_{n-1}} \oplus c_{G_n} = c_{G_1} \oplus \ldots \oplus c_{G_{i-1}} \oplus c_{G_{i+1}} \oplus \ldots \oplus c_{G_{j-1}} \oplus c_{G_j} \oplus c_{G_{j+1}} \oplus \ldots \oplus c_{G_{n-1}} \oplus c_{G_n}$$

for any $1 \leq i \leq j \leq n$. Moreover, it is a theorem that for any properties $G_1, \ldots, G_n$, the concept of $G_1$ is included in the sum of the concepts of $G_1$ and $G_2$, which in turn is included in the sum of the concepts of $G_1, G_2$, and $G_3, \ldots$, which in turn is included in the sum of the concepts $G_1, G_2, \ldots, G_n$; and the reverse is true for concept containment:

$$\vdash c_{G_1} \leq c_{G_1} \oplus c_{G_2} \leq \ldots \leq c_{G_1} \oplus \ldots \oplus c_{G_n}$$

$$\vdash c_{G_1} \oplus \ldots \oplus c_{G_n} \geq \ldots \geq c_{G_1} \oplus c_{G_2} \geq c_{G_1}$$

for any $n > 2$.

(656) **Remark:** Concepts and Properties. We have thus far analyzed Leibnizian concepts as abstract objects. But in Remark (601), we critically considered how the Leibnizian principles governing concept summation fare when concepts are instead analyzed as properties. We considered the definition:
and found that if $F$ and $G$ are properties (i.e., entities that can be distinct even though necessarily equivalent), then there is no obvious way to prove that summation is idempotent, commutative, and associative; see the discussion in Remark (601) for the details. In this Remark, we consider how the analysis of Leibnizian concepts as properties would give rise to additional difficulties when concept containment is brought into the picture and analyzed property-theoretically. And we examine a potential objection to the view that Leibnizian concepts are abstract objects.

Before we start our investigation, let’s examine how the present analysis might be used to interpret Leibnizian texts. Earlier, in (608), we proved Leibniz’s Equivalence in a completely general form, without reference to concepts of properties, for both concept inclusion and concept containment:

$$
c \leq d \equiv c \oplus d = d
$$

$$
c \geq d \equiv c = c \oplus d
$$

But if we instantiate these to concepts of properties, we obtain the following corollaries, one for concept inclusion and one for concept containment:

$$
c_F \leq c_G \equiv c_F \oplus c_G = c_G
$$

$$(\delta) \quad c_F \geq c_G \equiv c_F = c_F \oplus c_G
$$

These are of interest because they more closely resemble Leibniz’s texts. In Leibniz 1690b (LLP 131–132, G.vii 239), we find the following (in which the variables $L$ and $B$ have been replaced by $G$ and $F$, respectively):

Proposition 13:
If $G + F = G$, then $F$ will be in $G$

Proposition 14:
If $F$ is in $G$, then $G + F = G$

Clearly, if we conjoin these and substitute $F + G$ for $G + F$ (which we can do since concept addition is commutative), then we obtain:

$$
F \text{ is in } G \text{ if and only if } F + G = G
$$

And the containment version is:

$$(\zeta) \quad F \text{ contains } G \text{ if and only if } F = F + G$$

On the present analysis of Leibnizian concepts, we’ve captured $(\zeta)$ as $(\delta)$.

However, if one wanted to suggest that instead of analyzing Leibnizian concepts as abstract individuals they should be analyzed as properties, then $(\zeta)$ raises another issue. For suppose that one offers the following property-theoretic analysis of concept containment:
Presumably, this definition would allow one to conclude that since being a brother necessarily implies being male, the property being a brother contains the property being male. So the definition would provide one with a way of understanding the Leibnizian claim that the concept brother contains the concept male.

But consider what happens when the above definition is coupled with the property-theoretic definition of concept summation discussed in Remark (601). Then (ξ) would be analyzed as:

\[(ξ) \quad F \Rightarrow G \equiv F = [\lambda x Fx \land Gx]\]

(ξ), however, is inconsistent with reasonable principles about properties that one might wish to adopt. From the fact that property F implies property G, it does not follow that F just is identical to the conjunctive property \(\lambda x Fx \land Gx\). One may consistently extend our theory with the claim:

\[\exists F \exists G (F \Rightarrow G \& F \neq [\lambda x Fx \land Gx])\]

For example, one may reasonably claim both (a) that the property being a brother necessarily implies the property being male yet (b) that being a brother is not identical to being a brother and male. Or if we let K be the necessary property \([\lambda x Fx \lor \neg Fx]\) (where F is any property), then one might reasonably argue that, for any property G distinct from K, both \(G \Rightarrow K\) (indeed, this is provable) and \(G \neq [\lambda y Gy \land Ky]\). Indeed, some philosophers might wish to go further and assert that the right condition of (ξ) fails universally, i.e., that no (distinct) properties F and G are such that F is identical to \([\lambda y Fy \land Gy]\). In any case, we only need the existence of a single counterexample to show that (ξ) is unacceptable.

Of course, one could try to reinterpret the identity claim in (ζ) in terms of some weaker notion. Castañeda (1990, 17) suggests that Leibniz’s relation of coincidence is indeed a weaker relation than identity on concepts, but Ishiguro (1990, Chapter 2) argues that this isn’t really consistent with Leibniz’s texts. Among other things, it conflicts with Leibniz’s reading of the symbol ‘∞’ as ‘the same’ in Definition 1 of LLP 131 (G.vii 236). Of course, we’ve already ruled out Lenzen’s (1990) interpretation of the variables in terms of sets, since this offers only a mathematical model of Leibnizian concepts, not a theory of them.

By contrast, we’ve seen that when the concept F is analyzed as \(c_F\), concept addition as \(⊕\), and concept containment as \(≥\), then (ζ) becomes analyzed as (δ). The latter has the following instance:

\[c_B ≥ c_M \equiv c_B = c_B ⊕ c_M\]
The concept of being a brother contains the concept of being male if and only if the concept of being a brother is identical with the sum of the concepts of being a brother and being male.

Indeed, if one adds to our system the property-theoretic postulate that being a brother necessarily implies being male ($B \Rightarrow M$), one may derive either side of the above biconditional.\(^\text{305}\)

We conclude the present remark on concepts and properties by considering whether the following constitutes counterevidence to our analysis of concepts as abstract individuals. Some philosophers, including Leibniz, might assert that the following is true:

\((A)\) The concept brother is identical to the sum of the concept male and the concept sibling.

Now in certain pre-theoretical, ordinary language contexts, in which concept talk is just loose talk about properties and concept summation is intuitively understood as property conjunction, (A) is no doubt best interpreted as asserting that the property being a brother ('$B$') is identical to the property \([\lambda x \text{M} x \& S x]\), i.e., the conjunction of being male ('$M$') and being a sibling ('$S$'). This would yield a true interpretation of (A). But we have suggested in this subsection that Leibniz’s talk of ‘the concept brother’ should be analyzed as a reference to the concept of being a brother, i.e., $c_B$, and similarly for his talk of ‘the concept male’ and ‘the concept sibling’. Thus one might be tempted to analyze (A) as:

\((B)\) $c_B = c_M \oplus c_S$

But (B) is provably false if given, as minimal facts about these properties, that being a brother necessarily implies being a male sibling (i.e., $B \Rightarrow [\lambda x \text{M} x \& S x]$), and that neither $M$ nor $S$ necessarily imply this conjunctive property. For, given such facts, it follows by definition of $c_B$ and $c_M \oplus c_S$ that $c_B$ encodes $[\lambda x \text{M} x \& S x]$ and that $c_M \oplus c_S$ does not. Since $c_B$ encodes a property that $c_M \oplus c_S$ fails to encode, they are distinct, contradicting (B).

It may be tempting to conclude that this result shows that the property-theoretic analysis of the Leibnizian notion of concepts is preferable to the

\(^{305}\)To see this, assume $B \Rightarrow M$, i.e., $\Box \forall x (Bx \rightarrow Mx)$. Now to derive the left-side of the biconditional, i.e., $c_B \geq c_M$, we have to show $c_M \leq c_B$, by definition (603.2). So by definition (603.1), we have to show $\forall F (c_M F \rightarrow c_B F)$. By GEN, it suffices to show $c_M F \rightarrow c_B F$. So assume $c_M F$. Then by (653.1), $M \Rightarrow F$, i.e., $\Box \forall x (Mx \rightarrow Fx)$. But it follows from our assumption and this last fact that $\Box \forall x (Bx \rightarrow Fx)$, i.e., $B \Rightarrow F$. So by (653.1), $c_B F$, completing our conditional proof. Now to derive the right-side of the biconditional from $B \Rightarrow M$, we could just appeal to the derivation we just completed and the instance of (9) above in the text. Independently, however, we can easily show $c_B = c_M \oplus c_F$ by showing they encode the same properties. (\textit{\rightarrow}) Assume $c_B F$. Then $c_B F \lor c_M F$. Hence $c_B \oplus c_M F$. (\textit{\leftarrow}) Assume $c_B \oplus c_M F$. Then by (654), $(B \Rightarrow F) \lor (M \Rightarrow F)$. If $B \Rightarrow F$, then $c_B F$, by (653.1). If $M \Rightarrow F$, then given our assumption $B \Rightarrow M$, it follows that $B \Rightarrow F$. Hence, again, $c_B F$.\)
present analysis, since it avoids attributing to him a provable falsehood. As noted above, if we take the concepts discussed in (A) to be properties, and take the sum of the concepts male and sibling to be \([\lambda x Mx \& Sx]\), then (C) becomes an analysis of (A):

\[(C) \quad B = [\lambda x Mx \& Sx]\]

(C) is in fact true. The property \textit{being a brother} is identical to the property \textit{being a male sibling}. Moreover, on the basis of (C), it follows that the concept of \textit{being a brother} is identical to the concept of the conjunctive property \textit{being a male sibling}:

\[(D) \quad c_B = c_{[\lambda x Mx \& Sx]}\]

Once (C) is added to our system (say, as part of a theory of brotherhood), then (D) becomes an easy theorem.

So I think the conclusion to be drawn here is that either (A) is to be interpreted as (C), in which case Leibniz has asserted a property identity in the guise of concept identities, or (A) is to be interpreted as (D). If one doesn’t rigorously distinguish properties and concepts of properties, one might well say (A) when intending (C) or (D). Leibniz did in fact distinguish between properties and their concepts, but it doesn’t look like he did so rigorously. There are passages where he distinguishes an accident and its notion, and passages where he distinguishes a predicate and its concept. Consider the following passage from Article 8 in the \textit{Discourse on Metaphysics} (PW 19, G.iv 433):

\[
\text{... an accident is a being whose notion does not include all that can be attributed to the subject to which this notion is attributed. Take, for example, the quality of being a king, ...}
\]

In this passage, I take it, Leibniz is distinguishing the property (i.e., the accident or the quality) from the concept or notion of that property. And recall the following passage from his correspondence with Arnauld (June 1686, LA 63, G.ii 56):

\[
\text{... in every true affirmative proposition, necessary or contingent, universal or particular, the concept of the predicate is in a sense included in that of the subject; the predicate is present in the subject.}
\]

These passages show Leibniz did distinguish properties and their concepts. But he didn’t regiment the distinction and systematically adhere to it in his logic of concepts and containment theory of truth. So it shouldn’t be surprising if sometimes Leibniz asserted concept identities like (A) when he meant to assert either something like (C) or (D). This conclusion may address the concern that (A) constitutes counterevidence to the present analysis.
13.2. CONCEPTS OF PROPERTIES AND INDIVIDUALS

Notice also that from (C), we can also derive the property-theoretic postulate discussed earlier, namely, (a) \( B \Rightarrow M \), and so derive that (b) the concept of being a brother contains the concept of being male, i.e., that \( c_B \preceq c_M \). For (a), note that \( [\lambda x (Mx \& Sx)] \Rightarrow M \) (exercise) and so by (C), it follows that \( B \Rightarrow M \). Hence, for (b), the reasoning we used in footnote 305 now yields the conclusion that \( c_B \preceq c_M \).

In conclusion, on the present theory, there is a subtle and important difference between properties and concepts, between the sum concept \( c_M \oplus c_S \) and the conjunctive property \( [\lambda x (Mx \& Sx)] \), and hence between \( c_M \oplus c_S \) and \( c[\lambda x (Mx \& Sx)] \). In general, it is important to remember that adding concepts \( c_F \) and \( c_G \) to obtain \( c_F \oplus c_G \) is not the same as conjoining properties \( F \) and \( G \) to obtain \( [\lambda x (Fx \& Gx)] \). The conjunction \( [\lambda x (Fx \& Gx)] \) is a property whose extension (in the technical sense of Chapter 10, Section 10.3) is the intersection of the extensions of \( F \) and \( G \). The sum of \( c_F \) and \( c_G \) is a concept that encodes the union of the properties implied by \( F \) and those implied by \( G \).

(657) Theorem: Identity of The Concept of \( G \) and The (Thick) Form of \( G \). It should come as no surprise to those who have worked through the chapter on Forms that the concept of \( G \) is identical to the (thickly-conceived) Form of \( G \):

\[ c_G = \Phi_G \]

This establishes an interesting link between the work of Plato and Leibniz. As an exercise, consider what the resulting theorems say when we substitute \( c_G \) for \( \Phi_G \) in the theorems about Forms, and substitute \( \Phi_G \) for \( c_G \) in the theorems about concepts of properties.

13.2.2 Concepts of Individuals

In this subsection and for the remainder of this chapter, we use \( u, v \) as variables ranging over ordinary individuals. Since \( O!x \) is a rigid restriction condition in the sense of (334), we may reason with \( u, v \) as free restricted variables and employ our extended Rule RN (335).

(658) Definition: Concepts of Ordinary Individuals. If we employ our theory of definitions by equivalence and conventions for free restricted variables, we may say that \( c \) is a concept of \( u \) just in case \( c \) encodes exactly the properties that \( u \) exemplifies:

\[ \text{ConceptOf}(c, u) \equiv_{df} \forall F (cF \equiv Fu) \]

To take a simple example, if Socrates (‘s’) is an ordinary object and a concept \( c \) encodes exactly the properties Socrates exemplifies, then \( \text{ConceptOf}(c, s) \).

\[ \text{Note again that by using the free restricted variables } c \text{ and } u, \text{ our rules and Convention (332.2) } \]
(659) Theorems: Conditional Existence Conditions for Concepts of Ordinary Individuals. It follows that (.1) there is a concept of \(u\); (.2) there is a unique concept of \(u\); and (.3) the concept of \(u\) exists:

(.1) \(\exists c \text{ConceptOf}(c,u)\)

(.2) \(\exists ! c \text{ConceptOf}(c,u)\)

(.3) \(c \text{ConceptOf}(c,u)\)

These are straightforward consequences of the definition (658) and comprehension for concepts (593).

Of course, in these theorems, \(u\) is a free restricted variable and so, strictly speaking, all of the above are conditionals. But we can derive unconditional existence claims from them since it follows from (225.1) and the T schema that ordinary individuals exist.

(660) Definition: Notation for the Concept of \(u\). We henceforth use the notation \(c_u\) to denote the concept of \(u\):

\[c_u =_{df} \text{ConceptOf}(c,u)\]

So if we extend our language with the constant ‘\(s\)’, to designate Socrates, \(c_s\) is the concept of Socrates.

(661) Theorem: Contingency of Exemplification for Ordinary Objects. With the help of a previous theorem (203.1), we now prove that there exists an ordinary object \(u\) and a property \(F\) such that it is possible that (a) \(u\) exemplifies \(F\) and (b) possibly \(u\) fails to exemplify \(F\):

\[\exists u \exists F (Fu \& \neg Fu)\]

By (165.11), this implies that for some ordinary object \(u\) and property \(F\), \(\Diamond Fu \& \Diamond \neg Fu\). So there are objects \(u\) and properties \(F\) such that \(x\) possibly exemplifies \(F\) and possibly does not.

Exercise. Is it provable that every ordinary object \(u\) is such that for some property \(F\), both \(\Diamond Fu\) and \(\Diamond \neg Fu\), i.e., \(\forall u \exists F (\Diamond Fu \& \Diamond \neg Fu)\)? Consider the fact that the claim \(\exists x \square \Box E!x\), i.e., there exists an object that is necessarily concrete (e.g., an object such as Spinoza’s God), seems to be consistent with the theory. But imply that the definition yields the following as a theorem:

\[\text{ConceptOf}(x,y) \equiv (C!x \& O!y \& V(F(x \equiv F y)))\]

Moreover, \(c\) and \(u\) are rigid restricted variables, since it is provable that \(\square (C!x \rightarrow \square C!x)\) and \(\square (O!y \rightarrow \square O!y)\). So we may treat \(C!x\) and \(O!y\) are (necessary) axioms. Thus it follows from the preceding equivalence that:

\[\text{ConceptOf}(c,u) \equiv V(F(c \equiv Fu))\]

The derivability of this equivalence justifies the definition given in the text.
also consider the fact that for any two possible worlds \( w \) and \( w' \), there is at least one proposition, say \( p \), and thus one property, \([\lambda y \ p]\), that distinguishes them.

(662) **Remark:** The Concept of \( u \) is Not Strictly Canonical. By now familiar reasoning, we know that \( c_u \) is (identical to) a canonical object, i.e., that:

\[
c_u = \text{ix}(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv Fu))
\]

So \( c_u \) is canonical object.

But it is not difficult to see that \( c_u \) is not a strictly canonical object. Recall that in \((257.2)\), we stipulated that \( \text{ix}(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi)) \) is a strictly canonical object just in case \( \varphi \) is a rigid condition on properties, i.e., by \((257.1)\), just in case \( \vdash \Box \forall F (\varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi) \). If we let \( \varphi \) be the formula \( Fu \), then theorem \((661)\) has the form \( \exists u \exists F (\varphi \& \Box \neg \varphi) \). Then by reasoning analogous to that in Remarks \((288)\) and \((320)\), it follows that \( \varphi \) is not a rigid condition on properties, on pain of system inconsistency. So though \( c_u \) is (identical to) a canonical object, it is not (identical to) a strictly canonical object.

This is, of course, as it should be. Our system doesn’t assert, of any particular ordinary individual \( u \) and property \( F \), that \( \Box Fu \& \Box \neg Fu \). But it does imply the existence of ordinary individuals. To establish that \( c_u \) when \( F \) is a contingent property, we shall need to appeal to the contingent fact that \( Fu \), and this undermines the modal strictness of the reasoning. Thus, we should not expect completely general theorems about the properties \( c_u \) encodes to be modally strict.

(663) ★**Lemmas:** Facts About Concepts of Ordinary Objects. It is an immediate consequence of the foregoing that (.1) the concept of \( u \) encodes \( G \) iff \( u \) exemplifies \( G \), and (.2) the concept of \( u \) encodes \( G \) iff the concept of \( u \) contains the concept of \( G \):

\[
\begin{align*}
(1) \quad & c_u G \equiv Gu \\
(2) \quad & c_u G \equiv c_u \geq c_G
\end{align*}
\]

These theorems are not modally strict.

(664) **Definition:** Completeness of Concepts. Recall that \( \bar{F} \) was defined in \((194.1)\) to be \([\lambda y \neg F y]\). We now say that a concept \( c \) is complete just in case for every property \( F \), either \( c \) encodes \( F \) or \( c \) encodes \( \bar{F} \):

\[
\text{Complete}(c) \iff \forall F (cF \lor c\bar{F})
\]

(665) **Theorem:** The Concept of Individual \( u \) Is Complete.

\[
\text{Complete}(c_u)
\]
Though it is straightforward to give a non-modally strict proof of this theorem, a modally strict proof is given in the Appendix.

This theorem and theorem (663) fully capture Leibniz’s suggestion, in Article 8 of the Discourse on Metaphysics (PW 18–19, G.iv 433), that:

…it is in the nature of an individual substance, or complete being, to have a notion so complete that it is sufficient to contain and render deducible from itself, all the predicates of the subject to which this notion is attributed.

Theorem (663) ensures that all of the properties that \( u \) exemplifies are derivable from \( c_u \), and the present theorem ensures that \( c_u \) is provably complete.

(666) Remark: The Focus on Concepts of Ordinary Individuals. One might wonder why we are focusing on concepts of ordinary individuals and not on concepts of individuals generally. There are both theoretical reasons and practical reasons. One theoretical reason is that, strictly speaking, we don’t need a distinction between an abstract individual and a concept of that abstract individual. An abstract individual \( x \) is, by its very nature, something distinguished and identified by the properties it encodes. So any concept that encodes exactly the distinguishing and identifying properties of \( x \) just is \( x \).

Moreover, we already know that the properties that an abstract object exemplifies do not necessarily distinguish it from other abstract objects. Theorem (266) tells us that there are abstract objects, say \( a \) and \( b \), such that \( a \neq b \) and \( \forall F (Fa \equiv Fb) \). That is, there are abstract objects \( a \) and \( b \) that are distinct (i.e., encode different properties) but which are indiscernible (i.e., exemplify the same properties). Thus, if we had extended the definition of \( \text{ConceptOf}(c, u) \) to allow for concepts of abstract individuals, \( c_a \) and \( c_b \) would be identical concepts for such \( a \) and \( b \) (exercise). Thus, concepts of distinct but indiscernible abstract individuals would collapse. This gives us a reason to think that it would be a mistake to suppose that a concept of an abstract individual \( x \) encodes exactly what \( x \) exemplifies. We take this to be an insight, not a limitation.

Such theoretical reasons do not apply to concepts of ordinary individuals. Ordinary individuals are distinguished and identified by the properties they exemplify (239.2), and since the concepts of such individuals encode the latter’s exemplified properties, it makes sense to distinguish ordinary individuals and concepts of them. Moreover, whenever ordinary individuals \( a \) and \( b \) are distinct, their concepts \( c_a \) and \( c_b \) are distinct (exercise).

A practical reason for restricting our focus is that concepts of ordinary individuals suffice for representing the examples Leibniz and others have used in discussing the metaphysics of individual concepts. When expounding his calculus of concepts, containment theory of truth, and modal metaphysics, Leibniz always used concepts of ordinary individuals as examples. Moreover, as we
shall see, the study of concepts of ordinary individuals yields some very nice results in the modal metaphysics of concepts, discussed in Section 13.4 below.

### 13.2.3 Concepts of Generalizations

In what follows, we introduce concepts of generalizations, such as the concept *everything that exemplifies G* and the concept *something that exemplifies G*. In our metalanguage, we take the liberty of rendering these expressions more simply as the concept *every G* and the concept *some G*, and we introduce and define notation like $c_{\forall G}$ and $c_{\exists G}$, respectively, to represent them. To further simplify the discussion, these formal expressions will be defined directly in terms of canonical descriptions.

**Definition:** Concepts of Generalizations. Let us say (.1) the concept *every G* is the concept that encodes just the properties $F$ such that every $G$ exemplifies $F$; and (.2) the concept *some G* is the concept that encodes just the properties $F$ such that some $G$ exemplifies $F$:

\[
\begin{align*}
(\text{.1}) & \quad c_{\forall G}F \equiv \forall x(Gx \rightarrow Fx) \\
(\text{.2}) & \quad c_{\exists G}F \equiv \exists y(Gy & Fy)
\end{align*}
\]

In these definitions, the variables $x, y$ are unrestricted and range over individuals generally. Thus, $c_{\forall G}$ and $c_{\exists G}$ are canonical objects. We leave it as an exercise to show that $c_{\forall G}$ and $c_{\exists G}$ are not strictly canonical, i.e., that when $\varphi$ is either $\forall x(Gx \rightarrow Fx)$ or $\exists x(Gx & Fx)$, then $\varphi$ is not a rigid condition on properties.

**Lemma:** Facts About Concepts of Generalizations. It is an immediate consequence of the foregoing that (.1) the concept *every G* encodes $F$ iff every $G$ exemplifies $F$, and (.2) the concept *some G* encodes $F$ iff some $G$ exemplifies $F$:

\[
\begin{align*}
(\text{.1}) & \quad c_{\forall G}F \equiv \forall x(Gx \rightarrow Fx) \\
(\text{.2}) & \quad c_{\exists G}F \equiv \exists x(Gx & Fx)
\end{align*}
\]

It also follows that (.3) the concept *every G* encodes the property $F$ iff the concept *every G* contains the concept of $F$, and (.4) the concept *some G* encodes the property $F$ iff the concept *some G* contains the concept of $F$:

\[
\begin{align*}
(\text{.3}) & \quad c_{\forall G}F \equiv c_{\forall G} \geq c_{F} \\
(\text{.4}) & \quad c_{\exists G}F \equiv c_{\exists G} \geq c_{F}
\end{align*}
\]

These are not modally strict theorems.
13.3 The Containment Theory of Truth

(669) Theorems: Exemplification and Containment. It is a consequence of the preceding definitions and lemmas that exemplification predication is equivalent to the Leibnizian analysis of predication, for it follows that (61) u exemplifies G if and only if the concept of u contains the concept of G. Furthermore, the modern and Leibnizian analyses of simple quantified statements are equivalent, given the following theorems: (72) everything exemplifying G exemplifies F if and only if the concept everything that exemplifies G contains the concept of F; and (73) something exemplifies both G and F if and only if the concept something that exemplifies G contains the concept of F:

(61) \[ Gu \equiv c_u \geq c_G \]
(72) \[ \forall x (Gx \rightarrow Fx) \equiv c_{\forall G} \geq c_F \]
(73) \[ \exists x (Gx \& Fx) \equiv c_{\exists G} \geq c_F \]

These are easy consequences of previous theorems.

(670) Remark: The Containment Theory of Truth. To see how Leibniz’s containment theory of truth is preserved in these theorems, first recall the passage quoted at the outset, from the correspondence with Arnauld (June 1686, LA 63, G.ii 56):

…in every true affirmative proposition, necessary or contingent, universal or particular, the concept of the predicate is in a sense included in that of the subject; the predicate is present in the subject.

Leibniz also produced an early statement of his containment theory of truth in a work subsequently titled Elements of a Calculus, where he spoke of universal propositions and wrote (1679, 18–19; source C 51):

…every true universal affirmative categorical proposition simply shows some connection between predicate and subject (a direct connection, which is what is always meant here). This connection is, that the predicate is said to be in the subject, or to be contained in the subject; either absolutely and regarded in itself, or at any rate, in some instance; i.e., that the subject is said to contain the predicate in a stated fashion. This is to say that the concept of the subject, either in itself or with some addition, involves the concept of the predicate….

In Article 8 of the Discourse on Metaphysics (1686, Bennett’s translation of G.iv 433) we find:307

307 The words in brackets were interpolated by Bennett, so as to clarify Leibniz’s intention.
13.3. THE CONTAINMENT THEORY OF TRUTH

So the [notion of the] subject term must always include [that of] the predicate, so that anyone who understood the subject notion perfectly would also judge that the predicate belongs to it.

Now to see how these passages are validated by our theorems, let \( a \) stand for Alexander the Great and let us assume Alexander is an ordinary object. Then the concept of Alexander, \( c_a \), is significant, by (660) and (659.3). Moreover, let \( K \) stand for the property being a king. Then the concept of being a king, \( c_K \), is well-formed and logically proper, by (651) and (650.3). Now, given the above quotations, Leibniz analyzes the ordinary language predication:

\[
(.1) \text{ Alexander is a king}
\]

in the following terms:

\[
(.2) \text{ The concept of Alexander contains the concept of being a king}
\]

On our representation of Leibniz’s analysis, this becomes:

\[
(.3) c_a \succeq c_K
\]

Whereas the modern analysis of (.1) in the predicate calculus is:

\[
(.4) Ka
\]

So by (669.1)\( \star \), our representation (.3) of Leibniz’s analysis (.2) of the ordinary claim (.1) is equivalent to the modern analysis (.4) of (.1).

As a second example, consider the ordinary language predication:

\[
(.5) \text{ Every person is rational.}
\]

Leibniz’s analysis would be:

\[
(.6) \text{ The concept every person contains the concept of being rational}
\]

We represented the Leibnizian concept every person as the concept everything that exemplifies being a person, i.e., \( c_{vp} \), which is defined in (667.1). So our representation of Leibniz’s analysis (.6) becomes:

\[
(.7) c_{vp} \succeq c_R
\]

Whereas the modern analysis of (.5) in the predicate calculus is:

\[
(.8) \forall x(Px \rightarrow Rx)
\]

So by (669.2)\( \star \), our representation (.7) of Leibniz’s analysis (.6) of the ordinary claim (.5) is equivalent to the modern analysis (.8) of (.6). And analogously for the ordinary language predication ‘Some person is rational’,
(671) Remark: Generalized Quantifiers. Is is intriguing to consider whether there is a connection between Leibniz’s containment theory of truth and the idea of a generalized quantifier or Montague’s (1974) subject-predicate analysis of basic sentences of natural language. Montague gave a uniform subject-predicate analysis of a fundamental class of English sentences by treating such noun phrases as ‘John’ and ‘every person’ as sets of properties. He supposed that the proper name ‘John’ denotes the set of properties that John exemplifies and supposed that the noun phrase ‘every person’ denoted the set of properties that every person exemplifies. Then, on Montague’s theory, English sentences such as ‘John is rational’ and ‘Every person is rational’ could be given a uniform subject-predicate analysis: such sentences are true iff the property denoted by the predicate ‘is rational’ is a member of the set of properties denoted by the subject term. Leibniz’s containment theory of truth, on our analysis, offers a similar unification of the analysis of singular and general predications. Moreover, one could extend this to other concepts of generalizations, such as the concepts most things that exemplify F, many things that exemplify F, few things that exemplify F, etc., once the relevant quantifiers are introduced into our language, either as axiomatized primitives or by definition.

(672) Remark: Hypothetical Necessity. Leibniz’s containment theory of truth gives rise to an interesting objection. Leibniz anticipated the objection in Article 13 of the Discourse on Metaphysics. In that Article, Leibniz reiterates that “the notion of an individual substance involves, once and for all, everything that can ever happen to it”, and then says (PW 23, G.iv 436):

But it seems this will destroy the difference between contingent and necessary truths, that human freedom will no longer hold, and that an absolute fatality will rule over all our actions as well as over the rest of what happens in the world.

Leibniz’s contemporary, Antoine Arnauld, took this criticism in a theistic direction, suggesting that the view not only implies that everything that happens to a person happens by necessity but also that it places constraints on God’s freedom to shape what happens to the history of the human race (letter to Count Ernst von Hessen-Rheinfels, March 13, 1686, LA 9, G.ii 15).

Let us put aside Arnauld’s theistic turn. Given Leibniz’s phrasing, the objection charges that the containment theory of truth somehow collapses contingency and necessity and that, at best, the theory represents contingent truths as necessary truths and, at worst, implies that the actual world exhibits no contingency. If concept containment is not relative to any circumstance, then Leibniz has analyzed the contingent statement ‘Alexander is a king’ in terms of a claim that appears to be a necessary truth, namely, the concept of Alexander contains the concept of being a king. A similar worry arises about the analysis
of the contingent general claims ‘Every person is rational’ and ‘Some person is rational’, which if true, would also appear to be rendered as necessary truths given Leibniz’s analysis. For the purposes of simplifying the discussion, we’ll put these last two examples aside and focus just on the first, since the discussion of the first example will apply to them as well.

Leibniz’s response to the objection is somewhat intriguing. In the next passage of the Discourse, he continues (PW 23-24, G.iv 437):

To give a satisfactory answer to it, I assert that connexion or sequence is of two kinds. The one is absolutely necessary, whose contrary implies a contradiction; this kind of deduction holds in the case of eternal truths, such as those of geometry. The other is only necessary by hypothesis (ex hypothesi), and so to speak by accident; it is contingent in itself, since its contrary does not imply a contradiction.

So Leibniz defends himself against the objection by appealing to a distinction between absolute necessity and hypothetical necessity. The question is, what is hypothetical necessity?

Before we propose an answer to this question, note that Jonathan Bennett offers a slightly different translation of the passage from the Discourse just quoted. In his translation, Bennett (a) makes it much clearer that Leibniz is talking about two kinds of logical consequence, and (b) interpolates some text that helps us to understand what Leibniz is suggesting. Bennett’s translation goes as follows, with the added material enclosed between center dots:

To that end, I remark that there are two kinds of connection or following from. One is absolutely necessary, and its contrary implies a contradiction; such deduction pertains to eternal truths, such as those of geometry. The other is necessary not absolutely, but only ex hypothesi, and, so to speak, accidentally. It doesn’t bring us to it is necessary that P, but only to Given Q, it follows necessarily that P. Something that is necessary only ex hypothesi is contingent in itself, and its contrary doesn’t imply a contradiction.

Now I’m not sure why Bennett interpolated the text between the dots in his translation; it doesn’t appear in the original at G.iv 437. But his explanation of the distinction between absolute and hypothetical necessity seems to be on point, though it introduces a crucial ambiguity.

This translation leaves it open whether ‘necessarily’ in the phrase ‘Given Q, it follows necessarily that P’ attaches to ‘it follows that’ or to the proposition

---

308 In a note at the top of the translation, Bennett writes:

Small-dots enclose material that has been added, but can be read as though it were part of the original text.

This doesn’t say what the origin of the added material is.
CHAPTER 13. CONCEPTS

P. If the former, then Leibniz is thinking of hypothetical necessities in terms of a more formal, inferential notion of logical consequence, in which the conclusion follows by logical necessity from accidental (i.e., contingent) truths. But if the ‘necessarily’ in ‘... it follows necessarily that P’ attaches to the proposition P, then we would have to find an interpretation on which a necessary truth becomes derivable from a contingency. Let’s consider these interpretative options in turn.

Suppose that the ‘necessarily’ attaches to ‘it follows that’, so that the necessity in question is logical necessity, i.e., a conclusion derived from a contingent hypothesis is logically required. We can explore this idea by focusing either on derivations or on theorems. Focusing first on derivations, our system establishes that $Ka \vdash c_a \geq c_K$. Theorem (669.1) asserts $Ka \equiv c_a \geq c_K$, which implies $Ka \rightarrow c_a \geq c_K$. Thus, by (64.10), $Ka \vdash c_a \geq c_K$. So Leibniz’s containment analysis of ‘Alexander is a king’, is derivable from the contingent premise $Ka$; it is a conclusion that is a logically-required consequence of a contingent premise. This is one way to understand hypothetical necessity.

But if we focus on theorems instead of derivations, then $Ka \equiv c_a \geq c_K$ is a theorem (669.1) that is a logical consequence of our axioms and rules, i.e., those axioms and rules logically require it to be a theorem. We may not conclude that it is a necessary truth, since it has been established by non-modally strict means and ultimately rests on a modally fragile axiom. So this is a second way to understand hypothetical necessity.

Now, let’s consider the other interpretative option, in which ‘necessarily’ in the phrase ‘Given Q, it follows necessarily that P’ attaches to the proposition P. Then we may regard such hypothetical necessities as metaphysically necessary truths derivable from contingent premises. An example is found in the claim that the concept of Alexander encodes being a king, i.e., $\Box c_a K$. In object theory it is easy to show $Ka \vdash \Box c_a K$. To see that this holds, note that $Ka \vdash c_a K$, by (663.1) and (64.10). That is, the premise that Alexander is king implies that the concept of Alexander encodes being a king. But by axiom (51) and (64.10), we know can conclude $c_a K \vdash \Box c_a K$. Hence, from these two facts about derivations, it follows by (64.8) that $Ka \vdash \Box c_a K$. So a necessary truth, $\Box c_a K$, is derivable from a contingent premise. This is a third way to understand hypothetical necessity.

On none of these ways of understanding hypothetical necessity does it follow that the Leibnizian containment theory of truth banishes contingency from the actual world. But one might still wonder whether Leibniz and Arnauld might have made the objection stronger by recasting it as follows: the equivalence of an analysandum and its analysans should be a necessary equivalence, but the equivalence of the analysandum ‘Alexander is a king’ ($Ka$) and the analysans $c_a \geq c_K$ is not necessary. The fact being appealed to in this objection...
is correct, for as we know, the equivalence $KA \equiv c_a \geq c_K$, is an instance of theorem (669.1)⋆ and so not a modally strict theorem. So we can’t validly derive $\Box(Ka \equiv c_a \geq c_K)$ by applying RN to (669.1)⋆.

But though it is understandable why one might raise this objection, it can be met. For it is not clear why an analysans should be necessarily equivalent to its analysandum in a system in which all terms rigidly designate and abstractions can be defined on the basis of contingencies. In the present system, $c_a$ is defined on the basis of the properties Alexander in fact exemplifies, some of which are contingently exemplified. It is therefore inevitable that claims about the properties $c_a$ (rigidly) encodes become provably, but not necessarily, equivalent to claims about the properties Alexander in fact exemplifies. Thus, it may be that a correct analysis requires only that the equivalence of the analysans and analysandum be provable a priori rather than provably necessary.

13.4 The Modal Metaphysics of Concepts

(673) Remark: Primitive vs. Defined Counterparts. The theorems described in this section articulate a modal metaphysics of concepts inspired by Leibniz’s work. We may introduce these theorems by way of an issue in Leibniz scholarship. Some Leibniz scholars have suggested that the best way to reconstruct Leibniz’s modal metaphysics of concepts is to suppose that the counterpart relation partially systematized in Lewis 1968 should be applied to individual concepts. This general view is adopted here, but instead of taking counterpart to be a primitive, as in Lewis 1968 and in the work of other Leibniz scholars, we shall define a notion of individual concept and define the conditions under which one individual concept is a counterpart of another. Since our system axiomatizes a fixed domain of individuals and presupposes that every individual exemplifies properties in every possible world, it turns out that the modal metaphysics will preserve elements of Leibnizian, Lewisian, and Kripkean metaphysics.

The view adopted by various Leibniz scholars, that one should use counterpart theory to reconstruct Leibniz’s metaphysics, traces back to work of Mondadori (1973, 1975), who notes that the natural reading of certain passages in the Leibnizian corpus are suggestive of that theory (cf. Ishiguro 1972, 123–134). Here is a passage from the Theodicy (T 371, G.vi 363) which Mondadori cites:

I will now show you some [worlds], wherein shall be found, not absolutely the same Sextus as you have seen (that is not possible, he carries with him always that which he shall be) but several Sextuses resembling him, possessing all that you know already of the true Sextus, but not that is already in him imperceptibly, nor in consequence all that shall yet happen to him.
You will find in one world a very happy and noble Sextus, in another a Sextus content with a mediocre state, …

Mondadori also cites the letter to Count Ernst von Hessen-Rheinfels of April 12, 1686, where Leibniz talks about the different possible Adams, all of which differ from each other (PW 51, G.ii 20):

For by the individual notion of Adam I undoubtedly mean a perfect representation of a particular Adam, with given individual conditions and distinguished thereby from an infinity of other possible persons very much like him, but yet different from him… There is one possible Adam whose posterity is such and such, and an infinity of others whose posterity would be different; is it not the case that these possible Adams (if I may so speak of them) are different from one another, and that God has chosen only one of them, who is exactly our Adam?

When Mondadori suggests using counterpart theory to model Leibniz’s views, he notes that whereas for Lewis the counterpart relation is a relation on individuals, “in Leibniz’s case, it is best regarded as being a relation between (complete) concepts” (1973, 248). This suggestion is explicitly built into the Leibnizian system described in Fitch 1979, and has been adopted by other commentators as well.\(^{309}\)

According to this view, in a Leibnizian modal metaphysics, a possible world is not a locus of compossible individuals but rather a locus of compossible individual concepts. A reconstruction of such metaphysics would involve definitions that, intuitively, (1) induce a partition on the domain of individual concepts into equivalence classes of compossible individual concepts, (2) induce a one-to-one correspondence between groups of compossible individual concepts and the possible worlds where they ‘appear’, and (3) induce a separate partition of the domain of individual concepts into equivalence classes of counterpart individual concepts, which groups an individual concept at one possible world with its counterparts at other possible worlds. Such a reconstruction has to ensure that an ordinary claim such as:

Alexander is a king but might not have been.

becomes equivalent to the following claim:

The concept of Alexander contains the concept of being a king, but there is an individual concept \(c\) such that: (i) \(c\) is a counterpart of the concept

\(^{309}\)See Wilson 1979 and Vailati 1986. Lloyd (1978) also accepts that Leibniz ‘resorts to counterparts’ (p. 379), though she discovers some Leibnizian features in a Kripkean semantics of rigid designators, which assumes that the same individual can appear in other possible worlds. Interestingly, Kripke notes that “Many have pointed out to me that the father of counterpart theory is probably Leibnitz [sic]” (1980, 45, n. 13).
of Alexander, (ii) doesn’t contain the concept of being a king, and (iii) appears at some other possible world.

In our reconstruction of these ideas below, this equivalence is preserved as a fundamental theorem of Leibniz’s modal metaphysics, as item (715.1)★.

Now when Leibniz talks about the ‘many possible Adams’ and ‘several Sextuses’ that are all distinct from one another, the above-mentioned commentators take him to be talking about different concepts of the same individual rather than different possible individuals. In the modal metaphysics developed below, this suggestion is preserved, but we do not stipulate that the different concepts of Adam that appear at the various possible worlds stand in a primitive counterpart relation. Instead, we begin with the Kripkean view that Adam himself exemplifies different properties at different possible worlds. We then examine the different concepts of Adam that these exemplification facts induce on the domain of abstract objects. On the basis of this structure, we can define the sense in which the various concepts of Adam constitute counterparts of one another.

It is also important to remember again that our definitions will be cast within the context of the simplest quantified modal logic, in which there is a single, fixed domain of individuals. Thus, not only do the properties that Adam exemplifies at one possible world differ from the properties he exemplifies at other possible worlds, the ordinary individual Adam exemplifies properties at every possible world. For example, although Adam is concrete at our world and at certain other possible worlds, there are possible worlds where he fails to be concrete. In many of the possible worlds where Adam is concrete, his ‘posterity is different’. At possible worlds where Adam is not concrete, he has no posterity.

Now although the same ordinary individual Adam exemplifies properties at every other possible world, a Leibnizian metaphysics of ‘world-bound’ abstract individuals emerges once we consider, for each possible world \( w \), the concept that encodes exactly the properties that Adam exemplifies at \( w \). At each possible world, Adam realizes a different concept, since concepts differ whenever they encode distinct properties. The concept that encodes all and only the properties Adam exemplifies at one possible world is distinct from the concept that encodes all and only the properties Adam exemplifies at a different possible world, though all of the different concepts of Adam will be counterparts of one another. Of course, we will define only one of these concepts to be the concept of Adam, namely, the concept that encodes just what Adam exemplifies at the actual world. In other words, once we relativize concepts of Adam to a world \( w \), then the concept of Adam will be identified with the concept of Adam at \( w \). When Leibniz talks about ‘possible Adams’, we may take him to be talking about different Adam-at-\( w \) concepts. We’ll explain
this in more detail once the definitions and theorems have been presented.

What is more interesting is the fact that these individual concepts have certain other Leibnizian features. We shall not just stipulate that compossibility is an equivalence condition on individual concepts, but rather define compossibility and prove that it is such a condition. Moreover, we shall not define possible worlds as sets of compossible individual concepts, but rather prove that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the groups of compossible concepts and the possible worlds. We shall also show that there is a sense of mirrors for which it is provable that each member of a group of compossible individual concepts mirrors its corresponding possible world.

So, although we do not use counterpart-theoretic primitives in our reconstruction, we nevertheless recover a modal metaphysics in which complete individual concepts are world-bound (in the sense of appearing at a unique world). These individual concepts will provide an interpretation for much of what Leibniz says about necessity, contingency, completeness, mirroring, etc. and, in the process, offer a way to reconcile Kripke’s and Lewis’s modal metaphysics.

13.4.1 Realization, Appearance, Mirroring

In this subsection, we continue to use the variables $u, v$ to range over ordinary objects, and use $w$ to range over possible worlds, as defined in Chapter 12.

(674) Definition: Realization at a World. Making use of the notion of truth at a possible world ($w \models p$), as defined in (498) and (458), let us say that an ordinary object $u$ realizes a concept $c$ at possible world $w$ just in case for all properties $F$, the proposition $u$-exemplifies-$F$ is true at $w$ if and only if $c$ encodes $F$:

$$\text{RealizesAt}(u, c, w) \equiv_{df} \forall F (w \models Fu \equiv cF)$$

In other words, $u$ realizes $c$ at $w$ just in case $u$ exemplifies at $w$ exactly the properties $c$ encodes:

(675) Remark: In what follows, we shall investigate notions definable, and theorems expressible, in terms of RealizesAt. This will be a completely general study; we won’t prove any particular claims of the form RealizesAt($u, c, w$). Indeed, we can’t do so, and the reason is that our system hasn’t yet been applied and so doesn’t identify any particular ordinary objects. We do know, however, that there are ordinary objects.

To be maximally explicit, note that the following is provable, though by non-modally strict means:

$$\exists u \exists c \exists w \text{RealizesAt}(u, c, w)$$

Proof. By (225.1) and the T-schema, $\exists x O!x$. Let $a$ be such an object, so that we know $O!a$. Now consider $e_a$, which clearly exists. We now show
that $a$, $c_a$, and $w_a$ are witnesses to our claim. So by (674), we have to show $\forall F(w_a \models Fa \equiv c_aF)$ or, by GEN, $w_a \models Fa \equiv c_aF$. To do this, note that by (663)*, we know $c_aF \equiv Fa$. Moreover, by (518)*, we know $Fa \equiv w_a|Fa$ and, by the symmetry of the biconditional, $w_a|Fa \equiv c_aF$.

But though we can prove this claim, we can’t prove, for any particular ordinary individual, that it realizes a particular concept at a world. Our unapplied theory doesn’t identify or individuate any particular ordinary individual. So, the reader should recognize that though the theorems in what follows do govern ordinary objects, concepts, and worlds, they are, in some sense, projective. Of course, on occasion, it will be helpful to illustrate these claims with intuitive examples. But such examples presuppose that the theory has been appropriately extended with new (and sometimes contingent) facts.

(676) Theorem: Facts About Realization. The definition of realization at a world has the following consequences. (.1) if, for some ordinary object $u$ and possible world $w$, $u$ realizes $c$ at $w$ and $u$ realizes $d$ at $w$, then $c$ and $d$ are identical; (.2) if, for some concept $c$ and possible world $w$, $u$ realizes $c$ at $w$ and $v$ realizes $c$ at $w$, then $u$ is identical to $v$; and (.3) if, for some ordinary object $u$ and concept $c$, $u$ realizes $c$ at $w$ and $u$ realizes $c$ at $w'$, then $w$ is identical to $w'$:

\[(.1) \exists u \exists w (\text{RealizesAt}(u, c, w) \land \text{RealizesAt}(u, d, w)) \rightarrow c = d\]

\[(.2) \exists c \exists w (\text{RealizesAt}(u, c, w) \land \text{RealizesAt}(v, c, w)) \rightarrow u = v\]

\[(.3) \exists u \exists c (\text{RealizesAt}(u, c, w) \land \text{RealizesAt}(u, c, w')) \rightarrow w = w'\]

(677) Definition: Appearance at a World. We say that a concept $c$ appears at a world $w$ just in case some ordinary object realizes $c$ at $w$:

\[\text{AppearsAt}(c, w) \equiv_{df} \exists u \text{RealizesAt}(u, c, w)\]

(678) Theorem: Fact About Appearance. In light of the foregoing facts about realization at a world, we also have the following fact about appearance at a world: if a concept $c$ appears at possible world $w$, then a unique ordinary object realizes $c$ at $w$:

\[\text{AppearsAt}(c, w) \rightarrow \exists! u (\text{RealizesAt}(u, c, w))\]

(679) Theorem: Appearance and Being Ordinary. It proves useful to remember that if a concept $c$ appears at a world $w$, then $c$ encodes the property of being ordinary:

\[\text{AppearsAt}(c, w) \rightarrow cO!\]
**Definition:** Mirroring. Recall that in (289) we stipulated that $x$ encodes a proposition $p$, written $x\Sigma p$, just in case $x$ exists and encodes $[\lambda y.p]$. Since concepts are abstract objects (591), $c\Sigma p$ is defined and it follows that $c\Sigma p \equiv c[\lambda y.p]$. So we now say that a concept $c$ mirrors a possible world $w$ just in case for any proposition $p$, $c$ encodes $p$ if and only if $p$ is true at $w$:  

$$\text{Mirrors}(c, w) \equiv_{def} \forall p (c\Sigma p \equiv w \models p)$$  

Also, as noted in (498), $w \models p$ is equivalent to $w\Sigma p$. So the above definition entails the following equivalence:  

$$\text{Mirrors}(c, w) \equiv \forall p (c\Sigma p \equiv w\Sigma p)$$  

This better reveals why the definiens introduces a notion of mirroring: concept $c$ mirrors a possible world $w$ just in case $c$ and $w$ encode the same propositions.  

**Theorem:** Appearance and Mirroring. It now follows that if a concept appears at a possible world, it mirrors that world:  

$$\text{AppearsAt}(c, w) \rightarrow \text{Mirrors}(c, w)$$  

It is important to understand why the right-to-left direction fails, i.e., why it is provable that $\exists c \exists w (\text{Mirrors}(c, w) \& \neg \text{AppearsAt}(c, w))$. To find witnesses to this claim, consider any possible world, say $w_1$ (we know that there are are at least two, by (529.4)). Since possible worlds are abstract objects, they are also concepts. So $w_1$ is both a possible world and a concept. Then, clearly, $\text{Mirrors}(w_1, w_1)$. However, $\neg \text{AppearsAt}(w_1, w_1)$. For suppose $\text{AppearsAt}(w_1, w_1)$, for reductio. Then, by our useful fact (679), it follows that $w_1 !$. But since $w_1$ is, by hypothesis, a possible world, it is a situation (495). Hence every property $w_1$ encodes is a propositional property (455). It follows that Propositional$(O !)$. But this contradicts (274.4.c).  

**Theorem:** New Fact About Appearance. If some concept appears at possible worlds $w$ and $w'$, then $w = w'$:  

$$\exists c (\text{AppearsAt}(c, w) \& \text{AppearsAt}(c, w')) \rightarrow w = w'$$  

**Theorem:** Appearance At is Rigid. A concept $c$ appears at a possible world $w$ if and only if it necessarily does so:  

$$\text{AppearsAt}(c, w) \equiv \Box \text{AppearsAt}(c, w)$$  

**Theorem:** New Fact About Realization. We can now easily prove that if some concept $c$ is such that $u$ realizes $c$ at $w$ and $v$ realizes $c$ at $w'$, then both $w$ is identical to $w'$ and $u$ is identical to $v$.  

$$\exists c (\text{RealizesAt}(u, c, w) \& \text{RealizesAt}(v, c, w')) \rightarrow (w = w' \& u = v)$$
Intuitively, this theorem tells us that the concept alone fixes the other parameters of the condition $\text{RealizesAt}(u, c, w)$.

\(\star\text{Lemma:}\) Concepts of Ordinary Individuals, Realization, Appearance, and Mirroring. (1) $u$ realizes the concept of $u$ at the actual world; (2) the concept of $u$ appears at the actual world; (3) the concept of $u$ mirrors the actual world:

(1) $\text{RealizesAt}(u, c_u, w_\alpha)$

(2) $\text{AppearsAt}(c_u, w_\alpha)$

(3) $\text{Mirrors}(c_u, w_\alpha)$

None of these theorems are modally strict.

### 13.4.2 Individual Concepts

\(\star\text{Definition:}\) Individual Concepts. We've previously introduced (a) the notion of a concept of an ordinary individual, i.e., $\text{ConceptOf}(c, u)$, and (b) the concept of individual $u$, i.e., $c_u$. We now introduce the notion of an individual concept as any concept that appears at some possible world:

$$\text{IndividualConcept}(c) \equiv \exists w \text{AppearsAt}(c, w)$$

\(\star\text{Theorem:}\) Concepts of Ordinary Individuals are Individual Concepts. It now follows that if $c$ is a concept of some ordinary individual $u$, then $c$ is an individual concept:

$$\exists u \text{ConceptOf}(c, u) \rightarrow \text{IndividualConcept}(c)$$

There is an easy, but non-modally strict proof that appeals to theorem (518)$\star$, i.e., $p \equiv w_\alpha \models p$. Yet with some work, this theorem can be proved by modally strict means.

\(\star\text{Theorem:}\) The Concept of $u$ is an Individual Concept.

$$\text{IndividualConcept}(c_u)$$

\(\star\text{Assume } \exists u \text{ConceptOf}(c, u), \text{ and suppose } a \text{ be such an ordinary object, so that we know ConceptOf}(c, a). \text{ If we can show } V F(w_\alpha \models Fa \equiv cF), \text{ then by existentially generalizing on } a \text{ and } w_\alpha \text{ and applying definitions (674), (677), and (686), we’re done. But by definition (658), ConceptOf}(c, a) \text{ implies } V F(cF \equiv Fa). \text{ Moreover, as an instance of (518)$\star$, we know } Fa \equiv w_\alpha \models Fa, \text{ which by GEN yields } V F(Fa \equiv w_\alpha \models Fa). \text{ So by the laws of quantified biconditionals, } V F(cF \equiv w_\alpha \models Fa), \text{ i.e., } V F(w_\alpha \models Fa \equiv cF).}$$
This theorem isn’t modally strict because $c_a$ isn’t a strictly canonically object (662).

**Theorem (689):** Individual Concepts Exist. Of course, by applying $\exists I$ to the previous theorem, we can immediately conclude that individual concepts exist. But the resulting proof would not be modally strict. In the Appendix, however, we establish that individual concepts exist by modally strict means:

$$\exists c \text{IndividualConcept}(c)$$

**Theorem (690):** Rigidity of $\text{IndividualConcept}$ and Restricted Variables. Definition (686) abbreviates $\text{IndividualConcept}(x) \equiv df \ C!x \& \exists y (\text{PossibleWorld}(y) \& \text{AppearsAt}(x,y))$. It should be clear that $\text{IndividualConcept}(x)$ is a valid restriction condition (330). But to see that is a rigid restriction condition (331), we have to show, as a modally strict theorem, that necessarily, every individual concept is necessarily an individual concept:

$$\forall x (\text{IndividualConcept}(x) \rightarrow □ \text{IndividualConcept}(x))$$

We may therefore introduce the circumflexed, lower-case italic letters $\hat{c}, \hat{d}, \hat{e}, \ldots$ as rigid restricted variables ranging over individual concepts. Note that the present theorem guarantees that the quantifiers $\forall \hat{c}$ and $\exists \hat{c}$ behave classically in the sense that $\forall \hat{c} \varphi \rightarrow \exists \hat{c} \varphi$; cf. Remark (336). Note also that the remarks about doubly restricted variables in (497) apply to our restricted variables for individual concepts. For example, we have two options for expanding $\forall \hat{c} \varphi$: either as $\forall x (\text{IndividualConcept}(x) \rightarrow \varphi)$ or as $\forall c (\text{IndividualConcept}(c) \rightarrow \varphi_\xi)$.

**Theorem (691):** Appearance at a Unique Possible World. We may now establish (.1) there is a unique possible world at which an individual concept appears; and (.2) that there is a unique world at which an individual concept necessarily appears:

(1) $\exists ! w \text{AppearsAt}(\hat{c}, w)$

(2) $\exists ! w \square \text{AppearsAt}(\hat{c}, w)$

By applying the Rule of Actualization to (.1) and appealing to theorem (174.2), it follows that (.3) the world at which $\hat{c}$ appears exists:

(3) $rw \text{AppearsAt}(\hat{c}, w) \downarrow$

**Exercise:** Give a proof of (.3) without appealing to the Rule of Actualization or theorem (174.2), but instead uses theorem (172.3) and recent theorems.

**Definition (692):** The Possible World At Which an Individual Concept Appears. The previous theorem allows us to introduce the notation $w_\xi$ to refer to the possible world at which individual concept $\hat{c}$ appears:
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\[ w_c =_{df} \text{AppearsAt}(\hat{c}, w) \]

**Theorem:**Modally Strict Facts About \( w_c \). It is now a modally strict fact (.1) that an individual concept appears at the world where it appears:

\[ \text{AppearsAt}(\hat{c}, w) \]

This theorem sounds trivial and there is a non-modal proof that is trivial, which appeals to (145.2). But the modally strict proof involves (691.2), theorem (153.1), and definition (692).

It thus follows (.2) that an individual concept \( \hat{c} \) mirrors the possible world where it appears:

\[ \text{Mirrors}(\hat{c}, w) \]

Cf. Leibniz 1714, Section 56, where we find (PW 187, G.vi 616):

Now this connexion or adaptation of all created things with each, and of each with all the rest, means that each simple substance has relations which express all the others, and that consequently, it is a perpetual living mirror of the universe.

Here, we have to interpret Leibniz’s talk of simple substances in terms of the individual concepts of ordinary individuals. Of course, it is not clear what to make of Leibniz’s suggestion that a simple substance is a living mirror.

In any case, previous theorems and definitions now yield (.3) that an individual concept \( \hat{c} \) contains the possible world where it appears:

\[ \hat{c} \geq w \]

Cf. Leibniz 1686, Article 9, where we find (PW 19–20, G.iv 434):

Further, every substance is like an entire world and like a mirror of God, or of the whole universe, which each one expresses in its own way, very much as one and the same town is variously represented in accordance with different positions of the observer. Thus, the universe is in a way multiplied as many times as there are substances, …

So the metaphor of mirroring was used early on in Leibniz’s work. Once we interpret Leibniz to be talking about the individual concepts of ordinary individuals, we see that the world where an individual concept appears (\( w_c \)) is indeed ‘multiplied as many times as there are substances’ since each individual concept \( \hat{c} \) that appears at \( w_c \) has \( w_c \) as a part.

**Theorem:** Individual Concepts Contain the Concepts of Encoded Properties. It is also a consequence of the foregoing that an individual concept encodes a property if and only if it contains the concept of that property:
\( \hat{c}G \equiv \hat{c} \geq c_G \)

(695) Theorems: Individual Concepts and Property Negation. Facts about property negation become reflected in individual concepts as follows: (.1) an individual concept encodes \( G \) if and only if it fails to encode the negation of \( G \); (.2) an individual concept encodes the negation of \( G \) if and only if it fails to encode \( G \); (.3) an individual concept contains the concept of \( G \) if and only if it doesn’t contain the concept of the negation of \( G \); and (.4) an individual concept doesn’t contain the concept of \( G \) if and only if it contains the concept of the negation of \( G \):

(1) \( \hat{c}G \equiv \neg \hat{c}G \)

(2) \( \hat{c}G \equiv \neg \hat{c}G \)

(3) \( \hat{c} \geq c_G \equiv \hat{c} \not\geq c_G \)

(4) \( \hat{c} \not\geq c_G \equiv \hat{c} \geq c_G \)

(696) Theorem: Individual Concepts and Completeness. Recall that in (664) we defined a sense in which concepts are complete. It straightforwardly follows that an individual concept is complete:

\[ \text{Complete}(\hat{c}) \]

This provides further confirmation of Article 8 of the Discourse on Metaphysics, quoted earlier, where Leibniz says that “it is in the nature of an individual substance, or complete being, to have a notion so complete that it is sufficient to contain and render deducible from itself, all the predicates of the subject to which this notion is attributed” (PW 18–19, G.iv 433).

13.4.3 Compossibility

(697) Definition: Compossibility. We say that two individual concepts are composable just in case they appear at the same possible world:

\[ \text{Composable}(\hat{c}, \hat{e}) \equiv_{def} \exists w (\text{AppearsAt}(\hat{c}, w) \& \text{AppearsAt}(\hat{e}, w)) \]

(698) Lemma: The Common Possible World of Composable Individual Concepts. It follows from the previous definition that individual concepts \( \hat{c} \) and \( \hat{e} \) are composable if and only if the possible world where \( \hat{c} \) appears is identical to the one where \( \hat{e} \) appears:

\[ \text{Composable}(\hat{c}, \hat{e}) \equiv w_{\hat{c}} = w_{\hat{e}} \]
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(699) Theorems: Compossibility Partitions the Individual Concepts. It follows from the previous lemma that compossibility is a reflexive, symmetric, and transitive condition with respect to individual concepts:

(1) Compossible($\hat{c}$, $\hat{c}$)

(2) Compossible($\hat{c}$, $\hat{e}$) $\rightarrow$ Compossible($\hat{e}$, $\hat{c}$)

(3) Compossible($\hat{c}$, $\hat{d}$) & Compossible($\hat{d}$, $\hat{e}$) $\rightarrow$ Compossible($\hat{c}$, $\hat{e}$)

Since compossibility is an equivalence condition with respect to individual concepts, we know that the latter are partitioned. In light of lemma (698), all of the individual concepts that are compossible with one another appear at a common possible world.

13.4.4 World-Relative Concepts of Individuals

(700) Definition: World-Relative Concepts of Ordinary Individuals. Let us say that $c$ is a concept of $u$ at $w$ just in case $c$ encodes exactly the properties that $u$ exemplifies at $w$:

$$\text{ConceptOfAt}(c, u, w) \equiv \forall F (cF \equiv w \models Fu)$$

Note that we could have used RealizesAt($u$, $c$, $w$) as the definiens for the definendum ConceptOfAt($c$, $u$, $w$), since the definiens of RealizesAt($u$, $c$, $w$) is equivalent to the one above; they differ only by commuting the (quantified) biconditional. Though the linguistic notion of focus doesn’t apply to the formulas in our system, it nevertheless has some application to the regimented natural language we use to read those formulas. When we read the above definiens, the focus is on the concept $c$ and the properties it encodes, whereas when we read the definiens of RealizesAt($u$, $c$, $w$), the focus is on $u$ and the properties it exemplifies at $w$.

(701) Theorems: Existence of World-Relative Concepts of Individuals. It follows that (1) there is a concept of $u$ at $w$; (2) there is a unique concept of $u$ at $w$; and (3) the concept of $u$ at $w$ exists:

(1) $\exists c \text{ConceptOfAt}(c, u, w)$

(2) $\exists ! c \text{ConceptOfAt}(c, u, w)$

(3) $u \text{ConceptOfAt}(c, u, w) \downarrow$

Strictly speaking, these are conditional existence claims, given the presence of the restricted variables $u$ and $w$. But since we know that ordinary individuals exist, by (225.1) and the T schema, and that there are at least two possible worlds (529.4), we can derive unconditional existence claims.
**Definition:** Notation for the Concept of \(u\) at \(w\). We henceforth use the notation \(c^w_u\) to denote the concept of \(u\) at \(w\):

\[
c^w_u = \text{df ConceptOfAt}(c, u, w)
\]

This introduces \(c^w_u\) as a binary functional term with the free restricted variables \(u\) and \(w\).

**Theorems:** \(c^w_u\) is Strictly Canonical. Clearly, it follows (.1) that \(c^w_u\) is (identical to) a canonical concept:

\[
.c^w_u = \text{df} \forall F(cF \equiv w | w = Fu)
\]

If we let \(\varphi\) be the formula \(w | w = Fu\), then it follows that \(\varphi\) is a rigid condition on properties, i.e., (.2) that necessarily, every property such that \(\varphi\) is necessarily such that \(\varphi\):

\[
.2 \quad \Box \forall F(w | w = Fu) \rightarrow \Box w | w = Fu)
\]

So \(c^w_u\) is (identical to) a strictly canonical concept, by (257.2). Hence, by (258.2), it follows (.3) that \(c^w_u\) is a concept that encodes exactly those properties \(F\) that \(u\) exemplifies at \(w\):

\[
.3 \quad \text{Cle}_c^w & \forall F(c^w_u F \equiv w | w = Fu)
\]

**Lemma:** Basic Facts About World-Relative Concepts of Ordinary Individuals. (.1) \(u\) realizes the-concept-of-\(u\)-at-\(w\) at \(w\); (.2) the concept of \(u\) at \(w\) appears at \(w\); (.3) the concept of \(u\) at \(w\) is an individual concept; (.4) the concept of \(u\) at \(w\) mirrors \(w\); and (.5) the concept of \(u\) at \(w\) is complete:

\[
.1 \quad \text{RealizesAt}(u, c^u_w, w)
.2 \quad \text{AppearsAt}(c^u_w, w)
.3 \quad \text{IndividualConcept}(c^u_w)
.4 \quad \text{Mirrors}(c^u_w, w)
.5 \quad \text{Complete}(c^u_w)
\]

These are all modally strict.

**Theorem:** Equivalence of Individual Concepts and World-Relative Concepts of Individuals. From the definitions of individual concept and world-relative concepts of individuals, we may prove that (.1) a concept \(c\) is an individual concept if there is some ordinary object \(u\) and possible world \(w\) such that \(c\) is a concept of \(u\) at \(w\); and (.2) a concept \(c\) is an individual concept if there is some and ordinary object \(u\) and possible world \(w\) such that \(c\) is identical to the concept of \(u\) at \(w\):
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(1) $\text{IndividualConcept}(c) \equiv \exists u \exists w \text{ConceptOfAt}(c, u, w)$

(2) $\text{IndividualConcept}(c) \equiv \exists u \exists w (c = c_u^w)$

(706) Lemma: The Concept of an Individual at the Actual World. It is a basic fact about the notions that we’ve defined so far that the concept of $u$ at the actual world $w_a$ is identical to the concept of $u$:

$$c_u^{w_a} = c_u$$

While it is easy to give a non-modally strict proof of this theorem, the interest is in the fact that it is capable of a modally strict proof.

(707) Lemmas: Further Facts About World-Relative Concepts of Individuals. The following 5 lemmas are also immediately forthcoming: (1) the concept of $u$ at $w$ encodes a property $G$ iff it contains $c_G$; (2) if the concept of $u$ at $w$ contains $c_G$, then $u$ exemplifies $G$ at $w$; (3) if the concept of $u$ at $w$ is identical to the concept of $v$ at $w$, then $u$ and $v$ are identical; (4) if the concept of $u$ at $w$ is identical to the concept of $u$ at $w'$, then $w = w'$; and (5) if the concept of $u$ at $w$ is identical to the concept of $v$ at $w'$, then $w = w'$ and $u = v$

(1) $c_u^w G \equiv c_u^w \geq c_G$

(2) $w \models G u \equiv c_u^w \geq c_G$

(3) $c_u^w = c_v^w \rightarrow u = v$

(4) $c_u^w = c_u^{w'} \rightarrow w = w'$

(5) $c_u^w = c_v^{w'} \rightarrow (w = w' \& u = v)$

(708) Theorem: Compossible World-Relative Concepts of Individuals. It also follows that the concept of $u$ at $w$ and the concept of $v$ at $w$ are compossible:

$$\text{Compossible}(c_u^w, c_v^w)$$

(709) Remark: Interpreting Leibniz's Theodicy. Though the theory of individual concepts and possible worlds articulated thus far is completely silent about the existence of God, it nevertheless preserves an element of Leibniz’s theodicy, namely, his conception of the work that God would have had to undertake in order to ‘create’ the actual world. Leibniz makes it clear that God had to first evaluate all the possible worlds to determine which one should be actualized. But our works shows that to evaluate the possible worlds, all God had to do was to inspect an arbitrarily chosen individual concept from each group of compossible individual concepts. That one inspection alone would reveals all
the facts about the world where that individual concept appears, since every individual concept of the group mirrors that world.

Note that our metaphysics identifies the actual world only as the possible world that encodes, in the sense of (289), all and only the true propositions. So, having decided that some particular possible world \( w \) was the best, God could ‘actualize’ \( w \) by making it the case that every proposition encoded in \( w \) is true. This, in effect, creates a physical universe, as defined in (528). Indeed, when inspecting the possible worlds by examining an arbitrary individual concept from each group of compossible concepts, God could have just ‘actualized’ the individual concept \( \hat{c} \) that was chosen to determine whether \( w_{\hat{c}} \) was the best. To do so, God would have to make it the case that there exists an ordinary object which in fact exemplifies all the properties that \( \hat{c} \) encodes. In doing that, God would as a consequence actualize \( w_{\hat{c}} \), for when God made it the case that there is an ordinary object that exemplifies the properties \( \hat{c} \) encodes, God would have also made it the case that all of the propositions true in \( w_{\hat{c}} \) are true, since \( \hat{c} \) mirrors \( w_{\hat{c}} \) (693.2).

(710) Remark: Another Reason Why Concepts Are Not Properties. It is worth mentioning here that another reason not to identify concepts as properties is that such a view gets the Leibnizian metaphysics of individual concepts wrong. It is central to Leibniz’s view of individual concepts that for each ordinary individual \( u \) and possible world \( w \), a unique individual concept corresponds to \( u \) at \( w \). But if concepts are analyzed as properties, and individual concepts become a special kind of property, then uniqueness will fail unless the property theorist requires that properties be identical when necessarily equivalent, i.e., that \( \Box \forall x(Fx \equiv Gx) \rightarrow F = G \).

To see why, suppose one were to define:

\[
F \text{ is an individual concept of } u \text{ at } w \text{ if and only if both (a) } F \text{ necessarily implies all of the properties that } u \text{ exemplifies at } w, \text{ and (b) } u \text{ uniquely exemplifies } F \text{ at } w.
\]

To see the problem with this definition, consider the concept of Adam. If the necessary equivalence of properties doesn’t imply their identity, then one can’t prove that for every world \( w \), there is a unique individual concept of Adam at \( w \), as defined above. For suppose property \( P \) is Adam’s complete individual concept at \( w \). Now suppose \( Q \) is a property necessarily equivalent to, but distinct from, \( P \). Then \( Q \) is an individual concept of Adam, by the following reasoning:

\( Q \) satisfies clause (a) of the definition. Since \( P \) and \( Q \) are necessarily equivalent, then they necessarily imply the same properties by (432.3). So if \( P \) necessarily implies all the properties Adam exemplifies at \( w \), then so does \( Q \).
Q satisfies clause (b) of the definition. Since Adam uniquely exemplifies P at w, and P and Q are necessarily equivalent, then Adam uniquely exemplifies Q at w (we leave the proof as an exercise).

So if necessary equivalence doesn’t imply identity, and there are properties like Q that are necessarily equivalent to P, then P isn’t a unique individual concept of Adam at w. Thus, the property theorist faces a dilemma: either require that necessarily equivalent properties are identical and derive the existence of a unique concept of Adam at w or omit the requirement that necessarily equivalent properties are identical and give up the claim that there is a unique concept of Adam at w. Such a dilemma is not faced on the present theory.

In the next section, we interpret Leibniz’s talk of ‘the several Sextuses’ and ‘the many possible Adams’ as a reference to the variety of individual concepts connected with Sextus and Adam, in a sense to be precisely defined. Even though our subsystem of individual concepts was carved out without appeal to counterpart theory, we can, nevertheless, still speak with the counterpart theorists!

13.4.5 Counterpart Theory

(711) Definition: Counterpart Of. We say that individual concept ˆe is a counterpart of individual concept ˆc just in case there is an ordinary individual u and there are possible worlds w and w’ such that u realizes ˆc at w and u realizes ˆe at w’:

\[ \text{CounterpartOf}(\hat{e}, \hat{c}) \equiv \exists u \exists w \exists w' (\text{RealizesAt}(u, \hat{c}, w) \& \text{RealizesAt}(u, \hat{e}, w')) \]

For example, if Alexander is an ordinary object that realizes an individual concept ˆc at the actual world and realizes an individual concept ˆe at some non-actual possible world, then ˆe is a counterpart of ˆc.

(712) Theorem: Counterpart Of is an Equivalence Condition. We now have (.1) an individual concept is a counterpart of itself; (.2) if ˆe is a counterpart of ˆc, then ˆc is a counterpart of ˆe; and (.3) if ˆe is a counterpart of ˆd, and ˆd is a counterpart of ˆc, then ˆe is a counterpart of ˆc:

(.1) CounterpartOf(ˆe, ˆe)

(.2) CounterpartOf(ˆe, ˆc) \rightarrow CounterpartOf(ˆc, ˆe)

(.3) CounterpartsOf(ˆe, ˆd) \& CounterpartOf(ˆd, ˆc) \rightarrow CounterpartOf(ˆe, ˆc)

(713) Theorem: Counterparts and Realization. It follows that if ˆe is a counterpart of ˆc, then there is a unique ordinary individual that realizes ˆc at some world w and that realizes ˆe at some world w’.
CounterpartOf(\hat{e}, \hat{c}) \equiv \exists u \exists w \exists w'(\text{RealizesAt}(u, \hat{c}, w) \& \text{RealizesAt}(u, \hat{e}, w'))

(714) Theorem: World-Relative Concepts and Counterparts. It follows that (.1) the concept of \(u\) at \(w\) is a counterpart of the concept of \(u\) at \(w\); and (.2) \(\hat{e}\) is a counterpart of \(\hat{c}\) if and only if there is an ordinary individual \(u\) and there are worlds \(w\) and \(w'\) such that \(\hat{c}\) is the concept of \(u\) at \(w\) and \(\hat{e}\) is the concept of \(u\) at \(w'\):

(1) \(\text{CounterpartOf}(c_u^w, c_u^{w'})\)

(2) \(\text{CounterpartOf}(\hat{e}, \hat{c}) \equiv \exists u \exists w \exists w' (\hat{c} = c_u^w \& \hat{e} = c_u^{w'})\)

The first of these plays an important role in a fundamental theorem of Leibnizian modal metaphysics.

13.4.6 Fundamental Theorems

(715) Theorem: A Fundamental Theorem of Leibnizian Modal Metaphysics. It seems reasonable to suggest that Leibniz’s modal metaphysics is driven by the following conditionals (although Leibniz never explicitly formulates them as such), namely, (.1) if an ordinary individual \(u\) exemplifies \(F\) but might not have, then both (a) the concept of \(u\) contains the concept of \(F\) and (b) there is an individual concept \(\hat{c}\) such that \(\hat{c}\) is a counterpart of the concept of \(u\), \(\hat{c}\) doesn’t contain the concept of \(F\), and \(\hat{c}\) appears at a possible world distinct from the actual world; and (.2) if an ordinary individual \(u\) doesn’t exemplify \(F\) but might have, then both (a) the concept of \(u\) doesn’t contain the concept of \(F\) and (b) there is an individual concept \(\hat{c}\) such that \(\hat{c}\) is a counterpart of the concept of \(u\), \(\hat{c}\) does contain the concept of \(F\), and \(\hat{c}\) appears at a possible world distinct from the actual world:

(1) \(F u \& \Box \neg F u \rightarrow c_u \supseteq c_F \& \exists \hat{c}(\text{CounterpartOf}(\hat{c}, c_u) \& \hat{c} \nsubseteq c_F \& \exists w (w \neq w_u \& \text{AppearsAt}(\hat{c}, w)))\)

(2) \(\neg F u \& \Box F u \rightarrow c_u \nsubseteq c_F \& \exists \hat{c}(\text{CounterpartOf}(\hat{c}, c_u) \& \hat{c} \supseteq c_F \& \exists w (w \neq w_u \& \text{AppearsAt}(\hat{c}, w)))\)

If we suppose our theory has been applied, then as an example of (.1), we have: if Alexander is king but might not have been, then the concept of Alexander contains the concept of being a king and there is an individual concept that is a counterpart of the concept of Alexander, that doesn’t contain the concept of being a king, and that appears at some world other than the actual world. As an example of (.2), we have: if Alexander fails to be a philosopher but might have been, then the concept of Alexander fails to contain the concept of being a philosopher and there is an individual concept that is a counterpart of the
concept of Alexander, that does contain the concept of \textit{being a philosopher}, and that appears at some world other than the actual world.

\textbf{(716) \textasteriskcentered Theorems:} Biconditional Fundamental Theorems. Though we’ve labeled the preceding theorem a fundamental theorem of Leibnizian modal metaphysics, it is reasonable to suggest that, strictly speaking, a fundamental theorem so-called should be a biconditional. Though the converses of the preceding theorems are indeed derivable, a study of the matter reveals that these converses have antecedents that are stronger than they need to be. We shall see, for example, that one can derive $\neg F u \& \diamond \neg F u$ from the simpler conjunction $c_u \geq c_F \& \exists \hat{c}(\text{CounterpartOf}(\hat{c}, c_u) \& \hat{c} \not\geq c_F)$. This shows how much information is packed into the notions of concept containment and counterparts.

Consequently, we can formulate biconditional fundamental theorems as follows: (1) an ordinary individual $u$ exemplifies $F$ but might not have if and only if both (a) the concept of $u$ contains the concept of $F$ and (b) there is an individual concept $\hat{c}$ such that $\hat{c}$ is a counterpart of the concept of $u$ and $\hat{c}$ doesn’t contain the concept of $F$; and (2) an ordinary individual $u$ doesn’t exemplify $F$ but might have if and only if both (a) the concept of $u$ doesn’t contain the concept of $F$ and (b) there is an individual concept $\hat{c}$ such that $\hat{c}$ is a counterpart of the concept of $u$ and $\hat{c}$ does contain the concept of $F$:

\begin{align*}
(1) \quad & F u \& \diamond \neg F u \equiv c_u \geq c_F \& \exists \hat{c}(\text{CounterpartOf}(\hat{c}, c_u) \& \hat{c} \not\geq c_F) \\
(2) \quad & \neg F u \& \diamond F u \equiv c_u \not\geq c_F \& \exists \hat{c}(\text{CounterpartOf}(\hat{c}, c_u) \& \hat{c} \geq c_F)
\end{align*}

These theorems constitute \textit{Leibnizian truth conditions}, respectively, for the claim that $F u$ is contingently true and the claim that $F u$ is contingently false.

\textbf{(717) Theorems:} Additional Fundamental Theorems. It is interesting to note that there are several ways of adjusting the formulation of the fundamental theorems so as to produce modally strict versions. The most basic of these ways is to relativize both sides of the conditionals in (715)\textasteriskcentered, and both sides of the biconditionals in (716)\textasteriskcentered, to a possible world. This yields the facts that (1) if it is true at possible world $w$ that an ordinary individual $u$ exemplifies $F$ but might not have, then (a) the concept of $u$ at $w$ contains the concept of $F$ and (b) there is an individual concept $\hat{c}$ such that $\hat{c}$ is a counterpart of the concept of $u$-at-$w$, $\hat{c}$ doesn’t contain the concept of $F$, and $\hat{c}$ appears at a possible world distinct from $w$; and (2) if it is true, at possible world $w$, that an ordinary individual $u$ doesn’t exemplify $F$ but might have, then both (a) the concept of $u$ at $w$ doesn’t contain the concept of $F$ and (b) there is an individual concept $\hat{c}$ such that $\hat{c}$ is a counterpart of the concept of $u$-at-$w$, $\hat{c}$ does contain the concept of $F$, and $\hat{c}$ appears at a possible world distinct from $w$; (3) it is true, at possible world $w$, that an ordinary individual $u$ exemplifies $F$ but might not have if and only if (a) the concept of $u$ at $w$ contains the concept of $F$ and (b) there is an
individual concept \( \dot{c} \) such that \( \dot{c} \) is a counterpart of the concept of \( u \)-at-\( w \) and \( \dot{c} \) doesn’t contain the concept of \( F \); and (4) it is true, at possible world \( w \), that an ordinary individual \( u \) doesn’t exemplify \( F \) but might have if and only if both (a) the concept of \( u \) at \( w \) doesn’t contain the concept of \( F \) and (b) there is an individual concept \( \dot{c} \) such that \( \dot{c} \) is a counterpart of the concept of \( u \)-at-\( w \) and \( \dot{c} \) does contain the concept of \( F \):

\[
(1) \; w \models (F u \& \Diamond \lnot F u) \rightarrow c^w_u \geq c_F \& \exists \dot{c}(\text{CounterpartOf}(\dot{c}, c^w_u) \& \dot{c} \not\geq c_F \& \exists w'(w' \neq w \& \text{AppearsAt}(\dot{c}, w')))
\]

\[
(2) \; w \models (\lnot F u \& \Diamond F u) \rightarrow c^w_u \not\leq c_F \& \exists \dot{c}(\text{CounterpartOf}(\dot{c}, c^w_u) \& \dot{c} \geq c_F \& \exists w'(w' \neq w \& \text{AppearsAt}(\dot{c}, w')))
\]

\[
(3) \; w \models (F u \& \Diamond \lnot F u) \equiv c^w_u \geq c_F \& \exists \dot{c}(\text{CounterpartOf}(\dot{c}, c^w_u) \& \dot{c} \not\leq c_F)
\]

\[
(4) \; w \models (\lnot F u \& \Diamond F u) \equiv c^w_u \not\leq c_F \& \exists \dot{c}(\text{CounterpartOf}(\dot{c}, c^w_u) \& \dot{c} \geq c_F)
\]

Of course, given our discussion of Leibniz’s notion of hypothetical necessity, it may be that Leibniz would not have felt the need for modally strict versions of the fundamental theorems.

**Exercises:** Show that the following versions of (715.1)\( \star \) and (715.2)\( \star \) are modally strict:

\[
(1) \; \Diamond (F u \& \Diamond \lnot F u) \rightarrow \exists w(c^w_u \geq c_F \& \exists \dot{c}(\text{CounterpartOf}(\dot{c}, c^w_u) \& \dot{c} \not\geq c_F \& \exists w'(w' \neq w \& \text{AppearsAt}(\dot{c}, w'))))
\]

\[
(2) \; \Diamond (\lnot F u \& \Diamond F u) \rightarrow \exists w(c^w_u \not\leq c_F \& \exists \dot{c}(\text{CounterpartOf}(\dot{c}, c^w_u) \& \dot{c} \geq c_F \& \exists w'(w' \neq w \& \text{AppearsAt}(\dot{c}, w'))))
\]

Also, show that the following versions of (715.1)\( \star \) and (715.2)\( \star \) are modally strict:

\[
(3) \; \forall (F u \& \Diamond \lnot F u) \rightarrow c^w_u \geq c_F \& \exists \dot{c}(\text{CounterpartOf}(\dot{c}, c^w_u) \& \dot{c} \not\leq c_F \& \exists w'(w' \neq w_u \& \text{AppearsAt}(\dot{c}, w'))))
\]

\[
(4) \; \forall (\lnot F u \& \Diamond F u) \rightarrow c^w_u \not\leq c_F \& \exists \dot{c}(\text{CounterpartOf}(\dot{c}, c^w_u) \& \dot{c} \geq c_F \& \exists w'(w' \neq w_u \& \text{AppearsAt}(\dot{c}, w'))))
\]

Now show that the following versions of (716.1)\( \star \) and (716.2)\( \star \) are modally strict:

\[
(5) \; \Diamond (F u \& \Diamond \lnot F u) \equiv \exists w(c^w_u \geq c_F \& \exists \dot{c}(\text{CounterpartOf}(\dot{c}, c^w_u) \& \dot{c} \not\leq c_F))
\]

\[
(6) \; \Diamond (\lnot F u \& \Diamond F u) \equiv \exists w(c^w_u \not\leq c_F \& \exists \dot{c}(\text{CounterpartOf}(\dot{c}, c^w_u) \& \dot{c} \geq c_F))
\]

Also, show that the following versions of (716.1)\( \star \) and (716.2)\( \star \) are modally strict:
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(7) $\forall(Au \land \Diamond \neg Fu) \equiv c_{\alpha\in w} \geq c_F \land \exists \hat{c}(\text{CounterpartOf}(\hat{c}, c_{\alpha\in w}) \land \hat{c} \not\geq c_F)$

(8) $\forall(-Fu \land \Diamond Fu) \equiv c_{\alpha\in w} \not\geq c_F \land \exists \hat{c}(\text{CounterpartOf}(\hat{c}, c_{\alpha\in w}) \land \hat{c} \geq c_F)$

(718) Remark: The importance of the theorems in this final section shouldn't be understated. An unanalyzed truth to the effect that an ordinary object has a property but might not have (or that an ordinary object doesn't have a property but might have), which is represented and regimented in terms of our modern notions of exemplification ($Fx$), negation ($\neg$) and possibility ($\Diamond$), implies a complex web of facts in Leibniz’s modal metaphysics, involving the notions of: concepts ($C!$), concept containment ($\geq$), possible worlds ($w$), identity ($=$), concepts of individuals ($c_{\alpha}$), individual concepts ($\hat{c}$), concepts of properties ($c_F$), appearance, and counterpart of. And this list doesn’t include the notions in terms of which these notions are defined, such as encoding ($xF$), abstract objects ($A!$), situations, truth in a situation ($|=\)$, and propositional properties ($[\lambda y \rho]$). Moreover, these theorems have powerful consequences when the theory is applied. Once we start extending our theory with familiar, uncontroversial truths about the properties that ordinary objects exemplify (or fail to exemplify) contingently, an elaborate network of truths involving primitive and defined notions emerges and describes an elegant and precise metaphysical picture that articulates both the structural aspects of Leibniz’s view of the mind of God as well as some (though not all) of Lewis’s views about counterparts, even while preserving Kripkean intuitions that ground and anchor the structure by means of the properties each ordinary individual exemplifies at every possible world.
14.1 Philosophical Context

What are the natural numbers? Can the natural numbers number absolutely anything, as Frege assumed, or is it sufficient, for the needs of science, if the natural numbers can only count the objects that might be in the natural world? Is there an infinity of natural numbers and, if so, can this be established in some way other than by stipulation? What primitive notions and axioms do we need to prove the basic postulates governing natural numbers? Must we assume primitive mathematical notions and mathematical axioms for the proof of these postulates, or can we define the notions involved in the postulates non-mathematically and derive the postulates from more general principles?

We try to answer these questions in the present chapter. We begin by recalling Remark (304), in which we distinguished natural from theoretical mathematics. In that Remark, it was noted that true ordinary statements of number ("there are eight planets", etc.) constitute a body of pretheoretical claims that are assertible without assuming any explicit mathematical theory of numbers. These statements of number are therefore part of natural mathematics. They are to be distinguished from the statements mathematicians make when asserting either the axioms or theorems of some number theory, such as Dedekind/Peano number theory, real number theory, etc. These latter are part of theoretical mathematics.

In this chapter, we shall analyze the natural numbers as a part of natural mathematics rather than theoretical mathematics. As we shall see, there is a tight connection between the natural numbers and true ordinary statements.
about number. To articulate this connection, we shall adapt some of the techniques that Frege developed to define the natural numbers and to derive the postulates and principles that govern them. However, whereas Frege thought that the natural numbers are cardinal numbers that count all the objects that exemplify a property, our analysis takes them to have a more limited range of application; in the present system, the natural numbers are natural cardinals that count the ordinary (i.e., possibly concrete) objects and, we would argue, this is sufficient for the needs of the natural sciences. On our analysis, the natural numbers emerge as abstractions from the patterns of properties exemplified by ordinary objects – this is what makes them natural numbers.

Moreover, we shall extend the present theory of abstract objects with two intuitive, logico-metaphysical axioms that use no mathematical primitives. The resulting theory is capable of (a) defining the natural numbers as abstract objects, and (b) deriving the number-theoretic postulates as theorems. In particular, the central notions of Dedekind/Peano number theory will be defined and the standard postulates of that theory will be derived as theorems.

Consequently, this work is to be contrasted with that in Chapter 15, where we use rather different methods to analyze the language, axioms, and theorems of theoretical mathematics. Theoretical mathematics includes the various number theories, set theories, algebras and group theories, etc., and so includes any theory that assumes mathematical primitives and axioms. Thus, Dedekind/Peano number theory will make an appearance in the next chapter as well as in this one, though in the next chapter, its primitive notions will not be analyzed using Frege's methods, but rather using techniques that allow us to analyze any system of theoretical mathematics.

In this chapter, however, we formulate answers to the questions posed at the outset. Moreover, we show that the existence of an infinite cardinal can be proved without appealing to any mathematical primitives or mathematical axioms. Thus, we shall be able to answer what Heck (2011, 152) calls the fundamental epistemological question of the philosophy of arithmetic, namely, “What is the basis of our knowledge of the infinity of the series of natural numbers?” Our answer will be that such knowledge can be derived from the logico-metaphysical principles governing abstract objects generally; no mathematics has to be assumed.

The views developed in this and the next chapter together bear some similarity to the famous quip attributed to Leopold Kronecker by his students, namely, that “God made the whole numbers; all the others are the work of men”\footnote{This is reported by H. Weber, who attributes it to Kronecker in Weber 1893 (15). The passage in Weber attributing the quote to Kronecker is: Manche von Ihnen werden sich des Ausspruchs erinnern, den er in einem Vortrag}. But instead of appealing to God as the source of the natural numbers,
we find their origins in the principles governing abstract individuals.\footnote{As far as we’ve been able to discover, Kronecker never published this particular statement.}

(719) \textbf{Remark}: The Dedekind/Peano Postulates for Number Theory. As we just mentioned, one of the goals of this chapter is to derive the Dedekind/Peano postulates for number theory as theorems. Both Dedekind 1888 and Peano 1889 contain statements of these basic postulates. We formulate them below, though the presentation doesn’t exactly match that of either author.\footnote{Similarly, we avoid Bishop’s (1967, 2) endorsement of Kronecker’s appeal to God (as well as to the primitive concepts of a unit and adjunction):}

To assert the postulates in a logically perspicuous way, three primitives are needed. They are:

- the individual Zero, denoted by the constant 0
- the property being a number, denoted by the 1-place relation constant \( N \)
- the 2-place relation successor of, denoted by the 2-place relation constant \( S \), or the converse relation predecessor of, denoted by the 2-place relation constant \( P \)

So in what follows, we understand formulas of the form \( Nx \) as asserting that \( x \) exemplifies being a number, formulas of the form \( Sxy \) as asserting that \( x \) is an immediate successor of \( y \), and formulas of the form \( Pxy \) as asserting that \( x \) is an immediate predecessor of \( y \). Also, for present purposes, we may read \( Sxy \) as \( x \) succeeds \( y \) and read \( Pxy \) as \( x \) precedes \( y \).

We can state the Dedekind/Peano postulates in terms of the above primitives as follows, where \( m,n,k \) are restricted variables ranging over the assumed domain of numbers; for each of the axioms below stated in terms of succeeds, we give an alternative statement using precedes:

\footnote{Dedekind 1888 (§71) stipulates what must obtain for a set \( N \) to be ‘simply infinite’ or inductive, namely, \( N \) must contain an element 1 and be a subset of some set \( S \) for which there is a function \( \varphi \) on \( S \) such that (a) \( \varphi \) maps \( N \) into \( N \), (b) \( N \) is the minimal closure of the unit set \{1\} in \( S \) under \( \varphi \), (c) 1 is not the value of \( \varphi \) for any member of \( N \), and (d) \( \varphi \) is a one-to-one function. See Reck 2016 (Section 2.2), where he notes “it is not hard to show that these Dedekindian conditions are a notational variant of Peano’s axioms for the natural numbers.”}

bei der Berliner Naturforscher-Versammlung im Jahre 1886 that [sic] “Die ganzen Zahlen hat der liebe Gott gemacht, alles andere ist Menschenwerk”.

\begin{itemize}
\item The primary concern of mathematics is number, and this means the positive integers. … The positive integers and their arithmetic are presupposed by the very nature of our intelligence and, we are tempted to believe, by the very nature of intelligence in general. The development of the positive integers from the primitive concept of the unit, the concept of adjoining a unit, and the process of mathematical induction carries complete conviction. In the words of Kronecker, the positive integers were created by God.
\end{itemize}
1. Zero is a number.  
\[ N0 \]

2. Zero doesn’t succeed any number.  
\[ \neg \exists nSn0 \]

No number precedes Zero.  
\[ \neg \exists nPn0 \]

3. If a number \( k \) succeeds numbers \( n \) and \( m \), then \( n = m \).  
\[ \forall n\forall m\forall k(Skn \& Skm \rightarrow n = m) \]

If numbers \( n \) and \( m \) precede a number \( k \), then \( n = m \).  
\[ \forall n\forall m\forall k(Pnk \& Pmk \rightarrow n = m) \]

4. Every number is succeeded by some number.  
\[ \forall n \exists m Smn \]

Every number precedes some number.  
\[ \forall n \exists Pnm \]

5. Mathematical Induction: If (a) Zero exemplifies \( F \) and (b) \( Fm \) implies \( Fn \) whenever \( n \) succeeds \( m \), then every number exemplifies \( F \).  
\[ F0 \& \forall n\forall m(Smn \rightarrow (Fm \rightarrow Fn)) \rightarrow \forall nFn \]

If (a) Zero exemplifies \( F \) and (b) \( Fn \) implies \( Fm \) whenever \( n \) precedes \( m \), then every number exemplifies \( F \).  
\[ F0 \& \forall n\forall m(Pnm \rightarrow (Fn \rightarrow Fm)) \rightarrow \forall nFn \]

In addition, Boolos (1995, 293; 1996, 275), and Heck (2011, 288) include the following among the Dedekind/Peano postulates:

6. If \( x \) succeeds \( n \), \( x \) is a number.  
\[ \forall n\forall x(Sxn \rightarrow Nx) \]

If \( n \) precedes \( x \), \( x \) is a number.  
\[ \forall n\forall x(Pnx \rightarrow Nx) \]

7. If numbers \( m \) and \( k \) succeed a number \( n \), then \( m = k \).  
\[ \forall n\forall m\forall k(Smn \& Skn \rightarrow m = k) \]

If a number \( n \) precedes numbers \( m \) and \( k \), then \( m = k \).  
\[ \forall n\forall m\forall k(Pnm \& Pnk \rightarrow m = k) \]
All seven postulates will be derived as theorems of the natural numbers in what follows.

As noted previously, our derivation of these postulates will involve some of the methods that Frege developed. More specifically, we adapt some of the methods used in the proof of Frege's Theorem, which is the claim that the Dedekind/Peano postulates for number theory are derivable from a single principle (known as Hume's Principle) in second-order logic. Frege's Theorem and Hume's Principle are discussed further below, but before we turn to that discussion, it will be useful to have some definitions and a theorem before us.

(720) **Definition:** Correlates One-to-One. Let us say that a 2-place relation \( R \) correlates properties \( F \) and \( G \) one-to-one, written \( R \downarrow 1 \downarrow F \), just in case (a) \( R, F, \) and \( G \) exist, (b) each object exemplifying \( F \) (hereafter \( F \)-object) is \( R \)-related to a unique \( G \)-object, and (c) each \( G \)-object is such that a unique \( F \)-object is \( R \)-related to it:

\[
R \downarrow 1 \downarrow F \iff G 
\equiv \text{df} \quad R \downarrow F \downarrow G \downarrow \forall x (Fx \rightarrow \exists ! y (Gy \& Rxy)) \& \forall y (Gy \rightarrow \exists ! x (Fx \& Rxy))
\]

Note that the three existence conditions at the beginning of the definiens ensure that the definiendum will be true only when terms instancing the definition all have denotations, so that the definiendum acts like atomic formula.\(^{315}\)

It is important to remember here that when \( R \) correlates \( F \) and \( G \) one-to-one, the definition: (a) implies nothing about whether \( R \) relates \( F \)-objects to any \( G \)-objects, (b) implies nothing about whether \( R \) relates \( F \)-objects to any \( G \)-objects, and (c) implies nothing about whether \( R \) relates \( F \)-objects to any \( G \)-objects. For all we know, \( R \) might relate an \( F \)-object to a single \( G \)-object.

\(^{315}\)For those who have skipped the discussions of the theory of definitions, the definition that follows in the text is governed by Convention (17.2). That convention tells us that the following definition gives rise to well-formed instances when any terms substitutable for the free variables are so substituted, and when any alphabetic variant of the definiens replaces the definiens. Without this Convention, we would, strictly speaking, have to formulate the definition using metavariables. To see how this reduces cognitive load, suppose \( \Pi \), \( \Pi' \), or \( \Pi'' \) don’t contain free occurrences of the individual variables \( x \) and \( y \). Then, without our Convention, the definition in the text would have to be formulated as:

\[
\Pi^2 : \Pi \equiv \text{df} \\
\Pi^2 \downarrow \downarrow \Pi \downarrow \Pi' \downarrow \forall x (Fx \rightarrow \exists ! y (Gy \& Rxy)) \& \forall y (Gy \rightarrow \exists ! x (Fx \& Rxy))
\]

By casting the definition in the text with object-language variables, the definition becomes much easier to read and to understand. Moreover, it yields the same identities and truth conditions whenever it is instanced by denoting terms. See the discussion in Remarks (27) and (28).

Note also that the clause \( R \downarrow \downarrow F \) is required for the case where \( F \) and \( G \) are instanced by necessarily false properties. For if \( F \) and \( G \) are necessarily false, but \( R \) is instanced by a non-denoting relation term, the two main conjuncts of the definiens would be true by failure of the antecedent, and thus the definiendum would be derivable despite the fact that the term instancing \( R \) doesn’t denote. See the discussion in (36).
14.1. PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT

and to several $\mathcal{T}$-objects. Or $R$ might relate an $\mathcal{F}$-object to both a $\mathcal{T}$-object and to a $G$-object. None of these circumstances are ruled out when $R$ correlates $F$ and $G$ one-to-one. It would serve well to give an example of a relation $R$ that correlates $F$ and $G$ one-to-one even though $R$ relates various $\mathcal{F}$-objects and $\mathcal{T}$-objects to one another.\footnote{For the purposes of the following illustration (and those that we’ll construct later in the chapter), we assume that $F$ and $G$ do not overlap—i.e., there is no object $x$ such that $Fx \& Gx$. Also, we focus our attention on a few particular $\mathcal{F}$-objects and a few particular $\mathcal{T}$ objects. That is, we do not concern ourselves with depicting the overlap between $\mathcal{F}$ and $\mathcal{T}$. And we do not bother to say explicitly that $e$ is a $\mathcal{T}$ object and that $f$ and $g$ are $\mathcal{F}$ objects.}

**Example 1.** Suppose that there are exactly seven individuals $a – g$, and that the relevant facts about them are depicted in Figure 14.1: $a$ and $b$ are the only $F$-objects; $c$ and $d$ are the only $G$-objects; $e$ exemplifies $\mathcal{F}$; $f$ and $g$ exemplify $\mathcal{T}$; and $Rac$, $Rag$, $Rbd$, $Rec$, and $Ref$. Then $R \models F \overset{1:1}{\longleftrightarrow} G$.

(721) **Remark:** Digression on the Difference with Frege’s Definition. Students of Frege will observe that our definition of $R$ correlates $F$ and $G$ one-to-one in (720) differs from the one Frege gives in 1884. Our definition is weaker than his. In 1884 (§§71,72), Frege takes $R$ to correlate $F$ and $G$ one-to-one just in case the following four conditions hold:

1. each $F$-object is $R$-related to some $G$-object, i.e., $\forall x (Fx \rightarrow \exists y (Gy \& Rxy))$
2. each $G$-object has an $F$-object $R$-related to it, i.e., $\forall y (Gy \rightarrow \exists x (Fx \& Rxy))$
3. $R$ is functional, i.e., $\forall x \forall y \forall z (Rxy \& Rxz \rightarrow y = z)$
4. $R$ is one-to-one, i.e., $\forall x \forall y \forall z (Rxz \& Ryz \rightarrow x = y)$

This is stronger than the definition of correlates one-to-one that we introduced in (720). The definition in (720) doesn’t require $R$ to be functional globally.
and doesn’t require \( R \) to be one-to-one globally. For example, we saw that the relation \( R \) in Figure 14.1 correlates \( F \) and \( G \) one-to-one in the sense of (720). But \( R \) fails to be functional globally, since it relates \( e \) to both \( c \) and \( f \) and \( a \) to both \( c \) and \( g \). And \( R \) fails to be one-to-one globally, since it relates both \( e \) and \( a \) to \( c \). So, \( R \) in Figure 14.1 fails to correlate \( F \) and \( G \) one-to-one in Frege’s sense, since it fails the first two clauses of his definition.

Despite this difference, our weaker definition is all that is needed to derive the Dedekind/Peano postulates — as long as \( R \) meets the definition of (720), there is, intuitively, a one-to-one correspondence between the \( F \)-objects and the \( G \)-objects. If we restate the definition while temporarily assuming some mathematics just for the purpose of illustration, then we could say that our notion of correlates one-to-one is sufficient to partition the domain of properties into equivalence classes of equinumerous properties.\(^{317}\)

(722) **Definitions:** Relation \( R \) Maps \( F \) to \( G \). We now say that (.1) \( R \) maps \( F \) to \( G \) just in case (a) \( R \), \( F \), and \( G \) exist, and (b) each \( F \)-object is \( R \)-related to a unique \( G \)-object:

\[
(.1) \quad R |: F \rightarrow G \equiv_{df} R \downarrow F \downarrow \& R \downarrow G \downarrow \& \forall x (Fx \rightarrow \exists! y (Gy \& Rxy))
\]

Cf. Frege 1893, §38.\(^{318}\) A caution analogous to the one for definition (720) is in order. Though we’ll define functions, domains, and codomains in Section 14.8.2, note that the definition of \( R |: F \rightarrow G \) doesn’t imply that that \( R \) is a function from domain \( F \) to codomain \( G \), for it allows \( R \) to additionally relate both \( F \)-objects to other things (including \( G \)-objects), and relate \( F \)-objects to other things (including \( G \) and \( \overline{G} \)-objects). An example will make it clear why we’ve posted this caution:

**Example 2.** Suppose that there are exactly seven individuals \( a – g \), and that the relevant facts about them are depicted in Figure 14.2:

- \( a \) and \( b \) are the only \( F \)-objects;
- \( c \) and \( d \) are the only \( G \)-objects;
- \( e \)

\(^{317}\)Clearly, if \( R \) correlates \( F \) and \( G \) one-to-one in Frege’s sense, then \( R \) correlates \( F \) and \( G \) in our sense. Moreover, if \( R \) correlates \( F \) and \( G \) one-to-one in our sense, there is an \( R’ \) that correlates \( F \) and \( G \) in Frege’s sense. Choose \( R’ \) to be \([\lambda xy Rxy \& Ex \& Gy], \) i.e., the restriction of \( R \) to those \( F \)-objects in its domain and to those \( G \)-objects in its range. So, while our definition of what it takes for some relation \( R \) to correlate \( F \) and \( G \) one-to-one is weaker, the same \( F \)s and \( G \)s can always be correlated one-to-one by either definition. In other words, both our definition and Frege’s induce the same partition on the domain of properties.

\(^{318}\)In 1893, §38, Frege defines this notion differently. He says \( R \) maps \( F \) to \( G \) just in case (a) \( R \) is functional, as defined in (721.3) above, and (b) \( R \) relates each \( F \)-object to some \( G \)-object, as in (721.1). But our weaker definition of \( R \) maps \( F \) to \( G \) will suffice for the same reasons discussed in the previous footnote.

For purposes of comparison, Frege introduced (1893, §37) an operator \( \lambda \), which in his notation applies to the double value-range of a relation \( p \) so that \( Ip \) indicates that \( p \) is functional. He also introduced (1893, §38) the operator \( \#p \), which applies to the double value-range of a relation \( p \) so that \( \#p \) indicates that \( p \) maps the value-range of its first argument to that of its second.
exemplifies \( \overline{F} \); \( f \) and \( g \) exemplify \( \overline{G} \); and \( \text{Rad}, \text{Rag}, \text{Rbd}, \text{Rec}, \) and \( \text{Ref} \). Then \( R: F \rightarrow G \).

So it is important to keep in mind that when \( R: F \rightarrow G \), the definition tells us only some of what \( R \) may do and, indeed, only some of what \( R \) may do with respect to \( F \)-objects and with respect to \( G \)-objects.

We next say (.2) \( R \) maps \( F \) to \( G \) one-to-one, written \( R: F \overset{1-1}{\rightarrow} G \), just in case \( R \) maps \( F \) to \( G \) and for any \( F \)-objects \( x \) and \( y \) and any \( G \)-object \( z \), if \( R \) relates both \( x \) and \( y \) to \( z \), then \( x \) is identical to \( y \):

\[
(\text{.2}) \quad R: F \overset{1-1}{\rightarrow} G \equiv R: F \rightarrow G \land \forall x \forall y (Fx \land Gz \rightarrow Rxz)
\]

As a check, the reader should verify that \( R \) in Example 2 does not map \( F \) to \( G \) one-to-one. But consider:

**Example 3.** Suppose that there are exactly eight individuals \( a – h \), and that the relevant facts about them are depicted in Figure 14.3: \( a \) and \( b \) are the only \( F \)-objects; \( c, d, \) and \( h \) are the only \( G \)-objects; \( e \) exemplifies \( \overline{F} \); \( f \) and \( g \) exemplify \( \overline{G} \); and \( \text{Rad}, \text{Rag}, \text{Rbd}, \text{Rec}, \) and \( \text{Ref} \). Then \( R: F \overset{1-1}{\rightarrow} G \).

The reader should verify that in Example 3, \( R \) maps \( F \) to \( G \) one-to-one but does not correlate \( F \) and \( G \) one-to-one.

Next, we say (.3) \( R \) maps \( F \) onto \( G \) just in case \( R \) maps \( F \) to \( G \) and every \( G \)-object is such that some \( F \)-object bears \( R \) to it:

\[
(\text{.3}) \quad R: F \overset{\text{onto}}{\rightarrow} G \equiv R: F \rightarrow G \land \forall y (Gy \rightarrow \exists x (Fx \land Rxy))
\]

The reader should verify that \( R \) in Example 3 does not map \( F \) onto \( G \). But consider:

**Example 4.** Suppose that there are exactly eight individuals \( a – h \), and that the relevant facts about them are depicted in Figure 14.4:
a, b, and h are the only F-objects, c and d are the only G-objects, e exemplifies \( F \), f and g exemplify \( G \), and \( R_a, R_b, R_{bd}, R_c, R_{ef}, \) and \( R_{hd} \). Then \( R \mid: F \rightarrow G \).

The reader should also verify that \( R \) in Example 4 does not map \( F \) to \( G \) one-to-one.

Finally, whenever \( R \) both maps \( F \) to \( G \) one-to-one and maps \( F \) onto \( G \), we write \( R \mid: F \xrightarrow{1-1} \rightarrow G \):

\[
R \mid: F \xrightarrow{1-1} \rightarrow G 
\]

The reader should verify that \( R \) in Example 1 maps \( F \) onto \( G \) one-to-one.

(723) **Theorem:** Correlates One-to-One and One-to-One Onto Maps. The following is now derivable from the definitions in (720) and (722), namely, \( R \) correlates \( F \) and \( G \) one-to-one just in case \( R \) maps \( F \) onto \( G \) one-to-one:

\[
R \mid: F \xrightarrow{1-1} \rightarrow G \equiv R \mid: F \xrightarrow{onto} \rightarrow G
\]
(724) **Remark:** Frege's Theorem. Frege's system of 1893, despite being inconsistent, contained one of the most astonishing intellectual achievements in logic and philosophy. This is now known as Frege's Theorem, though Frege himself never formulated the result explicitly as a theorem, nor even thought of it as a result. Nevertheless, the theorem Frege proved is that the Dedekind/Peano postulates of number theory can be validly derived using only the resources of second-order logic supplemented by a single principle, namely, Hume's Principle.\(^{319}\)

To state Hume's Principle, two notions are needed. The first is expressed by the definite description *the number of Fs*. Frege thought that this description is significant because he believed that for every property \(F\), there is a unique individual \(x\) that numbers \(F\). The other notion needed for Hume’s Principle is the *equinumerosity* of properties \(F\) and \(G\). Without a definition of equinumerosity, Hume's Principle has an air of triviality to those encountering it for the first time, for it asserts:

**Hume's Principle**

The number of \(F\)s is equal to the number of \(G\)s if and only if \(F\) and \(G\) are equinumerous.

But the air of triviality can be dispelled if we define equinumerosity as in (.1), namely, that \(F\) and \(G\) are *equinumerous*, written \(F \approx G\), just in case there exists an \(R\) that correlates \(F\) and \(G\) one-to-one:

\[
F \approx G \equiv \exists R \left( R \mid F \leftrightarrow G \right)
\]

\(^{319}\)See Wright 1983, Heck 1993, and Zalta 2017, for details.

\(^{320}\)In Remark (721), we discussed how Frege's 1884 definition of \(R\) correlates \(F\) and \(G\) one-to-one is stronger than ours. Here we can add that in 1893, Frege rearranged the definition he used in 1884. Using his notion of \(R\) maps \(F\) to \(G\) (§38) and the notion of the converse of \(R\), i.e., \(\lambda x y \, R y x\) (§39), he says (§40) that \(R\) correlates \(F\) and \(G\) one-to-one just in case (a) \(R\) maps \(F\) to \(G\) and (b) the converse of \(R\) maps \(G\) to \(F\). (In footnote 318 above, we mentioned that his definition of \(R\) maps \(F\) to \(G\) requires \(R\) to be functional globally.) Though Frege's 1893 definition of correlates one-to-one is equivalent to his 1884 definition, Heck shows (1993, 586, note 22; 2011, 47) that it has 'technical advantages’ for some of the theorems Frege proves in 1893.
worth digressing briefly to say more about how Frege both attempted to define \#F and derive Hume’s Principle from his theory of extensions. We can simplify the discussion of how Frege thought this could be done by (a) representing Frege’s notion the extension of F as \(\epsilon F\) and (b) supposing that \(\epsilon F\) is axiomatized by Frege’s version of Basic Law V, which for present purposes, may be written as: \(\epsilon F = \epsilon G \equiv \forall x (Fx \equiv Gx)\). (In the discussion that follows, we’ll not suppose that \(\epsilon F\) is defined as in (316), unless otherwise indicated for purposes of comparison.) It is well known that the addition of Basic Law V to second-order logic (with unrestricted second-order comprehension for properties) is subject to Russell’s paradox. But Frege was initially unaware of the paradox and so defined \#F as the extension of the property being an extension of a property equinumerous to F.

In the present system, we may represent the predicate “is an extension of a property equinumerous to F” (without assuming that it denotes a property) as:

\[
\lambda x \exists G(x = \epsilon G & G \approx F)
\]

But axiom (39.2) doesn’t guarantee that the above predicate has a denotation – the \(\lambda\) binds a variable in the encoding formula subterms of the subterm \(x = \epsilon G\); for a full explanation, see footnote 199 in item (325)\(\star\) in Chapter 10. So, given the theory of definitions-by-identity in object theory, the term \(\epsilon[\lambda x \exists G(x = \epsilon G & G \approx F)]\) isn’t guaranteed to have a denotation either. But if we put these facts aside temporarily, we could represent Frege’s definition of the number of Fs as follows:

\[
\#F =_{df} \epsilon[\lambda x \exists G(x = \epsilon G & G \approx F)]
\]

Frege’s next step was to derive Hume’s Principle, \#F = #G \equiv F \approx G, from Basic Law V. Although this derivation of Hume’s Principle loses most of its interest given that Frege’s system is inconsistent, the fact is that once Frege had ‘derived’ Hume’s Principle, he then made no further essential appeal to Basic Law V when deriving the Dedekind/Peano postulates as theorems; his derivations of these postulates appealed only to Hume’s Principle and the theorems of second-order logic (Heck 1993).

It is now known, however, that if one takes \#F instead of \(\epsilon F\) as a primitive and adds Hume’s Principle instead of Basic Law V to second-order logic, the resulting system is provably consistent.\(^{321}\) Frege’s Theorem proceeds by constructing the following definitions, in which \(P\) stands for predecessor and \(N\) stands for being a natural (or finite) number:

\[
Pxy \equiv_{df} \exists F \forall z (Fz & y = \#F & x = \#[\lambda z' Fz' & z' \neq z])
\]

\(^{321}\)See Hodes 1984 (138), Burgess 1984 (639), and Hazen 1985 (252). Geach 1976 (446–7) develops the model that the others describe, but doesn’t specifically identify it as a model of second-order logic plus Hume’s Principle.
Thus Frege defined the three primitive notions used in the Dedekind/Peano postulates (namely, 0, \(N\), and \(P\)), and then derived the postulates as theorems of second-order logic supplemented by Hume’s Principle.

Despite this successful derivation, Frege’s Theorem, under this reconstruction of taking \(#F\) as primitive and asserting Hume’s Principle as an axiom, doesn’t accomplish one of Frege’s main goals, namely, that of defining the numbers and deriving fundamental number-theoretic principles without appeal to mathematical notions and axioms. That’s because Hume’s Principle requires a primitive mathematical notion, \(#F\), and the principle thereby becomes a mathematical axiom. By contrast, in what follows, we derive the Dedekind/Peano postulates without mathematical primitives and axioms.

Moreover, there are a number of problems surrounding the methodology of adding principles such as Hume’s Principle to second-order logic, some of which were raised by Frege himself. There is now a substantial literature on these problems and it would take us too far afield to delve into the details (see MacBride 2003 for an overview). But it is worth noting one problem that Frege raised, namely, the Julius Caesar problem (1884, §55), which we can state as follows: if the only principle that systematizes \(#F\) is Hume’s Principle, i.e., if Hume’s Principle is the sole axiom governing the number of Fs, then the open formula \(#F = x\) is not defined and the theory of numbers derived from Hume’s Principle doesn’t provide, for an arbitrary object \(x\), conditions under which \(#F = x\). In particular, the resulting theory offers no conditions for establishing whether the number of planets, say, is identical to Julius Caesar.

Though much has been written about this problem, we shall not spend time working through the literature, since object theory follows a rather different methodology, namely, of presenting separate principles for the existence and identity of theoretical objects.\(^{322}\) Identity formulas of the form \(x = y\) and \(F = G\) are defined generally in object theory, and once we identify the \(F\) as an abstract individual, the general object-theoretic principles of identity yield well-defined conditions under which \(#F = x\). The Julius Caesar problem just doesn’t arise.

---

\(^{322}\) This is the methodology used in set theory, for example. In Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, for example, the existence axioms (Null Set, Pair Set, Unions, Power Set, Infinity, Separation, and Replacement) are distinct from the axiom of the identity of sets (Extensionality).
It is important to recognize, however, that Frege’s methods can be adapted and applied in object theory only to a limited extent, and we’ll discuss this explicitly in Remarks (725), (767), (776), and (797). Nevertheless, his goals can be achieved by extending object theory in modest, interesting, and justifiable ways. We plan to show that $\#F$, $\text{Precedes}$, and $0$ can all be defined in object-theoretic terms, and that:

- Dedekind/Peano postulates 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7 can be derived in object theory by extending it with the axiom that $\text{Precedes}$ is a relation, and

- Dedekind/Peano postulate 4 (every number has a successor) can be derived in object theory by extending it with an intuitive modal axiom that we already implicitly accept.

After this is done, and the foundations of arithmetic are developed in some detail with numerous further definitions and theorems (including one grounding recursively-defined arithmetic functions), we conclude with an interesting result, namely, that, without any mathematical primitives or axioms, there is a derivation of the existence of both an infinite cardinal and an infinite set.

14.2 Equinumerosity and Ordinary Objects

Throughout the remainder of this chapter, we use $u$ and $v$ as rigid restricted variables ranging over ordinary objects. We continue to use $x$, $y$, and $z$ as variables ranging over all individuals. Note also that when we compare one of the theorems proved below to one of the theorems found in Frege’s work, we assume that our notion of a property (i.e., a 1-place relation) corresponds to Frege’s notion of a concept. The justification for this comes from Frege himself, who said (1892, 51) that the concepts under which an object falls are its properties. We shall not, however, adopt Frege’s analysis of concepts as functions from objects to truth values.

(725) Remark: Classical Equinumerosity Isn’t an Equivalence Condition. One of the keys to Frege’s theorem that we haven’t discussed is the fact that the equinumerosity of $F$ and $G$, as defined in (724.1), is an equivalence condition in the classical second-order predicate calculus. We leave it as an exercise for the reader to show that in classical second-order logic (without encoding), the condition $F \approx G$ is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive. Frege intuitively relied on this fact, which partitions the domain of properties into equivalence classes of equinumerous properties, to introduce a new object, $\#F$, to represent the class of all properties equinumerous to $F$.

However, in the present system, classical equinumerosity, as defined in (724.1), provably fails to be an equivalence condition on properties, and this
is the first obstacle we must surmount if we are to adapt Frege’s methods to object theory. To see why the equinumerosity of \( F \) and \( G \) fails to be an equivalence condition, recall that it was established in \( (266) \) that there are distinct abstract objects that exemplify the same properties:

\[
\exists x \exists y (A ! x & A ! y & x \not= y & \forall F (Fx \equiv Fy)) \quad (266)
\]

From this it follows that \( A ! \) is not equinumerous to any property, i.e.,

\( (1) \ \forall G (A ! \not\approx G) \)

**Proof.** Given \( (266) \), assume \( a \) and \( b \) are such objects, so that we know \( A ! a, A ! b, a \not= b, \) and \( \forall F (Fa \equiv Fb) \). Suppose, for reductio, that \( \exists G (A ! \approx G) \).

Let \( Q \) be such a property so that we know \( A ! \approx Q \). Then, by definition of \( \approx \) \( (724.1) \), there is a relation, say \( R \), that correlates \( A ! \) and \( Q \) one-to-one, i.e., \( R : A ! \leftarrow \rightarrow Q \). So by \( (723) \), we know both that \( R \) maps \( A ! \) to \( Q \) one-to-one and that \( R \) maps \( A ! \) onto \( Q \). A fortiori, \( R \) maps \( A ! \) to \( Q \). The latter fact and our assumption \( A ! a \) jointly imply that there is a (unique) object, say \( c \), such that both \( Qc \) and \( Rac \). So by Rule \( \beta C \) \( (182.2.a) \) and the facts that \( \lambda z Rzc \downarrow \) and \( a \downarrow \), it follows that \( \lambda z Rzc \downarrow \). But, since \( a \) and \( b \), by hypothesis, exemplify the same properties, \( \lambda z Rzc \downarrow \). So by Rule \( \beta C \) \( (182.1.a) \), \( Rbc \). But this contradicts the fact \( R \) maps \( A ! \) to \( Q \) one-to-one, for we now have \( A ! a, A ! b, Qc, Rac \) and \( Rbc \), which by the second conjunct of \( (722.2) \) implies \( a = b \). Contradiction.

In particular, then, it follows that \( A ! \not\approx A ! \). This result should come as no surprise: since \( \approx \) is defined in terms of exemplification patterns of properties and there are abstract objects that are indistinguishable by classical exemplification patterns \( (266) \), one should expect that no relation can correlate \( A ! \) one-to-one with itself.

Given that \( A ! \not\approx A ! \), we have established that equinumerosity is not a reflexive condition:

\( (2) \ \exists F (F \not\approx F) \)

Since equinumerosity is not reflexive, it is not an equivalence condition. Intuitively, then, equinumerosity doesn’t partition the domain of properties into mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive cells of equinumerous properties. Since the existence of such a partition is essential to Frege’s method of abstracting out a distinguished object, \( \#G \), that numbers all and only the properties equinumerous to \( G \), it will not do us much good to define \( \#G \) as \( \lambda x (A ! x & \forall F (xF \equiv F \approx G)) \). Fortunately, however, there is a notion of equinumerosity in the neighborhood which does much, though not all, of what Frege’s method requires.

Recall that the relation \( =_E \) was shown to be an equivalence relation on the ordinary objects \( (236) \). We also established that ordinary objects are classically
behaved: if \( x \) and \( y \) are distinct ordinary objects, then we have both \([\lambda y \ y =_E x]\) \( \neq [\lambda y \ y = E z] \) (240.1) and \([\lambda y \ y = x] \neq [\lambda y \ y = z] \) (240.2). These facts allow us to formulate a notion of equinumerosity that holds whenever there is a relation that correlates, one-to-one, the ordinary objects that exemplify \( F \) and those that exemplify \( G \).

(726) Definitions: Equinumerosity with respect to the Ordinary Objects. Using our rigid restricted variables \( u \) and \( v \) to range over ordinary objects, let us first introduce a special unique existence quantifier for ordinary objects. We say that (.1) there is a unique ordinary object such that \( \varphi \) if and only if (a) there is an ordinary object such that \( \varphi \), and (b) every ordinary object such that \( \varphi \) is identical \( E \) to it:

\[
(\ast) \exists!_u \varphi \equiv \exists u (\varphi \& \forall v (\varphi^u_v \rightarrow v =_E u))
\]

Thus, only ordinary objects can serve as witnesses for this unique existence quantifier. If we compare (.1) to definition (128.1) and ignore the restricted variables, we see that the main difference is that identity \( E \) replaces identity in the definiens. Clearly, nothing is lost by the replacement since we know by (237.1) that if \( u \) or \( v \) is ordinary, then \( u =_E v \) is equivalent to \( u = v \). So in what follows, it is important to remember that the unique existence of an ordinary object such that \( \varphi \) is defined, in part, to be a matter of identity \( E \). The virtue of using \( =_E \) in the definition of \( \exists! \varphi \) is that the resulting definiens of \( \exists! \varphi \) is a formula in which no free variables occur in an encoding formula subterm. So by convention, the definiendum is also a formula in which no free variables occur in an encoding formula subterm. Thus, we can abstract out properties from either the definiens or the definiendum. For example, from \( \exists!_u (Gv \& Rav) \) we can, by Rule \( \bar{B}C \) (182.2), infer \( [\lambda u \exists!_v (Gv \& Rav)]a \) (i.e., that \( a \) exemplifies being an ordinary individual \( u \) such that there is a unique, ordinary individual that exemplifies \( G \) and to which \( u \) bears \( R \)), since by (39.2), both \( [\lambda u \exists!_v (Gv \& Rav)]a \) and \( a \).

In any case, we may now use our special unique existence quantifier to say that (.2) \( 2 \)-place relation \( R \) correlates \( E \) \( F \) and \( G \) one-to-one, written \( R \downarrow F \leftrightarrow E G \), just in case (a) each ordinary \( F \)-object is \( R \)-related to a unique ordinary \( G \)-object, and (b) each ordinary \( G \)-object is such that a unique ordinary \( F \)-object is \( R \)-related to it:

\[
(\ast) \exists!_u (F \leftrightarrow E G) \equiv df \quad R \downarrow F \downarrow G \downarrow \& \forall u (Fu \rightarrow \exists!_v (Gv \& Ruv)) \& \forall v (Gv \rightarrow \exists!_u (Fu \& Ruv))
\]

Consider:

Example 5. Suppose that there are exactly ten individuals \( a - j \), and that the relevant facts about them are depicted in Figure 14.5: \( a - e \) and \( g \) are the only ordinary objects; \( a, b, \) and \( e \) are the only
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Figure 14.5: $R$ correlates $E$ $F$ and $G$ one-to-one.

The reader should verify that this is an example of the definition.

Finally, we say that (.3) properties $F$ and $G$ are equinumerous with respect to the ordinary objects, or equinumerous $E$, written $F \approx_{E} G$, just in case some relation correlates $E$ $F$ and $G$ one-to-one:

$$ (.3) \quad F \approx_{E} G \equiv_{df} \exists R \, | \, F \overset{1-1}{\leftrightarrow_{E}} G $$

In the proofs of the theorems that follow, we say that a relation $R$ is a witness to the equinumerosity $E$ of $F$ and $G$ whenever $R |: F \overset{1-1}{\leftrightarrow_{E}} G$. So $R$ in Figure 14.5 is a witness to the equinumerosity $E$ of $F$ and $G$. Also, we sometimes say that $F$ is equinumerous $E$ to $G$ when $F$ and $G$ are equinumerous $E$.

(727) Theorems: Equinumerosity $E$ partitions the Domain of Properties. It follows that: equinumerosity $E$ is (.1) reflexive; (.2) symmetric; and (.3) transitive:

$$ (.1) \quad F \approx_{E} F $$

$$ (.2) \quad F \approx_{E} G \rightarrow G \approx_{E} F $$

$$ (.3) \quad (F \approx_{E} G \land G \approx_{E} H) \rightarrow F \approx_{E} H $$

It also follows that (.4) if $F$ and $G$ are equinumerous $E$, then the same properties are equinumerous $E$ to $F$ and $G$, and (.5) if $F$ and $G$ are equinumerous $E$, then for any property $H$, actually exemplifying $H$ is equinumerous $E$ to $F$ iff it is equinumerous $E$ to $G$:

$$ (.4) \quad F \approx_{E} G \equiv \forall H (H \approx_{E} F \equiv H \approx_{E} G) $$

$$ (.5) \quad F \approx_{E} G \equiv \forall H ([\lambda z : \delta H z] \approx_{E} F \equiv [\lambda z : \delta H z] \approx_{E} G) $$
(4) is based on Theorem 25 in Frege 1893 (§61). Frege, of course, used rather different notation to state this theorem. Though we shall frequently indicate in what follows when a theorem proved here is in some way analogous to one that Frege proved in 1893, it goes beyond the scope of the present monograph to explain Frege’s notation. The reason for formulating and proving (5) won’t become apparent until the next section.

**Definitions:** \( R \) maps \( F \) to \( G \). We now adapt the notions defined in (722) as follows: (.1) \( R \) maps \( F \) to \( G \) just in case each ordinary \( F \)-object is \( R \)-related a unique ordinary \( G \)-object:

\[
(\cdot 1)
R & F \rightarrow E G \equiv \text{df} R \downarrow F \downarrow G \downarrow \forall u \left( Fu \rightarrow \exists! v (Gv \& Ruv) \right)
\]

Consider:

**Example 6.** Suppose that there are exactly ten individuals \( a – j \), and that the relevant facts about them are depicted in Figure 14.6: \( a – d \) are the only ordinary objects; \( a, b, \) and \( e \) are the only \( F \)-objects; \( c, d, f \) and \( g \) are the only \( G \)-objects; \( h \) exemplifies \( F \); \( i \) and \( j \) exemplify \( G \); and \( Rac, Rbc, Ref, Reg, Rhi, \) and \( Rj \). Then \( R : F \rightarrow E G \).

The following exercises may engender a better understanding:

**Exercise 1.** Since it follows from (225.1) that there are ordinary objects, suppose \( a \) is one. Then consider the relation \( R = [\lambda xy y =_E a] \). Show that that for any \( F, R : F \rightarrow E O! \).

**Exercise 2.** Show that the following definition:

\[
R : F \rightarrow E G \equiv \text{df} R \downarrow F \downarrow G \downarrow R : [\lambda x O!x \& Fx] \rightarrow [\lambda x O!x \& Gx]
\]

is equivalent to (.1). Note that the definiens employs the more general notion: \( R \) maps \( F \) to \( G \) (722.1). Verify that this alternative definition applies in Example 6.
Next, we say (.2) \( R \) maps \( E \) to \( F \) one-to-one just in case \( R \) maps \( E \) to \( G \) one-to-one and for any ordinary \( F \)-object \( t \) and ordinary \( G \)-object \( v \), if \( t \) bears \( R \) to \( v \) and \( u \) bears \( R \) to \( v \), then \( t \) is \( E \)-identical to \( u \):

\[
(.2) \quad R \mid: F \xrightarrow{1-1} E \rightarrow G \equiv \text{df} \quad \forall t \forall u \forall v ((Ft & Fu & Gv) \rightarrow (Rtv & Ruu \rightarrow t =_E u))
\]

Consider:

**Example 7.** Suppose that there are exactly 11 individuals \( a \) – \( k \), and that the relevant facts about them are depicted in Figure 14.7: \( a \), \( b \), and \( e \) are the only \( F \)-objects; \( c \), \( d \), \( f \), \( g \), and \( k \) are the only \( G \)-objects; \( h \) exemplifies \( F \); \( i \) and \( j \) exemplify \( G \); and \( R_{ac}, R_{bc}, R_{ef}, R_{eg}, R_{hi}, \) and \( R_{hj} \). Then \( R \mid: F \xrightarrow{1-1} E \rightarrow G \).

The following may prove useful:

**Exercise 3.** Show that the following definition is equivalent to (.2):

\[
R \mid: F \xrightarrow{1-1} E \rightarrow G \equiv \text{df} \quad \forall x (F \downarrow x & G \downarrow x & R \mid: \lambda x O!x & Fx) \rightarrow R \downarrow x \rightarrow \lambda x O!x & Gx)
\]

Note that this definiens employs the more general notion: \( R \) maps \( F \) to \( G \) one-to-one (722.2). Verify that this alternative definition applies in Example 7.

Next, we say (.3) \( R \) maps \( E \) onto \( G \) just in case \( R \) maps \( E \) to \( G \) and every ordinary \( G \)-object is such that some ordinary \( F \)-object bears \( R \) to it:

\[
(.3) \quad R \mid: F \xrightarrow{\text{onto}} E \rightarrow G \equiv \text{df} \quad R \mid: F \rightarrow E \rightarrow G & \forall v (Gv \rightarrow \exists u (Fu & Ruv))
\]

Consider:

**Example 8.** Suppose that there are exactly 11 individuals \( a \) – \( k \), and that the relevant facts about them are depicted in Figure 14.8: \( a \) – \( d \) and \( k \) are
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Figure 14.8: $R$ maps $E$ onto $G$.

the only ordinary objects; $a$, $b$, $e$ and $k$ are the only $F$-objects; $c$, $d$, $f$, and $g$ are the only $G$-objects; $h$ exemplifies $\overline{F}$, $i$ and $j$ exemplify $\overline{G}$; and $Rac$, $Rbd$, $Rkd$, $Ref$, $Rhi$, and $Rhj$. Then $R: F \underset{onto}{\longrightarrow} E \ G$.

The following may prove useful:

**Exercise 4.** Show that the following definition is equivalent to (.3):

$R: F \underset{onto}{\longrightarrow} E \ G \equiv df \ F \downarrow \& \ G \downarrow \& R: [\lambda x O!x \& Fx] \underset{onto}{\longrightarrow} [\lambda x O!x \& Gx]$  

Note that the definiens employs the more general notion: $R$ maps $E$ onto $G$ (722.3). Verify that this alternative definition applies in Example 8.

Finally, we use the following notation whenever $F$ maps $E$ onto $G$ one-to-one:

$R: F \underset{onto}{\longrightarrow} E \ G \equiv df \ F \downarrow \& \ G \downarrow \& R: [\lambda x O!x \& Fx] \underset{onto}{\longrightarrow} [\lambda x O!x \& Gx]$  

(729) **Theorem:** Correlates $E$ One-to-One and One-to-One Onto Maps $E$. It is now easy to show that $R$ correlates $E$ if and only if $R$ maps $E$ onto $G$ one-to-one:

$R: F \underset{onto}{\longrightarrow} E \ G \equiv R: F \underset{onto}{\longrightarrow} E \ G$

The reader may find the following useful:

**Exercise 5.** Using the definitions in the Exercises to (728), show that $R$ correlates $E$ if and only if $F$ and $G$ both exist and $R$ correlates $[\lambda x O!x \& Fx]$ and $[\lambda x O!x \& Gx]$ one-to-one, i.e.,

$R: F \underset{onto}{\longrightarrow} E \ G \equiv F \downarrow \& G \downarrow \& [\lambda x O!x \& Fx] \underset{onto}{\longrightarrow} [\lambda x O!x \& Gx]$.  

(730) **Definition:** Material Equivalence with Respect to the Ordinary Objects. We say that properties $F$ and $G$ are *materially equivalent with respect to the ordinary objects*, written $F \equiv_E G$, if and only if $F$ and $G$ both exist and are exemplified by the same ordinary objects:
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\[ F \equiv_E G \equiv df \ F \downarrow \& G \downarrow \& \forall u (F u \equiv G u) \]

**Lemmas**: Equinumerous\(_E\) and Equivalent\(_E\) Properties. The following consequences concerning equinumerous\(_E\) and materially equivalent\(_E\) properties are easily provable: (.1) if \( F \) and \( G \) are materially equivalent\(_E\), then they are equinumerous\(_E\); and (.2) if \( F \) is equinumerous\(_E\) to \( G \) and \( G \) is materially equivalent\(_E\) to \( H \), then \( F \) is equinumerous\(_E\) to \( H \):

\[
\text{(.1) } F \equiv_E G \rightarrow F \approx_E G \\
\text{(.2) } (F \approx_E G \& G \equiv_E H) \rightarrow F \approx_E H
\]

**Theorems**: Equinumerosity\(_E\) and Empty Properties. The following are modally-strict facts about the equinumerosity\(_E\) of empty properties: (.1) if no ordinary objects exemplify \( F \) and none exemplify \( H \), then \( F \) and \( H \) are equinumerous with respect to the ordinary objects; and (.2) if some ordinary object exemplifies \( F \) and no ordinary object exemplifies \( H \), then \( F \) and \( H \) aren’t equinumerous with respect to the ordinary objects:

\[
\text{(.1) } (\neg \exists u F u \& \neg \exists v H v) \rightarrow F \approx_E H \\
\text{(.2) } (\exists u F u \& \neg \exists v H v) \rightarrow \neg (F \approx_E H)
\]

These facts will prove useful later, when we define \#G and show that it is not strictly canonical object.

**Definition**: Being an \( F \) That Is Not Identical\(_E\) to \( u \). We introduce the notation \( F^{-u} \), where \( u \) ranges over ordinary individuals, to denote being \( F \) but not identical\(_E\) to \( u \):

\[ F^{-u} = df \ [\lambda z F z \& z \not\equiv_E u] \]

Although definition works as intended in what follows, it is important to understand (a) the behavior of the property \( \Pi^{-u} \) when \( \Pi \) is an empty property term, and (b) the behavior of the property \( F^{-x} \) when \( x \) is empty or signifies an abstract object, and (c) the behavior of the property \( \Pi^{-x} \) when \( \Pi \) is empty and \( x \) is empty or signifies an abstract object. **Exercise**. Explain why, in all three of these cases, the resulting expression is significant but denotes an unexemplified property.

**Lemma**: An Equinumerosity\(_E\) Lemma. If \( F \) and \( G \) are equinumerous\(_E\), \( u \) exemplifies \( F \), and \( v \) exemplifies \( G \), then \( F^{-u} \) and \( G^{-v} \) are equinumerous\(_E\):

\[ F \approx_E G \& F u \& G v \rightarrow F^{-u} \approx_E G^{-v} \]
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Compare this theorem with the result marked \( \vartheta \) just prior to Theorem 87 in Frege 1893 (§95).\(^{323}\)

(735) **Lemma:** Another Equinumerosity\(_E\) Lemma. If \( F^u \) and \( G^v \) are equinumerous\(_E\), \( u \) exemplifies \( F \), and \( v \) exemplifies \( G \), then \( F \) and \( G \) are equinumerous\(_E\):

\[
F^u \approx_E G^v \& Fu \& Gv \rightarrow F \approx_E G
\]

Compare Frege 1893, Theorem 66.\(^{324}\)

(736) ★**Theorems:** Equivalence\(_E\), Equinumerosity\(_E\), and Actually Being \( F \). The following theorems prove to be useful. (.1) actually being \( F \) is materially equivalent to \( F \) on the ordinary objects, and (.2) actually being \( F \) is equinumerous to \( F \) on the ordinary objects:

\[
\begin{align*}
(1) \quad & \exists z \forall Fz \equiv E F \\
(2) \quad & \exists z \forall Fz \approx E F
\end{align*}
\]

These theorems are not modally strict.

(737) **Theorem:** Equinumerous\(_E\) Is a Contingent Condition on Some Properties. Intuitively, the fact that \( F \) and \( G \) are equinumerous\(_E\) in one possible world doesn’t entail that they are equinumerous\(_E\) in another. For example, even if being a pencil on my desk and being a pen on my desk are in fact equinumerous\(_E\), things might have been different. But such examples require us to extend the theory with new predicates; can we prove that there are properties that are possibly equinumerous\(_E\) and possibly not?

In object theory, we can establish this by way of a preliminary proof that (.1) there are properties \( F \) and \( G \) such that it is possibly the case that both (a) \( F \) and \( G \) are equinumerous\(_E\) but (b) possibly not:

\[
(1) \exists F \exists G (F \approx_E G \& \Diamond \neg F \approx_E G)
\]

Clearly, by (165.11) and a Rule of Substitution, this implies \( \exists F \exists G (\Diamond F \approx_E G \& \Diamond \neg F \approx_E G) \). So, for some values of \( F \) and \( G \), the condition \( F \approx_E G \) is provably a contingent condition.

It is also important to observe a variation on this contingency. Namely, (.2) there are properties \( F \) and \( G \) such that it is possibly the case that both (a) actually exemplifying \( F \) is equinumerous\(_E\) to \( G \), but (b) possibly not:

\[^{323}\text{There are several differences. First, on the basis of Hume’s Principle, Frege uses numeral identities instead of equinumerosity claims in the antecedent and consequent, and we substitute these into the present theorem, we obtain } \#F = \#G \& Fu \& Gv \rightarrow \#F^u = \#G^v. \text{ Second, Frege proves the contrapositive, switches the order of the antecedents, and puts everything into conditional form. Thus, he proves: } F^u \rightarrow (Gv \rightarrow (\#F^u \neq \#G^v \rightarrow \#F \neq \#G)). \text{ Note also that Frege uses } c \text{ and } b, \text{ respectively, where we use } u \text{ and } v, \text{ and he uses } v \text{ and } u, \text{ respectively, where we use } \#F \text{ and } \#G.\]

\[^{324}\text{The present theorem differs from Frege’s Theorem 66 only by two applications of Hume’s Principle: in Frege’s Theorem, } \#F^u = \#G^v \text{ is substituted for } F^u \approx_E G^v \text{ in the antecedent, and } \#F = \#G \text{ is substituted for } F \approx_E G \text{ in the consequent.}\]
This analogously implies \( \exists F \exists G (\lambda z \ A F z \approx E G \& \neg (\lambda z \ A F z \approx E G)) \). The distinction between (.1) and (.2) plays an important role in what follows.

(738) Theorems: Conditions for Modal Collapse of Equinumerosity \( E \). (.1) If \( F \) is modally collapsed (i.e., if it is necessary that every \( F \)-thing is necessarily \( F \)), then \( F \) is equinumerous to actually exemplifying \( F \):

\[
(1) \quad \Box \forall x (Fx \rightarrow \Box Fx) \rightarrow F \approx_E \lambda z \ A F z
\]

Moreover, when we have two modally collapsed properties, their equinumerosity \( E \) is also modally collapsed, i.e., if it is necessary that every \( F \)-thing is necessarily \( F \) and it is necessary that every \( G \)-thing is necessarily \( G \), then necessarily, if \( F \) and \( G \) are equinumerous \( E \), they are necessarily equinumerous \( E \):

\[
(2) \quad \Box \forall x (Fx \rightarrow \Box Fx) \& \Box \forall x (Gx \rightarrow \Box Gx) \rightarrow \Box (F \approx E G \rightarrow \Box (F \approx_E G))
\]

(.2) plays an important role when we consider properties like actually exemplifying \( F \), e.g., \( \lambda z \ A F z \).

14.3 Natural Cardinals and The Number of Fs

In this section, we work our way towards a definition of \( x \) numbers \( G \) and then define \( x \) is a natural cardinal. When we reconstruct Frege’s understanding of these notions within object theory, we introduce some emendations. We’ll see that Frege’s understanding has an unintuitive consequence when transferred to a modal setting, namely, that the objects which number properties and which serve as natural cardinals would vary from possible world to possible world. This runs contrary to our general understanding of how natural cardinals work, for if there were, say, 2 ordinary \( F \) things at one possible world and 2 ordinary \( F \) things at a different possible world, we should be able to say that the same number numbers \( F \) at both worlds (cf. Panza 2018, 99–100, for a related point).\(^{325}\)

With a minor adjustment, however, we can ensure not only that there is one group of abstract objects that number properties and serve as natural cardinals, but also that these same objects can correctly number properties across modal contexts. One desideratum in what follows is to develop number theory without invoking the notion of possible world defined in Chapter 12. However,

\(^{325}\)Panza (2018) takes as a premise the fact that, for any property \( F \), it is contingent as to which object is \( \# F \) given that it is contingent as to which first-order properties exemplify the second-order property: being a first-order property equinumerous to \( F \). His conclusion is that \( \# F \) isn’t therefore a logical object. We don’t draw this same conclusion, since we allow that logical objects can be abstracted from contingent patterns in the natural world.
it is occasionally helpful to develop intuitive remarks in which we appeal to the notion of a possible world (e.g., in Remark (739) below). This is for exegetical purposes only, to prepare the ground and to help one better understand the issues involved.

**Remark (739):** How to Adapt Frege’s Conception of a Number That Belongs to a Concept. In 1884, Frege:

- defines *the Number which belongs to the concept* $F$ as: the extension of the concept *equinumerous to the concept* $F$ (§68), and
- defines *$n$ is a Number* as: there exists a concept such that $n$ is the Number which belongs to it (§72).

So, for Frege, a (cardinal) number is an extension of the second-level concept *being equinumerous to $G$*, for some $G$.\(^{326}\)

Now we’ve already seen why Frege’s notion of equinumerosity, when adapted to object theory, has to be reconstructed as equinumerosity$_E$, i.e., equinumerosity with respect to the ordinary objects. Given this restriction, though, we have the means to define, for any property $G$, an abstract object that encodes all and only the properties equinumerous$_E$ to $G$. So suppose we define (a) *$x$ numbers $G$* if and only if $x$ is an abstract object that encodes all and only the properties *equinumerous$_E$ to $G$*. So suppose we define (b) *$x$ is a natural cardinal* if and only if there is a $G$ such that $x$ numbers $G$:

\[
\text{Numbers}(x, G) \equiv_{df} \forall \exists! x \& \forall F (xF \equiv F \equiv E G)
\]

\[
\text{NaturalCardinal}(x) \equiv_{df} \exists G (\text{Numbers}(x, G))
\]

Though these definitions match Frege’s as closely as possible within object theory, they give rise to a problem: in our modal setting, they imply that different cardinal numbers emerge in different modal contexts. We can restate this problem by speaking intuitively in terms of possible worlds: the above definitions imply that the cardinals at one possible world will be distinct from the cardinals at other possible worlds.

The problem here isn’t that some object, say $x$, numbers $G$ at possible world $w_1$ and some different object, say $y$, numbers $G$ at possible world $w_2$. That is only to be expected, since $G$ might be exemplified by two ordinary objects in $w_1$, and three ordinary objects in $w_2$. Rather, the problem is that $G$ might...

---

\(^{326}\)Indeed, as we saw in a previous chapter, Boolos (1987, 3; 1998, 184) understands Frege by suggesting (a) that Frege implicitly uses a second mode of predication, namely $F$ is *in* $x$ (which Boolos represents as $F_{\eta}x$) and (b) that Frege conceives of the number $x$ that belongs to a concept $G$ as satisfying the condition: for every concept $F$, $F_{\eta}x$ if and only if $F$ is equinumerous to $G$. In the present analysis, we use the more general notion of encoding, $xF$, instead Boolos’ notion $F_{\eta}x$, since the latter has limited applicability.
be exemplified by two ordinary objects in both \( w_1 \) and \( w_2 \), but the object that numbers \( G \) in \( w_1 \) is different from the object that numbers \( G \) in \( w_2 \). To see why, note first that the above definitions give rise to the following necessary equivalences:

\[
\Box(\text{Numbers}(x, G) \equiv (A!x \& \forall F (xF \equiv F \approx E G))
\]

\[
\Box(\text{NaturalCardinal}(x) \equiv \exists G (\text{Numbers}(x, G))
\]

Intuitively, then, the embedded material biconditionals should be true at every possible world. But consider the scenario depicted in Figure 14.9, which shows only the ordinary objects that exemplify \( P \), \( Q \), and \( R \) in possible worlds \( w_1 \) and \( w_2 \). Clearly, this scenario illustrates (737.1), since \( P \) and \( Q \), for example, are equinumerous \( E \) in \( w_1 \), but not in \( w_2 \). Now, intuitively, the number of \( P \)s at \( w_1 \) should be identical to the number of \( P \)s at \( w_2 \), since there are exactly two objects exemplifying \( P \) at both \( w_1 \) and \( w_2 \). But suppose \( x \) numbers \( P \) at \( w_1 \), and so is a natural cardinal in virtue of numbering \( P \). Then, by the above definition, \( x \) encodes all and only the properties equinumerous \( E \) to \( P \) at \( w_1 \). Hence, \( x \) encodes \( Q \) as well, though not \( R \). Now suppose \( y \) numbers \( P \) at \( w_2 \), making it, too, a natural cardinal. As previously noted, it should be the case that \( y = x \). But then, \( y \) encodes \( R \), not \( Q \), since \( R \) is equinumerous \( E \) to \( P \) at \( w_2 \) and \( Q \) isn’t. Hence, it can’t be the case that \( y = x \), since \( x \) and \( y \) are abstract objects that encode different properties. In general, the natural cardinals carved out by the definition at \( w_1 \) are different from the natural cardinals carved out by the definition at \( w_2 \).

This is not just a consequence of identifying an object that numbers \( G \) as an abstract object that encodes the properties equinumerous \( E \) to \( G \). The problem arises from adapting Frege’s conception of numbers in a modal setting. On Frege’s conception of numbers, the second-level concept being equinumerous to \( P \) has different properties falling under it at \( w_1 \) and at \( w_2 \). So the object that is the extension of this second-level concept at \( w_1 \) is different from the object that is the extension of the second-level concept at \( w_2 \). Thus, the number that belongs to \( P \) at \( w_1 \) is different from the number that belongs to \( P \) at \( w_2 \), i.e., the
natural cardinal 2 abstracted from \( w_1 \) is different than the natural cardinal 2 abstracted from \( w_2 \). Since equivalence classes of equinumerous properties may vary from world to world, the Fregean abstractions on the basis of the simple equivalence condition of equinumerosity (or equinumerous \( E \)) will yield \emph{world-bound} natural cardinals.

However, we can avoid this result by noting (737.2) and strategically placing the actuality operator in the definition of \( x \) \emph{numbers} \( G \). Instead of the above, we shall say (a) \( x \) \emph{numbers} \( G \) if and only if \( x \) is an abstract object that encodes all and only the properties \( F \) such that actually exemplifying \( F \) is equinumerous to \( G \) with respect to the ordinary objects, and (b) \( x \) is a \emph{natural cardinal} if and only if there is a \( G \) such that \( x \) \emph{numbers} \( G \):

\[
\text{Numbers}(x,G) \equiv_{df} A!x \& \forall F (xF \equiv [\lambda z x Fz] \approx_E G)
\]

\[
\text{NaturalCardinal}(x) \equiv_{df} \exists G(\text{Numbers}(x,G))
\]

These definitions then effectively become the following necessary equivalences:

\[
\square(\text{Numbers}(x,G) \equiv A!x \& \forall F (xF \equiv [\lambda z x Fz] \approx_E G))
\]

\[
\square(\text{NaturalCardinal}(x) \equiv \exists G(\text{Numbers}(x,G)))
\]

So let’s see how these definitions and equivalences yield \emph{universal} cardinals; it helps to add an actual world to our picture, as in Figure 14.10. Now, intuitively, as in the previous figure, the number of \( Ps \) at \( w_1 \) should be identical to the number of \( Ps \) at \( w_2 \), since there are exactly two objects exemplifying \( P \) at both

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure14.10.png}
\caption{Emergence of universal natural cardinals.}
\end{figure}
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We verify this over the next two paragraphs by using our revised definitions.

Suppose $x$ numbers $P$ at $w_1$, making $x$ a natural cardinal in virtue of numbering $P$. Then, by our adjusted Fregean definition, $x$ encodes all and only the properties $F$ such that $[\lambda z A]\approx E\lambda z A Fz$ is equinumerous $E$ to $P$ at $w_1$. Inspection shows that $x$ therefore encodes both $Q$ and $R$, since $[\lambda z A]Qz$ and $[\lambda z A]Rz$ are both equinumerous $E$ to $P$ at $w_1$, i.e., there is a one-to-one correspondence from the ordinary objects exemplifying $[\lambda z A]Qz$ to the ordinary objects exemplifying $P$ at $w_1$, and similarly from the ordinary objects exemplifying $[\lambda z A]Rz$.

Now suppose $y$ numbers $P$ at $w_2$, making $y$ a natural cardinal. Then, by the adjusted Fregean definition, $y$ encodes all and only those $F$s such that $[\lambda z A]Fz$ is equinumerous $E$ to $P$ at $w_2$. If we assume that these are the only encoding facts available, then $x = y$; they are abstract objects that encode the same properties. Not only is the number of $P$s at $w_1$ identical to the number of $P$s at $w_2$, but the number of $Q$s at $w_1$ is identical to the number of $R$s at $w_2$. And so on.

Thus, a single group of universal natural cardinals emerges from our adjusted definition and that is why we shall pursue this revised version in what follows.

(740) **Theorems:** Facts About Actually Exemplifying $F$. (1) It is actually the case that $F$ is equinumerous to actually exemplifying $F$ and (2) actually exemplifying $F$ is modally collapsed:

(1) $\forall F (\exists F \approx E [\lambda z A Fz])$

(2) $\Box \forall F (\exists F \approx E [\lambda z A Fz])$

(741) **Definitions:** Numbering a Property. Consequently, we officially define: $x$ numbers (the ordinary objects exemplifying) $G$ if and only if $x$ is an abstract object that encodes just the properties $F$ such that actually exemplifying $F$ is equinumerous $E$ to $G$. Formally:

$$Numbers(x, G) \equiv_{df} A!x \& G \downarrow \forall F (xF \equiv [\lambda z A Fz] \approx E G)$$

As noted in the previous Remark (739), the use of the actuality operator in the definition of $Numbers(x, G)$ constitutes a small but important modification to Frege’s definition. We can render the definition intuitively as: for any world $w$, the abstract object that numbers $G$ in $w$ encodes those properties $F$ such that the ordinary objects exemplifying $F$ at the actual world correspond one-to-one with the ordinary objects exemplifying $G$ in $w$. This guarantees that there won’t be different numbers at other possible worlds.
Theorem: Equinumerosity\(_E\), Material Equivalence\(_E\), and Numbering.

(1) If \(G\) and \(H\) are equinumerous\(_E\), then \(x\) numbers \(G\) if and only if \(x\) numbers \(H\);
(2) If \(x\) numbers both \(G\) and \(H\), then \(G\) and \(H\) are equinumerous\(_E\); and
(3) If \(G\) is materially equivalent to \(H\) with respect to the ordinary objects, then \(x\) numbers \(G\) if and only if \(x\) numbers \(H\):

\[
(1) \quad G \approx_E H \rightarrow (\text{Numbers}(x, G) \equiv \text{Numbers}(x, H))
\]

\[
(2) \quad (\text{Numbers}(x, G) \& \text{Numbers}(x, H)) \rightarrow G \approx_E H
\]

\[
(3) \quad G \equiv_E H \rightarrow (\text{Numbers}(x, G) \equiv \text{Numbers}(x, H))
\]

Theorem: Conditional Underlying Hume's Principle. It is a modally strict consequence of the foregoing that if \(x\) numbers \(G\) and \(y\) numbers \(H\), then \(x\) is identical to \(y\) if and only if \(G\) and \(H\) are equinumerous with respect to the ordinary objects:

\[
(\text{Numbers}(x, G) \& \text{Numbers}(y, H)) \rightarrow (x = y \equiv G \approx_E H)
\]

Remark: Numbered Properties and Material Equivalence\(_E\). Intuitively, the fact that \(x\) numbers both \(G\) and \(H\) doesn't imply that \(G\) and \(H\) are materially equivalent with respect to the ordinary objects. So the following claim should be demonstrably false:

\[
(\text{Numbers}(x, G) \& \text{Numbers}(x, H)) \rightarrow G \equiv_E H
\]

Of course, examples are easy to come by: if one and the same abstract object numbers being a planet and being a human artifact on my desk, it doesn't follow that all and only the ordinary objects that exemplify being a planet exemplify being a human artifact on my desk.

But the question is, can one prove the negation of the claim displayed above within our system without additional assumptions, i.e., can we prove, for some object \(x\) and properties \(G\) and \(H\), that both \(\text{Numbers}(x, G)\) and \(\text{Numbers}(x, H)\) but \(G\) is not equivalent\(_E\) to \(H\):

\[
\exists x \exists G \exists H (\text{Numbers}(x, G) \& \text{Numbers}(x, H) \& \neg G \equiv_E H)
\]

As it turns out, the proof of this claim holds under the condition that there are at least two ordinary objects, as the next theorem establishes.

Theorem: Conditional Fact. If there are at least two ordinary objects, then there is an abstract object \(x\) and properties \(G\) and \(H\) such that \(x\) numbers both \(G\) and \(H\) but \(G\) and \(H\) are not materially equivalent\(_E\):

\[
\exists u \exists v (u \neq v) \rightarrow \exists x \exists G \exists H (\text{Numbers}(x, G) \& \text{Numbers}(x, H) \& \neg G \equiv_E H)
\]
Note, however, that our axioms we've asserted thus far do not guarantee that there are at least two ordinary objects.

(746) Theorems: Existence of (Unique) Objects that Number Properties. It follows immediately from definition (741) and (strengthened) comprehension for abstract objects that (1) there exists an object that numbers $G$; and (2) there exists a unique object that numbers $G$:

(1) $\exists x \text{Numbers}(x, G)$

(2) $\exists! x \text{Numbers}(x, G)$

Note here that by RN, (1) and (2) are necessarily true. Intuitively, in terms of possible worlds, these necessary truths tell us that at every possible world, there is a (unique) $x$ that numbers $G$ there, i.e., that encodes all and only the properties $F$ such that actually being $F$ is equinumerous to $G$ there.

(747) Theorem: When Numbering a Property Is and Isn’t Contingent. If we use reasoning analogous to that referenced in the proof of theorem (737.2), it is relatively straightforward to show that there is an object $x$ and a property $G$ such that $x$ numbers $G$ but doesn’t necessarily number $G$:

(1) $\exists x \exists G (\text{Numbers}(x, G) \& \neg \Box \text{Numbers}(x, G))$

This theorem takes on significance when we consider it in conjunction with the necessitation of (746.1). For taken together, they assure us that every property in any modal context is numbered by some object even though different objects may number the property in other modal contexts.

However, it follows generally that if $G$ is any modally collapsed property, then necessarily, anything that numbers $G$ necessarily numbers $G$:

(2) $\Box \forall z (Gz \rightarrow Gz) \rightarrow \Box \forall x (\text{Numbers}(x, G) \rightarrow \Box \text{Numbers}(x, G))$

Thus, since the property actually exemplifying $G$, i.e., $[\lambda z zGz]$, exhibits modal collapse (740.2), it follows that necessarily, anything that numbers $[\lambda z zGz]$ necessarily numbers $[\lambda z zGz]$:

(3) $\Box \forall x (\text{Numbers}(x, [\lambda z zGz]) \rightarrow \Box \text{Numbers}(x, [\lambda z zGz]))$

(748) Theorems: The Number of $Gs$ Exists. Though we have now established that necessarily, there exists a unique abstract object that numbers $G$, the definite description the number of $Gs$ rigidly picks out the abstract object that in fact numbers $G$. We therefore know that this object exists:

$ix \text{Numbers}(x, G)$
(749) Definition: Notation for the Number of (Ordinary) Gs. Since it follows that, for every G, the description \( ixNumbers(x, G) \) is significant, we may introduce the notation \( \#G \) to rigidly refer to the number of (ordinary) Gs:

\[
\#G =_{df} ixNumbers(x, G)
\]

Since the existence of G is required by the condition Numbers(x, G), a term of the form \( \#\Pi \) will be empty if \( \Pi \) is empty.

(750) Theorem: The Number of Gs is Canonical. Here are two theorems that show the number of Gs is (identical to) a canonical object:

(1) \( \#G = ix(A!x & \forall F (xF \equiv [\lambda z \Delta Fz] \approx E G)) \)

(2) \( \#G = ix(A!x & \forall F (xF \equiv F \approx E G)) \)

(751) Remark: The Number of Gs is Not Strictly Canonical. Recall that in (257.2), we stipulated that \( ix(A!x & \forall F (xF \equiv \phi)) \) is a strictly canonical object just in case \( \phi \) is a rigid condition on properties, i.e., by (257.1), if and only if \( \vdash \forall F (\phi \rightarrow \Box \phi) \). However, if we let \( \phi \) be the formula \( [\lambda z \Delta Fz] \approx E G \), then theorem (737.2) has the form \( \exists F \exists G (\phi \& \Diamond \neg \phi) \). By reasoning analogous to that in Remarks (288) and (320), it follows that \( \phi \) is not a rigid condition on properties, on pain of system inconsistency. So though \( \#G \) is (identical to) a canonical object, it is not (identical to) a strictly canonical object.

Since \( \#G \) isn’t strictly canonical, some well-known Fregean theorems about this object won’t be modally strict. In particular, we’ll see that the most obvious way of formulating Hume’s Principle won’t be modally strict. There is, however, a way of formulating a modally strict version of Hume’s Principle. See theorem (755) below.

(752) Definition: Natural Cardinals. Intuitively, cardinals are things that answer the question, “How many Fs are there?”. Frege defined a cardinal number to be a number that belongs to some property. To adapt this suggestion to the present context, we define the notion of a natural cardinal as something that answers the question, “How many (ordinary) Fs are there?”. We say that \( x \) a natural cardinal if and only if \( x \) is identical to the number of Gs, for some property G:

\[
NaturalCardinal(x) \equiv_{df} \exists G (x = \#G)
\]

Cf. Frege’s definition of Anzahl in 1884, §72, and in 1893, §42.327

(753) Theorem: Natural Cardinals are Necessarily Such. It is a modally strict theorem that if \( x \) is a natural cardinal, then necessarily \( x \) is a natural cardinal:

327In 1884, §72, Frege says:
the expression

“\( n \) is a Number”

is to mean the same as the expression
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NaturalCardinal(x) → □NaturalCardinal(x)

This theorem, then, contrasts with (747).

(754) ★Theorem: Hume’s Principle and Corollaries. It is a non-modally strict theorem that the number of Fs is identical to the number of Gs if and only if F and G are equinumerous:

(1) #F = #G ≡ F ≈ E G

Cf. Frege 1884 (§63–§72). Our version of Hume’s Principle clearly differs from Frege’s in two ways: (i) #F numbers the ordinary objects that exemplify F, whereas Frege assumed that cardinal numbers can number the abstract objects exemplifying F as well; (ii) #F has been rigidly defined in a modal setting, unlike Frege’s. Interestingly, in 1893, Frege doesn’t prove Hume’s Principle as a biconditional (Tennant 2004, 108–9).328

If we expand the right side of Hume’s Principle by definition (726.3) and apply theorem (729), we may conclude (2) that the number of Fs is identical to the number of Gs if and only if there is a relation that maps E F onto G one-to-one:

(2) #F = #G ≡ ∃R( R | : F \overset{1:1}{\rightarrow} E G )

It is also a straightforward consequence of Hume’s Principle and previous theorems that (3) if F and G are materially equivalent with respect to the ordinary objects, then the number of Fs is identical to the number of Gs:

(3) F ≡ E G → #F = #G

(755) Theorem: Modally Strict Version of Hume’s Principle. If we try to express what Hume’s Principle asserts without using terms defined by definite

“there exists a concept such that u is the Number which belongs to it”.

Thus the concept of Number receives its definition, apparently, indeed, in terms of itself, but actually without any fallacy, since “the Number which belongs to the concept F” has already been defined.

We have tried to represent this definition in our notation.

Note that in 1893, §42, Frege says:

\[ \tilde{\tau} \mu \Gamma = \Gamma \] is the truth-value of: that there is a concept to which the cardinal number \( \Gamma \) belongs or, as we can also say, that \( \Gamma \) is a cardinal number. Therefore, we call the function \( \tilde{\tau} \mu \) the concept cardinal number.

So where we use \( \# \) to operate on G to form \( \#G \) (i.e., the number of Gs), Frege uses the symbol \( \mu \) to operate on an extension \( u \) of a concept to form \( \mu u \), i.e., the number of the concept for which \( u \) is the extension.

328 Frege proves each direction as a separate theorem. The right-to-left direction is proved in §65, Theorem 32, and the contraposited version of the left-to-right direction is proved in §69, Theorem 49. See May & Wehmeier 2019, for further discussion.
descriptions, then a modally strict version of the principle presents itself, namely, there exists a unique object that numbers both $F$ and $G$ if and only if $F$ is equinumerous$_E$ to $G$:

$$\exists!x(\text{Numbers}(x,F) \& \text{Numbers}(x,G)) \equiv F \approx_E G$$

This principle directly asserts that the equinumerosity$_E$ of $F$ and $G$ is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a unique object that numbers both properties, and vice versa. By RN, this modally strict equivalence holds necessarily. This is a version of Hume's Principle even though it doesn't mention $#F$.

(756) **Lemma:** Fact About Non-Identity$_E$. Since theorem (236.1) tells us that $O!x \rightarrow x =_E x$, it follows that nothing whatsoever exemplifies the property of being an ordinary object that fails to be self-identical$_E$:

$$\neg \exists y[\lambda x O!x \& \neg(x =_E x)]y$$

(757) **Definition:** Zero. Since it is easily provable that the number of the property being a non-self-identical$_E$ ordinary object exists, we may define Zero to be the number of the property being an ordinary object that fails to be self-identical$_E$, i.e., using infix notation for the negated identity$_E$ claim:

$$0 =_{df} \#[\lambda x O!x \& x \neq x]$$

Using $u$ as a restricted variable ranging over ordinary objects, we can write this definition as follows:

$$0 =_{df} \#[\lambda u u \neq u]$$

Cf. Frege 1884, §74, and 1893, §41. We’ve kept the definition of Zero as close to Frege’s definition as possible. But we could have used any other property that either actually or necessarily fails to be exemplified by ordinary objects. For example, $T$ (i.e., the negation of $L$, where $L$ is the property $[\lambda x E!x \rightarrow E!x]$) is a property that is necessarily unexemplified and so necessarily unexemplified by ordinary objects.

(758) **Theorem:** Zero is a Natural Cardinal.

NaturalCardinal(0)

(759) **Lemmas:** Equinumerosity$_E$ and The Number of $Gs$. We now establish that: (.1) It is actually the case that $x$ numbers $G$ if and only if $x$ numbers actually exemplifying $G$; (.2) $x$ numbers actually exemplifying $G$ iff $x$ is the number of $Gs$; (.3) the number of $Gs$ numbers actually exemplifying $G$; (.4) the number of $Gs$ is abstract and, for any property $F$, encodes $F$ iff being actually $F$ is equinumerous$_E$ to actually exemplifying $G$; (.5) the number of $Gs$ encodes actually exemplifying $G$; (.6) if $x$ numbers $G$, then $x$ is a natural cardinal:
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(.1) $\exists A \text{Numbers}(x, G) \equiv \text{Numbers}(x, [\lambda z \exists Gz])$

(.2) $\text{Numbers}(x, [\lambda z \exists Gz]) \equiv x = \# G$

(.3) $\text{Numbers}(\# G, [\lambda y \exists Gy])$

(.4) $A! \# G & \forall F (\# GF \equiv [\lambda z \exists Fz] \approx [\lambda z \exists Gz])$

(.5) $\# G [\lambda z \exists Gz]$

(.6) $\text{Numbers}(x, G) \rightarrow \text{NaturalCardinal}(x)$

In (.4) and (.5), we put the symbol $G$ immediately following the octothorpe in a slightly smaller font size solely for ease of readability. Thus, $A! \# G$ asserts that $\# G$ exemplifies being abstract, while $\# GF$ asserts that $\# G$ encodes $F$.

Note here that we’ve done something different in proving the above theorems about $\# G$, namely, that we’ve proved modally strict theorems having the above forms even though $\# G$ is not strictly canonical. In previous chapters, the analogous theorems (i.e., having the above form) governing objects that aren’t strictly canonical were not modally strict. Consequently, it is important to observe the subtle differences in the above theorems which yield the modal strictness, such as the places where $[\lambda z \exists Gz]$ occurs instead of $G$. Our goal, remember, is to build natural cardinals and natural numbers that are completely general and that can number properties no matter what the modal context. See again Remark (739).

(760) Theorem: Natural Cardinals Encode the Properties They Number. It is now provable that a natural cardinal encodes a property $F$ just in case it the number of $Fs$:

$$\text{NaturalCardinal}(x) \rightarrow \forall F (xF \equiv x = \# F)$$

Clearly, once we apply the theory, then it follows from (.2) that if $x$ is a natural cardinal and is equal to the number of planets (i.e., and $x = \# P$), then $x$ encodes being a planet.

(761) Theorem: Zero Numbers Empty Properties. As simple consequences of the previous theorems and definitions we have $F$ fails to be exemplified by ordinary objects iff Zero numbers $F$:

$$\neg \exists u Fu \equiv \text{Numbers}(0, F)$$

Notice that since this theorem is modally strict, it holds necessarily. So, intuitively, at any possible world $w$, $F$ is empty at $w$ if and only if Numbers$(0, F)$. This shows that we’ve defined the natural cardinal Zero in such a way that it numbers empty properties at every world; there isn’t a different number Zero at other worlds that number the empty properties there.
(762) ★**Theorem:** Non-Strict Facts About Natural Cardinals. It is now a theorem that (.1) a natural cardinal encodes all and only the properties it numbers:

(.1) \( \text{NaturalCardinal}(x) \rightarrow \forall F(xF \equiv \text{Numbers}(x,F)) \)

Moreover, (.2) Zero encodes all and only the properties that no ordinary object exemplifies:

(.2) \( 0F \equiv \neg \exists uFu \)

Cf. Frege 1884 (§75) and 1893 (§99, Theorem 97). Finally, a property \( F \) is unexemplified by ordinary objects if and only if the number of \( Fs \) is Zero:

(.3) \( \neg \exists uFu \equiv \#F = 0 \)

Cf. the left-to-right direction with Frege 1893, Theorem 97.

### 14.4 Ancestrals and One-to-One Relations

(763) **Definition and Theorem:** Properties Hereditary w.r.t. a Relation. Let us say that a property \( F \) is hereditary with respect to a relation \( R \) if and only if every pair of \( R \)-related objects are such that if the first exemplifies \( F \) then so does the second:

(.1) \( \text{Hereditary}(F,R) \equiv_{df} R \downarrow & F \downarrow & \forall x \forall y (Rxy \rightarrow (Fx \rightarrow Fy)) \)

In what follows, we sometimes say \( F \) is \( R \)-hereditary instead of \( F \) is hereditary w.r.t. \( R \). We now have the following theorem:

(.2) \( [\lambda xy \forall F((\forall z (Rxz \rightarrow Fz) \& \text{Hereditary}(F,R)) \rightarrow Fy)] \downarrow \) \hspace{1cm} (**Theorem**)

This theorem establishes that the definiens of the following definition-by-\( = \) is significant.

(764) **Definition:** The Strong Ancestral of a Relation \( R \). In 1879, (Part III, Proposition 76), 1884 (§79) and 1893 (§45), Frege defined the notion \( y \) is an ancestor of \( x \) in the \( R \)-series, though later in Whitehead & Russell 1910–1913 (1925–1927, *90), say \( x \) is an ancestor of \( y \) with respect to relation \( R \). In the present work, we define the relation-forming operator being an \( R \)-ancestor of, written \( R' \), as: being an \( x \) and \( y \) such that \( y \) exemplifies every property \( F \) that is both (a) exemplified by all the objects to which \( x \) is \( R \)-related and (b) hereditary with respect to \( R \):

\[ R' =_{df} [\lambda xy \forall F((\forall z (Rxz \rightarrow Fz) \& \text{Hereditary}(F,R)) \rightarrow Fy)] \]

In what follows, we sometimes refer to \( R' \) as the strong ancestral of \( R \).
Theorem: Fundamental Fact about $R^*$. The following fundamental fact about the strong ancestral of $R$ follows immediately by $\beta$-Conversion: $x$ is an $R$-ancestor of $y$ if and only if $y$ exemplifies every property $F$ that is both (a) exemplified by all the objects to which $x$ is $R$-related and (b) hereditary with respect to $R$:

$$R^*xy \equiv \forall F(\forall z(Rxz \rightarrow Fz) \& \text{Hereditary}(F,R) \rightarrow Fy)$$

If we speak mathematically for the moment (i.e., using mathematical notions we haven’t defined within our system), we can think of any relation $R$ as inducing sequences on its domain. That is, whenever $Rab$ holds, there is a sense in which $a$ comes immediately before $b$ in an $R$-induced sequence. So, if $Rab$, $Rbc$, $Rcd$, and $Rbe$, then we can say that $R$ induces the sequence $a,b,c,d$ (along with its subsequences) and it also induces the sequence $a,b,e$ (along with its subsequences). We can then understand the ancestral $R^*$ as the relation that holds between the first member of an $R$-sequence and any later member of that sequence. Alternatively, one might say that the strong ancestral of $R$ is the transitive closure of $R$.

Lemmas: Facts About the Ancestral of $R$. The following are immediate consequences of (764) and (765): (.1) if $x$ bears $R$ to $y$, then $x$ is an $R$-ancestor of $y$; (.2) if (a) $x$ is an $R$-ancestor of $y$, (b) $F$ is exemplified by every object to which $x$ bears $R$, and (c) $F$ is $R$-hereditary, then $y$ exemplifies $F$; (.3) if (a) $x$ exemplifies $F$, (b) $x$ is an $R$-ancestor of $y$, and (c) $F$ is $R$-hereditary, then $y$ exemplifies $F$; (.4) if (a) $x$ bears $R$ to $y$ and $y$ is an $R$-ancestor of $z$, then $x$ is an $R$-ancestor of $z$; (.5) if $x$ is an $R$-ancestor of $y$ and $y$ is an $R$-ancestor of $z$, then $x$ is an $R$-ancestor of $z$; and (.6) if $x$ is an $R$-ancestor of $y$ and $y$ is an $R$-ancestor of $z$, then $x$ is an $R$-ancestor of $z$:

1. $Rxy \rightarrow R^*xy$
2. $(R^*xy \& \forall z(Rxz \rightarrow Fz) \& \text{Hereditary}(F,R)) \rightarrow Fy$
3. $(Fx \& R^*xy \& \text{Hereditary}(F,R)) \rightarrow Fy$
4. $(Rxy \& R^*yz) \rightarrow R^*xz$
5. $R^*xy \rightarrow \exists zRzy$
6. $(R^*xy \& R^*yz) \rightarrow R^*xz)$

Compare (.2) with Frege 1893, Theorem 123 (though beware of Frege's use of italic $a$ and Fraktur $a$ in the same formula), (.3) with Theorem 128, (.4) with Theorem 129, and (.5) with Theorem 124. Frege proved (.6) in 1879, Proposition 98.

Remark: Digression on a Departure From Frege's Methods and Previous Methods. Those familiar with Frege's work would expect, at this point,
a definition of the weak ancestral for an arbitrary relation $R$, i.e., introduce a
definition by identity for a new relation-term forming operator $R^*$ (‘the weak
ancestral of $R$’) using the expression being an $x$ and $y$ such that either $x$ is a strong
$R$-ancestor of $y$ or $x$ is identical to $y$. But if we were to offer such a definition, we
wouldn’t be able to guarantee that the the definiens denotes a relation. That
is, the $\lambda$-expression used as definiens in the following is not guaranteed to be
significant:

$$ R^* =_{df} [\lambda xy R^*xy \lor x = y] $$

Of course, we might instead introduce a definition by equivalence that says: $x$ is
a weak $R$-ancestor of $y$ (‘$R^*(x,y)$’) if and only if $R^*xy \lor x = y$ and explore theorems
that govern this new formula. This is in fact the method used in Zalta 1999. In
that work, it was asserted, as an axiom, that $Precedes(x,y)$ is a relation, and the
weak ancestral of this relation was defined as the following condition:

$$ Precedes^+(x,y) \equiv_{df} Precedes^*(x,y) \lor x = y $$

It was then asserted, as an axiom, that this condition also defined a relation.
These axioms were then used to derive a general principle of induction and
its corollary, the principle of mathematical induction. An Aczel model was
described to demonstrate that the new axioms could be consistently added to
the theory.

But further investigation into the matter shows that the methods used in
Zalta 1999 were stronger than strictly necessary and that we can achieve the
goal of deriving the principle of mathematical induction using weaker meth-
ods. Indeed, the new axioms added in Zalta 1999 to derive the general prin-
ciple of induction were not sufficiently restricted and require weakening, for
with a little work, we can show that they lead to McMichael’s paradox. To see
the problem with the earlier work, suppose $P$ is the relation of
predecessor.\textsuperscript{329}

Notice that if both the strong and weak ancestrals of $P$ are also relations, writ-
ten $P^*$ and $P^+$, then one can form the relation $[\lambda xy P^+xy \& \neg P^*xy]$, i.e.,
the relation of being an $x$ and $y$ such that $x$ is a weak $P$-ancestor of $y$ but not a
strong $P$-ancestor of $y$. But this relation turns out to be equivalent to a com-
pletely general relation of identity given that the definitions of $P$, $P^*$, and $P^+$
are defined for any objects whatsoever.\textsuperscript{330} A completely general relation of

\textsuperscript{329}The following observations emerged in a series of conversations in which Uri critically exam-
ined the various formulations of the earlier work. We’ve adopted Uri’s suggestions concerning the
best way to derive induction more carefully and unproblematically.

\textsuperscript{330}To see this, we can reason as follows:

\begin{align*}
[\lambda xy P^+xy \& \neg P^*xy]zw & \equiv P^+zw \& \neg P^*zw \quad \text{by } \beta \text{-Conversion} \\
& \equiv (P^+zw \lor z = w) \& \neg P^*zw \quad \text{by definition of } P^+zw \\
& \equiv z = w \quad \text{by propositional logic}
\end{align*}

Hence the defined relation would hold between any two objects if and only if they are equal. There
identity would reintroduce McMichael’s paradox, something that the present system currently avoids; see (190.3) and (190.4). So we have to take greater care when defining the weak ancestral of a relation \( R \). Fortunately, the error introduced by overlooking this consequence is one from which we can recover. For the notion of identity needed (in the definition of the weak ancestral of \( R \)) only has to be an equivalence relation on the objects in the domain of \( R \). The weak ancestral of \( R \) doesn’t require a completely general notion of identity for its definition.

Thus, there is a straightforward way to proceed. We first define and examine some theorems about rigid one-to-one relations \( R \). These theorems about rigid one-to-one relations in fact hold of one-to-one relations generally. However, since we will be introducing the restricted variable \( \mathbf{R} \) to range over one-to-one relations we want to make sure that our restricted variables are rigid restricted variables, in the sense of (334), so that when we reason modally about one-to-one relations using these rigid restricted variables, our theorems will be modally strict. See the discussion in Remarks (334) and (335).

In addition to developing theorems about rigid one-to-one relations, we also introduce a restricted and safe relation of identity, \( =_{\mathbf{R}} \), that can be defined on the elements in the domain of any rigid one-to-one relation. Then we shall define the weak ancestral for rigid one-to-one relations \( \mathbf{R} \) in terms of the strong ancestral of \( \mathbf{R} \) and \( =_{\mathbf{R}} \). This method guarantees that the weak ancestrals of such relations are themselves relations. So when we (a) axiomatize the relation of immediate predecessor \((\mathbb{P})\) and (b) show it is a rigid one-to-one relation, we’ll then be able to form its weak ancestral, define natural number, and derive the Dedekind/Peano postulates more simply than was done in Zalta 1999 (i.e., we no longer need to assert that the weak ancestral of the predecessor relation is a relation). As part of this effort, we plan to show that both the general principle of induction and the principle of mathematical induction are theorems. So the following investigation does not reprise Zalta 1999, but rather revises and improves on the presentation there.

(768) **Definitions and Theorem:** Rigid One-to-One Relations and \( \mathbf{R} \)-Domain Elements. We’ve had occasion to discuss in passing one-to-one relations. We now introduce this notion officially. First we say that (.1) \( R \) is one-to-one, written \( 1-1(R) \), just in case for any objects \( x \) and \( y \), if \( x \) bears \( R \) to \( z \) and \( y \) bears \( R \) to \( z \), then \( x \) is identical to \( y \):

\[
(\text{.1}) \quad 1-1(R) \equiv_{df} R \downarrow \land \forall x \forall y (Rxz \land Ryz \rightarrow x = y)
\]

Now if we recall the definition of a rigid relation in (553.1), then we next say

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can be no such relation in object theory. This result could have been avoided if it had been asserted that the weak ancestral is a relation only relative to the domain of \( \text{Precedes} \).
(2) \( R \) is a rigid one-to-one relation, written \( \text{Rigid}_{1-1}(R) \), just in case \( R \) is one-to-one and rigid:
\[
(2) \quad \text{Rigid}_{1-1}(R) \equiv_{df} 1-1(R) \& \text{Rigid}(R)
\]

It now follows that (3) if \( R \) is a rigid, one-to-one relation, then it is necessarily such that whenever \( R x z \) and \( R y z \) then \( x = y \):
\[
(3) \quad \text{Rigid}_{1-1}(R) \rightarrow \Box \forall x \forall y \forall z (R x z \& R y z \rightarrow x = y) \quad \text{(Theorem)}
\]

Clearly, there are rigid one-to-one relations: \( =_E \) is an example. We know that \( x =_E y \rightarrow \Box x =_E y \) (i.e., \( =_E \) is rigid). But clearly \( x =_E y \) is also one-to-one: if \( x =_E z \) and \( y =_E z \), then \( x = y \) (exercise). Consequently, we introduce the following restricted variables:
\[ R, S, \ldots \text{ range over rigid one-to-one relations} \]

Finally, we define the unrelated notion (4) \( x \) is in the domain of \( R \) (or \( x \) is an element of the \( R \)-domain), written \( \text{InDomainOf}(x, R) \), if and only if \( x \) is \( R \)-related to something:
\[
(4) \quad \text{InDomainOf}(x, R) \equiv_{df} \exists y R x y
\]

Clearly, if \( R x y \), then \( \exists y R x y \) and \( x \) is an \( R \)-domain element. Also, if \( R \) is empty, nothing is an \( R \)-domain element.

(769) Definition: Identity Restricted to the Domain of Rigid One-to-One Relations. Where \( R \) is any rigid one-to-one relation, we define the relation identity \( _R \) as being an \( x \) and \( y \) such there is something to which they are both \( R \)-related:
\[
=_R =_{df} [\lambda x y \exists z (R x z \& R y z)]
\]

We henceforth use \( _R = \) as infix notation and write \( a =_R b \) instead of \( =_{Rab} \).

Note that the definens, \( [\lambda x y \exists z (R x z \& R y z)] \), is provably significant. By (39.2), we know \( [\lambda x y \exists z (R x z \& R y z)] \downarrow \) given that this is a \( \lambda \)-expression where the \( \lambda \) does not bind any variable in any encoding formula subterm. Hence, \( \forall R ([\lambda x y \exists z (R x z \& R y z)] \downarrow) \), by GEN. Now note that any relation that satisfies the definition (768.1) can be instantiated into this universal claim.

(770) Theorems: Identity \( _R \) is Equivalent to Identity on the Objects in the Domain of \( R \). We first note that by \( \beta \)-Conversion, it follows that (1) \( x \) is identical \( _R \) to \( y \) just in case there is something to which they are both \( R \)-related, and (2) if \( x \) is identical \( _R \) to \( y \), then \( x \) and \( y \) are in the domain of \( R \):

---

331 So, for example, since \( =_E \) is a rigid one-to-one relation, the above definition tells us that there is a relation of identity (\( =_{=_E} \)), namely, \( [\lambda x y \exists z (x =_E z \& y =_E z)] \) that holds on the domain of the relation \( =_E \), i.e., that holds among the ordinary objects. One can prove that \( =_{=_E} \) is extensionally equivalent to \( =_E \).
14.4. ANCESTRALS AND ONE-TO-ONE RELATIONS

(.1) \( x \equiv y \iff \exists z (Rxz \& Ryz) \)

(.2) \( x \equiv y \rightarrow (\text{InDomainOf}(x, R) \& \text{InDomainOf}(y, R)) \)

Given this, it follows straightforwardly that (.3) the identity \( x \) of \( x \) and \( y \) implies the identity of \( x \) and \( y \); (.4) identity \( x \equiv y \) is equivalent to identity when restricted to the \( R \)-domain objects; (.5) identity \( x \equiv y \) is reflexive with respect to the \( R \)-domain objects; (.6) identity \( x \equiv y \) is symmetric; and (.7) identity \( x \equiv y \) is transitive:

(.3) \( x \equiv y \rightarrow x = y \)

(.4) \( (\text{InDomainOf}(x, R) \lor \text{InDomainOf}(y, R)) \rightarrow (x \equiv y \equiv x = y) \)

(.5) \( \text{InDomainOf}(x, R) \rightarrow x \equiv x \)

(.6) \( x \equiv y \rightarrow y \equiv x \)

(.7) \( x \equiv y \& y \equiv z \rightarrow x \equiv z \)

Consequently, identity \( x \equiv y \) is a genuine relation of identity restricted to the domain of any rigid one-to-one relation \( R \).

(771) Definition: The Weak Ancestral of Rigid One-to-One Relations. Let \( R \) be any rigid one-to-one relation. Then we define the relation being a weak \( R \) ancestor of, written \( R^+ \), as the relation being \( x \) and \( y \) such that \( x \) is an \( R \)-ancestor of \( y \) or \( x \) is identical \( R \)-to \( y \):

\[ R^+ =_{df} [\lambda xy \ R^*xy \lor x \equiv y] \]

Cf. Frege 1879, §29.; 1893, §46. We leave it as an exercise to show that the definiens is provably significant. So \( R^+ \) is a genuine relation.

(772) Theorem: Basic Fact About the Weak Ancestral of \( R \). It follows immediately by \( \beta \)-Conversion that \( x \) bears the weak ancestral of \( R \) to \( y \) whenever \( x \) bears the strong ancestral of \( R \) to \( y \) or \( x \) is identical \( R \)-to \( y \):

\[ R^+xy \equiv R^*xy \lor x \equiv y \]

We shall sometimes use Frege’s reading of the left condition as: \( y \) is a member of the \( R \) series beginning with \( x \) (1884, §81; 1893, §46). Though Frege’s reading has a slightly increased cognitive load (the variable for the object occurring later in the \( R \) series occurs earlier in the expression), the effect is mitigated by the phrase beginning with \( x \). The intuition here is that \( R \) induces sequences on its domain.

(773) Lemmas: Facts About the Weak Ancestral of \( R \). The following are immediate consequences of our definitions: (.1) if \( x \) bears \( R \) to \( y \), then \( x \) is a weak \( R \)-ancestor of \( y \); (.2) if (a) \( x \) exemplifies \( F \), (b) \( x \) is a weak \( R \)-ancestor of \( y \), and
(c) $F$ is $R$-hereditary, then $y$ exemplifies $F$; (.3) if $x$ is a weak $R$-ancestor of $y$ and $y$ bears $R$ to $z$, then $x$ is an $R$-ancestor of $z$; (.4) if $x$ is an $R$-ancestor of $y$ and $y$ bears $R$ to $z$, then $x$ is a weak $R$-ancestor of $z$; (.5) if $x$ bears $R$ to $y$, and $y$ is a weak $R$-ancestor of $z$, then $x$ is an $R$-ancestor of $z$; (.6) if $x$ is a weak $R$-ancestor of $y$ and $y$ bears $R$ to $z$, then $x$ is a weak $R$-ancestor of $z$; and (.7) if $x$ is a weak $R$-ancestor of $y$, then $x$ is a weak $R$-ancestor of something that bears $R$ to $y$:

1. $Rxy \rightarrow R^+xy$
2. $(Fx \& R^+xy \& \text{Hereditary}(F,R)) \rightarrow Fy$
3. $(R^+xy \& Ryz) \rightarrow R^+xz$
4. $(R^+xy \& Ryz) \rightarrow R^+xz$
5. $(Rxy \& R^+yz) \rightarrow R^+xz$
6. $(R^+xy \& R^+yz) \rightarrow R^+xz$
7. $R^+xy \rightarrow \exists z(R^+xz \& Rzy)$

Cf. (.2) with Frege 1893, Theorem 144; (.3) with Theorem 134; (.5) with Theorem 132; and (.7) with Theorem 141. Frege, of course, proves these principles for weak ancestrals that are defined more generally, and not just for weak ancestrals of one-to-one relations. We haven’t discovered a statement or proof of (.6) (i.e., transitivity of the weak ancestral) in Frege 1879 or 1893.

(774) Theorems: Rigid One-to-One Relations and Ancestrals. We have the following additional facts about rigid one-to-one relations and their ancestrals:

1. if $x$ bears $R$ to $y$ and $z$ is an $R$-ancestor of $y$, then $z$ is a weak $R$-ancestor of $x$; (.2) if $x$ bears $R$ to $y$, then if $x$ fails to be an $R$-ancestor of $x$, $y$ fails to be an $R$-ancestor of $y$; (.3) if $x$ fails to be an $R$-ancestor of $x$, then if $x$ is a weak $R$-ancestor of $y$, $y$ fails to be a weak $R$-ancestor of $y$; (.4) if $x$ is an $R$-ancestor of $y$, then $x$ is an $R$-domain element; and (.5) if $x$ is a weak $R$-ancestor of $y$, then $x$ is an $R$-domain element:

1. $(Rxy \& R^+zy) \rightarrow R^+xz$
2. $Rxy \rightarrow (\neg R^+xx \rightarrow \neg R^+yy)$

The version of this theorem asserted in Zalta 1999 was incorrectly asserted — the ‘proof’ incorrectly referenced an ill-formed λ-expression that contained the non-propositional formula $R^+(x,z)$, which violated the formation rules of Zalta 1999. Fortunately, the version of (.7) asserted in Zalta 1999 wasn’t used in that paper to derive any of the Dedekind/Peano postulates as theorems. Of course, the issue here is overshadowed by the issue discussed in Remark (767). Nevertheless, it is important to point out the error, and to note that in its present formulation, (.7) is restricted to one-to-one relations and is indeed a theorem that will be used below in the proof of an important fact, namely (774.1).
14.4. ANCESTRALS AND ONE-TO-ONE RELATIONS

(3) \(-R^* xx \rightarrow (R^+ xy \rightarrow \neg R^* yy)\)

(4) \(R^* xy \rightarrow \text{InDomainOf}(x, R)\)

(5) \(R^+ xy \rightarrow \text{InDomainOf}(x, R)\)

Some of these facts are used a bit later, to establish that no natural number is less than itself or is a predecessor of itself. But note that from definition (768.4), theorem (.4) and theorem (.5), we know that when \(R xy, R^* xy\) or \(R^+ xy\), then \(x\) is an \(R\)-domain element!

(775) Theorem: Generalized Induction. Let \(R\) be any rigid one-to-one relation. Then it is a theorem that if (a) \(z\) exemplifies \(F\) and (b) any two objects \(x\) and \(y\) having \(z\) as a weak \(R\) ancestor are such that, if \(x\) bears \(R\) to \(y\) then \(Fx\) implies \(Fy\), then (c) every object of which \(z\) is a weak \(R\) ancestor exemplifies \(F\). Formally:

\[
\text{Generalized Induction} \\
[Fz & \forall x \forall y ((R^+ zx & R^+ zy) \rightarrow (Rxy \rightarrow (Fx \rightarrow Fy)))] \rightarrow \forall x (R^+ zx \rightarrow Fx)
\]

We can state this theorem a bit more intuitively if we informally introduce a variation on the notion \(F\) is hereditary with respect to \(R\). Let use the expression:

\(F\) is hereditary on the \(R\)-series beginning with \(z\)

whenever:

\[
\forall x \forall y ((R^+ zx & R^+ zy) \rightarrow (Rxy \rightarrow (Fx \rightarrow Fy)))
\]

Then we may state Generalized Induction as follows: if both (i) \(z\) exemplifies \(F\) and (ii) \(F\) is hereditary on the \(R\)-series beginning with \(z\), then every member of that series beginning with \(z\) exemplifies \(F\).

This is a variant of Frege 1893, Theorem 152. Those interested in the differences between the above version and Frege’s may find the following Remark useful.

(776) Remark: Digression on the Changes to Frege’s Version of Generalized Induction. If we put aside the fact that we’ve restricted Generalized Induction to rigid one-to-one relations and their weak ancestors, then (775) differs from Frege’s Theorem 152 in two ways: (a) the consequent of the principle is expressed as a universal claim, and (b) an additional, though strictly unnecessary, conjunct has been added to the second conjunct of the antecedent. In this Remark, we explain the differences in more detail and justify both changes. Consider Frege’s Theorem 152:
This can be rewritten in our notation for predication, conditionals, and quantification as follows, where \(a\) and \(b\) are preserved as individual variables, the Gothic letters \(d\) and \(a\) are replaced by the variables \(x\) and \(y\), respectively, \(q\) is replaced by \(R\) (which for the purposes of this Remark, can be any relation), \(Rq\) is replaced by \(R^+\):

\[
[R^+ab \rightarrow \forall x(Fx \rightarrow (R^+ax \rightarrow \forall y(Rxy \rightarrow Fy)))] \rightarrow (Fa \rightarrow Fb)
\]

If we validly swap \(R^+ab\) in the antecedent of the antecedent with \(Fa\) in the antecedent of the consequent and apply Importation (89.7.b) in a couple of places, this starts to look more familiar:

\[
[Fa \& \forall x(Fx \& R^+ax \rightarrow \forall y(Rxy \rightarrow Fy))] \rightarrow (R^+ ab \rightarrow Fb)
\]

In other words, if \(a\) exemplifies \(F\) and every \(F\)-object in the \(R\)-series beginning with \(a\) passes \(F\) to everything to which it is \(R\)-related, then if \(b\) is in the \(R\)-series beginning with \(a\), \(b\) exemplifies \(F\).

Now if we rearrange the second conjunct of the antecedent a bit more using (100.7), symmetry of \&, and Exportation (89.7.a), the last claim displayed above is equivalent to:

\[
[Fa \& \forall x\forall y(R^+ax \rightarrow (Rxy \rightarrow (Fx \rightarrow Fy))] \rightarrow (R^+ab \rightarrow Fb)
\]

Since \(b\) is being used here as a free variable, GEN tells us if the above is derivable, then it holds for every \(b\). So by classical quantification theory (96.2):

(A) \( [Fa \& \forall x\forall y(R^+ax \rightarrow (Rxy \rightarrow (Fx \rightarrow Fy))] \rightarrow \forall b(R^+ab \rightarrow Fb) \)

Now compare (A) with (775): if you replace \(R\) by \(R_\ast\), \(a\) by \(z\), and \(b\) by \(x\) in (A), then (A) becomes similar to (775) with the only difference being that (A) eliminates \(R^+ay\) from the second conjunct of the antecedent of (775). Frege, of course, recognized that \(R^+ay\) isn't needed in the statement of the theorem, for it is provable in his system that if \(x\) is in the \(R\)-series beginning with \(z\) and \(x\) bears \(R\) to \(y\), then \(y\) is in the \(R\)-series beginning with \(z\), i.e., it is a theorem that \((R^+zx \& Rxy) \rightarrow R^+zy\). So (775) and (A) are equivalent, modulo the former's restriction to one-to-one relations.

In our system, we can prove a version for one-to-one relations. Assume \(R^+_zx \& Rxy\). Then by (773.3), \(R^+_zy\). Hence, by \(\forall I\) and definition (772), \(R^+_zy\).
14.5. PREDECESSOR

But we’ve formulated General Induction as in (775) because once it is instantiated in the manner described in (798) (i.e., by instantiating \( z \) to Zero and \( R \) to the predecessor relation \( P \) (see below), one can rewrite the result using rigid restricted variables to obtain the simple, classical statement of the Principle of Mathematical Induction. See the proof of (798).

14.5 Predecessor

(777) Remark: Frege’s Definition. In 1884 (§76) and 1893 (§43), Frege defined:

\[
\text{Succeeds}(y, x) \equiv_{df} \exists F \exists z (Fz \& y = \# F \& x = \# F^{-z})
\]

For those who have never seen Frege’s definition before, the insight can be made clear by way of an intuitive example. Though we haven’t yet defined ‘1’ and ‘2’, we pre-theoretically know that Succeeds(2, 1). So given Frege’s definition, the following should hold: \( \exists F \exists z (Fz \& 2 = \# F \& 1 = \# F^{-z}) \). This latter condition is intuitively true if we let \( F \) be the property author of Principia Mathematica and let \( r \) be Bertrand Russell. Then we know Fr, since Russell is an author of Principia Mathematica. Moreover, we know 2 = \# F, since 2 is the number of the property author of Principia Mathematica — both Russell and Whitehead coauthored the work. Finally, we know 1 = \# F^{-r}, since 1 is the number of the property author of Principia Mathematica not identical to Russell — there is only one object, namely, Whitehead, that exemplifies this property. So, conjoining Fr, 2 = \# F, and 1 = \# F^{-r}, and then existentially generalizing on \( r \) and \( F \), we have the definiens for Succeeds(2, 1).

In the next item (778), we shall modify Frege’s methodology somewhat. We shall work with the Fregean condition for Precedes(x, y) instead of Succeeds(y, x). This condition will be reformulated as:

\[
\exists F \exists u (Fu \& \text{Numbers}(y, F) \& \text{Numbers}(x, F^{-u}))
\]

Note that this condition is formulable entirely in terms of non-mathematical primitives, since Numbers(y, F) and Numbers(x, F^{-u}) are eliminable in terms of primitive notation. We then (a) assert that this condition defines a relation, and (b) define the mathematical notion of predecessor, which we’ll symbolize as \( P \), in terms of this relation.

As we saw in Section 14.1, the basic principles of number theory can be formulated with either predecessor or successor. But we prefer to work with the notion of predecessor for a simple reason: unlike Succeeds(y, x), the order of the variables in the expression \( Pxy \) matches the numerical order of any corresponding cardinal numbers that satisfy the condition. This may slightly reduce one’s cognitive load when attempting to parse and understand complex claims, especially concerning the strong and weak ancestral of a relation.
Our axiom alters Frege’s definition in two ways. First, since our natural cardinals only count the ordinary objects exemplifying a property $F$, the existential quantifier $\exists z$ in Frege’s definition will be replaced by the restricted quantifier $\exists u$ (with $u$ replacing $z$ throughout the remainder of the formula), where $u$ is a rigid restricted variable ranging over ordinary objects. Given this replacement, $\#F^{-u}$ is already defined as the number of the property being an $F$-object not identical $E$ to $u$.

Second, we substitute the conditions $Numbers(y,F)$ and $Numbers(x,F^{-u})$, respectively, for the conditions $y = \#F$ and $x = \#F^{-u}$ in Frege’s definition. We want to allow numbering of properties in any modal context, unlike Frege who was not concerned with different modal contexts. The condition $y = \#F$, identifies $y$ as the object that in fact numbers $F$. But $Numbers(y,F)$ identifies $y$, no matter what the modal context, as the object that numbers the $Fs$ in that context. In non-modal contexts, these two conditions are equivalent, as evidenced by theorem (759.2), which asserts $Numbers(y,F) \equiv y = \#F$. Moreover, the condition $Numbers(y,F)$ is preferable because it is several steps closer to primitive notation than the condition $y = \#F$; it makes no use of definite descriptions and doesn’t involve an identity formula (which is defined in object theory, unlike in Frege’s theory, where identity is a primitive).

(778) **Axiom:** The Existence of an Ordering Relation. We now assert that the following exists (as a relation): being an $x$ and $y$ such that, for some property $F$ and some ordinary object $u$ that exemplifies $F$, $y$ numbers $F$ and $x$ numbers the $Fs$ other than $u$:

$$\lambda xy \exists F \exists u (Fu \& Numbers(y,F) \& Numbers(x,F^{-u}))$$

It should be emphasized that this relation is a non-mathematical one. It does nothing more than assert the existence of an ordering relation on certain abstract objects that number properties. Ordering relations can be expressed entirely in logical terms. For example, a partial order is any relation $R$ that is irreflexive, transitive, and anti-symmetric, where these conditions can be defined in the usual manner, without any mathematics. So the above relation simply orders those abstract objects that, intuitively, encode equivalence classes of properties that are equinumerous on the ordinary objects. There is nothing inherently mathematical in this relation, just as there is nothing inherently mathematical about the relations $x$ is to the left of $y$, $x$ is on top of $y$, $x$ is outside of $y$, $x$ is after $y$, etc. In any case, no mathematical primitives are needed to assert this axiom.

(779) **Definition and Theorem:** Predecessor. We now define a new 2-place relation constant for the relation immediate predecessor, written $P$:

$$P =_{df} [\lambda xy \exists F \exists u (Fu \& Numbers(y,F) \& Numbers(x,F^{-u}))]$$
This definition-by-identity now yields, by our theory of definitions, the claim
\( P = [\lambda xy \exists F \exists u(Fu \& Numbers(y,F) \& Numbers(x,F^{-u}))]. \)

It now follows by \( \beta \)-Conversion that \( x \) immediately precedes \( y \) if and only if there is a property \( F \) and an ordinary object \( u \) such that (a) \( u \) exemplifies \( F \), (b) \( y \) numbers \( F \), and (c) \( x \) numbers being-\( F \)-but-not-identical-\( F \)-to-\( u \):

\[ (2) \ Pxy \equiv \exists F \exists u(Fu \& Numbers(y,F) \& Numbers(x,F^{-u})) \]

This theorem yields necessary and sufficient conditions for the predecessor relation.

Given this modally strict theorem, a Rule of Substitution (160.1) allows us to substitute the left and right sides for one another in any formula where one occurs as a subformula.

**(780) Definition and Theorem:** Strong Ancestral of Predecessor. Given these developments, (1) \( P^* \) becomes defined as the strong ancestral of \( P \). As an instance of the definition in (764), we have:

\[ (1) \ P^* =_d [\lambda xy \forall F((\forall z(Pxz \rightarrow Fz) \& \forall x' \forall y'(Px'y' \rightarrow (Fx' \rightarrow Fy')))) \rightarrow Fy] \]

And clearly, since \( P^*xy \) is an exemplification formula, we know by \( \beta \)-Conversion that (2) that \( x \) is a predecessor ancestor of \( y \) just in case \( y \) exemplifies every property \( F \) that is both (a) exemplified by all the objects of which \( x \) is a predecessor and (b) hereditary with respect to predecessor:

\[ (2) \ P^*xy \equiv \forall F((\forall z(Pxz \rightarrow Fz) \& \forall x' \forall y'(Px'y' \rightarrow (Fx' \rightarrow Fy')))) \rightarrow Fy \]

(Theorem)

It is now worth a moment’s reflection to consider the fact that the theorems in (766) governing the strong ancestral of a relation now apply when \( P \) is substituted for \( R \).

**(781) Lemma:** Zero, Predecessor, and its Ancestrals. It is a consequent of our definitions that nothing is an immediate predecessor of Zero:

\[ (1) \ \neg \exists x Px0 \]

Cf. Frege 1893, Theorem 108. It follows *a fortiori* that no natural cardinal is an immediate predecessor of Zero.

Moreover, it also follows that (2) nothing is a predecessor ancestor of Zero:

\[ (2) \ \neg \exists x P^*x0 \]

Cf. Frege 1893, Theorem 126. Clearly, then, (3) Zero is not a predecessor ancestor of itself:

\[ (3) \ \neg P^*00 \]
(782) Theorem: Predecessor is a Rigid One-to-One Relation. It now follows that predecessor is a rigid one-to-one relation:

(1) \( P_{xy} \rightarrow \square P_{xy} \)

(2) Rigid(\( P \))

(3) 1-1(\( P \))

(4) Rigid_{1,1}(\( P \))

Cf. Frege 1884, §78; and 1893, Theorem 89.

(783) Definitions and Theorems: The Weak Ancestral of Predecessor. First, since predecessor is a rigid one-to-one relation and \( [\lambda xy \exists z(P_{xz} \& P_{yz})] \) exists, we may explicitly formulate an instance of definition (769) to introduce the relation being predecessor-identical, written identical_{\( P \)} or =_{\( P \)}, as the relation being an \( x \) and \( y \) such that there is something that \( x \) and \( y \) both precede:

(1) \( =_{P} \equiv_{df} [\lambda xy \exists z(P_{xz} \& P_{yz})] \)

It follows immediately by \( \beta \)-Conversion that:

(2) \( x =_{P} y \equiv \exists z(P_{xz} \& P_{yz}) \) \hspace{1cm} \text{(Theorem)}

This result and the fact that \( [\lambda xy P^*xy \lor x =_{P} y] \) exists allows us to formulate an instance of definition (771), namely, (3) the weak ancestral of predecessor is the relation being an \( x \) and \( y \) such that either \( x \) is a predecessor-ancestor of \( y \) or \( x \) is predecessor identical to \( y \):

(3) \( P^+ =_{df} [\lambda xy P^*xy \lor x =_{P} y] \)

It follows immediately by \( \beta \)-Conversion that (4) \( x \) is a weak predecessor-ancestor of \( y \) if and only if either \( x \) is a predecessor ancestor of \( y \) or \( x \) is predecessor identical to \( y \):

(4) \( P^+xy \equiv P^*xy \lor x =_{P} y \) \hspace{1cm} \text{(Theorem)}

With this last theorem, we’re in a position to define the primitive notions and derive the postulates of Dedekind/Peano number theory. But it is worth pausing for a moment to reflect on the following facts. First, when \( P \) is substituted for \( R \) in the theorems in (770), we obtain new theorems in which \( =_{P} \) is a special case of \( =_{R} \). Second, when \( P \) is substituted for \( R \) in the theorems in (773) – (775), we obtain specific new theorems about \( P \) and its ancestrals.
14.6 Deriving the Number-Theoretic Postulates

(784) **Definition and Theorem**: Natural Numbers. Since \( \lambda x P^+0x \) is a property, we may now define (1.1) *being a natural number* is the property *being an x such that Zero bears the the weak ancestral of predecessor to x*: *Thus, to be a natural number is, in Frege’s terminology, to be a member of the predecessor-series beginning with Zero. Frege calls such numbers *finite cardinal numbers* (1893, §108). It follows immediately by \( \beta \)-Conversion that \( x \) is a natural number if and only if Zero bears the weak ancestral of predecessor to \( x \):

(1.2) \( \forall x (\exists x P^+0x) \)  

(Theorem)

(785) **Theorem**: Zero is a Natural Number. 

\[ \forall x \]

Interestingly, Frege (1893) doesn’t seem to prove this claim as a theorem, possibly because it is a trivial consequence of definitions and facts about identity. Instead, he proves only the general theorem \( R^xx \), i.e., that \( x \) is a weak \( R \)-ancestor of itself (1893, Theorem 140), and doesn’t label the instance \( P^+00 \) as a separate theorem.

With this theorem, however, we have derived the first Dedekind/Peano postulate.

(786) **Lemmas**: Number is a Rigid Property. The following lemmas will prove to be important. (1.1) if \( x \) is a number, then necessarily \( x \) is a number; (2.2) *being a number* is a rigid property:

(1) \( \forall x (\exists x P^+0x) \)

(2) \( \text{Rigid}(\forall x) \)

Since *being a number* is a rigid property, we may use \( m, n, k \), and if needed, \( i \) and \( j \), as rigid restricted variables ranging over natural numbers. Also, since we know that there are natural numbers, claims of the form \( \forall n \varphi \) imply \( \exists n \varphi \).

(787) **Theorem**: Zero Is Not the Successor of Any Natural Number. It also follows that no natural number is an immediate predecessor of Zero.

\[ \neg \exists n (Pn0) \]

Cf. Frege, 1893, Theorem 126. With this theorem, we have derived the second Dedekind/Peano postulate.
Theorems: No Two Natural Numbers Have the Same Successor. From the fact that predecessor is a one-to-one relation generally (782), it follows *a fortiori* that it is one-to-one with respect to the natural numbers. Hence, no two natural numbers have the same successor, i.e.,

\[ \forall n \forall m \forall k (Pnk \& Pmk \rightarrow n = m) \]

With (788), we have derived the third Dedekind/Peano postulate. We now work our way towards a proof that every natural number has a unique successor (796).

Lemma: Successors of Natural Numbers are Natural Numbers. A successor of a natural number is a natural number:

(1) \( Pnx \rightarrow \mathbb{N}x \)

Recall that this principle is listed by some as one of the basic postulates of number theory; see postulate 6 of Remark (719).

Moreover, it is also a theorem that (2) if a natural number is a predecessor ancestor of \( x \), then \( x \) is a natural number; and (3) if a natural number is a weak predecessor ancestor of \( x \), then \( x \) is a natural number:

(2) \( P^*nx \rightarrow \mathbb{N}x \)

(3) \( P^nx \rightarrow \mathbb{N}x \)

Lemma: Predecessors of Natural Numbers are Natural Numbers. A predecessor of a natural number is a natural number:

\( Pxn \rightarrow \mathbb{N}x \)

Lemma: Natural Numbers are Natural Cardinals. It is a consequence of our definitions that natural numbers are natural cardinals:

\( \mathbb{N}x \rightarrow \text{NaturalCardinal}(x) \)

This lemma and the preceding one play a role in the proof that every natural number has a successor.

Lemma: Predecessor is a Functional Relation. (1) If \( x \) is a predecessor of both \( y \) and \( z \), then \( y \) is identical to \( z \):

(1) \( Pxy \& Pxz \rightarrow y = z \)

Cf. Frege 1893, Theorem 71. Consequently, it follows that (2) predecessor is a functional relation when restricted to the natural numbers:

(2) \( Pnm \& Pnk \rightarrow m = k \)
Recall that (.2) is counted, by some, as one of the basic postulates of number theory; see postulate 7 of Remark (719).

**Axioms:** Possible Richness of Objects. The closures of the following modal claim are asserted *a priori*, as axioms: if there is a natural number which numbers the \( G \)s, then there might have been a concrete object \( y \) which is distinct \( E \) from every ordinary object that actually exemplifies \( G \):

\[
\exists x (N x \& x = \# G) \rightarrow \exists y (E! y \& \forall u (a! u \rightarrow u \neq y))
\]

We’ll justify this axiom in the next Remark (794). Note that this axiom would be incorrect without the antecedent. Suppose we had instead asserted: for every property \( G \), there might be a concrete object that is distinct \( E \) from all the ordinary objects that are actually \( G \), i.e., \( \forall G \exists y (E! y \& \forall u (a! u \rightarrow u \neq y)) \). This axiom would have foundered on the case when \( G \) is \( O! \). But we’re not yet in a position to see why. Basically, we’ll discover the natural cardinal that numbers \( O! \) is not a natural number. So it would be inconsistent to assert, for \( O! \), that there might have been a concrete object distinct \( E \) from all the ordinary objects that are actually \( O! \).

**Remark:** Justification of Axiom (793) on the Possible Richness of Objects. Since the closures of (793) are axioms, its necessitation in particular is an axiom. So (793) is not contingently true. Moreover, since (793) does not imply the existence of concrete objects, it is assertible *a priori*. (793) conditionalizes the possible existence of concrete objects: if the number of (actual) \( G \)s is a natural number, then there might have been a concrete object that is distinct \( E \) from all the actual \( G \)s.

Clearly, (793) is one way of capturing the view that logicians express when they say “the domain of objects *might* be of any size”. This is part of their argument when they conclude that logic should imply nothing about the size of the domain. For example, in Boolos (1987, 18; 1998, 199), we find:

> In logic, we ban the empty domain as a concession to technical convenience but draw the line there: We firmly believe that the existence of even two objects, let alone infinitely many, cannot be guaranteed by logic alone. . . .

> Since *there might be fewer than two items* [emphasis added] that we happen to be talking about, we cannot take even \( \exists x \exists y (x \neq y) \) to be valid.

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334It is worth noting that in the early drafts of 1999, Zalta used a schema of the form ‘There might have been at least \( n \) concrete objects’ (where each ‘\( n \)’ is eliminated in terms of numerical quantifiers). Karl-Georg Niebergall noted that the derivation that every number has a successor therefore required an appeal to an \( \omega \)-rule and suggested that, if possible, such a rule should be avoided. In the attempt to find a proof that did not appeal to the \( \omega \)-rule, subsequent drafts of the paper (and the eventual published form) used the actuality operator to state the axiom and stated the axiom as noted above. Thus Zalta 1999 derived, modulo the recoverable errors mentioned above, that every number has a successor, without an \( \omega \)-rule.
We take it here that Boolos is suggesting that logic shouldn’t imply anything about the number of concrete objects that there are.\footnote{We emphasize ‘concrete’ because the first modern logician, Frege, began the development of his logical system by postulating two distinct abstract objects, namely, the truth values The True and The False. His logic does seem to presuppose the existence of at least two abstract objects. Moreover, if you put aside his Basic Law V, and consider just his formal system of second-order logic, then his Rule of Substitution is equivalent to a Comprehension Principle for Concepts, which requires that the domain of concepts to contain at least two entities (Boolos 1985, 377 (= Boolos 1998, 161–162). So, Frege’s logic seems to be an exception to Boolos’ suggestion that logic should not guarantee the existence of even two entities. But let’s put this aside in what follows.} We certainly agree; logic shouldn’t tell us how few concrete objects there are or how many. Our modal axiom (793) makes Boolos’ intuition explicit by saying that no matter what natural number is the number of (ordinary, actual) $G$s, there could always have been one more object in the domain. Thus the modal axiom blocks the statement that some natural number of $(G)$-objects necessarily fixes the size of the domain.\footnote{We have not spent time commenting on the opening sentence of the quote from Boolos. The present theory doesn’t ban the empty domain as a concession to technical convenience. Even without (793), object theory asserts that there is at least one ordinary object, which may or may not be concrete. This ultimately traces back to axiom (45.4).}

Not only do some philosophical logicians implicitly rely on the modal intuition (that the domain might be of any size) to justify the ontological neutrality of logic, some even explicitly endorse the role that modality plays in the proof that natural numbers are unbounded. For example, Hodes writes (1984, 149):

> For a long time it has been thought that modality played no role in mathematics, since purely mathematical truths were uniformly necessary. ... But modality really permeates the terms in which we learn and discuss mathematics. For example, if we ask a bright child what it means to say that there are infinitely many numbers, the answer we want is something like “No matter how high I were to count, I could go on and count higher.”

Here Hodes is linking infinity with the possibility of counting ever higher.

Note the following theorem (796), that every number has a unique successor, does not imply that there are an infinite number of concrete objects in the domain. Rather, as we shall see in Section 14.10, it implies only that there are an infinite number of possibly concrete, i.e., ordinary, objects. But (793) is not like the axiom of infinity asserted in Whitehead and Russell 1910–1913 [1925–
1927] or in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. Without the Barcan Formula (167.1), the logic of actuality, and many other components of our system, (793) by itself doesn’t yield a successor for every natural number.

(795) Lemma: Distinctness of Possible Objects. The following is a consequence of the modal logic of actuality and the modal logic of identity $E$: if it is possible that ordinary object $v$ is distinct $E$ from every ordinary object that actually exemplifies $G$, then $v$ is distinct $E$ from every ordinary object that actually exemplifies $G$:

$$\Diamond \forall u (\exists ! G u \rightarrow u \neq E v) \rightarrow \forall u (\exists ! G u \rightarrow u \neq E v)$$

(796) Theorem: Every Natural Number Has a Unique Natural Number Successor. It now follows from (793) that for every natural number $n$, there is a unique natural number $m$ that $n$ precedes:

$$\forall n \exists ! m \ P nm$$

With this theorem, we have derived the fourth Dedekind-Peano Axiom.

(797) Remark: Digression on Frege’s Proof That Every Number Has a Successor. Frege proved that every number has a successor from Hume’s Principle without any additional axioms or rules. If we had tried to derive this claim from our version of Hume’s Principle, we would have run into the following obstacle. The claim to be proved may be represented as:

(a) $\exists m P nm$

Recall that to prove this claim, it suffices to prove the following in virtue of theorem (789):

(b) $\exists x P nx$

To prove (b), Frege’s strategy was to prove by induction that every number $n$ immediately precedes the number of members in the predecessor series ending with $n$; intuitively, that $n$ immediately precedes the number of natural numbers less than or equal to $n$. So Frege’s method was to show:

(c) $P n \# [\lambda x P^* xn]$

by induction (cf. Frege 1893, Theorem 155). However, in our system, (c) is provably false; natural numbers and natural cardinals only number the ordinary objects that fall under a property, and so no number $n$ is the number of the property being a member of the predecessor series ending with $n$.

To see exactly why (c) is provably false in the present system, suppose for reductio that (c) is true, for some $n$. Then, by the definition of predecessor, (c) implies that there is a property $Q$ and ordinary object $a$ such that:
(d) $Qa \& Numbers(\#[\lambda x P^* x n], Q) \& Numbers(n, Q^\omega)$

From the second conjunct of (d), it follows by (759.1), (759.3), and (43)\# that that $\#[\lambda x P^* x n]$ is identical to $\#Q$.\# So by Hume’s Principle (754)\#:

(e) $[\lambda x P^* x n] \approx_E Q$

By the definition of $\approx_E$, then, there is a relation, say $R$, that correlates $E$ the ordinary objects exemplifying $[\lambda x P^* x n]$ and the ordinary objects exemplifying $Q$ one-to-one. So since (d) implies $Qa$, there is an ordinary object, say $b$, that exemplifies $[\lambda x P^* x n]$ and such that $Rba$. But if $b$ exemplifies $[\lambda x P^* x n]$, then by $\beta$-Conversion, $P^* bn$. We leave it as an exercise to show that $b$ is therefore abstract. Contradiction. So (c) is provably false in the present system.

So, again, (c) fails because our natural numbers and natural cardinals only number the ordinary (i.e., possibly concrete) objects that exemplify a property. They do not count abstract objects; indeed, since it is provable that no object that exemplifies the property $[\lambda x P^* x n]$ is ordinary, the abstract object that numbers this property is Zero. The theorems in (265) and (266) guarantee that there are just too many abstract objects to count by means of the classical notions of exemplification and equinumerosity. It should be noted, however, that later, in (827), we shall define general numerical quantifiers, which allow us to assert, for any condition $\varphi$, that there are exactly $n$ objects such that $\varphi$, i.e., $\exists_n x \varphi$. This then allows us to assert or prove that there are exactly $n$ abstract objects such that $\varphi$, i.e., $\exists_n x (A! x \& \varphi)$. See (827) for the details.

(798) Theorem: Mathematical Induction. Since $P$ is a one-to-one relation, the Principle of Mathematical Induction falls out as a corollary to (775). For every property $F$, if Zero exemplifies $F$ and $F n$ implies $F m$ whenever $n$ and $m$ are any two successive natural numbers, then every natural number exemplifies $F$:

$$\forall F [F0 \& \forall n \forall m (P nm \rightarrow (F n \rightarrow F m)) \rightarrow \forall n F n]$$

With this theorem, we have derived the fifth and final Dedekind-Peano postulate.

(799) Remark: A Potential But Unfounded Worry. In light of the theorems in (265), the new axiom asserted in (778) and definition of $P$ stipulated in (779.1) have a consequence that raises some questions, though fortunately ones that can be put to rest. Recall that (265.1) and (265.2) assert:

$$\forall R \exists x \exists y (A! x \& A! y \& x \neq y \& [\lambda z R x z] = [\lambda z R y z]) \quad (265.1)$$

$$\forall R \exists x \exists y (A! x \& A! y \& x \neq y \& [\lambda z R x z] = [\lambda z R y z]) \quad (265.2)$$

\#337 By (759.3), we know $Numbers(\#Q, [\lambda y Q y])$. It then follows by (759.1) that $dNumbers(\#Q, Q)$. By (43)\#, we get $Numbers(\#Q, Q)$. It follows from the second conjunct of (d) and this last fact that $\#[\lambda x P^* x n] = \#Q$, by (746.2).
These imply, respectively, that:

\[ \exists x \exists y (A!x \& A!y \& x \neq y \& [\lambda z Pzx] = [\lambda z Pzy]) \]

\[ \exists x \exists y (A!x \& A!y \& x \neq y \& [\lambda z Pxz] = [\lambda z Pyz]) \]

Let \( a \) and \( b \) be witnesses to the first existential claim, and \( c \) and \( d \) be witnesses to the second. That is suppose:

\((\vartheta)\) \( A!a \& A!b \& a \neq b \& [\lambda z Pza] = [\lambda z Pzb]\)

\((\zeta)\) \( A!c \& A!d \& c \neq d \& [\lambda z Pcz] = [\lambda z Pdz]\)

These consequences give rise to the following questions: is anything a predecessor of either \( a \) or \( b \), and are \( c \) or \( d \) predecessors of anything? If the answer to the first is yes, then we could derive a contradiction from \((\vartheta)\) and the fact \( P \) is functional, i.e., \( \forall x \forall y \forall z (Pxy \& Pxz \rightarrow y = z) \) (792):

Suppose \( \exists y Pya \). Let \( e \) be such an object, so that \( Pya \). Then by \( \beta \)-Conversion, \( [\lambda z Pza]e \). So by \((\vartheta)\), \( [\lambda z Pzb]e \). By \( \beta \)-Conversion, \( Pbe \). But since \((\vartheta)\) also implies \( a \neq b \), we now we have \( Pya, Pbe \) and \( a \neq b \). This contradicts the functionality of \( P \).

Similarly, if \( c \) or \( d \) are predecessors of anything, then then we could derive a contradiction from \((\zeta)\) and the fact (782) that \( P \) is one-to-one (exercise).

But these derivations are simply reductio arguments to the conclusions that nothing is an immediate predecessor of \( a \) and \( b \) (i.e., that \( [\lambda z Pza] \) and \( [\lambda z Pzb] \) are unexemplified), and that \( c \) and \( d \) aren’t immediate predecessors of anything (i.e., that \( [\lambda z Pcz] \) and \( [\lambda z Pdz] \) are unexemplified). More generally, we can conclude that none of \( a, b, c, \) and \( d \) can be natural numbers.

### 14.7 Number Theory

#### (800) Definition: Notation for Successors. By theorem (796) we know that every natural number has a unique successor among the natural numbers. Hence, we may introduce the notation \( n' \) to abbreviate the definite description the natural number of which \( n \) is a predecessor:

\[ n' =_{df} \text{im} \\text{Pnum} \]

We henceforth refer to \( n' \) as the successor of \( n \).
Note: Since we are now using the prime symbol as a term-forming operator on terms that denote natural numbers, we must henceforth refrain from using prime symbols on our restricted variables \( n, m, \) and \( k \) to form new variables. However, we may continue to use prime notation on other variables — \( x \) and \( x' \) may be used as distinct general variables, and \( u \) and \( u' \) as distinct variables for ordinary objects.

(801) Theorem: Fact About Successors. If \( n \) is identical to \( m \), then the successor of \( n \) is identical to the successor of \( m \):

\[
 n = m \rightarrow n' = m'
\]

(802) Theorem: Fact Underlying Induction Using Successor Notation. It is common mathematical practice to inductively define a sequence of numerically-indexed notions. In these definitions, two clauses are used: in the first clause, the notion is defined for the index Zero, and in the second clause, the notion is defined for the index \( n' \) in terms of the notion for index \( n \). Though the Principle of Mathematical Induction ultimately grounds this practice, the use of successor notation often simplifies the formulation of the notions being defined inductively. The theorem that grounds this practice of using successor notation can now be stated very simply, namely, a natural number is either identical to Zero or identical to \( n' \), for some natural number \( n \):

\[
 m = 0 \vee \exists n (m = n')
\]

Study of the proof of this theorem shows that in addition to the definitions of \( \mathbb{N}, \mathbb{P}, \mathbb{P}', \mathbb{P}^*, =_p, \) and \( ' \), the result depends on a fact about the weak ancestral of \( \text{predecessor} \) (773.7), and the one-to-one and functional character of \( \text{predecessor} \) (782) and (792.1).

(803) Theorem: Natural Numbers Are Predecessors of Their Successors. By (153.2), it is a consequence of definition (800) that a natural number \( n \) is a predecessor of its successor:

\[
 \mathbb{P} nn'
\]

(804) Definitions: Introduction of the Numerals. Since every natural number has a unique successor, we may introduce the (base 10) numerals ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’, … , as abbreviations, respectively, for the descriptions the successor of 0, the successor of 1, the successor of 2, etc.

(1) \( 1 =_{df} 0' \)
(2) \(2 =_{df} 1'\)
(3) \(3 =_{df} 2'\)
...

The ellipsis is to be continued by a sequence of definitions with analogous definienda and definientia, ordered according to the base 10 representation of the natural numbers. Note that the definientia of the terms being introduced here are all significant. In English, the new definienda may be read, respectively: One, Two, Three, etc.

**Theorems:** Numerical Order. The predecessor ordering of the natural numbers now follows directly from (804) and (803):

(1) \(P_{01}\)
(2) \(P_{12}\)
(3) \(P_{23}\)
...

**Theorems:** Number-Theoretic Facts. The objects defined in (804) are natural numbers: (1) One is a natural number; (2) Two is a natural number; (3) Three is a natural number; ... 

(1) \(\mathbb{N}_1\)
(2) \(\mathbb{N}_2\)
(3) \(\mathbb{N}_3\)
...

**Definition:** Restricting Relations. We define (1) the restriction of 2-place relation \(R\) to property \(F\), written \(R_{\restriction F}\), to be the property being an \(F\)-object that bears \(R\) to \(y\):

(1) \(R_{\restriction F} =_{df} [\lambda xy Fx \& Rxy]\)

So, for example, \(=_{E\restriction E}\) is the relation \([\lambda xy E!x \& x =_Ey]\), i.e., the identity \(E\) relation restricted to the concrete objects.

More generally, (2) the restriction of \(n'\)-place relation \(R\) to \(n\)-place relation \(S^n\), written \(R_{\restriction S^n}\), is the \(n'\)-place relation being objects \(x_1, \ldots, x_{n'}, y\) such that \(x_1, \ldots, x_n\) both exemplify \(S^n\) and bear \(R\) to \(y\):
\( R \upharpoonright S^n = \text{df} [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n y \; S^n x_1 \ldots x_n & R x_1 \ldots x_n y] \)

In the case where \( n = 0 \), the definition yields that \((.3)\) the restriction of property \( R \) to proposition \( p \) is the property being such that \( p \) is true and \( y \) exemplifies \( R \):

\( R \upharpoonright p = \text{df} [\lambda y \; p & R y] \)

(808) Theorem: Fact About Restrictions of Rigid Relations. It is an interesting (and useful) fact that if an \( n' \)-place relation is rigid, then its restriction to a rigid \( n \)-place relation is rigid:

\[ \text{Rigid}(R) & \text{Rigid}(S^n) \rightarrow \text{Rigid}(R \upharpoonright S^n) \quad (n \geq 0) \]

Alternatively, we may say that rigid restrictions of modally collapsed relations are modally collapsed.

(809) Definitions: Some Number-Theoretic Relations. We now want to introduce the relations less than and less than or equal to. We could define them, respectively, as \([\lambda xy \; \mathbb{N} x \& \mathbb{N} y \& \mathbb{P}^* xy]\) and \([\lambda xy \; \mathbb{N} x \& \mathbb{N} y \& \mathbb{P}^* xy]\). However, we can define them more simply as restricted 2-place relations (807.1) if we take advantage of the facts that \( \mathbb{P}^* ny \rightarrow \mathbb{N} y \) (789.2) and \( \mathbb{P}^* ny \rightarrow \mathbb{N} y \) (789.3). For then we may define (.1) less than is the restriction of the ancestral of predecessor to being a natural number; and (.2) less than or equal to is the restriction of the weak ancestral of predecessor to being a natural number. In both cases, the definiens is significant. We may therefore introduce the standard mathematical symbols for these number-theoretic relations:

\( < = \text{df} \mathbb{P}^* \upharpoonright \mathbb{N} \)

\( \leq = \text{df} \mathbb{P}^* \upharpoonright \mathbb{N} \)

Given these definitions, we define (.3) greater than is the converse of less than, and (.4) greater than or equal to is the converse of less than or equal to. We introduce the standard mathematical symbols for these number-theoretic relations:

\( > = \text{df} [\lambda xy \; y < x] \)

\( \geq = \text{df} [\lambda xy \; y \leq x] \)

In the usual manner, we use infix notation for all of these new symbols.

(810) Theorems: Basic Facts About Less Than and Less Than Or Equal To. The following are easy consequences of the previous definitions and prior theorems. (.1) \( x \) is less than \( y \) if and only if \( x \) and \( y \) are both natural numbers and \( x \) is a predecessor-ancestor of \( y \); and (.2) \( x \) is less than or equal to \( y \) if and only if \( x \) and \( y \) are both natural numbers and \( x \) is a weak predecessor-ancestor of \( y \):

\( x < y \equiv \mathbb{N} x \& \mathbb{N} y & \mathbb{P}^* xy \)
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\[ x \leq y \equiv \mathbb{N}x \& \mathbb{N}y \& \mathbb{P}^*xy \]

(811) Theorems: Numerical Facts About Inequalities. If we now focus on the natural numbers, then the preceding theorems immediately yield, for natural numbers \( n \) and \( m \), that (.1) \( n \) is less than \( m \) iff \( n \) is a predecessor ancestor of \( m \); (.2) \( n \) is less than or equal to \( m \) iff \( n \) is a weak predecessor ancestor of \( m \); (.3) \( n \) is greater than \( m \) iff \( m \) is less than \( n \); and (.4) \( n \) is greater than or equal to \( m \) iff \( m \) is less than or equal to \( n \):

(1) \( n < m \equiv \mathbb{P}^*nm \)
(2) \( n \leq m \equiv \mathbb{P}^*nm \)
(3) \( n > m \equiv m < n \)
(4) \( n \geq m \equiv m \leq n \)

In light of these results, we restrict our attention below primarily to the basic theorems about \(<\) and \(\leq\).

(812) Theorem: Some Facts About Less Than (or Equal To). (.1) If \( n \) is a predecessor of \( m \), then \( n \) is less than \( m \); (.2) \( n \) is less than or equal to \( n \); (.3) if \( n \) is less than or equal to \( m \) and \( n \) is not equal to \( m \), then \( n \) is less than \( m \); (.4) if \( n \) is less than or equal to \( m \) and \( m \) is less than \( k \), then \( n \) is less than \( k \); and (.5) if \( n \) is less than or equal to \( m \) and \( m \) is less than or equal to \( k \), then \( n \) is less than \( k \); (.6) if \( n \) is less than or equal to \( m \) and \( m \) is less than \( k \), then \( n \) is less than \( k \); (.7) if \( n \) is less than \( m \) and \( m \) is less than \( k \), then \( n \) is less than \( k \); (.8) if \( n \) is less than or equal to \( m \) and \( m \) is less than \( k \), then \( n \) is less than \( k \):

(1) \( \mathbb{P}^*nm \rightarrow n < m \)
(2) \( n \leq n \)
(3) \( n < m \rightarrow n \leq m \)
(4) \( n \leq m \& n \neq m \rightarrow n < m \)
(5) \( n < m \& m < k \rightarrow n < k \)
(6) \( n \leq m \& m \leq k \rightarrow n \leq k \)
(7) \( n < m \& m \leq k \rightarrow n < k \)
(8) \( n \leq m \& m < k \rightarrow n < k \)

(813) Theorems: Some Additional Facts About Less Than (or Equal To). (.1) \( n \) is less than \( n' \); and (.2) \( n \) is less than or equal to \( n' \); (.3) if One is less than or equal to \( n \), then Zero is less than \( n \); (.4) If \( n \) is less than \( m' \), then \( m \) is less than \( n \):
(1) \( n < n' \)
(2) \( n \leq n' \)
(3) \( 1 \leq n \rightarrow 0 < n \)
(4) \( m' \leq n \rightarrow m < n \)

**Theorems:** Numerical Facts About Less Than. Clearly, from (813.1) and the definitions of the numerals in in (804), the following claims become non-modally strict theorems:

(1) \( 0 < 1 \)
(2) \( 1 < 2 \)
(3) \( 2 < 3 \)

The following may prove useful:

**Exercise 6.** Note that if we can derive the following claims:

\[
0' \leq 1, 0' \leq 2, \ldots \\
1' \leq 2, 1' \leq 3, \ldots \\
2' \leq 3, 2' \leq 4, \ldots \\
\vdots
\]

then by (813.4), the following claims become modally strict theorems:

\[
0 < 1, 0 < 2, \ldots \\
1 < 2, 1 < 3, \ldots \\
2 < 3, 2 < 4, \ldots \\
\vdots
\]

So as an exercise, derive the first two of the former group, i.e., that \( 0' \leq 1 \) and \( 0' \leq 2 \).

**Remark:** Necessity and the Number of Planets. In a system such as ours, where all the terms are rigid designators, it is easy to see why one of the Quinean arguments that cast suspicion on modal contexts can be easily undermined. Quine (1953 [1961], 143) noted that the following argument, stated in ordinary natural language, is invalid (soundness is not in question, since the second premise is no longer thought to be true):
Necessarily, nine is greater than seven.
Nine is (identical to) the number of planets.
∴ Necessarily, the number of planets is greater than seven.

Clearly, if the identity claim in the second premise has a rigid term (‘nine’) on one side of the identity claim and a non-rigid term (‘the number of planets’) on the other side, one can’t expect to validly use the substitution of identicals to substitute one term for the other in the modal context provided by the first premise.

But if we represent the argument by using the rigidly designating definite descriptions of applied object theory, we have the following valid argument:

\[ \Box \, 9 > 7 \]
\[ 9 = \exists x \,(\text{Numbers}(x, P)) \]
\[ \therefore \, \Box \exists x \, (\text{Numbers}(x, P)) > 7. \]

We can see why this is valid if we reason intuitively in the formal mode with primitive possible worlds: from the facts that (a) in every possible world, Nine is greater than Seven and (b) Nine is identical to the object that (at the actual world) numbers the planets, it follows that in every possible world, the object that (at the actual world) numbers the planets is greater than Seven.

So, as far as applied object theory goes, Quine’s argument does nothing to undermine the logical rigor of modal contexts. Of course, if one wants to give a reading of the natural language argument that shows why it is invalid, one has several options: (1) eliminate, in the manner of Russell’s theory, the description from the second premise and also eliminate it from the conclusion but with narrow scope with respect to the \[ \Box, \] or (2) introduce a new kind of definite description, namely, a non-rigid one and restrict the principle of the substitution of identicals so that identicals can’t be substituted within modal contexts.\(^3\)

\[^{338}\] That is, one could suggest that the following is a reading of the argument on which it is invalid:

\[ \Box \, 9 > 7 \]
\[ \exists x \,(\text{Numbers}(x, P) \& 9 = x) \]
\[ \therefore \, \Box \exists x \,(\text{Numbers}(x, P) \& x > 7) \]

This is invalid, as can be seen if we reason intuitively in the formal mode with primitive possible worlds: from the facts that (a) in every possible world Nine is greater than Seven and (b) there is a unique object that, at the actual world, numbers the planets and is identical to Nine, it doesn’t follow that in every possible world, there is a unique object that numbers the planets and is greater than Seven.

\[^{339}\] That is, one could suggest that the following is a reading of the argument on which it is invalid, where \( \exists x \phi \) has been introduced as a non-rigid designator subject to restrictions on substitution:

\[ \Box \, 9 > 7 \]
\[ 9 = \exists x \,(\text{Numbers}(x, P)) \]
\[ \therefore \, \Box \exists x \,(\text{Numbers}(x, P)) > 7. \]
**Theorems:** Further Facts About Natural Numbers. It is a consequence of our work thus far that (.1) no natural number is less than itself; (.2) no natural number is a predecessor of itself; and (.3) no natural number is identical to its own successor:

1. \( n \neq \overline{n} \)
2. \( \overline{\overline{P}}nn \)
3. \( n \neq n' \)

**Lemma:** Fact About Predecessor Identity and Predecessor. From the definition of predecessor-identity (783.1) and the basic fact about it (783.2), it follows that if \( x \) is a natural number and \( x \) is predecessor-identical to \( y \), then \( y \) is a natural number:

\[ Nx \land x = P y \rightarrow Ny \]

**Definition and Theorem:** Number-Identity. We now define a relation on the natural numbers and show it is a genuine, though restricted, notion of identity. To define the relation in question, recall the definition of the restriction of a relation \( R \) to property \( F \) in (807.1). Since predecessor identity \( (=_{P}) \) is a relation (783.1), we may write its restriction to the property being a natural number as \( =_{P} \upharpoonright \mathbb{N} \). This expression is best parsed as an instance of definition (807.1), in which \( =_{P} \) is substituted for \( R \) and \( \mathbb{N} \) is substituted for \( F \). Though we could have parsed this as an instance of (769), in which the relation \( P \upharpoonright \mathbb{N} \) has been substituted for \( R \) in the relation \( =_{R} \), the first parse is more convenient.\(^{\text{340}}\)

We therefore define being number-identical, written \( \doteq \), as the relation being predecessor-identical restricted to the property being a natural number:

\[ \doteq =_{P} \upharpoonright \mathbb{N} \]

We henceforth use \( \doteq \) as infix notation. It follows immediately from this definition and the previous lemma that (.2) \( x \) is number-identical to \( y \) if and only if \( x \) and \( y \) are both natural numbers and predecessor-identical:

\[ x \doteq y \equiv Nx \land Ny \land x =_{P} y \]  \hspace{1cm} \text{(Theorem)}

We can see why this is valid if we reason intuitively in the formal mode with primitive possible worlds: from the facts that (a) in every possible world, Nine is greater than Seven and (b) Nine is identical to the object that, at the actual world, numbers the planets, it follows that in every possible world \( w \), the object that numbers the planets at \( w \) is greater than Seven.\(^{\text{340}}\)

We could parse \( =_{P} \upharpoonright \mathbb{N} \) in the latter way, since \( P \upharpoonright \mathbb{N} \) is a one-to-one relation and so substitutable for \( R \) in (769) — if \( P \) is a one-to-one relation, then its restriction \( P \upharpoonright \mathbb{N} \) is also one-to-one. But this way of parsing \( =_{P} \upharpoonright \mathbb{N} \) only makes more work for us. It is better to parse it as defined by (807.1), in which \( =_{P} \) is substituted for \( R \) and \( \mathbb{N} \) is substituted for \( F \).
We now show that $\approx$ is a genuine, though restricted, notion of identity.

(819) **Theorem:** Number-Identity and Identity. It is now provable that (1) if $x$ is number-identical to $y$, then $x$ is identical to $y$; (2) if either $x$ or $y$ is a natural number, then $x$ and $y$ are number-identical if and only if they are identical; (3) number-identity is reflexive; (4) symmetric; (5) transitive; and (6) rigid:

1. $x \approx y \rightarrow x = y$
2. $(\exists x, y) (x \approx y \equiv x = y)$
3. $n \approx n$
4. $n \approx m \rightarrow m \approx n$
5. $(n \approx m \& m \approx k) \rightarrow n \approx k$
6. Rigid(\approx)
7. $n \leq m \equiv n < m \lor n = m$

So (2) implies that natural numbers $n$ and $m$ are number-identical precisely when identical, and (3) – (5) tell us that number-identity is provably an equivalence relation on natural numbers.

(820) **Definition** and **Theorem:** Positive Integers. We leave it as an exercise to show that the expression $\lambda x \neg(x \approx 0)$ is significant. Hence, we may define (1) being a positive integer, written $\mathbb{N}_+$, as being an $x$ such that $x$ is a natural number not number-identical to Zero:

1. $\mathbb{N}_+ = df \lambda x \neg(x \approx 0)$

It immediately follows that:

2. $\mathbb{N}_+, x \equiv \mathbb{N}_x \& \neg(x \approx 0)$ (Theorem)

(821) **Theorems:** One is a Positive Integer and Similar Facts. It now follows that (1) One is a positive integer. More generally, (2) if One is less than or equal to $n$, then $n$ is a positive integer:

1. $\mathbb{N}_+, 1$
2. $1 \leq n \rightarrow \mathbb{N}_+, n$

(822) **Theorems:** Every Positive Integer Succeeds a Unique Natural Number. If $x$ is a positive integer, there is a unique natural number that precedes it:

\[ \mathbb{N}_+, x \rightarrow \exists ! n \mathbb{P} n x \]
CHAPTER 14. NATURAL NUMBERS

Cf. Frege 1884 (§78, Proposition 6) where he asserts that every Number except Zero follows in the series of natural numbers directly after a number.

(823) Definitions: The Exact Numerical Quantifiers for Ordinary Objects. We now inductively define the exact numerical quantifiers, or cardinality quantifiers, for ordinary objects. Let us say (.1) there are exactly Zero ordinary objects that exemplify \( F \), written \( \exists_0 u Fu \), just in case no ordinary objects exemplify \( F \); and (.2) there are exactly \( n' \) ordinary objects that exemplify \( F \), written \( \exists_1 u Fu \), just in case there is an ordinary object \( u \) that exemplifies \( F \) and there are exactly \( n \) ordinary objects that exemplify \( F^u \):

\[(.1) \exists_0 u Fu \equiv df \neg \exists u Fu\]
\[(.2) \exists_1 u Fu \equiv df \exists u (Fu \& \exists_n v F^u v)\]

Note that the definition of \( \exists_1 u Fu \) is a condition with the variables \( n \) and \( F \) free. Note that the occurrences of the numerical indices in these definitions are not primitive metalinguistic terms but rather metaphysically defined. So we are making use of the natural numbers to (exactly) count the ordinary objects that fall under a property no matter what the modal context.

(824) Theorems: A Validating Consequence. If we set \( n \) to Zero in the preceding definition, then since \( 0' \) is 1, it is straightforward to establish (.1) there is exactly One ordinary object that exemplifies \( F \) if and only if there is a unique ordinary object that exemplifies \( F \):

\[(.1) \exists_1 u Fu \equiv \exists! u Fu\]

Furthermore, if we use (.1) as the base case, we can prove generally, by induction, for any \( n \), that there are exactly \( n \) ordinary \( F \)-objects if and only if there are ordinary objects \( u_1, \ldots, u_n \) such that (i) \( u_1, \ldots, u_n \) all exemplify \( F \), (ii) \( u_1, \ldots, u_n \) are pairwise distinct (i.e., \( u_i \neq u_j \), for \( 1 \leq i \leq j \leq n \)) and (iii) every ordinary object that exemplifies \( F \) is identical to one of \( u_1, \ldots, u_n \):

\[(.2) \exists_1 u Fu \equiv \exists u_1 \ldots \exists u_n (Fu_1 \& \ldots \& Fu_n \& u_1 \neq_F u_2 \& \ldots \& u_1 \neq_F u_n \& u_2 \neq_F u_3 \& \ldots \& u_2 \neq_F u_n \& \ldots \& u_{n-1} \neq_F u_n \& \forall v (Fv \rightarrow (v =_E u_1 \lor \ldots \lor v =_E u_n)))\]

These theorems establish that (823) correctly predicts truth conditions for the exact numerical quantifiers for ordinary objects. Moreover, these are modally strict theorems because we have a single subdomain of natural numbers that can count ordinary objects no matter what the modal context.

(825) Lemmas: Facts About Numbering Successors. (.1) If ordinary object \( u \) exemplifies \( F \) and \( n \) numbers the \( F \)-objects not identical \( E \) to \( u \), then \( n' \) numbers \( F \); (.2) If \( n' \) numbers \( F \), then for some ordinary object \( u \) exemplifying \( F \), \( n \) numbers the \( F \)-objects not identical \( E \) to \( u \):
(1) \( Fu \& \text{Numbers}(n, F^{-u}) \rightarrow \text{Numbers}(n', F) \)

(2) \( \text{Numbers}(n', F) \rightarrow \exists u(Fu \& \text{Numbers}(n, F^{-u})) \)

**Theorems:** Natural Numbers and Numerical Quantifiers Over Ordinary Objects. It is now provable that (.1) there are exactly \( n \) ordinary objects exemplifying \( G \) if and only if \( n \) encodes \( G \); and (.2) \( n \) is the abstract object that encodes just the properties \( F \) such that there are exactly \( n \) ordinary objects exemplifying \( F \):

\[
(1) \exists ! u Fu \equiv \text{Numbers}(n, F) \\
(2) \quad n = \exists x (A ! x \& \forall F (xF \equiv \exists ! u Fu))
\]

Note how (.2) validates an idea put forward by Hodes in papers from 1984 and 1990. He summarizes his 1984 view, ‘coding fictionalism’, as the idea that “numbers are, loosely speaking, fictions created to encode cardinality-quantifiers, thereby clothing a certain higher-order logic in the attractive garments of lower-order logic” (1990, 350).\(^3\)\(^4\)\(^1\) We validate this idea by taking his ‘fictions’ to be ‘reified logical patterns’, i.e., abstract objects. Each equinumerosity condition on properties in our logic could be represented in third-order logic as a property of properties. Thus, each natural number \( n \) encodes those properties \( F \) that fall under the following property of properties: being a property \( F \) such that there are exactly \( n \) ordinary objects exemplifying \( F \). Though

\(^{34}\) He goes on to say:

More precisely: arithmetic singular terms that appear to do the semantic job of designating numbers really do the different job of encoding cardinality-quantifiers; quantifier-phrases that appear to quantify over numbers really encode higher-order quantification over cardinality-quantifiers; predicate-phrases, whose logico-syntactic behavior make them of level one, really do the semantic work of expressions of higher levels.

His position was laid out earlier in 1984 where we find, on p. 143:

In making what appears to be a statement about numbers one is really making a statement primarily about cardinality object-quantifiers; what appears to be a first-order theory about objects of a distinctive sort really is an encoding of a fragment of third-order logic.

And on p. 144:

The mathematical-object picture may be described in two equivalent ways. . . . or we may see it as a pretense of positing objects that intrinsically represent type 2 entities. This second description makes mathematical discourse, when carried on within the mathematical-object picture, a special sort of fictional discourse: numbers are fictions “created” with a special purpose, to encode numerical object-quantifiers and thereby enable us to “pull down” a fragment of third-order logic, dressing it in first-order clothing.

By ‘higher-order logic’, Hodes means third-order logic. In our system, the Comprehension Principle for Abstract Objects grounds the way we abstract the numbers from these higher-order facts.
one might note that Hodes’s view holds for the numerical quantifiers over any objects (not just ordinary objects), but to do he requires richer assumptions to even state the view, namely, the assumptions of third-order logic, model theory, applied set theory, etc. By contrast, object theory can express and derive a version of the view in a second-order logic that is interpretable under general Henkin models.

(827) Remark: General Numerical Quantifiers, or How to Count Abstracta. We can now make use of the natural numbers to inductively define exact numerical quantifiers for any objects, any relations, and for any condition $\varphi$. These quantifiers will be unlike the numerical quantifiers for ordinary objects: we won’t be able to transform assertions involving them into facts about the number indexing the quantifier. Nevertheless, the following definitions are precise and allow us to assert there are exactly $n$ entities (individuals or relations, as the case may be) such that $\varphi$:

$$\exists^n_0 \alpha \varphi \equiv df \neg \exists \alpha \varphi$$
$$\exists^n_1 \alpha \varphi \equiv df \exists \alpha (\varphi \& \exists^n_1 \beta (\varphi^{\beta} & \beta \neq \alpha))$$

As the simplest (non-vacuous) case of this definition, let $\alpha$ be the individual variable $x$ and $\varphi$ be $Fx$, so that we have:

$$\exists_{10} xFx \equiv df \exists x Fx$$
$$\exists_{11} xFx \equiv df \exists x (Fx \& \exists_{10} y(Fy \& y \neq x))$$

Similarly, let $\alpha$ be the $m$-place relation variable $F^m$ (for some $m$, $m \geq 0$) and let $\varphi$ be any formula. Then our definition yields:

$$\exists^n_{10} F^m \varphi \equiv df \neg \exists F^m \varphi$$
$$\exists^n_{11} F^m \varphi \equiv df \exists F^m (\varphi \& \exists^n_{10} G^m (\varphi^{G^m} & G^m \neq F^m))$$

Though we can’t show $\exists^n_{10} xFx$ is equivalent to $Numbers(n,F)$, we can answer the question “How many abstract individuals are such that $\varphi$?” by showing, for some $n$, that $\exists^n_{10} x(A!x \& \varphi)$, and we can answer the question “How many Fs are such that $\varphi$?” by showing, for some $n$, $\exists^n_{10} F \varphi$. The answers make use of the natural numbers as informative indices, though once the answers are expanded by the definitions, they make no reference to the natural numbers.

14.8 Functions and Recursive Definitions

It is now time to discuss functions in greater generality. Up to this point, we have defined what it is for a 2-place relation $R$ to map $F$ to $G$ (722.1), and what it is for a relation $R$ to map $F$ to $G$ (728.1). But our goal in this section is to introduce and justify the usual recursive definitions of the arithmetic functions such as addition, multiplication, etc. To do this, we need to (a) define
n-ary functions generally and understand how they behave, (b) define maps and mappings generally, i.e., say what it is for an \( n' \)-place relation to be an \( n \)-ary mapping from relation \( S^n \) to property \( G \) and what it is for a relation to be a restricted function from \( S^n \) to \( G \), (c) introduce and justify the definition of new relations by induction and new functions by recursion, and then (d) combine our investigations so that we can justifiably use recursive definitions to introduce the classical, recursive, number-theoretic functions used in Peano Arithmetic.

14.8.1 Total Functions

\((828)\) Definitions: \( n \)-ary Total Functions. Let us say that (\(1.1\)) \( 2 \)-place relation \( R \) is a \textit{unary total function}, written \( \text{Function}^1(R) \), if and only if for every object \( x \), there is a unique object \( y \) such that \( x \) is \( R \)-related to \( y \):

\[(1) \quad \text{Function}^1(R) \equiv \text{df} \quad \forall x \exists! y Rxy \]

For convenience, we have dropped the superscript on \( R \) in \( \text{Function}^1(R) \), since the arity of \( R \) can be inferred.

More generally, we say that (\(2.1\)) an \( n' \)-place relation \( R \) is an \textit{n-ary total function}, written \( \text{Function}^n(R) \), if and only if for any objects \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \), there is a unique object \( y \) such that \( x_1, \ldots, x_n, y \) exemplify \( R \):

\[(2) \quad \text{Function}^n(R) \equiv \text{df} \quad \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n \exists! y Rx_1 \ldots x_n y \quad (n \geq 0) \]

Again, we have dropped the superscript on \( R \) in \( \text{Function}^n(R') \), since the arity of \( R \) must be \( n' \) when \( R \) is an \( n \)-ary total function. Thus, a \textit{binary} total function is a \( 3 \)-place relation \( R \) such that \( \forall x \forall y \exists! z Rx_1 y z \). And so on.

Our definition applies even when \( n = 0 \) so that (\(3.1\)) a \textit{nullary} total function is any \( 1 \)-place relation \( R \) that is uniquely exemplified:

\[(3) \quad \text{Function}^0(R) \equiv \text{df} \quad \exists! y R y \]

So any property exemplified by exactly one object is a nullary total function.

\((829)\) Definitions: A Distinguished Group of Necessary Relations. In the remainder of this chapter, we shall need to appeal to relations that are necessarily exemplified by every \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \). Of course, we’ve already introduced a necessary property, namely \( L \), which was defined in (\(201\)) as \( [\lambda x \ E!x \rightarrow E!x] \) (being concretes if concrete). However, instead of generalizing this definition to relations of higher arity, it is simpler to introduce necessary \( n \)-place relations for each arity \( n \) as follows. Recall that in (\(206\)), we let \( p_0 \) be the proposition \( \forall x(E!x \rightarrow E!x) \). Then let us define the \( n \)-place relation \( D^n \) to be the relation being \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) such that \( p_0 \):
\[ D^n = \text{df} \left[ \lambda x_1 \ldots x_n p_0 \right] \]

When \( n = 1 \), this definition yields that \( D^1 \) (henceforth \( D \)) is the property \( \left[ \lambda x p_0 \right] \), and when \( n = 0 \), the definition yields that \( D^0 \) is the proposition \( \left[ \lambda p_0 \right] \), which we know by (112.1) is just \( p_0 \). In what follows, we need not take a stand on whether the property \( D^1 \) is identical to the property \( L \). It matters only that the following theorems hold with respect to \( D^1 \) and, more generally, \( D^n \).

\textbf{(830) Theorems:} Facts About \( D^n \). Clearly, it follows from \( \beta \)-Conversion and the fact that \( p_0 \) is a theorem that (.1) individuals \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) exemplify being \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) such that \( p_0 \). Hence (.2) individuals \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) exemplify \( D^n \). So by GEN, (.3) any individuals \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) exemplify \( D^n \), and, by RN, (.4) necessarily, any individuals \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) exemplify \( D^n \):

\begin{itemize}
  \item (.1) \( \left[ \lambda x_1 \ldots x_n p_0 \right] x_1 \ldots x_n \)
  \item (.2) \( D^n x_1 \ldots x_n \)
  \item (.3) \( \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n D^n x_1 \ldots x_n \)
  \item (.4) \( \square \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n D^n x_1 \ldots x_n \)
\end{itemize}

So by (198.1), \( D^n \) is a necessary relation. When \( n = 0 \), (.1) asserts \textit{that} \( p_0 \) \textit{is} \textit{true}; (.2) and (.3) assert \textit{D} \textit{0} \textit{is} \textit{true}; and (.4) asserts \textit{necessarily, D} \textit{0} \textit{is} \textit{true}. Finally, note that in these theorems, we may regard \( n \) as a free variable, so that, by GEN, each becomes a universally generalized theorem beginning \textit{for every} \( n \).

\textbf{(831) Theorems:} Total Functions of Every Arity Exist. It is a theorem that:

\begin{itemize}
  \item (.1) \textit{being an} \( x \) \textit{and} \( y \) \textit{such that} \( x \) \textit{exemplifies D and y is number-identical to Zero}
  \item (.2) \textit{being an} \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) \textit{and} \( y \) \textit{such that} \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) \textit{exemplify D} \textit{n and y is number-identical to Zero}
\end{itemize}

\begin{itemize}
  \item (.1) Function\(^1\)(\( \left[ \lambda xy Dx \& y \equiv 0 \right] \))
  \item (.2) Function\(^n\)(\( \left[ \lambda x_1 \ldots x_n y D^n x_1 \ldots x_n \& y \equiv 0 \right] \))
\end{itemize}

Four observations may be of interest. First, in (.1), we may substitute any positive integer for Zero and the result remains a theorem. The same applies to (.2). Second, in (.2), we may regard \( n \) as a free variable, so that by GEN, it follows that the theorem holds for every \( n \). Third, the theorem holds even when \( n = 0 \). In that case, the theorem asserts:

\begin{itemize}
  \item (.3) Function\(^0\)(\( \left[ \lambda y y \equiv 0 \right] \))
\end{itemize}

Fourth, these theorems depend on axiom (778) and the definition of \( P \) (779.1). We can, however, prove that total functions of every arity exist without appealing to that axiom. See the next item.
(832) **Theorems:** Non-Numerical Total Functions of Every Arity Exist. Without relying on the axiom that *predecessor* is a relation, we can show that: (.1) some 2-place relations are unary total functions, and more generally, (.2) some \( n' \)-place relations are \( n \)-ary total functions:

(1) \( \exists R (\text{Function}^1(R)) \)

(2) \( \exists R (\text{Function}^n(R)) \)

Again, in (2), we may regard \( n \) as a free variable and so the theorem holds even when \( n = 0 \).

It might be instructive to at least identify the witnesses that establish the existence of non-numerical total functions. To do this, we exploit the fact that there is at least one ordinary object, which follows from (225.1) by the T schema. Let \( a \) be such an object. Then, the 2-place relation, *being an \( x \) and \( y \) such that \( x \) exemplifies \( D \) and \( y \) is identical \( E \) to \( a \)*, i.e., \( \lambda xy \text{Dx} \& y =_E a \), is a unary total function and a witness to (1). So is the 2-place relation \( [\lambda xy y =_E a] \).

Now for (2), for any natural number \( n \), the following \( n' \)-place relation is a witness to (2): *being an \( x_1, \ldots, x_n, y \) such that \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) exemplify \( D^n \) and \( y \) is identical \( E \) to \( a \)*, i.e.,

\[ [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n y D^n x_1 \ldots x_n \& y =_E a] \]

And the relation *being an \( x_1, \ldots, x_n, y \) such that \( y \) is identical \( E \) to \( a \)* is also a witness, i.e., \( [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n y y =_E a] \) is a witness.

(833) **Remark:** Restricted Variables for Total Functions. Since total functions are well-defined and exist for every \( n \), we can introduce restricted variables to range over them. Though our language is based on the convention that constants and variables ranging over relations are upper-case letters, we shall follow the normal practice of using the following variables to range over total functions:

\( f, g, h, \ldots \)

The arity of the total function will be clear from the number of arguments. Consequently, expressions of the form \( f x_1 \ldots x_n y \) are simply \( n' \)-ary exemplification formulas, with the \( n \)-ary total function variable \( f \) being an \( n' \)-place relation term. We turn next to some modal facts about total functions.

(834) **Theorems:** Relations That are Necessarily Total Functions. It immediately follows by RN from (831.1) and (831.2), respectively, that (.1) it is necessarily the case that *being an \( x \) and \( y \) such that \( x \) exemplifies \( D \) and \( y \) is number-identical to Zero* is a unary total function; and (.2) it is necessarily the case that *being an \( x_1, \ldots, x_n, y \) such that \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) exemplify \( D \) and \( y \) is number identical to Zero* is an \( n \)-ary total function:
Moreover, if we don’t appeal to the axiom that asserts predecessor is a relation, we can still prove the existence of non-numerical relations that are necessarily total functions. Recall that the relation $[[\lambda xy Dx \& y = E a]]$, where $a$ is some ordinary object, served as the witness to the proof of (832.1). This relation now serves as a witness to the following fact, which is derivable without any number-theoretic axioms or theorems: (.3) some 2-place relations are necessarily unary total functions:

$\exists R \Box \text{Function}^1(R)$

Similarly, the relation we identified as a witness to (832.2) is also a witness to the fact that (.4) some $n'$-place relations are necessarily $n$-ary total functions:

$\exists R \Box \text{Function}^n(R)$

(835) Theorems: Total Functions and Contingency. It is important understand that our system implies: (.1) some relations are total functions but possibly fail to be total functions, and (.2) some relations fail to be total functions but possibly are total functions:

$\exists R (\text{Function}^n(R) \& \Diamond \neg \text{Function}^n(R))$

$\exists R (\neg \text{Function}^n(R) \& \Diamond \text{Function}^n(R))$

Clearly, the unary total function $[[\lambda xy Dx \& y = 0]]$ that we discussed in (831.1) is not a witness to the $n = 1$ case of (.1) or (.2). As we saw, $[[\lambda xy Dx \& y = 0]]$ is necessarily a total function, and so isn’t a witnesses to (.1), and since it is in fact a total function, it isn’t a witnesse to (.2).

Instead, the proof of (.1), for $n = 1$, starts from the fact that, by (215.1), there are contingently true propositions, i.e., that there are propositions $p$ such that $p \& \Diamond \neg p$. The proof then reasons with respect to an arbitrary such contingent truth, say $p_1$, and shows that the relation $[[\lambda xy p_1 \& Dx \& y = 0]]$ is in fact a total function but possibly fails to be one. Call this relation $f_1$. Then the argument that $f_1$ is a total function is a variant of the reasoning used in the proof of (832.1). The theorem is modally-strict because the hypothesis that $p_1$ is contingently true is discharged. Moreover, the argument that $f_1$ possibly fails to be a total function also starts from the fact that $p_1$ is contingently true.\footnote{Intuitively, since $p_1$ is contingently true, there is a possible world, say $w$, where $p_1$ is false. At $w$, no objects $x$ and $y$ exemplify $f_1$ since at $w$, no $x$ and $y$ are such that $p_1$. Hence, at $w$, it is not the case that for every $x$ there is a unique $y$ such that $f_1xy$. So $f_1$ is not a total function at $w$. Hence, it is possible that $f_1$ is not a total function.} So there are relations that are total functions only contingently.
Analogously, the proof of (2.2) starts from the fact that there are contingently false propositions (215.2). But this proof is left as an exercise.

As might be expected, (2.1) and (2.2) remain theorems even if we don’t appeal to the new axiom (783.1). In this case, we can’t point to the relation $[\lambda x y Dx \& y =_E a]$ that we discussed in (832.1): it is not a witness to the $n = 1$ case of either (2.1) or (2.2) — it is necessarily a total function and so isn’t a witness to (2.1), and it is in fact a total function and so isn’t a witness to (2.2).

Instead, in this case, we can point to the relation $[\lambda x y p_1 \& Dx \& y =_E a]$, where $p_1$ is an arbitrarily chosen contingently true proposition and $a$ is some arbitrarily chosen ordinary object. Given this hint, we recommend the following:

**Exercise 7.** Derive (2.1) without appealing to axiom (778) and definition (779.1).

A proof is given in the Appendix. Moreover, starting with a contingently false proposition:

**Exercise 8.** Derive (2.2) without appealing to axiom (778) and definition (779.1).

(836) **Definition:** Function Application. Given any total function $f$, it follows by definition (828.2) that for any $x_1, \ldots, x_n$, there is a unique $y$ such that $fx_1 \ldots x_n y$. Hence the description $tyfx_1 \ldots x_n y$ is significant. We may therefore define the value of the $n$-ary total function $f$ for $x_1, \ldots, x_n$, written $f(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$, to be the object $y$ such that $fx_1 \ldots x_n y$:

$$f(x_1, \ldots, x_n) =_{df} tyfx_1 \ldots x_n y$$

Thus, even $f()$ is well-defined: where $n = 0$, $f$ is a nullary total function and $f()$ is defined as $tyf$.

In general, when $f$ is an $n$-ary total function and $\kappa_1, \ldots, \kappa_n$ are any individual terms, the parentheses and any comma separators in the new term $f(\kappa_1, \ldots, \kappa_n)$ jointly constitute an individual term-forming operator. Note that we can use our new terms to construct 2-place exemplification formulas such as $Ryf(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$. Moreover, defined identity formulas such as $f(x_1, \ldots, x_n) = y$ are also well-formed. Whenever such an identity formula is true and $n \geq 1$, we say that $f$ maps arguments $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ to the value $y$. We therefore tolerate the ambiguity between saying $f$ maps $x$ to $y$ and saying $R$ maps $F$ to $G$, as the latter was defined in (722.1), since the variables always make it clear which notion is being invoked. When $n = 0$ and $f() = y$, we simply say that the value of the nullary total function $f$ is $y$.

Our definitions establish that the notion of function application is reducible to the notion of exemplification and the description operator the, the latter being governed by the classical theorems involving uniqueness (i.e., existence
and identity) claims. Cf. Whitehead & Russell 1910–1913 [1925–1927], *30·01 and *30·02. Thus, our system stands in complete contrast to Frege’s system of 1893/1903, since there he took functions and function application as primitive, and identities of the form \( f(x_1, \ldots, x_n) = y \) as primitive atomic formulas.

(837) ★Theorem: Relations and Function Values. It is an immediate consequence of the preceding definition and the theory of descriptions that \( f \) maps the arguments \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) to the value \( y \) if and only if \( x_1, \ldots, x_n, y \) exemplify \( f \):

\[
f(x_1, \ldots, x_n) = y \equiv fx_1 \ldots x_n y
\]

It is important to understand why this theorem is not modally strict. Inspection of the proof makes it clear that ★-theorems (about definite descriptions) play a role in both directions of the biconditional. Intuitively, however, the situation is a familiar one. The theorem is a biconditional in which (a) the truth of the one condition (in this case, the right-hand condition) may vary from world to world, while (b) the truth of the other condition is rigidly tied to the identity of the object that in fact is the value of \( f \) for the arguments \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \). So the equivalence is guaranteed to hold in fact but not necessarily.

(838) ★Theorem: Fact about Total Functions That Are Materially Equivalent Relations. It is a consequence of our definitions and theorems that if \( f \) and \( h \) are materially equivalent relations, then necessarily, for all objects \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \), the value of \( f \) for \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) is identical to the value of \( h \) for \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \):

\[
\forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n \forall y(fx_1 \ldots x_n y \equiv hx_1 \ldots x_n y) \rightarrow \Box\forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n(f(x_1, \ldots, x_n) = h(x_1, \ldots, x_n))
\]

Although the necessity of identity (126) plays a role in the proof, the reasoning nevertheless appeals to (837)★ and so fails to be modally strict.

(839) Remark: Total Functions Aren’t Extensional Entities. In classical mathematics, functions \( f \) and \( g \) that map the same arguments to the same values are considered identical, i.e., the very same function. That is, classical mathematical functions obey the following principle of extensionality:

\[
\forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n(f(x_1, \ldots, x_n) = g(x_1, \ldots, x_n)) \rightarrow f = g
\]

This principle is not derivable in our system and we should not add it as an axiom, for it implies the identity of any relations that are materially equivalent total functions, i.e., it implies:

\[
\forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n \forall y(fx_1 \ldots x_n y \equiv gx_1 \ldots x_n y) \rightarrow f = g
\]

The proof is relatively straightforward.\(^{343}\) Put aside for now the fact that the reasoning in the derivation appeals to (837)★ and so fails to be modally strict;

\(^{343}\)Without loss of generality, we prove the 1-place case. Assume the principle of extensionality:

(E) \( \forall x(f(x) = g(x)) \rightarrow f = g \)
we’ll discuss this in Remark (841). Since object theory (a) analyzes total functions as relations and (b) allows us to consistently assert the distinctness of materially equivalent relations if the case demands it, we may assert the distinctness of materially equivalent total functions when the need arises. But the principle of extensionality for total functions would undermine that ability and should therefore be excluded as a general principle. So total functions are not extensional entities in the classical sense of mathematical functions. Nevertheless, they do have well-defined identity conditions, namely, those given in (23.2) and (117.2). Interestingly, these identity conditions offer a new sense in which extensionally equivalent total functions are identical.

Theorems: Existence of Total Functions That Are (Necessarily) Equivalent Relations. For simplicity, we restrict our attention in this item to the case of 2-place relations that are unary total functions. It is now provable that (.1) there are total functions that are materially equivalent relations, and (.2) there are total functions that are necessarily equivalent relations:

\[(.1) \exists f \exists h \forall x \forall y (fxy \equiv hxy)\]

To show that this implies that \(f\) and \(g\) are identical when materially equivalent, assume that \(f\) and \(g\) are materially equivalent, i.e., further assume:

\[\forall x \forall y (fxy \equiv gxy)\]

Now by two applications of \(\forall E\), this second assumption implies:

\[(\vartheta) fxy \equiv gxy\]

So we can show \(f(x) = y \equiv g(x) = y\) as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
  f(x) = y & \equiv fxy \quad \text{by (837)*} \\
  & \equiv gxy \quad \text{by (}\vartheta) \\
  & \equiv g(x) = y \quad \text{by (837)*}
\end{align*}
\]

Since \(x\) and \(y\) aren’t free in our second assumption, we may apply \(\text{GEN}\) twice to the last result to conclude:

\[(\zeta) \forall x \forall y (f(x) = y \equiv g(x) = y)\]

Now, independently, by the commutativity of the biconditional, it follows from modally strict theorem (118.4) that \(\forall y (x = y \equiv z = y) \equiv x = z\). Since this holds by \(\text{GEN}\) for any \(x\) and \(z\), if we instantiate \(x\) in this result to \(f(x)\) and \(z\) to \(g(x)\), then we obtain as a modally strict fact:

\[
\forall y (f(x) = y \equiv g(x) = y) \equiv f(x) = g(x)
\]

Hence, by a Rule of Substitution, we may substitute \(f(x) = g(x)\) for \(\forall y (f(x) = y \equiv g(x) = y)\) in \((\zeta)\) to obtain \(\forall x (f(x) = g(x))\). But, then, by the principle of extensionality assumed at the outset, \(f = g\).

To see this, consider unary total functions \(f\) and \(g\). Since they’re both 2-place relations, (117.2) says that \(f\) and \(g\) are identical whenever, for any object \(x\), \([\lambda y fyx] = [\lambda y gyx]\) and \([\lambda y fyx] = [\lambda y gyx]\).

By (117.1), this requires both (a) that \([\lambda y fyx]\) and \([\lambda y gyx]\) are necessarily encoded by the same objects, and (b) that \([\lambda y fyx]\) and \([\lambda y gyx]\) are necessarily encoded by the same objects. Given a formal semantics in which the truth conditions of ‘\(F\)’ are that the object denoted by \(’F’\) is in the encoding extension of the property denoted by \(’F’\), (117.1) guarantees that \(f\) and \(g\) are identical whenever the relational properties that \(f\) and \(g\) give rise to have the same encoding extension at every possible world. So if we allow that having the same encoding extension is a way of being extensionally equivalent, then total functions \(f\) and \(g\) that are extensionally equivalent at every world are identical.
It may help to note that the proofs of these theorems use witnesses that are familiar. Recall the total function used as a witness to (832.1), namely:

\[ f_0: \lambda x y \; D x \& y \neq 0 \]

Now consider \( h_0: \)

\[ h_0: \lambda x y \; y \neq 0 \]

The variable \( x \) bound by the \( \lambda \) in \( h_0 \) doesn’t appear free in the matrix of the \( \lambda \)-expression and so is vacuously bound. Nevertheless, \( h_0 \) is a unary total function (exercise). And it is relatively straightforward to show that \( f_0 \) and \( h_0 \) are not only materially equivalent but necessarily equivalent.

We need not assert here that \( f_0 \) and \( h_0 \) are in fact distinct relations since we are not now attempting to explain data that might suggest that they are distinct. But it is reasonable to assert that they are distinct and our system allows us to do so.

**Remark:** Observations. It is important to point out how the foregoing body of theorems about total functions takes advantage of the definition of \( f(x) \) as the object \( y \) in fact such that \( f xy \). This definition actually helps one to avoid the errors of (a) assuming that relations that are total functions are total functions necessarily, and (b) assuming that necessarily equivalent relations that happen to be total functions are total functions necessarily. To see (a), note that we wouldn’t want to define \( f(x) \) non-rigidly for relations that are only contingently total functions, since then \( f(x) \) might fail to be defined when it appears in a modal context. So even if a relation \( f \) is a total function only contingently, \( f(x) \) is defined no matter what the context. To see (b), recall the relation we labeled \( f_1 \) that served as the witness to (835.1):

\[ f_1: \lambda x y \; p_1 \& D x \& y \neq 0 \]

Compare \( f_1 \) with:

\[ h_1: \lambda x y \; p_1 \& y \neq 0 \]

It is easy to show that \( \Box \forall x \forall y (f_1 x y \equiv h_1 x y) \). But we shouldn’t conclude that either \( f_1 \) or \( h_1 \) is a total function necessarily. So we should define \( f_1(x) \) and \( h_1(x) \) rigidly, since those values would be undefined in certain modal contexts. Intuitively, in worlds where \( f_1 \) and \( h_1 \) fail to be total functions, their values there are undefined.

Thus, the fact that important theorems governing function application fail to be modally strict is completely in line with expectations. Theorems (837)*, (838)*, (840)*, and the reasoning in Remark (839) are precisely what we should expect given how function application has been defined.
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14.8.2 Functions From Domains to Codomains

(842) Remark: Our Strategy. We now work our way towards a definition of the conditions under which a relation $R$ is a function from $F$ to $G$, and more generally, a function from $S^n$ to $G$. In this Remark we motivate the elements of the definition by discussing only the simpler, less general case.

Intuitively, a relation $R$ is a function from $F$ to $G$ when it satisfies three conditions:

1. $R$ maps $F$ to $G$, i.e., by (722.1), $R$ relates each $F$-object to a unique $G$-object;

2. $R$ relates $F$-objects only to $G$-objects; and

3. $R$ doesn’t relate any $F$ objects to anything.

As we noted in (722.1), the first of the above conditions, i.e., $R$ maps $F$ to $G$ (written $R : F \rightarrow G$), doesn’t exclude either the possibility that $R$ relates something (e.g., an $F$-object) to $G$-objects or the possibility that $R$ relates $F$-objects to other objects. Indeed, as we saw in Figure 14.2, $R$ maps $F$ to $G$ even if, additionally, it (a) relates $F$-objects to $G$ objects, (b) relates $F$-objects to $G$ objects and (c) relates $F$-objects to $G$-objects.

But it is traditional to suppose that when $R$ is a function from $F$ to $G$, $R$ doesn’t relate anything to a non-$G$ object and $R$ doesn’t relate a non-$F$ thing to anything, since $R$ has $F$ as a domain and has $G$ as a codomain. Consequently, in what follows, we work up to a definition of $R$ is a function from $F$ to $G$ in stages. First, we generalize the notion $R$ maps $F$ to $G$ to define the notion $R$ maps relation $S^n$ to $G$. Then, after working with this notion a bit, we’ll say that $R$ is functional from $F$ to $G$ just in case $R$ maps $F$ to $G$ and $R$ relates $F$-objects only to $G$-objects. (We’ll note in passing that this implies that $R$ is functional on $F$, i.e., implies that if an $F$-object $x$ bears $R$ to both $y$ and $z$, then $y$ is identical to $z$.) We’ll then generalize the definition of functional from to a definition of $R$ is functional from $S^n$ to $G$. Finally, after working with these notions, we’ll define $R$ is a function from $F$ to $G$ just in case $R$ is functional from $F$ to $G$ and $R$ has $F$ as a domain (and so doesn’t relate $F$-objects to anything). This definition will have captured the three conditions stated at the beginning of this Remark. Again, we’ll generalize this to a definition of $R$ is a function from $S^n$ to $G$.

(843) Definitions: Maps From Relations to Properties. In (722.1), we defined $R$ maps property $F$ to property $G$:

$$R : F \rightarrow G \equiv_{df} \forall x (Fx \rightarrow \exists ! y (Gy \land Rx y))$$ (722.1)

We now generalize this to relations that map $n$-ary relations to properties. Where $R$ is an $n'$-place relation, we say that $R$ maps $n$-place relation $S$ to property $G$, written $R : S^n \rightarrow G$, just in case, whenever objects $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ exemplify
$S^n$, there exists a unique $y$ such that both $y$ exemplifies $G$ and $x_1, \ldots, x_n, y$ exemplify $R$:

(1) $R : S^n \to G \equiv df \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n(S^n x_1 \ldots x_n \to \exists! y(G y \& R x_1 \ldots x_n y))$

Where $n = 0$, this definition becomes (2) $R$ maps proposition $p$ to property $G$ just in case $p$ implies that there exists a unique $y$ such that $y$ both exemplifies $G$ and $R$:

(2) $R : p \to G \equiv df p \to \exists! y(G y \& R y)$

Thus, if $p$ is a false proposition, then every relation $R$ maps $p$ to every property $G$, by failure of the antecedent. And if there is a unique object that is both $G$ and $R$, then $R$ maps every proposition (true or false) to $G$.

It is important to remember the caution posted in (722). If $R : S^n \to G$, for any $n$, we can’t infer $R$ is a function with domain $S^n$ and codomain $G$. The above definition tells us nothing about whether $R$ relates objects that exemplify $S^n$ to anything, or whether $R$ relates anything to $G$-objects. A fortiori, we can’t infer that $R$ is a total function in the sense of (828.2).

(844) Theorem: Examples of Maps. It follows that (1) the 3-place relation being an $x, y$, and $z$ such that $x$ exemplifies $D$ and $y$ is identical to $z$ maps the relation being an $x$ and $y$ such that $x$ exemplifies $D$ and $y$ is an ordinary object to the property being ordinary; (2) number identity maps being a natural number to being a natural number; and (3) being an $x$ and $y$ such that $x$ exemplifies $D$ and $y$ is number-identical to Zero maps the property $D$ to the property $N$:

(1) $[\lambda xyz D x \& y = z] : [\lambda xy D x \& O! y] \to O$

(2) $\vdash : N \to N$

(3) $[\lambda xy D x \& y \hat{=} 0] : D \to N$

(845) Theorem: Predecessor is a Map. We also have the following distinguished case of a map, namely, predecessor maps being a number to being a number:

$P : N \to N$

Some readers may find the following useful:

Exercise 9. Show that $\neg(< : N \to N)$ and $\neg(\leq : N \to N)$, i.e., show that less than and less than or equal to do not map being a number to being a number. As part of the proof, use previous theorems to first show, for some $n, m,$ and $o$, that $n < m$, $n < o$, and $m \neq o$ (and similarly for $\leq$).

(846) Lemma: Fact About Restrictions on Relations. We note as a useful lemma that (1) if $R$ maps $F$ to $G$, then the restriction of $R$ to $F$ maps $F$ to $G$: 
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(1) $R : F \rightarrow G \rightarrow R_{|F} : F \rightarrow G$

More generally, (2) if $R$ maps $S^n$ to $G$, then the restriction of $R$ to $S^n$ maps $S^n$ to $G$:

(2) $R : S^n \rightarrow G \rightarrow R_{|S^n} : S^n \rightarrow G$

When $n = 0$, our theorem becomes (3) if $R$ maps $p$ to $G$, then $R$ restricted to $p$ maps $p$ to $G$:

(3) $R : p \rightarrow G \rightarrow R_{|p} : p \rightarrow G$

(847) Definitions: Functional From. Let $R$ be a 2-place relation. Then we say:

(1) $R$ is functional from $F$ to $G$, written $R \sim_{F} F \rightarrow G$, if and only if $R$ maps $F$ to $G$ and for any objects $x$ and $y$, if $x$ exemplifies $F$ and $R$ relates $x$ to $y$, then $y$ exemplifies $G$:

$R \sim_{F} F \rightarrow G \equiv_{df} R : F \rightarrow G \& \forall x \forall y (Fx \& Rxy \rightarrow Gy)$

Note that when $R$ is functional from $F$ to $G$, $R$ does not relate $F$-objects to $\overline{G}$-objects, though $R$ may still relate $\overline{F}$-objects to other things.

Example 9. Suppose that there are exactly seven individuals $a - g$, and that the relevant facts about them are depicted in Figure 14.11: $a$ and $b$ are the only $F$-objects; $c$ and $d$ are the only $G$-objects; $e$ exemplifies $\overline{F}$; $f$ and $g$ exemplify $\overline{G}$; and $Rad, Rbd, Rec, and Ref$. Then $R \sim F \rightarrow G$.

The following may be useful:

Exercise 10. Compare Figure 14.11 with Figures 14.2 – 14.4, in which the $R$s aren’t functional from $F$ to $G$. Say what minimal change could be made to all three earlier figures so that the $R$s become functional from $F$ to $G$.
With the example and exercises in mind, we say more generally (.2) $R$ is functional from $S^n$ to $G$, written $R \models S^n \rightarrow G$, if and only if $R$ maps $S^n$ to $G$ and for any objects $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ and $y$, if $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ exemplify $S^n$ and $R$ relates $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ to $y$, then $y$ exemplifies $G$:

(2) $R \models S^n \rightarrow G \equiv df R|: S^n \rightarrow G \& \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n \forall y(S^n x_1 \ldots x_n \& Rx_1 \ldots x_n y \rightarrow G y)$

Note that when $n = 0$, (2) asserts:

(3) $R \models p \rightarrow G \equiv df R|: p \rightarrow G \& \forall y(p \& Ry \rightarrow G y)$

That is, $R$ is functional from proposition $p$ to property $G$ whenever $R$ maps $p$ to $G$ and for every $y$, if $p$ is true and $y$ exemplifies $R$, then $y$ exemplifies $G$. 

(848) Theorems: A Relation That Is Functional From $\mathbb{N}$ To $\mathbb{N}$. The following relation is functional from $\mathbb{N}$ to $\mathbb{N}$, namely, being an $x$ and $y$ that exemplify $D$ and that are number-identical if natural numbers:

$$[\lambda xy D x \& Dy \& (Nx \& Ny \rightarrow x = y)] \models \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$$

Intuitively, this relation relates natural numbers to themselves and relates everything else to everything else. So although this relation is functional from $\mathbb{N}$ to $\mathbb{N}$, it is not yet a function from the natural numbers to the natural numbers given that objects which fail to be natural numbers are $R$-domain elements (i.e., $R$ relates them to something).

(849) Theorems: A Distinguished Relation That Is Functional From $\mathbb{N}$ To $\mathbb{N}$. It is also provable, but not by modally strict means, that predecessor is functional from $\mathbb{N}$ to $\mathbb{N}$:

$$\mathbb{P} \models \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$$

(850) Definitions: Functional On. Let us say (.1) $R$ is functional on $F$, written $\text{FunctionalOn}(R, F)$, just in case if an $F$-object bears $R$ to any objects $y$ and $z$, $y$ and $z$ are identical:

(1) $\text{FunctionalOn}(R, F) \equiv df \forall x(Fx \rightarrow \forall y \forall z(R xy \& R xz \rightarrow y = z))$

More generally, we say (.2) $R$ is functional on $S^n$, written $\text{FunctionalOn}(R, S^n)$, just in case any objects $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ that exemplify $S^n$ are such that any objects $y$ and $z$ that $R$ relates $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ to are identical:

(2) $\text{FunctionalOn}(R, S^n) \equiv df \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n(S^n x_1 \ldots x_n \rightarrow \forall y \forall z(R x_1 \ldots x_n y \& R x_1 \ldots x_n z \rightarrow y = z))$

Finally, when $n = 0$, our definition becomes (.3) $R$ is functional on $p$, written $\text{FunctionalOn}(R, p)$, just in case $p$ implies at most one thing exemplifies $R$: 


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(.3) \( \text{FunctionalOn}(R, p) \equiv_{df} \ p \rightarrow \forall y \forall z (Ry \land Rz \rightarrow y = z) \)

Note that every relation is functional on every false proposition.

(851) Theorems: Functional From Implies Functional On. It now follows that (.1) if \( R \) is functional from \( F \) to \( G \), then \( R \) is functional on \( F \):

(.1) \( R \vdash F \rightarrow G \rightarrow \text{FunctionalOn}(R, F) \)

More generally, (.2) if \( R \) is functional from \( S^n \) to \( G \), then \( R \) is functional on \( S^n \):

(.2) \( R \vdash S^n \rightarrow G \rightarrow \text{FunctionalOn}(R, S^n) \)

Finally, for \( n = 0 \), we have (.3) if \( R \) is functional from \( p \) to \( G \), then \( R \) is functional on \( p \):

(.3) \( R \vdash p \rightarrow G \rightarrow \text{FunctionalOn}(R, p) \)

These results help to justify our use of the term \( \text{functional from} \) for the definenda in (847).

(852) Remark: Domains, Ranges, and Codomains. Our next goal is to define the conditions under which a relation \( R \) is a \( \text{function from} \ F \) to \( G \), and more generally, when \( R \) is a function from \( S^n \) to \( G \). Given the strategy outlined in Remark (842), \( R \) is a function from \( F \) to \( G \) whenever \( R \) is functional from \( F \) to \( G \) and \( R \) doesn’t map any \( F \)-objects to anything. This last condition can be captured by saying that \( R \) has \( F \) as a domain, where this means that \( F \) is exemplified by all and only the objects that \( R \) relates to something.

When we introduce the notion \( R \text{ has } F \text{ as a domain} \), it is also natural to introduce the notion \( R \text{ has } H \text{ as a range} \). Intuitively, \( R \) has \( H \) as a range whenever \( H \) is exemplified by all and only the objects to which \( R \) relates something. Thus, these notions, of having a property as a domain or as a range, apply to every 2-place relation whatsoever — including those relations that aren’t functional from \( F \) to \( G \) and that aren’t maps from \( F \) to \( G \). However, once we define \( R \) as a function from \( F \) to \( G \) by stipulating that \( R \) is functional from \( F \) to \( G \) and has \( F \) as a domain, we’ll also stipulate that \( R \) has \( G \) as a codomain. The fact that \( R \) is a function from \( F \) to \( G \) doesn’t require that every \( G \)-object has some \( F \)-object \( R \) related to it. So a codomain of \( R \) is not necessarily a range of \( R \). Thus, our definitions will ensure that when \( R \) is a function from \( F \) to \( G \), (a) \( R \) has \( F \) as a domain by definition, (b) \( R \) has \( G \) as codomain by definition, and (c) \( R \) has \( H \) as a range whenever \( H \) is exemplified by all and only the objects to which \( R \) relates something.

(853) Definitions: Domains and Ranges. Where \( R \) is a 2-place relation and \( F \) is a property, we say that (.1) \( R \text{ has } F \text{ as a domain} \) just in case \( F \) is exemplified by all and only the objects that bear \( R \) to something, and (.2) \( R \text{ has } H \text{ as a range} \) just in case \( H \) is exemplified by all and only the objects that something bears \( R \) to:
(1) \( \text{HasDomain}(R, F) \equiv \forall x (Fx \equiv \exists y Rxy) \)

(2) \( \text{HasRange}(R, H) \equiv \forall y (Hy \equiv \exists x Rx y) \)

As noted previously, these notions apply to any 2-place relation whatsoever — \( R \) need not be a total function nor a map from \( F \) to \( G \). It follows from (.1), given definition (768.4), that \( R \) has domain \( F \) whenever the \( F \)-objects are precisely the \( R \)-domain elements.

More generally, where \( R \) is an \( n' \)-place relation and \( S^n \) is an \( n \)-place relation, we say that (.3) \( R \) has \( S^n \) as a domain just in case \( S^n \) is exemplified by all and only those objects \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) that bear \( R \) to something and (.4) \( R \) has \( H \) as a range just in case \( H \) is exemplified by all and only those objects to which \( R \) relates some objects \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \):

(3) \( \text{HasDomain}(R, S^n) \equiv_{df} \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n (S^n x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv \exists y R x_1 \ldots x_n y) \)

(4) \( \text{HasRange}(R, H) \equiv_{df} \forall y (H y \equiv \exists x_1 \ldots \exists x_n Rx_1 \ldots x_n y) \)

Analogously, these notions apply to any \( n' \)-place \( R \), even if \( R \) fails to be functional from \( S^n \) to \( G \) and fails to map \( S^n \) to \( G \). Note also that when \( n = 0 \), our definitions assert (.5) \( R \) has \( p \) as a domain if and only if \( p \) is materially equivalent to the claim something exemplifies \( R \), and (.6) \( R \) has \( H \) as a range just in case \( H \) is materially equivalent to \( R \):

(5) \( \text{HasDomain}(R, p) \equiv_{df} p \equiv \exists y Ry \)

(6) \( \text{HasRange}(R, H) \equiv_{df} \forall y (H y \equiv R y) \)

Notice here that if nothing exemplifies \( R \), then \( R \) has every false proposition as a domain and has every unexemplified property as a range. These facts will become important later.

(854) Remark: Domains and Ranges Aren’t Unique. Note that relations need not have unique domains or ranges. To see why, we need only consider, without loss of generality, a 2-place relation \( R \) that has \( Q \), say, as a domain. (Analogous considerations apply both to \( n \)-place relations generally and to any range that \( R \) has.) Then by (853.1), \( Q \) is exemplified by all and only those objects that bear \( R \) to something, i.e.,

\[ \forall x (Qx \equiv \exists y Rxy) \]

Now consider the property \([\forall x Qx \& p_0] \), where \( p_0 \) is \( \forall x (E!x \rightarrow E!x) \). Call this property \( K \). Though \( Q \) and \( K \) are materially, and indeed necessarily, equivalent, our theory doesn’t require them to be identical. But it is straightforward
14.8. FUNCTIONS AND RECURSIVE DEFINITIONS

Figure 14.12: $R$ is a function from $F$ to $G$.

to show that $R$ also $K$ as a domain.\footnote{To see that $R$ has $K$ as a domain in this scenario, we start with the assumption that $R$ has $Q$ as a domain, i.e.,

$(\delta) \forall x(Qx \equiv \exists y Rx y)$

Note independently that by $\beta$-Conversion and definition of $K$, it is a modally strict fact that $Kx \equiv (Qx \& p_0)$. And by propositional logic, it is a modally strict fact that $(Qx \& p_0) \equiv Qx$. Hence by modally strict reasoning, $Kx \equiv Qx$, which by the commutativity of the biconditional, yields $Qx \equiv Kx$. So by a Rule of Substitution, it follows from $(\delta)$ that $\forall x(Kx \equiv \exists y Rx y)$. But then by definition, $R$ has $K$ as a domain.}

So if $Q$ and $K$ are distinct, $R$ fails to have a unique domain.

**Exercise 11.** Show (a) that $R$ need not have a unique range, and (b) that if $R$ is an empty 2-place relation, i.e., $\neg \exists x \forall y Rx y$, then $R$ has $F$ as a domain if and only if $\neg \exists x Fx$.

(855) **Definitions:** Functions From Domains to Codomains. We now say that

$(.1) \quad R$ is a function from property $F$ to property $G$ if and only if $R$ is functional from $F$ to $G$ and $R$ has $F$ as a domain:

$R : F \rightarrow G \equiv_R \forall x(Fx \rightarrow (\exists y Rxy \& \exists z \neg (Rzx \& x \neq y)))$

When $R : F \rightarrow G$, we say that $R$ has $G$ as a codomain. Thus, when $R$ is a function from $F$ to $G$, $R$ doesn’t relate $F$-objects to anything, and doesn’t relate anything to $G$ objects.

**Example 10.** Suppose that there are exactly 9 individuals $a – i$, and that the relevant facts about them are depicted in Figure 14.12: $a$, $b$, and $c$ are the only $F$-objects; $d$, $e$, and $f$ are the only $G$-objects; $g$ exemplifies $F$; $h$ and $i$ exemplify $G$; and $Rae$, $Rbe$, and $Rcf$. Then $R : F \rightarrow G$.

The following may prove useful:
Exercise 12. Say exactly why $R$ in Figure 14.12 would fail to be a function from $F$ to $G$ if either (a) $R$ were to relate $g$ to $i$, (b) $R$ were to relate $a$ to $h$, or (c) $R$ were to relate $a$ to $d$ in addition to relating $a$ to $e$.

With this in mind, we may generalize (.1) by saying (.2) an $n'$-place relation $R$ is a function from relation $S^n$ to property $G$, written $R : S^n \rightarrow G$, just in case $R$ is functional from $S^n$ to $G$ and $R$ has $S^n$ as a domain:

\[(.2) \quad R : S^n \rightarrow G \equiv_{df} R \supset S^n \rightarrow G & \text{HasDomain}(R,S^n)\]

Similarly, when $R : S^n \rightarrow G$, we say that $R$ has $G$ as a codomain. As with the case of binary functions, when $R$ is a function from $S^n$ to $G$, $R$ doesn’t relate $S^n$-objects to anything, and doesn’t relate anything to $G$ objects.

When $n = 0$, our definition becomes (.3) $R$ is a function from $p$ to $G$ just in case $R$ is functional from $p$ to $G$ and $R$ has $p$ as a domain:

\[(.3) \quad R : p \rightarrow G \equiv_{df} R \supset p \rightarrow G & \text{HasDomain}(R,p)\]

This definition yields an interesting consequence of the relational analysis of functions, namely, that there exist nullary functions from $p$ to $G$ that have every false proposition as a domain and every unexemplified property as a range. We’ll prove this below, though some readers may wish to consider the matter for themselves beforehand. This consequence requires us to take precautions when we extend the definition of functional application to functions $R$ from $p$ to $G$, since when $R$ is a nullary function with an empty range, it is a ‘valueless’ function.

(856) Theorems: Summary Facts About Functions From $S^n$ to $G$. Recall the discussion in Remark (842), where we outlined the three conditions under which $R$ is a function from $F$ to $G$. These conditions are now captured by the following summarizing facts: (.1) $R$ is a unary function from $F$ to $G$ just in case (a) $R$ relates each $F$-object to a unique $G$-object, (b) $R$ relates $F$-objects only to $G$-objects, and (c) $R$ relates $x$ to something if and only if $x$ exemplifies $F$; and more generally, (.2) $R$ is an $n$-ary function from $S^n$ to $G$ just in case (a) $R$ relates any $n$ objects exemplifying $S^n$ to a unique $G$-object, (b) $R$ relates objects exemplifying $S^n$ only to $G$-objects, and (c) $R$ relates $n$ objects to something if and only if those objects exemplify $S^n$:

\[(.1) \quad R : F \rightarrow G \equiv \\
\forall x(Fx \rightarrow \exists!y(Gy & Rxy)) &
\]

\[346\text{Solution: In case (a), } R \text{ would fail to have } F \text{ as a domain, and so would fail to be a function from } F \text{ to } G. \text{ In case (b), } R \text{ would fail to relate } F \text{-objects only to } G \text{-objects, and hence would fail to be a function from } F \text{ to } G \text{ because it would fail the second clause of the definition of } F \text{ is functional from } F \text{ to } G. \text{ In case (c), } R \text{ would fail to be a function because it would fail to be a map from } F \text{ to } G \text{ — } R \text{ would relate } a \text{ to distinct } G \text{-objects } d \text{ and } e.\]
∀x∀y(Fx & Rxy → Gy) &
∀x(Fx ⊑ ∃yRxy)

(2) \( R : S^n \rightarrow G \equiv \)
\( \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n(S^n x_1 \ldots x_n → \exists y(Gy & R_{x_1} \ldots x_n y)) \) &
\( \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n \forall y(S^n x_1 \ldots x_n & R_{x_1} \ldots x_n y \rightarrow Gy) \) &
\( \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n(S^n x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv \exists yRx_{x_1} \ldots x_n y) \)

When \( n = 0 \), our theorem becomes (.3) \( R \) is a nullary function from \( p \) to \( G \) just in case (a) \( p \) implies there is a unique object that exemplifies both \( G \) and \( R \), (b) each object \( y \) such that \( p \) is true and \( Ry \) is such that \( Gy \), and (c) \( p \) is true if and only if \( R \) is exemplified by something:

(3) \( R : p \rightarrow G \equiv \)
\( p → \exists y(Gy & Ry) \) &
\( \forall y(p & Ry → Gy) \) &
\( p ≡ ∃yRy \)

Moreover, we have (.4) if \( R \) is functional from \( F \) to \( G \), then \( R \) restricted to \( F \) is a function from \( F \) to \( G \); (.5) if \( R \) is functional from \( S^n \) to \( G \), then \( R \) restricted to \( S^n \) is a function from \( S^n \) to \( G \); and (.6) if \( R \) is functional from \( p \) to \( G \), then \( R \) restricted to \( p \) is a function from \( p \) to \( G \):

(4) \( R \upharpoonright F \rightarrow G \rightarrow R_{\upharpoonright F} : F \rightarrow G \)
(5) \( R \upharpoonright S^n \rightarrow G \rightarrow R_{\upharpoonright S^n} : S^n \rightarrow G \)
(6) \( R \upharpoonright p \rightarrow G \rightarrow R_{\upharpoonright p} : p \rightarrow G \)

The following may prove useful to those of a mathematical bent, given how entrenched the notion of a function on a domain is in mathematics:

**Exercise 13.** Let us define: \( R \) is a function on (domain) \( F \) just in case \( \exists G(R : F → G) \). Then, recall the definition of \( FunctionalOn(R, F) \) (850) and prove that \( R \) is a function on \( F \) if and only if both \( FunctionalOn(R, F) \) and \( HasDomain(R, F) \). Show that this fact generalizes when we generalize the definition of function on to domains of arity \( n \geq 2 \) and arity \( n = 0 \).

Though the left-to-right direction of this exercise is straightforward, the right-to-left direction requires that one identify the witness to the existential claim. A proof is in the Appendix.

(857) **Theorems:** Examples of Functions From Domains to Codomains. It follows that (.1) the 3-place relation being an \( x \), \( y \), and \( z \) such that \( x \) exemplifies \( D \) and \( y \) is identical to \( z \) is a function from the relation being an \( x \) and \( y \) such that \( x \) exemplifies \( D \) and \( y \) is an ordinary object to the property being ordinary;
(2) *number-identity* is a function from the property of *being a natural number* to *being a natural number*; (3) the property *being a natural number that is number-identical to One* is a function from the proposition \(D^0\) to the property *being a natural number that Zero immediately precedes*:

(1) \(\lambda xyz \, Dx \land y = _Ez \colon [\lambda xy \, Dx \land O!y] \to O!\)

(2) \(\dividesection : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}\)

(3) \(\lambda n \, n \dividesection 1 \colon D^0 \to [\lambda n \, n \dividesection 0]\)

(858) **Theorem**: Facts About Domains. (1) If \(R\) is a function from \(F\) to \(G\) and \(\forall x (Fx \equiv Hx)\), then \(R\) is a function from \(H\) to \(G\):

(1) \((R : F \to G \land \forall x (Fx \equiv Hx)) \to R : H \to G\)

More generally, (2) if \(R\) is a function from \(S^n\) to \(G\) and \(\forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n (S^nx_1 \ldots x_n \equiv T^n x_1 \ldots x_n)\), then \(R\) is a function from \(T^n\) to \(G\):

(2) \((R : S^n \to G \land \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n (S^nx_1 \ldots x_n \equiv T^n x_1 \ldots x_n)) \to R : T^n \to G\)

When \(n = 0\), our theorem becomes (3) if \(R\) is a function from \(p\) to \(G\) and \(p \equiv q\), then \(R\) is a function from \(q\) to \(G\):

(3) \((R : p \to G \land p \equiv q) \to R : q \to G\)

(859) **Theorem**: Facts About Codomains. (1) If \(R\) is a function from \(F\) to \(G\) (i.e., with domain \(F\) and codomain \(G\)) and \(G\) materially implies \(H\), then \(R\) is a function from \(F\) to \(H\) (and so has \(H\) as codomain as well as \(G\)):

(1) \((R : F \to G \land \forall x (Gx \to Hx)) \to R : F \to H\)

Clearly, this theorem holds even when \(\neg \forall x (Hx \to Gx)\). Consider the following:

**Example 11.** Suppose that there are exactly 7 individuals \(a \ldots g\), and that the relevant facts about them are depicted in Figure 14.13: \(a, b, \) and \(c\) are the only \(F\)-objects; \(d, e, \) and \(f\) are the only \(G\)-objects; \(d, e, \) \(f, \) and \(g\) are the only \(H\)-objects; and \(Rae, Rbe, \) and \(Rcf\). Then \(R\) is a function from \(F\) to \(G\), a function from \(F\) to \(H\), and \(R\) has codomains \(G\) and \(H\) that aren’t equivalent and, hence, not identical.

We noted earlier that when \(R\) is a function from \(F\) to \(G\), \(R\) doesn’t relate anything to \(\overline{G}\) objects. So when (a) \(R\) is a function from \(F\) to \(G\) and (b) \(R\) is also a function from \(F\) to \(H\) because \(\forall x (Gx \to Hx)\), then the only \(H\)-objects that \(R\) relates \(F\)-objects to are \(G\)-objects. This is also illustrated in Figure 14.13.

Our theorem generalizes for \(n \geq 1\) and \(n = 0\). (2) If \(R\) is a function from \(S^n\) to \(G\), and \(G\) materially implies \(H\), then \(R\) is a function from \(S^n\) to \(H\); and (3) if \(R\) is a function from \(p\) to \(G\), and \(G\) materially implies \(H\), then \(R\) is a function from \(p\) to \(H\):
(860) Theorem: A Function with Distinct Codomain and Range. We now have as a theorem that \textit{predecessor restricted to the natural numbers} is a unary function from \textit{being a number} to \textit{being a number} but has range \textit{being a positive integer}:

\[ p \restrictedto \mathbb{N} : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \& \text{HasRange}(p \restrictedto \mathbb{N}, \mathbb{N}_+) \]

So \textit{predecessor restricted to the natural numbers} is a function that has \( \mathbb{N} \) as a domain, \( \mathbb{N} \) as a codomain, and \( \mathbb{N}_+ \) as a range.

(861) Theorems: Facts About Total Functions. Recall both the definition of a total function in (828) and the definition of the property \( D^1 \) (i.e., \( D \)) in (829). It follows that (.1) \( R \) is a unary total function if and only if \( R \) is a function from \( D \) to \( D \):

\[ \text{Function}^1(R) \equiv R : D \rightarrow D \]

Now recall the definition of the relation \( D^n \) in (829). Then we have (.2) \( R \) is an \( n \)-ary total function if and only if \( R \) is a function from \( D^n \) to \( D \):

\[ \text{Function}^n(R) \equiv R : D^n \rightarrow D \]

Finally if we recall the definition of \( D^0 \) and let \( n = 0 \), then (.2) asserts (.3) that \( R \) is a nullary total function if and only if \( R \) is a function from \( D^0 \) to \( D \):

\[ \text{Function}^0(R) \equiv R : D^0 \rightarrow D \]

Thus, for every \( n \), each \( n \)-ary total function \( R \) has relation \( D^n \) as domain and property \( D \) as codomain, and we can always regard \( R \) as a function from \( D^n \) to \( D \). Note also that (.3) has the interesting consequence that (.4) if \( R \) is a nullary total function, then for any proposition \( p \), \( R \) has \( p \) as a domain if and only if \( p \) is true:
(.4) \( \text{Function}^0(R) \rightarrow \forall p(\text{HasDomain}(R,p) \equiv p) \)

(862) Definitions: One-to-One and Onto Functions From \( S^n \) to \( G \). Recall that in (722.2) and (722.3), we defined, respectively, \( R \) maps \( F \) to \( G \) one-to-one and \( R \) maps \( F \) onto \( G \). We could generalize those definitions to define \( R \) maps \( S^n \) to \( G \) one-to-one and \( R \) maps \( S^n \) onto \( G \). And, similarly, we could generalize the definitions in (847) to define \( R \) is functional from \( S^n \) to \( G \) one-to-one, and \( R \) is functional from \( S^n \) onto \( G \). But since our primary interest in what follows is in relations that are functions, and not just maps, we proceed directly to define one-to-one and onto functions from \( S^n \) to \( G \).

Thus, we say (.1) \( R \) is a one-to-one function from \( F \) to \( G \) whenever \( R \) is a function from \( F \) to \( G \) and for any objects \( x, y \), and \( z \) if \( x \) bears \( R \) to \( z \) and \( y \) bears \( R \) to \( z \), then \( x = y \):

\[(.1) \quad R : F \xrightarrow{1-1} G \quad \equiv_{df} \quad R : F \rightarrow G \& \forall x \forall y (R x z \& R y z \rightarrow x = y)\]

Compare this with the definition of \( R \mid : F \xrightarrow{1-1} G \) in (722.2). When we know \( R \) is a function from \( F \) to \( G \), we can simplify the second conjunct of the definiens. We don’t need to require \( \forall x \forall y \forall z ((Fx \& Fy \& Gz) \rightarrow (Rxz \& Royz) \rightarrow x = y) \) because the antecedent \( Fx \& Fy \& Gz \) is implied when \( Rxz \) and \( Royz \). The definition of \( R : F \rightarrow G \) requires that \( R \) have \( F \) as a domain, and so it follows a fortiori from the definition of HasDomain in (853.1) that \( Rxz \) and \( Royz \) imply, respectively, that \( Fx \) and \( Fy \). And since \( R \) has to be functional from \( F \) to \( G \) to be a function from \( F \) to \( G \), \( Fx \) and \( Rxz \) imply \( Gz \).

More generally, (.2) \( R \) is a one-to-one function from \( S^n \) to \( G \) whenever \( R \) is a function from \( S^n \) to \( G \) and for any objects \( x_1, \ldots, x_n, y_1, \ldots, y_n, z \), if \( R x_1 \ldots x_n z \) and \( R y_1 \ldots y_n z \), then \( x_1 = y_1 \) and \( \ldots \) and \( x_n = y_n \):

\[(.2) \quad R : S^n \xrightarrow{1-1} G \quad \equiv_{df} \quad R : S^n \rightarrow G \& \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n \forall y_1 \ldots \forall y_n (Rx_1 \ldots x_n z \& Ry_1 \ldots y_n z \rightarrow (x_1 = y_1 \& \ldots \& x_n = y_n))\]

When \( n = 0 \), (.2) reduces to:

\[(.3) \quad R : p \xrightarrow{1-1} G \quad \equiv_{df} \quad R : p \rightarrow G \& \forall y (R y \rightarrow y = z)\]

Now let us say (.4) \( R \) is a function from \( F \) onto \( G \) just in case \( R \) is a function from \( F \) to \( G \) and every \( G \)-object is an object to which \( R \) relates something:

\[(.4) \quad R : F \rightarrow G \quad \equiv_{df} \quad R : F \rightarrow G \& \forall p (G y \rightarrow \exists x (Rx y))\]

Compare this with the definition of \( R \mid : F \rightarrow G \) in (722.3). When we know \( R \) is a function from \( F \) to \( G \), we can simplify the second conjunct of the definiens. We don’t need to require \( \forall y (G y \rightarrow \exists x (Fx \& Rx y)) \) because \( Fx \) is implied when \( Rxy \). Since we know by the definition of \( R : F \rightarrow G \) that \( R \) has \( F \) as a domain, it
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follows a fortiori from the definition of HasDomain in (853.1) that Rxy implies Fx.

More generally, (.5) R is a function from S^n onto G just in case R is a function from S^n to G and every G-object is an object to which R relates some things x_1,...,x_n:

(.5) \[ R : S^n \rightarrow_{onto} G \equiv_{df} R : S^n \rightarrow G \& \forall y (Gy \rightarrow \exists x_1,...,x_n R x_1,...,x_n y) \]

When n = 0, we have:

(.6) \[ R : p \rightarrow_{onto} G \equiv_{df} R : p \rightarrow G \& \forall y (Gy \rightarrow Ry) \]

The following may prove useful:

Exercise 14. Construct some specific examples of (.1) – (.6) above.

Note, finally, that since R is an n-ary total function iff R is a function from D^n to D (861.2), we may suppose that the case of n-ary one-to-one and onto total functions are covered by the above definitions. As a further exercise:

Exercise 15. Prove that if R is a unary one-to-one function from D to D according to (.1) above, then R is a one-to-one relation according to definition (768.1), i.e., prove \[ R : D \rightarrow 1-1 \rightarrow 1-1 \rightarrow D \rightarrow D \rightarrow (R) \]

(863) Theorems: Onto Functions From S^n to G and Ranges. It is a consequence of our definitions that (.1) a unary function from F onto G has G as a range; (.2) an n-ary function from S^n onto G has G as a range; and (.3) a nullary function from p onto G has G as a range:

(.1) \[ R : F \rightarrow_{onto} G \rightarrow \text{HasRange}(R,G) \]

(.2) \[ R : S^n \rightarrow_{onto} G \rightarrow \text{HasRange}(R,G) \]

(.3) \[ R : p \rightarrow_{onto} G \rightarrow \text{HasRange}(R,G) \]

(864) Definition: Reconstructing n-th Cartesian Products. Mathematicians often work with n-ary functions \( n \geq 1 \) that have the n-th Cartesian product \( (A_1 \times \cdots \times A_n) \) of the sets \( A_1,\ldots,A_n \) as a domain and that have some set B as the range. Here, we reconstruct n-th Cartesian products as relations. For \( n \geq 1 \), we say (.1) that the n-th Cartesian product of properties \( F_1,\ldots,F_n \), written \( F_1 \times \cdots \times F_n \), is the relation being objects \( x_1,\ldots,x_n \) such that \( x_1 \) exemplifies \( F_1 \) and ... and \( x_n \) exemplifies \( F_n \):

(.1) \[ F_1 \times \cdots \times F_n =_{df} [\lambda x_1,\ldots,x_n F_1 x_1 \& \ldots \& F_n x_n] \]
As an example, we have: \( D \times O! = [\lambda xy Dx & O!] \). Note that, given the above definition, \( R : (F_1 \times \cdots \times F_n) \to G \) becomes a special case of \( R : S^n \to G \). As a special case, for \( n \geq 1 \), we say (.2) the \( n \)th Cartesian product of a property \( F \), written \( F^{\times n} \), is being objects \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) such that \( x_1 \) exemplifies \( F \) and \( \ldots \) and \( x_n \) exemplifies \( F \):

\[
(\cdot 2) \quad F^{\times n} = df [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n Fx_1 \& \ldots \& Fx_n] \quad (n \geq 1)
\]

It will also be helpful to define the edge or degenerate case, namely, the 0th Cartesian product of a property \( F \). Recall that we defined \( D_0 \) in (829) as \([\lambda p_0]\), where \( p_0 \) is the necessary truth \( \forall x(Ex \to Ex) \). So \( D_0 \) is a true proposition. Hence we define (.3) the 0th Cartesian product of a property \( F \) to be just \( D_0 \):

\[
(\cdot 3) \quad F^{\times 0} = df D_0
\]

To understand this definition, it may be helpful to point out that we shall want to use Cartesian products as domains for functions. So \( F^{\times 0} \) needs to be the domain for a nullary function. Now if some relation \( R \) is a nullary function, then by (828.3), \( \exists ! yRy \). Every such \( R \) has \( D_0 \) (indeed, any true proposition) as a domain, by (861.4).

### 14.8.3 Restricted Functions

**Definitions**: Restricted Functions. Let us say \( R \) is a unary restricted function, written \( \uparrow \text{-function}^1(R) \), just in case there is a property \( F \) and a property \( G \) such that \( R \) is a function from \( F \) to \( G \) but \( R \) is not a total function:

\[
(\cdot 1) \quad \uparrow \text{-function}^1(R) \equiv df \exists F \exists G (R : F \to G \& \neg \text{Function}^1(R))
\]

In the usual manner, we have dropped the superscript on \( R \) since the arity of \( R \) can be inferred. More generally, we say (.2) \( R \) is an \( n \)-ary restricted function, written \( \uparrow \text{-function}^n(R) \), just in case there is a relation \( S^n \) and a property \( G \) such that \( R \) is a function from \( S^n \) to \( G \) but \( R \) is not a total function:

\[
(\cdot 2) \quad \uparrow \text{-function}^n(R) \equiv df \exists S^n \exists G (R : S^n \to G \& \neg \text{Function}^n(R))
\]

And when \( n = 0 \), our definition becomes (.3) \( R \) is an nullary restricted function, written \( \uparrow \text{-function}^0(R) \), just in case there is a proposition \( p \) and a property \( G \) such that \( R \) is a function from \( p \) to \( G \) but \( R \) is not a total function:

\[
(\cdot 3) \quad \uparrow \text{-function}^0(R) \equiv df \exists p \exists G (R : p \to G \& \neg \text{Function}^0(R))
\]

**Theorems**: Facts About Restricted Functions. It now follows from previous definitions and theorems that (.1) \( R \) is a unary restricted function if and only if for some \( F \) and \( G \), \( R \) is a function from \( F \) to \( G \) and \( F \) is not equivalent to the property \( D \):
(1) \[ \uparrow \text{function}^1(R) \equiv \exists F \exists G (R \rightarrow F \rightarrow G \land \neg \forall x (Fx \equiv Dx)) \]

More generally, (2) \( R \) is an \( n \)-ary restricted function if and only if for some \( S^n \) and \( G \), \( R \) is a function from \( S^n \) to \( G \) and \( S^n \) is not equivalent to the relation \( D^n \):

(2) \[ \uparrow \text{function}^n(R) \equiv \exists S^n \exists G (R : S^n \rightarrow G \land \neg \forall x_1 \ldots x_n (S^n x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv D^n x_1 \ldots x_n)) \]

And when \( n = 0 \), our theorem becomes (3) \( R \) is a nullary restricted function if and only if for some proposition \( p \) and property \( G \), \( R \) is a function from \( p \) to \( G \) and \( p \) is not equivalent to \( D^0 \):

(3) \[ \uparrow \text{function}^0(R) \equiv \exists p \exists G (R : p \rightarrow G \land p \neq D^0) \]

If we recall that by (829), (112.1), and a convention introduced in (206), \( D^0 = [\lambda p \rho_0] = p_0 = \forall x (E! x \rightarrow E! x) \), then the above tells us that \( R \) is a nullary restricted function iff for some proposition \( p \) and property \( G \), \( R \) is a function from \( p \) to \( G \) and \( p \) isn't equivalent to \( \forall x (E! x \rightarrow E! x) \) (i.e., and \( p \) is false).

Finally, one other striking fact emerges, namely, (4) \( R \) is a nullary restricted function if and only if \( R \) is an unexemplified property:

(4) \[ \uparrow \text{function}^0(R) \equiv \neg \exists y R y \]

(867) Theorem: Restricted Functions of Every Arity Exist. It now follows that (1) unary restricted functions exist:

(1) \[ \exists R (\uparrow \text{function}^1(R)) \]

More generally, (2) restricted functions of arity \( n \geq 1 \) exist:

(2) \[ \exists R (\uparrow \text{function}^n(R)) \]

When \( n = 0 \), our theorem becomes (3) nullary restricted functions exist:

(3) \[ \exists R (\uparrow \text{function}^0(R)) \]

(868) Theorems: Specific Restricted Functions. (1) being an \( x, y, \) and \( z \) such that \( y \) is identical \( E \) to \( z \) is a restricted function; (2) identity \( E \) is a restricted function; (3) predecessor is a restricted function; and (4) number-identity is a restricted function:

(1) \[ \uparrow \text{function}([\lambda xyz y =_E z]) \]

(2) \[ \uparrow \text{function}(=_E) \]

(3) \[ \uparrow \text{function}(\mathbb{P}) \]

(4) \[ \uparrow \text{function}(\hat{=}) \]
(869) Theorem: Facts About Nullary Restricted Functions. It is a consequence of our definitions and theorems that (.1) if $R$ is a nullary restricted function, then $R$ has a proposition as a domain iff that proposition is false, and (.2) if $R$ is a nullary restricted function, then $R$ a property as a range iff that property is unexemplified:

1. \[ \vdash \text{function}^0(R) \rightarrow \forall p (\text{HasDomain}(R, p) \equiv \neg p) \]
2. \[ \vdash \text{function}^0(R) \rightarrow \forall H (\text{HasRange}(R, H) \equiv \neg \exists x H x) \]

Contrast (.1) with an earlier fact (861.4) about total functions: nullary total functions have all and only true propositions as domains, whereas nullary restricted functions have all and only false propositions as domains.

(870) Definitions: Functions in Complete Generality. In what follows, we shall say, for $n \geq 0$, that a relation $R$ is an $n$-ary function, written $\text{function}^n(R)$, just in case there is a relation $S^n$ and a property $G$ such that $R$ is a function from $S^n$ to $G$:

\[ \text{function}^n(R) \equiv_{df} \exists S^n \exists G (R: S^n \rightarrow G) \]  

(n \geq 0)

(871) Theorem: Facts About Functions Generally. $R$ is a function if and only if $R$ is a total function or $R$ is a restricted function:

\[ \text{function}^n(R) \equiv \text{Function}^n(R) \lor \vdash \text{function}^n(R) \]

Thus, when we talk about functions generally, we are talking about both total functions and restricted functions.

Given this result and the previous definition, we shall repurpose our restricted variables $f, g, h, \ldots$ to range over functions generally. The context should always make it clear whether we are talking about total functions or restricted functions. The following may prove useful:

Exercise 16. Show that all nullary functions are one-to-one, i.e., that $function^0(R) \rightarrow \forall y \forall z (Ry \& Rz \rightarrow y = z)$.

(872) Theorem: Another Fact About Functions Generally. If there is an object $y$ such that function $f$ relates $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ to $y$, there is a unique object $y$ such that $f$ relates $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ to $y$:

\[ \exists y fx_1 \ldots x_n y \rightarrow \exists! y fx_1 \ldots x_n y \]

This holds for all $n$ and all functions, total or restricted. It holds by failure of the antecedent for nullary restricted functions because they are unexemplified (866.4) and so the antecedent of the above theorem is false.
14.8. FUNCTIONS AND RECURSIVE DEFINITIONS

Definitions: Extended Function Application. Given the previous theorem, we may extend the notion of functional application defined in (836) so that it applies to any function provided that it does in fact have a value. Where \( f \) is any \( n \)-ary function such that \( \exists yfx_1 \ldots x_n y \), we say the value of \( f \) for \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \), written \( f(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \), is the object \( y \) such that \( fx_1 \ldots x_n y \):

\[
f(x_1, \ldots, x_n) = dfyfx_1 \ldots x_n y
\]

This definition holds only when \( f \) in fact has a value for its arguments, since it takes advantage of the primitive Rule of Definition by Identity (74). This rule guarantees that if the definiens (when applied to any arguments) provably fails to be significant, then the definiendum (when applied to those arguments) provably fails to be significant.

As noted previously, when \( f \) is a nullary restricted function, \( \neg \exists yfy \) (that is, nothing exemplifies \( f \)). Hence, \( \neg \exists ! yfy \) and so both \( !xfx \) and \( f( ) \) are not significant. However, we also noted earlier in (836) that \( f( ) \) is well-defined when \( f \) is a nullary total function. In this case, the definition says that \( f( ) \) is \( !yfy \).

In general, then when \( f \) is any \( n \)-ary function, and \( \kappa_1, \ldots, \kappa_n \) are any individual terms \((n \geq 0)\) exemplifying a relation that \( f \) has as a domain (853.3), the parentheses and any comma separators in the term \( f(\kappa_1, \ldots, \kappa_n) \) jointly constitute an individual term-forming operator. In the remainder of this chapter, we shall primarily be discussing restricted numerical functions \( f \) that have domain \( \mathbb{N}^\times n \) and codomain \( \mathbb{N} \).

14.8.4 Numerical Operations

Definition and Theorem: \( n \)-ary Numerical Operations on the Natural Numbers. When \( n \geq 0 \), we say that (.1) \( n \)-place relation \( R \) is an \( n \)-ary numerical operation, written \( Op^n(R) \), if and only if \( R \) is rigid and a function from \( \mathbb{N} \times n \) to \( \mathbb{N} \):

\[
(.1) \quad Op^n(R) \equiv_{df} \text{Rigid}(R) \& R : \mathbb{N} \times n \rightarrow \mathbb{N}
\]

\((n \geq 0)\)

Observe that when \( n = 0 \), a nullary operation is defined as rigid relation that maps \( \mathbb{N} \times 0 (= D^0) \) to \( \mathbb{N} \).

Clearly, if \( Op^n(R) \), then if we detach the second conjunct of its definiens, apply \( \exists ! \) twice and appeal to definition (870), then it follows that \( R \) is a function:

\[
(2) \quad Op^n(R) \rightarrow \text{function}^n(R) \quad \text{(Theorem)}
\]

Thus, when \( n = 0 \), we have that a 0-ary numerical operation is a nullary function whose unique value is a natural number.
In what follows, we therefore use our variables $f, g, h, \ldots$ to range over numerical operations and, indeed, use them interchangeably with relation variables.

(875) Remark: Why Numerical Operations Should be Rigid. The result of a numerical operation should be completely determined by the given operands. Since there is only one natural number series, i.e., $\mathbb{N}$ (the property being a number) is rigid, a numerical operation (i.e., the relation that is a numerical operation) should be rigid. That is, if $Op^n(R)$, then:

$$\Box(Rm_1m_2 \ldots m_nk \rightarrow \Box Rm_1m_2 \ldots m_nk)$$

But given the Barcan Formula and the fact that $\mathbb{N}^{\times n}$ is the domain of a numerical operation, the above condition holds for arbitrary numbers $m_1, \ldots, m_n, k$ if and only if $R$ is rigid according to definition (553.1).

(876) Lemmas and Definitions: Basic Facts About Numerical Operations. From the fact that number-identity is rigid and the fact that it is numerical function on the natural numbers (857.2), it follows that (1) number-identity is a unary numerical operation:

$$(.1) \text{Op}^1(\doteq)$$ (Lemma)

The rigidity of $\doteq$ was established in (819.6).

We now introduce a definition that, at first glance, looks wrong but in fact is exactly what one would expect once one thinks about it. Let us define the relation of numerical succession, written $S$, as the restriction of the predecessor function on the natural numbers:

$$S = \text{df} P\downharpoonright \mathbb{N}$$

To see that this is in fact correct, note that $P\downharpoonright \mathbb{N}$ is defined as $[\lambda xy \mathbb{N}x & Pxy]$ (807.1), i.e., as being an $x$ and $y$ such that $x$ is a natural number and $x$ precedes $y$. Note that the predecessor is the first argument to the relation $P$ and the successor is the second argument. We’ve already noted (868.3) that predecessor is a restricted function. When we want to apply this function, as per (873), and we write $P\downharpoonright \mathbb{N}(n) = m$ instead $P\downharpoonright \mathbb{N}nm$. But the value of the function is the successor of the argument, that is we may read the formula $P\downharpoonright \mathbb{N}(n) = m$ as the numerical successor of $n$ is $m$. Thus, although the relation $S$ is the predecessor relation restricted to natural numbers, when it is conceived as a function, it is the numerical successor function.

Since the successor function is rigid and a numerical function on the natural numbers, it follows that (2) numerical successor is a unary numerical operation:

$$(.3) \text{Op}^1(S)$$ (Lemma)
The rigidity of $S$ (i.e., $P_{|\mathbb{N}}$) follows from the facts that (a) $P$ is rigid (782.2), $\mathbb{N}$ is rigid (786.2), and (b) the restriction of a rigid $n'$-place relation to a rigid $n$-place relation is rigid (808).

(877) Definitions and Theorems: The Constant Relations. For any natural numbers $n, m \geq 0$, we define the constant $n'$-place relation $C_{m}^{n'}$ as being an $x_{1}, \ldots, x_{n}$ and $y$ such that $x_{1}, \ldots, x_{n}$ are natural numbers and $y$ is number-identical to $m$:

(1) $C_{m}^{n'} = \text{df} [\lambda x_{1} \ldots x_{n} y \mathbb{N}X_{1} \& \ldots \& \mathbb{N}X_{n} \& y \equiv m]$ \hspace{1cm} ($n, m \geq 0$)

Note that $C_{m}^{1}$ is simply $[\lambda y y \equiv m]$. It now follows that $C_{m}^{n'}$ is an $n$-ary operation:

(2) $\text{Op}^{n}(C_{m}^{n'})$ \hspace{1cm} (Theorem)

(878) Definitions and Theorem: The Projection Relations. It is customary to introduce, for each $i \geq 1$, some $i'$-ary projection functions onto the $k$th argument. In the present case, we will define these as $i'$-ary relations ($i' \geq 1$) indexed by $k$ ($1 \leq k < i'$) that hold among $i'$ numbers whenever the $k$th argument matches the final argument. That is, these projection relations can be seen as selecting the $k$th argument. Hence, there is no unary projection relation (i.e., nullary projection function), since there is no argument to project. So in the simplest case (1), $\pi_{1}^{1}$ is simply the 2-place relation of number-identity ($\equiv$), which relates any two numbers $n$ and $m$ whenever its final (i.e, second) argument $m$ matches its first argument $n$. In the next case, (2) $\pi_{1}^{2}$ and $\pi_{2}^{3}$ are 3-place projection relations such that $\pi_{1}^{3}$ relates any three numbers $n_{1}, n_{2}$, and $m$ whenever $m$ equals $n_{1}$; and $\pi_{2}^{3}$ relates any three numbers $n_{1}, n_{2}$, and $m$ whenever $m$ equals $n_{2}$. If we proceed in this manner, we end up defining (3) a group of $i'$-ary projection relations $\pi_{1}^{i'}$, whereby $\pi_{k}^{i'}$ relates a string of $i'$ arguments whenever the final argument matches the $k$th argument in the string, for $1 \leq k < i'$:

(1) $\pi_{1}^{1} = \text{df} \equiv$

(2) $\pi_{1}^{2} = \text{df} [\lambda n_{1} n_{2} m m \equiv n_{1}]$

$\pi_{2}^{3} = \text{df} [\lambda n_{1} n_{2} n_{3} m \equiv n_{2}]$

(3) $\pi_{1}^{i'} = \text{df} [\lambda n_{1} \ldots n_{i-1} n_{i} m m \equiv n_{i}]$

$\vdots$

$\pi_{k}^{i'} = \text{df} [\lambda n_{1} \ldots n_{i-1} n_{i} m m \equiv n_{k}] \hspace{1cm} (1 \leq k \leq i)$

$\vdots$

$\pi_{i}^{i'} = \text{df} [\lambda n_{1} \ldots n_{i} m m \equiv n_{i}]$

It is now provable that $\pi_{k}^{i'}$ is an $i$-ary operation ($i \geq 2$):
(4) $Op^i(\pi^i_k) \quad (1 \leq k \leq i)$

(Lemma)

(879) **Lemma:** Numerical Operations Relate Natural Numbers. (.1) If $R$ is an $n$-ary numerical operation, then for any $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ and $y$, if $R$ relates $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ to $y$, all of $x_1, \ldots, x_n, y$ are natural numbers; (.2) if $R$ is an $n$-ary numerical operation, then for any objects $x_1, \ldots, x_n$, and $y$, $R$ relates $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ to $y$ if and only if $y$ is identical to the object to which $R$ relates $x_1, \ldots, x_n$; and (.3) if $R$ is an $n$-ary numerical operation, then for any natural numbers $m_1, \ldots, m_n$, then $R$ relates $m_1, \ldots, m_n$ to a unique natural number:

- \[ Op^n(R) \rightarrow \forall x_1 \ldots x_n \forall y (Rx_1 \ldots x_n y \rightarrow \mathbb{N} x_1 \& \ldots \& \mathbb{N} x_n \& \mathbb{N} y) \quad (n \geq 0) \]
- \[ Op^n(R) \rightarrow \forall x_1 \ldots x_n \forall y (Rx_1 \ldots x_n y \equiv y = y Rx_1 \ldots x_n y) \quad (n \geq 0) \]
- \[ Op^n(R) \rightarrow \forall m_1 \ldots \forall m_n \exists k R m_1 \ldots m_n k \quad (n \geq 0) \]

(880) **Definitions:** Composed Relations. Suppose $G$ and $H$ are both binary relations. Then we define (.1) $G$ composed with $H$, written $[G(H)]$, as the 2-place relation being an $x$ and $y$ such that for some $z$, $x$ bears $H$ to $z$ and $z$ bears $G$ to $y$:

- \[ [G(H)] = df \{ \lambda xy \exists z (Hz x \& G z y) \} \]

Now let $G$ be an $n'$-ary relation ($m \geq 1$) and $H_1, \ldots, H_m$ be $n'$-ary relations ($n \geq 0$). Then we define (.2) $G$ composed with $H_1, \ldots, H_m$, written $[G(H_1, \ldots, H_m)]$, as the $n + 1$-ary relation being $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ and $y$ such that for some $z_1, \ldots, z_m$, $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ bear $H_1$ to $z_1$ and ... and $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ bear $H_m$ to $z_m$ and $z_1, \ldots, z_m$ bear $G$ to $y$:

- \[ [G(H_1, \ldots, H_m)] = df \lambda z_1 \ldots z_m \exists z_1 \ldots \exists z_m (H_1 x_1 \ldots x_n z_1 \& \ldots \& H_m x_1 \ldots x_n z_m \& G z_1 \ldots z_m y) \]

When $m = n = 1$, then (.2) reduces to (.1). Clearly, by axiom (39.2), the definens is significant in each case – the initial $\lambda$ in the definiens doesn’t bind any variables in any encoding formula subterm. So by our theory of definitions the, definienda are significant as well.

(881) **Theorems:** Operations Defined by Composition. We now establish that (.1) if $H$ and $G$ are unary operations, then $[G(H)]$ is a unary operation such that for any $x$, $[G(H)](x) = G(H(x))$; and (.2) if $H_1, \ldots, H_m$ are $n$-ary operations ($n \geq 0$) and $G$ is an $m$-ary operation ($m \geq 1$), then $G$ composed with $H_1, \ldots, H_m$, when applied to $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ is identical to the result of applying $G$ to the arguments $H_1(x_1, \ldots, x_n), \ldots, H_m(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$:

- \[ Op^1 (H) \& Op^1 (G) \rightarrow (Op^1 ([G(H)]) \& \forall x ([G(H)](x) = G(H(x)))) \]
- \[ (Op^n (H_1) \& \ldots \& Op^n (H_m) \& Op^m (G)) \rightarrow (Op^n ([G(H_1, \ldots, H_m)]) \& \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n ([G(H_1, \ldots, H_m)](x_1, \ldots, x_n) = G(H_1(x_1, \ldots, x_n), \ldots, H_m(x_1, \ldots, x_n)))) \]
14.8. Functions and Recursive Definitions

14.8.5 Recursively-Defined Relations and Functions

(882) Remark: How to Justify Recursive Definitions. Recursive definitions of new numerical operations are distinctive in that the symbol being defined occurs on both sides of the recursive clause of the definition. For example, the standard recursive definition of *addition on the natural numbers* is given as follows:

\[(1) \quad n + 0 = n \]
\[n + m' = (n + m)'\]

In this definition, the new symbol + occurs in both the definiendum and definiens of the recursive clause.\(^{347}\)

The theory of definitions developed thus far makes no allowance for such definitions. So, if we want to introduce a definition by recursion like the above, we have to show that (a) the definition isn't circular, (b) the new symbol introduced is significant (i.e., denotes a relation), and (c) the relation signified by the new symbol is an operation on the natural numbers. All three of these goals can be accomplished by a Recursion Theorem, for such a theorem would guarantee that given any recursive definition, there is a relation which is a numerical operation that satisfies both clauses of the definition.

But it isn’t immediately obvious how to prove such a Recursion Theorem, since there are only a few ways to show that relations exist. One has to appeal to the safe extension axiom (49), the comprehension principle for relations (189), or the Kirchner Theorem (268). None of these ways make it clear why one would be justified in defining a new symbol by recursion.

In most logic and mathematics texts, a background of set theory is presupposed, so that the Recursion Theorem can be proved in a standard way. But in the present work, functions are defined as relations (not sets), and so the binary function symbol + introduced by the above recursive definition must denote a 3-place relation. So if + as given in \((1)\) is to be parsed as a new relation term, then there should be a proof that there is a relation \(R\) such that necessarily, \(R\) is exemplified by all and only numbers \(n, m, o\) such \(n + m = o\).

To see the issue more clearly, let’s make the relational character of \((1)\) explicit, by replacing the binary function symbol + with a 3-place relation symbol for *addition*, written \(A\). Let us temporarily assume that \(\text{Op}^2(A)\), i.e., that *addition* is a binary numerical operation. (This will be proved later.) Then, if we use relational notation for \(A\) instead of the infix notation for +, the relational character of \((1)\) is made explicit by expressing it as the following two-clause stipulation:

\[\text{For some readers, it may be helpful to point out that recursive definitions are somewhat analogous to differential equations, which defines constraints that any function serving as the solution to the equation must satisfy.}\]
In other words, (.2) stipulates that the binary numerical operation of addition relates \( n \) and Zero to \( n \) and relates \( n \) and \( m' \) to the successor of the number that results by adding \( n \) and \( m \). Note that (.2) is not a definition of \( A \), it merely gives a pair of constraints that \( A \) must satisfy in order to correspond to +.

Now by (879.2) and (873), we can rewrite the first clause of (.2) as \( A(n,0) = n \), and if we then also make use of facts about successor (876.2) and (876.3), we can rewrite the second clause of (.2) as \( A(n,m') = S(A(n,m)) \). So to justify recursive addition, we have to show that \( A \) exists and is a numerical operation such that:

(.3) \[
\begin{align*}
A(n,0) &= n \\
A(n,m') &= S(A(n,m))
\end{align*}
\]

Our plan for justifying the recursive definition of addition is to construct a new relation and prove that it is a numerical operation satisfying (.3). We will then follow the same strategy for the more general form of recursive definitions.

(883) Remark: Digression on Alternatives. We might try to avoid the task of proving a Recursion Theorem by regarding recursive definitions of new functions as mere metalinguistic abbreviations of complex terms of the language. For example, consider (882.1). Both the base clause and the recursive clause might be given a metalinguistic interpretation so as to avoid the interpretation of + as a term. The base clause would tell us metalinguistically that we can regard the expression \( n + 0 \) as an abbreviation of the expression \( n \). The recursive clause of the definition would tell us, metalinguistically, that the expression \( n + m' \) abbreviates the expression \( (n + m)' \). If \( m \) is not a symbol denoting Zero, then we could reapply this understanding: since every positive integer is the successor of a natural number (822), then the expression \( m \) could be regarded as the abbreviation of some expression, say \( k' \), where the expression \( k \) denotes the predecessor of the number denoted by \( m \). So \( (n + m)' \) would become an abbreviation of \( (n + k')' \), which then becomes an abbreviation of \( (n + k)'' \). As long as the expression \( k \) doesn’t denote Zero, we could continue this procedure until we reach the expression \( (n + 0)' \), for some finite sequence of primes. At this point, the base clause of the recursive definition allows us to regard the expression \( n + 0 \) as an abbreviation of the expression \( n \) and start reducing (and eventually eliminating) the sequence of primes using the definition of the numerals (804).

But this procedure abandons the analysis of recursive functions as relations and, hence, the analysis of + as an operation. If we want to regard recursive definitions like (882.1) as introducing relations, we must show how such definitions yield proofs of the existence of the relations in question by
one of the theorems asserting relation existence. Without forging this connection between recursive definitions and an existence theorem, recursive definitions at best introduce functional conditions rather than functional relations. Moreover, the recursion theorem we prove here is to be contrasted with those proved in Dedekind 1888 (Theorem 126), Frege 1903a (Theorem 256), Ender- 
ton 1972 (p. 27), etc., since these all take functions as primitive and assume 
that functions are extensional entities (and so identical when they map the 
same arguments to the same values).

There is a second alternative to proving a Recursion Theorem. We could 
regard (882.1) as asserting two new axioms. This is, after all, how mathemati-
cians formulate Peano Arithmetic. They take Zero (0), being a number (N), the 
successor function (′), along with the operations + and ×, as primitive notions 
and then assert the Dedekind/Peano postulates along with the recursive defi-
nitions of + and × as axioms. The axioms for + and × have the same form as the 
recursive definitions for + and × but have a different status within Peano Arith-
metic; they aren’t eliminable in the way that definitions are. Indeed, with these 
additional axioms, Peano Arithmetic becomes a non-conservative extension of 
the Dedekind/Peano axioms for number theory.

The advantage of proving a Recursion Theorem in the way outlined in 
Remark (882) now becomes clear. The Recursion Theorem would show that 
recursive definitions are simply conservative extensions of object theory. Such 
definitions don’t allow us to prove any new theorems not already provable in 
the language of the theory without those definitions.

(884) Theorems and Definitions: The Relation of Addition. Before we prove 
the general form of the Relational Recursion Theorem, we show, as an exam-
ple, how to inductively define a relation of addition that (a) exists by compre-
hension, (b) is a numerical operation, and (c) satisfies the recursive definition 
in (882.1). To do this, we define by induction a 3-place relation of addition 
that clearly exists by comprehension. In this and the next item, our goal is to 
develop the technique we’ll use to prove the general recursion theorem. Later, 
once we have proved the general recursion theorem, we will be able to re-prove 
the existence of the operation of addition in object theory using the traditional 
recursive definition. But for now it is of interest to see that there exists by 
comprehension a relation that accomplishes (a), (b), and (c) – these will be 
established, respectively, in (.4), (.5), and (.6.a), (.6.b) below.

However, in order to define the relation of addition, we must first define 
a sequence of relations and show that they are operations. We first 
define (1.a) A₀, i.e., addition-by-0. Then we prove (.1.b) that it is a unary oper-
ation. Then we show (.2.a) that if A_m is an operation then a certain composition 
is also an operation. Then (.2.b) we use the latter to define A_m′, i.e., addition-by-
m′. This yields a sequence of 3-place relations addition-by-m (3) all of which
are unary operations.

We therefore begin by defining $A_0$ as the relation of number identity and prove that it is a unary operation:

(.1) Base Definition of Addition-by-0 and Theorem:

(a) $A_0 \equiv$
(b) $Op^1(A_0)$ (Theorem)

We then establish that the composition of the successor function and $A_m$, for any number $m$, is an operation if $A_m$ exists, and then define $A'_m$ to be this composed function:

(.2) Inductive Theorem and Definition of Addition-by-$m'$:

(a) $Op^1(A_m) \to Op^1([S(A_m)])$ (Theorem)
(b) $A'_m \equiv [S(A_m)]$

It now follows that for every natural number $m$, addition-by-$m$ is a unary operation:

(.3) $\forall mOp^1(A_m)$ (Theorem)

We now define the relation of addition as the relation being natural numbers $n$, $m$, and $j$ such that (the value of) addition-by-$m$, when applied to (the argument) $n$, is $j$:

(.4) $A \equiv \lambda nmj A_m(n) \equiv j$

We now have the following:

(.5) $Op^2(A)$ (Theorem)

Finally, to see that $A$ satisfies the form of the recursive definition of addition (882.3), we show that $A$ relates $n$ and Zero to $n$; and $A$ relates $n$ and the successor of $m$ to the the successor of the $A$ of $n$ and $m$:

(.6) Addition Satisfies the Recursive Definition

(a) $A(n,0) = n$ (Theorem)
(b) $A(n,m') = S(A(n,m))$ (Theorem)

Note that the successor of $A(n,m)$, i.e., $S(A(n,m)) = [S(A)](n,m)$.

(885) Remark: The Traditional Recursive Definition of Addition. To see that addition as defined above satisfies the form of the recursive definition of addition (882.1), note that we are justified, by (884.5), in rewriting (884.6.a) and (884.6.b) in infix and prime notation, where $+$ replaces $A$ and $n'$ replaces $S(n)$:
Once a more general Relational Recursion Theorem is in place, operations like + can be introduced directly without going through a relation like $A$ explicitly. Note that using this alternative notation, we can prove:

$$n + 1 = n'$$

For as an instance of $(\zeta)$, we know:

$$n + 0' = (n + 0)'$$

So, using $(\xi)$ to substitute $n$ for $n + 0$ in the above it follows that:

$$(\delta) \ n + 0' = n'$$

But by (804), $1 = 0'$. From this and $(\delta)$ it follows that $n + 1 = n'$.

(886) Definitions: The General Form of Numerical Recursive Definitions. To justify recursive definitions of numerical operations (i.e., to show that such definitions introduce new relations), we first have to describe their general form. In a recursive definition, a new operation $f$ is defined in terms of some known operation and $f$ itself.

In the case of a unary numerical operation $f$, the base clause stipulates that the value of $f$ for the argument Zero is some given natural number, say $i$, and the recursive clause stipulates that the value of $f$ for the argument $m'$ is the value of a binary numerical operation $g$ for the arguments $m$ and $f(m)$, i.e.,

$$
\begin{align*}
(1) \quad f(0) &= i \\
      f(m') &= g(m, f(m))
\end{align*}
$$

In what follows, we plan to show how this definition is preserved in our system, where numerical functions are defined as relations. So, our plan will be to show that we can recursively define a binary relation $F$ if given a ternary relation $G$ such that both $F$ and $G$ are numerical operations. We do this by appealing to the composition of $G$ with $\pi_1^2$ (i.e., the number-identity projection function or $\hat{a}$) and $F$, as defined in (880.2), and recasting the above in functional notation defined in terms of relation-argument structure. Thus, while the form of such a recursive definition will be:

$$(2) \quad F(0) = i \\
      F(m') = [G(\pi_1^2, F)](m)$$

this definition will tell us that the recursively defined relation $F$ relates Zero to $i$ and relates $m'$ to the result of applying the composition of $G$ with number-identity and $F$ to $m$. The definition of function application will guarantee that (2) can be rewritten as (1).
In the case of a binary numerical operation \( f \), the traditional base clause stipulates that the value of \( f \) for the arguments \( n \) and Zero is to be the value of some unary numerical operation \( h \) for the argument \( n \), and the recursive clause stipulates that the value of \( f \) for the arguments \( n \) and \( m' \) is the value of some ternary numerical operation \( g \) for the arguments \( n, m, \) and \( f(n, m) \), i.e.,

\[
\begin{align*}
(3) \quad f(n, 0) &= h(n) \\
&= f(n, m') = g(n, m, f(n, m))
\end{align*}
\]

In relational terms, we recursively define a ternary relation \( F \) if given a 2-place relation \( H \) and a 4-place relation \( G \), both of which are numerical operations. In the recursive clause, we appeal to the composition of \( G \) with three functions: \( \pi_1^3 \), \( \pi_2^3 \), and \( F \). Such compositions were defined in (880.2). Thus, the above definition in functional notation is implemented in terms of relation-argument structure. The base clause of the recursive definition of \( F \) stipulates that \( F \) relates \( n \) and Zero to the natural number to which \( H \) relates \( n \). The recursive clause states \( F \) relates \( n \) and \( m' \) to the following number: the value of the composed function \( [G(\pi_1^3, \pi_2^3, F)] \) for the arguments \( n \) and \( m \):

\[
\begin{align*}
(4) \quad F(n, 0) &= H(n) \\
F(n, m') &= [G(\pi_1^3, \pi_2^3, F)](n, m)
\end{align*}
\]

When \( [G(\pi_1^3, \pi_2^3, F)] \) is applied to \( n \) and \( m \), there are two steps to the evaluation. In the first step, \( \pi_1^3 \) takes both arguments and yields \( n \), \( \pi_2^3 \) takes both arguments and yields \( m \), and \( F \) takes both arguments and yields \( F(n, m) \). In the second step, the values output in the first step are the three arguments to \( G \) so that \( F(n, m') \) ends up being \( G(n, m, F(n, m)) \). The definition of function application will guarantee that (3.3) can be rewritten as (4).

Finally, in the case of an \( i' \)-ary numerical operation \( f \), the base clause stipulates that the value of \( f \) for the arguments \( n_1, \ldots, n_i \) and Zero is the value of a \( n \)-ary numerical operation \( h \) for the arguments \( n_1, \ldots, n_i \), and the recursive clause stipulates that the value of \( f \) for the arguments \( n_1, \ldots, n_i \) and \( m' \) is the value of the \( i' \)-ary numerical operation \( g \) for the arguments \( n_1, \ldots, n_i, m \) and \( f(n_1, \ldots, n_i, m) \), i.e.,

\[
\begin{align*}
(5) \quad f(n_1, \ldots, n_i, 0) &= h(n_1, \ldots, n_i) \\
&= f(n_1, \ldots, n_i, m') = g(n_1, \ldots, n_i, m, f(n_1, \ldots, n_i, m))
\end{align*}
\]

To state this in relational terms, we recursively define \( F \) as an \( i+2 \)-place relation if given an \( i+1 \)-place relation \( H \) and an \( i+3 \)-place relation \( G \), both of which are numerical operations. In the recursive clause, we appeal to the composition of

\[\text{Consider the binary numerical operation of addition. If we let } H(x) = x \text{ and } G(x, y, z) = S(z), \text{ then we have } F(n, 0) = H(n) = n. \text{ And } F(n, m') = G(n, m, F(n, m)) = S(F(n, m)). \text{ Or, in more familiar notation } n + 0 = n \text{ and } n + m' = (n + m)'.\]
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G with $i + 2$ functions: $\pi''_1, \ldots, \pi''_i, \pi'''_i$ and $F$. Such compositions were defined in (880.2). Again, this implements the definition given in functional notation in terms of relation-argument structure. The recursive clause states $F$ relates $n_1, \ldots, n_i$ and $m'$ to the following number: the value of the composed function $[G(\pi''_1, \ldots, \pi''_i, \pi'''_i, F)]$ for the arguments $n_1, \ldots, n_i$ and $m$:

\[(.6) \quad F(n_1, \ldots, n_i, 0) = H(n_1, \ldots, n_i)
F(n_1, \ldots, n_i, m') = [G(\pi''_1, \pi''_2, \ldots, \pi''_i, \pi'''_i, F)](n_1, \ldots, n_i, m)\]

When $[G(\pi''_1, \pi''_2, \ldots, \pi''_i, \pi'''_i, F)]$ is applied to $n_1, \ldots, n_i$ and $m$, there are two steps in the evaluation. In the first step, $\pi''_1$ takes the arguments $n_1, \ldots, n_i, m$ and yields the value $n_1, \ldots, \pi'''_i$ takes the arguments $n_1, \ldots, n_i, m$ and yields the value $m$, while $F$ takes the arguments $n_1, \ldots, n_i, m$ and yields the value $F(n_1, \ldots, n_i, m)$. In the second step, the values output by the first step are the arguments to $G$ so that $F(n_1, \ldots, n_i, m')$ becomes $G(n_1, \ldots, n_i, m, F(n_1, \ldots, n_i, m))$. So the definition of function application guarantees that (.5) can be rewritten as (.6).

In what follows, we focus first on (.3) and (.4) and then turn to (.5) and (.6).

(887) Theorems and Definitions: Lemmas for the Recursion Theorem. We construct a binary operation $F$ in terms of a unary operation $H$ and a ternary operation $G$ by the following procedure:

- define an inductive sequence of 2-place relations $F_m$, 
- show, by induction, that the relations are unary operations,
- define the 3-place relation $F$ in terms of the sequence of relations,
- show that $F$ is a binary operation, and
- show that $F$ satisfies the conditions of an operation recursively defined in terms of $H$ and $G$.

We first define (.1.a) $F_0$ to be $H$. So clearly (.1.b) $F_0$ is a unary numerical operation given that $H$ is. We then show (.2.a) that given any $m$, if $F_m$ is a unary operation, then the composition of $G$ with three unary operations, namely the projection function $\pi''_1$, the constant function $C^m_2$, and $F_m$, is also a unary operation. Then we define $F_{m'}$ as that composition.

(.1) Base Definition of $F_0$ and Theorem:

\[(a) \quad F_0 \equiv_{df} H \quad (b) \quad Op^1(F_0) \quad (\text{Theorem})\]

(.2) Theorem For, and Definition of, the Recursive Operation $F_{m'}$:
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\[(.a) \ Op^1(F_m) \rightarrow Op^1([G(\pi_1^2, C_m, F_m)]) \quad (\text{Theorem})\]

\[(.b) \ F_m' = df [G(\pi_1^2, C_m, F_m)]\]

It now follows that (.3) for every natural number \(m\), the \(F\)-operation-by-\(m\) is a unary operation:

\[(.3) \ \forall m Op^1(F_m) \quad (\text{Theorem})\]

We next define (.4) \(F\) as the relation being natural numbers \(n, m, \text{ and } j\) such that (the value of) the \(F\)-operation-by-\(m\), when applied to (the argument) \(n\), is \(j\):

\[(.4) \ F = df [\lambda nmj F_m(n)=j]\]

It now follows that (.5) \(F\) is a binary numerical operation:

\[(.5) \ Op^2(F) \quad (\text{Theorem})\]

Finally, \(F\) satisfies the conditions of a binary operation recursively defined in terms of \(H\) and \(G\):

\[(.6) \ F \text{ Satisfies the Recursive Definition Conditions:}\]

\[(.a) \ F(n,0) = H(n) \quad (\text{Theorem})\]

\[(.b) \ F(n,m') = G(n,m,F(n,m)) \quad (\text{Theorem})\]

Note that \(G(n,m,F(n,m)) = [G(\pi_1^2, \pi_2^2, F)](n,m)\).

(888) Theorem: The Recursion Theorem for Binary Recursive Operations. The Recursion Theorem asserts: given a unary operation \(H\) and a ternary operation \(G\), there exists a binary operation \(F\) defined recursively in terms of \(G\) and \(H\):

\[(Op^1(H) \& Op^3(G)) \rightarrow \exists F(Op^2(F) \& F(n,0) = H(n) \& F(n,m') = G(n,m,F(n,m)))]

(889) Theorems and Definitions: Lemmas for the General Recursion Theorem. If given an \(i\)-ary operation \(H\) and an \(i + 2\)-ary operation \(G\) (\(i \geq 0\)), we construct an \(i+1\)-ary operation \(F\) using the following sequence of steps:

- define an inductive sequence of \(i+1\)-place relations \(F_m'\),
- show, by induction, that the relations are \(i\)-ary operations,
- define the \(i+2\)-place relation \(F\) in terms of the sequence of relations,
- show that \(F\) is an \(i+1\)-ary operation, and
- show that \(F\) satisfies the conditions of an operation recursively defined in terms of \(H\) and \(G\).
We first define (.1.a) $F_0$ to be $H$. So clearly (.1.b) $F_0$ is an $i$-ary numerical operation given that $H$ is. We then show (.2.a) that given any $m$, if $F_m$ is an $i$-ary operation, then the composition of $G$ with $i+2$ operations each of which is $i$-ary, namely the projection functions $\pi^i_1, \ldots, \pi^i_i$, the constant function $C^i_m$, and $F_m$, is also a $i$-ary operation. Then we define $F'_m$ as that composition.

(1) Base Definition of $F_0$ and Theorem:

(a) $F_0 = df H$

(b) $Op'(F_0)$ (Theorem)

(2) Theorem For, and Definition of, the Recursive Operation $F'_m$:

(a) $Op'(F_m) \rightarrow Op'(\{G(\pi^i_1, \ldots, \pi^i_i, C^i_m, F_m)\})$ (Theorem)

(b) $F'_m = df \{G(\pi^i_1, \ldots, \pi^i_i, C^i_m, F_m)\}$

Note that when $i = 0$, there are no projection functions and so, for the composition, $G$ just takes the nullary functions $C^i_0$ and $F_m$ as its two arguments.

It now follows that (.3) for every natural number $m$, the $F$-operation-by-$m$ is an $i$-ary operation:

(3) $\forall m Op'(F_m)$ (Theorem)

We now define (.4) $F$ as the relation being natural numbers $n_1, \ldots, n_i, m$, and $j$ such that (the value of) the $F$-operation-by-$m$, when applied to (the argument) $n_1, \ldots, n_i$, is $j$:

(4) $F = df \{\lambda n_1 \ldots n_i m j F_m(n_1, \ldots, n_i) = j\}$

Note that when $i = 0$, the $F$-operation-by-$m$ is nullary and there are no arguments $n_1, \ldots, n_i$.

It now follows that $F$ is a $i'$-ary numerical operation:

(5) $Op'(F)$ (Theorem)

Finally, $F$ satisfies the conditions of a binary operation recursively defined in terms of $H$ and $G$:

(6) $F$ Satisfies the Recursive Definition Conditions:

(a) $F(n_1, \ldots, n_i, 0) = H(n_1, \ldots, n_i)$ (Theorem)

(b) $F(n_1, \ldots, n_i, m') = G(n_1, \ldots, n_i, m, F(n_1, \ldots, n_i, m))$ (Theorem)

Note that $G(n_1, \ldots, n_i, m, F(n_1, \ldots, n_i, m)) = [G(\pi^n_1, \ldots, \pi^n_{i+1}, F)](n_1, \ldots, n_i, m)$.

(890) Theorem: The Recursion Theorem for General Recursive Operations. The Recursion Theorem asserts: given an $i$-ary operation $H$ and an $i'$-ary operation $G$, where $i \geq 0$, there exists a general $i'$-ary operation $F$ defined recursively in terms of $G$ and $H$.
Definitions: Traditional Recursive Definitions. With our justification for recursive definitions of numerical operations firmly in hand, we may now officially employ the traditional recursive definitions to introduce other mathematical operations such as addition (which we reintroduce!), multiplication, truncated subtraction, exponentiation, and factorialization on the natural numbers.

- To define Addition, we need only exhibit an appropriate unary operation $H$ and ternary operation $G$:

$$(891) \quad \begin{align*}
H &= \text{def} \; \pi^2_1 \\
G &= \text{def} \; [S(\pi^4_1)]
\end{align*}$$

Note that $\pi^2_1$ just is the relation $\dot{=}$, so the base case of the definition is the same as in (884.1.a). The recursive clause now makes use of our apparatus for defining recursive functions generally (890).

To recast $H$ and $G$ in more familiar notation, where we use $x$, $y$, and $z$ as restricted variables ranging over the natural numbers (to avoid clash of variables below), we have $H(x) = \pi^2_1(x) = x$ and $G(x, y, z) = [S(\pi^4_1)](x, y, z) = S(z) = z'$.

Note how this captures the traditional recursive definition of addition, usually stated as:

$$\begin{align*}
n + 0 &= n \\
n + m' &= (n + m)'
\end{align*}$$

The argument (by induction) is easy – one only has to remember that, for addition, the first two arguments of $G$ are ignored in the calculation of its value (and thus we can make a convenient selection, as we’ve done in the inductive case in the following proof):

Base case:

$$\begin{align*}
n + 0 &= n & \text{by definition of +} \\
&= H(n) & \text{by definition of } H \text{ in (.1) above} \\
&= F(n, 0) & \text{by (889.6.a)}
\end{align*}$$

Inductive Case:

$$\begin{align*}
n + m' &= (n + m)' & \text{by definition of +} \\
&= G(n, m, (n + m)) & \text{by definition of } G \text{ in (.1)} \\
&= G(n, m, F(n, m)) & \text{by Inductive Hypothesis} \\
&= F(n, m') & \text{by (889.6.b)}
\end{align*}$$

Note that, when needed, we may use $+$ as a (prefix) function term, i.e., $+(n, m) = n + m$. 
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To define Multiplication, we need only exhibit an appropriate unary operation $H$ and ternary operation $G$:

$$(.2)\quad H =_{df} C_0^2$$
$$G =_{df} [+(\pi_1^4, \pi_3^1)]$$

Intuitively, $H(x) = C_0^2(x) = 0$ and $G(x, y, z) = [+(\pi_1^4, \pi_3^1)](x, y, z) = +(x, z) = x + z$.

Note how this captures the traditional recursive definition of multiplication, usually stated as:

\begin{align*}
    n \times 0 &= 0 \\
    n \times m' &= n + (n \times m)
\end{align*}

The argument (by induction) is easy:

Base case:
\begin{align*}
    n \times 0 &= 0 \quad \text{by definition of } \times \\
    &= H(n) \quad \text{by definition of } H \text{ in } (.2) \\
    &= F(n, 0) \quad \text{by (889.6.a)}
\end{align*}

Inductive Case:
\begin{align*}
    n \times m' &= n + (n \times m) \quad \text{by definition of } \times \\
    &= G(n, m, (n \times m)) \quad \text{by definition of } G \text{ in } (.2) \\
    &= G(n, m, F(n, m)) \quad \text{by Inductive Hypothesis} \\
    &= F(n, m') \quad \text{by (889.6.b)}
\end{align*}

Note that, when needed, we may use $\times$ as a (prefix) function term, i.e., $\times(n, m) = n \times m$.

To define Exponentiation, we need only exhibit an appropriate unary operation $H$ and ternary operation $G$:

$$(.3)\quad H =_{df} C_1^2$$
$$G =_{df} [\times(\pi_1^4, \pi_3^1)]$$

Intuitively, $H(x) = C_1^2(x) = 1$ and $G(x, y, z) = [\times(\pi_1^4, \pi_3^1)](x, y, z) = \times(x, z) = x \times z$.

Note how this captures the traditional recursive definition of exponentiation, usually stated as:

\begin{align*}
    n^0 &= 1 \\
    n^{m'} &= n \times n^m
\end{align*}

The argument (by induction) is easy:

Base case:
\begin{align*}
    n^0 &= 1 \quad \text{by definition of exponentiation} \\
    &= H(n) \quad \text{by definition of } H \text{ in } (.3) \\
    &= F(n, 0) \quad \text{by (889.6.a)}
\end{align*}
Inductive Case:
\[ n^m = n \times n^m \quad \text{by definition of exponentiation} \]
\[ = G(n,m,n^m) \quad \text{by definition of } G \text{ in (.3)} \]
\[ = G(n,m,F(n,m)) \quad \text{by Inductive Hypothesis} \]
\[ = F(n,m') \quad \text{by (889.6.b)} \]

• To define the unary operation Factorialization, we need only exhibit an appropriate nullary operation \( H \) (i.e., a constant) and binary operation \( G \):

\[(.4) \quad \begin{align*}
H &= \text{df } C_1^1 \\
G &= \text{df } [\times(\pi_3^2, [S(\pi_1^1)])]
\end{align*} \]

Intuitively, \( H = C_1^1 = 1 \) and \( G(y,z) = [\times(\pi_3^2, [S(\pi_1^1)])](y,z) = \times(z,y') = z \times y' \). Note how this captures the traditional recursive definition of factorialization, usually stated as:

\[
0! = 1 \\
n! = n! \times n'
\]

The argument (by induction) is easy:

Base case:
\[
0! = 1 \quad \text{by definition of !} \\
= H \quad \text{by definition of } H \text{ in (.4)} \\
= F(0) \quad \text{by (889.6.a)}
\]

Inductive Case:
\[
\begin{align*}
n! &= n! \times n' \quad \text{by definition of !} \\
&= G(n,n!) \quad \text{by definition of } G \text{ in (.4)} \\
&= G(n,F(n)) \quad \text{by Inductive Hypothesis} \\
&= F(n') \quad \text{by (889.6.b)}
\end{align*}
\]

We leave the definition of many other primitive recursive functions to the reader; they can be found in classic texts, or in reference works such as Dean 2020.

14.9 Deriving 2nd-Order Peano Arithmetic

(892) Remark: Interpreting the Language of 2nd-order PA. We now show that the system of 2nd-order Peano Arithmetic is derivable in object theory. To do this, we show that there is a translation of the language of 2nd-order PA into the present language for which the axioms of 2nd-order PA become derivable as theorems. We use as our basis for the language of 2nd-order PA the system described in Simpson 1999 [2009]. In Simpson 1999 [2009] (2–3), we find the the language of 2nd-order PA is described in stages:
• Two distinct sorts of variables ranging over distinct domains:
  – Number variables: $i, j, k, m, n, \ldots$
  – Set variables: $X, Y, Z, \ldots$ (intended to range over all subsets of $\omega$).

• Numerical terms:
  – Number variables
  – The constant symbols 0 and 1
  – $\tau_1 + \tau_2$ and $\tau_1 \cdot \tau_2$, whenever $\tau_1$ and $\tau_2$ are numerical terms. (Here $+$ and $\cdot$ are binary operation symbols intended to denote addition and multiplication of natural numbers and the numerical terms are intended to denote natural numbers.)

• Atomic formulas: Where $\tau_1$ and $\tau_2$ are numerical terms and $X$ is any set variable:
  – $\tau_1 = \tau_2$
  – $\tau_1 < \tau_2$
  – $\tau_1 \in X$

(The intended meanings of these respective atomic formulas are that $\tau_1$ equals $\tau_2$, $\tau_1$ is less than $\tau_2$, and $\tau$ is an element of $X$.)

• Formulas: are built up from atomic formulas by means of propositional connectives $\land$, $\lor$, $\neg$, $\rightarrow$, $\leftrightarrow$ (and, or, not, implies, if and only if), number quantifiers $\forall n$, $\exists n$ (intended to mean: for all $n$ and there exists an $n$), and set quantifiers $\forall X$, $\exists X$ (intended to mean: for all sets $X$ and there exists a set $X$).

If we use the decorated metavariables $\tau^*_1$ and $\tau^*_2$ to designate the individual terms of object theory that serve as the translation of the second-order PA terms $\tau_1$ and $\tau_2$, respectively, and use $\phi^*$ and $\psi^*$, respectively, to designate the translations of $\phi$ and $\psi$, then the terms and formulas of second-order PA become translatable into object theory as follows:

• Variables:

  Number variables: are to be translated as the rigid, restricted variables ranging over numbers, as the latter are defined in (784).

  Set variables: are to be translated as property variables $F, G, H, \ldots$.

• Numerical terms:
  – Number variables: (as specified above)
– The constant symbols 0 and 1 are to be translated as the symbols 0 and 1, as defined in (757) and (804.1);
– The term $\tau_1 + \tau_2$ is to be translated as $\tau_1^* + \tau_2^*$, as defined in (891.1)
– the term $\tau_1 \cdot \tau_2$ is to be translated as $\tau_1^* \times \tau_2^*$, as defined in (891.2)

• Atomic formulas:
– $\tau_1 = \tau_2$ is to be translated as $\tau_1^* = \tau_2^*$, as defined in (818.1)
– $\tau_1 < \tau_2$ is to be translated as $\tau_1^* < \tau_2^*$, as defined in (809.1)
– $\tau_1 \in X$ is to be translated as $F\tau_1^*$, where $F$ is the translation of $X$ and $F\tau_1^*$ is an exemplification formula as defined in (3.3.a).

• Formulas:
– The formulas $\neg \varphi$ and $\varphi \rightarrow \psi$ are to be translated using the primitive connectives $\neg$ and $\rightarrow$ (2.1) and (2.2), respectively, and so are to be translated as the formulas $\neg \varphi^*$ and $\varphi^* \rightarrow \psi^*$.
– The formulas $\varphi \land \psi$, $\varphi \lor \psi$, and $\varphi \leftrightarrow \psi$ are to be translated into the formulas $\varphi^* \land \psi^*$, $\varphi^* \lor \psi^*$, and $\varphi^* \equiv \psi^*$, as defined in (18.1), (18.2) and (18.3), respectively.
– The formulas $\forall n \varphi$ and $\exists n \varphi$ are to be translated using both (a) the primitive quantifier $\forall$ (2.3) and the defined quantifier $\exists$ (18.4), respectively, and (b) the rigid, restricted variables ranging over numbers, so that $\forall n \varphi$ and $\exists n \varphi$ become translated as $\forall n \varphi^*$ and $\exists n \varphi^*$, respectively. (Note that we can expand these, by eliminating the restricted variables, to $\forall x(Nx \rightarrow \varphi^* x)$ and $\exists x(Nx \land \varphi^* x)$, respectively.)
– The formulas $\forall X \varphi$ and $\exists X \varphi$ are to be translated similarly but with the variable $F$ replacing $X$ (so that the quantifiers bind the property variable $F$), with the result that $\forall X \varphi$ and $\exists X \varphi$ become translated as $\forall F \varphi^*$ and $\exists F \varphi^*$.

Finally, Simpson states the axioms of 2nd-order PA as follows:

(i) basic axioms:

\[
\begin{align*}
n + 1 &\neq 0 \\
m + 1 &= n + 1 \rightarrow m = n \\
m + 0 &= m \\
m + (n + 1) &= (m + n) + 1 \\
m \cdot 0 &= 0 \\
m \cdot (n + 1) &= (m \cdot n) + m \\
\neg (m < 0) \\
m < n + 1 &\leftrightarrow (m < n \lor m = n)
\end{align*}
\]
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(ii) Induction Axiom:

\[ (0 \in X \land \forall n (n \in X \rightarrow n + 1 \in X)) \rightarrow \forall n (n \in X) \]

(iii) Comprehension Scheme:

\[ \exists X \forall n (n \in X \leftrightarrow \varphi), \text{where } \varphi \text{ is any formula of the language of 2nd-order PA in which } X \text{ doesn't occur free.} \]

When the translation scheme introduced above is expanded to include the translation of \( n+1 \) as \( n' \), as this latter was defined in (800), the above axioms of 2nd-order PA become translated as:

(i) basic axioms:

\[
\begin{align*}
&n' \neq 0 \\
&m' = n' \rightarrow m = n \\
&m + 0 = m \\
&m + n' = (m + n)' \\
&m \times 0 = 0 \\
&m \times n' = (m \times n) + m \\
&\neg (m < 0) \\
&m < n' \equiv (m < n \lor m = n)
\end{align*}
\]

(ii) Induction Axiom:

\[ (F0 \& \forall n (Fn \rightarrow Fn')) \rightarrow \forall n Fn \]

(iii) Comprehension Scheme:

\[ \exists F \forall n (Fn \equiv \varphi^*), \text{where } \varphi^* \text{ is the translation of } \varphi \text{ and } F \text{ doesn't occur free in } \varphi^*. \]

In light of the foregoing, we now have the following theorem.

\textbf{(893) Theorem:} The Axioms of 2nd-order PA are Theorems of Object Theory. A proof is in the Appendix.

\section*{14.10 \hspace{1em} Infinity}

\textbf{(894) Definition:} Finite and Infinite Cardinals. We defined natural cardinals in (752) and established that \( \text{NaturalCardinal}(x) \rightarrow \Box \text{NaturalCardinal}(x) \) (753). So we may introduce \( \kappa \) as a rigid restricted variable ranging over natural cardinals. We now say (.1) \( \kappa \) is \textit{finite} if and only if \( \kappa \) is a natural number, and (.2) \( \kappa \) is \textit{infinite} if and only if \( \kappa \) is not finite:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(.1) } \text{Finite}(\kappa) &\equiv_{df} \Box \kappa \\
\text{(.2) } \text{Infinite}(\kappa) &\equiv_{df} \neg \Box \kappa
\end{align*}
\]
(2) \( \text{Infinite}(\kappa) \equiv_{df} \neg \text{Finite}(\kappa) \)

We justify these definitions in the following Remark.

(895) \textbf{Theorem:} There Exists an Infinite Cardinal. It is a straightforward consequence of previous definitions and theorems that: (.1) the number of \textit{being ordinary} is a natural cardinal; (.2) the number of \textit{being ordinary} is infinite; and (.3) there exists an infinite cardinal:

(.1) \( \text{NaturalCardinal}(\#O!) \)

(.2) \( \text{Infinite}(\#O!) \)

(.3) \( \exists \kappa \text{Infinite}(\kappa) \)

Hence, we have established the existence of an infinite cardinal from no mathematical primitives! We don’t need any primitive notions, or assert any axioms, from set theory or number theory to define and prove there is an infinite number. Note that in light of (.2), the theorem that \( \exists x O!x \), which is a consequence of (225.1) by the T schema, has become an understatement!

(896) \textbf{Definition:} The Number of \textit{Being Ordinary}. Since we’ve shown that \#O! is infinite and a natural cardinal, we may introduce a name for it appropriate to its being an infinite natural cardinal. We define \( N_{O!} \) to be the number of \textit{being ordinary}:

\[
N_{O!} \equiv_{df} \#O!
\]

While similar to the standard notation \( N_0 \), which is traditionally taken to be the cardinality of the natural numbers, our infinite cardinal \( N_{O!} \) represents the cardinality of ordinary objects. Even if we were to extend the notion of equinumerosity \( E \) to equinumerosity, we could not guarantee that that the ordinary objects would be equinumerous to the natural numbers. For even if we were to produce a relation \( R \) that maps \( N \) one-to-one into \( O! \), we would have no basis for showing that \( R \) would also be \textit{onto} \( O! \).

(897) \textbf{Theorems:} The preceding definition yields the following immediate consequences. (.1) \( N_{O!} \) is a natural cardinal; (.2) \( N_{O!} \) is infinite; (.3) \( N_{O!} \) is not finite; (.4) \( N_{O!} \) is not a natural number; (.5) \( N_{O!} \) isn’t a member of the predecessor series beginning with Zero; and (.6) no natural number is a predecessor of \( N_{O!} \):

(.1) \( \text{NaturalCardinal}(N_{O!}) \)

(.2) \( \text{Infinite}(N_{O!}) \)

(.3) \( \neg \text{Finite}(N_{O!}) \)
\[ (4) \quad \neg \exists N \forall \]
\[ (5) \quad \neg P^* 0 \forall \]
\[ (6) \quad \neg \exists n Pn \forall \]

Note that (5) is just Theorem 167 (Frege 1893, §122), i.e., \( \models \theta \land (\sim \land \phi) \). We leave further discussion of this point to the following Remark.

**Remark:** On Frege’s Definition of Finite and Infinite Cardinals. It follows from our definition of \( N \) (784) by \( \beta \)-Conversion that \( N x \equiv P^* 0x \). But in 1884 (§83) and 1893 (§§46, 108, 122, 158), Frege indicated that \( P^* 0x \) is the definiens for the notion \( x \) is a finite cardinal number.

In 1884, §83 is titled ‘Definition of Finite Number’ and in this section, Frege writes:

\[
\ldots \text{I define as follows: the proposition “} n \text{ is a member of the series of natural numbers beginning with 0” is to mean the same as “} n \text{ is a finite number.”}
\]

In 1893, §46, he writes: 349

Accordingly, \( \Delta \sim (\Theta \sim \Upsilon) \) is the truth-value of: \( \Theta \) belongs to the \( \Upsilon \)-series starting with \( \Delta \). Thus, \( \theta \sim (\Theta \sim \phi) \) is the truth-value of: \( \Theta \) belongs to the cardinal number series starting with \( \theta \), for which I can also say \( \Theta \) is a finite cardinal number.

The statement \( \theta \sim (\Theta \sim \phi) \) would be written in our notation, substituting \( \theta \) for \( \theta \) and \( x \) for \( x \), as \( P^* 0x \), which in effect is the definiens for \( N x \) in (784).

Furthermore, in 1893, the main heading of §108 is:

\[
\models b \sim (b \sim \Upsilon) \\
\theta \sim (b \sim \Upsilon)
\]

Frege then writes:

The proposition mentioned in the main heading states that no object belonging to the cardinal number series starting with Zero follows after itself in the cardinal number series. Instead, we could also say: “No finite cardinal number follows after itself in the cardinal number series”.

In our notation, substituting appropriately, Frege’s main heading would be written: 349

349 In the following quote, I’ve corrected a known one-character transcription error in the first edition of the Ebert and Rossberg 2013 translation, p. 60. In the second sentence of the following quotation, the character \( f \) has been substituted for \( \Upsilon \) in the formula. This correction is based on the original (1893, p. 60) and is included in the revised, paperback edition of the translation (2016).
\[ \mathbb{P}^+0x \rightarrow \neg \mathbb{P}^+xx \]

and in (816.1), we proved this in the form \( n \prec n \).

Again, in 1893, the main heading of §122 is:

\[ \vdash \theta \neg (\sim \neg \varepsilon f) \]

Frege then writes:

There are cardinal numbers that do not belong to the cardinal numbers series beginning with \( 0 \), or, as we shall also say, that are not finite, that are infinite. One such cardinal number is that of the concept finite cardinal number; I propose to call it Endlos and designate it with ‘\( \infty \)’. I define it thus:

\[ \| \eta(\theta \cdot \kappa, \alpha f) = \infty \] (M)

For \( \theta \cdot \kappa, \alpha f \) is the extension of the concept finite cardinal number. The proposition mentioned in the heading says that the cardinal number Endlos is not a finite cardinal number.

We’ve now established that, in object theory, a distinguished abstract object, \#O!, is an infinite cardinal (895.2) and we’ve introduced \( \aleph_0 \) to name it (896). We then noted, in the subsequent discussion, that this results in a proof of the claim in Frege’s main heading of §122. In our notation, this claim becomes \( \neg \mathbb{P}^+0\aleph_0 \).

Finally, in 1893, the main heading of §156 is:

\[ \vdash \theta \cdot (\eta \mu \cdot \varepsilon f) \]

Frege then writes:

For finite cardinal numbers we can prove a proposition similar to the last, namely that the cardinal number of a concept is finite if the objects falling under it can be ordered into a simple (non-branching, non-looping back into itself) series starting with a certain object and ending with a certain object.

Frege’s main heading in §156 is a conditional and in the consequent of this conditional, he continues to use \( \theta \cdot (\eta \mu \cdot \varepsilon f) \), i.e., \( \eta \mu \) is a member of the predecessor series starting with \( 0 \), to express that the number of \( u \) (\( \eta \mu \)) is finite.

Given these examples, it is clear that Frege regards a cardinal number \( \kappa \) as finite just in case Zero bears the weak ancestral of predecessor to \( \kappa \), i.e., just in case \( \kappa \) is a natural number. And just as clearly, he suggests that a cardinal is infinite just in case it fails to be finite. So our definitions in (894) conform with Frege’s usage, though as we’ve seen, the existence of an infinite cardinal is not
established by considering the number of the concept finite cardinal (for us, the natural cardinal of that concept is Zero because no ordinary objects fall under that concept).

(899) Definition: Infinite Classes. Using the definition of $\text{ClassOf}(x, G)$ (307.1), we now stipulate that (.1) $x$ is an infinite class of $Gs$ if and only if $x$ is a class of $Gs$ that is numbered by an infinite cardinal, and that (.2) $x$ is an infinite class if and only if for some property $G$, $x$ is an infinite class of $Gs$:

$.1 \quad \text{InfiniteClassOf}(x, G) \equiv_{df} G \downarrow \& \text{ClassOf}(x, G) \& \exists \kappa (\text{Infinite}(\kappa) \& \text{Numbers}(\kappa, G))$

$.2 \quad \text{InfiniteClass}(x) \equiv_{df} \exists G (\text{InfiniteClassOf}(x, G))$

(900) Theorem: Existence of An Infinite Class. We can now prove that there exists an infinite class:

$\exists x \text{InfiniteClass}(x)$

So, we’ve established the existence of an infinite class without appealing to any mathematical primitives or asserting any mathematical axioms.

It should be noted that the above theorem is modally strict. But we could have identified $\epsilon O!$ as an infinite class, and although it provably is one, the proof is not modally strict. The theorem $\text{InfiniteClass}(\epsilon O!)$ is not modally strict because $\epsilon O!$ is not necessarily a class; this is a consequence of (311.5), which tells us that classes aren’t necessarily classes!
Part III

Metaphilosophy
Part IV

Technical Appendices, Bibliography, Index
Appendix: Proofs of Theorems and Metarules

NOTE: The items below numbered as (n), (n.m), or (n.m.a) refer to numbered items in Part II. So, for example, references to item (9.1) do not refer to Chapter 9.1, but rather to item (9.1), which occurs in Part II, Chapter 7.

(63.1) (Exercise)
(63.2) (Exercise)

(64.1) We establish the rule only for \( \vdash \). If \( \varphi \) is an element of \( \Lambda \), then the one element sequence \( \varphi \) is a proof of \( \varphi \), by (60.2).

(64.2) We establish the rule only for \( \vdash \). If \( \varphi \) is an element of \( \Gamma \), then the one element sequence \( \varphi \) is a derivation of \( \varphi \) from \( \Gamma \), by (60.1).

(64.3) We establish the rule only for \( \vdash \). If \( \vdash \varphi \), then by definition (60.2), there is a sequence of formulas every element of which is either a member of \( \Lambda \) or a direct consequence of some of the preceding members of the sequence by virtue of MP. Since \( \Lambda \subseteq \Lambda \cup \Gamma \), there is a sequence of formulas every element of which is either a member of \( \Lambda \cup \Gamma \) or a direct consequence from some of the preceding members of the sequence by virtue of MP. Hence, by definition (60.1), \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi \).

(64.4) (Exercise)

(64.5) We establish the rule only for \( \vdash \). Assume \( \Gamma_1 \vdash \varphi \) and \( \Gamma_2 \vdash (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \). Then there is a sequence \( \chi_1, \ldots, \chi_{n-1}, \varphi \) (\( = S_1 \)) that is a derivation of \( \varphi \) from \( \Gamma_1 \) and there is a sequence \( \theta_1, \ldots, \theta_{m-1}, \varphi \rightarrow \psi \) (\( = S_2 \)) that is a derivation of \( \varphi \rightarrow \psi \) from \( \Gamma_2 \). So the consider the sequence:

\[
\chi_1, \ldots, \chi_{n-1}, \varphi, \theta_1, \ldots, \theta_{m-1}, \varphi \rightarrow \psi, \psi
\]

(\( S_3 \))

Since every element of \( S_1 \) and \( S_2 \) is either an element of \( \Lambda \cup \Gamma_1 \cup \Gamma_2 \) or follows from preceding members by MP, the same holds for every member of the initial
segment of $S_3$ up to and including $\varphi \rightarrow \psi$. Since the last member of $S_3$ follows from previous members by MP, we know that every element of $S_3$ is either an element of $\Lambda \cup \Gamma_1 \cup \Gamma_2$ or follows from preceding members by MP. Hence, $S_3$ is a derivation of $\psi$ from $\Gamma_1 \cup \Gamma_2$. This is a witness to $\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \psi$. ⊳

(64.6) (Exercise)

(64.7) We establish the rule only for $\vdash$. Assume $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$ and that $\Gamma \subseteq \Delta$. Then by the former, there is a sequence $S$ ending in $\varphi$ such that every member of the sequence is either in $\Lambda \cup \Gamma$ or follows from previous members by MP. But since $\Gamma \subseteq \Delta$, it follows that every member of $S$ is either in $\Lambda \cup \Delta$ or follows from previous members by MP, i.e., $\Delta \vdash \varphi$. ⊳

(64.8) We establish the rule only for $\vdash$. Assume $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$ and $\varphi \vdash \psi$. By the former, there is a sequence $S_1 = \chi_1, \ldots, \chi_{n-1}, \varphi$ such that every member of the sequence is either in $\Lambda \cup \Gamma$ or follows from previous members by MP. By the latter, there is a sequence $S_2 = \theta_1, \ldots, \theta_{m-1}, \psi$ such that every member of the sequence is either in $\Lambda \cup \{\varphi\}$ or follows from previous members by MP. So consider, then, the following sequence:

$$\chi_1, \ldots, \chi_{n-1}, \theta_1, \ldots, \theta_{m-1}, \psi \quad (S_3)$$

This sequence is the concatenation of the first $n-1$ members of $S_1$ with the entire sequence $S_2$. Since $S_1$ and $S_2$ are derivations, we know that all the $\chi_i$ ($1 \leq i \leq n-1$) and $\theta_j$ ($1 \leq j \leq m-1$) are either elements of $\Lambda \cup \Gamma$ or follow from two of the preceding members of the sequence by MP. The only potential exceptions are possible occurrences of $\varphi$ among the $\theta_j$s. But note that $\varphi$ follows by MP from two members of $\chi_1, \ldots, \chi_{n-1}$. Thus $S_3$ is a derivation of $\psi$ from $\Gamma$ and, hence, $\Gamma \vdash \psi$. ⊳

(64.9) We establish the rule only for $\vdash$. Suppose $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$. Since the instances of (38.1) are axioms, we know by (64.1) that $\vdash \varphi \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \varphi)$, where $\psi$ is any formula. So by (64.3), we have $\Gamma \vdash \varphi \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \varphi)$. From our initial hypothesis and this last result, it follows by an instance of (64.5) (i.e., an instance in which we (a) set both $\Gamma_1$ and $\Gamma_2$ in (64.5) to $\Gamma$ and (b) set $\psi$ in (64.5) to $\psi \rightarrow \varphi$) that $\Gamma \vdash (\psi \rightarrow \varphi)$, where $\psi$ is any formula. ⊳

(64.10) We establish the rule only for $\vdash$. Suppose $\Gamma \vdash (\varphi \rightarrow \psi)$. Since $\Gamma \subseteq \Gamma \cup \{\varphi\}$, it follows from (64.7) that:

$$\Gamma \cup \{\varphi\} \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi$$

But since $\varphi \in \Gamma \cup \{\varphi\}$, it follows by (64.2) that:

$$\Gamma \cup \{\varphi\} \vdash \varphi$$
So from (8) and (ξ), it follows by (64.5) (setting both \( \Gamma_1 \) and \( \Gamma_2 \) in (64.5) to \( \Gamma \)) that \( \Gamma \cup \{ \varphi \} \vdash \psi \), i.e., \( \Gamma, \varphi \vdash \psi \).

(64.11) (Exercise)

(67) Suppose (a) \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi \), and (b) \( \alpha \) doesn’t occur free in any formula in \( \Gamma \). We show by induction on the length of the derivation of \( \varphi \) from \( \Gamma \) that \( \Gamma \vdash \forall \alpha \varphi \).

**Base case.** The derivation of \( \varphi \) from \( \Gamma \) is a one-element sequence, in which case the sequence must be \( \varphi \) itself since a derivation of \( \varphi \) from \( \Gamma \) must end with \( \varphi \).

Then by the definition of *derivation from* (60.1), \( \varphi \in \Lambda \cup \Gamma \). So we have two cases: (A) \( \varphi \) is an element of \( \Lambda \), i.e., \( \varphi \) is one of the axioms asserted in Chapter 8, or (B) \( \varphi \) is an element of \( \Gamma \).

**Case A.** \( \varphi \in \Lambda \). Then \( \forall \alpha \varphi \in \Lambda \), since we took the universal closures of all our axioms as axioms, i.e., the conditional, if \( \varphi \in \Lambda \), then \( \forall \alpha \varphi \in \Lambda \), governed our statement of the axioms. So, \( \forall \alpha \varphi \in \Lambda \cup \Gamma \), and so by (64.4), it follows that \( \Gamma \vdash \forall \alpha \varphi \).

**Case B.** \( \varphi \in \Gamma \). Then, by hypothesis, \( \alpha \) doesn’t occur free in \( \varphi \). Consequently, \( \varphi \rightarrow \forall \alpha \varphi \) is an instance of axiom (39.4) meeting the condition that \( \alpha \) doesn’t occur free in \( \varphi \). So by (60.1), the sequence \( \varphi, \varphi \rightarrow \forall \alpha \varphi, \forall \alpha \varphi \) is a witness to \( \Gamma \vdash \forall \alpha \varphi \), since every member of the sequence is either a member of \( \Lambda \cup \Gamma \) or is a direct consequence of two previous members by MP.

**Inductive Case.** Suppose that the derivation of \( \varphi \) from \( \Gamma \) is a sequence of length \( n \), where \( n > 1 \). Then either \( \varphi \in \Lambda \cup \Gamma \) or \( \varphi \) follows from two previous members of the sequence, namely, \( \psi \rightarrow \varphi \) and \( \psi \), by MP. If \( \varphi \in \Lambda \cup \Gamma \), then using the same reasoning as in the base case, \( \Gamma \vdash \forall \alpha \varphi \). If \( \varphi \) follows from previous members \( \psi \rightarrow \varphi \) and \( \psi \) by MP, then by the definition of a derivation, we know that \( \Gamma \vdash \psi \rightarrow \varphi \) and \( \Gamma \vdash \psi \), where these are derivations of length less than \( n \). Since our IH is that the theorem holds for all derivations of formulas from \( \Gamma \) of length less than \( n \), it follows that \( \Gamma \vdash \forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \varphi) \) and \( \Gamma \vdash \forall \alpha \psi \). So there is a sequence \( S_1 = \chi_1, \ldots, \chi_i \), where \( \chi_i = \forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \varphi) \), that is a witness to the former and a sequence \( S_2 = \theta_1, \ldots, \theta_j \), where \( \theta_j = \forall \alpha \psi \), that is a witness to the latter. Now by using an instance of axiom (39.3), we may construct the following sequence:

\[
\chi_1, \ldots, \chi_i, \theta_1, \ldots, \theta_j, \forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \varphi) \rightarrow (\forall \alpha \psi \rightarrow \forall \alpha \varphi), \forall \alpha \psi \rightarrow \forall \alpha \varphi, \forall \alpha \varphi \quad (S_3)
\]

The antepenultimate member of \( S_3 \) is an instance of axiom (39.3), and so an element of \( \Lambda \) and hence of \( \Lambda \cup \Gamma \). The penultimate member of \( S_3 \) follows from previous members (namely, the antepenultimate member and \( \chi_i \)) by MP, and the last member of \( S_3 \) follows from previous members (namely, the penultimate member and \( \theta_j \)) by MP. Hence, every element of \( S_3 \) is either in \( \Lambda \cup \Gamma \) or follows from previous members by MP. So \( \Gamma \vdash \forall \alpha \varphi \).
Suppose $\Gamma \vdash \Box \varphi$, i.e., there is a modally-strict derivation of $\varphi$ from $\Gamma$. We show by induction on the length of the derivation that $\Box \Gamma \vdash \Box \Box \varphi$, i.e., that there is a modally strict derivation of $\Box \varphi$ from $\Box \Gamma$.

**Base Case.** If $n = 1$, then the modally-strict derivation of $\varphi$ from $\Gamma$ consists of a single formula, namely, $\varphi$ itself. So by the definition of $\Gamma \vdash \Box \varphi$ (61), $\varphi$ must be in $\Lambda_{\Box} \cup \Gamma$. So we have two cases: (A) $\varphi$ is in $\Lambda_{\Box}$ or (B) $\varphi$ is in $\Gamma$.

**Case A:** $\varphi \in \Lambda_{\Box}$. Then $\varphi$ must be a necessary axiom and so its necessitation $\Box \varphi$ is an axiom. So $\Box \Gamma \vdash \Box \Box \varphi$ by (64.1) and $\Box \Gamma \vdash \Box \varphi$ by (64.3).378

**Case B:** $\varphi \in \Gamma$. Then $\Box \varphi$ is in $\Box \Gamma$, by the definition of $\Box \Gamma$ (69). Hence, by (64.2), it follows that $\Box \Gamma \vdash \Box \varphi$.

**Inductive Case.** Suppose that the modally-strict derivation of $\varphi$ from $\Gamma$ is a sequence $S$ of length $n$, where $n > 1$. Then either $\varphi \in \Lambda_{\Box} \cup \Gamma$ or $\varphi$ follows by MP from two previous members of the sequence, namely, $\psi \rightarrow \varphi$ and $\psi$. If $\varphi \in \Lambda_{\Box} \cup \Gamma$, then using the reasoning in the base case, it follows that $\Box \Gamma \vdash \Box \Box \varphi$. If $\varphi$ follows from previous members $\psi \rightarrow \varphi$ and $\psi$ by MP, then by the definition of a modally-strict derivation, we know both that $\Gamma \vdash \Box \psi \rightarrow \Box \varphi$ and $\Gamma \vdash \Box \psi$. Consequently, since our IH is that the theorem holds for all such derivations of length less than $n$, it implies:

(a) $\Box \Gamma \vdash \Box (\psi \rightarrow \varphi)$

(b) $\Box \Gamma \vdash \Box \psi$

Now since instances of the K schema (45.1) are necessary axioms (i.e., members of $\Lambda_{\Box}$), we know by (64.1):

$\Box \Gamma \vdash \Box (\psi \rightarrow \varphi) \rightarrow (\Box \psi \rightarrow \Box \varphi)$

So by (64.3), it follows that:

$\Box \Gamma \vdash \Box (\psi \rightarrow \varphi) \rightarrow (\Box \psi \rightarrow \Box \varphi)$

So by (64.5) (setting both $\Gamma_1$ and $\Gamma_2$ in (64.5) to $\Gamma$), it follows from this and (a) that:

$\Box \Gamma \vdash \Box \psi \rightarrow \Box \varphi$

And again by (64.5), it follows from this and (b) that:

$\Box \Gamma \vdash \Box \varphi$

(75) Axiom (38.2) asserts:

378Note that (64.3) says that if $\Gamma \vdash \Box \varphi$, then $\Gamma \vdash \Box \varphi$, for any $\Gamma$. So, in this case, we’ve substituted $\Box \Gamma$ for $\Gamma$ in (64.3). The clash of variables is not an egregious one.
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\[ \varphi \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \chi) \rightarrow ((\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow \chi)) \]

If we let \( \varphi \) in the above be \( \varphi \), let \( \psi \) in the above be \( (\varphi \rightarrow \varphi) \), and let \( \chi \) in the above be \( \varphi \), then we obtain the following instance of (38.2):

\[ (\varphi \rightarrow ((\varphi \rightarrow \varphi) \rightarrow \varphi)) \rightarrow ((\varphi \rightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow \varphi)) \rightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow \varphi)) \]

But the following is an instance of (38.1):

\[ \varphi \rightarrow ((\varphi \rightarrow \varphi) \rightarrow \varphi) \]

Since this latter is the antecedent of the former, we may apply MP to obtain:

\[ (\varphi \rightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow \varphi)) \rightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow \varphi) \]

But now the following is also an instance of (38.1):

\[ \varphi \rightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow \varphi) \]

By applying MP to our last two results we obtain:

\[ \varphi \rightarrow \varphi \]

\( (76) \) Suppose \( \Gamma, \varphi \vdash \psi \). We show by induction on the length of a derivation of \( \psi \) from \( \Gamma \cup \{\varphi\} \) that \( \Gamma \vdash (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \).

**Base case.** The derivation of \( \psi \) from \( \Gamma \cup \{\varphi\} \) is a one-element sequence, namely, \( \psi \) itself. Then by the definition of *derivation from*, (60.1), \( \psi \in \Lambda \cup \Gamma \cup \{\varphi\} \). So we have two cases: (A) \( \psi \) is an element of \( \Lambda \cup \Gamma \), i.e., \( \psi \) is one of the axioms asserted in Chapter 8 or an element of \( \Gamma \), or (B) \( \psi = \varphi \).

**Case A.** \( \psi \in \Lambda \cup \Gamma \). Then by (60.1), \( \Gamma \vdash \psi \). Since the instances of (38.1) are axioms governing conditionals, we know \( \vdash (\psi \rightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow \psi)) \), by (64.1). So, by (64.3), it follows that \( \Gamma \vdash (\psi \rightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow \psi)) \). Hence by (64.5), it follows that \( \Gamma \vdash (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \).

**Case B.** \( \psi = \varphi \). Then by (75), we know \( \vdash (\psi \rightarrow \psi) \). So, \( \vdash (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \), and hence, by (64.3), it follows that \( \Gamma \vdash (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \).

**Inductive Case.** The derivation of \( \psi \) from \( \Gamma \cup \{\varphi\} \) is a sequence of length \( n \), where \( n > 1 \). Then either \( \psi \in \Lambda \cup \Gamma \cup \{\varphi\} \) or \( \psi \) follows from two previous members of the sequence, namely, \( \chi \rightarrow \psi \) and \( \chi \), by MP. If \( \psi \in \Lambda \cup \Gamma \cup \{\varphi\} \), then using the same reasoning as in the base case, \( \Gamma \vdash (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \). If \( \psi \) follows from previous members \( \chi \rightarrow \psi \) and \( \chi \) by MP, then since our IH is that the theorem holds for all derivations of formulas from \( \Gamma \) of length less than \( n \), it implies both:

(a) \( \Gamma \vdash (\varphi \rightarrow \chi) \)

(b) \( \Gamma \vdash (\varphi \rightarrow (\chi \rightarrow \psi)) \)
Now since the instances of (38.2) are axioms governing conditionals, we know, by (64.1):
\[
\vdash (\varphi \rightarrow (\chi \rightarrow \psi)) \rightarrow ((\varphi \rightarrow \chi) \rightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow \psi))
\]
So, by (64.3), it follows that:
\[
\Gamma \vdash (\varphi \rightarrow (\chi \rightarrow \psi)) \rightarrow ((\varphi \rightarrow \chi) \rightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow \psi))
\]
From this and (b), it follows by (64.5) that:
\[
\Gamma \vdash (\varphi \rightarrow \chi) \rightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow \psi)
\]
And from this last conclusion and (a), it follows that:
\[
\Gamma \vdash (\varphi \rightarrow \psi)
\]

(77.1) Assume:
(a) \( \Gamma_1 \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi \)
(b) \( \Gamma_2 \vdash \psi \rightarrow \chi \)

So, by definition (60.1), there is a sequence, say \( S_1 \), that is a witness to (a) and a sequence, say \( S_2 \), that is a witness to (b). Then consider the sequence \( S_3 \) consisting of the members of \( S_1 \), followed by the members of \( S_2 \), followed by \( \varphi \rightarrow \psi, \psi \rightarrow \chi, \varphi, \psi \), and ending in \( \chi \). It is not hard to show that this is a witness to:
\[
(\delta) \quad \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2, \varphi \rightarrow \psi, \psi \rightarrow \chi, \varphi \vdash \chi
\]
since every element of \( S_3 \) either: (a) is an element of \( \Gamma_1 \), or (b) is an element of \( \Gamma_2 \), or (c) is just the formula \( \varphi \rightarrow \psi, \psi \rightarrow \chi, \varphi, \psi \), or (d) follows from previous members of the sequence by MP. By an application of the Deduction Theorem to (\( \delta \)), it follows that:
\[
\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2, \varphi \rightarrow \psi, \psi \rightarrow \chi, \varphi \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \chi
\]
By an application of the Deduction Theorem to the above, and another application to the result, we obtain:
\[
(\xi) \quad \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2, \vdash (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow ((\psi \rightarrow \chi) \rightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow \chi))
\]
But from (a) and (b), respectively, it follows by (64.7) that:
(c) \( \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi \)
(d) \( \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \psi \rightarrow \chi \)
So from (\( \xi \)) and (c) it follows by (64.5) that:
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(ζ) \( \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2, \vdash (\psi \rightarrow \chi) \rightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow \chi) \)

And from (ζ) and (d) it again follows by (64.5) that \( \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2, \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \chi \). ☐

(77.2) (Exercise)

(77.3) Consider the premise set \( \Gamma = \{ \varphi \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \chi), \psi, \varphi \} \). From the first and third members of \( \Gamma \), we obtain \( \psi \) by MP. From \( \psi \) and the second member of \( \Gamma \), we obtain \( \chi \) by MP. Hence, the sequence consisting of the members of \( \Gamma \) followed by \( \psi \) and \( \chi \) constitute a witness to \( \varphi \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \chi), \psi, \varphi \vdash \chi \). So by the Deduction Theorem (76), \( \varphi \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \chi), \psi, \varphi \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \chi \). ☐

(78.1) As an instance of (38.3), we have: \( \neg \varphi \rightarrow (\neg \neg \neg \varphi) \rightarrow ((\neg \neg \neg \varphi \rightarrow \varphi) \rightarrow \varphi) \).

Moreover, by (75), we have \( \neg \neg \varphi \rightarrow \neg \neg \varphi \). Then by (77.4), it follows that \( \neg \neg \varphi \rightarrow \neg \neg \varphi \). But \( \neg \neg \varphi \rightarrow (\neg \neg \varphi \rightarrow \neg \neg \varphi) \) is an instance of (38.1). So it follows that \( \neg \neg \varphi \rightarrow \varphi \), by (77.1). ☐

(78.2) As an instance of (38.3), we have: \( \neg \neg \neg \neg \varphi \rightarrow \neg \neg \neg \varphi \rightarrow ((\neg \neg \neg \neg \varphi \rightarrow \neg \neg \neg \varphi) \rightarrow \neg \neg \varphi) \). Moreover, as an instance of (78.1), we know: \( \neg \neg \neg \varphi \rightarrow \neg \neg \neg \varphi \). So by MP, it follows that \( \neg \neg \neg \varphi \rightarrow \neg \neg \neg \varphi \). But as an instance of (38.1), we know: \( \neg \neg \neg \varphi \rightarrow (\neg \neg \neg \neg \varphi \rightarrow \varphi) \). So by (77.1), it follows that \( \neg \neg \varphi \rightarrow \neg \neg \varphi \). ☐

(78.3) Assume \( \neg \varphi \) for conditional proof. Now assume \( \varphi \) for a conditional proof nested within our conditional proof. Then since \( \varphi \rightarrow (\neg \psi \rightarrow \varphi) \) is an instance of axiom (38.1), it follows from this and our second assumption that:

(a) \( \neg \psi \rightarrow \varphi \)

Moreover, since \( \neg \varphi \rightarrow (\neg \psi \rightarrow \neg \varphi) \) is an instance of axiom (38.1), it follows from this and our first assumption that:

(b) \( \neg \psi \rightarrow \neg \varphi \)

But as an instance of axiom (38.3), we know:

(c) \( \neg \psi \rightarrow \neg \varphi \rightarrow ((\neg \psi \rightarrow \varphi) \rightarrow \psi) \)

From (b) and (c), it follows that \( \neg \psi \rightarrow \varphi \). And from this and (a), it follows that \( \psi \). So, discharging the premise of our nested conditional proof, it follows that \( \varphi \rightarrow \psi \). Hence, discharging the premise of our original conditional proof, it follows that \( \neg \varphi \rightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \). ☐
(78.4) We establish \((-\psi \rightarrow -\varphi) \rightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow \psi)\) by conditional proof. Assume 
\(-\psi \rightarrow -\varphi\). Then as an instance of (38.3), we know: 
\((-\psi \rightarrow -\varphi) \rightarrow (\neg\psi \rightarrow \phi)\). So it follows that 
\((\neg\psi \rightarrow \varphi) \rightarrow \psi\). But as an instance of (38.1), we know: 
\(\varphi \rightarrow (\neg\psi \rightarrow \varphi)\). So by hypothetical syllogism (77.1) from from our last 
two results, it follows that \(\varphi \rightarrow \psi\). So, by conditional proof (CP), it follows that 
\((-\psi \rightarrow -\varphi) \rightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow \psi)\). ▷

(78.5) We establish \((\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (-\psi \rightarrow -\varphi)\) by conditional proof. Assume \(\varphi \rightarrow \psi\). We know by (78.1) that 
\(-\neg\varphi \rightarrow \neg\varphi\). So it follows by hypothetical syllogism 
(77.3) that:

(a) \(-\neg\varphi \rightarrow \psi\\n\)
But by (78.2), we know:

(b) \(\psi \rightarrow -\neg\psi\\n\)
So it follows from (a) and (b) by hypothetical syllogism (77.3) that \(-\neg\varphi \rightarrow -\neg\psi\). But as an instance of (78.4), we know: 
\((-\neg\varphi \rightarrow -\neg\psi) \rightarrow (\neg\psi \rightarrow -\varphi)\). Hence it follows that 
\(-\neg\varphi \rightarrow \neg\varphi\). So, by conditional proof (CP), it follows that 
\((\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (\neg\varphi \rightarrow \neg\varphi)\). ▷

(78.6) Assume \(\varphi \rightarrow -\psi\), to show \(\psi \rightarrow -\varphi\) by conditional proof. Now assume \(\psi\) 
for a conditional proof nested within our conditional proof. From \(\psi\) it follows 
by (78.1) that \(-\neg\psi\). Then from \(\varphi \rightarrow -\psi\) and \(-\neg\psi\), it follows by Modus Tollens 
that \(-\psi\). So discharging the premise of our nested conditional proof, we have 
\(\psi \rightarrow -\varphi\). And discharging the premise of our original conditional proof, it 
follows that \((\varphi \rightarrow -\psi) \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow -\varphi)\). ▷

(78.7) (Exercise)

(78.8) – (78.9) Follow the proofs in Mendelson 1997, Lemma 1.11(f) – (g), pp. 39–40. ▷

(78.10) (Exercise)

(79.1) – (79.2) (Exercises)

(80.1) Assume \(\Gamma_1 \vdash (\varphi \rightarrow \psi)\) and \(\Gamma_2 \vdash -\psi\). Since \(\Gamma_1 \subseteq \Gamma_1 \cup \Gamma_2\), it follows from the 
first assumption by (64.7) that:

(a) \(\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash (\varphi \rightarrow \psi)\\n\)
Since \(\Gamma_2 \subseteq \Gamma_1 \cup \Gamma_2\), it follows from the second assumption by (64.7) that:

(b) \(\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash -\psi\\n\)
Now as an instance of (78.5), we know:

\(\vdash (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (-\psi \rightarrow -\varphi)\)
and hence by (64.3) that:

\[ \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (\neg \psi \rightarrow \neg \varphi) \]

So by applying (64.5) to this last result and (a), we have: \( \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \neg \psi \rightarrow \neg \varphi \). And by applying (64.5) to this result and (b), we have \( \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \neg \varphi \). \( \Rightarrow \)

(80.2) (Exercise)

(81.1) (\( \rightarrow \)) Assume:

(\( \delta \)) \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi \)

But given (78.5), we know:

\[ \vdash (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (\neg \psi \rightarrow \neg \varphi) \]

and hence by (64.3) that:

\[ \Gamma \vdash (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (\neg \psi \rightarrow \neg \varphi) \]

Hence by applying (64.5) to this last result and (\( \delta \)), we obtain \( \Gamma \vdash (\neg \psi \rightarrow \neg \varphi) \).

(\( \leftarrow \)) By symmetric reasoning, but using (78.4). \( \Rightarrow \)

(81.2) (\( \rightarrow \)) Assume:

(\( \delta \)) \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \neg \psi \)

But given (78.6), we know:

\[ \vdash (\varphi \rightarrow \neg \psi) \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \neg \varphi) \]

and hence by (64.3) that:

\[ \Gamma \vdash (\varphi \rightarrow \neg \psi) \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \neg \varphi) \]

Hence by applying (64.5) to this last result and (\( \delta \)), we obtain \( \Gamma \vdash (\psi \rightarrow \neg \varphi) \).

(\( \leftarrow \)) By symmetric reasoning, but using (78.7). \( \Rightarrow \)

(82.1) Assume \( \Gamma_1, \neg \varphi \vdash \neg \psi \) and \( \Gamma_2, \neg \varphi \vdash \psi \). By analogy with the first step of the reasoning in (80.1), it follows by (64.7) that both:

(a) \( \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2, \neg \varphi \vdash \neg \psi \)

(b) \( \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2, \neg \varphi \vdash \psi \)

Now, by the Deduction Theorem (76), it follows from (a) and (b), respectively, that:

(\( \delta \)) \( \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash (\neg \varphi \rightarrow \neg \psi) \)

(\( \zeta \)) \( \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash (\neg \varphi \rightarrow \psi) \)
But the instances of (38.3) are axioms and hence theorems, by (64.1). So we know:

\[ \vdash (\neg \varphi \rightarrow \neg \psi) \rightarrow ((\neg \varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow \varphi) \]

From this result it follows by (64.3) that:

(\xi) \quad \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash (\neg \varphi \rightarrow \neg \psi) \rightarrow ((\neg \varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow \varphi)

But by apply (64.5) to (8) and (\xi); to the result and (\zeta), apply (64.5) again. It follows that \( \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \varphi. \square \)

(82.2) (Exercise)

(84) As an instance of (75), we know \( \neg \varphi \rightarrow \neg \varphi \). But by the definition of \( \land \) (18.2) and the Rule of Definition by Equivalence (73), we also know that the following is a theorem:

\[ (\neg \varphi \rightarrow \neg \varphi) \rightarrow (\varphi \lor \neg \varphi) \]

Hence, by Modus Ponens, \( \varphi \lor \neg \varphi. \square \)

(85) By the definition of \( \land \) (18.1) and the Rule of Definition by Equivalence (73), we know that the following is a theorem:

\[ (\varphi \land \neg \varphi) \rightarrow \neg (\varphi \rightarrow \neg \neg \varphi) \]

If we label \( \varphi \land \neg \varphi \) as \( A \), and label \( \varphi \rightarrow \neg \neg \varphi \) as \( B \), then the theorem displayed above has the form \( A \rightarrow \neg B \). Now if we can show \( A \rightarrow B \), then by a form of Reductio Ad Absurdum, namely, the Variant of (82.2), it follows that \( \neg A \), which is what we want to prove. But we already know \( B \), by theorem (78.2), which asserts \( \varphi \rightarrow \neg \neg \varphi \). And axiom (38.1) tells us if something is already established, then any claim whatsoever implies it. Hence \( A \rightarrow B. \square \)

(86.1) For conditional proof, assume \( \varphi \land \psi \), to show \( \varphi \). Now by definition of \( \land \) (18.1) and the Rule of Definition by Equivalence (73), we know that \( (\varphi \land \psi) \rightarrow \neg (\varphi \rightarrow \neg \psi) \) is a theorem. From this and our assumption, it follows that \( \neg (\varphi \rightarrow \neg \psi) \). Hence, by axiom (38.1), everything implies \( \neg (\varphi \rightarrow \neg \psi) \) and so, in particular, we may conclude:

(\delta) \quad \neg \varphi \rightarrow \neg (\varphi \rightarrow \neg \psi)

Independently, assume \( \neg \varphi \), for a nested conditional proof. Then by (78.3), it follows that \( \varphi \) implies any formula, and so \( \varphi \rightarrow \neg \psi. \) Hence, by our nested conditional proof:

(\xi) \quad \neg \varphi \rightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow \neg \psi)
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From \((\vartheta)\) and \((\xi)\) we may infer \(\phi\), by a form of Reductio Ad Absurdum, namely, the Variant of (82.1). So, by conditional proof, \((\varphi & \psi) \rightarrow \varphi. \bowtie\)

**86.2** For conditional proof, assume \(\varphi & \psi\), to show \(\psi\). Now by definition of \& (18.1) and the Rule of Definition by Equivalence (73), we know that \((\varphi & \psi) \rightarrow \neg(\varphi \rightarrow \neg\psi)\) is a theorem. From this and our assumption, it follows that \((\varphi \rightarrow \neg\psi)\). Hence, by axiom (38.1), everything implies \((\varphi \rightarrow \neg\psi)\)

and so, in particular, we may conclude:

\((\vartheta)\) \(\neg\psi \rightarrow \neg(\varphi \rightarrow \neg\psi)\)

Independently, assume \(\neg\psi\), for a nested conditional proof. Then by axiom (38.1), it follows that \(\varphi \rightarrow \neg\psi\). Hence, by our nested conditional proof:

\((\xi)\) \(\neg\psi \rightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow \neg\psi)\)

From \((\vartheta)\) and \((\xi)\) we may infer \(\psi\), by a form of Reductio Ad Absurdum, namely, the Variant of (82.1). So, by conditional proof, \((\varphi & \psi) \rightarrow \psi. \bowtie\)

**86.3** By (78.2), we know:

\(\text{(A)}\) \(\varphi \rightarrow \neg\neg\varphi\)

Independently, by (78.3), we know:

\(\text{(B)}\) \(\neg\neg\varphi \rightarrow (\neg\varphi \rightarrow \psi)\)

So by hypothetical syllogism (77.3) from (A) and (B), it follows that:

\(\text{(C)}\) \(\varphi \rightarrow (\neg\varphi \rightarrow \psi)\)

Independently, by definition of \(\lor\) (18.2) and the Rule of Definition by Equivalence (73), we also know the following is a theorem:

\(\text{(D)}\) \((\neg\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (\varphi \lor \psi)\)

So by hypothetical syllogism from (C) and (D) it follows that \(\varphi \rightarrow (\varphi \lor \psi). \bowtie\)

**86.4** (Exercise)

**86.5** Assume \(\varphi\), for conditional proof, to show \(\psi \rightarrow (\varphi & \psi)\). Assume \(\psi\), for conditional proof, to show \(\varphi \& \psi\). By definition of \& (18.1) and the Rule of Definition by Equivalence (73), we know that \((\varphi \rightarrow \neg\psi) \rightarrow (\varphi \& \psi)\) is a theorem. So, to show \(\varphi \& \psi\), it suffices by Modus Ponens to show \((\varphi \rightarrow \neg\psi)\). We prove the latter by appealing to the Variant version of Reductio Ad Absurdum (82.2) and, in particular, by showing both:

\((\vartheta)\) \((\varphi \rightarrow \neg\psi) \rightarrow \psi\)

\((\xi)\) \((\varphi \rightarrow \neg\psi) \rightarrow \psi\)
We establish (8) by conditional proof. Suppose \( \varphi \rightarrow \neg \psi \). Then from this and \( \varphi \) (our first assumption), it follows that \( \neg \psi \). We establish (\( \xi \)) immediately from our second assumption, \( \psi \), by axiom (38.1). Hence, by reductio, \( \neg (\varphi \rightarrow \neg \psi) \), which sufficed to show \( \varphi \& \psi \). And so by conditional proof, \( \psi \rightarrow (\varphi \& \psi) \), and by conditional proof, \( \varphi \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow (\varphi \& \psi)) \). ⊢

(86.6) Let \( A \) be \( (\varphi \& \varphi) \) and \( B \) be \( \varphi \). Then since we want to prove \( A \equiv B \), we may use the following proof strategy:

1. Prove \( A \rightarrow B \)
2. Prove \( B \rightarrow A \)
3. Independently, we know that theorem (86.5) has an instance of the form:

\[
(A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow ((B \rightarrow A) \rightarrow ((A \rightarrow B) \& (B \rightarrow A)))
\]

4. From steps 1, 2 and 3, it follows that:

\[
(A \rightarrow B) \& (B \rightarrow A)
\]

5. By definition of \( \equiv \) (18.3) and the Rule of Definition by Equivalence (73), we know the following is a theorem:

\[
((A \rightarrow B) \& (B \rightarrow A)) \rightarrow (A \equiv B)
\]

6. From steps 4 and 5 it follows that \( A \equiv B \)

Given this strategy, it remains only to show steps 1 and 2. Step 1 is easy, since \( (\varphi \& \varphi) \rightarrow \varphi \) is an instance of (86.1). We prove step 2 by conditional proof. So assume \( \varphi \). Then as an instance of (86.5), we know \( \varphi \rightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow (\varphi \& \varphi)) \). But then by two applications of Modus Ponens, it follows that \( \varphi \& \varphi \). ⊢

(86.7) Let \( A \) be \( (\varphi \vee \varphi) \) and \( B \) be \( \varphi \). Then since we want to prove \( A \equiv B \), we may use the proof strategy we used in (86.6). So it remains only to show steps 1 and 2.

We prove step 2 by conditional proof. So assume \( \varphi \vee \varphi \). Now by definition of \( \vee \) (18.2) and the Rule of Definition by Equivalence (73), we know \( (\varphi \vee \varphi) \rightarrow (\neg \varphi \rightarrow \varphi) \) is a theorem. Hence \( \neg \varphi \rightarrow \varphi \). But independently we know, as an instance of theorem (75), that \( \neg \varphi \rightarrow \neg \varphi \). So it follows from our last two results that \( \varphi \), by Reductio Ad Absurdum (82.1).

Step 2 is easy, since if we assume \( \varphi \) and then conclude \( \varphi \vee \varphi \) by (86.3), it follows by conditional proof that \( \varphi \rightarrow (\varphi \vee \varphi) \). ⊢

(87.1) Assume \( \Gamma_1 \vdash \varphi \) and \( \Gamma_2 \vdash \psi \). Note independently, by theorem (86.5), that \( \varphi \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow (\varphi \& \psi)) \). Hence, \( \Gamma_1 \vdash \varphi \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow (\varphi \& \psi)) \), by (64.3). So from our first assumption and this last result, it follows by (64.5) that \( \Gamma_1 \vdash \psi \rightarrow (\varphi \& \psi) \). But
from this and our second assumption, it follows that $\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \varphi \& \psi$, by (64.5).

$\approx$ [NOTE: In the usual manner, the justification of the $\vdash \Box$ form of the rule is analogous.]

(87.2.a) – (87.3.b) (Exercises)

(87.3.b) Assume:

(A) $\Gamma_1 \vdash \varphi \lor \psi$

(B) $\Gamma_2 \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \chi$

(C) $\Gamma_3 \vdash \psi \rightarrow \theta$

We want to show $\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2, \Gamma_3 \vdash \chi \lor \theta$. Note that by definition of $\lor$ (18.2) and the Rule of Definition by Equivalence (73), we know $\vdash (\varphi \lor \psi) \rightarrow (\neg \varphi \rightarrow \psi)$ is a theorem. Hence by (64.3):

(D) $\Gamma_1 \vdash (\varphi \lor \psi) \rightarrow (\neg \varphi \rightarrow \psi)$

So from (A) and (D) it follows by (64.5) that:

(E) $\Gamma_1 \vdash \neg \varphi \rightarrow \psi$

Now independently, it follows from (B) by a rule of contraposition (81.2) that:

(F) $\Gamma_2 \vdash \neg \chi \rightarrow \neg \varphi$

But then from (F) and (E) it follows by a corollary to the Deduction Theorem, namely (77.1), that:

(G) $\Gamma_2, \Gamma_1 \vdash \neg \chi \rightarrow \psi$

But from (G) and (C) it follows by the same corollary that:

(H) $\Gamma_2, \Gamma_1, \Gamma_3 \vdash \neg \chi \rightarrow \theta$

But we know, by definition of $\lor$ (18.2) and the Rule of Definition by Equivalence (73), that $\vdash (\neg \chi \rightarrow \theta) \rightarrow (\chi \lor \theta)$ is a theorem. So by (64.3):

(I) $\Gamma_2, \Gamma_1, \Gamma_3 \vdash (\neg \chi \rightarrow \theta) \rightarrow (\chi \lor \theta)$

So from (H) and (I) it follows by (64.5) that $\Gamma_2, \Gamma_1, \Gamma_3 \vdash \chi \lor \theta$. But given (64.11), the order in which premise sets are listed makes no difference, and so $\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2, \Gamma_3 \vdash \chi \lor \theta$.

(87.4.a) Assume $\Gamma_1 \vdash \varphi \lor \psi$, $\Gamma_2 \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \chi$, and $\Gamma_3 \vdash \psi \rightarrow \chi$. We want to show $\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2, \Gamma_3 \vdash \chi$. Note that if we let $\theta$ in (87.3.c) be $\chi$, then we know:

If $\Gamma_1 \vdash \varphi \lor \psi$, $\Gamma_2 \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \chi$, and $\Gamma_3 \vdash \psi \rightarrow \chi$, then $\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2, \Gamma_3 \vdash \chi \lor \chi$. 


Hence it follows that:

$$\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2, \Gamma_3 \vdash \chi \lor \chi$$

Independently, by the idempotency of \(\lor\) (86.7), it is a theorem that \((\chi \lor \chi) \equiv \chi\). By definition of \(\equiv\) (18.3) and the Rule of Definition by Equivalence (73), this implies \(((\chi \lor \chi) \rightarrow \chi) \& (\chi \rightarrow (\chi \lor \chi))\). So by Rule \&E (87.2), it follows that \((\chi \lor \chi) \rightarrow \chi\). Since this is a theorem, we know \(\vdash (\chi \lor \chi) \rightarrow \chi\), and so by (64.3), it follows that:

$$\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2, \Gamma_3 \vdash (\chi \lor \chi) \rightarrow \chi$$

So, from (\xi) and (\theta), it follows that \(\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2, \Gamma_3 \vdash \chi\), by (64.5).

(87.4.b) – (87.4.c) (Exercises)

(88.1) Assume \(\Gamma, \neg\phi \vdash \psi \& \neg\psi\). But \(\neg(\psi \& \neg\psi)\) is a theorem, i.e., \(\vdash \neg(\psi \& \neg\psi)\), by (85). Hence, by (64.3), \(\neg(\psi \& \neg\psi)\) follows from any premise set. So, in particular: \(\Gamma, \neg\phi \vdash \neg(\psi \& \neg\psi)\). But then, by our original form of Reductio Ad Absurdum (82.1), it follows that \(\Gamma \vdash \phi\).

(88.2) – (88.6) (Exercises)

(86.1) – (89.2.f) (Exercises)

(89.3.a) By the definition of \(\equiv\) (18.3) and the Rule of Definition by Equivalence (73), it suffices to show: \((\phi \rightarrow \phi) \& (\phi \rightarrow \phi)\). But \(\phi \rightarrow \phi\) is a theorem (75), and so by the idempotence of \(\&\) (86.6), it follows that \((\phi \rightarrow \phi) \& (\phi \rightarrow \phi)\).

(89.3.b) (Exercise)

(89.3.c) We use reductio (88.2) to prove \(\neg(\phi \equiv \neg\phi)\), by assuming \(\phi \equiv \neg\phi\) and deriving a contradiction of the form \(\chi \& \neg\chi\). It follows from our assumption, by the definition of \(\equiv\) (18.3) and the Rule of Definition by Equivalence (73), that:

\[(\phi \rightarrow \neg\phi) \& (\neg\phi \rightarrow \phi)\]

So by \&E, we know both:

$$\phi \rightarrow \neg\phi$$

$$\neg\phi \rightarrow \phi$$

Note that \((\phi \rightarrow \neg\phi) \rightarrow ((\phi \rightarrow \phi) \rightarrow \neg\phi)\) is an instance of (78.10). From this instance and (\theta), it follows that \((\phi \rightarrow \phi) \rightarrow \neg\phi\). But \(\phi \rightarrow \phi\) is a theorem (75). Hence \(\neg\phi\). But from this last result and (\xi) it follows that \(\phi\). By Rule \&I, we may conclude \(\neg\phi \& \phi\) and, by the commutativity of \(\&\) (89.2.a), conclude \(\phi \& \neg\phi\), which is a contradiction.
(89.4.a) – (89.8.h) (Exercises)

(89.8.i) Assume \( \varphi \equiv (\psi \& \chi) \), for conditional proof, to show \( \psi \rightarrow (\varphi \equiv \chi) \). By definition of \( \equiv \) and the Rule of Definition by Equivalence (73), our assumption implies:

\[
(\varphi \rightarrow (\psi \& \chi)) \& ((\psi \& \chi) \equiv \varphi)
\]

So by Rules &E (87.2.a) and (87.2.b), this last result implies:

(\(\delta\)) \( \varphi \rightarrow (\psi \& \chi) \)

(\(\xi\)) \( (\psi \& \chi) \rightarrow \varphi \)

We want to show \( \psi \rightarrow (\varphi \equiv \chi) \). So assume \( \psi \), to show \( \varphi \equiv \chi \). By definition of \( \equiv \) and our Rule of Definition by Equivalence, it suffices to show \( (\varphi \rightarrow \chi) \& (\chi \rightarrow \varphi) \). By Rule &I (87.1), it suffices to show each conjunct.

For the first conjunct, assume \( \varphi \), for conditional proof. Then from \( \varphi \) and (\(\delta\)), it follows that \( \psi \& \chi \). Hence, by Rule &E (87.2.b), \( \chi \).

For the second conjunct, assume \( \chi \), for conditional proof. From our assumption \( \psi \) and our assumption \( \chi \), it follows by Rule &I that \( \psi \& \chi \). Hence, by (\(\xi\)), it follows that \( \varphi \). \(\therefore\)

(90.1) – (90.3.f) (Exercises)

(91.1) [Note: As usual, we justify only the \( \vdash \) form of the rule; the proof of the \( \vdash \) form is analogous.] Suppose \( \varphi \equiv_{df} \psi \) is an instance of a definition-by-\( \equiv \). Then by the Rule of Definition by Equivalence (73), we know both \( \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi \) and \( \vdash \psi \rightarrow \varphi \). So by (64.3), \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi \) and \( \Gamma \vdash \psi \rightarrow \varphi \). But then, by Rule &I (87.1), it follows that:

(\(\delta\)) \( \Gamma \vdash (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \& (\psi \rightarrow \varphi) \)

Independently, by the definition of \( \equiv \) and the Rule of Definition by Equivalence, we know independently that \( \vdash ((\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \& (\psi \rightarrow \varphi)) \rightarrow (\varphi \equiv \psi) \). Hence, by (64.3):

(\(\xi\)) \( \Gamma \vdash ((\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \& (\psi \rightarrow \varphi)) \rightarrow (\varphi \equiv \psi) \)

Hence, from (\(\delta\)) and (\(\xi\)), it follows by (64.5) that \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi \equiv \psi \). \(\therefore\)

(91.2) Let \( \varphi \equiv_{df} \psi \) be an instance of a definition-by-\( \equiv \). Then by the Rule of Equivalence by Definition (91.1) we know \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi \equiv \psi \). Now assume \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi \). Hence by biconditional syllogism, i.e., Rule \( \equiv E \) (90.3.a), it follows that \( \Gamma \vdash \psi \). \(\therefore\)

(91.3) (Exercise)

(92.1) Assume \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi \equiv (\psi \& \chi) \) and \( \Gamma \vdash \psi \), to show \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi \equiv \chi \). Then by Rule &I (87.1), it follows that:
Independent, it follows from (89.8.i) and the relevant instance of (89.7.b) that:

\((\varphi \equiv (\psi \land \chi)) \land \psi\)

From this it follows by (64.3) that:

\((\xi) \quad \Gamma \vdash ((\varphi \equiv (\psi \land \chi)) \land \psi) \implies (\varphi \equiv \chi)\)

From (\(\varphi\)) and (\(\xi\)) it follows that \(\Gamma \vdash \varphi \equiv \chi\). \(\blacktriangleleft\)

(92.2) – (92.3) (Exercises)

(94.1) Assume \(\Gamma_1 \vdash \forall \alpha \varphi\) and \(\Gamma_2 \vdash \tau \downarrow\). Assume further that \(\tau\) is substitutable for \(\alpha\) in \(\varphi\). By (64.7), it follows both that:

(a) \(\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \forall \alpha \varphi\)

(b) \(\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \tau \downarrow\)

 Independently, since we’ve taken instances of (38.1) as axioms, we know by (64.1) that:

\[ \vdash \forall \alpha \varphi \rightarrow (\tau \downarrow \rightarrow \varphi^\tau_{\alpha}) \]

Hence by (64.3), we know:

\[ \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \forall \alpha \varphi \rightarrow (\tau \downarrow \rightarrow \varphi^\tau_{\alpha}) \]

From this, (a) and (64.5), it follows that:

\[ \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \tau \downarrow \rightarrow \varphi^\tau_{\alpha} \]

But from this, (b) and (64.5), it follows that \(\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \varphi^\tau_{\alpha}\). \(\blacktriangleleft\)

(94.1) [Proof of the Variant form of the rule.] Assume \(\forall \alpha \varphi\) and \(\tau \downarrow\), where \(\tau\) is substitutable for \(\alpha\) in \(\varphi\). Then by (87.1), it follows that:

\[ \forall \alpha \varphi \land \tau \downarrow \]

However, by applying an appropriate instance of Exportation (89.7.b) to our first quantifier axiom (39.1), we know that:

\[ (\forall \alpha \varphi \land \tau \downarrow) \rightarrow \varphi^\tau_{\alpha} \]

So by MP, \(\varphi^\tau_{\alpha}\). Thus, we’ve established \(\forall \alpha \varphi, \tau \downarrow \vdash \varphi^\tau_{\alpha}\). \(\blacktriangleleft\)

(94.2) Assume that \(\Gamma \vdash \forall \alpha \varphi\), that \(\tau\) is substitutable for \(\alpha\) in \(\varphi\), and that \(\tau\) is either a primitive constant, a variable, or a \(\lambda\)-expression in which the initial \(\lambda\) doesn’t bind any variables in any encoding formula subterms. Then \(\tau \downarrow\) is an
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axiom, by (39.2). So by (64.1) that \( \vdash \tau \downarrow \), and hence, \( \Gamma \vdash \tau \downarrow \) by (64.3). So by (94.1) (with \( \Gamma = \Gamma_1 = \Gamma_2 \)), it follows that \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi \tau \alpha \). Hence we’ve established that \( \forall \alpha \varphi \vdash \varphi \tau \alpha \). \( \triangleleft \triangledown \) (94.2)

[Proof of the Variant form of the rule.] Assume \( \forall \alpha \varphi \) and suppose both that \( \tau \) is substitutable for \( \alpha \) in \( \varphi \) and that \( \tau \) is a primitive constant, a variable, or a \( \lambda \)-expression in which the initial \( \lambda \) doesn’t bind any variables in any encoding formula subterms. Then, by (39.2), we know \( \tau \downarrow \). Once we conjoin \( \forall \alpha \varphi \) and \( \tau \downarrow \) by \&I, it follows by reasoning used in the proof of the preceding theorem that \( \varphi \tau \alpha \). Hence we’ve established that \( \forall \alpha \varphi \vdash \varphi \tau \alpha \). \( \triangleleft \triangledown \) (96.1)

Assume \( \forall \alpha \varphi \), that \( \tau \) is substitutable for \( \alpha \) in \( \varphi \), and that \( \tau \) is either a primitive constant, a variable, or a \( \lambda \)-expression in which the initial \( \lambda \) doesn’t bind any variable in any encoding formula subterms. Then by Rule \( \forall \alpha E \) (94.2), it follows that \( \varphi \tau \alpha \). So by conditional proof (CP), \( \forall \alpha \varphi \rightarrow \varphi \tau \alpha \). \( \triangleleft \triangledown \) (96.2)

Assume \( \forall \alpha (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \), where \( \alpha \) is not free in \( \varphi \). Then by the special case [Variant] of Rule \( \forall \alpha E \) (94.3), it follows that \( \varphi \rightarrow \psi \). Now assume \( \varphi \) for a nested conditional proof. Then, \( \psi \), by MP. Since we’ve derived \( \psi \) from two premises in which \( \alpha \) isn’t free, we may apply GEN to \( \psi \) to conclude \( \forall \alpha \psi \). Hence we may discharge the premise of our nested conditional proof to conclude \( \varphi \rightarrow \forall \alpha \psi \), and then discharge the premise of our initial conditional proof to conclude that: \( \forall \alpha (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow \forall \alpha \psi) \). \( \triangleleft \triangledown \) (96.3) (Exercise)

(97) Follow the proof in Enderton 1972, Theorem 24F (p. 116). (In the second edition, Enderton 2001, the proof of Theorem 24F occurs on pp. 123–124.) All of the results needed for the proof are in place. [Warning: Note that in the proof of this theorem, Enderton uses \( \varphi_\alpha c \) to be the result of replacing every occurrence of the constant \( c \) in \( \varphi \) with an occurrence of the variable \( y \). By contrast, we use \( \varphi_\alpha \tau \) to be the result of replacing every occurrence of the constant \( \tau \) in \( \varphi \) with an occurrence of the variable \( \alpha \).] \( \triangleleft \triangledown \)

(98.1) We need not prove this lemma by induction; the recursive definitions of \( \varphi_\alpha \tau \) and substitutable for carry the following reasoning through all the inductive cases. Assume \( \beta \) is substitutable for \( \alpha \) in \( \varphi \) and \( \beta \) doesn’t occur free in \( \varphi \). There are two cases. In the case where \( \varphi \) has no free occurrences of \( \alpha \), then by the definition of substitutable for, \( \beta \) is trivially substitutable for \( \alpha \) in \( \varphi \). In that case, however, \( \varphi_\alpha \beta \) just is \( \varphi \) and so \( (\varphi_\alpha \beta)_\alpha = \varphi_\alpha \). Moreover by hypothesis, \( \beta \) doesn’t occur free in \( \varphi \). So by an analogous fact, \( \varphi_\beta \) = \( \varphi \). Hence \( (\varphi_\beta)_\beta = \varphi \).

In the case where \( \alpha \) has at least one free occurrence in \( \varphi \), then without loss of generality, consider any free occurrence of \( \alpha \) in \( \varphi \). Since \( \beta \) is substitutable for \( \alpha \) in \( \varphi \) (by hypothesis), we know that \( \beta \) will not be bound when substituted for \( \alpha \) at this occurrence. Thus, \( \beta \) will be free at this occurrence in \( \varphi_\alpha \). And since \( \varphi \) has no free occurrences of \( \beta \) (by hypothesis), we know that every free
occurrence of $\beta$ in $\varphi_n^\beta$ replaced a free occurrence of $\alpha$ in $\varphi$. Thus no free occurrence of $\beta$ in $\varphi_n^\beta$ falls under the scope of a variable binding operator that binds $\alpha$. Hence, $\alpha$ is substitutable for $\beta$ in $\varphi_n^\beta$.

Now we must show that $(\varphi_n^\beta)_{\alpha}^{\beta} = \varphi$. Suppose, for reductio, that $(\varphi_n^\beta)_{\alpha}^{\beta} \neq \varphi$. Since substitution only changes the substituted variables, then there must be some occurrence of $\alpha$ in $(\varphi_n^\beta)_{\alpha}^{\beta}$ that is not in $\varphi$ or some occurrence of $\alpha$ in $\varphi$ that is not in $(\varphi_n^\beta)_{\alpha}^{\beta}$. But both cases lead to contradiction:

Case 1. Suppose there is an occurrence of $\alpha$ in $(\varphi_n^\beta)_{\alpha}^{\beta}$ that is not in $\varphi$. Then there was an occurrence of $\beta$ in $\varphi$ that remained an occurrence of $\beta$ in $\varphi_n^\beta$ but was replaced by an occurrence of $\alpha$ in $(\varphi_n^\beta)_{\alpha}^{\beta}$. But if an occurrence of $\beta$ in $\varphi_n^\beta$ was replaced by an occurrence of $\alpha$ in $(\varphi_n^\beta)_{\alpha}^{\beta}$, then that occurrence of $\beta$ in $\varphi_n^\beta$ had to be a free occurrence. But that occurrence of $\beta$ must have been a free occurrence in $\varphi$ (had it been a bound occurrence, it would have remained a bound occurrence in $\varphi_n^\beta$). And this contradicts the hypothesis that $\beta$ doesn’t occur free in $\varphi$.

Case 2. Suppose there is an occurrence of $\alpha$ in $\varphi$ that is not in $(\varphi_n^\beta)_{\alpha}^{\beta}$. Then there was an occurrence of $\alpha$ in $\varphi$ that was replaced by an occurrence of $\beta$ in $\varphi_n^\beta$, which, in turn, remained an occurrence of $\beta$ in $(\varphi_n^\beta)_{\alpha}^{\beta}$. But if that occurrence of $\beta$ remained an occurrence of $\beta$ in the re-replacement, then it had to be bound by a variable-binding operator binding $\beta$ in $\varphi_n^\beta$. But this contradicts the hypothesis that $\beta$ is substitutable for $\alpha$ in $\varphi$, which requires that $\beta$ must remain free at every occurrence of $\alpha$ in $\varphi$ that it replaces in $\varphi_n^\beta$.

(98.2) Assume $\tau$ is a constant symbol that doesn’t occur in $\varphi$. If $\alpha$ has no free occurrences in $\varphi$, then $\tau$ is trivially substitutable for $\alpha$ in $\varphi$ and $\varphi_n^\tau = \varphi$. In that case, both $(\varphi_n^\tau)_{\alpha}^{\tau} = \varphi$, and $\varphi_n^\alpha = \varphi$. Hence $(\varphi_n^\tau)_{\alpha}^{\tau} = \varphi_n^\alpha$. So we consider only the case where $\alpha$ has at least one free occurrence in $\varphi$.

Suppose, for reductio, that $(\varphi_n^\alpha)_{\alpha}^{\tau} \neq \varphi_n^\beta$. Then there must be some occurrence of $\beta$ in $(\varphi_n^\alpha)_{\alpha}^{\tau}$ that is not in $\varphi_n^\beta$ or some occurrence of $\beta$ in $\varphi_n^\alpha$ that is not in $(\varphi_n^\alpha)_{\alpha}^{\tau}$. But both cases lead to contradiction:

Case 1. Suppose there is an occurrence of $\beta$ in $(\varphi_n^\alpha)_{\alpha}^{\tau}$ that is not in $\varphi_n^\beta$. Since by hypothesis, there are no occurrences of $\tau$ in $\varphi$, then there must be an occurrence of $\alpha$ in $\varphi$ that remained an occurrence of $\alpha$ in $\varphi_n^\alpha$ but became an occurrence of $\beta$ in $(\varphi_n^\alpha)_{\alpha}^{\tau}$. But if an occurrence of $\alpha$ in $\varphi_n^\alpha$ became an occurrence of $\beta$ in $(\varphi_n^\alpha)_{\alpha}^{\tau}$, then that occurrence of $\alpha$ in $\varphi_n^\alpha$ had to be a free occurrence. But that contradicts the fact that $\varphi_n^\alpha$ is, by definition, the result of replacing every free occurrence of $\alpha$ by $\tau$ in $\varphi$.

Case 2. Suppose there is an occurrence of $\beta$ in $\varphi_n^\alpha$ that is not in $(\varphi_n^\alpha)_{\alpha}^{\tau}$. Then there must be an occurrence of $\alpha$ in $\varphi$ that became an occurrence
of \( \tau \) in \( q^*_\alpha \) which remained an occurrence of \( \tau \) in \( (q^*_\alpha)^\beta \). But that contradicts the definition of \( \psi^\beta \), which signifies the result of replacing every occurrence of \( \tau \) in \( \psi \) by an occurrence of \( \beta \).

(98.3) (Exercise)

(100.1) \((\rightarrow)\) Assume \( \forall \alpha \forall \beta \varphi \), for conditional proof (to show \( \forall \beta \forall \alpha \varphi \)). Then by the special case [Variant] of Rule \( \forall E \) (94.3), it follows that \( \forall \beta \forall \alpha \varphi \). By a second application of this same rule it follows that \( \varphi \). Since \( \alpha \) is not free in our hypothesis \( \forall \alpha \forall \beta \varphi \), we may infer \( \forall \alpha \varphi \), by GEN. Since \( \beta \) is not free in our hypothesis, we may infer \( \forall \beta \forall \alpha \varphi \), by GEN. Hence, by conditional proof, \( \forall \alpha \forall \beta \varphi \rightarrow \forall \beta \forall \alpha \varphi \). \((\leftarrow)\) By symmetric reasoning. \(\triangleright\)

(100.2) (Exercise)

(100.3) Assume \( \forall \alpha (\varphi \equiv \psi) \) and apply the special case [Variant] of Rule \( \forall E \) (94.3) to obtain \( \varphi \equiv \psi \). By \( \equiv I \) (90.2), it suffices to establish both directions of \( \forall \alpha \varphi \equiv \forall \alpha \psi \). \((\rightarrow)\) Assume \( \forall \alpha \varphi \). By the special case [Variant] of Rule \( \forall E \) (94.3) to our second assumption, we have \( \varphi \). So by a biconditional syllogism (90.3.a), it follows that \( \forall \alpha \psi \), by GEN. Discharging our second assumption, we’ve established \( \forall \alpha \varphi \rightarrow \forall \alpha \psi \). \((\leftarrow)\) Assume \( \forall \alpha \psi \). The conclusion is then reached by analogous reasoning, but by biconditional syllogism (90.3.b). \(\triangleright\)

(100.4) \((\rightarrow)\) Assume, for conditional proof, that \( \forall \alpha (\varphi \& \psi) \). Then by the special case [Variant] of Rule \( \forall E \) (94.3), we have \( \varphi \& \psi \). From this we have both \( \varphi \) and \( \psi \), by (87.2.a) and (87.2.b), respectively. Since \( \alpha \) isn’t free in our assumption, we may apply GEN to both conclusions to obtain \( \forall \alpha \varphi \) and \( \forall \alpha \psi \). Hence by (87.1), it follows that \( \forall \alpha \varphi \& \forall \alpha \psi \). [We here omit the last step of assembling the conditional to be proved, since it is now obvious.] \((\leftarrow)\) Assume \( \forall \alpha \varphi \& \forall \alpha \psi \), for conditional proof. It follows by (87.2.a) and (87.2.b) that \( \forall \alpha \varphi \) and \( \forall \alpha \psi \). Hence, by applying the special case [Variant] of Rule \( \forall E \) (94.3) to both, we obtain both \( \varphi \) and \( \psi \). So by \&I, we have \( \varphi \& \psi \). Since \( \alpha \) isn’t free in our assumption, we may apply GEN to obtain \( \forall \alpha (\varphi \& \psi) \). \(\triangleright\)

(100.5) Assume, for conditional proof, that \( \forall \alpha_1 ... \forall \alpha_n \varphi \). By the special case [Variant] of Rule \( \forall E \) (94.3), it follows that \( \forall \alpha_2 ... \forall \alpha_n \varphi \). By analogous reasoning, we can strip off the quantifier \( \forall \alpha_2 \). Once we have legitimately stripped off the outermost quantifier in this way a total of \( n \) times, it follows that \( \varphi \). \(\triangleright\)

(100.6) \((\rightarrow)\) This direction is an instance of theorem (96.3). \((\leftarrow)\) Assume \( \forall \alpha \varphi \). Then since \( \alpha \) isn’t free in our assumption, we may apply GEN to obtain \( \forall \alpha \forall \alpha \varphi \). So by conditional proof, \( \forall \alpha \varphi \rightarrow \forall \alpha \forall \alpha \varphi \). \(\triangleright\)

(100.7) By hypothesis, \( \alpha \) isn’t free in \( \varphi \). By \( \equiv I \) (90.2), it suffices to prove both directions of the biconditional. \((\rightarrow)\) Assume \( \varphi \rightarrow \forall \alpha \psi \). Now for a secondary
conditional proof, assume \( \varphi \). Then by MP, it follows that \( \forall \alpha \psi \) and by the special [Variant] case of Rule \( \forall \)E (94.3), it follows that \( \psi \). Discharging the premise of our secondary conditional proof, it follows that \( \varphi \rightarrow \psi \). Since \( \alpha \) isn’t free in \( \varphi \), it isn’t free in our remaining (original) assumption. So the conditions of GEN are met and we may conclude that \( \forall \alpha (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \). \( \therefore \) By (96.2).

(100.8) (Exercise)

(100.9) (Exercise)

(100.10) Assume \( \forall \alpha (\varphi \equiv \psi) \& \forall \alpha (\psi \equiv \chi) \). By &E, this yields \( \forall \alpha (\varphi \equiv \psi) \) and \( \forall \alpha (\psi \equiv \chi) \). By the special case [Variant] of Rule \( \forall \)E (94.3), it follows, respectively, that \( \varphi \equiv \psi \) and \( \psi \equiv \chi \). By a biconditional syllogism (90.3.e), it follows that \( \varphi \equiv \chi \). Since \( \alpha \) isn’t free in our assumption, we may apply GEN to conclude \( \forall \alpha (\varphi \equiv \chi) \). \( \therefore \) By (96.2).

(100.11) (Exercise)

(100.12) (Exercise)

(100.13) Suppose \( \beta \) is substitutable for \( \alpha \) in \( \varphi \) and doesn’t occur free in \( \varphi \). Note that \( \beta \) could still be \( \alpha \), since (a) \( \alpha \) is trivially substitutable for \( \alpha \) in any \( \varphi \), and (b) \( \alpha \) may not occur free in \( \varphi \) (either because \( \alpha \) doesn’t occur in \( \varphi \) or because \( \varphi \) might itself have the form \( \forall \alpha \psi \)). So we have two cases:

Case 1. \( \beta \) just is the variable \( \alpha \). Then our theorem becomes: \( \forall \alpha \varphi \equiv \forall \alpha \varphi^\beta \). But \( \varphi^\beta \) just is \( \varphi \), by definition. So our theorem becomes \( \forall \alpha \varphi \equiv \forall \alpha \varphi \), which is an instance of a tautology.

Case 2. \( \beta \) is distinct from \( \alpha \). \( (\rightarrow) \) Assume \( \forall \alpha \varphi \). Since \( \beta \) is a variable and substitutable for \( \alpha \) in \( \varphi \), it follows by Rule \( \forall \)E (94.2) that \( \varphi^\beta \). Furthermore, since \( \beta \) doesn’t occur free in \( \varphi \), \( \beta \) doesn’t occur free in our assumption \( \forall \alpha \varphi \). So we may apply GEN to obtain \( \exists \beta (\varphi^\beta \). \( (\leftarrow) \) Assume \( \exists \beta (\varphi^\beta \). Since \( \beta \) is substitutable for \( \alpha \) in \( \varphi \) and doesn’t occur free in \( \varphi \), it follows, by the re-replacement lemma (98.1), both (a) that \( \alpha \) is substitutable for \( \beta \) in \( \varphi^\beta \) and (b) that \( \varphi^\beta \). From (a) and the fact that \( \alpha \) is a variable, it follows from our assumption that \( \varphi^\beta \), by Rule \( \forall \)E (94.2). But by (b), this is just \( \varphi \), and since \( \alpha \) isn’t free in our assumption, it follows by GEN that \( \forall \alpha \varphi \). \( \therefore \)

(100.14) Let \( \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n \) be any distinct variables, for \( n \geq 2 \). As an instance of axiom (39.3), we know:

\[
\forall \alpha_n (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (\forall \alpha_n \varphi \rightarrow \forall \alpha_n \psi)
\]

Since this is a theorem, it follows by GEN that:

\[
\forall \alpha_{n-1} (\forall \alpha_n (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (\forall \alpha_n \varphi \rightarrow \forall \alpha_n \psi))
\]

By axiom (39.3), we may distribute \( \forall \alpha_{n-1} \) over the conditional to conclude:
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\((\vartheta)\)  \[ \forall a_{n-1} \forall a_n(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow \forall a_{n-1}(\forall a_n \varphi \rightarrow \forall a_n \psi) \]

But as an instance of (39.3), we know:

\((\xi)\)  \[ \forall a_{n-1}(\forall a_n \varphi \rightarrow \forall a_n \psi) \rightarrow (\forall a_{n-1} \forall a_n \varphi \rightarrow \forall a_{n-1} \forall a_n \psi) \]

So by biconditional syllogism from (\(\vartheta\)) and (\(\xi\)), it follows that:

\[ \forall a_{n-1} \forall a_n(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (\forall a_{n-1} \forall a_n \varphi \rightarrow \forall a_{n-1} \forall a_n \psi) \]

If \(n = 2\), we’re done; otherwise if we apply this same series of reasoning steps to the variables \(a_{n-2}, \ldots, a_1\), we obtain:

\[ \forall a_1 \ldots \forall a_n(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (\forall a_1 \ldots \forall a_n \varphi \rightarrow \forall a_1 \ldots \forall a_n \psi) \]

\((100.15)\) (Exercise)

\((101)\) Assume \(\Gamma \vdash \varphi^\tau_\alpha\), where \(\tau\) is a primitive constant (i.e., isn’t introduced by a definition) of the same type as \(\alpha\) that doesn’t occur in \(\Gamma, \Lambda, \) or \(\varphi\). Then by Rule \(\forall I\) (97), it follows that:

\[ \Gamma \vdash \forall \beta(\varphi^\tau_\alpha) \]

where \(\beta\) is a variable (of the same type as \(\alpha\) and \(\tau\)) that doesn’t occur in \(\varphi^\tau_\alpha\). Since \(\tau\), by hypothesis, doesn’t occur in \(\Gamma\) or \(\varphi\), we know by the Re-replacement Lemma (98.2) that:

\[ (\varphi^\tau_\alpha)_\tau = \varphi^\beta_\alpha \]

Thus, from our last two displayed results, it follows that:

\[ \Gamma \vdash \forall \beta \varphi^\beta_\alpha \]

But independently, it follows from the right-to-left direction of (100.13) that:

\[ \forall \beta \varphi^\beta_\alpha \vdash \forall \alpha \varphi \]

by (64.10). Hence, from our last two displayed results, it follows that:

\[ \Gamma \vdash \forall \alpha \varphi \]

\((102.1)\) For simplicity, we justify the Variant version of the rule. By hypothesis, \(\tau\) is substitutable for \(\alpha\) in \(\varphi\). Our proof strategy is:

(A) Show \((\varphi^\tau_\alpha \& \tau \downarrow) \rightarrow \exists \alpha \varphi\)

(B) Conclude \(\varphi^\tau_\alpha \rightarrow (\tau \downarrow \rightarrow \exists \alpha \varphi)\) by Exportation (89.7.a)

(C) Apply (64.10) twice to (B) to conclude: \(\varphi^\tau_\alpha, \tau \downarrow \vdash \exists \alpha \varphi\)
So it remains to show (A). Assume both $\varphi^+_{\alpha}$ and $\tau \downarrow$. Note that the following is an instance of axiom (39.1):

$$\forall \alpha \neg \varphi \rightarrow (\tau \downarrow \rightarrow \neg \varphi^+_{\alpha})$$

We leave it as an exercise to show that this is equivalent to:

$$\tau \downarrow \rightarrow (\forall \alpha \neg \varphi \rightarrow \neg \varphi^+_{\alpha})$$

It follows from this theorem and our second assumption that $\forall \alpha \neg \varphi \rightarrow \neg \varphi^+_{\alpha}$. Hence, by contraposition (81.2), $\varphi^+_{\alpha} \rightarrow \neg \forall \alpha \neg \varphi$. From this and our first assumption, it follows that $\neg \forall \alpha \neg \varphi$. But then by the Rule of Definiendum Introduction, i.e., Rule $\equiv_{df}$ I (91.3), it follows from this last conclusion and definition (18.4) that $\exists \alpha \varphi$. 

\[\text{(102.2) (Exercise)}\]

\[\text{(103) Assume } \Gamma, \varphi^+_{\alpha} \vdash \psi, \text{ where } \tau \text{ is a primitive constant that does not occur in } \varphi, \psi, \Gamma, \text{ or } \Lambda. \text{ Then we leave it as an exercise to show the 'contrapositive', i.e., that:}\]

$$\Gamma, \neg \psi \vdash \neg \varphi^+_{\alpha}$$

where $\neg \varphi^+_{\alpha}$ is short for $\neg (\varphi^+_{\alpha})$. Since $\neg (\varphi^+_{\alpha}) = (\neg \varphi)^+_{\alpha}$ by metadefinition (14), we henceforth ignore the distinct ways of describing the same formula. Now since $\tau$ is, by hypothesis, a primitive constant that does not occur in $\varphi, \psi, \Gamma, \text{ or } \Lambda$, we know independently by the Variant of the Corollary to Rule $\forall I$ (101), that:

$$\neg \varphi^+_{\alpha} \vdash \forall \alpha \neg \varphi$$

So by (64.8), it follows from our two displayed results that $\Gamma, \neg \psi \vdash \forall \alpha \neg \varphi$. So by the Deduction Theorem (76):

$$\Gamma \vdash \neg \psi \rightarrow \forall \alpha \neg \varphi$$

It follows, by the Rule of Contraposition (81):

$$\Gamma \vdash \neg \forall \alpha \neg \varphi \rightarrow \neg \neg \psi$$

Now given theorem (78.1), i.e., $\neg \neg \psi \rightarrow \psi$, and (64.3), we independently know:

$$\Gamma \vdash \neg \neg \psi \rightarrow \psi$$

So by Hypothetical Syllogism (77.1), our last two displayed results imply:

$$\Gamma \vdash \neg \forall \alpha \neg \varphi \rightarrow \psi$$

Now, independently, by definition of $\exists$ (18.4) and our Rule of Definition by Equivalence (73), we know:
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\[ \Gamma \vdash \exists \alpha \varphi \rightarrow \neg \forall \alpha \neg \varphi \]

So by Hypothetical Syllogism, our last two displayed results imply:

\[ \Gamma \vdash \exists \alpha \varphi \rightarrow \psi \]

Hence, by (64.10), \( \Gamma, \exists \alpha \varphi \vdash \psi \). ⊢

(104.1) Assume \( \forall \alpha \varphi \). Then by the special case [Variant] of Rule \( \forall \)E (94.3), it follows that \( \varphi \). Since \( \varphi \) has the form \( \varphi^a_\alpha \) and \( \alpha \) is both a variable and substitutable for itself in \( \varphi \), the conditions of Rule \( \exists \)I (102.2) are satisfied and we may infer \( \exists \alpha \varphi \). ⊢

(104.2) By \( \equiv \)I (90.2), it suffices to prove both directions of the biconditional.

\( \rightarrow \) Assume \( \neg \forall \alpha \varphi \). We want to show \( \exists \alpha \neg \varphi \). So by the definition of \( \exists \) (18.4) and our Rule of Definiendum Introduction (91.3), we have to show: \( \neg \forall \alpha \neg \varphi \).

For reductio, assume \( \forall \alpha \neg \neg \varphi \). Then it follows that \( \neg \neg \varphi \), by the special case [Variant] of Rule \( \forall \)E (94.3). Hence, by double negation elimination (79.2), we may infer \( \varphi \). Since \( \alpha \) isn’t free in any of our assumptions, it follows by GEN that \( \forall \alpha \varphi \). Since we’ve reached a contradiction, we may discharge our reductio assumption and conclude, by a version of RAA (88.4), that \( \neg \forall \alpha \neg \varphi \), which is all that remained to show. (←) [For this direction of the proof, we shall appeal to Rule \( \exists \)E (103) in the form in which it is stated in the text. However, in subsequent proofs, we shall often use Rule \( \exists \)E in the manner described in the paragraph immediately following the introduction of the rule.] Assume, where \( \tau \) is arbitrary (i.e., some fresh, primitive constant) that \( \neg \varphi^\tau_\alpha \). Now assume, for reductio, that \( \forall \varphi \). Since \( \tau \) is a primitive constant, it is substitutable for \( \alpha \) in \( \varphi \). So by Rule \( \forall \)E (94.2), we have \( \varphi^\tau_\alpha \). Contradiction. So by RAA (88.4), \( \neg \forall \alpha \varphi \). We’ve thus shown \( \neg \varphi^\tau_\alpha \vdash \neg \forall \alpha \varphi \). Since \( \tau \) doesn’t appear in \( \varphi \) or \( \neg \forall \alpha \varphi \) or in any of our axioms, we may apply Rule \( \exists \)E (103) to conclude \( \exists \alpha \neg \varphi \vdash \neg \forall \alpha \varphi \). ⊢

(104.3) By \( \equiv \)I (90.2), it suffices to prove both directions of the biconditional. [Henceforth, we omit mention of this proof strategy for biconditionals.] \( \rightarrow \) Assume \( \forall \alpha \varphi \). We want to show \( \neg \exists \alpha \neg \varphi \). For reductio, assume \( \exists \alpha \neg \varphi \). From this and (104.2), it follows that \( \neg \forall \alpha \varphi \), by a biconditional syllogism (90.3.b). Contradiction. So by RAA (88.3), \( \neg \forall \alpha \neg \varphi \). (←) Assume \( \neg \exists \alpha \neg \varphi \), for conditional proof. Assume, for reductio, that \( \neg \forall \alpha \varphi \). From this and (104.2), it follows that \( \exists \alpha \neg \varphi \), by a biconditional syllogism (90.3.a). Contradiction. So by RAA (88.4), \( \forall \alpha \varphi \). ⊢

(104.4) (Exercise)

(104.5) (Exercise)

(104.6) (Exercise)

(104.7) (Exercise)
(104.8) (Exercise)

(104.9) Assume ¬∃αϕ & ¬∃αψ. From the first conjunct and (104.4) it follows
that ∀α¬ϕ, and from the second conjunct and the same theorem it follows that
∀α¬ψ. Hence, by respective applications of the special case [Variant] of Rule
∀E (94.3), it follows that ¬ϕ and ¬ψ, which by &I gives us ¬ϕ & ¬ψ. By ∀I
(87.3.b), we may infer (ϕ & ψ) ∨ (¬ϕ & ¬ψ). So by (89.4.g), we know ϕ ≡ ψ.
Since α isn’t free in our assumption, it follows by GEN that ∀a(ϕ ≡ ψ).

(104.10) (Exercise)
(104.11) (Exercise)

(105.1) The definition of proposition existence (20.3) is:

\[ p ≡ df [λx p] \]

By Conventions (17.2.a) and (17.2.b), all the variables in this definition func-
tion as metavariables. So the definition could be rewritten as:

\[ Π^0 ≡ df [λν Π^0] \], provided ν isn’t free in Π^0

So let Π^0 be any 0-place relation term, and choose ν to be some individual
variable not free in ϕ. Then, by the Rule of Equivalence by Definition (91), it
follows from the above definition that:

\[ Π^0 ≡ [λν Π^0] \]

But since ν isn’t free in ϕ, axiom (39.2) asserts [λν Π^0]. Hence, Π^0 ↓. ﬁ

(105.2) By the previous theorem (105.1), Π^0 ↓, for any relation term Π^0. But
by the BNF definition in (4), all and only formulas ϕ are 0-place relation terms
(4). So ϕ ↓. So ﬁ

(107) By (39.2), the modal closures of a ↓ are axioms, where a is any variable.
We therefore know □a ↓ is an axiom. Hence, by GEN, ∀a □a ↓. Now let ϕ be
□a ↓. Then as an instance of axiom (39.1), we know:

\[ ∀a □a ↓ → (τ ↓ → □τ ↓) \], where τ is any term substitutable for a in □a ↓

But every term τ of the same type as a is substitutable for a in □a ↓. So it
follows by Rule MP that τ ↓ → □τ ↓. ﬁ

(108.1) Assume τ = σ. Then we prove τ ↓ by cases:

(A) τ is an individual term.

(B) τ is an 1-place relation term.

(C) τ is an n-place relation term (n ≥ 2).
(D) \( \tau \) is a 0-place relation term.

Case A. \( \tau \) is an individual term. Then \( \tau \) and \( \sigma \) are both individual terms, say \( \kappa \) and \( \kappa' \), respectively, so that our assumption is \( \kappa = \kappa' \). It then follows from this assumption, the definition of = (23.1), our conventions for definitions (17.2), and the Rule of Equivalence by Definition (91), that:

\[
(O!\kappa \& O!\kappa' \& \forall F(F\kappa \equiv F\kappa')) \lor (A!\kappa \& A!\kappa' \& \Box \forall F(\kappa F \equiv \kappa' F)),
\]

where \( F \) doesn’t occur free in \( \kappa \) or \( \kappa' \)

So we reason by cases from the disjuncts. If \( O!\kappa \) and \( O!\kappa' \) and \( \forall F(F\kappa \equiv F\kappa') \), then \( O!\kappa \), and by axiom (39.5.a), \( \kappa \downarrow \), i.e., \( \tau \downarrow \). If \( A!\kappa \) and \( A!\kappa' \) and \( \Box \forall F(\kappa F \equiv \kappa' F) \), then \( A!\kappa \) and, by axiom (39.5.a), \( \kappa \downarrow \), i.e., \( \tau \downarrow \).

Case B. \( \tau \) is a 1-place relation term. Then \( \tau \) and \( \sigma \) are both property terms, say \( \Pi \) and \( \Pi' \), so that our assumption is \( \Pi = \Pi' \). Given (a) our conventions (17.2) for understanding the definition of property identity (23.2) and (b) Rule \( \equiv \! df \) of Definiendum Elimination (91.2), it follows that:

\[
\Pi \downarrow \& \Pi' \downarrow \& \Box \forall x (x \Pi \equiv x \Pi'),
\]

where \( x \) is any individual variable that doesn’t occur free in \( \Pi \) or \( \Pi' \).

Hence \( \Pi \downarrow \), i.e., \( \tau \downarrow \).

Case C. By reasoning analogous to Case B but with an appeal to the definition of relation identity (23.3).

Case D. Then \( \tau \downarrow \) by (105.1). \( \Box \)

(108.2) By reasoning analogous to (108.1). \( \Box \)

(109.1) Let \( \Pi \) and \( \Pi' \) be any \( n \)-place relation terms, \( n \geq 0 \), and assume \( \Pi = \Pi' \). Then by (108.1), it follows that \( \Pi \downarrow \), and by (108.2), it follows that \( \Pi' \downarrow \). Note independently that the following is axiomatic, since it is a closure of the axiom for the substitution of identicals (41):

\[
\forall F\forall G(F = G \rightarrow (\Box \forall x_1 \ldots x_n (F x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv F x_1 \ldots x_n) \rightarrow \Box \forall x_1 \ldots x_n (F x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv G x_1 \ldots x_n)))
\]

Since \( \Pi \downarrow \) and \( \Pi' \downarrow \), it follows by Rule \( \forall \! E \) that:

\[
\Pi = \Pi' \rightarrow
(\Box \forall x_1 \ldots x_n (\Pi x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv \Pi x_1 \ldots x_n) \rightarrow \Box \forall x_1 \ldots x_n (\Pi x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv \Pi' x_1 \ldots x_n))
\]

And since \( \Pi = \Pi' \) by assumption, it follows that:

\[
\Box \forall x_1 \ldots x_n (\Pi x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv \Pi x_1 \ldots x_n) \rightarrow \Box \forall x_1 \ldots x_n (\Pi x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv \Pi' x_1 \ldots x_n)
\]

But the antecedent is clearly a theorem, by \( n \) applications of GEN and an application of RN to the instance \( \Pi x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv \Pi x_1 \ldots x_n \) of the tautology \( \varphi \equiv \varphi \). Hence \( \Box \forall x_1 \ldots x_n (\Pi x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv \Pi' x_1 \ldots x_n) \). \( \Box \)
(109.2) (Exercise)

(111) Assume $\Gamma_1 \vdash \varphi_\alpha^\tau$ and $\Gamma_2 \vdash \tau = \sigma$. Now if we set $\Delta$ in (64.7) to $\Gamma_1 \cup \Gamma_2$, then we know:

$\xi$ $\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \varphi_\alpha^\tau$

$\theta$ $\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \tau = \sigma$

We have to show $\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \varphi'$, where $\varphi'$ is the result of replacing zero or more occurrences of $\tau$ in $\varphi_\alpha^\tau$ with occurrences of $\sigma$. We begin by noting that theorems (108.1) and (108.2) respectively imply the following, by (64.10):

(a) $\tau = \sigma \vdash \tau \downarrow$

(b) $\tau = \sigma \vdash \sigma \downarrow$

Hence by applying (64.8) first to the pair $\theta$ and (a) and then to the pair $\theta$ and (b), we obtain, respectively:

(c) $\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \tau \downarrow$

(d) $\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \sigma \downarrow$

Since universal generalizations of the axiom schema for the substitution of identicals (41) are also axioms, we know by (64.1) that:

$\vdash \forall \alpha \forall \beta (\alpha = \beta \rightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow \varphi'))$, whenever $\beta$ is substitutable for $\alpha$ in $\varphi$ and $\varphi'$ is the result of replacing zero or more free occurrences of $\alpha$ in $\varphi$ with occurrences of $\beta$.

It follows from this last result by (64.3) that:

(e) $\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \forall \alpha \forall \beta (\alpha = \beta \rightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow \varphi'))$, whenever $\beta$ is substitutable for $\alpha$ in $\varphi$ and $\varphi'$ is the result of replacing zero or more free occurrences of $\alpha$ in $\varphi$ with occurrences of $\beta$.

Now let $\psi$ be $\forall \beta (\alpha = \beta \rightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow \varphi'))$ so that we may abbreviate (e) as:

(e) $\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \forall \alpha \psi$

It now follows from (e) and (c) by Rule $\forall E$ (94.1) that $\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \psi^\tau_\alpha$, i.e.,

(f) $\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \forall \beta (\tau = \beta \rightarrow (\varphi_\alpha^\tau \rightarrow \varphi'))$, where $\varphi'$ is the result of replacing zero or more occurrences of $\tau$ in $\varphi_\alpha^\tau$ by occurrences of $\beta$.

Now abbreviate the proper scope of $\forall \beta$ in (f) as $\chi$, so that we may abbreviate (f) as:

(f) $\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \forall \beta \chi$
It now follows from (f) and (d) by Rule ∀E (94.1) that \( \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \chi \sigma \beta \), i.e.,

\[(g) \quad \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \tau = \sigma \rightarrow (\varphi_\alpha \rightarrow \varphi') \],

where \( \varphi' \) is the result of replacing zero or more occurrences of \( \tau \) in \( \varphi_\alpha \) by occurrences of \( \sigma \).

Hence, from (g) and (θ), it follows by familiar reasoning that \( \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \tau = \sigma \rightarrow (\varphi_\alpha \rightarrow \varphi') \).

From this last result and (ξ), it follows that \( \Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \varphi_\alpha \rightarrow \varphi' \).

\[\Box \Box \Box \] (112.1) The 0-place instance of the axiom \( \eta \)-Conversion (48.3) asserts \( \lambda p = p \), where \( p \) is a 0-place relation variable. Since the closures of this principle are axioms, the following is therefore an axiom:

\[\Box \Box \Box \] (112.2) \( \lambda \varphi \equiv \lambda \psi \) is an instance of the tautology \( \varphi \equiv \psi \). Moreover, by (112.1), we know \( \lambda \varphi = \varphi \). So by Rule =E (111) it follows that \( \lambda \varphi \equiv \varphi \).

\[\Box \Box \Box \] (112.3) By axiom (39.2), \( \lambda \varphi \) exists, i.e., \( \lambda \varphi \downarrow \). From this and the 0-place case of \( \alpha \)-Conversion (48.1), it follows that \( \lambda \varphi = [\lambda \varphi]' \), where \( [\lambda \varphi]' \) is any alphabetic variant of \( [\lambda \varphi] \).

\[\Box \Box \Box \] (112.4) We know:

\( [\lambda \varphi] = [\lambda \varphi]' \) \hspace{1cm} (112.3)
\( [\lambda \varphi] = \varphi \) \hspace{1cm} (112.1)

So by Rule =E (111), it follows that \( \varphi = [\lambda \varphi]' \). Independently, by the definition of alphabetic variants (16), we know \( [\lambda \varphi]' = [\lambda \varphi'] \). So by metalinguistic substitution of identicals, \( \varphi = [\lambda \psi] \). But as an instance of (112.1), we know \( [\lambda \varphi'] = \varphi' \). Hence, again, by Rule =E, \( \varphi = \varphi' \).

\[\Box \Box \Box \] (112.5) (Exercise)

\[\Box \Box \Box \] (112.6) \( \rightarrow \) Assume \( \varphi \equiv \psi \). By (112.2), we know \( [\lambda \varphi] \equiv \varphi \). Hence, by biconditional syllogism, \( [\lambda \varphi] \equiv \psi \). But also by (112.2) and the commutativity of the biconditional, we know \( \psi \equiv [\lambda \psi] \). Hence again by biconditional syllogism, \( [\lambda \varphi] \equiv [\lambda \psi] \). \( \leftarrow \) Reverse the reasoning, starting with the assumption that \( [\lambda \varphi] \equiv [\lambda \psi] \).

\[\Box \Box \Box \] (115) By (112.5), we know \( \vdash (\varphi \equiv \varphi') \), where \( \varphi' \) is any alphabetic variant of \( \varphi \). Hence, by (64.3), \( \Gamma \vdash (\varphi \equiv \varphi') \). By definition of \( \equiv \) (18.3) and Rule \( \equiv df \) E of Definiendum Elimination (91.2), it follows that \( \Gamma \vdash ((\varphi \rightarrow \varphi') \& (\varphi' \rightarrow \varphi)) \). So by Rule &E, it follows that:
(A) \( \Gamma \vdash (\varphi \to \varphi') \)

(B) \( \Gamma \vdash (\varphi' \to \varphi) \)

Now to justify the left-to-right direction of the Rule of Alphabetic Variants, assume \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi \). Then from this and (A), it follows by (64.5) that \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi' \). By analogous reasoning from (B), if \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi' \), then \( \Gamma \vdash \varphi \).

(116.1) Since the \( \lambda \) in \([\lambda x \Diamond E!x]\) doesn’t bind any variables in any encoding formula subterm, axiom (39.2) asserts \([\lambda x \Diamond E!x]\). Given definition (22.1), i.e., \( O! := [\lambda x \Diamond E!x] \), the Rule of Definition by Identity (74) tells us that:

\[
([\lambda x \Diamond E!x] \to (O! = [\lambda x \Diamond E!x])) \land ([\lambda x \Diamond E!x] \to \neg O!)
\]

So the first conjunct and the fact that \([\lambda x \Diamond E!x]\) imply \( O! = [\lambda x \Diamond E!x] \). So by (108.1), \( O! \). ⇒

(116.2) (Exercise)

(116.3) We want to show \( O! x \lor A! x \). For reductio, assume \( \neg (O! x \lor A! x) \). Then it follows that both:

(A) \( \neg O! x \)

(B) \( \neg A! x \)

Note independently that \([\lambda x \Diamond E!x]\) and \([\lambda x \neg \Diamond E!x]\), by axiom (39.2). Hence, the definitions of \( O! \) (22.1) and \( A! \) (22.2) imply, by our Rule of Definition by Identity (74):

(C) \( O! = [\lambda x \Diamond E!x] \)

(D) \( A! = [\lambda x \neg \Diamond E!x] \)

From (A) and (C) it follows by Rule =E (111) that:

(E) \( \neg[\lambda x \Diamond E!x] x \)

and from (B) and (D) it follows by the same rule that:

(F) \( \neg[\lambda x \neg \Diamond E!x] x \)

Independently, it follows from \( \beta \)-Conversion (48.2) and the facts that \([\lambda x \Diamond E!x]\) and \([\lambda x \neg \Diamond E!x]\) that:

(G) \( [\lambda x \Diamond E!x] x \equiv \Diamond E!x \)

(H) \( [\lambda x \neg \Diamond E!x] x \equiv \neg \Diamond E!x \)
But from (G) and (E) it follows that \( \neg \Diamond !x \), by (90.3.c). And by the same principle, it follows from (H) and (F) that \( \neg \Box !x \). Hence \( \Box !x \). Contradiction.

(117.1) By definition of property identity (23.2) and Rule of Equivalence by Definition (91.1), we know:

\[
F = G \equiv (F \downarrow \& G \downarrow \& \forall x (xF \equiv xG))
\]

But by axiom (39.2), we know both \( F \downarrow \) and \( G \downarrow \). Hence by the general form of the Rule \( \equiv S \) of Biconditional Simplification (92), it follows that:

\[
F = G \equiv \Box \forall x (xF \equiv xG)
\]

(117.2) – (117.3) (Exercises)

(118.1) We prove this by cases, using the cases of definition of identity (23) as our guide. The cases we have to show are:

- \( x = x \)
- \( F = F \), where \( F \) is a 1-place relation variable
- \( F = F \), where \( F \) is an \( n \)-place relation variable, \( n \geq 2 \)
- \( p = p \), where \( p \) is a 0-place relation variable

Case 1. By definition (23.1), we have to show:

\[
(\vartheta) \ (O!x \& O!x \& \Box \forall x (Fx \equiv Fx)) \lor (A!x \& A!x \& \Box \forall x (xF \equiv xF))
\]

To establish \((\vartheta)\), our proof strategy is to reason by disjunctive syllogism (87.3.c) as follows:

From:

(a) \( O!x \lor A!x \)
(b) \( O!x \rightarrow (O!x \& O!x \& \Box \forall x (Fx \equiv Fx)) \)
(c) \( A!x \rightarrow (A!x \& A!x \& \Box \forall x (xF \equiv xF)) \)

conclude \((\vartheta)\).

So if we can establish (a), (b), and (c), we’re done. But (a) is just theorem (116.3). So it remains to show (b) and (c):

(b) Assume \( O!x \). By the idempotency of \& (86.6), it follows that \( O!x \& O!x \). Note, independently that as an instance of (89.3.a), we have \( Fx \equiv Fx \).

Since this is a theorem, we may apply GEN (67) to obtain \( \forall x (Fx \equiv Fx) \). Since this is a \( \Box \)-theorem, it follows by RN (69) that \( \Box \forall x (Fx \equiv Fx) \). If we conjoin this last result by \&I (87.1) with what we have established so far, we have \( O!x \& O!x \& \Box \forall x (Fx \equiv Fx) \).
Hence, to prove \( F \) above, we may instantiate the above result to Case 2. But since \( F \) (89.3.a), we know \( xF \) \( \forall \) to obtain Case 3. Since \( F \) we may instantiate the above result to \( F \). So to prove \( \forall \) by (n) \( \forall \) and \( \forall \) \( \forall \) \( \forall \) this is a theorem, we may apply GEN to obtain \( \forall \). Note, independently that as an instance of (89.3.a), we have \( \forall \) and \( \forall \). Since this is a theorem, we may apply GEN (67) to obtain \( \forall \). Since this is a \( \forall \)-theorem, it follows by RN (69) that \( \forall \) to theorem (117.1), we obtain:

\[
\forall G(F = G \equiv \forall x(F \equiv xG))
\]

But since \( F \) \( \forall \) and \( F \) is a variable and substitutable for \( G \) in the matrix of the above, we may instantiate the above result to \( F \), by (94.2), to obtain:

\[
F = F \equiv \forall x(F \equiv xF)
\]

Hence, to prove \( F = F \), it suffices to show \( \forall x(F \equiv xF) \). But, as an instance of (89.3.a), we know \( xF \equiv xF \). Since this is a theorem, we may apply GEN (67) to obtain \( \forall x(F \equiv xF) \). Since this is a \( \forall \)-theorem, it follows by RN (69) that \( \forall x(F \equiv xF) \).

**Case 3.** If we apply GEN once to theorem (117.2), then we know:

\[
\forall G(F^n = G^n) \equiv \\
\forall y_1 \ldots \forall y_{n-1}([\lambda x F^n x y_1 \ldots y_{n-1}] = [\lambda x G^n x y_1 \ldots y_{n-1}] \& [\lambda x F^n y_1 x y_2 \ldots y_{n-1}] = [\lambda x G^n y_1 x y_2 \ldots y_{n-1}] \& \ldots \& [\lambda x F^n y_1 \ldots y_{n-1} x] = [\lambda x G^n y_1 \ldots y_{n-1} x])
\]

Since \( F \) \( \forall \) and \( F \) is a variable and substitutable for \( G \) in the matrix of the above, we may instantiate the above result to \( F \), by (94.2), to obtain:

\[
F^n = F^n \equiv \\
\forall y_1 \ldots \forall y_{n-1}([\lambda x F^n x y_1 \ldots y_{n-1}] = [\lambda x F^n x y_1 \ldots y_{n-1}] \& [\lambda x F^n y_1 x y_2 \ldots y_{n-1}] = [\lambda x F^n y_1 x y_2 \ldots y_{n-1}] \& \ldots \& [\lambda x F^n y_1 \ldots y_{n-1} x] = [\lambda x F^n y_1 \ldots y_{n-1} x])
\]

So to prove \( F^n = F^n \), it suffices to show:

\[
\forall y_1 \ldots \forall y_{n-1}([\lambda x F^n x y_1 \ldots y_{n-1}] = [\lambda x F^n x y_1 \ldots y_{n-1}] \& [\lambda x F^n y_1 x y_2 \ldots y_{n-1}] = [\lambda x F^n y_1 x y_2 \ldots y_{n-1}] \& \ldots \& [\lambda x F^n y_1 \ldots y_{n-1} x] = [\lambda x F^n y_1 \ldots y_{n-1} x])
\]

By \( n - 1 \) applications of GEN, it suffices to show:

\[
[\lambda x F^n x y_1 \ldots y_{n-1}] = [\lambda x F^n x y_1 \ldots y_{n-1}] \& [\lambda x F^n y_1 x y_2 \ldots y_{n-1}] = [\lambda x F^n y_1 x y_2 \ldots y_{n-1}] \& \ldots \& [\lambda x F^n y_1 \ldots y_{n-1} x] = [\lambda x F^n y_1 \ldots y_{n-1} x]
\]
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But note that in all of the \(\lambda\)-expressions in the above, the initial \(\lambda\) doesn’t bind any variables in any encoding formula subterms. Hence, by (39.2), we know:

\[
\lambda F^nxy_1\ldots y_{n-1} \downarrow \\
\lambda F^nxy_1y_2\ldots y_{n-1} \downarrow \\
\vdots \\
\lambda F^nxy_1\ldots y_{n-1}x \downarrow
\]

So we may instantiate, one-by-one, each of the above terms into the universal generalization of Case 2 and we obtain each of the conjuncts of what we had to show. ∎

Case 4. By applying GEN to Case 2 above, it follows that \(\forall F(F = F)\), where \(F\) is a property variable. Note that \([\lambda p] \downarrow (39.2)\) and \([\lambda x p]\) is substitutable for \(F\) in the matrix \(F = F\). So we may use Rule VE (94.2) to infer \([\lambda x p] = [\lambda x p]\). Now by a single application of GEN to theorem (117.3), we know \(\forall q(p = q \equiv [\lambda x p] = [\lambda x q])\). Since \(p\) is substitutable for \(q\) in the matrix of this universal claim and \(p\) is a variable, it follows, by Rule VE (94.2), that \(p = p \equiv [\lambda x p] = [\lambda x p]\). Since we’ve established \([\lambda x p] = [\lambda x p]\), it follows by biconditional syllogism (90.3.b) that \(p = p\). ∎

(118.2) By (118.1), we know \(\alpha = \alpha\). For conditional proof, assume \(\alpha = \beta\). Hence by the Variant version of Rule =E (111), it follows that \(\beta = \alpha\).379 ∎

(118.3) Assume the antecedent, so that by &E we know both \(\alpha = \beta\) and \(\beta = \gamma\). Then by Rule =E (111) it follows that \(\alpha = \gamma\). ∎

(118.4) \((\rightarrow)\) Note that for any distinct variable \(\gamma\) of the same type as \(\alpha\), it is an easy exercise to show \(\forall \gamma(\alpha = \gamma \equiv \alpha = \gamma)\). So for conditional proof, assume \(\alpha = \beta\). Then by Rule =E (111), \(\forall \gamma(\alpha = \gamma \equiv \beta = \gamma)\). \((\Leftarrow)\) Assume \(\forall \gamma(\alpha = \gamma \equiv \beta = \gamma)\). Then since \(\alpha \downarrow\) and is substitutable for \(\gamma\) in the matrix of this universal claim, it follows by by Rule VE (94.2) that \(\alpha = \alpha \equiv \beta = \alpha\). But \(\alpha = \alpha\), by (118.1). So \(\beta = \alpha\), by biconditional syllogism (90.3.a), and thus \(\alpha = \beta\), by (118.2). ∎

(119.1) Assume:

\((\delta)\) \(\Gamma \vdash \tau \downarrow\)

Now we independently establish that:

\((\xi)\) \(\vdash \tau \downarrow \rightarrow \tau = \tau\)

379To obtain the relevant instance of the rule we just used, set the metavariables in Rule =E to the following values: let \(\tau = \alpha, \sigma = \beta, \alpha = \gamma, \varphi\) be \(\gamma\) (so that \(\varphi'\) is \(\alpha = \alpha\)), and \(\varphi'\) be \(\beta = \alpha\) (thus, \(\varphi'\) is the result of replacing one occurrence of \(\alpha\) in \(\varphi'\) by \(\beta\)). Given these assignments, the rule asserts: \(\alpha = \alpha, \alpha = \beta \vdash \beta = \alpha\).
Proof. To see that there is a proof of $\tau \downarrow \rightarrow \tau = \tau$, assume for conditional proof that $\tau \downarrow$. Independently, by (118.1), it is a theorem that $\alpha = \alpha$. So this theorem yields $\forall \alpha (\alpha = \alpha)$ by GEN. Now since $\alpha$ occurs free in $\alpha = \alpha$ and doesn't occur within the scope of any variable-binding operators, $\tau$ is substitutable for $\alpha$ in $\alpha = \alpha$. Hence, by Rule $\forall$ (94.1) it follows that $\tau = \tau$.

Then from ($\delta$) and ($\xi$) it follows that $\Gamma \vdash \tau = \tau$, by (64.5). ⊢

(119.2) Assume $\tau$ is a primitive constant, a variable, or a $\lambda$-expression in which the initial $\lambda$ doesn’t bind any variables in any encoding formula subterm. Then by (39.2), $\tau \downarrow$ is an axiom and, hence, a theorem. Since this establishes $\vdash \tau \downarrow$, it follows by Rule =I (119.1) that $\vdash \tau = \tau$. ⊢

(121.1) By hypothesis:
(A) $\tau(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n) =_{df} \sigma(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n)$ is a definition-by-$=$ in which the variables $\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n$ occur free ($n \geq 0$),
(B) $\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n$ are any terms substitutable, respectively, for $\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n$ in the definiens and definiendum, and
(C) $\Gamma \vdash \sigma(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n) \downarrow$.

From (A) and the Rule of Definition by Identity (74), we know:
$\vdash (\sigma(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n) \downarrow \rightarrow \tau(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n) = \sigma(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n)) \& (\neg \sigma(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n) \downarrow \rightarrow \neg \tau(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n) \downarrow)$

By (64.3), the above implies:
(D) $\Gamma \vdash \sigma(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n) \downarrow \rightarrow \tau(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n) = \sigma(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n)) \& (\neg \sigma(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n) \downarrow \rightarrow \neg \tau(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n) \downarrow)$

By Rule &E (87.2.a), it follows from (D) that:
(E) $\Gamma \vdash \sigma(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n) \downarrow \rightarrow \tau(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n) = \sigma(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n)$

Hence, from (E) and (C) it follows by (64.5) that:
$\Gamma \vdash \tau(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n) = \sigma(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n)$ ⊢

(121.2.a) By hypothesis:
(A) $\tau(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n) =_{df} \sigma(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n)$ is a definition-by-$=$
(B) $\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n$ are substitutable for $\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n$, respectively, in $\sigma$
(C) $\varphi$ contains one or more occurrences of $\tau(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n)$
(D) $\varphi'$ is the result of replacing zero or more occurrences of $\tau(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n)$ in $\varphi$ by $\sigma(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n)$
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Now assume:

(E) $\Gamma \vdash \sigma(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n)\downarrow$

(F) $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$

(A), (B), and (E) imply, by the Rule of Identity by Definition (121.1), that:

(G) $\Gamma \vdash \tau(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n) = \sigma(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n)$

Then by (C), (D), and Rule $\equiv$ (111), it follows from (G) and (F) that:

$\Gamma \vdash \varphi'$

(121.2.b) By hypothesis:

(A) $\tau(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n) =_{df} \sigma(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n)$ is a definition-by-$=$

(B) $\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n$ are substitutable for $\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n$, respectively, in $\sigma$

(C) $\varphi$ contains one or more occurrences of $\sigma(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n)$

(D) $\varphi'$ is the result of replacing zero or more occurrences of $\sigma(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n)$ in $\varphi$

by $\tau(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n)$

Now assume:

(E) $\Gamma \vdash \sigma(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n)\downarrow$

(F) $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$

(A), (B), and (E) imply, by the Rule of Identity by Definition (121.1), that:

(G) $\Gamma \vdash \tau(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n) = \sigma(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n)$

Now note independently that since (108.1) is a theorem, we know:

$\vdash \tau(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n) = \sigma(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n) \rightarrow \tau(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n)\downarrow$

It follows from this last fact by (64.10) that:

(H) $\tau(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n) = \sigma(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n) \vdash \tau(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n)\downarrow$

Hence, from (G), and (H), it follows by (64.8) that the significance of the definien-
dum is derivable from $\Gamma$, i.e., that:

(I) $\Gamma \vdash \tau(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n)\downarrow$

But note independently that it is a theorem that identity is symmetric (118.2),
i.e., that $\vdash \alpha = \beta \rightarrow \beta = \alpha$. So two applications of GEN:

(J) $\vdash \forall \alpha \forall \beta (\alpha = \beta \rightarrow \beta = \alpha)$
From (J), it follows by (64.3) that:

\[(K) \quad \Gamma \vdash \forall \alpha \forall \beta (\alpha = \beta \rightarrow \beta = \alpha)\]

But by (E) and (I), we know that the significance of the terms \(\tau(t_1, \ldots, t_n)\) and \(\sigma(t_1, \ldots, t_n)\) is derivable from \(\Gamma\). So by two applications of Rule \(\forall\)E (94.1), it follows from (K) that:

\[(L) \quad \Gamma \vdash \tau(t_1, \ldots, t_n) = \sigma(t_1, \ldots, t_n) \rightarrow \sigma(t_1, \ldots, t_n) = \tau(t_1, \ldots, t_n)\]

So from (L) and (G), it follows by (64.5) that:

\[(M) \quad \Gamma \vdash \tau(t_1, \ldots, t_n) = \sigma(t_1, \ldots, t_n) \rightarrow \sigma(t_1, \ldots, t_n) = \tau(t_1, \ldots, t_n)\]

Then by Rule \(\beta\)E (111), it follows from (F) and (M) that:

\[\Gamma \vdash \phi^\prime \]

\((122.1)\) Consider any term \(\tau\) in which \(\beta\) doesn’t occur free. \((\rightarrow)\) Assume \(\tau \downarrow\). Then by Rule \(\exists\)I (119.1), \(\tau = \tau\). Now let \(\phi\) be \(\beta = \tau\). Note that since \(\beta\) doesn’t occur free in \(\tau\), \(\phi\) has just one free occurrence of \(\beta\), namely, the initial occurrence. So \(\tau = \tau\) has the form \(\phi^\tau_\beta\). Note also that \(\tau\) is substitutable for \(\beta\) in \(\phi\). And since \(\tau \downarrow\), all the conditions for applying Rule \(\exists\)I (102.1) are met. So we can infer \(\exists \beta \phi\) from \(\phi^\tau_\beta\), i.e., infer \(\exists \beta (\beta = \tau)\) from \(\tau = \tau\).

\((\leftarrow)\) Assume \(\exists \beta (\beta = \tau)\). Now suppose \(\sigma\) is an arbitrary such entity, so that we know \(\sigma = \tau\); formally, \(\sigma\) is a fresh, primitive constant of the same type as \(\beta\) that hasn’t previously appeared in \(\beta = \tau\), or \(\tau \downarrow\), or in any axioms in \(\Lambda\).\(^{380}\) Then by (108.2), it follows that \(\tau \downarrow\). Since we have reached \(\tau \downarrow\) from \(\sigma = \tau\) and the conditions of Rule \(\exists\)E (103) are met, we may use Rule \(\exists\)E to conclude that we have derived \(\tau \downarrow\) from our assumption \(\exists \beta (\beta = \tau)\).

\((122.2)\) By hypothesis, \(\tau\) is substitutable for \(\alpha\) in \(\phi\) and \(\beta\) doesn’t occur free in \(\tau\). Now, for conditional proof, assume \(\forall \alpha \phi\) to show \(\exists \beta (\beta = \tau) \rightarrow \phi^\tau_\alpha\). And for a nested conditional proof, assume \(\exists \beta (\beta = \tau)\), to show \(\phi^\tau_\alpha\). From our second assumption (given our hypothesis that \(\beta\) doesn’t occur free in \(\tau\)), it follows from the right-to-left direction of the previous theorem (122.1) that \(\tau \downarrow\). Hence, from our first assumption and this last result (given our hypothesis that \(\tau\) is substitutable for \(\alpha\) in \(\phi\)), it follows by axiom (39.1) that \(\phi^\tau_\alpha\). \(\Rightarrow\)

\((122.3)\) From (122.1) and axiom (39.2). \(\Rightarrow\)

\(^{380}\)Without the proviso that \(\beta\) doesn’t occur free in \(\tau\), the assumption that \(\sigma\) is an arbitrary witness to \(\exists \beta (\beta = \tau)\) yields only the knowledge that \(\sigma = \tau^\beta_\tau\). And this fact doesn’t allow us to conclude \(\tau \downarrow\); it only yields \(\tau^\beta_\tau \downarrow\). But with the proviso that \(\beta\) doesn’t occur free in \(\tau\), the term \(\tau^\beta_\tau\) is just \(\tau\) itself. So \(\sigma = \tau^\beta_\tau\) is the same expression as \(\sigma = \tau\). This explains why the proviso that \(\beta\) doesn’t occur free in \(\tau\) is essential to the right-to-left direction of this theorem.
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(122.4) From (122.1) and axioms (39.5.a) and (39.5.b). ☐

(124.1.a) Since α is a variable, α ↓ is an instance of axiom (39.2) and, hence, a theorem. By GEN, ∀α α ↓. ☐

(124.1.b) [There are several different ways to prove this theorem. Here is one.] Let α and β be distinct variables of the same type. Since α is a variable, α ↓ is an instance of axiom (39.2). Note that β is substitutable for α in α ↓ and that, since β is a variable distinct from α, it doesn't occur free in α. So, it follows by the left-to-right direction of (122.1) that ∃β (β = α). Hence, by GEN, ∀α ∃β (β = α).

(124.2.a) Since α is a variable, α ↓ is an instance of (39.2). So, by RN (69), □α ↓. ☐

(124.2.b) From (124.1.b), it follows that ∃β (β = α), by Rule ∀E (94.3). Since the derivation was modally strict, it follows by RN (69) that □∃β (β = α). ☐

(124.3.a) Since (124.1.a) is a □-theorem, we may apply RN (69) to obtain □∀α α ↓. ☐

(124.3.b) Since (124.1.b) is a □-theorem, we may apply RN (69) to obtain □∀α ∃β (β = α). ☐

(124.4.a) From (124.2.a), by GEN. ☐

(124.4.b) From (124.2.b), by GEN. ☐

(124.5.a) From the □-theorem (124.4.a), by RN (69). ☐

(124.5.b) From the □-theorem (124.4.b), by RN (69). ☐

(125.1) Apply GEN to theorem (118.1). Since the result is a □-theorem, apply RN. ☐

(125.2) Since (118.1) is a □-theorem, we may apply RN to obtain □(α = α) as a theorem. Hence, by GEN, we have: ∀α □(α = α). ☐

(126.1) Assume α = β, for conditional proof. Since α = α (118.1) is a □-theorem, we know by RN (69) that □α = α. Then by Rule =E (111), it follows that □α = β.

(126.2) Assume τ = σ, for conditional proof. Then by (108.1) and (108.2), we know both τ ↓ and σ ↓. Now since (126.1) is a theorem, it follows by two applications of GEN that:

∀α ∀β (α = β → □α = β)

Hence, by two applications of Rule ∀E (94.1), it follows that τ = σ → □τ = σ. ☐
Suppose \( \beta \) is substitutable for \( \alpha \) in \( \varphi \) and doesn't occur free in \( \varphi \). Then there are two cases.

**Case 1.** \( \beta \) just is \( \alpha \). Then our theorem states \( \varphi \equiv \exists \alpha (\alpha = \alpha \& \varphi_\alpha) \). By hypothesis, \( \beta \), i.e., \( \alpha \), doesn't occur free in \( \varphi \) and so \( \varphi_\alpha = \varphi \). So our theorem states \( \varphi \equiv \exists \alpha (\alpha = \alpha \& \varphi) \). We leave the remainder of the proof as an exercise.

**Case 2.** \( \beta \) and \( \alpha \) are distinct variables of the same type. (\( \rightarrow \)) Assume \( \varphi \), for conditional proof. By definition of substitutions, the formula \( \varphi \) is identical to \( \varphi_\alpha \). Since it is a theorem (118.1) that \( \alpha = \alpha \), we have, by \&I, that \( \alpha = \alpha \& \varphi_\alpha \). Hence, by \( \exists I \), it follows that \( \exists \beta (\beta = \alpha \& \varphi_\beta) \). (\( \leftarrow \)) Assume, for conditional proof:

(\( \delta \)) \( \exists \beta (\beta = \alpha \& \varphi_\beta) \),

Assume \( \tau \) is an arbitrary such entity; formally, the metavariable \( \tau \) takes as its value some new, primitive constant that doesn't appear in (\( \delta \)), that has the same type as the variable that \( \beta \) takes as value, and that is therefore substitutable for \( \beta \) in the matrix of (\( \zeta \)). So we know:

(\( \zeta \)) \( \tau = \alpha \& (\varphi_\alpha)^\tau \)

We may detach the two conjuncts of (\( \zeta \)) by \&E. Since \( \beta \) is substitutable for \( \alpha \) in \( \varphi \) and doesn't occur free in \( \varphi \), and \( \tau \) is substitutable for \( \alpha \) in \( \varphi \), the Re-replacement theorem (98.3) tells us that \((\varphi_\alpha)^\beta = \varphi_\beta^\tau \). So it follows from the right conjunct of (\( \zeta \)) that \( \varphi_\beta^\tau \). But from this latter conclusion and the left conjunct of (\( \zeta \)), it follows by Rule =E (111) that we may substitute \( \alpha \) for every occurrence of \( \tau \) in \( \varphi_\alpha \), to obtain \( (\varphi_\alpha)^\tau \). But, by Re-replacement lemma (98.2), since \( \tau \) is a primitive constant that doesn't appear in \( \varphi \), this is just \( \varphi_\alpha^\tau \), i.e., \( \varphi \). By \( \exists E \) (103), we can discharge (\( \zeta \)) and conclude \( \varphi \). ⌦

(127.2) Assume \( \tau \downarrow \), where \( \tau \) is, by hypothesis, substitutable for \( \alpha \) in \( \varphi \). Now choose any variable of the same type as \( \alpha \), say \( \beta \), that is substitutable for \( \alpha \) in \( \varphi \) and that doesn't occur free in \( \varphi \). Then by applying GEN to (127.1), we know the following applies to \( \varphi \):

(\( \delta \)) \( \forall \alpha (\varphi \equiv \exists \beta (\beta = \alpha \& \varphi_\beta)) \)

Since \( \tau \) is substitutable for \( \alpha \) in \( \varphi \), it is substitutable for \( \alpha \) in the matrix of (\( \delta \)). So since \( \tau \downarrow \), we may instantiate \( \tau \) into \( \forall \alpha \) in (\( \delta \)) by \( \forall E \), to obtain:

\( \varphi_\tau \equiv \exists \beta (\beta = \tau \& \varphi_\beta) \)

But given our choice of \( \beta \), we know that by commuting an appropriate instance of (104.7), the following applies to \( \varphi \):

\( \exists \beta (\beta = \tau \& \varphi_\beta) \equiv \exists \alpha (\alpha = \tau \& \varphi) \)
By biconditional syllogism (90.3.e), it follows that:

\[ \phi \tau \equiv \exists \alpha (\alpha = \tau \& \phi) \]

\(\blacksquare\)

(127.3) Suppose \(\alpha, \beta\) are distinct variables and consider any formula \(\phi\) in which \(\beta\) is substitutable for \(\alpha\) and doesn’t occur free. \((\rightarrow)\) Assume:

\(\zeta\) \(\phi \& \forall \beta (\phi_{\beta}^{\alpha} \rightarrow \beta = \alpha)\)

By theorem (100.2), it suffices to show \(\forall \beta (\phi_{\beta}^{\alpha} \rightarrow \beta = \alpha) \& \forall \beta (\beta = \alpha \rightarrow \phi_{\beta}^{\alpha})\). Since the 1st conjunct is the 2nd conjunct of \((\zeta)\), it remains only to show \(\forall \beta (\beta = \alpha \rightarrow \phi_{\beta}^{\alpha})\). By hypothesis, \(\beta\) doesn’t occur free in \(\phi\) and, hence, doesn’t occur free in our assumption \((\zeta)\). So by GEN, it remains to show \(\beta = \alpha \rightarrow \phi_{\beta}^{\alpha}\). So assume \(\beta = \alpha\), which by the symmetry of identity (118.2), yields \(\alpha = \beta\). Now \((\zeta)\) also implies \(\phi\). Since \(\beta\) is, by hypothesis, substitutable for \(\alpha\) in \(\phi\), it follows by Rule \(\equiv E\) (111) that \(\phi_{\alpha}^{\beta}\). \((\leftarrow)\) Assume:

(\(\delta\)) \(\forall \beta (\phi_{\alpha}^{\beta} \equiv \beta = \alpha)\)

for conditional proof. By &I, it suffices to show:

(a) \(\phi\)

(b) \(\forall \beta (\phi_{\alpha}^{\beta} \rightarrow \beta = \alpha)\)

(a) Since, by hypothesis, \(\beta\) is substitutable for \(\alpha\) in \(\phi\) and isn’t free in \(\phi\), it follows by the Re-replacement lemma (98.1) that \(\alpha\) is substitutable for \(\beta\) in \(\phi_{\beta}^{\alpha}\). Hence \(\alpha\) is substitutable for \(\beta\) in \(\phi_{\beta}^{\alpha} \equiv \beta = \alpha\). So we may, by Rule \(\equiv E\) (94.2), instantiate \(\forall \beta\) in \((\delta)\) to \(\alpha\), and thereby obtain:

\(\forall \beta (\phi_{\alpha}^{\beta} \equiv \beta = \alpha)\)

By the definition of \(\psi_{\beta}^{\alpha}\) (14) extended to include defined formulas of the form \(\psi \equiv \chi\), this becomes:

(\(\xi\)) \(\forall \beta (\phi_{\alpha}^{\beta} \equiv \beta = \alpha)\)

Since the Re-replacement lemma is operative, the left condition of \((\xi)\) is just \(\phi\). By definition of substitutions, the right condition of \((\xi)\) is \(\alpha = \alpha\) (this is obvious, but we leave the strict proof, by way of the cases in the definition of \(=\), as an exercise). Hence, \((\xi)\) resolves to:

\(\phi \equiv \alpha = \alpha\)

But since we know \(\alpha = \alpha\) by (118.1), it follows that \(\phi\), by biconditional syllogism. (b) By (100.2), it follows from \((\delta)\) that:

\(\forall \beta (\phi_{\beta}^{\alpha} \rightarrow \beta = \alpha) \& \forall \beta (\beta = \alpha \rightarrow \phi_{\beta}^{\alpha})\)
Suppose $\alpha, \beta$ are distinct variables of the same type and consider any formula $\varphi$ in which $\beta$ is substitutable for $\alpha$ in $\varphi$ and doesn’t occur free in $\varphi$. We show both directions of the biconditional.

(→) Assume:

\[ \varphi_\beta^\alpha \land \forall \alpha (\varphi \rightarrow \alpha = \beta) \]

Since $\alpha$ doesn’t occur free in $(\zeta)$, it suffices by GEN to show $\varphi \equiv \alpha = \beta$. (→) Assume $\varphi$. Note that from the second conjunct of $(\zeta)$ it follows by the special case of Rule $\forall$E (94.3) that $\varphi \rightarrow \alpha = \beta$. Hence $\alpha = \beta$. (→) Assume $\alpha = \beta$. From this and the first conjunct of $(\zeta)$ it follows by the Rule $=\text{E}$ (111) that $(\varphi_\alpha^\beta)'$, where $(\varphi_\alpha^\beta)'$ is the result of replacing zero or more occurrences of $\beta$ in $\varphi_\alpha^\beta$ by $\alpha$.

Since this includes the special case where we replace all the occurrences of $\beta$ in $\varphi_\alpha^\beta$ by $\alpha$, i.e., $(\varphi_\alpha^\beta)_\beta^\alpha$. But by hypothesis, $\beta$ is substitutable for $\alpha$ in $\varphi$ and doesn’t occur free in $\varphi$. So the Re-replacement Lemma (98.1) applies and $(\varphi_\alpha^\beta)_\beta^\alpha$ just is $\varphi$.

(←) Assume $\forall \alpha (\varphi \equiv \alpha = \beta)$. Then since $\beta$ is substitutable for $\alpha$ in $\varphi$, we can instantiate $\beta$ into the universal claim to obtain $\varphi_\alpha^\beta \equiv \beta = \tau$. Since $\beta = \tau$ is a theorem, it follows that $\varphi_\alpha^\beta$. So it remains to show $\forall \alpha (\varphi \rightarrow \alpha = \beta)$, which is left as an exercise. \[\Box\]

(129) Assume $\exists ! \alpha \varphi$, where (by hypothesis) $\beta$ and $\gamma$ are variables that don’t occur free, and are substitutable for $\alpha$, in $\varphi$. Then by definition of the uniqueness quantifier (128.2) and Rule $\equiv \text{df}E$ of Definiendum Elimination (91.2), $\exists ! \alpha \beta (\varphi_\alpha^\beta \equiv \beta = \alpha)$. Suppose $\tau$ is such an $\alpha$, i.e., let $\tau$ be an arbitrarily chosen, primitive constant of the same type as $\alpha$ and assume:

\[ \forall \beta (\varphi_\alpha^\beta \equiv \beta = \tau) \]

By hypothesis, $\gamma$ also doesn’t occur free, and is substitutable for $\alpha$, in $\varphi$. So we want to show:

\[ \forall \beta \forall \gamma ((\varphi_\alpha^\beta \land \varphi_\alpha^\gamma) \rightarrow \beta = \gamma) \]

Since neither $\beta$ nor $\gamma$ occur free in any assumption, it suffices, by two applications of GEN, to show:

\[ (\varphi_\alpha^\beta \land \varphi_\alpha^\gamma) \rightarrow \beta = \gamma \]

So assume both $\varphi_\alpha^\beta$ and $\varphi_\alpha^\gamma$. From these assumptions, it follows from $(\delta)$ by (94.3) and (94.2), respectively, that $\beta = \tau$ and $\gamma = \tau$. We know $\beta \downarrow$ and $\gamma \downarrow$ by (39.2), and we also know $\tau \downarrow$ by hypothesis and (39.2), since $\tau$ is an arbitrarily chosen, primitive constant and thus not introduced by a definition. (The significance of these terms is also implied by the identities just established, by
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(108.1) and (108.2). So, by the symmetry of identity, \( \gamma = \tau \) implies \( \tau = \gamma \) and, by the transitivity of identity, it follows that \( \beta = \gamma \).

(130) Assume:

(a) \( \forall \alpha (\varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi) \)

(b) \( \exists ! \alpha \varphi \)

Now pick \( \beta \) to be a variable that doesn't occur free, and is substitutable for \( \alpha \), in \( \varphi \). Then from (b), it follows by definition (128.1) of the uniqueness quantifier and our Rule \( \equiv \text{df} \) of Definiendum Elimination (91.2) that:

(8) \( \exists \alpha (\varphi \& \forall \beta (\varphi^\beta_\alpha \rightarrow \beta = \alpha)) \)

So suppose \( \tau \) is an arbitrary such entity, i.e., suppose:

(\( \xi \)) \( \varphi^\tau_\alpha \& \forall \beta (\varphi^\beta_\alpha \rightarrow \beta = \tau) \),

where \( \tau \) is an arbitrarily chosen constant of the same type as \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \). Now to show \( \exists ! \alpha \Box \varphi \), we have to show, by definition (128.1) and Rule \( \equiv \text{df} \) I of Definiendum Introduction (91.3), that \( \exists ! \alpha (\Box \varphi \& \forall \beta (\Box \varphi^\beta_\alpha \rightarrow \beta = \alpha)) \). By \( \exists ! \), it suffices to show that \( \tau \) is a witness to this claim, i.e., show both that \( \tau \downarrow \) and that \( \tau \) is substitutable for \( \alpha \) in the matrix of (a). Hence, by Rule \( \forall \text{E} \) and MP, \( \Box \varphi^\tau_\alpha \) is jointly implied by (a) and the first conjunct of (\( \xi \)). To show the second conjunct, it suffices by \( \text{GEN} \) to show \( \Box \varphi^\beta_\alpha \rightarrow \beta = \tau \). So assume \( \Box \varphi^\beta_\alpha \). Then, by the T schema (45.2), we have \( \varphi^\beta_\alpha \). But from this and the second conjunct of (\( \xi \)), it follows that \( \beta = \tau \). This conclusion remains once we discharge (\( \xi \)) by \( \exists \text{E} \).

(131) Assume, for conditional proof, \( \therefore (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \). From this and axiom (44.2), it follows that \( \therefore \Box \varphi \rightarrow \Box \psi \), by biconditional syllogism.

(132) The T schema \( \Box \varphi \rightarrow \varphi \) (45.2) is an axiom, and so are its closures. Hence, \( \therefore (\varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi) \) is an axiom. So by the previous theorem (131), \( \therefore \Box \varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi \). However, as an instance of axiom (46.2), we know \( \Box \varphi \equiv \therefore \Box \varphi \), from which it follows, by the definition of \( \equiv \) (18.3) and &\( \text{E} \) (87.2.a), that \( \Box \varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi \). So by hypothetical syllogism, \( \Box \varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi \).

(133.1) By applying the definition of \( \equiv \) (18.3) to axiom (44.4) and then detaching the second conjunct by &\( \text{E} \) (87.2.b), we know:

(\( \zeta \)) \( \therefore \Box \varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi \)

Independently, by analogous reasoning, we may infer from axiom (44.2) that its right-to-left direction holds, but let us express this direction with different Greek metavariables so as to avoid clash of variables later:
Now consider the instance of the above schema in which we let $\chi$ be the formula $\forall \phi$ and let $\theta$ be the formula $\phi$:

$$(\xi) \ (\forall \phi \rightarrow \forall \phi) \rightarrow \forall (\forall \phi \rightarrow \phi)$$

It then follows from $(\xi)$ and $(\xi)$ that $\forall (\forall \phi \rightarrow \phi)$. ⊨

(133.2) By applying the definition of $\equiv$ (18.3) to axiom (44.4) and then detaching the first conjunct by &E (87.2.a), we know:

$$(\zeta) \ \forall \phi \rightarrow \forall \phi$$

As in the previous theorem, we independently know the right-to-left direction of axiom (44.2) holds and we again express this with different Greek metavariables, to avoid clash of variables later:

$$(\forall \chi \rightarrow \forall \theta) \rightarrow \forall (\chi \rightarrow \theta)$$

Now consider the following instance of the above schema, in which we let $\chi$ be the formula $\forall \phi$ and let $\theta$ be the formula $\forall \phi$:

$$(\xi) \ (\forall \phi \rightarrow \forall \phi) \rightarrow \forall (\forall \phi \rightarrow \forall \phi)$$

It then follows from $(\zeta)$ and $(\xi)$ that $\forall (\forall \phi \rightarrow \forall \phi)$. ⊨

(133.3) The principle of Adjunction (86.5) is $\phi \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow (\phi \& \psi))$. Since this is a $\square$-theorem, we may apply RN to obtain:

$$(c) \ \square (\phi \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow (\phi \& \psi)))$$

Now theorem (132) is that $\square \chi \rightarrow \forall \chi$, so it follows from (c) that:

$$(d) \ \forall (\phi \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow (\phi \& \psi)))$$

Then by theorem (131), (d) implies:

$$(e) \ \forall \phi \rightarrow \forall (\psi \rightarrow (\phi \& \psi))$$

Now if we consider only the consequent of (e), then we know, independently and by the same distribution law, that it obeys the principle:

$$(f) \ \forall (\psi \rightarrow (\phi \& \psi)) \rightarrow (\forall \psi \rightarrow \forall (\phi \& \psi))$$

It now follows from (e) and (f) by hypothetical syllogism that:

$$(g) \ \forall \phi \rightarrow (\forall \psi \rightarrow \forall (\phi \& \psi))$$

From (g), it follows by Importation (89.7.b) that $(\forall \phi \& \forall \psi) \rightarrow \forall (\phi \& \psi)$. ⊨

(133.4) To avoid clash of variables, we may rewrite (133.3) as:
(ζ) A((Aϕ → ϕ) & (ϕ → Aϕ)) → A(Aϕ ≡ ϕ)

Hence, the following actualization of the above is a theorem:
A(Aϕ ≡ ϕ)

But from (ζ) and this last result, it follows that:

A(Aϕ ≡ ϕ)

(134.1) Theorem (133.4) is:
(θ) A(Aϕ ≡ ϕ)

But as an instance of the left-to-right direction of axiom (44.4), we know:

381In particular, the Rules of Definiendum Elimination (91.2) and Definiendum Introduction (91.3) don’t permit the intersubstitution of definiens and definiendum when one or the other occurs as a proper subformula. Once we prove the special case (160.2) of the Rule of Substitution, however, we will be able to substitute definiendum and definiens for one another whenever one occurs as a proper subformula within some formula.
(ξ) $\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{A}q \equiv q) \rightarrow \mathcal{A}\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{A}q \equiv q)$

So from (θ) and (ξ), it follows that:

(ζ) $\mathcal{A}\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{A}q \equiv q)$

If $\mathcal{A}...\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{A}q \equiv q)$ is simply $\mathcal{A}\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{A}q \equiv q)$, then we’re done. Otherwise, repeat the above of reasoning starting with (ζ) to conclude:

$\mathcal{A}\mathcal{A}\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{A}q \equiv q)$

And so on, as many times as needed to obtain the finite initial string of actuality operators in $\mathcal{A}...\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{A}q \equiv q)$. ♦

(134.2) – (134.4) (Exercises) [Note: The proofs are outlined in the text.]

(135) Suppose $\Gamma \vdash q$, i.e., that there is a derivation of $q$ from $\Gamma$. We show by induction on the length of the derivation that $\mathcal{A}\Gamma \vdash \mathcal{A}q$, i.e., that there is a derivation of $\mathcal{A}q$ from $\mathcal{A}\Gamma$.

**Base Case.** If $n = 1$, then the derivation of $q$ from $\Gamma$ consists of a single formula, namely, $q$ itself. So, by the definition of $\Gamma \vdash q$, $q$ must be in $\Lambda \cup \Gamma$. So we have two cases: (A) $q$ is in $\Lambda$ or (B) $q$ is in $\Gamma$.

**Case A:** $q \in \Lambda$. Then $q$ is an axiom. So either (i) $q$ is a necessary axiom or (ii) $q$ is an instance of (43)*. 382 If (i), then the actualization of $q$, i.e., $\mathcal{A}q$, is an axiom, by the fact that we took all the closures of necessary axioms as axioms. So $\vdash \mathcal{A}q$ by (64.1) and $\mathcal{A}\Gamma \vdash \mathcal{A}q$ by (64.3). If (ii), then, as stipulated in (43)*, $q$ is either (a) $\mathcal{A}\psi \equiv \psi$, for some formula $\psi$, or (b) a universal closure of $\mathcal{A}\psi \equiv \psi$. (a) If $q$ is $\mathcal{A}\psi \equiv \psi$, then by (134.4), $\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{A}\psi \equiv \psi)$ is a theorem, i.e., $\vdash \mathcal{A}q$. So $\mathcal{A}\Gamma \vdash \mathcal{A}q$ by (64.3). (b) If $q$ is a universal closure of $\mathcal{A}\psi \equiv \psi$, then by theorem (134.4), $\mathcal{A}q$ is a theorem. So again, by (64.3), $\mathcal{A}\Gamma \vdash \mathcal{A}q$.

**Case B:** $q \in \Gamma$. Then $\mathcal{A}q$ is in $\mathcal{A}\Gamma$, by the definition of $\mathcal{A}\Gamma$. Hence by (64.2), it follows that $\mathcal{A}\Gamma \vdash \mathcal{A}q$.

**Inductive Case.** Suppose that the derivation of $q$ from $\Gamma$ is a sequence $S$ of length $n$, where $n > 1$. Then either $q \in \Lambda \cup \Gamma$ or $q$ follows by MP from two previous members of the sequence, namely, $\psi \rightarrow q$ and $\psi$. If $q \in \Lambda \cup \Gamma$, then using the reasoning in the base case, it follows that $\mathcal{A}\Gamma \vdash \mathcal{A}q$. If $q$ follows from previous members $\psi \rightarrow q$ and $\psi$ by MP, then by the definition of a derivation, we know both that $\Gamma \vdash \psi \rightarrow q$ and $\Gamma \vdash \psi$, where these are sequences of less than $n$. Since our IH is that the theorem holds for all such derivations of length less than $n$, it follows that:

382Note that case (ii), which would apply to any other modally fragile axiom that may have been added to the system, should be omitted when the present proof is converted to a proof of the $\vdash \Box$ form of Rule RA, which asserts that if $\Gamma \vdash \Box q$, then $\mathcal{A}\Gamma \vdash \mathcal{A}q$. 
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(a) $\vdash \Gamma \vdash \Delta(\psi \rightarrow \varphi)$

(b) $\vdash \Delta \psi$

Now since (44.2) is an axiom, we know:

$\vdash \Delta(\psi \rightarrow \varphi) \equiv (\Delta \psi \rightarrow \Delta \varphi)$

By definition (18.3), this is just:

$\vdash (\Delta(\psi \rightarrow \varphi) \rightarrow (\Delta \psi \rightarrow \Delta \varphi)) \& ((\Delta \psi \rightarrow \Delta \varphi) \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \varphi))$

So by &E (87.2.a), it follows that:

$\vdash \Delta(\psi \rightarrow \varphi) \rightarrow (\Delta \psi \rightarrow \Delta \varphi)$

It follows from this by (64.3) that:

$\vdash \Delta(\psi \rightarrow \varphi) \rightarrow (\Delta \psi \rightarrow \Delta \varphi)$

So by (64.5), it follows from this and (a) that:

$\vdash \Delta \psi \rightarrow \Delta \varphi$

And again by (64.5), it follows from this and (b) that:

$\vdash \Delta \varphi$

(137) Assume $\vdash \varphi$. We show, by induction on the length of any proof of $\varphi$ that $\vdash \Box \varphi$, i.e., that there is a modally strict proof of $\Box \varphi$.

**Base Case.** $n = 1$. Then the proof of $\varphi$ consists of a single formula, namely, $\varphi$ itself. So by the definition of $\vdash \varphi$, $\varphi$ must be an axiom in $\Lambda$. So we have two cases: (A) $\varphi$ is a necessary axiom (i.e., $\varphi \in \Lambda_\Box$), or (B) $\varphi$ is an instance of axiom (43)$\star$ or a universal closure of such an instance.

Case A: $\varphi \in \Lambda_\Box$. Then by (64.1), it follows that $\vdash \Box \varphi$. So by the $\vdash$ version of RA (135), which we didn’t explicitly formulate given the convention in (68), it follows that $\vdash \Box \Delta \varphi$.383

Case B: $\varphi$ is an instance of (43)$\star$ or a universal closure of such an instance. If $\varphi$ is an instance of (43)$\star$, then $\varphi$ has the form $\Delta \psi \equiv \psi$, for some formula $\psi$. Then by theorem (133.4), we know that $\vdash (\Delta \psi \equiv \psi)$ is a modally strict theorem, i.e., that $\vdash (\Delta \psi \equiv \psi)$, i.e., that $\vdash \Delta \varphi$. If $\varphi$ is a universal closure of an instance of (43)$\star$, then by (134.4), we again know that $\vdash \Delta \varphi$.

383Alternatively, from $\vdash \Box \varphi$, it follows by (the official form of) RN (69) that $\vdash \Box \Box \varphi$, which then implies $\vdash \Delta \varphi$, by the fact that (132), i.e., $\Box \varphi \rightarrow \Delta \varphi$, is a modally strict theorem.
**Inductive case.** If the proof of $\varphi$ is a sequence of length $n$, where $n > 1$, then either $\varphi \in \Lambda$ or $\varphi$ follows from two previous members of the sequence, namely, $\psi$ and $\psi \to \varphi$, by MP. If $\varphi \in \Lambda$, then using the same reasoning as in the base case, $\vdash \lambda \psi$. If $\varphi$ follows from previous members $\psi \to \varphi$ and $\psi$, then by the definition of a proof, we know both $\vdash \psi$ and $\vdash \psi \to \varphi$. Then our Inductive Hypothesis implies:

\begin{enumerate}[(IH1)]
    \item If $\vdash \psi$, then $\vdash \lambda \psi$
    \item If $\vdash \psi \to \varphi$, then $\vdash \lambda (\psi \to \varphi)$
\end{enumerate}

Since we’ve established the antecedents of both IH1 and IH2, we know, respectively, that:

\begin{enumerate}[(a)]
    \item $\vdash \lambda \psi$
    \item $\vdash \lambda (\psi \to \varphi)$
\end{enumerate}

But since (131) is a theorem, we know:

\begin{enumerate}[(c)]
    \item $\vdash \lambda (\psi \to \varphi) \to (\lambda \psi \to \lambda \varphi)$
\end{enumerate}

So it follows from (c) and (c) by (64.5) that $\vdash \lambda \psi \to \lambda \varphi$. And from this last fact and (d), it follows by (64.5) that $\vdash \lambda \varphi$. □

\[(138.1)\] Axiom (43)★ is $\lambda \varphi \equiv \varphi$. So it follows by a tautology for biconditionals (89.4.b) that $\neg \lambda \varphi \equiv \neg \varphi$. □

\[(138.2)\] If we substitute $\neg \varphi$ for $\varphi$ on both sides of (138.1)★, we obtain the following instance: $\neg \lambda \neg \varphi \equiv \neg \varphi$. But it is a tautology that $\neg \neg \varphi \equiv \varphi$, by (89.3.b) and (89.2.e). So by a biconditional syllogism (90.3.e), it follows that $\neg \lambda \neg \varphi \equiv \varphi$. □

\[(139.1)\] As an instance of the tautology (84), we know $\lambda \varphi \lor \neg \lambda \varphi$. So we reason cases (87.4.a) from the two disjuncts. If $\lambda \varphi$, then by $\lor I$ (87.3.a), $\lambda \varphi \lor \lambda \neg \varphi$. If $\neg \lambda \varphi$, then by axiom (44.1), it follows that $\lambda \neg \varphi$. So by $\lor I$ (87.3.b), $\lambda \varphi \lor \lambda \neg \varphi$. Hence, $\lambda \varphi \lor \lambda \neg \varphi$. □

\[(139.2)\] By theorem (133.3), $\lambda$ and the definition of $\equiv$, it suffices to show just the left-to-right direction. ($\to$) A tautology of conjunction simplification (86.1) is $(\varphi \& \psi) \to \varphi$. By the Rule of Actualization (135), it follows that $\lambda ((\varphi \& \psi) \to \varphi)$. So by theorem (131), we may infer:

\begin{enumerate}[(a)]
    \item $\lambda ((\varphi \& \psi) \to \varphi)$
\end{enumerate}

By analogous reasoning from the other tautology of conjunction simplification (86.2), i.e., $(\varphi \& \psi) \to \psi$, we may similarly infer:

\begin{enumerate}[(b)]
    \item $\lambda ((\varphi \& \psi) \to \varphi)$
\end{enumerate}
Now for conditional proof, assume \(A(\varphi & \psi)\). Then from (a) and (b), respectively, we may conclude both \(A\varphi\) and \(A\psi\). So by &I, \(A\varphi & A\psi\). ⊲

**Proof of Theorem 139.3** As an instance of (139.2), we have:

(\(\delta\)) \(A((\varphi \rightarrow \psi) & (\psi \rightarrow \varphi)) \equiv (A(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) & A(\psi \rightarrow \varphi))\)

Note that we can’t immediately infer the desired conclusion that \(A(\varphi \equiv \psi) \equiv (A(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) & A(\psi \rightarrow \varphi))\), since we can’t substitute a definiendum for a definiens when the latter occurs as a subformula. But we can reason as follows. Given definition (18.3) and the Rule of Definition by Equivalence (73), we know the following are theorems:

\[
(\varphi \equiv \psi) \rightarrow ((\varphi \rightarrow \psi) & (\psi \rightarrow \varphi))
\]

\[
((\varphi \rightarrow \psi) & (\psi \rightarrow \varphi)) \rightarrow (\varphi \equiv \psi)
\]

Hence by applying the Rule of Actualization to these theorems:

\[
A((\varphi \equiv \psi) \rightarrow ((\varphi \rightarrow \psi) & (\psi \rightarrow \varphi)))
\]

\[
A(((\varphi \rightarrow \psi) & (\psi \rightarrow \varphi)) \rightarrow (\varphi \equiv \psi))
\]

So by (131), we may infer from these two theorems, respectively:

\[
A(\varphi \equiv \psi) \rightarrow A((\varphi \rightarrow \psi) & (\psi \rightarrow \varphi))
\]

\[
A((\varphi \rightarrow \psi) & (\psi \rightarrow \varphi)) \rightarrow A(\varphi \equiv \psi)
\]

By combining these two results by &I and applying the definition of \(\equiv\), it follows that:

\[
A(\varphi \equiv \psi) \equiv A((\varphi \rightarrow \psi) & (\psi \rightarrow \varphi))
\]

From this last result and (\(\delta\)), it follows by biconditional syllogism that:

\[
A(\varphi \equiv \psi) \equiv (A(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) & A(\psi \rightarrow \varphi))
\]

**Proof of Theorem 139.4** (\(\rightarrow\)) By theorem (131), we know:

(a) \(A(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (A\varphi \rightarrow A\psi)\)

(b) \(A(\psi \rightarrow \varphi) \rightarrow (A\psi \rightarrow A\varphi)\)

So by Double Composition (89.8.d), we may conjoin the antecedents of (a) and (b) into a single conjunctive antecedent and conjoin the consequents of (a) and (b) into a single conjunctive consequent, to obtain:

(\(\delta\)) \((A(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) & A(\psi \rightarrow \varphi)) \rightarrow ((A\varphi \rightarrow A\psi) & (A\psi \rightarrow A\varphi))\)
By definition of \( \equiv \), we independently know:

\[
(\xi) \ ((\varnothing \varphi \rightarrow \varnothing \psi) \& (\varnothing \psi \rightarrow \varnothing \varphi)) \rightarrow (\varnothing \varphi \equiv \varnothing \psi)
\]

So by hypothetical syllogism from \((\xi)\) and \((\xi)\), it follows that:

\[
(\varnothing (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \& \varnothing (\psi \rightarrow \varphi)) \rightarrow (\varnothing \varphi \equiv \varnothing \psi)
\]

\(\leftarrow\) Assume \( \varnothing \varphi \equiv \varnothing \psi \), for conditional proof. Then, by definition of \( \equiv \) and \&E, it follows that \( \varnothing \varphi \rightarrow \varnothing \psi \) and \( \varnothing \psi \rightarrow \varnothing \varphi \). But by the right-to-left direction of axiom (44.2), the first implies \( \varnothing (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \) and the second implies \( \varnothing (\psi \rightarrow \varphi) \). So by \&I, we are done. \(\triangleright\)

(139.5) \(\rightarrow\) By biconditional syllogism (90.3.e) from theorems (139.3) and (139.4). \(\triangleright\)

(139.6) \(\rightarrow\) This direction is just axiom (46.1). \(\leftarrow\) This direction is an instance of the T schema. \(\triangleright\)

(139.7) Assume \( \varnothing \Box \varphi \). Then by the right-to-left direction of axiom (46.2), it follows that \( \Box \varphi \). So by (132), it follows that \( \varnothing \varphi \). But then by (46.1), it follows that \( \Box \varnothing \varphi \). \(\triangleright\)

(139.8) Assume \( \Box \varphi \). From this and axiom (46.2), it follows by biconditional syllogism that \( \varnothing \Box \varphi \). From this latter and theorem (139.7), it follows that \( \Box \varnothing \varphi \). \(\triangleright\)

(139.9) \(\rightarrow\) Assume \( \varnothing (\varphi \lor \psi) \), for conditional proof. But now assume, for reductio, \( \neg (\varnothing \varphi \lor \varnothing \psi) \). Then by a De Morgan’s Law (89.5.d), it follows that \( \neg \varnothing \varphi \& \neg \varnothing \psi \). By \&E, we have both \( \neg \varnothing \varphi \) and \( \neg \varnothing \psi \). These imply, respectively, by axiom (44.1), that \( \varnothing \neg \varphi \) and \( \varnothing \neg \psi \). We may conjoin these by \&I to produce \( \varnothing \neg \varphi \& \varnothing \neg \psi \), and by an appropriate instance of theorem (139.2), namely, \( \varnothing (\neg \varphi \& \neg \psi) \equiv \varnothing \neg \varphi \& \varnothing \neg \psi \), it follows by biconditional syllogism that:

\[
(a) \ \varnothing (\neg \varphi \& \neg \psi)
\]

Now, independently, by the commutativity of \( \equiv \) (89.2.e), we may transform an instance of De Morgan’s law (89.5.d) to obtain \( \neg (\varphi \& \neg \psi) \equiv \neg (\varphi \lor \psi) \) as a theorem. So we may apply the Rule of Actualization to this instance to obtain:

\[
(b) \ \varnothing (\neg \varphi \& \neg \psi) \equiv \neg (\varphi \lor \psi)
\]

Hence, from (b) it follows by an appropriate instance of (139.5) that:

\[
(c) \ \varnothing (\neg \varphi \& \neg \psi) \equiv \varnothing \neg (\varphi \lor \psi)
\]

From (a) and (c), it follows by biconditional syllogism that \( \varnothing \neg (\varphi \lor \psi) \). But by axiom (44.1), it follows that \( \neg \varnothing (\varphi \lor \psi) \), which contradicts our initial assumption. Hence, we may conclude by reductio (RAA) version (88.3) that \( \varnothing \varphi \lor \varnothing \psi \).

\(\leftarrow\) Exercise. \(\triangleright\)

(139.10) We first prove some preliminary lemmas:
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\( (8) \quad \neg \forall x \alpha \neg \varphi \equiv \neg \forall x \alpha \neg \varphi \)

Proof. As an instance of axiom (44.3), we know \( \forall x (\alpha \neg \varphi \equiv \neg \forall x \alpha \neg \varphi ) \).

So by the tautology (89.4.b), \( \neg \forall x (\alpha \neg \varphi \equiv \neg \forall x \alpha \neg \varphi ) \).

\( (\xi) \quad \neg \forall x \alpha \neg \varphi \equiv \neg \forall x \neg \varphi \)

Proof. We know \( \forall x (\alpha \neg \varphi \equiv \neg \alpha \neg \varphi ) \), since it is a closure of axiom (44.1). So by a theorem of quantification theory (100.3), it follows that \( \forall x (\alpha \neg \varphi \equiv \neg \forall x \alpha \neg \varphi ) \).

Hence by our tautology (89.4.b), \( \neg \forall x (\alpha \neg \varphi \equiv \neg \forall x \alpha \neg \varphi ) \).

With these two lemmas, we may reason as follows. By Rule \( \equiv \)Df (91.1), the biconditional derived from definition (18.3) is a theorem. So by Rule RA, it follows that \( \forall x (\alpha \neg \varphi \equiv \neg \forall x \alpha \neg \varphi ) \).

By the left-to-right direction of (139.5), it follows that \( \forall x (\alpha \neg \varphi \equiv \neg \forall x \alpha \neg \varphi ) \).

We may therefore reason from this result by biconditional chaining as follows:

\[ \begin{align*}
\forall x (\alpha \neg \varphi & \equiv \neg \forall x \alpha \neg \varphi \\
& \equiv \neg \forall x (\neg \alpha \neg \varphi) \quad \text{by axiom (44.1)} \\
& \equiv \neg \forall x (\neg \alpha \neg \varphi) \quad \text{by (8)} \\
& \equiv \neg \forall x (\neg \varphi) \quad \text{by (xi)} \\
& \equiv \exists x \neg \varphi \quad \text{by definition of } \exists
\end{align*} \]

\( (139.11) \quad (\rightarrow) \) Assume \( \forall x (\alpha \neg \varphi \equiv \psi ) \). Then by axiom (44.3), it follows that \( \forall x (\alpha \neg \varphi \equiv \psi ) \).

So by Rule \( \forall E \) (94.3), \( \forall x (\alpha \neg \varphi \equiv \psi ) \).

By the left-to-right direction of (139.5), it follows that \( \forall x (\alpha \neg \varphi \equiv \psi ) \).

But since we’ve reached this result from an assumption in which \( \alpha \) doesn’t occur free, we may apply GEN and conclude \( \forall x (\alpha \neg \varphi \equiv \psi ) \).

Hence by our tautology (89.4.b), \( \neg \exists x \neg \varphi \equiv \neg \forall x (\alpha \neg \varphi \equiv \psi ) \).

\( (140) \quad \) Let \( \varphi \) be any formula in which \( \beta \) is substitutable for \( \alpha \) and doesn’t occur free in \( \varphi \). We prove both directions of the biconditional. (\( \rightarrow \)) Assume \( \forall x (\alpha \beta \equiv \beta = \alpha ) \).

Now independently apply GEN to axiom (43) to obtain \( \forall x (\alpha \beta \equiv \beta = \alpha ) \).

Since \( \beta \) is substitutable for \( \alpha \) in \( \varphi \) and doesn’t occur free in \( \varphi \), it follows by (100.13), that \( \forall x (\beta \equiv \beta = \alpha ) \), i.e., \( \forall x (\beta \equiv \beta = \alpha ) \).

And from this result and our assumption it follows by (100.10) that \( \forall x (\beta \equiv \beta = \alpha ) \).

(\( \leftarrow \)) By analogous reasoning.

\( (141) \quad \) Consider any \( \varphi \) in which \( z \) is substitutable for \( x \) and doesn’t occur free.

By axiom (47), we know \( x = 1 x \varphi \equiv \forall z (z(\varphi x^z x) = z = x) \).

But by our previous theorem (140), we know that \( \forall x (z(\varphi x^z x) = z = x) \equiv \forall x (z(\varphi x^z x) = z = x) \).

Hence, by biconditional syllogism, it follows that \( x = 1 x \varphi \equiv \forall z (z(\varphi x^z x) = z = x) \).

\( \therefore \)
Consider any \( \varphi \) in which \( z \) is substitutable for \( x \) and doesn't occur free.

Then by the fundamental theorem (141) for descriptions, we know:

\[
(\vartheta) \quad x = \text{ix}\varphi \equiv \forall z (\varphi^z_x \equiv z = x)
\]

But, given our hypothesis that \( z \) is substitutable for \( x \) in \( \varphi \) and doesn't occur free in \( \varphi \), we have as an instance of (127.3) that:

\[
(\varphi \land \forall z (\varphi^z_x \rightarrow z = x)) \equiv \forall z (\varphi^z_x \equiv z = x)
\]

From this last claim, it follows by the commutativity of \( \equiv \) (89.2.e) that:

\[
(\xi) \quad \forall z (\varphi^z_x \equiv z = x) \equiv (\varphi \land \forall z (\varphi^z_x \rightarrow z = x))
\]

So by biconditional syllogism (90.3.e) from (\( \vartheta \)) and (\( \xi \)) it follows that:

\[
x = \text{ix}\varphi \equiv (\varphi \land \forall z (\varphi^z_x \rightarrow z = x))
\]

By hypothesis, we know (a) \( \psi \) is either an exemplification formula \( \Pi^n \kappa_1 \ldots \kappa_n \) \((n \geq 1)\) or an encoding formula \( \kappa_1 \ldots \kappa_n \Pi^n \), (b) \( x \) occurs in \( \psi \) and only as one or more of the \( \kappa_i \) \((1 \leq i \leq n)\), and (c) \( z \) is substitutable for \( x \) in \( \varphi \) and doesn't appear free in \( \varphi \). We want to show:

\[
(a) \quad \psi^{x\varphi}_x \equiv \exists y (\varphi \land \forall z (\varphi^z_x \rightarrow z = x) \land \psi)
\]

Our strategy will be to use Hintikka's schema (142). Since \( z \) is substitutable for \( x \) in \( \varphi \) and doesn't appear free in \( \varphi \), we know that Hintikka's schema applies to \( \varphi \), so that we have:

\[
x = \text{ix}\varphi \equiv (\varphi \land \forall z (\varphi^z_x \rightarrow z = x))
\]

By GEN, it follows that:

\[
(b) \quad \forall x (x = \text{ix}\varphi \equiv (\varphi \land \forall z (\varphi^z_x \rightarrow z = x)))
\]

(b) will be used in proving both directions of (a).

(\( \rightarrow \)) Assume:

\[
(c) \quad \psi^{x\varphi}_x
\]

for conditional proof. Since \( \psi \) is, by hypothesis, an exemplification or encoding formula, it follows from (c) by axiom (39.5.a) and (39.5.b) that \( \text{ix}\varphi \downarrow \). So, where \( y \) is some variable that doesn't occur free in \( \text{ix}\varphi \), it follows by (122.1) that:

\[
(d) \quad \exists y (y = \text{ix}\varphi)
\]

Assume that \( a \) is an arbitrary such object, so that we know \( a = \text{ix}\varphi \). If we instantiate (b) to \( a \) by Rule \( \forall E \) (94.2), we obtain:
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\[ a = \exists x \phi \equiv \phi^a_x \land \forall z (\phi^z_x \to z = a) \]

So by biconditional syllogism, it follows that:

(e) \[ \phi^a_x \land \forall z (\phi^z_x \to z = a) \]

Note independently that we’ve established the symmetry of identity for objects (118, 2), so that by GEN, we know \( \forall x \forall y (x = y \to y = x) \). In this universal claim, we may instantiate \( \forall x \) to \( a \) and, given that we already know \( \exists x \phi \downarrow \), instantiate \( \forall y \) to \( \exists x \phi \), thereby inferring from the assumption that \( a = \exists x \phi \) that \( \exists x \phi = a \). From this and (c) it follows by Rule =E (111) that \( \psi^x \) (i.e., the result of substituting \( a \) for all the occurrences of \( \exists x \phi \) in \( \psi^x \)). Conjoining this last result with (e) by &I we obtain:

\[ \phi^a_x \land \forall z (\phi^z_x \to z = a) \land \psi^a_x \]

Hence, by \( \exists \), our desired conclusion follows:

\[ \exists x (\phi \land \forall z (\phi^z_x \to z = x) \land \psi) \]

Since we’ve inferred this conclusion from the assumption that \( a = \exists x \phi \), where \( a \) is arbitrary, we may discharge the assumption to reach our conclusion from (d), by \( \exists \)E (103).

(\( \leftarrow \)) Assume, for conditional proof:

(f) \[ \exists x (\phi \land \forall z (\phi^z_x \to z = x) \land \psi) \]

Assume \( b \) is an arbitrary such object, so that we know:

(g) \[ \phi^b_x \land \forall z (\phi^z_x \to z = b) \land \psi^b_x \]

By instantiating \( b \) into (b), we have:

(h) \[ b = \exists x \phi \equiv \phi^b_x \land \forall z (\phi^z_x \to z = b) \]

If we now detach the first two conjuncts of (g) from the third conjunct by one application of &E, we have both:

(i) \[ \phi^b_x \land \forall z (\phi^z_x \to z = b) \]

(j) \[ \psi^b_x \]

From (i) and (h) it follows by biconditional syllogism that:

(k) \[ b = \exists x \phi \]

From (k) and (j), it follows by Rule =E (111) that \( \psi^x \). Thus, we may discharge (g) to reach this same conclusion from (f) by \( \exists \)E (103).
(144.1) ★ (→) Assume $ix\varphi \downarrow$. Then by the left-to-right direction of (122.1), $\exists y(y = ix\varphi)$, where $y$ is some variable that doesn’t occur free in $\varphi$. Suppose $a$ is such an object, so that we know $a = ix\varphi$. Now, independently, if we apply GEN to Hintikka’s schema (142)★ and instantiate the resulting universal claim to the constant $a$, we know, by Rule $\forall E$ (94.2), that $a = ix\varphi \equiv q_0^x \& \forall z(q_0^x \rightarrow z = a)$, where $z$ is some variable that is substitutable for $x$ in $\varphi$ and that doesn’t occur free in $\varphi$. So it follows by biconditional syllogism that $q_0^x \& \forall z(q_0^x \rightarrow z = a)$. Hence, by $\exists I$, it follows that $\exists x(\varphi \& \forall z(q_0^x \rightarrow z = x))$. Given our choice of $z$, it follows by definition of the uniqueness quantifier (128.1) that $\exists !x\varphi$. This last conclusion remains once we discharge our assumption about $a$ by $\exists E$. (←) Use analogous reasoning in the reverse direction. ★

(144.2) ★ (Exercise)

(145.1) ★ Assume $x = ix\varphi$. Now pick a variable, say $z$, that is substitutable for $x$ in $\varphi$. Then by Hintikka’s schema (142)★, it follows that $\varphi \& \forall z(q_0^x \rightarrow z = x)$. A fortiori, $\varphi$. ★

(145.2) ★ By hypothesis, $z$ is substitutable for $x$ in $\varphi$. If we apply GEN to the previous theorem (145.1)★, it is a theorem that:

$(\delta) \quad \forall x(x = ix\varphi \rightarrow \varphi)$

Since $z$ is substitutable for $x$ in $\varphi$, it follows from the definition of substitutable for (15) that $z$ is substitutable for $x$ in the formula $x = ix\varphi \rightarrow \varphi$. Since $z$ is a variable and substitutable for $x$ in the matrix of $(\delta)$, we may instantiate it into $(\delta)$, by Rule $\forall E$ (94.2), to infer $(x = ix\varphi \rightarrow \varphi)_z$. It then follows from the definition of $\psi_z^x$ (14) that $(x = ix\varphi \rightarrow \varphi)_z$ just is $z = ix\varphi \rightarrow \varphi_z$. (exercise). ★

(145.3) ★ By hypothesis, $ix\varphi$ is substitutable for $x$ in $\varphi$. Assume, for conditional proof, $ix\varphi \downarrow$. Now we saw, in the proof of the previous theorem, that the following is a ★-theorem:

$(\delta) \quad \forall x(x = ix\varphi \rightarrow \varphi)$

Since $ix\varphi$ is, by hypothesis, substitutable for $x$ in $\varphi$, it must be substitutable for $x$ in $x = ix\varphi \rightarrow \varphi$. Hence the conditions for applying Rule $\forall E$ (94.1) obtain and we may conclude from $(\delta)$ that $(x = ix\varphi \rightarrow \varphi)_z^x$, i.e., $ix\varphi = ix\varphi \rightarrow \varphi_z$. But our assumption $ix\varphi \downarrow$ also implies, by Rule =$I$ (119), that $ix\varphi = ix\varphi$. Hence, $\varphi_z^x$. ★

(145.4) ★ (Exercise)

384 Note that $(ix\varphi)_z^x$ is just $ix\varphi$, since any free occurrences of $x$ in $\varphi$ become bound in $ix\varphi$.
385 If no free variable in $ix\varphi$ is captured when $ix\varphi$ is substituted for all the free occurrences of $x$ in $\varphi$, then since the initial occurrence of $x$ in $x = ix\varphi \rightarrow \varphi$ doesn’t fall under the scope of any quantifiers, no free variable in $ix\varphi$ is captured when $ix\varphi$ is substituted for all the free occurrences of $x$ in $x = ix\varphi \rightarrow \varphi$. 
Let \( \varphi \) be any formula in which \( \beta \) is substitutable for \( \alpha \) and doesn’t occur free. Axiom (44.3) is \( s\varphi \equiv s\varphi \) and by the commutativity of \( \equiv \), \( s\varphi \equiv s\varphi \) is also a theorem. By GEN, it follows, respectively, that \( \forall \alpha (\varphi \equiv s\varphi) \) and \( \forall \alpha (\varphi \equiv s\varphi) \) are also theorems. Given our hypothesis about \( \beta \), the following alphabetic variants of our last two theorems are also theorems, respectively, by (100.13): 
\[
\forall \beta \left((A\varphi \equiv AA\varphi)\beta \equiv \alpha\right)
\]
and
\[
\forall \beta \left((AA\varphi \equiv A\varphi)\beta \equiv \alpha\right).
\]
By the definition of substitution (14), it follows from these last two theorems, respectively, that:

\[
(\xi) \; \forall \beta (\varphi^\beta \equiv s\varphi^\beta)
\]

\[
(\zeta) \; \forall \beta (s\varphi^\beta \equiv \varphi^\beta)
\]

Using these two facts, we now prove both directions of our biconditional.

(\rightarrow) Assume \( \forall \beta (\varphi^\beta \equiv \beta = \alpha) \). From (\zeta) and this assumption, it follows that \( \forall \beta (s\varphi^\beta \equiv \beta = \alpha) \), by (100.10). (\leftarrow) Assume \( \forall \beta (s\varphi^\beta \equiv \beta = \alpha) \). From (\xi) and this assumption, it follows that \( \forall \beta (\varphi^\beta \equiv \beta = \alpha) \), also by (100.10).

(147.1) We may reason as follows, where \( z \) is chosen to be some variable substitutable for \( x \) in \( \varphi \):

\[
x = ix \varphi \equiv \forall z (ax \varphi^z \equiv z = x) \quad \text{by axiom (47)}
\]

\[
\equiv \forall z (sax \varphi^z \equiv z = x) \quad \text{by theorem (146)}
\]

\[
x = ix \varphi \quad \text{by axiom (47)}
\]

(147.2) Assume \( ix \varphi \downarrow \). Note independently that it follows from the previous theorem (147.1) by GEN that \( \forall x (x = ix \varphi \equiv x = ix \varphi) \). Note also (exercise) that \( ix \varphi \) is substitutable for \( x \) in the matrix of this last universal claim. Hence, by Rule \( \forall E \) (94.1), we may infer \( ix \varphi = ix \varphi \equiv ix \varphi = ix \varphi \). Moreover, given our assumption, it follows by Rule \( \equiv I \) (119) that \( ix \varphi = ix \varphi \). Hence \( ix \varphi = ix \varphi \).

(148) Suppose \( z \) is substitutable for \( x \) and doesn’t occur free in \( \varphi \). Then by the axiom governing descriptions (47) we know:

(\delta) \( x = ix \varphi \equiv \forall z (ax \varphi^z \equiv z = x) \)

But, given our hypothesis that \( z \) is substitutable for \( x \) in \( \varphi \) and doesn’t occur free in \( \varphi \), we have as an instance of (127.3) that:

\[
(s \varphi \& \forall z (ax \varphi^z \rightarrow z = x)) \equiv \forall z (ax \varphi^z \equiv z = x)
\]

From this last claim, it follows by the commutativity of \( \equiv \) (89.2.e) that:

(\xi) \( \forall z (ax \varphi^z \equiv z = x) \equiv (s \varphi \& \forall z (ax \varphi^z \rightarrow z = x)) \)

So by biconditional syllogism (90.3.e) from (\delta) and (\xi) it follows that:

\[
x = ix \varphi \equiv (s \varphi \& \forall z (ax \varphi^z \rightarrow z = x))
\]
(149.1) Assume $\forall x (\varphi \equiv \psi)$. Then by the left-to-right direction of (139.11), we know:

$(\delta) \ \forall x (\exists \varphi \equiv \exists \psi)$

Now we want to show $\forall x (x = \exists \varphi \equiv x = \exists \psi)$. By GEN, it suffices to show $x = \exists \varphi \equiv x = \exists \psi$. $(\rightarrow)$ Assume $x = \exists \varphi$. Without loss of generality, pick some variable, say $z$, that (a) is substitutable for $x$ in both $\varphi$ and $\psi$ and (b) doesn't occur free in $\varphi$ and $\psi$. Then by the axiom governing descriptions (47), our assumption $x = \exists \varphi$ implies:

$(\xi) \ \forall z (\exists \varphi z \equiv z = x)$

Now we want to show $x = \exists \psi$. Again, by the axiom for descriptions and our choice of $z$, it suffices to show $\forall z (\exists \psi z \equiv z = x)$. And by GEN, it suffices to show $\exists \psi z \rightarrow z = x$. Now since $z$ is, by hypothesis, substitutable for $x$ in both $\varphi$ and $\psi$, it is substitutable for $x$ in $\exists \varphi \equiv \exists \psi$. That is, it is substitutable for $x$ in the matrix of $(\delta)$. Hence, since $z$ is a variable, it follows from $(\delta)$ by Rule $\forall E$ (94.2) that:

$(\exists \varphi \equiv \exists \psi) z$

But, by definition of $\chi z$ (14), the above is just $\exists \varphi z \equiv \exists \psi z$, which by the commutativity of $\equiv$ is equivalent to:

$(\zeta) \ \exists \psi z \equiv \exists \varphi z$

Now by Rule $\forall E$ (94.3), $(\xi)$ implies $\exists \varphi z \equiv z = x$. But by biconditional syllogism from $(\zeta)$ and this last result, it follows that $\exists \psi z \equiv z = x$, which is all that it remained to show. $(\leftarrow)$ By analogous reasoning. $\ast$

(149.2) Assume both $\exists \varphi \downarrow$ and $\forall x (\varphi \equiv \psi)$. From our second assumption, it follows, by (149.1), that:

$\forall x (x = \exists \varphi \equiv x = \exists \psi)$

But from the assumption $\exists \varphi \downarrow$ and the fact (exercise) that $\exists \varphi$ is substitutable for $x$ in the matrix of this last claim, it follows by Rule $\forall E$ (94.1) that:

$\exists \varphi = \exists \varphi \equiv \exists \varphi = \exists \psi$

But it also follows from our first assumption that $\exists \varphi = \exists \varphi$, by Rule $=I$ (119). Hence $\exists \psi = \psi$. $\ast$

(149.3) Assume both $\exists \varphi \downarrow$ and $\forall x (\varphi \equiv \psi)$. From our second assumption, it follows from (132) that $\forall x (\varphi \equiv \psi)$. Hence $\exists \varphi = \exists \psi$, by (149.2). $\ast$

(149.4) (Exercise)
(149.5) Assume $ix\varphi \downarrow$ and that the variable $y$ doesn’t occur free in $\varphi$. Note independently that as an instance of theorem (125.2), we know $\forall z \Box (z = z)$. Since $ix\varphi$ is substitutable for $z$ in the matrix of this universal claim, we can apply Rule $\forall E$ (94.1) and conclude $\Box ix\varphi = ix\varphi$. From this last fact, the assumption that $ix\varphi \downarrow$, and the fact that $y$ doesn’t occur free in $\varphi$, it follows by Rule $\exists I$ (102.1) that $\exists y \Box (y = ix\varphi)$. ⊲

(150.1) Assume $\forall x (\varphi \equiv \psi)$. Then by the logic of actuality (43), we know $A \forall x (\varphi \equiv \psi)$. So by (149.1), it follows that $\forall x (x = ix\varphi \equiv x = ix\psi)$. ⊲

(150.2) Assume both $ix\varphi \downarrow$ and $\forall x (\varphi \equiv \psi)$. Then by the logic of actuality (43), the second assumption implies $A \forall x (\varphi \equiv \psi)$. From this, it follows by (149.1):

$(\vartheta) \quad \forall x (x = ix\varphi \equiv x = ix\psi)$

By now familiar reasoning, it follows that $ix\varphi = ix\varphi \equiv ix\varphi = ix\psi$, and hence, $ix\varphi = ix\psi$. ⊲

(151) For both directions, follow the proof of (143), but instead of appealing to (142), appeal to the modally-strict version of Hintikka’s schema (148) and reason with respect to $\forall \varphi$ instead of $\varphi$. ⊲

(152.1) $\rightarrow$ Assume $ix\varphi \downarrow$. Then by the left-to-right direction of an appropriate instance of (122.1), $\exists y (y = ix\varphi)$, where $y$ is some variable that doesn’t occur free in $\varphi$. Suppose $a$ is such an object, so that we know $a = ix\varphi$. Now, independently, if we apply GEN to the axiom governing descriptions (47) and instantiate the resulting universal claim to the constant $a$, we know, by Rule $\forall E$ (94.2):

$$a = ix\varphi \equiv \forall z (a \varphi \equiv z = a)$$

where $z$ is some variable that is substitutable for $x$ in $\varphi$ and that doesn’t occur free in $\varphi$. So it follows by biconditional syllogism that $\forall z (a \varphi \equiv z = a)$. Hence, by $\exists I$, it follows that $\exists z \forall z (a \varphi \equiv z = x)$. Given our choice of $z$, it follows by definition of the uniqueness quantifier (128.2) that $\exists ! x a \varphi$. This last conclusion remains once we discharge our assumption about $a$ by $\exists E$. $(\leftarrow)$ Use analogous reasoning in the reverse direction. ⊲

(152.2) Assume $x = ix\varphi$. Then, for some variable, say $z$, that is substitutable for $x$ in $\varphi$ and that doesn’t occur free in $\varphi$, we know, by the modally strict version of Hintikka’s schema (148), that $\forall \varphi \& \forall z (a \varphi \equiv z = x)$. A fortiori, $a \varphi$. ⊲

(152.3) Suppose $z$ is substitutable for $x$ in $\varphi$. By applying GEN to theorem (152.2), we know it is a theorem that:

$(\vartheta) \quad \forall x (x = ix\varphi \rightarrow a \varphi)$
Since $z$ is, by hypothesis, substitutable for $x$ in $\varphi$, it is substitutable for $x$ in the formula $x = ix\varphi \rightarrow sl\varphi$. Since $z$ is a variable substitutable for $x$ in the matrix of (5), we may instantiate it into (5), by Rule $\forall E$ (94.2), to conclude $z = ix\varphi \rightarrow sl\varphi^z$. ⊢

(152.4) Assume $ix\varphi \downarrow$. Note independently that it follows by GEN from (152.2) that:

(5) $\forall x(x = ix\varphi \rightarrow sl\varphi)$

Since $ix\varphi$ is, by hypothesis, substitutable for $x$ in $\varphi$, it must be substitutable for $x$ in $x = ix\varphi \rightarrow sl\varphi$. Hence the conditions for applying Rule $\forall E$ (94.1) obtain and we may conclude from (5) that $ix\varphi = ix\varphi \rightarrow sl\varphi^z$. But our assumption $ix\varphi \downarrow$ also implies, by Rule $=I$ (119), that $ix\varphi = ix\varphi$. Hence, $sl\varphi^z$. ⊢

(152.5) Assume $ix\varphi = ix\psi$. By (108.1) and (108.2), respectively, it follows that $ix\varphi \downarrow$ and $ix\psi \downarrow$. So, instantiating these terms into (118.2), we therefore know $ix\psi = ix\varphi$. Hence $sl\psi \equiv sl\varphi$. So by (139.5), $sl(q \equiv \psi)$. Since $x$ isn’t free in our assumption, it follows by GEN that $\forall xsl(q \equiv \psi)$. Hence by axiom (44.3), $sl\forall x(q \equiv \psi)$. ⊢

(153.1) Assume $\exists ! x \Box \varphi$, where $y$ doesn’t occur free in $\varphi$ and is substitutable for $x$ in $\varphi$. By Rule $=\forall E$ of Definiendum Elimination (91.2), it follows from definition (128.1) that:

(5) $\exists x(\Box \varphi \& \forall z(\Box q^z \rightarrow z = x))$

Suppose $b$ is an arbitrary such object, i.e., that:

(5) $\Box q^b_x \& \forall z(\Box q^z \rightarrow z = b)$

where $z$ is some variable that is substitutable for $x$ in $\varphi$ and that doesn’t occur free in $\varphi$. Now we want to show that $\forall y(y = ix\varphi \rightarrow q^y_x)$. But it suffices by GEN to show $y = ix\varphi \rightarrow q^y_x$. So assume $y = ix\varphi$. If we apply GEN to the modally strict version of Hintikka’s Schema (148) and instantiate the result to the variable $y$, then $y = ix\varphi$ implies:

(5) $slq^y_x \& \forall z(slq^z_x \rightarrow z = y)$

If we now instantiate $b$ into the second conjunct of (5), we obtain $slq^b_x \rightarrow b = y$. But the first conjunct of (5) implies, by theorem (132), that $slq^b_x$. So $b = y$. But the first conjunct of (5) also implies $q^b_x$, by the T schema (45.2). Hence, by Rule $=E$, $q^b_x$. Since this is what remained to show that $\forall y(y = ix\varphi \rightarrow q^y_x)$, we’ve derived the latter from (5). Hence, by $\exists E$, we’ve derived $\forall y(y = ix\varphi \rightarrow q^y_x)$ from (5) and, thus, from our initial assumption. ⊢
Assume \( \forall x (\varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi) \) and \( \exists! x \varphi \). Then by (130), it follows that \( \exists! x \Box \varphi \). But then by (153.1), we may conclude \( \forall y (y = \check{x} \varphi \rightarrow \varphi_y) \). \( \Box \)

Assume \( \nu \varphi \downarrow \). Then by the Variant of Rule \( =\Gamma (119.1) \), it follows that \( \nu \varphi = \nu \varphi \). By definition (16.4), (16.5) and the ensuing discussion in (16), we know that since \( \nu \varphi \) and \( \nu \varphi' \) are alphabetically-variant terms, then \( \nu \varphi = \nu \varphi \) and \( \nu \varphi = \nu \varphi' \) are alphabetically variant formulas. So it follows by the Rule of Alphabetic Variants (115) that \( \nu \varphi = (\nu \varphi)' \). \( \Box \)

(Exercise)

We prove only the stronger form, since the weaker form follows trivially by (63.1). Assume \( \Gamma \vdash \Box \varphi \rightarrow \psi \), i.e., that there is a modally-strict derivation of \( \varphi \rightarrow \psi \) from \( \Gamma \). Then the conditions of the strong form of RN are met and we may apply RN to conclude \( \Box \Gamma \vdash (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \). Since instances of the K schema are necessary axioms, we know \( \vdash \Box \varphi \rightarrow (\Box \varphi \rightarrow \Box \psi) \), by (64.1). So \( \vdash \Gamma \vdash (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (\Box \varphi \rightarrow \Box \psi) \), by (64.3), and by (64.6), it follows that \( \vdash \Gamma \vdash (\Box \varphi \rightarrow \Box \psi) \). \( \Box \)

We prove only the stronger form, since the weaker form follows trivially by (63.1). Assume \( \Gamma \vdash \Box \varphi \rightarrow \psi \), i.e., that there is a modally-strict derivation of \( \varphi \rightarrow \psi \) from \( \Gamma \). Since the metarules of contraposition (81) apply generally to all derivations, they apply to modally-strict derivations, and so it follows by (81.1) that \( \Gamma \vdash \Box \psi \rightarrow \Box \varphi \). Hence by Rule RM (157.1), it follows that \( \Box \Gamma \vdash \Box \Box \neg \varphi \rightarrow \Box \Box \neg \psi \). So, again by our metarule of contraposition (81.1), it follows that:

\[
\Box \Gamma \vdash \Box \Box \neg \varphi \rightarrow \Box \Box \neg \psi
\]

Now by the definition of \( \Diamond \) and the \( \vdash \Box \) form of the Rule of Definition by Equivalence (73), we independently know:

\[
\Box \Gamma \vdash \Box \Box \neg \psi \rightarrow \Diamond \psi
\]

Hence it follows from this last result and (8) by a corollary (77.1) to the Deduction Theorem that:

\[
\Box \Gamma \vdash \Box \Box \neg \varphi \rightarrow \Diamond \psi
\]

Moreover, again by the definition of \( \Diamond \) and Rule of Definition by Equivalence, we independently know:

\[
\Box \Gamma \vdash \Diamond \varphi \rightarrow \Box \Box \neg \varphi
\]

Recall that though the Rule of Definition by Equivalence (73) was formulated for \( \vdash \), it also holds for \( \vdash \Box \); we omitted the statement of the rule for \( \vdash \Box \) by convention (68).
From this last result and \((\xi)\), it follows by the same corollary \((77.1)\) to the Deduction Theorem that \(\Box \Gamma \vdash \Box \phi \rightarrow \Box \psi\). \(\Rightarrow\)

\((157.3)\) Assume \(\Gamma \vdash \Box \phi \equiv \psi\). Then, by the definition of \(\equiv\) and the \(\vdash\) form of Rule \(\equiv_E\) of Definiendum Elimination \((91.2)\):

\[\Gamma \vdash (\phi \rightarrow \psi) \& (\psi \rightarrow \phi)\]

So by two applications of Rule \&E, we have both:

\[\Gamma \vdash \phi \rightarrow \psi\]
\[\Gamma \vdash \psi \rightarrow \phi\]

By applying Rule RM \((157.1)\) to each, we have:

\[\Gamma \vdash \Box \phi \rightarrow \Box \psi\]
\[\Gamma \vdash \Box \psi \rightarrow \Box \phi\]

Hence, by Rule \&I:

\[\Gamma \vdash (\Box \phi \rightarrow \Box \psi) \& (\Box \psi \rightarrow \Box \phi)\]

So by the Rule of Definiendum Introduction \((91.3)\):

\[\Box \Gamma \vdash \Box \phi \equiv \Box \psi\] \(\Rightarrow\)

\((157.4)\) (Exercise)

\((158.1)\) By the first axiom \((38.1)\) governing conditionals, we have \(\phi \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \phi)\). Since this is a \(\Box\)-theorem, we may apply RM \((157.1)\) to conclude \(\Box \phi \rightarrow \Box (\psi \rightarrow \phi)\). \(\Rightarrow\)

\((158.2)\) Since the tautology \((78.3)\), i.e., \(\neg \phi \rightarrow (\phi \rightarrow \psi)\), is a modally strict theorem, it follows by RM \((157.1)\) that \(\Box \neg \phi \rightarrow \Box (\phi \rightarrow \psi)\). \(\Rightarrow\)

\((158.3)\) \((\rightarrow)\) A tautology of conjunction simplification \((86.1)\) is \((\phi \& \psi) \rightarrow \phi\). Since this is a \(\Box\)-theorem, we may apply RM \((157.1)\) to obtain:

\[(a) \Box (\phi \& \psi) \rightarrow \Box \phi\]

By analogous reasoning from \((\phi \& \psi) \rightarrow \psi\) \((86.2)\), we obtain:

\[(b) \Box (\phi \& \psi) \rightarrow \Box \psi\]

Assume \(\Box (\phi \& \psi)\) for conditional proof. Then from \(a\) and \(b\), respectively, we may infer \(\Box \phi\) and \(\Box \psi\). Hence by \&I, \(\Box \phi \& \Box \psi\). \((\rightarrow)\) The principle of Adjunction \((86.5)\) is \(\phi \rightarrow (\psi \to (\phi \& \psi))\). Since this is a \(\Box\)-theorem, we may apply RM \((157.1)\) to obtain:
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(c) □φ → □(ψ → (φ & ψ))

The consequent of (c) can be used to form an instance of K (45.1):

(d) □(ψ → (φ & ψ)) → (□ψ → □(φ & ψ))

By hypothetical syllogism (77.3), if follows from (c) and (d) that □φ → (□ψ → □(φ & ψ)). Then by Importation (89.7.b), it follows that (□φ & □ψ) → □(φ & ψ).

(158.4) As an instance of (158.3), we have:

(δ) □((ψ → ϕ) & (ϕ → φ)) ≡ (□(ψ → ϕ) & □(φ → ϕ))

Independently, we know, by the ⊢ form of Rule ≡Df (91.1) of Equivalence by Definition, that the following is a modally strict theorem, given the definition of ≡:

(φ ≡ ψ) ≡ ((φ → ψ) & (ψ → φ))

So by Rule RE (157.3):

(ξ) □(φ ≡ ψ) ≡ □((φ → ψ) & (ψ → φ))

But then it follows from (ξ) and (δ) by biconditional syllogism that:

□(φ ≡ ψ) ≡ (□(φ → ψ) & □(ψ → φ))

(158.5) The following are both instances of the K axiom (45.1):

□(φ → ψ) → (□φ → □ψ)

□(ψ → φ) → (□ψ → □φ)

So by Double Composition (89.8.d), we may conjoin the two antecedents into a single conjunctive antecedent and conjoin the two consequents into a single conjunctive consequent, to obtain:

(□(φ → ψ) & □(ψ → φ)) → ((□φ → □ψ) & (□ψ → □φ))

But by the Rule of Definition by Equivalence (73) and the definition of ≡, we know:

((□φ → □ψ) & (□ψ → □φ)) → (□φ ≡ □ψ)

So by hypothetical syllogism:

□(φ → ψ) & □(ψ → φ) → □φ ≡ □ψ
(158.6) Theorem (158.4) is $\Box(\varphi \equiv \psi) \equiv (\Box(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \& \Box(\psi \rightarrow \varphi))$. From this, it follows, by the definition of $\equiv$ and the Rules $\equiv\Delta E$ of Definiendum Elimination (91.2) and $\&E$ (87.2.a) that $\Box(\varphi \equiv \psi) \rightarrow (\Box(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \& \Box(\psi \rightarrow \varphi))$. But from this and (158.5), it follows by hypothetical syllogism (77.3) that $\Box(\varphi \equiv \psi) \rightarrow (\Box(\varphi \equiv \psi))$. But from this and (158.5), it follows by hypothetical syllogism (77.3) that $\Box(\varphi \equiv \psi) \rightarrow (\Box(\varphi \equiv \psi))$.

(158.7) Assume $(\Box \varphi \& \Box \psi) \vee (\Box \neg \varphi \& \Box \neg \psi)$. Then we reason by cases (87.4.a).

Assume $\Box \varphi \& \Box \psi$. Then by $\&E$, both $\Box \varphi$ and $\Box \psi$. From the latter, it follows by (158.1) that $\Box(\varphi \rightarrow \psi)$. From the former, it follows by (158.1) that $\Box(\psi \rightarrow \varphi)$. Hence, by $\&I$, it follows that $\Box(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \& \Box(\psi \rightarrow \varphi)$. This last conclusion and the right-to-left direction of (158.4) jointly imply $\Box(\varphi \equiv \psi)$, by biconditional syllogism.

Now assume $\Box \neg \varphi \& \Box \neg \psi$. By the right-to-left direction of (158.3), it follows that $\Box(\neg \varphi \& \neg \psi)$. Note independently that it is easy to establish, by conditional proof, $\lor I$, and the right-to-left direction of (89.4.g), that $(\neg \varphi \& \neg \psi) \rightarrow (\varphi \equiv \psi)$. Since this is a modally strict theorem, it follows by RM (157.1) that $\Box(\neg \varphi \& \neg \psi) \rightarrow (\Box(\varphi \equiv \psi))$. Since we’ve already established the antecedent, $\Box(\varphi \equiv \psi)$ follows by Modus Ponens.

(158.8) Assume $\Box(\varphi \& \psi)$. From this and (158.3), it follows by $\equiv E$ (90.3.a) that $\Box \varphi \& \Box \psi$. So by (158.7), $\Box(\varphi \equiv \psi)$. ì

(158.9) Assume $\Box(\neg \varphi \& \neg \psi)$. Independently, we leave it as an exercise to prove, using the right-to-left direction of the modally strict theorem (89.4.g) and $\lor I$, that $(\neg \varphi \& \neg \psi) \rightarrow (\varphi \equiv \psi)$ is a modally-strict theorem. Hence by Rule RM it follows that:

$$\Box(\neg \varphi \equiv \neg \psi) \rightarrow (\Box(\varphi \equiv \psi))$$

From this and our assumption, it follows that $\Box(\varphi \equiv \psi)$.

(158.10) Since the tautology $\varphi \equiv \neg \neg \varphi$ (89.3.b) is a $\Box$-theorem, it follows by Rule RE that $\Box \varphi \equiv \Box \neg \neg \varphi$.

(158.11) $(\rightarrow)$ Assume $\neg \Box \varphi$, for conditional proof. We want to show $\Diamond \neg \varphi$. By definition of $\Diamond$ and Rule $\equiv \Delta I$, we have to show $\neg \Box \neg \varphi$. For reductio, assume $\Box \neg \neg \varphi$. From this and (158.10), it follows by biconditional syllogism that $\Box \varphi$, which contradicts our initial assumption. $(\leftarrow)$ Assume $\Diamond \neg \varphi$. Then by definition of $\Diamond$ and Rule $\equiv \Delta I$, $\neg \Box \neg \varphi$. We want to show $\neg \Box \varphi$. So, for reductio, assume $\Box \varphi$. From this and (158.10), it follows by biconditional syllogism that $\Box \neg \neg \varphi$, which is a contradiction.

(158.12) $(\rightarrow)$ Assume $\Box \varphi$. For reductio, assume $\Diamond \neg \varphi$. From this and (158.11), it follows by biconditional syllogism that $\neg \Box \varphi$, which contradicts our initial assumption. $(\leftarrow)$ Assume $\neg \Diamond \neg \varphi$, for conditional proof. For reductio, assume
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(158.13) By the special case of (64.2), we know \( (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \vdash (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \). So by RM\(\diamond\) (157.2), it follows that \( \boxdot (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \vdash \diamond \varphi \rightarrow \diamond \psi \). Hence, by the \( \vdash\) version of the Deduction Theorem (76), it is a modally strict theorem that \( \boxdot (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow \diamond \varphi \rightarrow \diamond \psi \). □

(158.14) By (158.11), it is a \( \square \)-theorem that \( \neg \square \varphi \equiv \diamond \neg \varphi \). Hence, by RE, it follows that \( \neg \neg \square \varphi \equiv \square \neg \neg \varphi \). By the relevant instance of a biconditional tautology (89.4.b), we can negate both sides to obtain: \( \neg \square \neg \neg \varphi \equiv \neg \square \neg \varphi \). But by definition of \( \diamond \) and Rule \( \equiv \text{Df} \) (91.1), we know \( \square \varphi \equiv \neg \square \neg \varphi \). So by biconditional syllogism, it follows that \( \diamond \square \varphi \equiv \square \neg \neg \varphi \). □

(158.15) By simple conditional proofs and the rules for \( \vee \)I (87.3.a) and (87.3.b), we can establish the following \( \square \)-theorems:

\[
\varphi \rightarrow (\varphi \vee \psi) \\
\psi \rightarrow (\varphi \vee \psi)
\]

Hence it follows by Rule RM (157.1) that:

\[
\square \varphi \rightarrow \square (\varphi \vee \psi) \\
\square \psi \rightarrow \square (\varphi \vee \psi)
\]

So by an appropriate instance of the tautology (89.8.c), it follows that \( (\square \varphi \vee \square \psi) \rightarrow \square (\varphi \vee \psi) \). □

(158.16) Assume:

\( (\vartheta) \; \square \varphi \& \diamond \psi \)

Now independently, by (86.5), we know that \( \varphi \rightarrow (\psi \rightarrow (\varphi \& \psi)) \) is a modally strict theorem. So by Rule RM, \( \square \varphi \rightarrow \square (\psi \rightarrow (\varphi \& \psi)) \). So from this last result and the first conjunct of (\( \vartheta \)), \( \square (\psi \rightarrow (\varphi \& \psi)) \). But since this last result was proved by modally strict means, it follows by Rule RM\(\diamond\) (157.2) that \( \diamond \psi \rightarrow \diamond (\varphi \& \psi) \). This result and the second conjunct of (\( \vartheta \)) imply \( \diamond (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \). □

(159.1) Our global assumption is:

\( (\xi) \; \vdash (\psi \equiv \chi) \)

Since instances of the T schema (45.2) are axioms, we know:

\( \vdash (\psi \equiv \chi) \rightarrow (\psi \equiv \chi) \)

by (64.1). From this and our global assumption, it follows by (64.6) that:
We frequently appeal to either $(\xi)$ or $(\delta)$ in establishing the following cases of the consequent of the rule:

(a) Show $\vdash \neg \psi \equiv \neg \chi$. Since instances of (89.4.b) are theorems, we know:

$$\vdash \psi \equiv \chi \equiv \neg \psi \equiv \neg \chi$$

From this and $(\delta)$, it follows by biconditional syllogism (90.3.a) that:

$$\vdash \neg \psi \equiv \neg \chi$$

(b) Show $\vdash (\psi \to \theta) \equiv (\chi \to \theta)$. Note that since instances of (89.4.c) are theorems, we know:

$$\vdash (\psi \equiv \chi) \to ((\psi \to \theta) \equiv (\chi \to \theta))$$

From this and $(\delta)$, it follows by (64.6) that $\vdash (\psi \to \theta) \equiv (\chi \to \theta)$.

(c) Show $\vdash (\theta \to \psi) \equiv (\theta \to \chi)$. By reasoning analogous to the previous case, but starting with an instance of (89.4.d) instead of (89.4.c).

(d) Show $\vdash \forall \alpha \psi \equiv \forall \alpha \chi$. From $(\delta)$, it follows by GEN that $\vdash \forall \alpha (\psi \equiv \chi)$. But by our proof of (100.3), we know:

$$\vdash \forall \alpha (\psi \equiv \chi) \rightarrow (\forall \alpha \psi \equiv \forall \alpha \chi)$$

Hence it follows by (64.6) that $\vdash \forall \alpha \psi \equiv \forall \alpha \chi$.

(e) Show $\vdash [\lambda \psi] \equiv [\lambda \chi]$. Since the instances of (112.6) are theorems, we know:

$$\vdash (\psi \equiv \chi) \equiv ([\lambda \psi] \equiv [\lambda \chi])$$

From this fact and $(\delta)$, it follows by biconditional syllogism (90.3.a) that

$$\vdash [\lambda \psi] \equiv [\lambda \chi].$$

(f) Show $\vdash \forall \alpha \psi \equiv \forall \alpha \chi$. Our proof of (132) establishes that:

$$\vdash \Box (\psi \equiv \chi) \to \forall \alpha (\psi \equiv \chi)$$

From this and our global assumption $(\xi)$, it follows that:

$$(\xi) \vdash \forall \alpha (\psi \equiv \chi).$$
by (64.6).\footnote{387} But by (139.5), we know that $\sA(\psi \equiv \chi) \equiv (\sA\psi \equiv \sA\chi)$, so that we know:

$$\vdash \sA(\psi \equiv \chi) \equiv (\sA\psi \equiv \sA\chi)$$

Hence it follows that $\vdash \sA\psi \equiv \sA\chi$, by (90.3.a).

(g) Show $\vdash \Box(\psi \equiv \chi)$. By our proof of (158.6), we know:

$$\vdash \Box(\psi \equiv \chi) \rightarrow (\Box\psi \equiv \Box\chi)$$

But it follows from this an our global assumption (ξ) that $\vdash \Box\psi \equiv \Box\chi$, by biconditional syllogism (90.3.a). ⊢

\textbf{(159.2)} Assume:

\[(\sigma) \vdash \Box(\psi \equiv \chi)\]

and let $q'$ be the result of substituting the formula $\chi$ for zero or more occurrences of $\psi$ where the latter is a subformula of $q$. We then show, by induction on the complexity of $q$, that $\vdash q \equiv q'$.

However, we may put aside the following subcases that occur in the base case and the inductive cases:

(ζ) If no occurrences of $\psi$ in $q$ are replaced by $\chi$, then $q' = q$, and we simply have to show $\vdash q \equiv q$. But $q \equiv q$ is theorem (89.3.a).

(ξ) If $\psi$ is a subformula of $q$ because $\psi = q$, then $q' = \chi$ and (σ) becomes $\vdash \Box(q \equiv q')$. Since instances of the T schema (45.2) are axioms, we know $\vdash \Box(q \equiv q') \rightarrow (q \equiv q')$, by (64.1). It follows that $\vdash q \equiv q'$, by (64.6).

Given (ζ) and (ξ), we need to reason only in those cases where (a) $q'$ is the result of substituting $\chi$ for at least one occurrence of $\psi$ in $q$, and (b) $\psi$ is a proper subformula of $q$ (i.e., a subformula of $q$ not identical with $q$).

**Base Case.** By our BNF (4), $q$ is (a) an exemplification formula of the form $\Pi^n\kappa_1\ldots\kappa_n$ ($n \geq 1$) or (b) an encoding formula of the form $\kappa_1\ldots\kappa_n\Pi^n$ ($n \geq 1$) or (c) a 0-place relation constant or variable. In all three cases, $q$ has no proper subformulas and so $\psi$ can’t be a proper subformula of $q$. So these cases are covered by (ζ) and (ξ) above.

\footnote{387} Although we could have established $\vdash \sA(\psi \equiv \chi)$ by citing (σ) and appealing to the modally fragile axiom (43)*, we have refrained from doing so. If we had done so, this rule and the subsequently derivable the Rules of Substitution would have become non-strict metarules, since their justification would depend on an axiom that is modally fragile. Any conclusions drawn using the metarules derived in this manner would be *-theorems. By appealing to (132), we prove the present case without an appeal to any *-theorems.

\footnote{388} Again, (139.5) could have been proved using an appeal to (43)*, but for the reasons given in footnote 387, we are relying on the proof that makes no appeal to *-theorems.
Inductive Case 1. \( \varphi = [\lambda \theta] \). Then \( \varphi' \), i.e., \([\lambda \theta]'\), must be \([\lambda \theta']\). So our IH implies:

If \( \vdash \Box(\psi \equiv \chi) \), then \( \vdash \theta \equiv \theta' \)

It follows from this and (8) that \( \vdash \theta \equiv \theta' \). But from our proof of (112.6), it follows a fortiori that:

\[ \vdash (\theta \equiv \theta') \rightarrow ([\lambda \theta] \equiv [\lambda \theta']) \]

Hence it follows by (64.6) that \( \vdash [\lambda \theta] \equiv [\lambda \theta'] \), i.e., \( \varphi \equiv \varphi' \).

Inductive Case 2. \( \varphi = \neg \theta \). Then \( \varphi' \), i.e., \((\neg \theta)'\) must be \(\neg(\theta')\), which we henceforth write simply as \(\neg \theta'\). Now our IH implies:

If \( \vdash \Box(\psi \equiv \chi) \), then \( \vdash \theta \equiv \theta' \)

So it follows from this and (8) that \( \vdash \theta \equiv \theta' \). Since we’ve proved instances of the tautology (89.4.b), we know:

\[ \vdash (\theta \equiv \theta') \equiv (\neg \theta \equiv \neg \theta') \]

From this and \( \vdash \theta \equiv \theta' \), it follows by biconditional syllogism (90.3.a) that

\[ \vdash \neg \theta \equiv \neg \theta' \]

Inductive Case 3. \( \varphi = \theta \rightarrow \omega \). Then \( \varphi' \), i.e., \((\theta \rightarrow \omega)\), must be \(\theta' \rightarrow \omega'\). Our IHs are:

If \( \vdash \Box(\psi \equiv \chi) \), then \( \vdash \theta \equiv \theta' \)

If \( \vdash \Box(\psi \equiv \chi) \), then \( \vdash \omega \equiv \omega' \)

So it follows from these and (8) that \( \vdash \theta \equiv \theta' \) and \( \vdash \omega \equiv \omega' \). Hence by &I (87.1), it follows that:

(a) \( \vdash (\theta \equiv \theta') \& (\omega \equiv \omega') \)

But one can prove (as an exercise) the tautology:

\[ (((\theta \equiv \theta') \& (\omega \equiv \omega')) \rightarrow ((\theta \rightarrow \omega) \equiv (\theta' \rightarrow \omega')) \]

It therefore follows from the theoremhood of this tautology and (a), by (64.6), that:

\[ \vdash (\theta \rightarrow \omega) \equiv (\theta' \rightarrow \omega') \]

i.e., \( \vdash \varphi \equiv \varphi' \).

Inductive Case 4. \( \varphi = \forall \alpha \theta \). Then \( \varphi' \), i.e., \((\forall \alpha \theta)'\), must be \(\forall \alpha \theta'\). Our IH implies:

If \( \vdash \Box(\psi \equiv \chi) \), then \( \vdash \theta \equiv \theta' \)
So it follows from this and \((\ast)\) that \(\vdash \theta \equiv \theta'\). So by GEN it follows that \(\vdash \forall \alpha (\theta \equiv \theta')\). But by our proof of \((100.3)\), we know:
\[
\vdash \forall \alpha (\theta \equiv \theta') \rightarrow (\forall \alpha \theta \equiv \forall \alpha \theta')
\]
Hence it follows by biconditional syllogism \((90.3.a)\) that \(\vdash \forall \alpha \theta \equiv \forall \alpha \theta'\), i.e., \(\vdash \varphi \equiv \varphi'\).

**Inductive Case 5.** \(\varphi = \exists \theta\). Then \(\varphi'\), i.e., \((\exists \theta)'\) must be \(\exists \theta'\). Our IH implies:

If \(\vdash \Box (\psi \equiv \chi)\), then \(\vdash \theta \equiv \theta'\)

It follows from this and \((\ast)\) that \(\vdash \theta \equiv \theta'\). So by the Rule of Actualization \((135)\), we have \(\vdash \exists \theta (\theta \equiv \theta')\). But since \((139.5)\) is a theorem, we know \(\vdash \exists \theta (\theta \equiv \theta') \equiv (\exists \theta \theta \equiv \exists \theta \theta')\). So by biconditional syllogism \((90.3.a)\), we have \(\vdash \exists \theta \theta \equiv \exists \theta \theta'\), i.e., \(\vdash \varphi \equiv \varphi'\).

**Inductive Case 6.** \(\varphi = \Box \theta\). Then \(\varphi'\), i.e., \((\Box \theta)'\), must be \(\Box \theta'\). Our IH implies:

If \(\vdash \Box (\psi \equiv \chi)\), then \(\vdash \theta \equiv \theta'\)

It follows from this and \((\ast)\) that \(\vdash \theta \equiv \theta'\). Since no \(\star\)-theorems were cited to establish this theorem, it follows by the Rule of Necessitation that \(\vdash \Box (\theta \equiv \theta')\). But by our proof of \((158.6)\), we know:
\[
\vdash \Box (\theta \equiv \theta') \rightarrow (\Box \theta \equiv \Box \theta')
\]
Hence it follows by \((64.6)\) that \(\vdash \Box \theta \equiv \Box \theta'\), i.e., \(\varphi \equiv \varphi'\). \(\blacksquare\)

\((159.3)\) By hypothesis, \(\vdash \Box \psi \equiv \chi\). Then, by RN, \(\vdash \Box (\psi \equiv \chi)\). So, where \(\varphi'\) is the result of substituting the formula \(\chi\) for zero or more occurrences of \(\psi\) where the latter is a subformula of \(\varphi\), it follows by by \((159.2)\) that \(\vdash \varphi \equiv \varphi'\). \(\blacksquare\)

\((159.4)\) By hypothesis, \(\psi \equiv \psiD \chi\). Then by Rule \(\equiv \text{Df} \ (91.1)\) of Equivalence by Definition, the \(\psi \equiv \chi\) is a theorem. So by RN, \(\vdash \Box (\psi \equiv \chi)\) is a theorem. If \(\varphi'\) is the result of substituting \(\psi\) for zero or more occurrences of the \(\chi\) where the latter is a subformula of \(\varphi\), then by \((159.2)\), \(\vdash \varphi \equiv \varphi'\) is a theorem. [NOTE: To justify the \(\vdash \Box \varphi \equiv \varphi'\) of the present rule, we use the \(\vdash \Box \varphi \equiv \varphi'\) form of \((91.1)\), which lets us conclude that \(\vdash \Box \psi \equiv \chi\) from the definition \(\psi \equiv \psiD \chi\). So by the \(\vdash \Box \varphi \equiv \varphi'\) form of \((159.3)\), it follows that \(\vdash \Box \varphi \equiv \varphi'\).] \(\blacksquare\)

\((160.1)\) By hypothesis, \(\vdash \Box \psi \equiv \chi\) and \(\varphi'\) is the result of substituting the formula \(\chi\) for zero or more occurrences of \(\psi\) where the latter is a subformula of \(\varphi\). Then, by \((159.3)\), \(\vdash \varphi \equiv \varphi'\). By the definition of \(\equiv\) and \&E, it follows both that \(\varphi \rightarrow \varphi'\) and \(\varphi' \rightarrow \varphi\). So by \((64.10)\), we know both:

(a) \(\varphi \vdash \varphi'\)

(b) \(\varphi' \vdash \varphi\)
Now we show both directions of the rule. (→) Assume $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$. Then from this and (a) it follows that $\Gamma \vdash \varphi'$, by (64.8). (←) By analogous reasoning from (b).

(160.2) (Exercise)

(164.1) As an instance of theorem (89.3.b), we know $\forall \varphi \equiv \neg\forall \neg \varphi$. Independently, a necessary axiom of actuality (44.1) yields, by the commutativity of $\equiv$, the modally strict theorem $\neg\forall \neg \varphi \equiv \forall \neg \neg \varphi$. Hence, it follows from these two results, by a Rule of Substitution (160.1), that $\forall \varphi \equiv \forall \neg \neg \varphi$. $\vDash$

(164.2) As an instance of axiom (46.2), we know $\Box \neg \varphi \equiv \forall \Box \neg \varphi$. By a classical tautology (89.4.b), it follows that $\neg \Box \neg \varphi \equiv \neg \forall \Box \neg \varphi$. Since $\forall \varphi \equiv \neg \Box \neg \varphi$ follows from definition (18.5) by Rule $\equiv$ Df (91.1), it follows from the last two results that $\forall \varphi \equiv \neg \forall \Box \neg \varphi$, by biconditional syllogism. But as an instance of necessary axiom (44.1), we know $\neg \forall \Box \neg \varphi \equiv \neg \Box \neg \neg \varphi$. So again by biconditional syllogism, $\forall \varphi \equiv \neg \Box \neg \varphi$. But since $\forall \varphi \equiv \neg \Box \neg \varphi$ is a modally strict equivalence arising from a definition, it follows by a Rule of Substitution (160.2) that $\forall \varphi \equiv \forall \Box \neg \varphi$. $\vDash$

(164.3) As an instance of (132), we know $\Box \neg \varphi \rightarrow \forall \Box \neg \varphi$. So by contraposition, $\neg \forall \Box \neg \varphi \rightarrow \neg \Box \neg \varphi$. But by (164.1), we know $\forall \varphi \rightarrow \neg \forall \Box \neg \varphi$. So by biconditional syllogism, $\forall \varphi \rightarrow \neg \Box \neg \varphi$. But since $\neg \Box \neg \varphi \rightarrow \forall \varphi$, by definition of $\forall$ and the Rule of Definition by Equivalence (73), it follows that $\forall \varphi \rightarrow \forall \Box \neg \varphi$. $\vDash$

(164.4) (→) This is an instance of the the T$\Diamond$ schema (163.1). (←) Assume $\Diamond \forall \varphi$. Then by definition of $\Diamond$, we know $\neg \Box \neg \varphi$. But by commuting (44.1), we know $\neg \forall \Box \neg \varphi \equiv \forall \neg \Box \neg \varphi$. Hence, $\Box \neg \varphi$, which contradicts (5). $\vDash$

(164.5) By the right-to-left direction of (164.4), we know $\Diamond \forall \varphi \rightarrow \forall \Box \varphi$. Independently, by (164.3) we know $\forall \varphi \rightarrow \forall \Box \varphi$. And independently, by (164.2), we know $\Diamond \varphi \rightarrow \forall \Box \varphi$. Hence by hypothetical syllogism, $\Diamond \forall \varphi \rightarrow \forall \Box \varphi$. $\vDash$

(162.1) (Exercise)

(162.2) We reason using a Rule of Necessary Equivalence (159.3):
\[
\begin{align*}
\diamond (\varphi \lor \psi) & \equiv \neg \Box (\neg \varphi \land \neg \psi) \quad \text{by (89.5.b) and (159.3)} \\
& \equiv \neg \Box (\neg \varphi \land \neg \psi) \quad \text{by (158.11)} \\
& \equiv \neg (\neg \Box \varphi \land \neg \Box \psi) \quad \text{by (158.3) and (159.3)} \\
& \equiv \neg (\neg \diamond \varphi \land \neg \diamond \psi) \quad \text{by (162.1) and (159.3)} \\
& \equiv \neg \neg (\diamond \varphi \lor \diamond \psi) \quad \text{by (89.5.b) and (159.3)} \\
& \equiv \diamond \varphi \lor \diamond \psi \quad \text{by (89.3.b)}
\end{align*}
\]

(162.3) The tautologies of conjunction simplification (89.1) are \((\varphi \land \psi) \rightarrow \varphi\) and \((\varphi \land \psi) \rightarrow \psi\). Since these are modally strict theorems, it follows by RM\((\neg((\neg \Box \varphi \land \neg \Box \psi) \land (\neg \Box \varphi \land \neg \Box \psi)) \rightarrow \Box \varphi \lor \Box \psi)\) by (162.1) and (159.3)

(162.4) We reason using a Rule of Necessary Equivalence (159.3):

\[
\begin{align*}
\diamond (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) & \equiv \diamond (\neg \varphi \lor \psi) \quad \text{by (89.1.c) and (159.3)} \\
& \equiv \neg \varphi \lor \diamond \psi \quad \text{by (162.2)} \\
& \equiv \neg \Box \varphi \lor \diamond \psi \quad \text{by (158.1) and (159.3)} \\
& \equiv \Box \varphi \rightarrow \diamond \psi \quad \text{by (89.1.c)}
\end{align*}
\]

(162.5) We reason using a Rule of Necessary Equivalence (159.4):

\[
\begin{align*}
\diamond \diamond \varphi & \equiv \diamond \neg \Box \varphi \quad \text{by definition (18.5) and (159.4)} \\
& \equiv \neg \neg \varphi \quad \text{by (158.11)}
\end{align*}
\]

(162.6) Assume \(\Box (\varphi \lor \psi)\). Suppose, for reductio, \(\neg (\Box \varphi \lor \Box \psi)\). Then by a De Morgan's law (89.5.d) and &E, it follows both that \(\neg \Box \varphi\) and \(\neg \Box \psi\). By (158.11), the first implies:

(\(\varphi\)) \(\diamond \neg \varphi\)

But our initial assumption implies, by definition of \(\lor\) and the Rule of Substitution for Defined Formulas (160.2), that \(\Box (\neg \varphi \rightarrow \psi)\). This latter implies, by the K\(\diamond\) schema (158.13), \(\neg \varphi \rightarrow \diamond \psi\). From this and (\(\varphi\)), it follows that \(\diamond \psi\). Contradiction. \(\therefore\)

(162.7) Assume \(\Box (\varphi \lor \psi)\) and \(\diamond \neg \varphi\). From the first assumption and (162.6), it follows that \(\Box \varphi \lor \diamond \psi\). From the second assumption it follows that \(\neg \Box \varphi\), by (158.11). From our last two results, it follows that \(\diamond \psi\), by disjunctive syllogism (87.4.b). \(\therefore\)

(163.1) As an instance of the T schema (45.2), we know \(\Box \neg \varphi \rightarrow \neg \varphi\). So by contraposition (81), \(\neg \neg \varphi \rightarrow \neg \Box \neg \varphi\). But \(\varphi \rightarrow \neg \neg \varphi\) is a tautology (78.2). So by hypothetical syllogism (77.3), it follows that \(\varphi \rightarrow \neg \Box \neg \varphi\). By the definition of \(\diamond\) (18.5) and the Rule of Definition by Equivalence (73), we independently know \(\neg \Box \neg \varphi \rightarrow \diamond \varphi\). So our last two results imply \(\varphi \rightarrow \diamond \varphi\), by hypothetical syllogism. \(\therefore\)
(163.2) Assume $\diamondsuit \square \varphi$. From this and (158.14), it follows by biconditional syllogism that $\neg \diamondsuit \neg \varphi$. But note that the following is an instance of the 5 schema:

$$\diamondsuit \neg \varphi \rightarrow \square \diamondsuit \neg \varphi.$$  

So by a rule of modus tollens (80.1), $\neg \diamondsuit \neg \varphi$, which by (158.12), yields $\square \varphi$. \textbf{**} 

(165.1) $(\rightarrow) \diamondsuit \varphi \rightarrow \diamondsuit \varphi$ is the 5 schema. $(\leftarrow) \square \diamondsuit \varphi \rightarrow \diamondsuit \varphi$ is an instance of the T schema (45.2). \textbf{**} 

(165.2) $(\rightarrow) \square \varphi \rightarrow \diamondsuit \varphi$ is an instance of the T schema (163.1). $(\leftarrow) \diamondsuit \varphi \rightarrow \square \varphi$ is an instance of the 5 schema (163.2) \textbf{**} 

(165.3) By the T schema (163.1), we know $\varphi \rightarrow \diamondsuit \varphi$. And as an instance of the 5 schema (45.3), we know: $\diamondsuit \varphi \rightarrow \diamondsuit \varphi$. So by hypothetical syllogism (77.3), it follows that $\varphi \rightarrow \square \varphi$. \textbf{**} 

(165.4) As an instance of the B schema (165.3), we have $\neg \varphi \rightarrow \diamondsuit \neg \varphi$. It follows from this by contraposition that $\neg \diamondsuit \neg \varphi \rightarrow \neg \varphi$. Since $\neg \varphi \rightarrow \varphi$ (78.1), it follows by hypothetical syllogism that:

$$(\text{§}) \neg \diamondsuit \neg \varphi \rightarrow \varphi$$

Now, independently, it follows a fortiori from (158.14) that $\diamondsuit \varphi \rightarrow \neg \square \neg \varphi$. From this and (§), it follows by hypothetical syllogism that $\diamondsuit \varphi \rightarrow \varphi$. \textbf{**} 

(165.5) $\square \varphi \rightarrow \diamondsuit \varphi$ is an instance of the B schema (165.3). Independently, since $\diamondsuit \varphi \rightarrow \square \varphi$ is a $\square$-theorem (163.2), it follows by RM (157.1) that $\square \diamondsuit \varphi \rightarrow \square \varphi$. So by hypothetical syllogism, $\square \varphi \rightarrow \square \varphi$. \textbf{**} 

(165.6) (Exercise) 

(165.7) $(\rightarrow)$ As an instance of (162.6), we know:

$$\square (\varphi \lor \square \psi) \rightarrow (\square \varphi \lor \square \psi)$$

Since the commuted form of (165.2) establishes a modally strict equivalence between $\diamondsuit \square \psi$ and $\square \psi$, the Rule of Substitution (160.1) allows us to infer the following: $\square (\varphi \lor \square \psi) \rightarrow (\square \varphi \lor \square \psi)$. $(\rightarrow)$ As an instance of (158.15), we know:

$$((\square \varphi \lor \square \psi) \rightarrow (\square \varphi \lor \square \psi))$$
Since (165.6) establishes a modally strict equivalence between $\Box\Box\psi$ and $\Box\psi$, the Rule of Substitution (160.1) allows us to infer the following: $(\Box\varphi \lor \Box\psi) \rightarrow \Box(\varphi \lor \Box\psi)$. $\blacksquare$

(165.10) (Exercise)

(165.11) We reason using a Rule of Necessary Equivalence (159.3) as follows:

$$
\begin{align*}
\Diamond(\varphi \& \Diamond\psi) & \equiv \Diamond(-\varphi \lor \Diamond\psi) & \text{by (89.5.a) and (159.3)} \\
& \equiv \Diamond(-\varphi \lor \Box\psi) & \text{by (162.1) and (159.3)} \\
& \equiv \neg\Box(-\varphi \lor \Box\psi) & \text{by (158.11)} \\
& \equiv \neg(\Box\neg\varphi \lor \Box\neg\psi) & \text{by (165.9) and (89.4.c)} \\
& \equiv \Diamond\varphi \& \Diamond\psi & \text{by (89.5.a)}
\end{align*}
$$

$\blacksquare$

(165.12) (Exercise)

(165.13) $(\rightarrow)$ For the left-to-right direction, our proof strategy is as follows:

(a) Show $\Box(\varphi \rightarrow \Box\psi) \rightarrow (\Diamond\varphi \rightarrow \psi)$, by a modally strict proof.

(b) Conclude $\Box\Box(\varphi \rightarrow \Box\psi) \rightarrow \Box(\Diamond\varphi \rightarrow \psi)$ from (a) by Rule RM (157.1)

(c) Show that the left-to-right direction of our theorem, i.e., $\Box(\varphi \rightarrow \Box\psi) \rightarrow \Box(\Diamond\varphi \rightarrow \psi)$, follows from (b).

It remains to show (a) and (c).

For (a), assume $\Box(\varphi \rightarrow \Box\psi)$. Then by K$\Diamond$ (158.13), it follows that $\Diamond\varphi \rightarrow \Diamond\Box\psi$. But the B$\Diamond$ schema (165.4) is $\Diamond\Box\psi \rightarrow \psi$. So $\Diamond\varphi \rightarrow \psi$ follows by hypothetical syllogism from our last two results.

For (c), assume $\Box(\varphi \rightarrow \Box\psi)$. Then by the 4 schema (165.5), it follows that $\Box\Box(\varphi \rightarrow \Box\psi)$. So by (b), it follows that $\Box(\Diamond\varphi \rightarrow \psi)$.

($\leftarrow$) We leave the right-to-left direction as an exercise. $\blacksquare$

(166.1) [We prove only the stronger version.] Assume $\Gamma \vdash \Diamond\varphi \rightarrow \psi$, i.e., that there is a modally-strict derivation of $\Diamond\varphi \rightarrow \psi$ from $\Gamma$. So by the strong form of Rule RM (157.1), it follows that $\Box\Gamma \vdash \Box\Diamond\varphi \rightarrow \Box\psi$. By (165.3), the instances of the B schema are modally strict theorems, so by (64.3) we have $\Box\Gamma \vdash \Box\varphi \rightarrow \Box(\Diamond\varphi \rightarrow \psi)$. Hence, by the $\vdash\Box$ version of (77.1), it follows that $\Box\Gamma \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \Box\psi$. $\blacksquare$

(166.2) [We prove only the stronger version.] Assume $\Gamma \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \Box\psi$. Then by the strong form of RM$\Diamond$ (157.2), it follows that $\Box\Gamma \vdash \Diamond\varphi \rightarrow \Diamond\Box\psi$. But the schema B$\Diamond$ (165.4) is a modally strict theorem, and so $\Box\Gamma \vdash \Diamond\varphi \rightarrow \Box\psi$, by (64.3). Hence, by the $\vdash\Box$ version of (77.1) it follows that $\Box\Gamma \vdash \Diamond\varphi \rightarrow \psi$. $\blacksquare$
We reason as follows:

1. $\forall \alpha \Box \phi \rightarrow \Box \phi$ instance of (96.3)
2. $\Box \forall \alpha \Box \phi \rightarrow \Box \phi$ from (1) by RM (157.2)
3. $\Box \phi \rightarrow \phi$ instance of B (165.4)
4. $\Box \forall \alpha \Box \phi \rightarrow \forall \alpha \phi$ from (2),(3) by (77.3)
5. $\forall \alpha (\Box \forall \alpha \Box \phi \rightarrow \forall \alpha \phi)$ from (5) by GEN
6. $\forall \alpha (\Box \forall \alpha \Box \phi \rightarrow \forall \alpha \phi)$ instance of (96.2)
7. $\forall \alpha \Box \phi \rightarrow \forall \alpha \phi$ from (5),(6) by MP
8. $\forall \alpha \Box \phi \rightarrow \Box \forall \alpha \phi$ from (7) by Rule (166.1)

Theorem (96.3) asserts $\forall \alpha \phi \rightarrow \phi$. So by Rule RM (157.1), it follows that $\Box \forall \alpha \phi \rightarrow \Box \phi$. By GEN, it follows that $\forall \alpha (\Box \forall \alpha \phi \rightarrow \Box \phi)$. But since $\alpha$ isn’t free in $\Box \forall \alpha \phi$, it follows by an appropriate instance of (96.2) that $\Box \forall \alpha \phi \rightarrow \Box \forall \alpha \phi$.

Given (167.1) and (167.2), it is a modally strict theorem that $\forall \alpha \square \phi \equiv \square \forall \alpha \phi$. So as an instance, we know $\forall \alpha \Box \neg \phi \equiv \Box \forall \alpha \neg \phi$, which commutes to:

$\Box \forall \alpha \neg \phi \equiv \forall \alpha \square \neg \phi$

Hence we may reason using the Rules of Substitution (160.1) and (160.2) as follows:

$\Box \exists \alpha \phi \rightarrow \neg \Box \neg \exists \alpha \phi$ by definition $\Box$ and (73)

$\rightarrow \neg \Box \forall \alpha \neg \phi$ by (104.4) and (160.1)

$\rightarrow \neg \forall \alpha \Box \neg \phi$ by (8) and (160.1)

$\rightarrow \exists \alpha \Box \neg \phi$ by (104.2)

$\rightarrow \exists \alpha \neg \phi$ by definition $\Box$ and (160.2)

Given (167.1) and (167.2), it is a modally strict theorem that $\forall \alpha \square \phi \equiv \square \forall \alpha \phi$. So as an instance, we know:

$\Box \forall \alpha \neg \phi \equiv \forall \alpha \square \neg \phi$

Hence we may reason using the Rules of Substitution (160.1) and (160.2) as follows:

$\exists \alpha \Box \phi \rightarrow \neg \forall \alpha \neg \phi$ by definition $\exists$ and (73)

$\rightarrow \neg \forall \alpha \Box \neg \phi$ by (162.1) and (160.1)

$\rightarrow \neg \Box \forall \alpha \neg \phi$ by (8) and (160.1)

$\rightarrow \Box \forall \alpha \neg \phi$ by (158.11)

$\rightarrow \Box \exists \alpha \phi$ by definition $\exists$ and (160.2)

Assume $\exists \alpha \Box \phi$. Now assume $\tau$ be an arbitrary such $\alpha$, so that we know:

$\Box \phi$
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Since \( \tau \) is an arbitrarily chosen, primitive constant that is substitutable for, and has the same type as, the variable \( \alpha \) in \( \varphi \), we know independently that \( \tau \downarrow \) by (39.2). Hence, by (107):

\[(\xi) \Box \tau \downarrow\]

Also, independently, Rule \( \exists I \) (102.1) tells us \( \varphi_\alpha^\tau, \tau \downarrow \vdash \exists \alpha \varphi \). Hence, by (107):

\[\Box \varphi \tau \alpha, \Box \tau \downarrow \vdash \Box \exists \alpha \varphi \].

So from (\( \theta \)) and (\( \xi \)) it follows that \( \Box \exists \alpha \varphi \). By Rule \( \exists E \) (103), we may discharge (\( \vartheta \)) and we've thereby derived \( \Box \exists \alpha \varphi \) from our initial assumption \( \exists \alpha \Box \varphi \).

Theorem (96.3) asserts \( \forall \alpha \varphi \rightarrow \varphi \). By RM \( \Diamond \) (157.2), then, it follows that \( \Diamond \forall \alpha \varphi \rightarrow \Diamond \varphi \). So by GEN, it follows that \( \forall \alpha (\Diamond \forall \alpha \varphi \rightarrow \Diamond \varphi) \). But since \( \alpha \) isn't free in \( \Diamond \forall \alpha \varphi \), it follows by an appropriate instance of (96.2) that \( \Diamond \forall \alpha \varphi \rightarrow \forall \alpha \Diamond \varphi \).

From (104.5), by RM \( \Diamond \) (157.2).

(Exercise)

Assume, for conditional proof:

\[\Box \forall \alpha (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \& \Box \forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \chi)\]

Then since a conjunction of necessities implies a necessary conjunction (158.3), it follows that:

\[(\delta) \Box (\forall \alpha (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \& \forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \chi))\]

Note, independently, that the following is an instance of (100.9):

\[
(\forall \alpha (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \& \forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \chi)) \rightarrow \forall \alpha (\varphi \rightarrow \chi)
\]

Since this is a modally strict theorem, it follows by Rule RM (157.1) that:

\[\Box (\forall \alpha (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \& \forall \alpha (\psi \rightarrow \chi)) \rightarrow \Box \forall \alpha (\varphi \rightarrow \chi)\]

And from this last result and (\( \delta \)), it follows by MP that \( \Box \forall \alpha (\varphi \rightarrow \chi) \).

By reasoning analogous to (168.5) but starting with (100.10) and using (158.6) instead of the K axiom.

Since it is a modally strict theorem (107) that \( \tau \downarrow \rightarrow \Box \tau \downarrow \), it follows by rule (166.2) that \( \Diamond \tau \downarrow \rightarrow \tau \downarrow \).

(Exercise)

It follows from (169.1) that \( \neg \tau \downarrow \rightarrow \neg \Diamond \tau \downarrow \), by contraposition. But by the right-to-left direction of (162.1), \( \neg \Diamond \tau \downarrow \rightarrow \Box \neg \tau \downarrow \). So by hypothetical syllogism, \( \neg \tau \downarrow \rightarrow \Box \neg \tau \downarrow \).
(169.4) (Exercise)

(170.1) \((\rightarrow)\) By theorem (126.1), we know \(\alpha = \beta \rightarrow \Box \alpha = \beta\). Since this is a \(\Box\)-theorem, it follows by (166.2) that \(\Diamond \alpha = \beta \rightarrow \alpha = \beta\). \(\therefore\)

(170.2) By (170.1), \(\Diamond \alpha = \beta \rightarrow \alpha = \beta\). By contraposition, \(\neg \alpha = \beta \rightarrow \neg \Diamond \alpha = \beta\). But by (162.1), \(\neg \Diamond \alpha = \beta \rightarrow \Box \neg \alpha = \beta\). Hence, \(\neg \alpha = \beta \rightarrow \Box \neg \alpha = \beta\). Using infix notation, \(\alpha \neq \beta \rightarrow \Box \alpha \neq \beta\). \(\therefore\)

(170.3) \((\rightarrow)\) By (170.2), \(\alpha \neq \beta \rightarrow \Box \alpha \neq \beta\), Since this is a modally strict theorem, we may apply (166.2) to conclude \(\Diamond \alpha \neq \beta \rightarrow \alpha \neq \beta\). \(\therefore\)

(170.4) – (170.5) (Exercises)

(171.1) \((\rightarrow)\) Assume \(\Box (\phi \rightarrow \Box \phi)\). Then by (158.13), \(\Diamond \phi \rightarrow \Diamond \Box \phi\). But by the 5\(\Diamond\) schema (163.2), \(\Diamond \Box \phi \rightarrow \Box \phi\). Hence, by hypothetical syllogism, \(\Diamond \phi \rightarrow \Box \phi\).\(^{389} \)

\((\leftarrow)\) Assume \(\Diamond \phi \rightarrow \Box \phi\). For reductio, assume \(\neg \Box (\phi \rightarrow \Box \phi)\), i.e., by (158.11), assume:

\[(\delta) \Diamond (\neg (\phi \rightarrow \Box \phi))\]

But it is a modally strict theorem that \(\neg (\phi \rightarrow \Box \phi) \equiv (\phi \& \neg \Box \phi)\), by (89.1.b). Hence, it follows from (\(\delta\)) and this last fact by the Rule of Substitution (160.1) that \(\Diamond (\phi \& \neg \Box \phi)\). So by (162.3) and \&E, it follows that both \(\Diamond \phi\) and \(\Diamond \neg \Box \phi\). The former implies, by our initial assumption, \(\Box \phi\). The latter implies, by the modally strict theorem \(\neg \Box \phi \equiv \Diamond \neg \phi\) and the Rule of Substitution, \(\Diamond \neg \phi\), which by the 4\(\Diamond\) principle (165.7) implies \(\Box \neg \phi\), i.e., \(\neg \Box \phi\). Contradiction. \(\therefore\)

(171.2) Since \(\Box (\phi \rightarrow \Box \phi)\) implies \(\Diamond \phi \rightarrow \Box \phi\) by (171.1), it suffices to show that the latter implies \(\Diamond \phi \equiv \Box \phi\). But this is easy, since we only have to show \(\Box \phi \rightarrow \Diamond \phi\), which follows from the T and T\(\Diamond\) schemata. \(\therefore\)

(171.3) Assume \(\Box (\phi \rightarrow \Box \phi)\). \((\rightarrow)\) Assume \(\neg \Box \phi\). Our global assumption implies \(\Diamond \phi \rightarrow \Box \phi\), by (171.1). Hence, \(\neg \Diamond \phi\), i.e., \(\neg \Box \phi\), by (162.1). \((\leftarrow)\) Assume \(\neg \Diamond \phi\). Then \(\neg \phi\) by the T schema, and so \(\neg \phi\), by the T\(\Diamond\) schema. Hence, \(\neg \Box \phi\), by (158.11). \(\therefore\)

(171.4) Assume both the antecedent and the antecedent of the consequent:

\[(\delta) \Box (\phi \rightarrow \Box \phi) \& \Box (\psi \rightarrow \Box \psi)\]

\[(\xi) \Box \phi \equiv \Box \psi\]

From (\(\xi\)) it follows that \((\Box \phi \& \Box \psi) \lor (\neg \Box \phi \& \neg \Box \psi)\), by an appropriate instance of (89.4.g). We now reason by cases from the two disjuncts to show, in each case, that \(\Box (\phi \equiv \psi)\):

\(^{389}\)Here is an alternative proof of this direction. Assume \(\Box (\phi \rightarrow \Box \phi)\). Then by (165.13), \(\Box (\Diamond \phi \rightarrow \phi)\). Hence by the K axiom, \(\Box \Diamond \phi \rightarrow \Box \phi\). Now assume \(\Diamond \phi\). Then by the 5 axiom (45.3), \(\Box \Diamond \phi\). Hence, \(\Box \phi\).
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• Assume \(\Box \varphi \land \Box \psi\). Then it follows from (158.7) that \(\Box (\varphi \equiv \psi)\), by a biconditional syllogism (90.3.a).

• Assume \(\neg \Box \varphi \land \neg \Box \psi\). Note independently that by (171.3), the conjuncts of (8) imply, respectively:

\[
\neg \Box \varphi \equiv \Box \neg \varphi \\
\neg \Box \psi \equiv \Box \neg \psi
\]

So we may easily derive \(\Box (\neg \varphi \land \neg \psi)\) from our local assumption. But then by (158.3), it follows that \(\Box (\neg \varphi \land \neg \psi)\), and by (158.9) that \(\Box (\varphi \equiv \psi)\). \(\downarrow\)  

(171.5) Assume the antecedent:

\[\Box (\varphi \to \Box \varphi) \land \Box (\psi \to \Box \psi)\]

Then by the T schema, it follows from each conjunct, respectively, that:

(8) \(\varphi \to \Box \varphi\)

(ξ) \(\psi \to \Box \psi\)

Now assume the antecedent of the consequent of our theorem, i.e., \(\varphi \equiv \psi\). Then either \(\varphi \land \psi\) or \(\neg \varphi \land \neg \psi\) and we show \(\Box (\varphi \equiv \psi)\) in both cases:

\(\varphi \land \psi\). The first conjunct and (8) yield \(\Box \varphi\), and the second conjunct and (ξ) yield \(\Box \psi\). So \(\Box \varphi \land \Box \psi\), which implies \(\Box \varphi \equiv \Box \psi\). From this and our initial assumption, it follows by (171.4) that \(\Box (\varphi \equiv \psi)\).

\(\neg \varphi \land \neg \psi\). Then both \(\Diamond \neg \varphi \land \Diamond \neg \psi\), i.e., both \(\neg \Box \varphi\) and \(\neg \Box \psi\). It follows from the first and (8) that \(\neg \varphi\) and from the second and (ξ) that \(\neg \psi\). Hence \(\Diamond \neg \varphi \land \Diamond \neg \psi\), i.e., \(\neg \Box \varphi\) and \(\neg \Box \psi\). So \(\Box \varphi \equiv \Box \psi\). So again it follows from this and our initial assumption by (171.4) that \(\Box (\varphi \equiv \psi)\). \(\downarrow\)  

(172.1) By commuting (164.4), we know \(\Diamond \Box \varphi \equiv \Box \varphi\). But theorem (139.6) asserts \(\Box \varphi \equiv \Box \varphi\). Hence \(\Diamond \Box \varphi \equiv \Box \varphi\). \(\downarrow\)

(172.2) Assume \(\Box (\varphi \to \Box \varphi)\). Then by (171.1):

(8) \(\Diamond \varphi \to \Box \varphi\)

(→) Assume \(\Box \varphi\). Then by (164.3), it follows that \(\Diamond \varphi\). Hence, by (8), \(\Box \varphi\), and so by the T schema (45.2), \(\varphi\). (←) Assume \(\varphi\). Then \(\Diamond \varphi\), by the T\(\Diamond\) schema (163.1). Hence \(\Box \varphi\), by (8). So, \(\Box \varphi\), by (132). \(\downarrow\)

(172.3) Assume:

(8) \(\Box \forall x(\varphi \to \Box \varphi)\)
(ξ) \( \exists ! x \varphi \)

We want to show \( \exists ! x \varphi \downarrow \), but by (152.1), it suffices to show: \( \exists ! x \triangleleft \varphi \). Now from (ξ), let \( a \) be such an object, so that we know:

(ζ) \( \varphi^a & \forall y (\varphi^y \rightarrow y = a) \)

Since we want to show \( \exists ! x A \varphi \) and \( a \) is going to be our witness, the definition of the uniqueness quantifier requires us to show:

\( A \varphi^a x \& \forall y (A \varphi^y x \rightarrow y = a) \). Note independently that by the Converse Barcan Formula (167.2), \( (\varphi) \) implies:

(172.4) (Exercise) [Hint: This follows from (172.2) and the modally strict version of Hintikka’s scheme (148).]

Let \( \alpha, \beta \) be variables of the same type. By (126.1), we know \( \alpha = \beta \rightarrow \Box \alpha = \beta \). Since this is a modally strict theorem, it follows by RN that \( \Box (\alpha = \beta \rightarrow \Box \alpha = \beta) \). So, by (172.2), it follows that \( \triangleleft \alpha = \beta \equiv \alpha = \beta \). So by commutativity of \( \equiv \), \( \alpha = \beta \equiv \triangleleft \alpha = \beta \). \( \Updownarrow \)

(173.2) We may reason as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\alpha \neq \beta & \equiv \neg \alpha = \beta \quad \text{by (24) and Rule \( \equiv \text{Df} \)} \\
& \equiv \neg \triangleleft \alpha = \beta \quad \text{by (173.1) and (89.4.b)} \\
& \equiv \triangleleft \neg \alpha = \beta \quad \text{commute (44.1)} \\
& \equiv \triangleleft \alpha \neq \beta \quad \text{(24), Rule \( \equiv \text{Df} \), (159.3)} \quad \Updownarrow \\
\end{align*}
\]

(174.1) We want to establish:

\( \triangleleft \exists \alpha \varphi \equiv \exists \alpha \triangleleft \varphi \)

By definition of unique existence (128.2), we have to show, for some variable \( \beta \) that is substitutable for \( a \) in \( \varphi \) and that doesn’t occur free in \( \varphi \):

\[ \triangleleft \exists \alpha \forall \beta (\varphi^a \equiv \beta = a) \equiv \exists \alpha \forall \beta (\triangleleft \varphi^a \equiv \beta = a) \]

We do this by first noting some modally strict theorems:
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(8) \( \forall \beta (\forall x \equiv \beta = \alpha) \equiv \forall \beta (\forall x \equiv \beta = \alpha) \) (44.3)

(ξ) \( \forall \beta (\forall x \equiv \beta = \alpha) \equiv (\forall x \forall \beta \equiv \beta = \alpha) \) (139.5)

(ζ) \( \forall \beta = \alpha \equiv \beta = \alpha \) (173.1)

Hence we may reason as follows:

\[ \exists x (\forall x \equiv \beta = \alpha) \equiv \exists x (\forall x \equiv \beta = \alpha) \text{ instance of (139.10)} \]
\[ \exists x (\forall x \equiv \beta = \alpha) \equiv \exists x (\forall x \equiv \beta = \alpha) \) by (8), (159.3) \]
\[ \exists x (\forall x \equiv \beta = \alpha) \equiv \exists x (\forall x \equiv \beta = \alpha) \) by (ξ), (159.3) \]
\[ \exists x (\forall x \equiv \beta = \alpha) \equiv \exists x (\forall x \equiv \beta = \alpha) \) by (ζ), (159.3) \]
\[ \exists x (\forall x \equiv \beta = \alpha) \]

(174.2) By (152.1) we know \( \forall \exists \equiv \exists ! \forall \). But if we set the variable \( \alpha \) in (174.1) to \( x \), we obtain the instance \( \forall \exists \equiv \exists ! \forall \), which commutes to \( \exists ! \forall \equiv \exists ! \forall \). Hence \( \forall \exists \equiv \exists ! \forall \).

(175.1) By definition of \( \downarrow \) (20.1) and Rule \( \equiv \), we have to show \( \forall E \downarrow \forall \exists ! \forall \). Consider the well-defined property \( L = \exists ! \forall \). By \( \exists ! \forall \), it suffices to show \( L \exists ! \forall (x = y) \). By the modally strict version of Russell’s analysis (151), we have to show:

\[ \exists x (\forall x \equiv \beta = \alpha) \equiv \exists x (\forall x \equiv \beta = \alpha) \]

But again by \( \exists ! \forall \) and the fact that \( y \downarrow \) (39.2), it suffices to show that \( y \) is a witness to this claim, i.e., to show:

\[ \forall x (\forall x \equiv \beta = \alpha) \equiv \forall x (\forall x \equiv \beta = \alpha) \]

Before we begin, we establish some consequences of (173.1), which has as an instance that \( x = y \equiv \forall x \equiv \exists \). By a single application of GEN, it follows that \( \forall x (x = y \equiv \exists \). Since both \( y \downarrow \) and \( z \downarrow \), we may infer both of the following from this last result:

(ξ) \( y = y \equiv \forall y = y \)
(ζ) \( z = y \equiv \forall z = y \)

The first conjunct of (8) follows from (ξ) and \( y = y \), which we know by Rule \( = \). To show the second conjunct of (8), it suffices, by GEN, to show \( \forall z = y \equiv \exists \). But this is just the right-to-left direction of (ξ). And the third conjunct of (8) follows from the fact that \( \forall z = z \), which we know by reasoning from the definition of \( L \) (exercise).

(175.2) Since the closures of axiom (47) are axioms, the following is an axiom:

\[ \forall x (x = y) \equiv \forall z (z \equiv x) \] provided \( z \) is substitutable for \( x \) in \( \varphi \) and doesn’t occur free in \( \varphi \)
Now consider the variable $y$. We not only know $\downarrow y$, but also that no matter what $\varphi$ is, $y$ is substitutable for $x$ in the matrix of the above universal claim, since the matrix has only two free occurrences of $x$, neither of which is in the scope of a variable-binding operator that binds $y$. So we may instantiate that claim to the variable $y$ and obtain:

$$y = \downarrow x \varphi \equiv \forall z(\downarrow x \varphi z \equiv z = y),$$
provided $z$ is substitutable for $x$ in $\varphi$ and doesn’t occur free in $\varphi$.

Now let $\varphi$ be the formula $x = y$. Then $z$ is substitutable for $x$ in $\varphi$ and doesn’t occur free in $\varphi$. So as an instance of our last result, we know:

$$\downarrow x(x = y) \equiv \forall z(\downarrow x z = y \equiv z = y)$$

Now, independently, by (173.1), we know $x = y \equiv \downarrow x = y$, which commutes to $\downarrow x = y \equiv x = y$. By GEN, it follows that $\forall x(\downarrow x = y \equiv x = y)$. By the Rule of Alphabetic Variants, it follows that:

$$\forall z(\downarrow x z = y \equiv z = y)$$

But this last fact and (8) jointly imply $\downarrow x(x = y)$. □

(176.1) Consider any $n \geq 1$ and assume $x_1 \ldots x_n F^n$. Then by axiom (50), biconditional syllogism, and &E, we know all of the following:

$$x_1 [\lambda y F^n y x_2 \ldots x_n]$$
$$x_2 [\lambda y F^n x_1 y x_3 \ldots x_n]$$
$$\vdots$$
$$x_n [\lambda y F^n x_1 \ldots x_{n-1} y]$$

By (107), $F \downarrow \rightarrow \Box F \downarrow$, and by axiom (51), each of these unary encoding claims implies its own necessitation. Hence, we know:

$$\Box x_1 [\lambda y F^n y x_2 \ldots x_n]$$
$$\Box x_2 [\lambda y F^n x_1 y x_3 \ldots x_n]$$
$$\vdots$$
$$\Box x_n [\lambda y F^n x_1 \ldots x_{n-1} y]$$

Now we leave it as an exercise to prove the generalized version of theorem (158.3), i.e., to prove $\Box(q_1 \& \ldots \& q_n) \equiv (\Box q_1 \& \ldots \& \Box q_n)$. So, after we conjoin last set of lines displayed above by $n - 1$ applications of &I, it follows that:

$$\Box(x_1 [\lambda y F^n y x_2 \ldots x_n] \& x_2 [\lambda y F^n x_1 y x_3 \ldots x_n] \& \ldots \& x_n [\lambda y F^n x_1 \ldots x_{n-1} y])$$

Independently, if we apply Rule RE to the necessary axiom (50), then we obtain:
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\[ (\xi) \quad \square x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \equiv \square(x_1[\lambda y F^n x_2 \ldots x_n] \& x_2[\lambda y F^n x_3 \ldots x_n] \& \ldots \& x_n[\lambda y F^n x_1 \ldots x_{n-1} y]) \]

From (\xi) and (\vartheta), it follows by biconditional syllogism (90.3.b) that \( \square x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \).

(176.2) Assume \( \neg x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \), and for reductio, assume \( \neg \square \neg x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \). Then by definition of \( \Diamond \) and Rule \( \equiv \text{Df} \) (91.1), it follows from the latter that \( \Diamond x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \). But, independently, it follows from the modally strict theorem \( x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \rightarrow \square x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \) (176.1) that \( \Diamond x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \rightarrow x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \), by (166.2). Hence \( x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \). Contradiction.

(177.1) Since theorem (176.1), i.e., \( x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \rightarrow \square x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \), is modally strict, it follows by RN that \( \square(x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \rightarrow \square x_1 \ldots x_n F^n) \). By \( \vee I \), it follows that:

\[ \square(x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \rightarrow \square x_1 \ldots x_n F^n) \lor (\Diamond x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \rightarrow \square x_1 \ldots x_n F^n) \]

So by theorem (171.2), it follows that \( \Diamond x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \equiv \square x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \). \( \Rightarrow \)

(177.2) By (176.1) for (\( \rightarrow \)) direction and the T schema for the (\( \leftarrow \)) direction. \( \Leftarrow \)

(177.3) (\( \rightarrow \)) By the \( \square \)-theorem (176.1), i.e., \( x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \rightarrow \square x_1 \ldots x_n F^n \), and rule (166.2). (\( \leftarrow \)) By the T \( \Diamond \) (163.1) schema. \( \Rightarrow \)

(177.4) To make the proof more easily readable, we prove this for the 1-place case. For \( n \geq 2 \), the proof is obtained by analogous reasoning in which appeals to appeals to theorem (176.1) replace appeals to axiom (51).

(\( \rightarrow \)) Assume:

(\( \vartheta \)) \( x F \equiv y G \)

To show \( \square x F \equiv \square y G \), we show both directions:

(\( \rightarrow \)) Assume \( \square x F \). Then by the T schema (45.2), \( x F \). So by (\( \vartheta \)), \( y G \). Then by axiom (51), \( \square y G \).

(\( \leftarrow \)) By analogous reasoning.

(\( \leftarrow \)) Assume \( \square x F \equiv \square y G \). Again, we show both directions:

(\( \rightarrow \)) Assume \( x F \). Then by axiom (51), \( \square x F \). From this and our global assumption, it follows that \( \square y G \). Hence, by the T schema (45.2), \( y G \).

(\( \leftarrow \)) By analogous reasoning. \( \Leftarrow \)

(177.5) Again, without loss of generality, we prove this for the 1-place case. For \( n \geq 2 \), the proof is obtained by analogous reasoning in which appeals to theorem (176.1) replace appeals to axiom (51).
This direction is immediate from the relevant instance of theorem (158.6), which asserts that □(φ ≡ ψ) → (□φ ≡ □ψ). Alternatively, if one assumes the antecedent, i.e., □(x₁...xₙFⁿ ≡ y₁...yₙGⁿ) and applies the T schema, we obtain x₁...xₙFⁿ ≡ y₁...yₙGⁿ, which by the left-to-right direction of the previous theorem (177.4) implies □x₁...xₙFⁿ ≡ □y₁...yₙGⁿ.

As an instance of (171.4), we know:

(8) (□(xF → □xF) & □(yG → □yG)) → ((□xF ≡ □yG) → □(xF ≡ yG))

But xF → □xF and yG → □yG are both just instances of axiom (31). Hence, by RN, we have both □(xF → □xF) and □(yG → □yG). So it follows from (8) that (□xF ≡ □yG) → □(xF ≡ yG). ≡

(177.6) Without loss of generality, we prove only the 1-place case. By the commutativity of the biconditional (89.2.e), (177.5) converts to □(xF ≡ yG) → □(xF ≡ yG). Then (177.4) and this last result imply (xF ≡ yG) ≡ □(xF ≡ yG), by ≡E (90.3.e). ≡

(177.7) (→) By theorem (176.2). (←) By the T schema. ≡

(177.8) Without loss of generality, we prove only the 1-place case. Theorem (177.2) is that xF ≡ □xF. So by a classical tautology (89.4.b), it follows that ¬xF ≡ □¬xF. Independently, as an instance of (158.11), we know that ¬□xF ≡ □¬xF. So by the transitivity of ≡ (90.3.e), it follows that ¬xF ≡ □¬xF, which commutes to □¬xF ≡ ¬xF. ≡

(177.9) (Exercise)

(177.10) Since x₁...xₙF → □x₁...xₙ is a □-theorem (176.1), it follows by Rule RN that □(x₁...xₙF → □x₁...xₙF). So by (172.2), □x₁...xₙF ≡ x₁...xₙF. By the commutativity of ≡, x₁...xₙF ≡ □x₁...xₙF. ≡

(178.1) Assume □!x. Then by definition of □! (22.1) and Rule =ffE, [λx □!x]x. Now, independently, since [λx □!x]⪯, β-Conversion (48.2) yields:

(8) [λx □!x]x ≡ □!x

So it follows from what we’ve established thus far that □!x. This implies, by the 5 axiom (45.3), that □□E!x. Note also that from the □-theorem (8), its commuted form □□E!x ≡ [λx □!x]x is also a □-theorem. From this and □□E!x it follows, by the Rule of Substitution (160.1), that □[λx □!x]x. Hence, by definition of □! and Rule =ffI, □□!x. ≡

(178.2) Assume □!x. Then by definition of □! (22.2) and Rule =ffE, we know [λx □!x]x. Independently, from the fact that [λx □!x]⪯, it follows by β-Conversion that the following is a □-theorem:

(8) [λx □!x]x ≡ □□!x
So it follows from what we've established that \( \neg \Diamond E!x \). This implies \( \Box \neg E!x \), by the modally strict equivalence \((162.1)\). By the 4 schema \((165.5)\) it follows that \( \Box \neg \Box E!x \). From this and \((162.1)\) again, we apply the Rule of Substitution \((160.1)\) to obtain \( \Box \neg \Diamond E!x \). This implies, by the commuted form of \((\delta)\) (which is also a \( \Box \)-theorem) and the Rule of Substitution \((160.1)\) that \( \Box [\lambda x \rightarrow \Diamond E!x]x \). So by the definition of \( A! \) and Rule \( =_{df} \), we have \( \Box A!x \). \\

\((178.3)\) From the \( \Box \)-theorem \((178.1)\), it follows that \( \Diamond O!x \rightarrow O!x \), by rule \((166.2)\).

\(\Rightarrow\)

\((178.5)\) \((\rightarrow)\) By hypothetical syllogism from \((178.3)\) and \((178.1)\). \((\Leftarrow)\) By the T and \( T \Diamond \) schemata. \(\Rightarrow\)

\((178.6)\) \((\rightarrow)\) By hypothetical syllogism from \((178.4)\) and \((178.2)\). \((\Leftarrow)\) By the T and \( T \Diamond \) schemata. \(\Rightarrow\)

\((178.7)\) Since \( O!x \rightarrow \Box O!x \) \((178.1)\) is a theorem, it follows by Rule RN that \( \Box (O!x \rightarrow \Box O!x) \). So by \((172.2)\), \( \Box O!x \equiv O!x \), which commutes to \( O!x \equiv \Box O!x \). \(\Rightarrow\)

\((178.8)\) (Exercise)

\((179)\) Let \( \mu_1, \ldots, \mu_n \) \((n \geq 1)\) be any distinct individual variables, and let \( \varphi \) be any formula in which \( \nu_1, \ldots, \nu_n \) are any individual variables substitutable, respectively, for \( \mu_1, \ldots, \mu_n \). We want to prove: \(^{390}\)

\[(\xi) \ [\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi] \downarrow \rightarrow ([\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi] \nu_1 \ldots \nu_n \equiv \varphi_{\nu_1 \ldots \nu_n}^{\nu_1 \ldots \nu_n})\]

Note that by \( n \) applications of the Special Case of Rule \( VE \) \((94.3)\), it suffices to prove a universal closure of \((\xi)\), namely:

\[(\zeta) \ \forall \nu_1 \ldots \forall \nu_n ([\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi] \downarrow \rightarrow ([\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi] \nu_1 \ldots \nu_n \equiv \varphi_{\nu_1 \ldots \nu_n}^{\nu_1 \ldots \nu_n})\]

Note also that there may be free variables in \( \varphi \) not among \( \nu_1, \ldots, \nu_n \) and \( \mu_1, \ldots, \mu_n \). If there are such, then these variables occur free in \((\zeta)\). So suppose that \( \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_m \) are the variables that occur free in \((\zeta)\). Then by \( m \) applications of the Special Case of Rule \( VE \) \((94.3)\), it suffices to prove a universal closure of \((\zeta)\), namely \((\omega)\):

\[(\omega) \ \forall \alpha_1 \ldots \forall \alpha_m \forall \nu_1 \ldots \forall \nu_n ([\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi] \downarrow \rightarrow ([\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi] \nu_1 \ldots \nu_n \equiv \varphi_{\nu_1 \ldots \nu_n}^{\nu_1 \ldots \nu_n})\]

Clearly, there are no free variables in \((\omega)\). Now consider the specific list \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) of individual variables and perform the following transformation of \( \varphi \):

---

\(^{390}\)I'm indebted to Uri Nodelman for helping me to work through a number of subtleties in the following proof; my original attempt had a number of gaps.
• For each $\alpha_j$ ($1 \leq j \leq m$), if $\alpha_j$ is among the list of variables $x_1, \ldots, x_n$, let $\alpha'_j$ be a variable distinct from $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ and substitute $\alpha'_j$ for every free occurrence of $\alpha_j$ in $\varphi$ and call the result $\varphi''$; otherwise, let $\alpha'_j$ be $\alpha_j$. Thus, $\varphi''$ has no free occurrences of $x_1, \ldots, x_n$.

• Let $\varphi'$ be an alphabetic variant of $\varphi''$ such that every bound occurrence of $x_i$ in $\varphi''$ is replaced with a fresh variable. \footnote{The transformation from $\varphi''$ to $\varphi'$ is done to ensure that every $x_i$ is substitutable for $\mu_i$. We want to avoid the situation in which the substitution of $x_i$ for $\mu_i$ in $\varphi$ would result in $x_i$’s capture by variable-binding operator binding $x$. But, by the transformation, $\varphi'$ has no $x_i$-binding operators within it.}

Then consider the following alphabetic variant of $\omega$:

$$\omega' \equiv \forall \alpha'_1 \ldots \forall \alpha'_m \forall \nu \forall \nu_n (\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi') \downarrow \rightarrow (\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi'' \nu_1 \ldots \nu_n \equiv \varphi'' \nu'_1 \ldots \nu'_n)$$

To prove $\omega$, it suffices to prove $\omega'$, by the Rule of Alphabetic Variants. So if we can show that $\omega'$ itself is an alphabetic variant of an axiom, we’re done. Observe that there are no free variables in $\omega'$ and, moreover, none of the variables $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ occur free in any subformula or term in $\omega'$ (since any free occurrence in $\varphi$ would have been swapped out in the transformation from $\varphi$ to $\varphi''$). Observe also that each variable $x_i$ in the list $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ is substitutable for $\mu_i$ in $\varphi'$, for there are no operators binding $x_i$ that could capture them after the transformation from $\varphi''$ to $\varphi'$. (One might recall here the discussion following theorem (100.13).) Consider the following alphabetic variant of $\omega'$:

$$\forall \alpha'_1 \ldots \forall \alpha'_m \forall \nu \forall \nu_n (\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n (\varphi')^\nu_1 \ldots ^\nu_n \downarrow \rightarrow (\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n (\varphi')^\nu_1 \ldots ^\nu_n x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv (\varphi')^\nu'_1 \ldots ^\nu'_n))$$

But this claim is a universal closure of an instance of (48.2) and hence an axiom.

\footnote{The transformation from $\varphi''$ to $\varphi'$ is done to ensure that every $x_i$ is substitutable for $\mu_i$. We want to avoid the situation in which the substitution of $x_i$ for $\mu_i$ in $\varphi$ would result in $x_i$’s capture by variable-binding operator binding $x$. But, by the transformation, $\varphi'$ has no $x_i$-binding operators within it.}

\footnote{(181.1) For simplicity, we prove the theorem using the variables $x_i$ and $y_i$ as arbitrary stand-ins for any variables meeting the conditions of the theorem. (This will be easier to read than a proof using metavariables.) By hypothesis, for $1 \leq i \leq n$, the variable $y_i$ is substitutable for the variable $x_i$ in $\varphi$, so that $[\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi]$ gives rise to instances of axiom (48.2). Then the following is also an axiom, since it is a universal closure of an instance of (48.2):

$$\forall y_1 \ldots \forall y_n ([\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi] \downarrow \rightarrow ([\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi] y_1 \ldots y_n \equiv q_{\nu'_1 \ldots \nu'_n})$$

Then by theorem (100.14), we may distribute the quantifiers $\forall y_1, \ldots, \forall y_n$ over the conditional, so that we may conclude:

$$\forall y_1 \ldots \forall y_n ([\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi] \downarrow) \rightarrow \forall y_1 \ldots \forall y_n ([\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi] y_1 \ldots y_n \equiv q_{\nu'_1 \ldots \nu'_n})$$}
(181.2) For simplicity, we prove the theorem using the variables $x_i$ and $y_i$ as arbitrary stand-ins for any variables meeting the conditions of the theorem. (This will be easier to read than a proof using metavariables.) Assume:

$$(\theta) \ [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi] \downarrow$$

By hypothesis, $y_1, \ldots, y_n$ are substitutable, respectively, for $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ in $\varphi$ and so that $[\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi]$ gives rise to instances of axiom (48.2). Then the following is also an axiom, since it is a universal closure of an instance of (48.2):

$$\forall y_1 \ldots \forall y_n ([\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi] y_1 \ldots y_n \equiv \varphi^{y_1, \ldots, y_n}_{x_1, \ldots, x_n})$$

But also, by hypothesis, none of $y_1, \ldots, y_n$ occur free in $[\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi]$. So from our last conclusion and (100.15), it follows that:

$$[\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi] \downarrow \Rightarrow \forall y_1 \ldots \forall y_n ([\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi] y_1 \ldots y_n \equiv \varphi^{y_1, \ldots, y_n}_{x_1, \ldots, x_n})$$

From this last result and our assumption ($\theta$), it then follows that:

$$\forall y_1 \ldots \forall y_n ([\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi] y_1 \ldots y_n \equiv \varphi^{y_1, \ldots, y_n}_{x_1, \ldots, x_n}) \triangleleft \triangleleft$$

(181.3) For simplicity, we prove the theorem using the variables $x_i$ and $y_i$ as arbitrary stand-ins for any variables meeting the conditions of the theorem. (This will be easier to read than a proof using metavariables.) Since $[\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi]$ is, by hypothesis, a $\lambda$-predicate in which the $\lambda$ doesn’t bind any variables in any encoding formula subterms, the following is an axiom, since it is a universal closure of an instance of (39.2):

$$(\theta) \ \forall y_1 \ldots \forall y_n ([\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi] \downarrow)$$

But also, by hypothesis, for all $i$ such that $1 \leq i \leq n$, the variable $y_i$ is substitutable for the variable $x_i$ in $\varphi$. So it follows from ($\theta$) and (181.1) that:

$$\forall y_1 \ldots \forall y_n ([\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi] y_1 \ldots y_n \equiv \varphi^{y_1, \ldots, y_n}_{x_1, \ldots, x_n}) \triangleleft \triangleleft$$

(182.1) We prove the (a) and (b) forms of the rule together. Assume:

$$(\theta) \ [\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi] \kappa_1 \ldots \kappa_n$$

Then by axiom (39.5.a), we know all of the following:

(A) $[\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi] \downarrow$

(B_i) $\kappa_i \downarrow$

(182) $\kappa_n \downarrow$
By hypothesis, \([\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi]\) has no free variables. Now let \(v_1, \ldots, v_n\) be any individual variables substitutable, respectively, for \(\mu_1, \ldots, \mu_n\) in \(\varphi\). Since \(v_1, \ldots, v_n\) aren’t free in \([\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi]\), it follows from (A) by (181.2) that:

\[
\forall v_1 \ldots \forall v_n ([\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi] v_1 \ldots v_n \equiv \varphi^{v_1/v_n})
\]

But from (B_1) – (B_n) and the fact that \(\kappa_1, \ldots, \kappa_n\) are substitutable, respectively, for \(\mu_1, \ldots, \mu_n\) in \(\varphi\), it follows by \(n\) applications of Rule \(\forall E\) that:

\[
(\xi) \ [\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi] \kappa_1 \ldots \kappa_n \equiv (\varphi^{\kappa_1/v_1} \ldots \kappa_n/v_n)
\]

Since, for all \(i\) such that \(1 \leq i \leq n\), both \(\kappa_i\) and \(v_i\) are substitutable for \(\mu_i\) in \(\varphi\), we can establish independently that \((\varphi^{\kappa_1/v_1} \ldots \kappa_n/v_n)\) just is \(\varphi^{\kappa_1/v_1} \ldots \kappa_n/v_n\) (exercise). Hence, \((\xi)\) becomes \([\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi] \kappa_1 \ldots \kappa_n \equiv \varphi^{\kappa_1/v_1} \ldots \kappa_n/v_n\). So, by conditional proof, we’ve established:

\[
(\tilde{\xi}) \vdash [\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi] \kappa_1 \ldots \kappa_n \rightarrow \varphi^{\kappa_1/v_1} \ldots \kappa_n/v_n
\]

So by (64.10), the (.a) form of our rule follows from \((\tilde{\xi})\):

(.a) \([\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi] \kappa_1 \ldots \kappa_n \vdash \varphi^{\kappa_1/v_1} \ldots \kappa_n/v_n\)

Moreover, from \((\tilde{\xi})\) and the rules of contraposition (81), it follows that:

\[
\vdash \neg \varphi^{\kappa_1/v_1} \ldots \kappa_n/v_n \rightarrow \neg[\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi] \kappa_1 \ldots \kappa_n
\]

But this implies, by (64.10), the (.b) form of our rule:

(.b) \(\neg \varphi^{\kappa_1/v_1} \ldots \kappa_n/v_n \vdash \neg[\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi] \kappa_1 \ldots \kappa_n\)

\(\downarrow\)

\(182.2\) We prove only the (.a) form of the rule and leave the (.b) form as an exercise. Assume all of the following:

(A) \([\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi]\)

(B_1) \(\kappa_1\)

:\n
(B_n) \(\kappa_n\)

(C) \(\varphi^{\kappa_1/v_1} \ldots \kappa_n/v_n\)

By hypothesis, \([\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi]\) has no free variables. Now let \(v_1, \ldots, v_n\) be any individual variables substitutable, respectively, for \(\mu_1, \ldots, \mu_n\) in \(\varphi\). Since \(v_1, \ldots, v_n\) aren’t free in \([\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi]\), it follows from (A) by (181.2) that:

\[
\forall v_1 \ldots \forall v_n ([\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi] v_1 \ldots v_n \equiv \varphi^{v_1/v_n})
\]
But from (B₁) – (Bₙ) and the fact that \( \kappa_1, \ldots, \kappa_n \) are substitutable, respectively, for \( \mu_1, \ldots, \mu_n \) in \( \varphi \), it follows by \( n \) applications of Rule \( \forall E \) that:

\[
(8) \quad [\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi] \kappa_1 \ldots \kappa_n \equiv (\varphi^\eta_{\kappa_1 \ldots \kappa_n})^\eta_{\mu_1 \ldots \mu_n}
\]

Since, for all \( i \) such that \( 1 \leq i \leq n \), both \( \kappa_i \) and \( \nu_i \) are substitutable for \( \mu_i \) in \( \varphi \), we can establish independently that \( (\varphi^\eta_{\kappa_1 \ldots \kappa_n})^\eta_{\mu_1 \ldots \mu_n} \) just is \( \varphi^{\kappa_1 \ldots \kappa_n} \) (exercise). Hence, it follows from (8) that \([\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi] \kappa_1 \ldots \kappa_n \equiv \varphi_{\mu_1 \ldots \mu_n}^{\kappa_1 \ldots \kappa_n} \). But then, by (C), it follows that \([\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi] \kappa_1 \ldots \kappa_n \). Hence, by \( n + 2 \) applications of conditional proof, we have established that:

\[
\vdash [\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi] \downarrow \quad (\kappa_1 \downarrow \quad (\ldots \quad (\kappa_n \downarrow \quad (\varphi^\eta_{\kappa_1 \ldots \kappa_n} \rightarrow [\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi] \kappa_1 \ldots \kappa_n))))
\]

So by \( n + 1 \) applications of (64.10), it follows that

\[
[\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi] \downarrow, \kappa_1 \downarrow, \ldots, \kappa_n \downarrow, \varphi^{\kappa_1 \ldots \kappa_n}_{\mu_1 \ldots \mu_n} \vdash [\lambda \mu_1 \ldots \mu_n \varphi] \kappa_1 \ldots \kappa_n \quad \blacksquare
\]

(184.1) Let \( \Pi^n \) be any \( n \)-place relation term \( (n \geq 0) \) in which none of \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) occur free. Now assume \( \Pi^n \downarrow \). Independently, we know that the closures of \( \eta \)-Conversion (48.3) are axioms. Hence, we know, for every \( n \geq 0 \):

\[
(\xi) \quad \forall F^n([\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n F^n x_1 \ldots x_n] = F^n)
\]

By hypothesis, \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) aren’t free in \( \Pi^n \), and so \( \Pi^n \) is substitutable for \( F \) in \([\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n F^n x_1 \ldots x_n] = F^n \). Hence, the provisos for applying Rule \( \forall E \) (94.1) are met so that we may conclude \([\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \Pi^n x_1 \ldots x_n] = \Pi^n \). \( \blacksquare \)

(184.2) Assume \( \Pi^n \downarrow \), where \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \) are any distinct individual variables none of which occur free in \( \Pi^n \). Then by (184.1), it follows that:

\[
(8) \quad [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \Pi^n x_1 \ldots x_n] = \Pi^n
\]

But then, where \( \nu_1, \ldots, \nu_n \) are any distinct variables not free in \( \Pi^n \), we know:

\[
[\lambda \nu_1 \ldots \nu_n \Pi^n \nu_1 \ldots \nu_n] \text{ is an alphabetic variant of } [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \Pi^n x_1 \ldots x_n]
\]

Hence \([\lambda \nu_1 \ldots \nu_n \Pi^n \nu_1 \ldots \nu_n] = \Pi^n \) is an alphabetic variant of (8) and so follows from (8) by the Rule of Alphabetic Variants (115). \( \blacksquare \)

(185) We prove this by cases.

Case 1: \( \rho' \) is an immediate \( \eta \)-variant of \( \rho \) with respect to \( \Pi^n \). We have two subcases:

Subcase A: \( n = 0 \). Then \( \Pi^0 \) is some formula \( \varphi \) and either (a) \( \varphi \) is a subterm of \( \rho \) and \( \rho' \) results from \( \rho \) by replacing \( \varphi \) by \( [\lambda \varphi] \) or (b) \( [\lambda \varphi] \) is a subterm of \( \rho \) and \( \rho' \) results from \( \rho \) by replacing \( [\lambda \varphi] \) by \( \varphi \). Hence, by existentially generalizing on \( \Pi^0 \), the sequence \( \rho, \rho' \) is a witness to the fact that \( \rho' \) is an \( \eta \)-variant of \( \rho \), by definition (183.5). Since we already know \( \vdash \Pi^0 \downarrow \) (105.1), we need only assume
\( \rho \downarrow \) to prove Rule \( \eta C \). By Rule \( =I \), it follows that \( \vdash \rho = \rho \). But since we know both \( [\lambda \varphi] = \varphi \), by (112.1), and \( \varphi = [\lambda \varphi] \), by symmetry of identity, we may infer \( \vdash \rho = \rho' \) from the fact that \( \vdash \rho = \rho \), by Rule \( =E \), in either case (a) and (b).

**Subcase B:** \( n \geq 1 \). Then, by definition (183.4), either (a) \( \Pi^n \) is a subterm of \( \rho \) and \( \rho' \) results from \( \rho \) by replacing \( \Pi^n \) by an \( \eta \)-expansion \( [\lambda \nu_1 \ldots \nu_n \Pi^n \nu_1 \ldots \nu_n] \) or (b) the elementary expression \( [\lambda \nu_1 \ldots \nu_n \Pi^n \nu_1 \ldots \nu_n] \) is a subterm of \( \rho \) and \( \rho' \) results from \( \rho \) by replacing \( [\lambda \nu_1 \ldots \nu_n \Pi^n \nu_1 \ldots \nu_n] \) by its \( \eta \)-contraction \( \Pi^n \). Hence, by existentially generalizing on \( \Pi^n \), the sequence \( \rho, \rho' \) is a witness to the fact that \( \rho' \) is an \( \eta \)-variant of \( \rho \), by definition (183.5). Now to show Rule \( \eta C \), we need only assume \( \vdash \rho \downarrow \) and \( \vdash \Pi^n \downarrow \) (to show \( \vdash \rho = \rho' \)), since all the other conditions of the rule are satisfied. From \( \vdash \Pi^n \downarrow \) and the fact that (184.2) is a theorem, it follows by (64.6) that:

\[
(\delta) \vdash [\lambda \nu_1 \ldots \nu_n \Pi^n \nu_1 \ldots \nu_n] = \Pi^n
\]

By symmetry of identity, we also know:

\[
(\xi) \vdash \Pi^n = [\lambda \nu_1 \ldots \nu_n \Pi^n \nu_1 \ldots \nu_n]
\]

Moreover, since \( \vdash \rho \downarrow \) by assumption, we know by Rule \( =I \) that:

\[
(\zeta) \vdash \rho = \rho
\]

Then in case (a), \( (\xi) \) and \( (\zeta) \) imply \( \rho = \rho' \) by Rule \( =E \) (111), and in case (b), \( (\delta) \) and \( (\zeta) \) imply \( \rho = \rho' \) by Rule \( =E \).

**Case 2:** \( \rho' \) is an \( \eta \)-variant of \( \rho \) but not an immediate \( \eta \)-variant with respect to \( \Pi^n \). To prove Rule \( \eta C \), we may assume (a) \( \rho \downarrow \), (b) the witness to the fact that \( \rho' \) is an \( \eta \)-variant of \( \rho \) is the sequence \( \rho_1, \ldots, \rho_m \), for which \( \rho = \rho_1 \) and \( \rho' = \rho_m \) (and so \( m \geq 3 \), since we \( \rho' \) is not an immediate \( \eta \)-variant), and (c) for each \( 1 \leq i \leq m - 1 \), if \( \rho_{i+1} \) is an immediate \( \eta \)-variant of \( \rho_i \) with respect to the \( n \)-place relation term \( \Pi^n \) (\( n \geq 1 \)), then \( \vdash \Pi^n \downarrow \). Then for each \( i, 1 \leq i \leq m - 1 \), it follows from Case 1 that \( \vdash \rho_i = \rho_{i+1} \). Hence, by \( m - 2 \) applications of the transitivity of identity (118.3), it follows that \( \vdash \rho = \rho' \).

\( (186.1) \) Assume both:

\[
(A) [\lambda z_1 \ldots z_n \chi^i_{\chi^1}] \downarrow \]

\[
(B) \xi\varphi = \xi\psi
\]

Now (A) implies, by Rule \( =I \):

\[
(C) [\lambda z_1 \ldots z_n \chi^i_{\chi^1}] = [\lambda z_1 \ldots z_n \chi^i_{\chi^1}]
\]

But where (\( \delta \)) is:

\[
(\delta) [\lambda z_1 \ldots z_n \chi] = [\lambda z_1 \ldots z_n \chi]
\]
then (C) is, by the definition of substitutions, \((\delta)^{ix\psi}_{y}\). Now since \(ix\varphi\) and \(ix\psi\) are, by hypothesis, both substitutable for \(y\) in \([\lambda z_1 \ldots z_n \chi]\), they are both substitutable for \(y\) in \((\delta)\). Hence, by Rule \(=E\) \((111)\), \((\delta)^{ix\psi}_{y}\) and (B), we may infer \((\delta')\), i.e., the result of substituting \(ix\psi\) for zero or more occurrences of \(ix\varphi\) in \((\delta)^{ix\psi}_{y}\). But the following is such a \((\delta')\):

\[
[\lambda z_1 \ldots z_n x_{ix\psi}^{x\varphi}] = [\lambda z_1 \ldots z_n x']
\]

since, by hypothesis, \(x'\) is the result of substituting \(ix\psi\) for one or more occurrences of \(ix\varphi\) in \(x_{ix\psi}^{x\varphi}\).

(186.2) (Exercise)

(187) \((\rightarrow)\) Exercise. \((\leftarrow)\) For conditional proof, assume:

\((\delta)\) \(\forall x(xF^1 \equiv xG^1)\)

to show \(F^1 = G^1\). By theorem \((117.1)\), we have to show:

\[
\Box \forall x(xF^1 \equiv xG^1)
\]

We can’t simply apply RN \((69)\) to \((\delta)\), for that would violate the conditions of application of the rule. But by the Barcan Formula \((167.1)\), it suffices to show:

\[
\forall x \Box (xF^1 \equiv xG^1)
\]

Since \(x\) is not free in our assumption \((\delta)\), it suffices by GEN to show \(\Box (xF^1 \equiv xG^1)\). We do this as follows. From \((\delta)\), it follows by Rule \(\forall E\) \((94.3)\) that:

\((\xi)\) \(xF^1 \equiv xG^1\)

Note that we independently know, by \((177.2)\), both:

\((\xi')\) \(xF^1 \equiv \Box xF^1\)

\((\omega')\) \(xG^1 \equiv \Box xG^1\)

So we can show \(\Box xF^1 \equiv \Box xG^1\) as follows:

\[
\Box xF^1 \equiv xF^1 \quad \text{by} \,(\xi), \text{commutativity of} \,\equiv \\
\equiv xG^1 \quad \text{by} \,(\xi) \\
\equiv \Box xG^1 \quad \text{by} \,(\omega)
\]

From this, we can reach \(\Box (xF^1 \equiv xG^1)\), by the right-to-left direction of \((177.5)\).

(189.1) Suppose \(\varphi\) contains \((a)\) no free occurrences of \(x_1, \ldots, x_n\) in any encoding formula subterms, and \((b)\) no free occurrences of \(F^n\). Then, from \((a)\) and \((39.2)\), we know \([\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi]\). It then follows by \(\beta\)-Conversion \((48.2)\) that:
\[ [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi] x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv \varphi \]

So by \( n \) applications of GEN:

\[ \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n ([\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi] x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv \varphi) \]

Since this claim has been established by a modally strict proof, it follows by RN (69) that:

\[ \Box \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n ([\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi] x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv \varphi) \]

Since \( F \) doesn’t occur free in \( \varphi \), the previous line has the form \( \psi [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi] \), i.e., the result of substituting \([\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi] \) for all the free occurrences of \( F \) in the formula:

\[ (\psi) \Box \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n (Fx_1 \ldots x_n \equiv \varphi) \]

From this and the fact that \([\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi] \downarrow \), it follows by \( \exists I \) that \( \exists F \psi \), i.e., that:

\[ \exists F \Box \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n (F x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv \varphi) \]

(189.2) This is just the 1-place case of (189.1). \( \Rightarrow \)

(190.1) Suppose, for reductio:

\[ [\lambda x \exists G(xG \& \neg Gx)] \downarrow \]

Note that the above \( \lambda \)-predicate has no free variables. Now consider the following instance of the Comprehension Principle for Abstract Objects (53):

\[ \exists x (A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv F = [\lambda x \exists G(xG \& \neg Gx)]) \]

Suppose \( a \) is such an object, so that we know \( a \downarrow \) and:

\[ (\xi) A!a \& \forall F(aF \equiv F = [\lambda x \exists G(xG \& \neg Gx)]) \]

Now, for notational convenience, abbreviate \([\lambda x \exists G(xG \& \neg Gx)] \) as \([\lambda x \varphi] \). Since either \([\lambda x \varphi] a \) or \( \neg [\lambda x \varphi] a \), we may reason each case to a contradiction. Assume \([\lambda x \varphi] a \). Then by Rule \( \beta C \) (182.1.a), \( \exists G(aG \& \neg Ga) \). Let \( P \) be such a property, so that we know \( P \downarrow, aP, \) and \( \neg Pa \). But from the first two, it follows from the second conjunct of \( (\xi) \) by \( \forall E \) that \( P = [\lambda x \varphi] \). So \( \neg [\lambda x \varphi] a \), contrary to hypothesis. Then assume \( \neg [\lambda x \varphi] a \). From this and the facts that \([\lambda x \varphi] \downarrow \) and \( a \downarrow \), Rule \( \beta C \) (182.2.b) implies \( \neg \exists G(aG \& \neg Ga) \), i.e., \( \forall G(aG \rightarrow Ga) \). Hence, \( a[\lambda x \varphi] \rightarrow [\lambda x \varphi] a \). But since \([\lambda x \varphi] \downarrow \), the second conjunct of \( (\xi) \) implies \( a[\lambda x \varphi] \equiv [\lambda x \varphi] = [\lambda x \varphi] \)

\(^{392}\)Thus, the fact that \( F \) doesn’t occur free in \( \varphi \) is essential to the proof, for otherwise the free occurrence of \( F \) in \( \varphi \) would be captured if we were to introduce \( \exists F \) to existentially generalize on the relation term \([\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \varphi] \). This would be an invalid application of \( \exists I \), like the ones discussed in the penultimate paragraph of (102).
and Rule =I (119) implies \([\lambda x \varphi]=\lambda x \varphi\). Hence, \(a[\lambda x \varphi]\), and so \([\lambda x \varphi]a\). Contradiction. \(\Rightarrow\)

\((190.2)\) (Exercise)

\((190.3)\) Assume, for reductio:

\( (\varepsilon) \ \forall y([\lambda z z=y] \downarrow) \)

Now by the Comprehension Principle for Abstract Objects (53), we know:

\[ \exists x (A!x \land \forall F (xF \equiv \exists y ([\lambda z z=y] \land \neg yF))) \]

Let \(a\) be such an object, so that we know both \(a\downarrow\) and:

\( (\xi) \ A!a \land \forall F \equiv \exists y (F = [\lambda z z=y] \land \neg yF)) \)

Then it follows from \((\varepsilon)\) that \([\lambda z z = a]\). So we may instantiate \([\lambda z z = a]\) into the second conjunct of \((\xi)\) to conclude:

\( (\zeta) \ a[\lambda z z = a] \equiv \exists y ([\lambda z z = a] = [\lambda z z = y] \land \neg y[\lambda z z = a]) \)

Now either \(a[\lambda z z = a]\) or \(\neg a[\lambda z z = a]\), but both cases lead to contradiction.

- Assume \(a[\lambda z z = a]\). Then by \((\zeta)\):

\[ \exists y ([\lambda z z = a] = [\lambda z z = y] \land \neg y[\lambda z z = a]) \]

Suppose \(b\) is such an object, so that \([\lambda z z = a] = [\lambda z z = b] \land \neg b[\lambda z z = a]\). Since \(a\downarrow\), we know by Rule =I that \(a = a\). From this and the facts that \([\lambda z z = a]\downarrow\) and \(a\downarrow\), it follows by Rule =C (182.2.a) that \([\lambda z z = a]a\). But we know \([\lambda z z = a] = [\lambda z z = b]\) and so by Rule =E, \([\lambda z z = b]a\). It follows by Rule =C (182.1.a) that \(a = b\), i.e., \(b = a\). But since we established \(\neg b[\lambda z z = a]\), it follows that \(\neg a[\lambda z z = a]\), contrary to hypothesis.

- Assume \(\neg a[\lambda z z = a]\). Then by \((\zeta)\):

\[ \neg \exists y ([\lambda z z = a] = [\lambda z z = y] \land \neg y[\lambda z z = a]) \]

i.e.,

\[ \forall y ([\lambda z z = a] = [\lambda z z = y] \rightarrow y[\lambda z z = a]) \]

Since \(a\downarrow\), we may instantiate the above to \(a\) to obtain:

\[ [\lambda z z = a] = [\lambda z z = a] \rightarrow a[\lambda z z = a] \]

But since we’ve established that \([\lambda z z = a]\downarrow\), we know by Rule =I that the antecedent of this last result holds. Hence, \(a[\lambda z z = a]\), contrary to hypothesis. \(\Rightarrow\)
(190.4) (Exercise) [Note: it is easier to prove this theorem with the help of a later theorem, namely, (266). But the preceding theorem shows the way towards a proof that doesn’t cite (266).]

(190.5) (Exercise)

(191.1) ★ Assume $\forall x Gx$. To prove our theorem, we need the following lemma, which holds under this assumption:

Lemma: $\forall x (Gy(y = x & \exists H(xH & \neg Hx)) \equiv \exists H(xH & \neg Hx))$

Let’s suppose, for the moment, that the Lemma holds (we’ll prove it at the end). Then assume, for reductio:

$[\forall x Gy(y = x & \exists H(xH & \neg Hx))] \downarrow$

Now suppose we simply abbreviate the $\lambda$-predicate in the above claim as $[\lambda x \varphi]$. Then since $[\lambda x \varphi]$ has no free variables (and, in particular, $x$ doesn’t occur free in $[\lambda x \varphi]$) and $x$ is substitutable for itself in the matrix of $[\lambda x \varphi]$, it follows from the above claim, by (181.1), that:

(8) $\forall x ([\lambda x \varphi]x \equiv Gy(y = x & \exists H(xH & \neg Hx)))]$

But from this and the Lemma, it follows by (100.10) that:

$\forall x ([\lambda x \varphi]x \equiv \exists H(xH & \neg Hx))$

Since $[\lambda x \varphi]\downarrow$, it follow by $\exists I$ that:

$\exists F \forall x (Fx \equiv \exists H(xH & \neg Hx))$

But this contradicts (190.2). So it remains only to show the Lemma holds under the assumption $\forall x Gx$.

Proof of the Lemma: We gave a proof sketch of this in footnote 29. But here is a proof sketch that cites the theorems we’ve now established. By GEN, it suffices to show:

$Gy(y = x & \exists H(xH & \neg Hx)) \equiv \exists H(xH & \neg Hx)$

But this follows, by biconditional syllogism, from the following two biconditionals:

(A) $Gy(y = x & \exists H(xH & \neg Hx)) \equiv \exists ! y(y = x & \exists H(xH & \neg Hx))$

(B) $\exists ! y(y = x & \exists H(xH & \neg Hx)) \equiv \exists H(xH & \neg Hx)$

Proof of (A). We prove both directions. $(\to)$ Assume $Gy(y = x & \exists H(xH & \neg Hx))$. Then by axiom (39.5.a), $y(y = x & \exists H(xH & \neg Hx)) \downarrow$. So by (144.1)★, $\exists ! y(y = x & \exists H(xH & \neg Hx))$. $(\leftarrow)$ Assume $\exists ! y(y = x & \exists H(xH & \neg Hx))$. Let $a$ be such an object so that, by the definition of the unique existence quantifier, we know both:
\[ a = x \land \exists H (xH \land \neg Hx) \]
\[ \forall z(z = x \land \exists H (xH \land \neg Hx) \rightarrow z = a) \]

But recall that we’re under the assumption \( \forall x Gx \). Hence \( Ga \). So if we conjoin the above two claims with \( Ga \), it follows by \( \exists I \) that there is an object \( y \) (namely \( a \)) such that (i) \( y = x \land \exists H (xH \land \neg Hx) \), (ii) \( \forall z(z = x \land \exists H (xH \land \neg Hx) \rightarrow z = y) \), and (iii) \( Gy \). Hence, by Russell’s theory of descriptions (143*), \( G(y = x \land \exists H (xH \land \neg Hx)) \).

Proof of (B). Again, we prove both directions. \( (\rightarrow) \) Assume \( \exists ! y (y = x \land \exists H (xH \land \neg Hx)) \). Then, as before, let \( a \) be such an object, so that we know, among other things, that \( a = x \land \exists H (xH \land \neg Hx) \). Then it follows that \( \exists H (xH \land \neg Hx) \). \( (\leftarrow) \)

Assume \( \exists H (xH \land \neg Hx) \). Since we know \( x = x \) by the reflexivity of identity, it follows that:

\( (\zeta) \ x = x \land \exists H (xH \land \neg Hx) \)

Moreover, it is trivial that:

\( (\omega) \ \forall z(z = x \land \exists H (xH \land \neg Hx) \rightarrow z = x) \)

So if we conjoin \( (\zeta) \) and \( (\omega) \) and apply \( \exists I \), it follows that:

\[ \exists y(y = x \land \exists H (xH \land \neg Hx) \land \forall z(z = x \land \exists H (xH \land \neg Hx) \rightarrow z = y)) \]

So by the definition of the unique existence quantifier, \( \exists ! y(y = x \land \exists H (xH \land \neg Hx)). \star \)

(191.2)* (Exercise)

\( (192) \) Let \( \varphi \) be any formula with no free occurrences of \( p \). Since \( \varphi \equiv \varphi \) is an instance of the modally strict theorem (89.3.a), it follows by RN that \( \Box (\varphi \equiv \varphi) \). But by (105.2), we know that \( \varphi \downarrow \). Since \( p \) doesn’t occur free in \( \varphi \), we may use Rule \( \exists I \) (102.1) to conclude \( \exists p \Box (p \equiv p) \). \star

(193.1) Assume \( \Diamond \neg \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n (F^n x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv G^n x_1 \ldots x_n) \), which by (158.11), implies \( \neg \Box \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n (F^n x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv G^n x_1 \ldots x_n) \). Then by modus tollens and (109.1), \( F^n \not\equiv G^n \). \star

(193.2) Let \( F \) and \( G \) be \( n \)-place relation variables \( (n \geq 0) \) and assume the antecedent:

\( (\delta) \ \Diamond (\varphi \not\equiv \varphi') \)

where \( G \) is substitutable for \( F \) in \( \varphi \) and \( \varphi' \) is the result of substituting \( G \) for one or more occurrences of \( F \) in \( \varphi \). Now the following is an instance of a modally strict theorem (89.4.h):

\( (\xi) \ (\varphi \not\equiv \varphi') \equiv ((\varphi \land \neg \varphi') \lor (\neg \varphi \land \varphi')) \)
It follows from (θ) and (ξ) by the Rule of Substitution (160.1) that:

$$\diamond((\varphi \& \neg \varphi') \lor (\neg \varphi \& \varphi'))$$

Hence, by (162.2), $$\diamond(\varphi \& \neg \varphi') \lor \diamond(\neg \varphi \& \varphi').$$ We show that $$F \neq G$$ in both cases.

- $$\diamond(\varphi \& \neg \varphi').$$ Since it is a modally strict theorem that $$\varphi \& \neg \varphi'$$ is equivalent to $$\neg(\varphi \rightarrow \varphi'),$$ we may infer by the Rule of Substitution (160.1) that $$\diamond
\neg(\varphi \rightarrow \varphi'),$$ i.e., $$\neg \Box (\varphi \rightarrow \varphi').$$ But since $$G$$ is substitutable for $$F$$ in $$\varphi$$ and $$\varphi'$$ is the result of substituting $$G$$ for one or more occurrences of $$F$$ in $$\varphi,$$ the following is a modal closure of an instance of the axiom for the substitution of identicals (41) and hence an axiom:

$$\Box (F = G \rightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow \varphi'))$$

So by the K axiom (45.1):

$$\Box F = G \rightarrow \Box (\varphi \rightarrow \varphi')$$

But since we’ve established the negation of the consequent, it follows that $$\neg \Box F = G.$$ So by the principle of the necessity of identity (126.1), it follows that $$\neg F = G,$$ i.e., $$F \neq G.$$

- $$\diamond(\neg \varphi \& \varphi').$$ (Exercise)

(193.3) – (193.4) (Exercises)

(195) Let $$\Pi$$ be any $$n$$-place relation term ($$n \geq 0$$) in which $$x_1, \ldots, x_n$$ don’t occur free. Note that the Rule of Definition by Identity asserts the following with respect to the instance of definition (194) with $$\Pi$$ substituted for $$F$$:

$$\theta ((\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \neg \Pi x_1 \ldots x_n) \downarrow \rightarrow (\overline{\Pi} = [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \neg \Pi x_1 \ldots x_n]) \&
\neg(\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \neg \Pi x_1 \ldots x_n) \downarrow \rightarrow \neg \overline{\Pi})$$

But no matter whether $${\Pi} \downarrow$$ or $$\neg(\Pi \downarrow),$$ it is axiomatic that $$[\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \neg \Pi x_1 \ldots x_n] \downarrow.$$ For since $$x_1, \ldots, x_n$$ don’t occur free in $$\Pi,$$ the $$\lambda$$ doesn’t bind any variables in any encoding formula subterm. Hence, we may infer from the first conjunct of (θ) that $$\overline{\Pi} = [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \neg \Pi x_1 \ldots x_n].$$

(197.1) We reason by cases: Case: $$n \geq 1$$ and Case: $$n = 0.$$

Case $$n \geq 1.$$ By (195), we know $$\overline{F^n} = [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \neg Fx_1 \ldots x_n].$$ By the symmetry of identity, this implies $$[\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \neg Fx_1 \ldots x_n] = \overline{F^n}.$$ It follows from these facts, respectively, by the axiom for the substitution of identicals (41) that:

$$\overline{F^n} x_1 \ldots x_n \rightarrow [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \neg Fx_1 \ldots x_n] x_1 \ldots x_n$$

$$[\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \neg Fx_1 \ldots x_n] x_1 \ldots x_n \rightarrow \overline{F^n} x_1 \ldots x_n$$
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Hence:

\[(\vartheta) \quad F^n x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \neg F x_1 \ldots x_n] x_1 \ldots x_n\]

Moreover, since we know \([\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \neg F x_1 \ldots x_n] \downarrow\), it is a consequence of \(\beta\)-Conversion (48.2) that:

\[(\xi) \quad [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \neg F x_1 \ldots x_n] x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv \neg F x_1 \ldots x_n\]

But (\(\vartheta\)) and (\(\xi\)) imply:

\[F^n x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv \neg F x_1 \ldots x_n\]

Case \(n = 0\). By (195), we know \(\overline{p} = [\lambda \neg p]\). By theorem (109.2), this implies \(\square (\overline{p} \equiv [\lambda \neg p])\), and so \(\overline{p} \equiv [\lambda \neg p]\), by the T schema. But \([\lambda \neg p] \equiv \neg p\), by (112.2). Hence, \(\overline{p} \equiv \neg p\). \(\triangleright\)

(197.2) (Exercise)

(197.3) This is the 0-place case of (197.1). \(\triangleright\)

(197.4) This is the 0-place case of (197.2). \(\triangleright\)

(197.5) Assume, for reductio, that \(F^n = F^n\). Then by (108.1) and (108.2), both \(F^n \downarrow\) and \(F^n \downarrow\), and so we can apply the symmetry of identity (118.2) to conclude \(F^n = F^n\). Since theorem (197.1) is that \(F^n x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv \neg F^n x_1 \ldots x_n\), it follows by Rule \(\equiv E\) that \(F^n x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv \neg F^n x_1 \ldots x_n\), which is a contradiction (89.3.c). \(\triangleright\)

(197.6) This is the 0-place case of (197.5). \(\triangleright\)

(197.7) By (195), we know \(\overline{p} = [\lambda \neg p]\). Moreover, by the special case of \(\eta\)-Conversion (112.1), we have \([\lambda \neg p] \equiv \neg p\). Clearly, all of the terms mentioned thus far are significant, and so by the transitivity of identity (118.3), \(\overline{p} \equiv \neg p\). \(\triangleright\)

(197.8) Assume \(p = q\). Since \(\neg p\) is a formula, \((\neg p) \downarrow\) is an instance of theorem (105.2). So it follows by Rule \(\equiv I\) (119.1) that \(\neg p = \neg q\). Hence \(\neg p = \neg q\), by Rule \(\equiv E\) (111). \(\triangleright\)

(197.9) (Exercise)

(200.1) \(\rightarrow\) Assume NonContingent\((F)\). Then by the 1-place case of definition (198.3) and Rule \(\equiv d\ E\) (91.2), we know:

(A) Necessary\((F)\) \(\lor\) Impossible\((F)\)

Given (A) and definition (198.1), we may infer, by a relevant instance of (89.8.h) and biconditional syllogism, that:

(B) \(\square \forall x F x \lor\) Impossible\((F)\)
Independently, by Rule ≡S of Biconditional Simplification (92.1), we can infer, from definition (198.2) and the fact that \( F \downarrow \) (recall Remark (199)), that:

(C) \( \text{Impossible}(F) \equiv \Box \forall x \neg Fx \)

So from (B) and (C), it follows by (89.8.g) and biconditional syllogism that:

(D) \( \Box \forall x Fx \lor \Box \forall x \neg Fx \)

Now we know by (197.2) and (197.1), respectively, that the following are \( \Box - \) theorems: \( \neg \overline{Fx} \equiv Fx \) and \( \overline{Fx} \equiv \neg Fx \). Applying the commutativity of \( \equiv \) to each, we therefore have the following \( \Box - \) theorems:

(E) \( Fx \equiv \neg \overline{Fx} \)

(F) \( \neg Fx \equiv \overline{Fx} \)

Hence, from (D), (E), and (F), it follows by two applications of the Rule of Substitution (160.1) that:

\( \Box \forall x \neg \overline{Fx} \lor \Box \forall x \overline{Fx} \)

And by the commutativity of \( \lor \), this implies:

(G) \( \Box \forall x \overline{Fx} \lor \Box \forall x \neg \overline{Fx} \)

From the commuted form of definition (198.1) and (G) it follows by an instance of (89.8.h) that:

(H) \( \text{Necessary}(\overline{F}) \lor \Box \forall x \neg \overline{Fx} \)

Independently, by Rule \( \equiv S \) of Biconditional Simplification (92.1), we know that definition (198.2) and the fact that \( F \downarrow \) jointly imply the following equivalence:

(I) \( \text{Impossible}(\overline{F}) \equiv \Box \forall x \neg \overline{Fx} \)

If we start with the commuted form of (I) and then consider (H), we may conclude, by (89.8.g), that:

\( \text{Necessary}(\overline{F}) \lor \text{Impossible}(\overline{F}) \)

Hence, \( \text{NonContingent}(\overline{F}) \), by definition (198.3). (\( \rightarrow \)) Reverse the reasoning. (\( \Leftarrow \)) Assume \( \text{Contingent}(F) \). Its definition (198.4) and the axiom \( F \downarrow \) imply, by Rule \( \equiv S \) of Biconditional Simplification (92.1):

(A) \( \neg (\text{Necessary}(F) \lor \text{Impossible}(F)) \)

From (A) and the modally strict biconditional introduced by definition (198.1), we may infer, by the Rule of Substitution for Defined Formulas (160.2), that:
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(B) \( \neg(\Box \forall x Fx \lor \text{Impossible}(F)) \)

Independently, by Rule \( \equiv S \) of Biconditional Simplification (92.1), definition (198.2) and the axiom \( F \downarrow \) imply the modally strict theorem:

(C) \( \text{Impossible}(F) \equiv \Box \forall x \neg Fx \)

So by the Rule of Substitution (160.1), it follows from (B) and (C) that:

\( \neg(\Box \forall x Fx \lor \Box \forall x \neg Fx) \)

By De Morgan’s Law (89.5.d), it follows that:

\( \neg \Box \forall x Fx \land \neg \Box \forall x \neg Fx \)

Using (158.11) on both conjuncts, it follows that:

\( \Diamond \neg \forall x Fx \land \Diamond \neg \forall x \neg Fx \)

If we consider the form of the left conjunct and consider a modally-strict quantifier-negation \( \Box \)-theorem (104.2), we may infer by the Rule of Substitution (160.1) that:

\( \Diamond \exists x \neg Fx \land \Diamond \neg \forall x \neg Fx \)

If we consider the form of the right conjunct and consider the modally strict biconditional introduced by the definition of \( \exists \) (18.4), it follows by the Rule of Substitution for Defined Formulas (160.2) that:

\( \Diamond \exists x \neg Fx \land \Diamond \exists Fx \)

Finally, by the commutativity of \( \land \) (89.2.a), it follows that:

\( \Diamond \exists Fx \land \Diamond \exists x \neg Fx \)

(\( \rightarrow \)) Reverse the reasoning. \( \Rightarrow \)

(200.3) (\( \rightarrow \)) Assume Contingent \( (F) \). Its definition (198.4) and the axiom \( F \downarrow \) imply, by Rule \( \equiv S \) (92.1):

\( \neg(\text{Necessary}(F) \lor \text{Impossible}(F)) \)

From this and the modally strict biconditional introduced by definition (198.1), we may infer, by the Rule of Substitution for Defined Formulas (160.2), that:

\( \neg(\Box \forall x Fx \lor \text{Impossible}(F)) \)

And by now familiar reasoning, definition (198.2) and the axiom \( F \downarrow \) independently imply, by the special case of Rule \( \equiv S \), the modally strict biconditional:

\( \text{Impossible}(F) \equiv \Box \forall x \neg Fx \)
So, by the Rule of Substitution (160.1), the last two displayed results imply:

\[(\varphi) \neg (\Box \forall x Fx \lor \Box \forall x \neg Fx)\]

Now we know by (197.2) and (197.1), respectively, that the following are □-theorems: \(\neg \overline{Fx} \equiv Fx\) and \(\overline{Fx} \equiv \neg Fx\). Applying the commutativity of \(\equiv\) to both, we therefore have, respectively, the following □-theorems:

(a) \(Fx \equiv \neg \overline{Fx}\)

(b) \(\neg Fx \equiv \overline{Fx}\)

Then (\(\varphi\)), (a) and (b) imply, by two applications of the Rule of Substitution (160.1) that:

\[(\xi) \neg (\Box \forall x \neg \overline{Fx} \lor \Box \forall x \overline{Fx})\]

Now every instance of the commutativity of \(\lor\) is a modally strict theorem. So from the relevant instance of the commutativity of \(\lor\) and the Rule of Substitution (160.1) it follows from (\(\xi\)) that:

\[\neg (\Box \forall x \overline{Fx} \lor \Box \forall x \neg \overline{Fx})\]

From this and the modally strict biconditional introduced by definition (198.1), we may infer, by the Rule of Substitution for Defined Formulas (160.2):

\[(\zeta) \neg (\text{Necessary} \overline{F} \lor \Box \forall x \neg \overline{Fx})\]

Independently, definition (198.2) and the fact that \(\overline{F} \downarrow\) imply, by the special case of Rule \(\equiv S\):

\[\text{Impossible}(\overline{F}) \equiv \Box \forall x \neg \overline{Fx}\]

So by the Rule of Substitution (160.1), (\(\zeta\)) and the commuted form of this last result imply:

\[\neg (\text{Necessary}(\overline{F}) \lor \text{Impossible}(\overline{F}))\]

Hence, by conjoining the fact that \(\overline{F} \downarrow\) with this last fact, it follows by definition (198.4) that \(\text{Contingent}(\overline{F})\). (←) Reverse the reasoning. ≈

(201.1) By definition (198.1) and the Rule of Alphabetic Variants (115), it suffices to show \(\Box \forall x Lx\). From the fact that \([\lambda x E!x \rightarrow E!x] \downarrow (39.2)\), it follows from \(\beta\)-Conversion (48.2) that:

\[\lambda x E!x \rightarrow E!x \equiv E!x \rightarrow E!x\]
Since the right side is a tautology, it follows that $[\lambda x E!x \rightarrow E!x]!x$, i.e., $Lx$, by definition of $L$ and Rule $=_{df}$ I of Definiendum Introduction (121.2.b). Since this is a theorem, we may apply GEN and conclude $\forall xLx$. Since this is a $\Box$-theorem, it follows by RN that $\Box\forall xLx$. \(\star\)

(201.2) From (197.2) and the commutativity of $\equiv$, we know $Fx \equiv \neg Fx$. By two applications of GEN, it then follows that $\forall F\forall x(Fx \equiv \neg Fx)$. Since $L$ clearly exists, given its definition, it follows that:

(a) $\forall x(Lx \equiv \neg Lx)$

Independently, from theorem (201.1), definition (198.1), and Rule $\equiv_{df} E$, it follows that $\Box\forall xLx$. So by the T schema (45.2):

(b) $\forall xLx$

By (100.3), it follows from (a) and (b) that:

$\forall x\neg Lx$

Since this is a $\Box$-theorem, it follows by RN that $\Box\forall x\neg Lx$. Since we also know $L_{\downarrow}$, it follows from definition (198.2) and Rule $\equiv_{df} I$ that Impossible($\neg L$). \(\star\)

(201.3) (Exercise)

(201.4) This follows either by theorems (201.3) and (200.1), or by theorem (201.2) and definition (198.3). \(\star\)

(201.5) (Exercise) [Use (201.3), (201.4), and facts about the distinctness of properties that are negations of one another, or use (193.1).]

(202.1) We may reason as follows:\[393\]

\[
\exists x(Fx \& \neg Fx) \equiv \exists x(\neg Fx \& \neg \neg Fx) \quad \text{by (167.3) and (167.4)}
\]

\[
\equiv \exists x((\neg Fx \& \neg \neg Fx) \quad \text{(165.11) and (159.3)}
\]

\[
\equiv \exists x((\neg Fx \& \neg Fx) \quad \text{by (89.2.a) and (159.3)}
\]

\[
\equiv \exists x(\neg Fx \& \neg Fx) \quad \text{commute (165.11), and (159.3)}
\]

\[
\equiv \exists x(\neg Fx \& \neg Fx) \quad \text{by (167.4) and (167.3)} \quad \star
\]

(202.2) Apply (197.1), (197.2) and the Rule of Substitution (160.1) to the right-hand condition of (202.1). \(\star\)

(203.1) We want to show $\exists x(E!x \& \neg E!x)$. By CBF $\Diamond (167.4)$, it suffices to show $\exists x(\Diamond E!x \& \neg \Diamond E!x)$. By the commuted version of an appropriate instance of (165.11) and the Rule of Substitution (160.1), it suffices to show $\exists x(\neg E!x \& \neg \neg E!x)$. We prove this by first noting that by BF $\Diamond (167.3)$, axiom (45.4) implies $\exists x(\Diamond E!x \& \neg \neg \Diamond E!x)$. Suppose $a$ is such an object, so that we know $\Diamond (E!a \& \neg \neg E!a)$. By (162.3), this implies:

\[393\]The following proof by Uri Nodelman simplified my original.
(8) \( \Diamond E!a \& \Diamond \neg \Diamond E!a \)

Now since \( \neg \Diamond E!a \equiv \Diamond \neg E!a \) is an instance of a modally strict theorem (44.1), we may infer from (8) by the Rule of Substitution (160.1) that:

(ξ) \( \Diamond E!a \& \Diamond \neg \Diamond E!a \)

But as an instance of the commuted form of (164.4), we know \( \Diamond \neg E!a \equiv \Diamond \neg \Diamond E!a \). From this last fact and (ξ) it follows by (89.4.f) that:

(ζ) \( \Diamond E!a \& \Diamond \neg E!a \)

But the right conjunct of (ζ) implies \( \neg \Diamond E!a \), by (164.3). So if we conjoin the left conjunct of (ζ) with this last fact, we have established \( \Diamond E!a \& \Diamond \neg \Diamond E!a \). Hence, \( \exists x (\Diamond E!x \& \Diamond \neg \Diamond E!x) \), which is what sufficed to show. ⊢

(203.2) Apply GEN to theorem (202.1), instantiate the result to \( E! \) (which clearly exists), and then apply biconditional reasoning to the resulting instance and (203.1). ⊢

(203.3) By (203.1) and (168.4). ⊢

(203.4) By (203.2) and (168.4). ⊢

(203.5) By (200.2), (203.3) and (203.4). ⊢

(203.6) From (203.5) and (200.3). ⊢

(203.7) (Exercise)

(204.1) Assume \textit{NonContingent}(F). Then by definition (198.3):

(8) \textit{Necessary}(F) \lor \textit{Impossible}(F)

Now assume, for reductio, that \( \exists G(\textit{Contingent}(G) \& G \equiv F) \). Let \( P \) be an arbitrary such property, so that we have \textit{Contingent}(P) \& P \equiv F. Given the second conjunct and Rule \( \equiv \textit{E} \), the first conjunct implies that \textit{Contingent}(F). Now, independently, from definition (198.4) and the axiom \( p \downarrow \), it follows by Rule \( \equiv \textit{S} \) (92.1) that:

\[ \textit{Contingent}(F) \equiv \neg (\textit{Necessary}(F) \lor \textit{Impossible}(F)) \]

Hence, \( \neg (\textit{Necessary}(F) \lor \textit{Impossible}(F)) \), which contradicts (8). ⊢

(204.2) (Exercise) [Hint: Use reasoning similar to that of (204.1).]

(204.3) (Exercise)

(205.1) (→) Assume \textit{NonContingent}(p). Then by the 0-place case of definition (198.3) and Rule \( \equiv \textit{E} \), we know \textit{Necessary}(p) \lor \textit{Impossible}(p). From definition (198.1) and this last fact, it follows by (89.8.h) and biconditional reasoning that \( \Box p \lor \textit{Impossible}(p) \). Now, independently, definition (198.2) and the axiom \( p \downarrow \) imply, by Rule \( \equiv \textit{S} \) (92.1), the biconditional \( \textit{Impossible}(p) \equiv \Box \neg p \). So by (89.8.g) and biconditional reasoning, it follows that:
Indepndently, if we commute □-theorems (197.4) and (197.3), respectively, then we know that \( p \equiv \neg p \) and \( \neg p \equiv \neg \neg p \) are □-theorems. So by Rule RE (157.3), respectively:

\[
\begin{align*}
(a) & \quad \Box p \equiv \Box \neg p \\
(b) & \quad \Box \neg p \equiv \Box p 
\end{align*}
\]

From (a) and (b), it follows by (89.8.h) that \( \Box \neg p \lor \Box \neg p \lor \Box \neg p \). By the commutativity of ∨, this implies: \( \Box p \lor \Box \neg p \). From definition (198.1) and this last fact, we may infer by (89.8.h) that Necessary(\( p \)) ∨ \Box \neg p.\) Independently, by applying the special case of Rule \( \equiv \text{S} \) to definition (198.2) and the axiom \( p \downarrow \), we know the following is a modally strict theorem: Impossible(\( p \)) \equiv \Box \neg p.\) Hence, by now familiar reasoning, Necessary(\( p \)) ∨ Impossible(\( p \)). So NonContingent(\( p \)), by definition (198.3) and Rule \( \equiv \text{df} \). (←) Reverse the reasoning. \( \Rightarrow \)

(205.2) Assume Contingent(\( p \)). Definition (198.4) and the axiom \( p \downarrow \) then imply, by Rule \( \equiv \text{S} \) (92.1), \( \neg \text{Necessary}(p) \lor \text{Impossible}(p) \)). From this and (the modally strict biconditional introduced by) definition (198.1), it follows by the Rule of Substitution for Defined Formulas (160.2) that \( \neg (\Box p \lor \Box \neg p) \). And since we know, by now familiar reasoning, that \( \text{Impossible}(p) \equiv \Box \neg p \) is a modally strict theorem, it follows by the Rule of Substitution (160.1) that:

\( \neg (\Box p \lor \Box \neg p) \)

By De Morgan’s Law (89.5.d), it follows that:

\( \neg \Box p \land \neg \Box \neg p \)

The modally strict theorem (158.11) and this last fact imply, by (89.4.e), that \( \Diamond \neg p \land \Diamond \Box \neg p \). And from the definition of \( \Diamond \) and this last fact, it follows by now familiar reasoning from (89.4f) that:

\( \Diamond \neg p \land \Diamond p \)

Finally, by the commutativity of \& (89.2.a), it follows that:

\( \Diamond p \land \Diamond \neg p \)

(←) Reverse the reasoning. \( \Rightarrow \)

(205.3) (→) Assume Contingent(\( p \)). Then its definition (198.4) and the axiom \( p \downarrow \) imply, by the special case of Rule \( \equiv \text{S} \), \( \neg \text{Necessary}(p) \lor \text{Impossible}(p) \)). This and definition (198.1) imply, by the Rule of Substitution (160.1), \( \neg (\Box p \lor \Box \neg p) \). Since we know, by now familiar reasoning, that Impossible(\( p \)) \equiv \Box \neg p \) is a modally strict theorem, it follows by the Rule of Substitution (160.1) that:
(8) \( \neg(\Box p \lor \Box \neg p) \)

Independently, if we commute (197.4) and (197.3), we have as \( \Box \)-theorems:

(a) \( p \equiv \neg \overline{p} \)

(b) \( \neg p \equiv \overline{p} \)

From (8) and (a), it follows by the Rule of Substitution (160.1) that \( \neg(\Box \neg \overline{p} \lor \Box \neg p) \), and from this result and (b), it follows by the same rule that:

\( \neg(\Box \neg p \lor \Box p) \)

So we may use an appropriate instance of the commutativity of \( \lor \) (which is a \( \Box \)-theorem) and the Rule of Substitution (160.1) to transform the last formula into:

\( \neg(\Box p \lor \Box \neg p) \)

From this and definition (198.1), we obtain \( \neg(Necessary(\overline{p}) \lor \Box \neg \overline{p}) \), by the Rule of Substitution (160.1). Independently, \( Impossible(\overline{p}) \equiv \Box \neg \overline{p} \) is a modally strict theorem, by now familiar reasoning. By commuting this last result and combining it with the previous result, it follows by the Rule of Substitution (160.1) that:

\( \neg(Necessary(\overline{p}) \lor Impossible(\overline{p})) \)

Conjoining \( \bot \) with this last result yields \( Contingent(\overline{p}) \), by (198.3). \( \Rightarrow \) Reverse the reasoning.

(206.1) We’re given the definition \( p_0 =_{df} \forall x(E!x \rightarrow E!x) \). Now from \( E!x \rightarrow E!x \), GEN and RN, we have \( \Box \forall x(E!x \rightarrow E!x) \). By definition of \( p_0 \) and Rule =_{df}I, it follows that \( \Box p_0 \). Hence by definition (198.1) and Rule =_{df}I, it follows that \( Necessary(p_0) \). \( \Rightarrow \)

(206.2) By the reasoning in (206.1), we established the following as a theorem:

(a) \( \Box p_0 \)

Note that by the commutativity of \( \equiv \), it follows from theorem (197.4) that \( p \equiv \neg \overline{p} \), and hence by GEN that \( \forall p(p \equiv \neg \overline{p}) \). Since \( p_0 \) clearly exists, we can instantiate this last claim to \( p_0 \) to obtain \( p_0 \equiv \neg \overline{p_0} \). From (a) and this last \( \Box \)-theorem, the Rule of Substitution (160.1) yields \( \Box \neg \overline{p_0} \). We can conjoin the fact (exercise) that \( \overline{p_0} \) with this last result and apply definition (198.2) to conclude \( Impossible(\overline{p_0}) \). \( \Rightarrow \)

(206.3) – (206.5) (Exercises)

(207)⋆ Suppose, for reductio, that \( \exists x(E!x \& \neg \exists \overline{a} E!x) \). Let \( a \) be such an object, so that we know:
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Then the second conjunct of (θ) implies $\vdash \neg \neg \alpha$, by the right-to-left direction of axiom (44.1). Then by axiom (43)\*, it follows that $\neg \alpha$, which contradicts the first conjunct of (θ).

(208.1) Suppose, for reductio, that $\vdash \exists x (E!x \& \neg \neg \alpha \neg x y)$. Then it follows by (139.10) that $\exists x \neg \vdash (E!x \& \neg \neg \alpha \neg x y)$. Suppose $\alpha$ is such an object, so that we know $\vdash (E! \neg x \& \neg \neg \alpha \neg x y)$. But this implies a contradiction, by the following reasoning:

$$\vdash (E! \neg x \& \neg \neg \alpha \neg x y) \rightarrow \neg \neg \alpha \neg x y \text{ by (139.2)}$$
$$\rightarrow \alpha \neg x y \& \neg \neg \alpha \neg x y \text{ commute (44.1), (89.4.f)}$$
$$\rightarrow \alpha \neg x y \& \neg \neg \alpha \neg x y \text{ commute (44.4), (160.1)}$$

(208.2) By (208.1), we know $\neg \neg \neg \exists x (E!x \& \neg \neg \alpha \neg x y)$. Hence, $\vdash \neg \neg \exists x (E!x \& \neg \neg \alpha \neg x y)$, by (44.1). But then by (164.3), $\Diamond \neg \neg \exists x (E!x \& \neg \neg \alpha \neg x y)$.

(208.3) Axiom (45.4) asserts $\Diamond \exists x (E!x \& \neg \neg \alpha \neg x y)$. By BF $\Diamond$ (167.3), it follows that $\exists x (E!x \& \neg \neg \alpha \neg x y)$. Suppose $\alpha$ is such an object, so that we know $\Diamond (E! \neg x \& \neg \neg \alpha \neg x y)$. Then by (162.3), it follows that both:

$$(\theta) \Diamond \neg \neg \alpha \neg x y$$
$$(\xi) \Diamond \neg \neg \neg \alpha \neg x y$$

Now (ξ) implies $\neg \Box \neg \neg \alpha \neg x y$, by (158.11). But as an instance of the theorem (139.6), we know $\neg \vdash \exists x (E!x \& \neg \neg \alpha \neg x y)$, $\text{by (139.10)}$. But then by the 0-place case of definition (198.3), it follows that $\vdash \Diamond \neg \neg \exists x (E!x \& \neg \neg \alpha \neg x y)$.

(209.1) – (209.4) (Exercises)

(210.1) Assume NonContingent($p$). By the 0-place case of definition (198.3), it follows that Necessary($p$) $\lor$ Impossible($p$). Now assume, for reductio, that $\exists q (\text{Contingent}(q) \& q = p)$. Let $q_1$ be an arbitrary such proposition, so that $\text{Contingent}(q_1) \& q_1 = p$. Then Contingent($p$). But, independently, from definition (198.4) and the fact that $p \downarrow$, it follows by Rule $\equiv S$ that Contingent($p$) is equivalent to $\neg (\text{Necessary}(p) \lor \text{Impossible}(p))$. Contradiction.

(210.2) – (210.4) (Exercise)

(212.1) – (212.2) (Exercises)

(212.3) Assume ContingentlyTrue($p$). Then by definition (211.1) and Rule $\equiv dE$, we know:

$$(\theta) \ p \ & \ \Diamond \neg p$$
By (211.2), we have to show: $\neg p \& \Diamond\neg p$. By (197.4), the first conjunct of (8) implies $\neg p$. So it remains to show $\Diamond\neg p$. Now if we commute (197.3), we obtain, as a modally strict theorem, $\neg p \equiv \neg\Diamond p$. Hence it follows by the Rule of Substitution (160.1) from the second conjunct of (8) that $\Box\neg p$. $\Rightarrow$

(212.4) Assume ContingentlyFalse($p$). Then by definition (211.2), we know:

(8) $\neg p \& \Diamond p$

By (211.1), we have to show: $p \& \Diamond\neg p$. By (197.3), the first conjunct of (8) implies $p$. So it remains to show $\Diamond
\neg p$. Now if we commute (197.4), we obtain a modally strict proof of $p \equiv \neg p$. Hence it follows by the Rule of Substitution (160.1) from the second conjunct of (8) that $\Diamond\neg p$. $\Rightarrow$

(212.5) Assume ContingentlyTrue($p$) and Necessary($q$). Assume for reductio that $p = q$. Then Necessary($p$), i.e., $\Box p$, i.e., $\neg\Diamond \neg p$. But since $p$ is contingently false, it follows by definition (211) that $\Diamond \neg p$. Contradiction. $\Rightarrow$

(212.6) Assume ContingentlyFalse($p$) and Impossible($q$). Assume for reductio that $p = q$. Then Impossible($p$), and so it follows from definition (198.4) a fortiori that $\Box \neg p$, i.e., $\neg\Diamond p$. But since $p$ is contingently false, it follows by definition (211) that $\Diamond p$. Contradiction. $\Rightarrow$

(213.1)$\star$ By (207)$\star$ and the definition of $q_0$ as $\exists x(E!x \& \neg\exists!E!x)$, we know $\neg q_0$. By axiom (45.4) and the definition of $q_0$, we know $\Diamond q_0$. Hence, by $\&I$ and definition (211.2), it follows that ContingentlyFalse($q_0$). $\Rightarrow$

(213.2)$\star$ (Exercise)

(215.1) Since we’ve defined $q_0 =_df \exists x(E!x \& \neg\exists!E!x)$, axiom (45.4) implies, by Rule $=_df I$:

(8) $\Diamond q_0$

and theorem (208.2) implies:

(8) $\Diamond q_0$

From these two facts, we can reason by cases from the tautology $q_0 \lor \neg q_0$ to the conclusion $\exists p$ ContingentlyTrue($p$).

Assume $q_0$. From this and (8), we have $q_0 \& \Diamond q_0$. So, ContingentlyTrue($q_0$), by definition (211.1). Hence $\exists p$ ContingentlyTrue($p$).

Assume $\neg q_0$. From this and (8), we have $\neg q_0 \& \Diamond q_0$. So, ContingentlyFalse($q_0$), by definition (211.2). But then, since $q_0 \downarrow$, we may infer ContingentlyTrue($\Diamond q_0$), by (212.4). Since $q_0 \downarrow$, we may conclude $\exists p$ ContingentlyTrue($p$). $\Rightarrow$

(215.2) If we let $q_0$ be $\exists x(E!x \& \neg\exists!E!x)$, axiom (45.4) becomes:
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(θ) $\Diamond q_0$

and theorem (208.2) becomes:

(ξ) $\Diamond \neg q_0$

From these two facts, we can reason by cases from the tautology $q_0 \lor \neg q_0$ to the conclusion $\exists p \text{ContingentlyFalse}(p)$.

Assume $q_0$. From this and (ξ), we have $q_0 \land \Diamond \neg q_0$. So, $\text{ContingentlyTrue}(q_0)$, by definition (211.1). But then, since $q_0 \downarrow$, we may infer $\text{ContingentlyFalse}(\neg q_0)$, by (212.3). Since $\neg q_0 \downarrow$, we may conclude $\exists p \text{ContingentlyFalse}(p)$.

Assume $\neg q_0$. From this and (θ), we have $\neg q_0 \land \Diamond q_0$. So, $\text{ContingentlyFalse}(q_0)$, by definition (211.2). Hence, $\exists p \text{ContingentlyFalse}(p)$.

(215.2) [Simpler Proof] By (215.1), we know $\exists p \text{ContingentlyTrue}(p)$. Let $r$ be such a proposition, so that we know $\text{ContingentlyTrue}(r)$. (See the discussion in Remark 216 as to why this assumption doesn’t undermine the modal strictness of the reasoning.) Then since $r$ exists by hypothesis, we may infer $\text{ContingentlyFalse}(\neg r)$, by (212.3). But $\neg r \downarrow$, and so, $\exists p \text{ContingentlyFalse}(p)$.

(217.1) In the following, let:

$$Q_p = df [\lambda z \top]$$

Clearly, $Q_p \downarrow$, for every $p$. Before we begin our proof, note that the following, modally strict lemma governs $Q_p$:

(θ) $\forall p \forall x \Box (Q_p x \equiv p)$

Proof. As an instance of (181.3), $\forall x (\forall z \top x \equiv p)$ is a modally strict theorem. So by RN, $\Box \forall x (\forall z \top x \equiv p)$ and by BF (167.1), $\forall x \Box (\forall z \top x \equiv p)$.

And by GEN, $\forall p \forall x \Box (\forall z \top x \equiv p)$ is a theorem. Then by definition of $Q_p$,

$$\forall p \forall x (Q_p x \equiv p).$$

Now to prove our theorem, by (215.1), we know that there are contingently true propositions. Let $p_1$ be such a proposition, so that we know $p_1 \land \Diamond \neg p_1$.\footnote{Again, we emphasize that although this assumption is not a necessary truth, it won’t undermine the modal strictness of the reasoning, since the assumption will be discharged by $\exists E$ and so the theorem will depend only on (215.1). See Remark (71) and the discussion in Remark (216). More specifically, we will derive the present theorem from the assumption that $p_1 \land \Diamond \neg p_1$. But it then follows by $\exists E$ that our theorem is derivable from $\exists p (p \land \Diamond \neg p)$. Since latter is a modally strict theorem, by (215.1) and (211.1), our theorem will be proved from no assumptions. We develop the proof in detail below because it is important to see that it is modally strict, notwithstanding the introduction of assumptions that aren’t necessary truths.} Now consider $Q_{p_1}$, which we know exists. We now argue as follows:

"
(A) Show: $p_1 \vdash Q_{p_1} y$. By (64.10), it suffices to show $p_1 \rightarrow Q_{p_1} y$. So assume $p_1$.

Then by lemma (6), $\forall x \Diamond (Q_{p_1} x \equiv p_1)$. Hence $\Box (Q_{p_1} y \equiv p_1)$, and by the $T$ schema, $Q_{p_1} y \equiv p_1$. So $Q_{p_1} y$.

(B) Show: $\Diamond \neg p_1 \vdash \Diamond \neg Q_{p_1} y$. By (64.10), it suffices to show $\Diamond \neg p_1 \rightarrow \Diamond \neg Q_{p_1} y$.

By instantiating $p_1$ and $y$ into lemma (6), we know $\Box (Q_{p_1} y \equiv p_1)$. A fortiori, $\Box (Q_{p_1} y \rightarrow p_1)$. This implies $\Box (\neg p_1 \rightarrow \neg Q_{p_1})$. Hence by $K\Diamond$, $\Diamond \neg p_1 \rightarrow \Diamond \neg Q_{p_1}$.

(C) Infer from (A) and (B):

$p_1 \& \Diamond \neg p_1 \vdash Qy \& \Diamond \neg Qy$

by using the principle:

If $\varphi \vdash \psi$ and $\chi \vdash \theta$, then $\varphi \& \psi \vdash \chi \& \theta$

(D) By $\exists I$, we independently know: $Qy \& \Diamond \neg Qy \vdash \exists F \exists x (Fx \& \Diamond \neg Fx)$

(E) Hence from (C) and (D) it follows by (64.8) that:

$p_1 \& \Diamond \neg p_1 \vdash \exists F \exists x (Fx \& \Diamond \neg Fx)$

(F) It follows by $\exists E$ that:

$\exists p (p \& \Diamond \neg p) \vdash \exists F \exists x (Fx \& \Diamond \neg Fx)$

(G) But by by (215.1) and (211.1), $\exists p (p \& \Diamond \neg p)$ is a theorem, and so it follows from (F) that $\exists F \exists x (Fx \& \Diamond \neg Fx)$, by (64.8).

Since the reasoning in (A) – (G) is straightforward, it remains only to show the principle used in (C):

If $\varphi \vdash \psi$ and $\chi \vdash \theta$, then $\varphi \& \psi \vdash \chi \& \theta$

Proof. Assume $\varphi \vdash \psi$ and $\chi \vdash \theta$. Then by the Deduction Theorem, it follows, respectively, that $\varphi \rightarrow \psi$ and $\chi \rightarrow \theta$. So by Double Composition (89.8.d), $(\varphi \& \chi) \rightarrow (\psi \& \theta)$. But then by (64.10), we have: $\varphi \& \chi \rightarrow \varphi \& \psi \& \theta$.

(217.2) (Exercise)

(219.1) In the following, let:

$L =_{df} [\lambda x E! x \rightarrow E! x]$

$Q_p =_{df} [\lambda z p]$

Clearly, $L$ exists, and $Q_p$ exists for every proposition $p$. Before starting the proof proper, we first prove two modally strict lemmas:
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(8) \( \forall p(p \rightarrow \forall x(Lx \equiv Q_p x)) \)

*Proof. By GEN, we show \( p \rightarrow \forall x(Lx \equiv Q_p x) \). So assume \( p \). By GEN, it then suffices to show \( Lx \equiv Q_p x \). Since \( L \uparrow \) and \( Q_p \downarrow \), we independently know, by Strengthened \( \beta \)-Conversion (179) and the definitions of \( L \) and \( Q_p \):

\[
(\zeta) \quad Lx \equiv (E!x \rightarrow E!x)
\]

\[
(\omega) \quad Q_p x \equiv p
\]

Hence, to show \( Lx \equiv Q_p x \), it suffices to show \( (E!x \rightarrow E!x) \equiv p \). But the left side is a tautology (75) and the right side is true by assumption. So since both sides of the biconditional are true, the biconditional is true.

(\xi) \( \forall p(\Diamond \neg p \rightarrow \Diamond \neg \forall x(Lx \equiv Q_p x)) \)

*Proof. By GEN, we show \( \Diamond \neg p \rightarrow \Diamond \neg \forall x(Lx \equiv Q_p x) \). But we can infer this by RM\( \Diamond \) (157.2) from a modally strict proof of \( \neg p \rightarrow \neg \forall x(Lx \equiv Q_p x) \). So assume \( \neg p \). For reductio, assume \( \forall x(Lx \equiv Q_p x) \). Then, \( Lx \equiv Q_p x \). From (\( \zeta \)), and (\( \omega \)) above (which were established independently) and this last result, it follows that:

\[
(E!x \rightarrow E!x) \equiv p
\]

But since \( \neg p \) by assumption, it follows that \( \neg (E!x \rightarrow E!x) \), which contradicts the tautology \( E!x \rightarrow E!x \) (75).

Now to prove our theorem. By (215.1), we know that there are contingently true propositions. Let \( p_1 \) be such a proposition, so that we know \( p_1 \& \Diamond \neg p_1 \). We now show that \( L \) and \( Q_{p_1} \) are the witnesses to the theorem we’re trying to prove. The proof then, goes as follows:

(A) Show: \( p_1 \vdash \forall x(Lx \equiv Q_{p_1} x) \). By (64.10), it suffices to show \( p_1 \rightarrow \forall x(Lx \equiv Q_{p_1} x) \). This, however, is an instance of lemma (8).

(B) Show: \( \Diamond \neg p_1 \vdash \Diamond \neg \forall x(Lx \equiv Q_{p_1} x) \). But it suffices by (64.10) to show \( \Diamond \neg p_1 \rightarrow \Diamond \neg \forall x(Lx \equiv Q_{p_1} x) \). This, however, is an instance of lemma (\( \xi \)).

(C) It follows from (A) and (B) that:

\[
p_1 \& \Diamond \neg p_1 \vdash \forall x(Lx \equiv Q_{p_1} x) \& \Diamond \neg \forall x(Lx \equiv Q_{p_1} x)
\]

See footnote 394.

The principle used to go from (A) and (B) to (C) is:

If \( \phi \vdash \psi \) and \( \chi \vdash \theta \), then \( \phi \& \psi \vdash \chi \& \theta \)

To see that this holds, assume \( \phi \vdash \psi \) and \( \chi \vdash \theta \). Then by the Deduction Theorem, it follows, respectively, that \( \phi \rightarrow \psi \) and \( \chi \rightarrow \theta \). So by Double Composition (89.8.d), \( (\phi \& \chi) \rightarrow (\psi \& \theta) \). But then by (64.10), we have: \( \phi \& \chi \vdash \psi \& \theta \).
(D) But clearly, by \( \exists I \), we know the following about the conclusion of the derivation in (C):

\[
\forall x (Lx \equiv Qp, x) \& \Diamond \neg \forall x (Lx \equiv Qp, x) \vdash \exists F \exists G (\forall x (Fx \equiv Gx) \& \Diamond \neg \forall x (Fx \equiv Gx))
\]

(E) Hence, from (C) and (D) it follows by (64.8) that:

\[
p_1 \& \Diamond \neg p_1 \vdash \exists F \exists G (\forall x (Fx \equiv Gx) \& \Diamond \neg \forall x (Fx \equiv Gx))
\]

(F) It follows by \( \exists E \) that:

\[
\exists p(p \& \Diamond \neg p) \vdash \exists F \exists G (\forall x (Fx \equiv Gx) \& \Diamond \neg \forall x (Fx \equiv Gx))
\]

(G) But by (215.1) and (211.1), \( \exists p(p \& \Diamond \neg p) \) is a theorem, and so it follows from (F) that \( \vdash \exists F \exists G (\forall x (Fx \equiv Gx) \& \Diamond \neg \forall x (Fx \equiv Gx)) \), by (64.8).

(219.2) In the following, let:

\[
L =_d [\lambda x E!x \rightarrow E!x]
\]

\[
Qp =_d [\lambda z p]
\]

Clearly, \( L \) exists, and \( Qp \) exists for every proposition \( p \). Before starting the proof proper, we first prove two modally strict lemmas:

(8) \( \forall p(\neg p \rightarrow \neg \forall x (Lx \equiv Qp, x)) \)

**Proof.** By GEN, we show: \( \neg p \rightarrow \neg \forall x (Lx \equiv Qp, x) \). Assume \( \neg p \). For reductio, assume \( \forall x (Lx \equiv Qp, x) \). But by the definition of \( L \), we know \( \forall x Lx \). So it follows that \( \forall x Qp, x \). Hence, by definition of \( Qp \), \( \forall x (\lambda z p|x) \). But then \( (\lambda z p)x \), by VE, and by \( \beta \)-Conversion, \( p \). Contradiction.

(ξ) \( \forall p(\Diamond p \rightarrow \Diamond \forall x (Lx \equiv Qp, x)) \)

**Proof.** By GEN, we show: \( \Diamond p \rightarrow \Diamond \forall x (Lx \equiv Qp, x) \). But we can infer this by RMO(157.2) from a modally strict proof of \( p \rightarrow \forall x (Lx \equiv Qp, x) \). So assume \( p \). Then, by \( \beta \)-Conversion, \( (\lambda z p)x \). Hence, by definition of \( Qp, Qp, x \). Since \( x \) doesn’t occur free in any assumption, \( \forall x Qp, x \), by GEN. But we know \( \forall x Lx \), by definition and properties of \( L \). Hence, \( \forall x (Lx \equiv Qp, x) \).

Now we prove our theorem. By (215.2), we know that there are contingently false propositions. Let \( p_1 \) be such a proposition, so that we know \( \neg p_1 \& \Diamond p_1 \).

Now we are going to show that \( L \) and \( Q_{p_1} \), are the witnesses to the theorem we’re trying to prove. The proof, then, goes as follows:

(A) Show: \( \neg p_1 \vdash \neg \forall x (Lx \equiv Q_{p_1}, x) \). By (64.10), it suffices to show \( \neg p_1 \rightarrow \neg \forall x (Lx \equiv Q_{p_1}, x) \). This, however, is an instance of lemma (8).
(B) Show: \( \Diamond p_1 \vdash \Diamond \forall x (Lx \equiv Q_p, x) \). But it suffices, by (64.10), to show \( \Diamond p_1 \vdash \Diamond \forall x (Lx \equiv Q_p, x) \). This, however, is an instance of lemma (\( \xi \)).

(C) Then it follows from (A) and (B), by the reasoning in footnote 396, that:

\[ \neg p_1 \land \Diamond p_1 \vdash \neg \forall x (Lx \equiv Q_p, x) \land \Diamond \forall x (Lx \equiv Q_p, x) \]

(D) But clearly, by \( \exists I \), we also know the following about the conclusion of the derivation in (C):

\[ \neg \forall x (Lx \equiv Q_p, x) \land \Diamond \forall x (Lx \equiv Q_p, x) \]

(E) Hence, from (C) and (D), it follows by (64.8) that:

\[ \neg p_1 \land \Diamond p_1 \vdash \exists F \exists G (\neg \forall x (Fx \equiv Gx) \land \Diamond \forall x (Fx \equiv Gx)) \]

(F) It follows by \( \exists E \) that:

\[ \exists p (\neg p \land \Diamond p) \vdash \exists F \exists G (\neg \forall x (Fx \equiv Gx) \land \Diamond \forall x (Fx \equiv Gx)) \]

(G) But by (215.1) and (211.1), \( \exists p (\neg p \land \Diamond p) \) is a theorem, and so it follows from (F) that \( \vdash \exists F \exists G (\neg \forall x (Fx \equiv Gx) \land \Diamond \forall x (Fx \equiv Gx)) \), by (64.8).

(219.3) In the following, let:

\[ L \equiv \lambda x !x \rightarrow !x \]

\[ Q_p \equiv \lambda z p \]

Clearly, \( L \) exists, and \( Q_p \) exists for every proposition \( p \). Before starting the proof proper, we first prove two modally strict lemmas:

(\( \vartheta \)) \( \forall p (\exists ! \neg p \rightarrow \exists ! \forall x (Lx \equiv Q_p, x)) \)

*Proof.* In the proof of (219.2), we independently established, as lemma (\( \vartheta \)), that \( \forall p (\neg p \rightarrow \neg \forall x (Lx \equiv Q_p, x)) \). Since this is a theorem, it follows by the Rule of Actualization that \( \exists ! \forall p (\neg p \rightarrow \neg \forall x (Lx \equiv Q_p, x)) \). Hence by axiom (44.3), \( \forall p \exists ! (\neg p \rightarrow \neg \forall x (Lx \equiv Q_p, x)) \). But as an instance of axiom (44.2), the following is a modally strict theorem:

\[ \exists ! (\neg p \rightarrow \neg \forall x (Lx \equiv Q_p, x)) \equiv (\exists ! \neg p \rightarrow \exists ! \forall x (Lx \equiv Q_p, x)) \]

So (\( \vartheta \)) follows by a Rule of Substitution.

(\( \xi \)) \( \forall p (\Diamond p \rightarrow \Diamond \forall x (Lx \equiv Q_p, x)) \)

*Proof.* See the proof of (\( \xi \)) in (219.2).
Now we prove our theorem. Let \( q_0 \) again be the proposition \( \exists x(E!x \& \neg dE!x) \). Then it follows from (208.1) by axiom (44.1) that \( dE!q_0 \). Independently, by axiom (45.4), we know \( \diamond q_0 \). So both \( dE!q_0 \) and \( \diamond q_0 \) are theorems.

Now consider \( Q_{q_0} \). We now show that \( L \) and \( Q_{q_0} \), are the witnesses to the theorem we’re trying to prove. The proof, then, goes as follows:

(A) Show: \( dE!q_0 \vdash dE\forall x(Lx \equiv Q_{q_0}x) \). By (64.10), it suffices to show \( dE!q_0 \rightarrow dE\forall x(Lx \equiv Q_{q_0}x) \). This, however, is an instance of lemma (\( \vartheta \)).

(B) Show: \( \diamond q_0 \vdash \forall x(Lx \equiv Q_{q_0}x) \). But it suffices, by (64.10), to show \( \diamond q_0 \vdash \forall x(Lx \equiv Q_{q_0}x) \). This, however, is an instance of lemma (\( \xi \)).

(C) Then it follows from (A) and (B), by reasoning analogous to (but not exactly the same as) that in footnote 396, that:

\[
\vdash \neg q_0, \vdash \neg \forall x(Lx \equiv Q_{q_0}x) \wedge \forall x(Lx \equiv Q_{q_0}x)
\]

(D) But clearly, by \( \exists I \), we also know the following about the conclusion of the derivation in (C):

\[
\vdash \forall x(Lx \equiv Q_{q_0}x) \wedge \forall x(Lx \equiv Q_{q_0}x) \vdash \exists F \exists G (\neg \forall x((Fx \equiv Gx) \wedge \exists F \exists G (\neg \forall x((Fx \equiv Gx) \wedge \forall x((Fx \equiv Gx)))
\]

(E) Hence, from (C) and (D) it follows by (64.8) that:

\[
\neg q_0, \vdash \exists F \exists G (\neg \forall x((Fx \equiv Gx) \wedge \exists F \exists G (\neg \forall x((Fx \equiv Gx))
\]

(F) Since we established (at the outset) that both \( \neg q_0 \) and \( \diamond q_0 \) are theorems, it follows that \( \vdash \exists F \exists G (\neg \forall x((Fx \equiv Gx) \wedge \exists F \exists G (\neg \forall x((Fx \equiv Gx))) \), by a generalization of (64.8) when \( \Gamma \) is empty.\(^{397}\)

(219.4) By GEN, it suffices to show:

\[(\vartheta) \exists G (\forall x((Fx \equiv Gx) \wedge \exists F \exists G (\neg \forall x((Fx \equiv Gx)))
\]

We first prove some facts before laying out the proof of (\( \vartheta \)).\(^{398}\)

Let \( q \) be any proposition you please and consider the following two properties, both of which exist, by (39.2):

\[
F_q \equaldf \lambda z (Fz \& q)
\]

\[
F_q' \equaldf \lambda z (Fz \& q) \lor \neg q
\]

Given these definitions, it follows that:

(A) \( q \rightarrow \forall x((Fx \equiv F_q x)) \)

\(^{397}\)The generalization in question, which we leave as an exercise, states: if \( \vdash \varphi_1, \ldots, \vdash \varphi_n \), and \( \varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_n \vdash \psi \), then \( \vdash \psi \).

\(^{398}\)I’m indebted to Uri Nodelman for suggesting this proof strategy.
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By definition (22.1), we have to show

\[ p \]

But (219.5) – (219.6) – (Exercises)

Case 2. \( F \)

But since we’re in Case 1, \( F \) holds. \( F \)

Case 1. \( F \)

there is a witness to \( (215.1) \). Then let \( p \)

may universally generalize on the free variable \( q \).

With this proof of \( (D) \), we may conclude our preliminaries by noting that one

Since the fact we just established is modally strict, it follows by RM\( \diamond \) that \( (C) \).

To see that \( (D) \) holds, assume \( \Box q \) and, for reductio, \( \forall z(F_q \equiv F'_q(z)) \). From this reduc-
tio assumption, it follows by definitions of \( F_p \), \( F'_p \) and \( \beta \)-Conversion that

\( (F \land q) \equiv ((F \land q) \lor \neg q) \). But our assumption \( \neg q \) implies \( (F \land q) \lor \neg q \).

And from this and the biconditional just established, it follows that \( F \)

and \( q \). Contradiction.

Now to prove \( (\varepsilon) \). We know that there is a contingently true proposition

(215.1). Then let \( p_1 \) be such a proposition, so that \( p_1 \) and \( \Box \neg p_1 \). Now consider

\( F_{p_1} \) and \( F'_{p_1} \). Now either \( \Box \forall x(F \equiv F'_{p_1}) \) (i.e., \( F \leftrightarrow F_{p_1} \)) or not. We show that

there is a witness to \( (\varepsilon) \) in both cases.

Case 1. \( F \leftrightarrow F_{p_1} \). Note that it follows from the fact that \( p_1 \), by (B), that \( \forall x(F \equiv F'_{p_1}) \). So to show that \( F'_{p_1} \)

is a witness to \( (\varepsilon) \), it remains only to show \( \Box \neg \forall x(F \equiv F'_{p_1}) \).

Case 2. \( F \not\leftrightarrow F_{p_1} \). Then, \( \Box \forall x(F \equiv F_{p_1}) \). Note that it follows from the fact that

\( p_1 \), by (A), that \( \forall x(F \equiv F_{p_1}) \). So \( F_{p_1} \) is a witness to \( (\varepsilon) \).

But \( (\xi) \) and \( (\zeta) \) imply \( \Box \forall x(F \equiv F'_{p_1}) \).

Case 2. \( F \not\leftrightarrow F_{p_1} \). Then, \( \Box \forall x(F \equiv F_{p_1}) \). Note that it follows from the fact that

\( p_1 \), by (A), that \( \forall x(F \equiv F_{p_1}) \). So \( F_{p_1} \) is a witness to \( (\varepsilon) \).

\( (219.5) \) – \( (219.6) \) (Exercises)

(220.1) By definition (24), we have to show \( \neg (O! = A!) \). For reductio, assume

\( O! = A! \). By definitions (22.1), (22.2), and Rule \( = \alpha E \), it follows that \( [\lambda x \Box E! x] = [\lambda x \neg \Box E! x] \). Since \( [\lambda x \Box E! x] \), it follows by \( \beta \)-Conversion that:
[λx \mathcal{O} x] \equiv \mathcal{O} x

From this and a previously established identity, it follows by Rule =E (111) that:

(δ) \[λx \neg \mathcal{O} x] \equiv \mathcal{O} x

But since \[λx \neg \mathcal{O} x]\downarrow, the following is also a consequence of β-Conversion:

(ξ) \[λx \neg \mathcal{O} x] \equiv \neg \mathcal{O} x

So from (δ) and (ξ) it follows by biconditional syllogism (90.3.f) that \mathcal{O} x \equiv \neg \mathcal{O} x, which by (89.3.c) is a contradiction. ⊥

(220.2) Since the λ-expressions in what follows are provably significant (39.2), we may reason as follows, using β-Conversion:

\[O! x \equiv O! x \quad (89.3.a)\]
\[\equiv [λx \mathcal{O} x] x \quad \text{Definition } O!, \text{ Rule } =_{df} \mathcal{O} (\rightarrow), \text{ Rule } =_{df} I (\leftarrow)\]
\[\equiv \mathcal{O} x \quad \beta-\text{Conversion}\]
\[\equiv \neg \neg \mathcal{O} x \quad (89.3.b)\]
\[\equiv \neg [λx \neg \mathcal{O} x] x \quad \beta-\text{Conversion}\]
\[\equiv \neg A! x \quad \text{Rule } =_{df} I \quad \Box\]

(220.4) By (200.2) and &I, it suffices to establish \mathcal{O} \exists xO! x and \exists x \neg O! x.

To prove \mathcal{O} \exists xO! x, we start with theorem (203.3), i.e., \mathcal{O} \exists xE! x. By BF\mathcal{O} (167.3), we obtain \exists x \mathcal{O} E! x. Note independently that \[λx \mathcal{O} x] x exists. So it follows from β-Conversion and the commutativity of \equiv that \mathcal{O} E! x \equiv [λx \mathcal{O} x] x. Since this is a □-theorem, it follows from \exists x \mathcal{O} E! x that \exists x ([λx \mathcal{O} x] x), by the Rule of Substitution (160.1). But by definition of O! (22.1), this is just \exists xO! x. So by T\mathcal{O} (163.1), we have \exists xO! x.

To prove \mathcal{O} \exists x \neg O! x, let \varphi be an formula in which x doesn’t occur free. Then by comprehension axiom for abstract objects (53), we know \exists x(A! x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi)). By (104.5), it follows that \exists xA! x. Now we know by the previous theorem (220.3) that A! x \equiv \neg O! x. This is a □-theorem and so by the Rule of Substitution (160.1), we may infer \exists x \neg O! x from \exists xA! x. But by T\mathcal{O}, it then follows that \mathcal{O} \exists x \neg O! x. ⊣

(220.5) – (220.6) (Exercises)

(220.7) From (220.2) by (89.4.b), (78) and the Rule of Substitution (160.1). ⊣

(220.8) From (220.4) and (200.3). ⊣

(220.9) From (220.5) and (200.3). ⊣
(222.1) \(\rightarrow\) Assume \(\text{WeaklyContingent}(F)\). Then by definition (221) and Rule \(\equiv_E\), we know both \(\text{Contingent}(F)\) and \(\forall x(\Diamond Fx \rightarrow \Box Fx)\). From the former, it follows that \(\text{Contingent}(\overline{F})\), by (200.3). So, to show \(\text{WeaklyContingent}(\overline{F})\), it remains, by Rule \(\equiv_I\), to establish \(\forall x(\Diamond \overline{F}x \rightarrow \Box \overline{F}x)\). By GEN, it suffices to show \(\Diamond \overline{F}x \rightarrow \Box \overline{F}x\). So assume \(\Diamond \overline{F}x\). Since it is a \(\Box\)-theorem (197.1) that \(\overline{F}x \equiv \neg Fx\), it follows by the Rule of Substitution (160.1) that \(\neg Fx\), i.e., \(\neg \Box Fx\). Now we want to show \(\Box \overline{F}x\), but for reductio, assume \(\neg \Box Fx\), i.e., by definition of relation negation and Rule \(\equiv_E\), \(\neg \overline{[\lambda y \neg Fy]}x\). Since \(\overline{[\lambda y \neg Fy]}\downarrow\), Strengthened \(\beta\)-Conversion implies the \(\Box\)-theorem \(\overline{[\lambda y \neg Fy]}x \equiv \neg Fx\). So it follows by the Rule of Substitution (160.1) that \(\neg \Box Fx\), i.e., \(\Diamond Fx\), by definition of \(\Diamond\). Since we already know \(\forall x(\Diamond Fx \rightarrow \Box Fx)\), it follows that \(\Box Fx\). Contradiction. \(\neg\neg\) Exercise. \(\Rightarrow\)

(222.2) (Exercise)

(223.1) By (220.4), we know \(\text{Contingent}(O!)\). By the left-to-right direction of (178.5) and GEN, we know \(\forall x(\Diamond O!x \rightarrow \Box O!x)\). Hence, by definition (221) and Rule \(\equiv_I\), \(\text{WeaklyContingent}(O!)\). \(\Rightarrow\)

(223.2) By (220.5), we know \(\text{Contingent}(A!)\). By the left-to-right direction of (178.6) and GEN, we know: \(\forall x(\Diamond A!x \rightarrow \Box A!x)\). Hence by definition (221) and Rule \(\equiv_I\), \(\text{WeaklyContingent}(A!)\). \(\Rightarrow\)

(223.3) By (221), we have to show either \(\neg \text{Contingent}(E!)\) or \(\neg \forall x(\Diamond E!x \rightarrow \Box E!x)\). But we already know, by (203.5), that \(\text{Contingent}(E!)\). So we have to show \(\neg \forall x(\Diamond E!x \rightarrow \Box E!x)\). For reductio, assume \(\forall x(\Diamond E!x \rightarrow \Box E!x)\). Now axiom (45.4) tells us \(\Diamond \exists x(E!x \& \neg aE!x)\). So by BF(\(167.3\), \(\exists x(E!x \& \neg aE!x)\). Suppose a is such an object, so that we know \(\Diamond (E!a \& \neg aE!a)\). Then by (162.3):

\[(\theta) \Diamond E!a \& \Diamond \neg aE!a\]

The first conjunct of \(\theta\) implies, by our reductio assumption, that \(\Box E!a\). But from this, it follows by (132) that \(\Diamond E!a\), and by axiom (46.1), that \(\Box aE!a\). But the second conjunct of \(\theta\) implies that \(\neg aE!a\) (158.11). Contradiction. \(\Rightarrow\)

(223.4) (Exercise) [Hint: Show that \(L\) fails the first conjunct in the definition of weakly contingent. Appeal to previous theorems.] \(\Rightarrow\)

(223.5) (Exercise)

(223.6) (Exercise)

(224) Consider the following entities and definitions:

- By (208.3), we know \(\exists x(\Diamond E!x \& \neg aE!x)\). So let \(o\) be an (arbitrary) such object, so that we know \(\Diamond E!o \& \neg aE!o\).

\[^{399}\text{The following extended proof sketch was contributed by Daniel Kirchner, personal communication, 29 May 2018, and reproduced with permission.}\]
• Let $a$ be an (arbitrary) abstract object.

• Let $\Delta$ be the necessary or contingently false operator,\(^{400}\) defined as follows:

$$\Delta \varphi \equiv \text{df} \Box \varphi \lor (\neg \mathfrak{A} \varphi \land \Diamond \varphi)$$

• Define $q_0 = \text{df} \exists x (E!x \land \neg \mathfrak{A} E!x)$, so that we know $\Diamond q_0$ by axiom (45.5), $\neg \mathfrak{A} q_0$ by theorem (208.1), and $\neg \Box q_0$ by (208.2) and modal negation.

• Define $L = \text{df} \left[ \lambda x E!x \rightarrow E!x \right]$.

Now consider Figure 1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\mathfrak{A} \Pi \varnothing$</th>
<th>$\Delta \Pi \varnothing$</th>
<th>$\mathfrak{A} \Pi a$</th>
<th>$\Delta \Pi a$</th>
<th>entries as binary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\top$</td>
<td>$-$</td>
<td>$-$</td>
<td>$-$</td>
<td>$0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[\lambda y A!y \land q_0]$</td>
<td>$-$</td>
<td>$-$</td>
<td>$+$</td>
<td>$1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[\lambda y A!y \land \neg q_0]$</td>
<td>$-$</td>
<td>$+$</td>
<td>$-$</td>
<td>$2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$A!$</td>
<td>$-$</td>
<td>$-$</td>
<td>$+$</td>
<td>$3$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$E!$</td>
<td>$-$</td>
<td>$+$</td>
<td>$-$</td>
<td>$4$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[\lambda y q_0]$</td>
<td>$-$</td>
<td>$+$</td>
<td>$-$</td>
<td>$5$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[\lambda y A!y \lor (A!y \land q_0)]$</td>
<td>$-$</td>
<td>$+$</td>
<td>$-$</td>
<td>$6$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[\lambda y A!y \lor E!y]$</td>
<td>$-$</td>
<td>$+$</td>
<td>$+$</td>
<td>$7$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[\lambda y O!y \land E!y]$</td>
<td>$-$</td>
<td>$-$</td>
<td>$-$</td>
<td>$8$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[\lambda y E!y \lor (A!y \land q_0)]$</td>
<td>$+$</td>
<td>$-$</td>
<td>$+$</td>
<td>$9$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[\lambda y q_0]$</td>
<td>$+$</td>
<td>$-$</td>
<td>$+$</td>
<td>$10$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$E!$</td>
<td>$+$</td>
<td>$-$</td>
<td>$+$</td>
<td>$11$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$O!$</td>
<td>$+$</td>
<td>$+$</td>
<td>$-$</td>
<td>$12$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[\lambda y O!y \lor q_0]$</td>
<td>$+$</td>
<td>$-$</td>
<td>$+$</td>
<td>$13$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[\lambda y O!y \lor \neg q_0]$</td>
<td>$+$</td>
<td>$+$</td>
<td>$-$</td>
<td>$14$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$L$</td>
<td>$+$</td>
<td>$+$</td>
<td>$+$</td>
<td>$15$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Assign + if Provable and – if Negation is Provable

In this figure, each cell represents a formula, namely, the result of taking the predicate labeling a cell’s row as the value of the metavariable $\Pi$ labeling a cell’s column. We place ‘+’ in a cell to indicate that the formula represented is provable, and ‘−’ to indicate that the negation of the formula is provable. To see that the rows are pairwise distinct, note that the entries for a given row can

\(^{400}\)Since we know by (215.1) and (215.2) that there are contingently true and contingently false propositions, then we intuitively know (in terms of semantically primitive possible worlds) that there is a non-actual possible world distinct from the actual world. (This will be proved within our system in Chapter 12.) So, given the following definition, $\Diamond \varphi$ holds if and only if either $\varphi$ is true at every possible world or $\varphi$ true in some non-actual world but not at the actual world.
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be interpreted as the 4-bit binary representation (reading − as 0 and + as 1) of a number between 0 to 15.

Note the following two facts:

- as a general truth about object theory, any two formulas \( \varphi \) and \( \psi \) are equivalent if one results from the other by the substitution of identicals, and

- since no two rows in the table are the same, all of the properties are pairwise distinct; if two properties \( F \) and \( G \) in the left column were such that \( F = G \), then substituting \( G \) for \( F \) would result in an equivalent formula and so the rows for \( F \) and \( G \) in the table would have to be the same.

Now, by straightforward arguments, one can prove that each cell in the table is correctly labeled with + or −, if given the following facts about particular properties and propositions (and the dual facts about their negations):

- \( \Diamond q_0, \neg\Box q_0, \neg\Box \neg q_0, \Diamond \neg q_0, \Diamond q_0 \)
- \( \Box \forall x Lx, \Box \forall x \neg Lx \)
- \( O!o, \Box O!o, \Box \neg A!o, \triangle E!o \)
- \( \Box A!a, \Box \neg O!a, \Box \neg E!a \)
- \( \forall x(\Diamond \forall y \neg q_0 x) \)
- \( \forall x(\neg \Diamond \forall y q_0 x) \)

and the general principles:

- \( \Box \varphi \rightarrow \square \varphi \) (132)
- \( \Box \varphi \rightarrow \triangle \varphi \)

It is then straightforward to show that the cells in the rows of \( A! \), \( E! \), \( O! \), \( L \) and \( \lambda \lambda \neg q_0 \) are correctly labeled, i.e., to produce the relevant proofs. The label for each cell in the remaining rows is just a consequence of the labels for the cells in the first five rows (by applying combinatory methods).

It may make it easier to see that the cells are correctly labeled by regrouping the properties, so that it becomes clearer that the cells in the final 11 rows are negations and combinations of (negations of) the cells in the first 5 rows. We’ve done this in Figure 2 (below), though the regrouping in this figure may make it more difficult to see that all of the properties are pairwise distinct, since the rows are no longer systematically ordered by their entries.

(225.1) In the first part of the proof of (220.4), we proved \( \exists x O!x \) along the way, by modally strict means. So our theorem follows by RN.
<table>
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<th>$\triangle \Pi_0$</th>
<th>$\exists \Pi_0$</th>
<th>$\triangle \Pi_0$</th>
<th>entries as binary</th>
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<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
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</table>

Figure 2: Proof of Pairwise Distinctness

(225.2) In the second part of the proof of (220.4), we proved $\exists x A! x$ along the way, by modally strict means. So our theorem follows by RN. $\bowtie$

(225.3) From the modally strict theorem (220.3), i.e., $A! x \equiv \neg O! x$, and the previous theorem (225.2), it follows, by the Rule of Substitution (160.1), that $\square \exists x \neg O! x$. Hence from this and the modally strict theorem (104.2), i.e., $\exists x \neg \varphi \equiv \neg \forall x \varphi$, it follows that $\square \neg \forall x O! x$, also by the Rule of Substitution (160.1). $\bowtie$

(225.4) From modally strict theorem (220.2), i.e., that $O! x \equiv \neg A! x$, and theorem (225.1), it follows, by the Rule of Substitution (160.1), that $\square \exists x \neg A! x$. From this and the modally strict theorem (104.2), it follows by the Rule of Substitution (160.1) that $\square \neg \forall x A! x$. $\bowtie$

(225.5) In the second part of the proof of (220.4), we established $\exists x A! x$ as a modally strict theorem. By definition of $A!$, this implies $\exists x [\lambda x \neg \Diamond E! x] x$. Suppose $a$ is such an object, so that we know $[\lambda x \neg \Diamond E! x] a$. Then $\neg \Diamond E! a$, by Rule $\beta \ C$ (182.1). By (162.1), $\square \neg E! a$. Hence $\neg E! a$, by the T schema. Hence, by $\exists I$ and $\exists E$, $\exists x \neg E! x$. By (104.2), the implies $\neg \forall x E! x$. Since this last result constitutes a modally strict theorem, it follows that $\square \neg \forall x E! x$. $\bowtie$

(226) Assume, for reductio, that $\exists x (O! x \land A! x)$. Suppose $b$ is such an object, so that we know both $O! b$ and $A! b$. From the former, it follows that $\neg A! b$, by
(220.2). Contradiction. ⊢

(230.1) (Exercise)

(230.2) Assume $x =_E y$. Then by (230.1):

$$O!x & O!y & □VF(Fx ≡ Fy)$$

Hence by ∨I:

$$(O!x & O!y & □VF(Fx ≡ Fy)) \lor (A!x & A!y & □VF(xF ≡ yF))$$

But by definition (23.1) and the Rule ≡ df I of Definiendum Introduction (91.3), it follows that $x = y$. ⊢

(231.1) (→) Assume $x =_E y$. Then, by theorem (230.1), we know the following:

$$…$$

(8) $O!x & O!y & □VF(Fx ≡ Fy)$

By (178.1), the first two conjuncts of (8) imply, respectively, $□O!x$ and $□O!y$. The third conjunct of (8) implies $□□VF(Fx ≡ Fy)$, by the 4 schema (165.5). Assembling what we have established:

$$□O!x & □O!y & □□VF(Fx ≡ Fy)$$

We now leave it as an exercise to show, based on a theorem of K, namely (158.3), that $□x = E y$ implies $□(□O!x & □O!y & □□VF(Fx ≡ Fy))$. Hence it follows that:

$$□□O!x & □□O!y & □□□VF(Fx ≡ Fy)$$

But, independently, it follows from (230.1) by Rule RE that:

$$□x =_E y \equiv □(O!x & O!y & □VF(Fx ≡ Fy))$$

Hence, our last two results imply $□x =_E y$, by (90.3.b). (←) This direction is an instance of the T schema. ⊢

(231.2) (→) From (231.1), it follows a fortiori that $x =_E y \rightarrow □x =_E y$. Since this is a □-theorem, it follows by (166.2) that $□x =_E y \rightarrow x =_E y$. (←) This direction is an instance of the T□ schema. ⊢

(231.3) (Exercise)

(233) We first establish:

(8) $[λxy ¬(=_E xy)]\downarrow$

Proof. By (39.2), $[λxy ¬Rxy] \downarrow$, where $R$ is a 2-place relation variable. So by GEN, $VR([λxy ¬Rxy] \downarrow)$. Since $=_E \downarrow$, we may instantiate into our universal claim to obtain $[λxy ¬(=_E xy)] \downarrow$.

Given this, we may reason as follows:
\[ x \not= _E y \equiv \not= _E x y \] by convention (232.2)
\[ \equiv \equiv x y \] by convention (232.1)
\[ \equiv [ \lambda xy \neg (=_E xy)] xy \] by Df (194), Rules =d_\phi E and =d_\phi I
\[ \equiv \neg (=_E xy) \] by (\phi) and \beta-Conversion (48.2)
\[ \equiv \neg (x =_E y) \] by convention (228)

\[ \not= \equiv _E \] by convention (232.1)

\[ \equiv \neg (\not= (x =_E y)) \] by Df (194), Rules =d_\phi E and =d_\phi I
\[ \equiv \neg (\not= (x =_E y)) \] by (\phi) and \beta-Conversion (48.2)
\[ \equiv \neg (x =_E y) \] by convention (228)

(234.1) It is a theorem of modal negation (162.1) that \( \Box \neg \not= _E y \equiv \neg \Diamond \not= _E y \).
Indepedently, we may negate both sides of (231.2) to conclude \( \neg \Diamond \not= _E y \equiv \neg \not= _E y \). So by biconditional syllogism:
\[ \Box \neg \not= _E y \equiv \neg \not= _E y \]

From this and the \( \Box \)-theorem derivable by commuting theorem (233), namely
\( \neg \not= _E y \equiv \not= _E y \), it follows by the Rule of Substitution (160.1) that \( \Box x \not= _E y \equiv x \not= _E y \). Hence, \( x \not= _E y \equiv \Box x \not= _E y \). \( \bowtie \)

(234.2) \( \rightarrow \) It follows a fortiori from (234.1) that \( x \not= _E y \rightarrow \Box x \not= _E y \). Since this is a \( \Diamond \)-theorem, it follows by (166.2) that \( \Box x \not= _E y \rightarrow x \not= _E y \). \( \leftarrow \) This is an instance of the T\( \Diamond \) schema. \( \bowtie \)

(234.3) (Exercise)

(235.1) By the left-to-right direction of (231.1), it is a modally strict theorem
that \( x =_E y \rightarrow \Box x =_E y \). So by Rule RN, \( \Box (x =_E y \rightarrow \Box x =_E y) \). Hence, by (172.2),
\( \Box x =_E y \equiv x =_E y \). So \( x =_E y \equiv \Box x =_E y \). \( \bowtie \)

(235.2) We may reason as follows:
\[ x \not= _E y \equiv \neg (x =_E y) \] by (233)
\[ \equiv \neg \Box x =_E y \] by (235.1) and (89.4.b)
\[ \equiv \Box \neg x =_E y \] by (44.1)
\[ \equiv \Box x \not= _E y \] commute (233) and Rule (159.3) \( \bowtie \)

(236.1) Assume \( O!x \). So by (86.6), it follows that \( O!x \& O!x \). Independently, by (89.3.a), we know \( Fx \equiv Fx \), and so by GEN, \( \forall F (Fx \equiv Fx) \), and by RN, \( \Box \forall F (Fx \equiv Fx) \). So we have established: \( O!x \& O!x \& \Box \forall F (Fx \equiv Fx) \). So by theorem (230.1),
it follows that \( x =_E x \). \( \bowtie \)

(236.2) Assume \( x =_E y \). Then, by (230.1) and &E, it follows a fortiori that \( O!x \).
Hence we know \( x = x \), by (236.1). So by Rule =E, \( y =_E x \). \( \bowtie \)

(236.3) Let \( \varphi \) be \( y =_E z \) and let \( \varphi' \) be \( x =_E z \). Then, the following is an instance
of the axiom for the substitution of identicals (41):
\[ (\xi) \ y =_E x \rightarrow (y =_E z \rightarrow x =_E z) \]
But by (236.2), we know \( x =_E y \rightarrow y =_E x \). From this and (\xi) it follows by
hypothetical syllogism (77.3) that:
Proofs of Theorems and Metarules

\[ x =_E y \rightarrow (y =_E z \rightarrow x =_E z) \]

So by Impartation (89.7.b), it follows that:

\[ x =_E y \land y =_E z \rightarrow x =_E z \]

(237.1) Assume \( O!x \lor O!y \). We reason by cases from the disjuncts.

Case 1. \( O!x \). Our proof strategy is to show:

(\( \vartheta \)) \( O!x \vdash \Box O!x \)
(\( \xi \)) \( \Box O!x \vdash \Box (x = y \equiv x =_E y) \)

For these two facts establish that \( \Box (x = y \equiv x =_E y) \) is derivable from \( O!x \), by (64.8).

Now (\( \vartheta \)) follows from (178.1), by (64.10). To show (\( \xi \)), it suffices, by Rule RN, to show that there is a modally strict derivation of \( x = y \equiv x =_E y \) from \( O!x \), i.e., to show \( O!x \vdash (x = y \equiv x =_E y) \). So, by (64.10), it suffices to show. \( O!x \rightarrow (x = y \equiv x =_E y) \). \( O!x \) is already an assumption of the present case. (\( \rightarrow \)) Assume \( x = y \). From \( O!x \) and (236.1), we know that \( x =_E x \). Hence, by substitution of identicals, \( x =_E y \). (\( \leftarrow \)) Assume \( x =_E y \). Then by (230.2), \( x = y \).

Case 2. By analogous reasoning. \( \Box \)

(237.2) Under the assumption \( O!y \), the conclusion follows from:

(\( \vartheta \)) \( \lambdabar x. x = y \downarrow \)
(\( \xi \)) \( \Box \forall x (x = y \equiv x = y) \)

and the following instance of axiom (49):

\[(\lambdabar x. x = y) \downarrow \land \Box \forall x (x = y \equiv x = y) \rightarrow (\lambdabar x. x = y) \downarrow \]

But (\( \vartheta \)) is axiomatic (39.2). So it remains only to show (\( \xi \)). Our assumption \( O!y \)
implies \( O!x \lor O!y \), and so it follows from (237.1) that \( \Box (x = y \equiv x =_E y) \). Since \( x \)
isn’t free in our assumption, it follows by GEN that \( \forall x \Box (x = y \equiv x =_E y) \). So by the Barcan Formula (167.1), it follows that \( \forall x \Box (x = y \equiv x =_E y) \). \( \Box \)

(237.3) Axiom (49) has the following instance:

\[ (\lambdabar x y. O!x \land O!y \land x = y) \downarrow \land \Box \forall x (O!x \land O!y \land x = y \equiv O!x \land O!y \land x = y) \rightarrow (\lambdabar x y. O!x \land O!y \land x = y) \downarrow \]

So, to prove our theorem, it suffices to show both conjuncts of the antecedent.

The first conjunct is axiomatic (39.2). For the second conjunct, it suffices, by two applications of GEN and one application of RN, to prove the following by modally strict means:
\((O!x & O!y & x =_E y) \equiv (O!x & O!y & x = y)\)

\((\to)\) Assume \(O!x & O!y & x =_E y\). Then it follows from the third conjunct that \(x = y\), by (230.2). Hence \(O!x & O!y & x = y\). \((\leftarrow)\) \(O!x & O!y & x = y\). From the first conjunct and third conjuncts, it follows by (237.1) and the T schema that \(x =_E y\). Hence \(O!x & O!y & x =_E y\). \(\ast\)

(238) Assume \(\forall F(Fx \equiv Fy)\). Now consider the \(\lambda\)-expression \(\lambda x \Box \forall F(Fx \equiv Fy)\). By (39.2), this expression is significant, since the \(\lambda\) doesn’t bind any variables in any encoding formula subterms. Moreover, \(\lambda x \Box \forall F(Fx \equiv Fy)\) is substitutable for \(F\) in the matrix \(Fx \equiv Fy\) of our assumption – no variable gets captured if we substitute \(\lambda x \Box \forall F(Fx \equiv Fy)\) for \(F\) in this biconditional. Hence, by \(\forall E\):

\[\lambda x \Box \forall F(Fx \equiv Fy)]x \equiv [\lambda x \Box \forall F(Fx \equiv Fy)]y\]

But we also know that \(\beta\)-Conversion applies to both sides of this biconditional, i.e., that:

\[\lambda x \Box \forall F(Fx \equiv Fy)]x \equiv \Box \forall F(Fx \equiv Fy)\]
\[\lambda x \Box \forall F(Fx \equiv Fy)]y \equiv \Box \forall F(Fy \equiv Fy)\]

Hence it follows that \(\Box \forall F(Fx \equiv Fy) \equiv \Box \forall F(Fy \equiv Fy)\). But the right side of this last result is a theorem. Hence \(\Box \forall F(Fx \equiv Fy)\). \(\ast\)

(239.1) Assume \(O!x, O!y\), and \(\forall F(Fx \equiv Fy)\). Then from the third assumption and the previous theorem (238), it follows that \(\Box \forall F(Fx \equiv Fy)\). So by the right-to-left direction of (230.1), it follows from our first two assumptions and this last result that \(x =_E y\). \(\ast\)

(239.2) (Exercise)

(240.1) Assume \(O!x, O!y\). Note that both \([\lambda z z =_E x]x\] and \([\lambda z z =_E y]x\], by now familiar reasoning. \((\to)\) Assume \(x \neq y\). Then \(x \neq y\), by (230.2). For reductio, assume \([\lambda z z =_E x]x\) and \([\lambda z z =_E y]x\). Since \(O!x\), we know by the reflexivity of \(=_E\) (236.1) that \(x =_E x\). Since \([\lambda z z =_E x]x\] and \(x \downarrow\), it follows by Rule \(\beta C\) (182.2.a) that \([\lambda z z =_E x]x\]. But then by Rule \(\equiv E\), it follows that \([\lambda z z =_E y]x\). By Rule \(\beta C\) (182.1.a), it follows that \(x =_E y\). But by (233), this contradicts \(x \neq y\). \((\leftarrow)\) The proof of this direction, which is equivalent to its contrapositive \(x = y \to [\lambda z z =_E x] = [\lambda z z =_E y]\), is trivial.\(^{401}\) \(\ast\)

(240.2) (Exercise)

\(^{401}\) In an earlier draft of this work, the statement of the contrapositive in the proof was inadvertently reversed. The error was discovered by Daniel Kirchner, using automated reasoning techniques. See Kirchner 2017.
(241) Assume $O!x$. Then by (178.1), it follows that $\Box O!x$. Since the closures of the instances of (52) are axioms, we also know: $\Box (O!x \to \exists FxF)$. So by the K axiom (45.1), $\Box O!x \to \Box \neg \exists FxF$ and, hence, $\Box \exists FxF \to \Box \neg \exists FxF$. $\Box$

(242.1) Suppose $A!x$, $A!y$, and $\forall F(xF \equiv yF)$, for conditional proof. By $\forall I$ and (23.1), it suffices to show $\Box \forall F(xF \equiv yF)$. By Rule $\forall E$ (94.3), our third assumption implies $xF \equiv yF$. Now independently, by (177.2), we know $xF \equiv \Box xF$, which commutes to $\Box xF \equiv xF$. So by transitivity of $\equiv$, $\Box xF \equiv yF$. But we also know from (177.2) that $yF \equiv \Box yF$. So, by transitivity of $\equiv$, it follows that $\Box xF \equiv \Box yF$. Since $F$ isn’t free in our assumption, it follows by GEN that $\forall F(\Box xF \equiv \Box yF)$. Thus, by the Barcan formula, $\Box \forall F(xF \equiv yF)$. $\Box$

(242.2) (Exercise)

(243) By contraposing (52) and eliminating the double negation, we have: $\exists FxF \to \neg O!x$. But the right-to-left direction of (220.3) is $\neg O!x \to A!x$. So by hypothetical syllogism, $\exists FxF \to A!x$. $\Box$

(244.1) By axiom (39.2), $H \downarrow$. So by the 1-place case of definition (20.2), $\exists x xH$. By GEN, $\forall H \exists x xH$. $\Box$

(244.2) – (244.4) (Exercises)

(247) Let $\varphi$ be any formula with no free $x$s. Then by (53), $\exists x (A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi))$. Assume $a$ is an arbitrary such object, so that we know:

(δ) $A!a \& \forall F(aF \equiv \varphi)$

To show $\exists x (A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi))$, it suffices, by $\& I$, $\forall I$, the definition of the uniqueness quantifier (128.1) and $\exists E$, to show:

$$\forall y [(A!y \& \forall F(yF \equiv \varphi)) \to y = a]$$

But by GEN, it then suffices to show $A!y \& \forall F(yF \equiv \varphi) \to y = a$. So assume:

(ξ) $A!y \& \forall F(yF \equiv \varphi)$

The second conjuncts of (δ) and (ξ) jointly imply $\forall F(aF \equiv yF)$, by the laws of quantified biconditionals (100.11) and (100.10). Since $A!a$ and $A!y$ are, respectively, the first conjuncts of (δ) and (ξ), we may appeal to (242.1) to conclude $y = a$. $\Box$

(248.1) – (248.6) These are all instances of theorem (247). $\Box$

(249) Let $\varphi$ be any formula in which $x$ doesn’t occur free. Then by Strengthened Comprehension (247), it is a theorem that $\exists x (A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi))$. Hence, by the Rule of Actualization (135), it follows that $\forall \exists! x (A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi))$. So by (174.2), $\forall x (A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi)) \downarrow$. $\Box$
Consider any formula $\varphi$ in which $x$ doesn’t occur free. Now let $\psi$ be the formula $A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi)$. Then if we assume the antecedent of our theorem, our assumption can be expressed as:

$$(\delta) \quad y = ix\psi$$

Without loss of generality, choose $z$ be to some variable substitutable for $x$ in $\varphi$. Then, independently, as an instance of the modally strict version of Hintikka’s schema (148), we know:

$$\forall z(A\psi y x \& \forall z(A\varphi z x \rightarrow z = y))$$

From the last fact and (\delta), it follows that:

$$\forall z(A\psi y x \& \forall z(A\varphi z x \rightarrow z = y))$$

i.e.,

$$\forall y(A!y \& \forall F(yF \equiv \varphi)) \& \forall z(A!(z \& \forall F(zF \equiv \varphi)) \rightarrow z = y)$$

By (139.2), $\forall$ distibutes over a conjunction and so the first conjunct of our last result implies:

$$\forall A!y \& \forall F(yF \equiv \varphi)$$

The first conjunct of this result, namely $\forall A!y$, implies $A!y$, by the modally-strict theorem (178.8).

(253) Suppose \( \varphi \) is a formula in which both $x$ doesn’t occur free and $G$ is substitutable for $F$. Then by (249), we know that $ix(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi)) \downarrow$. We leave it as an exercise to show that the description $ix(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi))$ is substitutable for $x$ in its own matrix. Hence by (145.3)*, we may perform the substitution to conclude:

$$(\delta) \quad A!ix(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi)) \& \forall F(ix(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi))F \equiv \varphi)$$

Now we know $G \downarrow$ (39.2). And since $G$ is substitutable for $F$ in $\varphi$, it is substitutable for $F$ in the matrix of the second conjunct (\( \delta \)). Hence, by Rule $\forall E$ (94.1), we may instantiate $G$ for $\forall F$ in the second conjunct of (\( \delta \)) to obtain:

$$ix(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi))G \equiv \varphi_G^F$$

(255) Consider any formula $\varphi$ where $x$ doesn’t occur free and $G$ is substitutable for $F$. We want to show (without appealing to any $\star$-theorems):

$$ix(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi))G \equiv \forall G_F^\varphi$$
In what follows, we take $\psi$ to be: $A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi)$. Hence, we want to show:

$$ix\psi G \equiv \mathcal{A}q^G_F$$

Now $ix\psi$ is a canonical description, and so we know, by (249), that $ix\psi \downarrow$. So by (152.4), it follows that $\mathcal{A}iq_x^{ix\psi}$, i.e.,

$$\mathcal{A}(A!ix\psi \& \forall F(ix\psi F \equiv \varphi))$$

Since the actuality operator distributes over a conjunction (139.2), it follows that $\mathcal{A}\forall F(ix\psi F \equiv \varphi)$. Since the actuality operator and the universal quantifier commute (44.3), we may infer $\forall F\mathcal{A}(ix\psi F \equiv \varphi)$. Now $G$ is, by hypothesis, substitutable for $F$ in $\varphi$, and so it is substitutable for $F$ in the matrix of last result. Hence $\mathcal{A}(ix\psi G \equiv \varphi^G_F)$. But the actuality operator also distributes over the biconditional (139.5), so we may infer:

$$(\mathcal{A}) \mathcal{A}ix\psi G \equiv \mathcal{A}q^G_F$$

But note also that by the 1-place case of theorem (177.10) and the existence of $ix\psi$, we know $\mathcal{A}ix\psi G \equiv ix\psi G$, which commutes to $ix\psi G \equiv \mathcal{A}ix\psi G$. From this last result and (8), it follows that $ix\psi G \equiv \mathcal{A}q^G_F$. ⊢

(256.1) Assume $\Box q^G_F$, where $x$ doesn’t occur free in $\varphi$ and $G$ is substitutable for $F$ in $\varphi$. It follows that $\mathcal{A}q^G_F$, by theorem (132). But then by the right-to-left direction of the theorem (255), we may conclude $ix(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi))G$. ⊢

(256.2) Assume:

$$(\mathcal{A}) \Box q^G_F$$

where $\varphi$ is any formula in which both $x$ doesn’t occur free in $\varphi$ and $G$ is substitutable for $F$. Then by a ‘paradox’ of strict implication (158.1), (8) implies:

$$(\mathcal{A}) (ix(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi))G \rightarrow q^G_F)$$

Put this result aside for the moment. By our previous theorem (256.1), it also follows from (8) that:

$$ix(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi))G$$

From this and the fact that every canonically-described individual exists (249) it follows by the rigidity of encoding that:

$$\Box ix(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi))G$$

This implies, by the same ‘paradox’ of strict implication, that:

$$(\mathcal{A}) (q^G_F \rightarrow ix(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi))G)$$

By &I we may conjoin (ξ) and (ζ), so that by (158.4), we’ve derived:
\( \Box(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi))G \equiv \varphi^G \)

(258.1) Suppose \( \varphi \) is a rigid condition on properties (257.1) in which \( x \) doesn't occur free. Now assume the antecedent of our theorem, so that we know both:

(a) \( A!x \)

(b) \( \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi) \)

To show \( \Box(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi)) \), it suffices, by the right-to-left direction of (158.3), to show both \( \Box A!x \) and \( \Box \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi) \). But \( \Box A!x \) follows from (a) by (178.2). So it remains to show \( \Box \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi) \). By BF (167.1), it suffices to show \( \forall F(\Box(xF \equiv \varphi)) \) and by GEN, it suffices to show \( \Box(\forall F \equiv \varphi) \). But note that this is the consequent of the following instance of (171.4):

\[
(\Box(\varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi) \& \Box(\forall F \rightarrow \Box xF)) \rightarrow ((\Box xF \equiv \Box \varphi) \rightarrow \Box(xF \equiv \varphi))
\]

So it remains to establish:

(\( \delta \)) \( \Box(\varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi) \)

(\( \xi \)) \( \Box(\forall F \rightarrow \Box xF) \)

(\( \zeta \)) \( \Box xF \equiv \Box \varphi \)

For (\( \delta \)), note that since \( \varphi \) is, by hypothesis, a rigid condition on properties, it follows by definition (257.1) that \( \vdash \forall F(\varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi) \). So by RN, \( \Box \forall F(\varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi) \) is a theorem. Hence, by CBF (167.2), \( \forall F(\Box(\varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi)) \). So by Rule \( \forall E \) (94.3), \( \Box(\varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi) \).

For (\( \xi \)), we simply note that it is an axiom; it is a closure of (51).

For (\( \zeta \)), we prove both directions. (\( \rightarrow \)) Assume \( \Box xF \). Then \( xF \) by the T schema (45.2). But (b) implies \( xF \equiv \varphi \). Hence, \( \varphi \). Moreover, by the T schema, (\( \delta \)) implies \( \varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi \). Hence \( \Box \varphi \). (\( \leftarrow \)) Assume \( \Box \varphi \). Then \( \varphi \), by the T schema. Since (b) implies \( xF \equiv \varphi \), it follows that \( xF \), which implies \( \Box xF \) by axiom (51).

(258.2) Suppose \( \varphi \) is a rigid condition on properties in which \( x \) doesn't occur free. Now let \( \psi \) be the formula \( A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi) \). Then it follows from (258.1) by GEN that:

\( \forall x(\psi \rightarrow \Box \psi) \)

So by theorem (153.2), it follows that:

\[ \exists !x \psi \rightarrow \forall y(y = 1x \psi \rightarrow \psi^y) \]

\[ 402 \text{I'm indebted to Daniel Kirchner for discovering, using automated reasoning techniques, that an incorrect theorem was cited in a previous version of this proof. See Kirchner 2017 [2020].} \]
But we know $\exists! \psi$, since that just is Strengthened Comprehension for Abstract Objects (247), i.e.,

$$\exists! (A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi))$$

So we may conclude $\forall y(y = ix \rightarrow \psi^C)$, i.e.,

$$\forall y(y = ix(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi)) \rightarrow (A!y \& \forall F(yF \equiv \varphi)))$$

Hence, our theorem follows by Rule $\forall E$ (94.3).

(258.3) Let $\varphi$ be a rigid condition on properties in which both $x$ doesn’t occur free and $G$ is substitutable for $F$. Now we know, independently, by (249), that:

$$ix(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi)) \downarrow$$

For ease of reading, abbreviate the description as $ix \psi$, so that we know $ix \psi \downarrow$. Then the description can be instantiated in the universal generalization of (258.2) to obtain:

$$ix \psi = ix \psi \rightarrow (A!ix \psi \& \forall F(ix \psi F \equiv \varphi))$$

Since the antecedent holds by Rule =I, we may detach the consequent, which implies $\forall F(ix \psi F \equiv \varphi)$. Instantiating to $G$ yields $ix \psi G \equiv \varphi^G_F$, i.e.,

$$ix(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi))G \equiv \varphi^G_F \leftarrow$$

(261.1) By definition (260.1) and the Rule of Substitution for Defined Formulas (160.2), we have to show:

(δ) $\exists! x(A!x \& \neg \exists FxF)$

To find a witness, note that by the Comprehension Principle for Abstract Objects (53), we know:

$$\exists x(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv F \not= xF))$$

Suppose $a$ is an arbitrary such object, so that we know:

(ξ) $A!a \& \forall F(aF \equiv F \not= F)$

Our strategy is to show that $a$ is a witness to (δ). So by &I, $\exists I$, the definition of the uniqueness quantifier, and Rule $\equiv \eta I$, it suffices to show both:

(a) $A!a \& \neg \exists FaF$

(b) $\forall y((A!y \& \neg \exists FyF) \rightarrow y = a)$
(a) Since the first conjunct of \((\xi)\) is \(A!a\), it remains to show \(\neg \exists FaF\). Suppose, for reductio, that \(\exists FaF\) and that \(P\) is an arbitrary such property, so that we know \(aP\). Then by the right conjunct of \((\xi)\), it follows that \(P = P\), contradicting the fact that \(P = P\), which we know by the special case of Rule \(=I\) (119.2).

(b) By GEN, it suffices to show \((A!y & \neg \exists FyF) \rightarrow y = a\). So assume \(A!y & \neg \exists FyF\). But the second conjunct, \(\neg \exists FyF\), and the fact we just established, namely \(\neg \exists FaF\), jointly imply \(\forall F(aF \equiv yF)\), by (104.9). Since we also know that both \(y\) and \(a\) are abstract, it follows by (242.1) that \(y = a\).

261.2 (Exercise)

261.3 Since (261.1) is a modally strict theorem, it follows that \(\forall \exists! x Null(x)\), by the Rule of Actualization. Since \(y\) doesn’t occur free in this last result, it follows by (174.2) that \(ixNull(x)\). ⊥

261.4 (Exercise)

263.1 Assume \(Null(x)\). Then, by definition (260.1) and &E, we know both (a) \(A!x\) and (b) \(\neg \exists Fx\). Now to show \(\square Null(x)\), we have to show \(\square (A!x \& \neg \exists Fx)\), by the Rule of Substitution for Defined Formulas (160.2). By &I and (158.3), it suffices to show \(\square A!x\) and \(\square \neg \exists Fx\). By (178.2), (a) implies \(\square A!x\). Now to show \(\square \neg \exists Fx\), suppose \(\neg \square \exists Fx\), for reductio. Then by definition (18.5) and Rule \(\equiv dF\), \(\exists F \& xF\). Suppose \(P\) is an arbitrary such property, so that we know \(\diamond xP\). Then by the left-to-right direction of (177.3), it follows that \(xP\), and hence, \(\exists Fx\), by \(\exists I\), which contradicts (b).

263.2 Assume \(Universal(x)\). Then, by definition (260.2), we know both (a) \(A!x\) and (b) \(\forall Fx\). Now to show \(\square Universal(x)\), we have to show \(\square (A!x \& \forall Fx)\), by the Rule of Substitution for Defined Formulas (160.2). By &I and (158.3), it suffices to show \(\square A!x\) and \(\square \forall Fx\). By (178.2), (a) implies \(\square A!x\). Now to show \(\square \forall Fx\), suppose \(\neg \square \forall Fx\), for reductio. Then by (158.11), \(\diamond \neg \forall Fx\). Since \(\neg \forall Fx \equiv \exists F \neg xF\) is an instance of the modally strict theorem (104.2), it follows by the Rule of Substitution (160.1) that \(\diamond \exists F \neg xF\). So by BF\(\diamond (167.3)\), \(\exists F \& \neg xF\). Suppose \(P\) is an arbitrary such property, so that we know \(\diamond \neg P\). Then by the left-to-right direction of (177.8), it follows that \(\neg P\), and hence, \(\exists F \neg xF\), i.e., \(\neg \forall Fx\), which contradicts (b).

263.3 As an instance of (153.2), we know:

\[
\forall x(Null(x) \rightarrow \square Null(x)) \rightarrow (\exists xNull(x) \rightarrow \forall y(y = ixNull(x) \rightarrow Null(y)))
\]

By applying GEN to (263.1), we know \(\forall x(Null(x) \rightarrow \square Null(x))\). Hence:

\[
\exists xNull(x) \rightarrow \forall y(y = ixNull(x) \rightarrow Null(y))
\]

But (261.1) is \(\exists! xNull(x)\). Hence:
∀y(y = \text{i}x \text{Null}(x) \rightarrow \text{Null}(y))

Since $a_\emptyset \downarrow$, it follows that:

$a_\emptyset = \text{i}x \text{Null}(x) \rightarrow \text{Null}(a_\emptyset)$

But by definition (262.1) and Rule of Identity by Definition (121.1), $a_\emptyset = \text{i}x \text{Null}(x)$. Hence $\text{Null}(a_\emptyset) \Leftarrow$

(263.4) (Exercise)

(263.5) By (263.4) and (260.2), it follows that $A!a_\emptyset$ and $\forall F a_\emptyset F$. By (263.3) and (260.1), it follows that $A!a_\emptyset$ and $\neg \exists F a_\emptyset F$. Since both $a_\emptyset$ and $a_\emptyset$ are abstract, it suffices, by (242.2), to show $\exists F(a_\emptyset F \& ∼a_\emptyset F)$. Given that we can prove the existence of at least some properties, any property you please serves as a witness (exercise). ⊢

(263.6) – (263.7) (Exercises)

(265.1) [Note: Readers who have gotten this far should now be well-equipped to follow the more obvious shortcuts in reasoning we take in this proof and the ones that follow.] Consider the following instance of comprehension, in which there is a free occurrence of the 2-place relation variable $R$:

$\exists x(A!x \& \forall F(x F \equiv \exists y(A!y \& F = [\lambda z Rzy] \& ∼y F)))$

Assume $a$ is an arbitrary such object, so that we have:

($\delta$) $A!a \& \forall F(a F \equiv \exists y(A!y \& F = [\lambda z Rzy] \& ∼y F))$

Now consider the property $[\lambda z Rza]$, which we know exists by (39.2), and we now show, by reductio, that $a$ encodes this property. Assume $\neg a[\lambda z Rza]$. Then, from the second conjunct of ($\delta$) it follows that:

$\neg \exists y(A!y \& [\lambda z Rza] = [\lambda z Rzy] \& ∼y[\lambda z Rza]))$,

i.e., by quantifier negation:

($\xi$) $\forall y((A!y \& [\lambda z Rza] = [\lambda z Rzy]) \rightarrow y[\lambda z Rza])$,

i.e., for any abstract object $y$, if $[\lambda z Rza] = [\lambda z Rzy]$, then $y[\lambda z Rza]$. Instantiate ($\xi$) to $a$. We know $A!a$ by the left conjunct of ($\delta$) and we know $[\lambda z Rza] = [\lambda z Rza]$ by Rule =I. Hence $a[\lambda z Rza]$, contrary to assumption. So we’ve established by reductio that $a[\lambda z Rza]$. Then by the second conjunct of ($\delta$), there is an abstract object, say $b$, such that both $[\lambda z Rza] = [\lambda z Rzb]$ and $\neg b[\lambda z Rza]$. But since $a[\lambda z Rza]$ and $\neg b[\lambda z Rza]$, it follows by the contrapositive of Rule =E that $a \neq b$.403 So, by $\exists$I and two applications of $\exists$E, there are abstract objects $x$ and $y$.

403Since Rule =E is: $\varphi \tau \tau' \equiv \varphi'$, its contrapositive rule is: $\varphi' \equiv \varphi' \equiv \varphi'$, and $\tau \equiv \tau'$. We leave its justification as an exercise.
y such that \( x \neq y \), yet such that \([\lambda z \ Rzx] = [\lambda z \ Rzy] \). By GEN, this theorem holds for every \( R \). ⊨

(265.2) By reasoning analogous to that used in the proof of (265.1). ⊨

(265.3) Consider the following instance of comprehension in which there is a free occurrence of the 1-place property variable \( F \):

\[
\exists x (A! x & \forall G(xG \equiv \exists y (A! y & G = [\lambda z Fy] \& \neg yG)))
\]

By reasoning analogous to that used in the proof of (265.1), it is straightforward to establish that there are distinct abstract objects, say \( k \) and \( l \), such that \([\lambda z Fk] = [\lambda z Fl] \). But, then by the fundamental theorem governing proposition identity (117.3), it follows that \( Fk = Fl \). By GEN, this holds for every property \( F \). ⊨

(266) Let \( R_1 \) be the relation \([\lambda xy \ \forall F(Fx \equiv Fy)]\), which exists by (39.2). By (265.1), it follows that:

\[
\exists x \exists y (A! x & A! y & x \neq y & [\lambda z R_1 zx] = [\lambda z R_1 zy])
\]

Suppose \( a \) and \( b \) are such objects, so that we know:

(8) \( A! a & A! b & a \neq b & [\lambda z R_1 za] = [\lambda z R_1 zb] \)

Since we know both \( R_1 \downarrow \) and \( a \downarrow \), we can apply Rule \( \beta C \) (182.2.a) to the easily-established fact that \( \forall F(Fa \equiv Fa) \) and conclude \( R_1 aa \). Note independently that by (39.2), \([\lambda z \ [\lambda xy \ \forall F(Fx \equiv Fy)]za] \downarrow \), i.e., \([\lambda z R_1 za] \downarrow \). Hence by Rule \( \beta C \) (182.2.a) we may infer from the previously established \( R_1 aa \) that \([\lambda z R_1 za]a \).

Hence, by Rule \( \beta C \) (182.1.a), \( R_1 ab \). Since \( R_1 \) is \([\lambda x \forall F(Fx \equiv Fy)]\), we may apply Rule \( \beta C \) again to conclude \( \forall F(Fa \equiv Fb) \). Hence, \( \exists x \exists y (A! x & A! y & a \neq b & \forall F(Fx \equiv Fy)) \). ⊨

(268.1) Let \( \varphi \) be any formula in which \( y \) doesn’t occur free. (→) Our proof strategy is:

(A) Establish: \( \Box [\lambda x \ \varphi] \downarrow \rightarrow \Box \forall x \forall y (\forall F(Fx \equiv Fy) \rightarrow (\varphi \equiv \varphi^x_y)) \)

(B) Assume \( [\lambda x \ \varphi] \downarrow \), for conditional proof

(C) Infer \( [\lambda x \ \varphi] \downarrow \), from (B) by (107)

(D) Conclude \( \Box \forall x \forall y (\forall F(Fx \equiv Fy) \rightarrow (\varphi \equiv \varphi^x_y)) \), from (A) and (C)

Given this strategy, we need only prove (A). By Rule RM, it suffices to show that there is a modally strict proof of:
\[\lambda x \varphi \downarrow \rightarrow \forall x (\forall F (F x \equiv F y) \rightarrow (\varphi \equiv \varphi^y_x))\]

So assume \([\lambda x \varphi]_\downarrow\]. Since \(x\) and \(y\) don’t occur free in any assumption, it suffices by GEN to show \(\forall F (F x \equiv F y) \rightarrow (\varphi \equiv \varphi^y_x)\). So assume \(\forall F (F x \equiv F y)\). Since \([\lambda x \varphi]_\downarrow\) and is substitutable for \(F\) in the matrix of our last assumption, it follows that \([\lambda x \varphi]_x \equiv [\lambda x \varphi]_y\). But since we can apply \(\beta\)-Conversion to both sides, it follows that \(\varphi \equiv \varphi^y_x\).

\((\Leftarrow)\) Our proof strategy is:

(E) Show: \(\Box x \forall y (\forall F (F x \equiv F y) \rightarrow (\varphi \equiv \varphi^y_x)) \rightarrow \Box y (\exists x (\forall F (F x \equiv F y) \& \varphi) \equiv \varphi^y_x)\).

(F) Assume: \(\Box x \forall y (\forall F (F x \equiv F y) \rightarrow \varphi \equiv \varphi^y_x)\), for conditional proof.

(G) Infer: \(\exists x (\forall F (F x \equiv F y) \& \varphi) \equiv \varphi^y_x\), from (E) and (F).

(H) Infer: \([\lambda y \varphi^x_y]_\downarrow\), by appealing to the following alphabetic-variant of axiom (49):

\([\lambda y \exists x (\forall F (F x \equiv F y) \& \varphi)]_\downarrow \& \Box y (\exists x (\forall F (F x \equiv F y) \& \varphi) \equiv \varphi^y_x) \rightarrow [\lambda y \varphi^x_y]_\downarrow\]

and deriving both conjuncts of the antecedent. The first conjunct of the antecedent of this instance of (49), namely \([\lambda y \exists x (\forall F (F x \equiv F y) \& \varphi)]_\downarrow\), is an instance of (39.2) (by hypothesis, \(y\), doesn’t occur free in \(\varphi\) and so, by inspection, the \(\lambda\) doesn’t bind any variables in any encoding formula subterms). The second conjunct of the antecedent of the instance of (49) is just (G).

(I) Conclude: \([\lambda x \varphi]_\downarrow\), since this is just an alphabetic variant of (H).

Given this proof strategy, it remains to show (E). By Rule RM, it suffices to show that there is a modally strict proof of:

\(\forall x \forall y (\forall F (F x \equiv F y) \rightarrow (\varphi \equiv \varphi^y_x)) \rightarrow \forall y (\exists x (\forall F (F x \equiv F y) \& \varphi) \equiv \varphi^y_x)\)

So assume \(\forall x \forall y (\forall F (F x \equiv F y) \rightarrow (\varphi \equiv \varphi^y_x))\). Since \(y\) doesn’t occur free in our assumption, it suffices by GEN to show: \(\exists x (\forall F (F x \equiv F y) \& \varphi) \equiv \varphi^y_x\). So, for reductio, assume not. Then either (J) or (K):

(J) \(\exists x (\forall F (F x \equiv F y) \& \varphi) \& \neg \varphi^y_x\)

(K) \(\varphi^y_x \& \neg \exists x (\forall F (F x \equiv F y) \& \varphi)\)

But both lead to contradiction.

If (J), then suppose \(a\) is a witness to the first conjunct, so that we know:

(L) \(\forall F (F a \equiv F y) \& \varphi^y_x\)
If we instantiate \( a \) and \( y \), respectively, into our initial assumption, it follows that \( \forall F(Fa \equiv Fy) \rightarrow (q^a_x \equiv q^y_x) \). This and the first conjunct of (L) imply \( q^a_x \equiv q^a_x \). But this result and the second conjunct of (L) imply \( q^y_x \), which contradicts the second conjunct of (J).

If (K), then the second conjunct implies:

\[
(M) \forall x(\neg \forall F(Fx \equiv Fy) \lor \neg \varphi)
\]

If we instantiate (M) to \( y \), then either \( \neg \forall F(Fy \equiv Fy) \) or \( \neg \varphi^y_x \). Since \( \forall F(Fy \equiv Fy) \) is a theorem, it follows that \( \neg \varphi^y_x \), which contradicts the first conjunct of (K).

\[
(268.2) \text{ (Exercise)}
\]

(269.1) Let \( \varphi \) be any formula in which \( y \) doesn’t occur free. Assume \([\lambda x \varphi]\)\downarrow. Then by (268.1), \( \square x \forall y(\forall F(Fx \equiv Fy) \rightarrow (\varphi \equiv \varphi^y_x)) \). By now familiar modal reasoning using the Converse Barcan Formula and a Rule of Substitution, it follows that:

\[
(\delta) \forall x \forall y(\forall F(Fx \equiv Fy) \rightarrow (\varphi \equiv \varphi^y_x))
\]

Now we want to show \( \forall x \forall y(\forall F(Fx \equiv Fy) \rightarrow \square(\varphi \equiv \varphi^y_x)) \). Since \( x \) and \( y \) don’t occur free in any assumptions we’ve made, it suffices by GEN to show \( \forall F(Fx \equiv Fy) \rightarrow \square(\varphi \equiv \varphi^y_x) \). So assume \( \forall F(Fx \equiv Fy) \). Then if we instantiate \( x \) and \( y \) into (\( \delta \)), it follows that:

\[
\square(\forall F(Fx \equiv Fy) \rightarrow (\varphi \equiv \varphi^y_x))
\]

By the K axiom, this implies:

\[
(\xi) \square \forall F(Fx \equiv Fy) \rightarrow \square(\varphi \equiv \varphi^y_x)
\]

But it follows from our assumption \( \forall F(Fx \equiv Fy) \) that \( \square \forall F(Fx \equiv Fy) \), by (238). Hence \( \square(\varphi \equiv \varphi^y_x) \). \( \square \)

(271.1) Since the \( \lambda \) in \([\lambda y \varphi]\) doesn’t bind any variables, it doesn’t bind any variables in any encoding formula subterm. So the present theorem is just an \textit{axiom}, since it is a universal closure of an instance of (39.2), i.e., a universal closure of \([\lambda y \varphi]\)\downarrow. \( \square \)

(271.2) There are two interesting ways to prove this theorem. First, it is a consequence of the previous theorem, (271.1), which asserts \( \forall \varphi([\lambda y \varphi]\downarrow) \). Note that any instance of the following schema is an alphabetic variant and so a theorem:

\[
(\delta) \forall \varphi([\lambda \nu \varphi]\downarrow)
\]

In this schema, \( \nu \) can be \textit{any} individual variable. Now, independently, we know that \( \varphi \downarrow \) for any \( \varphi \) (105.2). \textit{A fortiori}, \( \varphi \downarrow \) for any \( \varphi \) in which \( \nu \) doesn’t occur free.
So a formula $\varphi$ in which $\nu$ doesn’t occur free is substitutable for $p$ in the matrix of ($\delta$). Hence, by $\forall E$, $[\lambda \nu \varphi] \downarrow$, for any formula $\varphi$ in which $\nu$ doesn’t occur free.

The following, rather different, proof is simpler and may come as a surprise if one has forgotten the definition of $\downarrow$ as it applies to propositions. Consider any formula $\varphi$ in which the individual variable $\nu$ doesn’t occur free. Then since (a) we know $\varphi \downarrow$ by (105.2) and (b) $\varphi$ is a 0-place relation term, it follows by definition (20.3) and Rule $\equiv df E$ that $[\lambda \nu \varphi] \downarrow$. ⊲

(271.3) From the fact that $[\lambda y p] \downarrow$ (39.2), Strengthened $\beta$-Conversion (179) implies $[\lambda y p]x \equiv p$. So by GEN, it follows that $[\lambda \nu \varphi] \downarrow$. ⊲

(271.4) Assume Propositional($F$). Then by definition, $\exists p(F = [\lambda y p])$. Assume $q_1$ is such a proposition, so that we know $F = [\lambda y q_1]$. Hence by (126.2), $\square[F = [\lambda y q_1]]$. So, by $\exists I$ and $\exists E$, $\exists p(F = [\lambda y p])$. Then by the Buridan Formula (168.1), $\exists p(F = [\lambda y p])$. Hence, $\square$Propositional($F$), by definition (270) and the Rule of Substitution for Defined Formulas (160.2). ⊲

(273) Assume Propositional($F$). Since $F \downarrow$, it remains only to show $\square(\exists x Fx \rightarrow \forall x Fx)$, by definition (272) of Indiscriminate($F$) and Rule $\equiv df l$. By (271.4), our assumption implies that $\square$Propositional($F$). So by definition (270) and the Rule of Substitution for Defined Formulas (160.2), it follows that $\square \exists p(F = [\lambda y p])$. Now if we can establish:

$$\square \exists p(F = [\lambda y p]) \rightarrow \square(\exists x Fx \rightarrow \forall x Fx)$$

we’re done. But by Rule RM (157.1), it suffices to give a modally strict proof of $\exists p(F = [\lambda y p]) \rightarrow (\exists x Fx \rightarrow \forall x Fx)$. So assume $\exists p(F = [\lambda y p])$. Suppose $q_1$ is such a proposition, so that we know $F = [\lambda y q_1]$. Now assume $\exists x Fx$, to show $\forall x Fx$. Suppose $a$ is such an object, so that we know $Fa$. Then $[\lambda y q_1]a$, and by Rule $\overset{\beta}{\rightarrow} C$ (182.1.a), $q_1$. But since $[\lambda y q_1] \downarrow$ and $x \downarrow$, it follows that $[\lambda y q_1]x$, by Rule $\overset{\beta}{\rightarrow} C$ (182.2.a). So $Fx$. Since $x$ doesn’t occur free in any of our assumptions, we may infer $\forall x Fx$ by GEN. ⊲

(274.1) As an instance of (38.1), we know:

$$\forall x Fx \rightarrow (\exists x Fx \rightarrow \forall x Fx)$$

Since this theorem is modally strict, it follows by RM (157.1) that:

$$\square \forall x Fx \rightarrow \square(\exists x Fx \rightarrow \forall x Fx)$$

By definition (198.1) and the Rule of Substitution for Defined Formulas (160.2), we may infer:
Independently, it follows from definition (272), the axiom $F \downarrow$, and Rule $\equiv S$ of Biconditional Simplification, that the following is a modally strict theorem:

$$Indiscriminate(F) \equiv \Box(\exists x Fx \rightarrow \forall x Fx)$$

From this and (8), it follows that that $Necessary(F) \rightarrow Indiscriminate(F)$, by the Rule of Substitution (160.1).

(274.2) As an instance of (78.3), we know:

$$\neg \exists x Fx \rightarrow (\exists x Fx \rightarrow \forall x Fx)$$

So from the right-to-left direction of an appropriate instance of (104.4) and the above, it follows by hypothetical syllogism that:

$$\forall x \neg Fx \rightarrow (\exists x Fx \rightarrow \forall x Fx)$$

Since this theorem is modally strict, it follows by RM (157.1) that:

$$\Box \forall x \neg Fx \rightarrow \Box(\exists x Fx \rightarrow \forall x Fx)$$

Independently, we know that $Impossible(F) \equiv \Box \forall x \neg Fx$ is a modally strict theorem, by definition (198.2), the axiom $F \downarrow$ and Rule $\equiv S$ (92.1). So our last two results imply the following, by the Rule of Substitution (160.1):

$$Impossible(F) \rightarrow \Box(\exists x Fx \rightarrow \forall x Fx)$$

Again, independently, we know $Indiscriminate(F) \equiv \Box(\exists x Fx \rightarrow \forall x Fx)$, by now familiar reasoning. So by the Rule of Substitution, our last two results imply:

$$Impossible(F) \rightarrow Indiscriminate(F)$$

(274.3.a) Suppose, for reductio, that $E!$ is indiscriminate. Then, by definition (272) and Rule $\equiv_{df} E$:

$$E! \downarrow \& \Box(\exists x E!x \rightarrow \forall x E!x)$$

Now independently we know $\Diamond \exists x E!x$ (203.3). But this and the right conjunct of (8) imply $\Diamond \forall x E!x$, by (158.13). Moreover, we also know independently that $\Box \neg \forall x E!x$ (225.5), which is equivalent to $\neg \Diamond \forall x E!x$. Contradiction.

(274.3.b) Suppose, for reductio, that $\overline{E}$! is indiscriminate. Then, by definition (272) and Rule $\equiv_{df} E$:

$$\overline{E}! \downarrow \& \Box(\exists x \overline{E}!x \rightarrow \forall x \overline{E}!x)$$
Now independently, we know \(\Box \neg \exists x \neg E! x\) (exercise). In turn, this is equivalent to \(\Box \exists x \neg E! x\) (exercise). But from this last result and the right conjunct of (8), it follows that \(\Box \forall x \neg E! x\), by the K schema. Independently, however, we know \(\neg \exists x \neg E! x\) (exercise), which in turn is equivalent to \(\neg \Box \forall x \neg E! x\). Contradiction. \(\rhd\)

(274.3.c) Suppose, for reductio, that \(O!\) is indiscriminate. Then, by definition (272) and Rule \(\equiv \text{df} E:\)

\[(\vartheta)\ O! \downarrow \& \Box (\exists x O! x \rightarrow \forall x O! x)\]

Now independently we know \(\Box \exists x O! x\) (225.1). From this and the right conjunct of (8), it follows by the K schema that \(\Box \forall x O! x\). By the T schema, \(\forall x O! x\). But an application of the T schema to (225.4) yields \(\neg \forall x O! x\). Contradiction. \(\rhd\)

(274.3.d) Suppose, for reductio, that \(A!\) is indiscriminate. Then, by definition (272) and Rule \(\equiv \text{df} E:\)

\[(\vartheta)\ A! \downarrow \& \Box (\exists x A! x \rightarrow \forall x A! x)\]

Now independently we know \(\Box \exists x A! x\) (225.1). From this and the right conjunct of (8), it follows by the K schema that \(\Box \forall x A! x\). By the T schema, \(\forall x A! x\). But an application of the T schema to (225.4) yields \(\neg \forall x A! x\). Contradiction. \(\rhd\)

(274.4.a) – (274.4.d) (Exercises)

(275.1) Assume \(\Box \exists p (F = [\lambda y p])\), to show \(\exists p (F = [\lambda y p])\). By BF\(\Box (167.3)\), it follows that \(\exists p (F = [\lambda y p])\). Assume \(q_1\) is an arbitrary such \(p\), so that we know \(\exists (F = [\lambda y q_1])\). But properties that are possibly identical are identical (170.1), and since \(F \downarrow\) and \([\lambda y q_1]\downarrow\), it follows that \(F = [\lambda y q_1]\). Hence, by \(\exists I (102.2)\) that \(\exists p (F = [\lambda y p])\). \(\rhd\)

(275.2) Assume \(\forall p (F \neq [\lambda y p])\). Then \(F \neq [\lambda y p]\). Since \(F \downarrow\) and \([\lambda y p]\downarrow\), it follows by (170.2) that \(\Box F \neq [\lambda y p]\). Hence, by GEN, \(\forall p \Box F \neq [\lambda y p]\). And by BF (167.1), \(\Box \forall p (F \neq [\lambda y p])\). \(\rhd\)

(275.3) From (275.1) by (166.1), given that the (275.1) is a modally-strict theorem. \(\rhd\)

(275.4) From (275.2) by (166.2), given that (275.2) is a modally strict theorem. \(\rhd\)

(276.1) Assume \(\Box V F (x F \rightarrow \exists p (F = [\lambda y p]))\), for conditional proof. By the Buridan\(\Box\) formula (168.2), this implies:

\[(\vartheta)\ \forall F \Box (x F \rightarrow \exists p (F = [\lambda y p]))\]
Now we want to show \( \forall F(xF \rightarrow \exists p(F = [\lambda y \, p])) \). By GEN it suffices to show \( xF \rightarrow \exists p(F = [\lambda y \, p]) \). So assume \( xF \). Then \( \Box xF \), by axiom (51). Now if we instantiate (8) to \( F \), it follows that \( \Diamond(xF \rightarrow \exists p(F = [\lambda y \, p])) \). This together with \( \Box xF \) yields \( \Diamond \exists p(F = [\lambda y \, p]) \), by (162.4). But by a previous theorem (275.1), it follows that \( \exists p(F = [\lambda y \, p]) \). ⊥

(276.2) From (276.1), by (166.1), given that (276.1) is a □-theorem. ⊥

(283.1) As an instance of the Comprehension Principle for Abstract Objects (53), we know:

\[
\exists x(A!x & \forall F(xF \equiv \exists q((q \equiv p) & F = [\lambda y \, q])))
\]

But by definition (281) and the Rule of Substitution for Defined Formulas (160.2), it follows that:

\[
\exists x\text{TruthValueOf}(x, p)
\]

(283.2) By the same reasoning as in (283.1), but starting with an instance of the Strengthened Comprehension for Abstract Objects (247). ⊥

(284) It follows from (283.2) that \( \forall x\exists!x\text{TruthValueOf}(x, p) \), by the Rule of Actualization. Hence by (174.2), \( x\text{TruthValueOf}(x, p) \). ⊥

(286) By (284), we know:

(8) \( x\text{TruthValueOf}(x, p) \)

By Rule ≡Df, definition (281) yields the following as a theorem:

\[
\text{TruthValueOf}(x, p) \equiv A!x & \forall F(xF \equiv \exists q((q \equiv p) & F = [\lambda y \, q]))
\]

So by GEN and RN:

(ξ) \( \Box \forall x(\text{TruthValueOf}(x, p) \equiv A!x & \forall F(xF \equiv \exists q((q \equiv p) & F = [\lambda y \, q]))) \)

It follows from (8) and (ξ) by (149.3) that:

(ζ) \( x\text{TruthValueOf}(x, p) \equiv x(A!x & \forall F(xF \equiv \exists q((q \equiv p) & F = [\lambda y \, q]))) \)

Since all of the terms in question are significant, it follows by (285), (ζ), and the transitivity of identity that:

\(
op = x(A!x & \forall F(xF \equiv \exists q((q \equiv p) & F = [\lambda y \, q])))\)

(287) We can establish our theorem by taking as our witnesses a contingently true proposition and a propositional property constructed out of a necessarily true proposition. We know that there are contingently true propositions by
(215.1). So assume \( p_1 \) is such a proposition, so that we know \( p_1 \land \neg p_1 \).\(^{404}\) Furthermore, where \( p_0 \) is the necessarily true proposition \( \forall x (E! x \rightarrow E! x) \) (206.1), consider the property \( \left[ \lambda y p_0 \right] \). Clearly, then, \( \left[ \lambda y p_0 \right] \downarrow \). By two applications of \( \exists I \), it then suffices to show:

\[

\Diamond \exists q ((q \equiv p_1) \land \left[ \lambda y p_0 \right] = [\lambda y q]) \land \Diamond \neg \exists q ((q \equiv p_1) \land \left[ \lambda y p_0 \right] = [\lambda y q])
\]

By the \( T \Diamond \) schema, it suffices to show:

\[

(\zeta) \exists q ((q \equiv p_1) \land \left[ \lambda y p_0 \right] = [\lambda y q]) \land \Diamond \neg \exists q ((q \equiv p_1) \land \left[ \lambda y p_0 \right] = [\lambda y q])
\]

The first conjunct of (\( \zeta \)) is easy to establish, since \( p_0 \) is a witness: \( p_0 \) is materially equivalent to \( p_1 \) (given that \( p_0 \) and \( p_1 \) are both true) and \( \left[ \lambda y p_0 \right] = \left[ \lambda y p_0 \right] \) follows from \( \left[ \lambda y p_0 \right] \downarrow \) by Rule \( =I \) (119.1) (Variant).

To establish the second conjunct of (\( \zeta \)), we first prove the following general lemma, for any propositions \( p \) and \( r \):

\[ (A) \quad \Box \exists q ((q \equiv p) \land \left[ \lambda y r \right] = [\lambda y q]) \rightarrow (r \equiv p) \]

**Proof.** By RN it suffices to give a modally strict proof of: \( \exists q ((q \equiv p) \land \left[ \lambda y r \right] = [\lambda y q]) \rightarrow (p \equiv r) \). So assume \( \exists q ((q \equiv p) \land \left[ \lambda y r \right] = [\lambda y q]) \). Suppose \( s \) is such a proposition, so that we know both \( s \equiv p \) and \( \left[ \lambda y r \right] = [\lambda y s] \). The latter implies \( r = s \). Hence, \( r \equiv p \).

As an instance of (A), we know:

\[ (B) \quad \Box \exists q ((q \equiv p_1) \land \left[ \lambda y p_0 \right] = [\lambda y q]) \rightarrow (p_0 \equiv p_1) \]

Now to prove the second conjunct of (\( \zeta \)), assume its negation for reductio, i.e., assume \( \Box \exists q ((q \equiv p_1) \land \left[ \lambda y p_0 \right] = [\lambda y q]) \). Then from this and (B), it follows by the K axiom (45.1) that \( \Box (p_0 \equiv p_1) \). But by (158.6), this result and our assumption \( \Box p_0 \) imply \( \Box p_1 \), which contradicts the assumption that \( \Diamond \neg p_1 \).\(^{405}\)

\( (290.1)\)★ By definition (285):

\[ (8) \quad \Box p = \text{truthValueOf} (x, p) \]

\(^{404}\)We’ve noted on prior occasions why reasoning of the kind used in the remainder of this proof is modally strict notwithstanding the appeal to assumptions that aren’t necessary truths. In this particular case, the assumption will be discharged by \( \exists E \) – we prove our theorem follows from the assumption \( p_1 \land \neg p_1 \) and then conclude by \( \exists E \) that our theorem follows from the modally strict theorem \( \exists p (p \land \neg p) \). See the discussion in Remark (71), Remark (216), and the proof of theorem (219.1).

\(^{405}\)Intuitively, this reductio proof can be restated more simply as follows. For reductio, assume the negation of the second conjunct of (\( \zeta \)), i.e., assume that necessarily, some proposition materially equivalent to \( p_1 \), say \( r \), is such that \( \left[ \lambda y p_0 \right] = [\lambda y r] \). By definition of proposition identity, this is just to suppose that necessarily, \( r \) is both materially equivalent to \( p_1 \) and identical to \( p_0 \). But now we have a contradiction: if necessarily \( r \) is both materially equivalent to \( p_1 \) and identical to a necessary truth, then \( p_1 \) is a necessary truth, contradicting the hypothesis that \( p_1 \) is contingently true.
This implies $\mathbf{op} \downarrow$, by (108.1). Hence, by (145.2): 

$$\text{TruthValueOf}(\mathbf{op}, p)$$

(290.2) By the previous theorem (290.1) and definition (281), it follows that $A! \circ p & \forall F(\mathbf{op}F \equiv \exists q((q \equiv p) & F = [\lambda y r]))$. Our theorem follows a fortiori. ⋆

(290.3) By instantiating (290.2) to the property $[\lambda y r]$, it follows that:

$$\big(\vartheta\big) \mathbf{op}[\lambda y r] \equiv \exists q((q \equiv p) & [\lambda y r] = [\lambda y q])$$

Now we have to show $\mathbf{op} \Sigma r \equiv (r \equiv p)$. (→) Assume $\mathbf{op} \Sigma r$. By definition (289), it follows a fortiori that $\mathbf{op}[\lambda y r]$. From this and (δ), we may conclude that:

$$\big(\xi\big) \exists q((q \equiv p) & [\lambda y r] = [\lambda y q])$$

Let $q_1$ be an arbitrary such proposition, so that we know:

$$\big(\zeta\big) (q_1 \equiv p) & [\lambda y r] = [\lambda y q_1]$$

From the right conjunct of (ζ), it follows by the theorem governing proposition identity (117.3) that $r = q_1$, which by symmetry yields $q_1 = r$. But from this and the left conjunct of (ζ), it follows by Rule =E that $r \equiv p$.

(←) Suppose that $r \equiv p$. Independently, since $[\lambda y r] \downarrow$ (39.2), it follows by Rule =I (119.1) that $[\lambda y r] = [\lambda y r]$. Conjoining our assumption and this last fact, we obtain: $(r \equiv p) & [\lambda y r] = [\lambda y r]$. By EI, it follows that $\exists q((q \equiv p) & [\lambda y r] = [\lambda y q])$. So, by (δ), it follows that $\mathbf{op}[\lambda y r]$. From this and the fact that $\mathbf{op} \downarrow$ (exercise), it follows that $\mathbf{op} \Sigma r$, by (289). ⋆

(290.4) (Exercise)

(290.5) Since z is a variable substitutable for x in TruthValueOf$(x, p)$ and doesn’t occur free in TruthValueOf$(x, p)$, we have the following instance of the theorem (141), where ϕ in that theorem is set to TruthValueOf$(x, p)$:

$$x = \text{ixTruthValueOf}(x, p) \equiv \forall z(\text{TruthValueOf}(z, p) \equiv z = x)$$

So by GEN:

$$\big(\delta\big) \forall x(x = \text{ixTruthValueOf}(x, p) \equiv \forall z(\text{TruthValueOf}(z, p) \equiv z = x))$$

But by (284), $\text{ixTruthValueOf}(x, p) \downarrow$. Hence by definition (285), we know $\mathbf{op} \downarrow$. From this last result and (δ), it follows by Rule $\forall E$ (94.1) Variant that:

$$\mathbf{op} = \text{ixTruthValueOf}(x, p) \equiv \forall z(\text{TruthValueOf}(z, p) \equiv z = \mathbf{op})$$

So, by definition (285) and biconditional syllogism, it follows that:

$$\forall z(\text{TruthValueOf}(z, p) \equiv z = \mathbf{op})$$
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By instantiating this last result to \( x \), and we have:

\[
\text{TruthValueOf}(x, p) \equiv x = \circ p
\]

(291)\(\star\) (\(\rightarrow\)) Assume \( op = oq \). Since we know that \( op \Sigma p \) by (290.4)\(\star\), it follows by Rule \(-E\) that \( oq \Sigma p \). Hence by (290.3)\(\star\), it follows that \( p \equiv q \). (\(\leftarrow\)) Assume \( p \equiv q \). We want to show that \( op = oq \). Clearly, \( A! \circ p \) and \( A! \circ q \). So by theorem (242.1), it remains only to show \( \forall F (opF \equiv oqF) \). Since \( F \) isn’t free in our assumptions, it suffices by GEN to show \( opF \equiv oqF \). Without loss of generality, we prove only \( opF \rightarrow oqF \), since the reasoning for the converse is analogous. So assume \( opF \). From this and an alphabetic variant of (290.2)\(\star\) it follows that:

\[
\exists r ((r \equiv p) & F = [\lambda y r])
\]

Let \( r_1 \) be an arbitrary such proposition, so that we know:

(\(\delta\)) \( (r_1 \equiv p) & F = [\lambda y r_1] \)

From the first conjunct of (\(\delta\)) and our global assumption that \( p \equiv q \), it follows that \( r_1 \equiv q \). Conjoining this result with the second conjunct of (\(\delta\)) and we have:

\( (r_1 \equiv q) & F = [\lambda y r_1] \). So by \(\exists I\), we have:

\[
\exists r ((r \equiv q) & F = [\lambda y r])
\]

From this it follows by (290.2)\(\star\) that \( oqF \). \(\Rightarrow\)

(292.1) (\(\rightarrow\)) Assume \( p \). By GEN, it suffices to show the equivalence of (\(\delta\)) and (\(\xi\)):

(\(\delta\)) \( \exists q (q \equiv p) & F = [\lambda y q] \)

(\(\xi\)) \( \exists q ((q \equiv p) & F = [\lambda y q]) \)

We show each direction separately:

(\(\rightarrow\)) Assume (\(\delta\)). Suppose \( q_1 \) is such a proposition, so that we know \( q_1 \) is true and \( F = [\lambda y q_1] \). But since \( p \) is true, it is materially equivalent to \( q_1 \). So it follows that \( (q_1 \equiv p) & F = [\lambda y q_1] \), and by \(\exists I\), that (\(\xi\)).

(\(\leftarrow\)) Assume (\(\xi\)). Suppose \( q_2 \) is an arbitrary such proposition, so that we know \( q_2 \equiv p \) and \( F = [\lambda y q_2] \). But then since \( p \) is true, \( q_2 \) is true. So \( q_2 \& F = [\lambda y q_2] \), and by \(\exists I\), (\(\delta\)).

(\(\rightarrow\)) Our assumption is:

\[
\forall F [\exists q (q \equiv p) & F = [\lambda y q]]
\]

We want to show \( p \). For reductio, assume \( \neg p \). Since \( [\lambda y \neg p] \downarrow \), instantiate the property \( [\lambda y \neg p] \) into our assumption, to obtain:
(ζ) \( \exists q (q \land [\lambda y \neg p] = [\lambda y q]) \equiv \exists q ([q \equiv p] \land [\lambda y \neg p] = [\lambda y q]) \)

Note also that Rule =I (119.2) governs \( [\lambda y \neg p] \), and so we know \( [\lambda y \neg p] = [\lambda y \neg p] \). Hence we know:
\[
\neg p \land [\lambda y \neg p] = [\lambda y q]
\]
So, by \( \exists I \),
\[
\exists q (q \land [\lambda y \neg p] = [\lambda y q])
\]
From this last conclusion and (ζ), it follows that:
\[
\exists q ([q \equiv p] \land [\lambda y \neg p] = [\lambda y q])
\]
Let \( q_1 \) be such a proposition, so that we know \( [q_1 \equiv p] \land [\lambda y q_1] \). By the definition of identity for propositions, the second conjunct implies \( \neg p = q_1 \). But \( \neg p \) is true by our reductio assumption. So it follows that \( q_1 \) is true. But since \( q_1 \) is equivalent to \( p \), \( p \) is true. Contradiction. □

(292.2) \( (\to) \) Assume \( \neg p \). By GEN, it suffices to show the equivalence of (δ) and (ξ):

(δ) \( \exists q (\neg q \land F = [\lambda y q]) \)

(ξ) \( \exists q ([q \equiv p] \land F = [\lambda y q]) \)

We show each direction separately:

(\( \to \)) Assume (δ). Suppose \( q_1 \) is an arbitrary such proposition, so that we know \( \neg q_1 \) and \( F = [\lambda y q_1] \). But since \( \neg p \), it follows that \( q_1 \equiv p \). Hence \( (q_1 \equiv p) \land F = [\lambda y q_1] \), and by \( \exists I \), that (ξ).

(\( \leftarrow \)) Assume (ξ). Suppose \( q_2 \) is an arbitrary such proposition, so that we know \( q_2 \equiv p \) and \( F = [\lambda y q_2] \). But then since \( \neg p \), it follows that \( \neg q_2 \). So \( \neg q_2 \land F = [\lambda y q_2] \), and by \( \exists I \), (δ).

(\( \leftarrow \)) (Exercise) □

(294) By (290.1), we know \( \text{TruthValueOf}(q, q) \). Hence, \( \exists p \text{TruthValueOf}(q, p) \).

So by definition (293), it follows that \( \text{TruthValue}(q) \). □

(295.1) Assume:

(δ) \( A!x \land \forall F (xF \equiv \exists q (q \land F = [\lambda y q])) \)

To show \( \text{TruthValue}(x) \), we have to show, by definition (293):

\[ \exists p (\text{TruthValue}(q, p)) \]
We can do this if we take \( p_0 \), defined in item (206) as \( \forall x (E!x \to E!x) \), as our witness. So we have to show:

\[ \text{TruthValueOf}(x, p_0) \]

By definition (281), we have to show:

\[ (\xi) \ A!x \land \forall F(xF \equiv \exists q((q \equiv p_0) \land F = [\lambda y q])) \]

Note independently that in the proof of Necessary \( p_0 \) in (206.1), we established that \( p_0 \) is true by a modally-strict proof. So it follows from (292.1) that:

\[ \forall F[\exists q(q \land F = [\lambda y q]) \equiv \exists q((q \equiv p_0) \land F = [\lambda y q])] \]

Then by \( \forall E: \)

\[ \exists q(q \land F = [\lambda y q]) \equiv \exists q((q \equiv p_0) \land F = [\lambda y q]) \]

Since we’ve established this by a modally-strict proof, it follows from (\( \vartheta \)) by the Rule of Substitution (160.1) that (\( \xi \)). \( \triangleright \)

(295.2) (Exercise)

(297.1)\( \star \) By definition of \( \top \) (296.1), we know:

\[ (\delta) \ \top \equiv \exists x(A!x \land \forall F(xF \equiv \exists p(p \land F = [\lambda y p]))) \]

So \( \top \downarrow \). By applying GEN to an appropriate instance of (145.2)\( \star \) and instantiating \( \top \), it follows that:

\[ A!\top \land \forall F(\top F \equiv \exists p(p \land F = [\lambda y p])) \]

Hence by lemma (295.1), it follows that \( \text{TruthValue}(\top) \). \( \triangleright \)

(297.2)\( \star \) (Exercise)

(297.3)\( \star \) (Exercise)

(298) Consider the following two instances of Object Comprehension (53):

\[ \exists x(A!x \land \forall F(xF \equiv \exists p(p \land F = [\lambda y p])) \]

\[ \exists x(A!x \land \forall F(xF \equiv \exists p(\neg p \land F = [\lambda y p])) \]

Let \( a, b \) be arbitrary such objects, respectively, so that we know:

\[ (\delta) \ A!a \land \forall F(aF \equiv \exists p(p \land F = [\lambda y p])) \]

\[ (\xi) \ A!b \land \forall F(bF \equiv \exists p(\neg p \land F = [\lambda y p])) \]

We now develop modally-strict arguments that show:

\[ (1) \ \text{TruthValue}(a) \land \text{TruthValue}(b) \]
(2) \( a \neq b \)

(3) \( \forall z(\text{TruthValue}(z) \rightarrow z = a \lor z = b) \)

Note that (1) follows from (295.1) and (295.2), respectively, given (\( \vartheta \)) and (\( \xi \)).

To show (2), note that the left conjuncts of (\( \vartheta \)) and (\( \xi \)), respectively, are that \( A! a \) and \( A! b \). So, it suffices, by theorem (242.1), to show \( a \) encodes a property that \( b \) fails to encode, or vice versa. Consider the property \([\lambda y p_0]_\downarrow\), where \( p_0 \) has been previously defined as \( \forall x(E! x \rightarrow E! x) \). Now although \( p_0 \) is a defined constant, we can cite (39.2) to conclude \([\lambda y p_0]_\downarrow\), for the \( \lambda \) doesn’t bind any variables. And since \([\lambda y p_0]_\downarrow\), it follows from the right conjunct of (\( \vartheta \)) that:

\[
a[\lambda y p_0] \equiv \exists p (p & [\lambda y p_0] = [\lambda y p])
\]

But the right condition is easily derived since \( p_0 \) is a witness: it is true and \([\lambda y p_0] = [\lambda y p]\). Suppose \( p_1 \) is an arbitrary such proposition, so that we know \( \neg p_1 & [\lambda y p_0] = [\lambda y p_1] \). By the theorem governing proposition identity (117.3), it follows that \( p_0 = p_1 \). Hence by Rule =E (111), it follows that \( \neg p_0 \), which contradicts the fact that \( p_0 \) is true.

To show (3), since \( z \) isn’t free in any assumption, it suffices by GEN to show \( \text{TruthValue}(z) \rightarrow z = a \lor z = b \).

Now we reason by disjunctive syllogism, from the tautology \( p_2 \lor \neg p_2 \), to show \( z = a \lor z = b \).

- Assume \( p_2 \), to show \( z = a \). Since both \( z \) and \( a \) are abstract, it suffices to show \( \forall G(zG \equiv aG) \) by theorem (242.1). Since \( G \) isn’t free in our assumption, it suffices, by GEN, to show \( zG \equiv aG \). But since \( p_2 \) is true, we may reason as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
zG & \equiv \exists q((q \equiv p_2) & G = [\lambda y q]) & \text{by right conjunct of (\( \zeta \))} \\
& \equiv \exists q(q & G = [\lambda y q]) & \text{by (292.1) and the truth of} \ p_2 \\
& \equiv aG & \text{by right conjunct of (\( \delta \))}
\end{align*}
\]

- Assume \( \neg p_2 \), to show \( z = b \). By analogous reasoning, using (292.2).

Hence, by disjunctive syllogism, \( z = a \lor z = b \).

Since the proofs of (1), (2), and (3) make no appeal to any \( \star \)-theorems, they constitute a modally-strict proof that there are exactly two truth-values. \( \star \)

(299.1)\( \star \) Assume \( \text{TruthValueOf}(x,p) \). By definition (281), it follows that:
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(8) \( A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \exists q((q \equiv p) \& F = [\lambda y q])) \)

Independently, by the reasoning in the proof of (297.1)*, we know:

(a) \( A!\top \)

(b) \( \forall F(\top F \equiv \exists q(q \& F = [\lambda y q])) \)

Now we want to show \( p \equiv x = \top \). (\( \rightarrow \)) Assume \( p \). Since we know both \( x \) and \( \top \) are abstract, it suffices by (242.1) to show that \( \forall F(xF \equiv \top F) \). Note that since \( p \) is true, we know by theorem (292.1) that:

\[
\forall F[\exists q(q \& F = [\lambda y q]) \equiv \exists q((q \equiv p) \& F = [\lambda y q])] 
\]

By (100.10), it follows from (b) and this last result that:

\[
\forall F(\top F \equiv \exists q((q \equiv p) \& F = [\lambda y q])) 
\]

By (100.11), we can commute the conditions of a quantified biconditional, to obtain:

(c) \( \forall F(\exists q((q \equiv p) \& F = [\lambda y q]) \equiv \top F) \)

Again by (100.10), the right conjunct of (8) and (c) jointly imply \( \forall F(xF \equiv \top F) \).

(\( \leftarrow \)) Assume \( x = \top \). Then by Rule =E, it follows from the right conjunct of (8) that:

(d) \( \forall F(\top F \equiv \exists q((q \equiv p) \& F = [\lambda y q])) \)

By by commuting the biconditional in (b) (100.11) and applying (100.10) to the result and (d), it follows that:

\[
\forall F[\exists q((q \equiv p) \& F = [\lambda y q]) \equiv \exists q((q \equiv p) \& F = [\lambda y q])] 
\]

Hence by (292.1), it follows that \( p. \Rightarrow \)

(299.2)* (Exercise)

(300.1)* By (290.1), we know TruthValueOf(\( \circ p, p \)). So by the previous theorem (299.1)*, it follows that \( p \equiv \circ p = \top\. \Rightarrow \)

(300.2)* (Exercise)

(300.3)* (\( \rightarrow \)) Assume \( p \). Then by (300.1)*, \( \circ p = \top \). But we know independently by (290.4)*, that \( \circ p \Sigma p \). Hence by Rule =E, \( \top \Sigma p \). (\( \leftarrow \)) Assume \( \top \Sigma p \). Then, by definition (289), \( \top [\lambda y p] \). By the reasoning in (297.1)*, we already know that:

\[
\forall F(\top F \equiv \exists q(q \& F = [\lambda y q])) 
\]
Hence, \( \exists q (q \& [\lambda y \ p] = [\lambda y \ q]) \). Suppose \( q_1 \) is an arbitrary such proposition, so that we know both that \( q_1 \) is true and that \([\lambda y \ p] = [\lambda y \ q_1]\). Then by definition of proposition identity, \( p = q_1 \). Hence \( p \) is true. \( \Rightarrow \)

\((300.4)\) (Exercise)

\((300.5)\) (Exercise)

\((300.6)\) (Exercise)

\((302)\) (\(\rightarrow\)) Assume \( \text{ExtensionOf}(x, p) \). So by definition \((301)\):

\[ A! x \& \forall F (xF \rightarrow \text{Propositional}(F)) \& \forall q ((x \Sigma q) \equiv (q \equiv p)) \]

And by definition \((270)\) and the Rule of Substitution for Defined Formulas \((160.2)\), it follows that:

\[(\varnothing) \ A! x \& \forall F (xF \rightarrow \exists q (F = [\lambda y q])) \& \forall q ((x \Sigma q) \equiv (q \equiv p)) \]

Since the first conjunct is \( A! x \), it remains by definition \((281)\) to show:

\[ \forall F (xF \equiv \exists q ((q \equiv p) \& F = [\lambda y q])) \]

By GEN, it suffices to show:

\[ xF \equiv \exists q ((q \equiv p) \& F = [\lambda y q]) \]

We prove both directions:

(\(\rightarrow\)) Assume \( xF \). Then by the second conjunct of \((\varnothing)\), it follows that \( \exists q (F = [\lambda y q]) \). Let \( q_1 \) be an arbitrary such proposition, so that we know \( F = [\lambda y q_1] \). Hence, \( x[\lambda y q_1] \), and since we know \( x \downarrow \), it follows by definition \((289)\) that \( x \Sigma q_1 \). But then from the third conjunct of \((\varnothing)\), it follows that \( q_1 \equiv p \). So we’ve established \((q_1 \equiv p) \& F = [\lambda y q_1] \). Hence, \( \exists q ((q \equiv p) \& F = [\lambda y q]) \).

(\(\leftarrow\)) Assume \( \exists q ((q \equiv p) \& F = [\lambda y q]) \). Let \( q_2 \) be an arbitrary such proposition, so that we know:

\[ (\xi) \ (q_2 \equiv p) \& F = [\lambda y q_2] \]

Now by the third conjunct of \((\varnothing)\), it follows that \( (x \Sigma q_2) \equiv (q_2 \equiv p) \). From this and the first conjunct of \((\xi)\), it follows that \( x \Sigma q_2 \). By definition \((289)\), it follows \( a \text{ fortiori} \) that \( x[\lambda y q_2] \). But then by the second conjunct of \((\xi)\), it follows that \( xF \).

(\(\leftarrow\)) Assume \( \text{TruthValueOf}(x, p) \). So by definition \((281)\), we know:

\[ (\zeta) \ A! x \& \forall F (xF \equiv \exists q ((q \equiv p) \& F = [\lambda y q])) \]
Since A!x, it remains by definition (301) to show:

(a) \( \forall F(xF \rightarrow \text{Propositional}(F)) \)

(b) \( \forall q((x\Sigma q) \equiv (q \equiv p)) \)

(a) is easy, since it follows \textit{a fortiori} from the second conjunct of (\( \zeta \)) that \( \forall (xF \rightarrow \exists q(F = [\lambda y q])) \). This implies (a), by definition (270) and the Rule of Substitution for Defined Formulas (160.2). For (b), it suffices to show \( (x\Sigma q_3) \equiv (q_3 \equiv p) \), for an arbitrary proposition \( q_3 \):

\((\rightarrow)\) Assume \( x\Sigma q_3 \). Then by definition (289), \( x[\lambda y q_3] \). So by the second conjunct of (\( \zeta \)), it follows that:

\( \exists q((q \equiv p) \& [\lambda y q_3] = [\lambda y q]) \)

Suppose \( q_4 \) is an arbitrary such proposition, so that we know: \( (q_4 \equiv p) \& [\lambda y q_3] = [\lambda y q_4] \). But the second conjunct of this last result and a well-known fact about the identity of propositions jointly imply \( q_3 = q_4 \).

So from the first conjunct, it follows that \( q_3 \equiv p \).

\((\leftarrow)\) Assume \( q_3 \equiv p \). Then by Rule \( =I \) (119.2) and \( \&I \), \( (q_3 \equiv p) \& [\lambda y q_3] = [\lambda y q] \). Hence, \( \exists q((q \equiv p) \& [\lambda y q_3] = [\lambda y q]) \). So by the second conjunct of (\( \zeta \)), it follows that \( x[\lambda y q_3] \). But since \( x \downarrow \), it follows by (289) that \( x\Sigma q_3 \).

\(\therefore\)

\(303.1\) By (283.2), \( \exists! x \text{TruthValueOf}(x, p) \). Since (302) is modally strict, we may use it and the Rule of Substitution (160.1) to infer \( \exists! x \text{ExtensionOf}(x, p) \). \(\therefore\)

\(303.2\) (Exercise)

\(303.3\) As an instance of theorem (149.1), we know:

\[ \forall x(\text{ExtensionOf}(x, G) \equiv \text{TruthValueOf}(x, p)) \]

\[ \forall x(x = \text{ExtensionOf}(x, p) \rightarrow x = \text{TruthValueOf}(x, p)) \]

But the antecedent is obtained by applying GEN and then the Rule of Actualization to theorem (302). Hence:

\[ \forall x(x = \text{TruthValueOf}(x, p) \rightarrow x = \text{ExtensionOf}(x, p)) \]

Instantiating to \( op \) (which we know exists), we obtain:

\[ op = \text{ExtensionOf}(x, p) \rightarrow op = \text{TruthValueOf}(x, p) \]

But the antecedent holds by definition (285). Hence \( op = \text{ExtensionOf}(x, p) \), which by the symmetry of identity gives us \( \text{ExtensionOf}(x, p) = op \). \(\therefore\)

\(303.4\) (Exercise)

\(309.1\) Assume \( \text{ExtensionOf}(x, G) \) and \( \text{ExtensionOf}(y, H) \). By definition (307.1), the fact that \( G \downarrow \), and Rule \( \equiv S \), these assumptions imply, respectively:
(a) \( A!x \land \forall F(xF \equiv \forall z(Fz \equiv Gz)) \)

(b) \( A!y \land \forall F(yF \equiv \forall z(Fz \equiv Hz)) \)

(\( \to \)) Assume \( x = y \). Then by Rule \( \equiv E \), it follows from (a) that:

(c) \( A!y \land \forall F(yF \equiv \forall z(Fz \equiv Gz)) \)

Hence, by (100.11) and (100.10), the second conjuncts of (b) and (c) imply:

(d) \( \forall F[\forall z(Fz \equiv Hz) \equiv \forall z(Fz \equiv Gz)] \)

Now if we instantiate (d) to \( G \), it follows that:

(e) \( \forall z(Gz \equiv Hz) \equiv \forall z(Gz \equiv Gz) \)

But the right condition of (e) is easily derivable. So \( \forall z(Gz \equiv Hz) \), by biconditional syllogism.

(\( \leftarrow \)) Assume:

(f) \( \forall z(Gz \equiv Hz) \)

Since we know \( A!x \) and \( A!y \) by the left conjuncts of (a) and (b), it suffices by theorem (242.1) to show \( \forall F(xF \equiv yF) \), and by GEN, that \( xF \equiv yF \):

(\( \rightarrow \)) Assume \( xF \). Then by the right conjunct of (a), it follows that \( \forall z(Fz \equiv Gz) \). But from this and (f), it follows that \( \forall z(Fz \equiv Hz) \). Hence, by the right conjunct of (b), it follows that \( yF \).

(\( \leftarrow \)) Assume \( yF \). Then by the right conjunct of (b), it follows that \( \forall z(Fz \equiv Hz) \). Now since our assumption (f), which asserts the material equivalence of \( G \) and \( H \), is a symmetric condition on \( G \) and \( H \) (exercise), it follows that \( \forall z(Hz \equiv Gz) \). But material equivalence is also a transitive condition on properties (exercise). Hence it follows from \( \forall z(Fz \equiv Hz) \) and \( \forall z(Hz \equiv Gz) \) that \( \forall z(Fz \equiv Gz) \). So by the right conjunct of (a), \( xF \). \( \blacksquare \)

(309.2) Assume \( ExtensionOf(x,H) \), \( xF \), and \( xG \). From the first, it follows by definition (307.1) that:

(\( \delta \)) \( \forall K(zK \equiv \forall z(Kz \equiv Hz)) \)

From our assumptions \( xF \), \( xG \), and (\( \delta \)), it follows respectively that \( \forall z(Fz \equiv Hz) \) and \( \forall z(Gz \equiv Hz) \). Hence \( \forall z(Fz \equiv Gz) \). \( \blacksquare \)

(309.3) Assume \( xF \), \( xG \), and \( \neg \forall z(Fz \equiv Gz) \). Assume, for reductio, that \( Class(x) \). Then by definition, \( \exists H(ExtensionOf(x,H)) \). Suppose \( P \) is such a property, so that we know \( ExtensionOf(x,P) \). Now, independently, by instantiating \( P \) into (309.2), we know that:
(ExtensionOf(\(x,P\) & \(xF \& xG\) \(\rightarrow \forall z(Fz \equiv Gz)\))

Since we’ve established all three conjuncts of the antecedent, it follows that \(\forall z(Fz \equiv Gz)\). Contradiction. \(\Rightarrow\)

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(309.3) [Alternative Proof] By classical propositional logic, (309.2) is equivalent to (exercise):

\((xF \& xG \& \forall z(Fz \equiv Gz)) \rightarrow \neg\text{ExtensionOf}(x,H)\)

Since \(H\) doesn’t occur free in the antecedent of this theorem, it follows by (39.4) that:

\((xF \& xG \& \forall z(Fz \equiv Gz)) \rightarrow \forall H \neg\text{ExtensionOf}(x,H)\)

Hence, by the modally strict equivalence \(\forall a \neg\varphi \equiv \neg\exists a \varphi\), it follows by a Rule of Substitution that:

\((xF \& xG \& \forall z(Fz \equiv Gz)) \rightarrow \neg\exists H(\text{ExtensionOf}(x,H))\)

Hence, by definition of \(\text{Class}(x)\) (307.2) and a Rule of Substitution:

\((xF \& xG \& \forall z(Fz \equiv Gz)) \rightarrow \neg\text{Class}(x)\) \(\Rightarrow\)

(310.1) As an instance of the Comprehension Principle for Abstract Objects (53), we know:

(\(\vartheta\)) \(\exists x(\forall x \& \forall F(Fx \equiv \forall z(Fz \equiv Gz)))\)

But from definition (307.1) and the fact that \(G \downarrow\), it becomes a modally strict theorem, by Rule \(\equiv S\), that:

(\(\xi\)) \(\text{ExtensionOf}(x,G) \equiv (\forall x \& \forall F(Fx \equiv \forall z(Fz \equiv Gz)))\)

It then follows from (\(\vartheta\)) and (\(\xi\)) that \(\exists x\text{ExtensionOf}(x,G)\), by a Rule of Substitution (160.1). \(\Rightarrow\)

(310.2) (Exercise)

(310.3) It follows from (310.2) that \(\forall x\exists x\text{ExtensionOf}(x,G)\), by the Rule of Actualization. Hence by (174.2), \(ix\text{ExtensionOf}(x,G)\). \(\Rightarrow\)

(310.4) (Exercise)

(311.1) By the usual principles of predicate logic, it suffices to show:

\(\exists x\exists G(\text{ExtensionOf}(x,G) \& \neg\Box \text{ExtensionOf}(x,G))\)

Before we look for witnesses to this claim, recall that by theorem (219.1), we know \(\exists F\exists G(\forall z(Fz \equiv Gz) \& \Box \neg \forall z(Fz \equiv Gz))\). Let \(P\) and \(Q\) be such properties, so that we know:
(8) \( \forall z(Pz \equiv Qz) \& \diamond \neg \forall z(Pz \equiv Qz) \)

Now by (310.1), we know \( \exists x \text{ExtensionOf}(x, Q) \). Let \( a \) be such an object, so that we know \( \text{ExtensionOf}(a, Q) \). So it remains only to show \( \neg \Box \text{ExtensionOf}(a, Q) \).

Before we do, note that from \( \text{ExtensionOf}(a, Q) \), we may infer \( \forall F(aF \equiv \forall z(Fz \equiv Qz)) \), by definition (307.1). This last fact and the first conjunct of (8) yield \( aP \).

Now suppose, for reductio, that \( \Box \text{ExtensionOf}(a, Q) \). Then, by definition (307.1), and a Rule of Substitution, it follows that:

\[
\Box (A \downarrow a & Q \downarrow & \forall F(aF \equiv \forall z(Fz \equiv Qz)))
\]

By (158.3), all three conjuncts are necessary and so \( \Box \forall F(aF \equiv \forall z(Fz \equiv Qz)) \), in particular. Then by the Converse Barcan Formula (167.2):

\[
\forall F \Box (aF \equiv \forall z(Fz \equiv Qz))
\]

Instantiating to \( P \) and we obtain: \( \Box (aP \equiv \forall z(Pz \equiv Qz)) \). So by (158.6), \( \Box aP \equiv \Box \forall z(Pz \equiv Qz) \). But we established above that \( aP \), and so by axiom (51), \( \Box aP \).

Hence \( \Box \forall z(Pz \equiv Qz) \), i.e., \( \neg \neg \forall z(Pz \equiv Qz) \), which contradicts the second conjunct of (8). \( \Rightarrow \)

(311.1) [Alternative Proof] By the usual principles of predicate logic, it suffices to show:

\[
\exists x \exists G (\text{ExtensionOf}(x, G) \& \neg \Box \text{ExtensionOf}(x, G))
\]

Before we look for a witness to this claim, recall that by theorem (219.1), we know \( \exists F \exists G (\forall z(Fz \equiv Gz) \& \diamond \neg \forall z(Fz \equiv Gz)) \). Let \( P \) and \( Q \) be such properties, so that we know:

(8) \( \forall z(Pz \equiv Qz) \& \diamond \neg \forall z(Pz \equiv Qz) \)

Now by (310.1), we know \( \exists x \text{ExtensionOf}(x, Q) \). Let \( a \) be such an object, so that we know \( \text{ExtensionOf}(a, Q) \). So it remains only to show \( \neg \Box \text{ExtensionOf}(a, Q) \).

Note that from \( \text{ExtensionOf}(a, Q) \), it follows \textit{a fortiori}, from definition (307.1), that:

\[
\forall F(aF \equiv \forall z(Fz \equiv Qz))
\]

This last fact implies not only \( aQ \), but together with the first conjunct of (8), implies \( aP \). So by axiom (51), \( \Box aP \) and \( \Box aQ \). Now since we want to show \( \neg \Box \text{ExtensionOf}(a, Q) \), assume, for reductio, that \( \Box \text{ExtensionOf}(a, Q) \). Then we know:

\[
\Box \text{ExtensionOf}(a, Q) \& \Box aP \& \Box aQ
\]

Hence, by the right-to-left direction of an extended version of (158.3):

(ζ) \( \Box (\text{ExtensionOf}(a, Q) \& aP \& aQ) \)
Now, independently, if we apply RN and then GEN to the modally strict theorem (309.2), we obtain:

\[ \forall H \forall F \forall G \forall x ((\text{ExtensionOf}(x, H)) \& xF \& xG) \rightarrow \forall z (Fz \equiv Gz) \]

Instantiating to \( Q, P, Q, \) and \( a, \) respectively:

\[ \Box ((\text{ExtensionOf}(a, Q)) \& aP \& aQ) \rightarrow \forall z (Pz \equiv Qz) \]

So by Rule RM:

\[ \Box ((\text{ExtensionOf}(a, Q)) \& aP \& aQ) \rightarrow \Box \forall z (Pz \equiv Qz) \]

But the antecedent is just (\( \zeta \)). Hence \( \Box \forall z (Pz \equiv Qz) \), i.e., \( \neg \Box \forall z (Pz \equiv Qz) \), which contradicts the second conjunct of (\( \vartheta \)).

(311.2) By the usual principles of predicate logic, it suffices to show:

\[ \exists x (\text{Class}(x) \& \neg \Box \text{Class}(x)) \]

Before we identify a witness, recall that \( \exists F \exists G (\forall x (Fx \equiv Gx) \& \Box \neg \forall x (Fx \equiv Gx)) \), by (219.1). Suppose \( P \) and \( Q \) are such properties, so that we know:

(A) \( \forall z (Pz \equiv Qz) \)

(B) \( \Box \neg \forall z (Pz \equiv Qz) \)

Now by (310.1), we know \( \exists \text{ExtensionOf}(x, Q) \). So let \( a \) be such an object, so that we know:

(C) \( \text{ExtensionOf}(a, Q) \)

Then, by definition (307.1), (C) implies:

(D) \( \forall F (aF \equiv \forall z (Fz \equiv Qz)) \)

By now familiar reasoning, we may infer from (D), (A), and \( \forall z (Qz \equiv Qz) \), that both \( aP \) and \( aQ \). So by axiom (51):

(E1) \( \Box aP \)

(E2) \( \Box aQ \)

Now since (C) implies \( \exists H (\text{ExtensionOf}(a, H)) \), we may infer by definition (307.2) that \( \text{Class}(a) \). It then remains to show \( \neg \Box \text{Class}(a) \), and so it suffices to show \( \Box \neg \text{Class}(a) \). Our strategy is to use (309.3), which by RN and GEN implies:

\[ \forall x \forall F \forall G ((xF \& xG \& \neg \forall z (Fz \equiv Gz)) \rightarrow \neg \text{Class}(x)) \]

Instantiating to \( a, P, \) and \( Q \), it follows that:
\[ \Box ((aP \land aQ \land \neg \forall z \,(Pz \equiv Qz)) \rightarrow \neg \text{Class}(a)) \]

From this it follows by Rule RM\( \Diamond \) that:

\[ \Diamond (aP \land aQ \land \neg \forall z \,(Pz \equiv Qz)) \rightarrow \Diamond \neg \text{Class}(a) \]

So if we can establish the antecedent, we’re done. But note that the following is an easy theorem of \( K \):

\[ (\Box \varphi \land \Box \psi \land \Diamond \chi) \rightarrow (\varphi \land \psi \land \chi) \]

This is a variant of (158.16) and we leave it as an exercise. As an instance, we know:

\[ (\Box aP \land \Box aQ \land \Diamond \neg \forall z \,(Pz \equiv Qz)) \rightarrow (aP \land aQ \land \neg \forall z \,(Pz \equiv Qz)) \]

But by \&I, we’ve established the antecedent, since \( \Box aP \) is (E1), \( \Box aQ \) is (E2), and \( \Diamond \neg \forall z \,(Pz \equiv Qz) \) is (B).

(311.3) To show our theorem, it suffices to show \( \Diamond \neg \forall x \,(\text{Class}(x) \rightarrow \Diamond \text{Class}(x)) \), i.e., to show \( \Diamond \exists x \,(\text{Class}(x) \land \neg \text{Class}(x)) \). By CBF\( \Diamond \) (167.4), it suffices to show:

(\( \epsilon \)) \( \exists x \,(\text{Class}(x) \land \neg \text{Class}(x)) \)

So we have to find a witness to (\( \epsilon \)). Before we do so, we first prove an instrumental, modally strict lemma:

(\( \xi \)) \( \forall F \forall G \Box (\forall z \,(Fz \equiv Gz)) \rightarrow \exists x \,(\text{Class}(x) \land xF \land xG) \)

**Proof.** By GEN, we show \( \Box (\forall z \,(Fz \equiv Gz)) \rightarrow \exists x \,(\text{Class}(x) \land xF \land xG) \). By RN, it suffices to find a modally strict proof of \( \forall z \,(Fz \equiv Gz) \rightarrow \exists x \,(\text{Class}(x) \land xF \land xG) \). So assume \( \forall z \,(Fz \equiv Gz) \). Now we know independently by (310.1) \( \exists x \text{ExtensionOf}(x,G) \). So let \( a \) be such an object, so that we know \( \text{ExtensionOf}(a,G) \). It then remains only to show that \( a \) is a witness to \( \exists x \,(\text{Class}(x) \land xF \land xG) \). Since \( \exists H \,(\text{ExtensionOf}(a,H)) \), it follows by (307.2), that \( \text{Class}(a) \). It also follows from \( \text{ExtensionOf}(a,G) \), by definition (307.1), that \( \forall H \,(aH \equiv \forall z \,(Hz \equiv Gz)) \). But, our assumption is \( \forall z \,(Fz \equiv Gz) \), and so it also follows that \( aF \). And, clearly, \( aG \).

Now to prove our theorem, note that by (219.3), we know \( \exists F \exists G \,(a \rightarrow \forall z \,(Fz \equiv Gz) \land \Diamond \forall z \,(Fz \equiv Gz)) \). So let \( P \) and \( Q \) be such properties, so that we know:

(A) \( a \rightarrow \forall z \,(Pz \equiv Qz) \)

(B) \( \Diamond \forall z \,(Pz \equiv Qz) \)

Moreover, instantiating \( P \) and \( Q \) into our lemma (\( \xi \)), we know that the following is a theorem:
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□(∀z(Pz ≡ Qz) → ∃x(Class(x) & xP & xQ))

Hence, by the K□ schema, □∀z(Pz ≡ Qz) → □∃x(Class(x) & xP & xQ). From this last result and (B), it follows that □∃x(Class(x) & xP) & xQ). So by CBF (167.3), ∃x□(Class(x) & xP & xQ). Now suppose b is such an object, so that we know:

□(Class(b) & bP & bQ)

This implies, by (162.3):

(ζ) □Class(b) & □bP & □bQ

Now if we can show that b is the desired witness to (θ), we’re done. So we have to show □(Class(b) & ¬□Class(b)). But it is an easy consequence of the right-to-left direction of theorem (165.12) that (□θ & □ψ) → □(θ & ψ). So, by &I, it suffices to show both:

(C) □Class(b)

(D) □¬□Class(b)

But (C) is the first conjunct of (ζ). So it remains to show (D). Now if we apply the Rule of Actualization (RA) and then GEN twice to theorem (309.3), then we know:

\( ∀F∀G∀(xF & xG & ¬∀z(Pz ≡ Qz)) → ¬Class(x) \)

Instantiating to P, Q, and b:

\( □((bP & bQ & ¬∀z(Pz ≡ Qz)) → ¬Class(b)) \)

By applications of axiom (44.2) and theorem (139.2), it follows that:

\( □(bP & □bQ & □¬∀z(Pz ≡ Qz)) → □¬Class(b) \)

The antecedent of this last result holds, since:

• the first conjunct follows from the 2nd conjunct of (ζ), by (177.3) and (177.10),

• the second conjunct follows from the 3rd conjunct of (ζ), by (177.3) and (177.10), and

• the third conjunct is (A).

Thus □¬Class(b). So by axiom (46.1), □□¬Class(b), which is all that remained for us to show. ⊢

(311.4) Assume ExtensionOf(x,H). Then it follows from definition (307.1) that:
(8) \( \forall F(xF \equiv \forall z(Fz \equiv Hz)) \)

Hence, \( xH \), and by axiom (51), \( \Box xH \). Now by (219.4), it follows that for some property \( G, H \) is equivalent to \( G \) but might not have been, i.e., that \( \exists G(\forall z(Hz \equiv Gz) \& \Box \neg \forall z(Hz \equiv Gz)) \). Suppose \( Q \) is such a property, so that we know both \( \forall z(Hz \equiv Qz) \) and \( \Box \neg \forall z(Hz \equiv Qz) \). It follows from the first and (8) that \( xQ \), and so \( \Box xQ \). Now as an instance of (309.2), substituting \( H \) for \( H \), \( H \) for \( F \), and \( Q \) for \( G \), we know:

\[(\text{ExtensionOf}(x,H) \& xH \& xQ) \rightarrow \forall z(Hz \equiv Qz)\]

By classical propositional logic (exercise), it follows that:

\[(xH \& xQ \& \neg \forall z(Hz \equiv Qz)) \rightarrow \neg \text{ExtensionOf}(x,H)\]

But we already know all of \( \Box xH \), \( \Box xQ \) and \( \Box \neg \forall z(Hz \equiv Qz) \). But we saw in the proof of (311.2) that by reasoning from (158.16), these three facts imply \( \Box (xH \& xQ \& \neg \forall z(Hz \equiv Qz)) \). So by (ξ), \( \Box \neg \text{ExtensionOf}(x,H) \).

(315) Assume \( \text{Class}(x) \). Then by definition (307.2), \( \exists F(\text{ClassOf}(x,F)) \). Let \( P \) be such a property, so that we know \( \text{ClassOf}(x,P) \). By definition (307.1), it follows that:

(8) \( \forall F(xF \equiv \forall z(Fz \equiv Pz)) \)

Hence, \( xP \), and by axiom (51), \( \Box xP \). Independently, if we instantiate \( P \) into theorem (219.4), then we know there is a property \( G \) such that \( P \) is equivalent to \( G \) but possibly not, i.e., that \( \exists G(\forall z(Pz \equiv Gz) \& \Box \neg \forall z(Pz \equiv Gz)) \). Let \( Q \) be such a property, so that we know:

(ξ) \( \forall z(Pz \equiv Qz) \& \Box \neg \forall z(Pz \equiv Qz) \)

From (8) and the first conjunct of (ξ), we may infer \( xQ \), and so \( \Box xQ \), again by (51). But from the second conjunct of (ξ) and the facts that \( \Box xP \) and \( \Box xQ \), it follows by now familiar modal reasoning based on (158.16) that (exercise):

\( \Box (xP \& xQ \& \neg \forall z(Pz \equiv Qz)) \)

But if we apply RM\( \Box \) to theorem (309.3) and instantiate to \( P \) and \( Q \), we also know:

\( \Box (xP \& xQ \& \neg \forall z(Pz \equiv Qz)) \rightarrow \Box \neg \text{Class}(x) \)

Hence \( \Box \neg \text{Class}(x) \).

(313.1) By standard principles of predicate logic, it suffices to establish:
∃x∃y(y ∈ x & ¬□y ∈ x)

We start with the fact that ∃pContingentlyTrue(p) (215.1). Suppose p₁ is such a proposition, so that we know p₁ & □¬p₁. Then consider [λx p₁], which clearly exists. Call this property Q. By (310.1), we know ∃xExtensionOf(x,Q). Let a be such an object, so that we know ExtensionOf(a,Q). By definition (307), it follows that:

(A) ∀F(aF ≡ ∀z(Fz ≡ Qz))

And by β-Conversion, we know, where y is an arbitrary but fixed object:

(B) Qy ≡ p₁

Now consider the property we've previously designated as L, i.e., [λx E!x → E!x]. Then by the reasoning in the proof of (219.1), we know that L and Q are materially equivalent but possibly not materially equivalent:

(C) ∀z(Lz ≡ Qz) & ◊¬∀z(Lz ≡ Qz)

From (A), (B), and (C) it is straightforward to establish aQ, aL, and Qy. From the first two, it follows by axiom (51) that □aQ and □aL. From the third, we now know ExtensionOf(a,Q) & Qy, and so it follows by ∃I and definition (312) that y ∈ a. So it remains only to show ¬□y ∈ a.

First note that by the principles of propositional logic, theorem (309.2) is equivalent to (exercise):

(xF & xG & ¬∀z(Fz ≡ Gz)) → ¬ExtensionOf(x,H)

Since H doesn’t occur free in the antecedent of this theorem, it follows by (39.4) that:

(xF & xG & ¬∀z(Fz ≡ Gz)) → ∀H ¬ExtensionOf(x,H)

Hence, by the modally strict equivalence ∀a¬φ ≡ ¬∃aφ, it follows by a Rule of Substitution that:

(xF & xG & ¬∀z(Fz ≡ Gz)) → ¬∃H(ExtensionOf(x,H))

Since this is a modally strict theorem, it follows by RM◊ that:

◊(xF & xG & ¬∀z(Fz ≡ Gz)) → ◊¬∃H(ExtensionOf(x,H))

By GEN, this holds for any x, F, and G, and so it holds for a, L, and Q:

(D) ◊(aL & aQ & ¬∀z(Lz ≡ Qz)) → ◊¬∃H(ExtensionOf(x,H))
But by now familiar reasoning from (158.16), the antecedent of (D) follows from \( \Box aL, \Box aQ, \) and \( \Diamond \neg \forall z (Lz \equiv Qz) \), all of which we've established. Hence \( \Diamond \neg \exists H(ExtensionOf(a,H)) \). But it is also a modal principle that \( \Diamond \neg \exists a \varphi \rightarrow \Diamond \neg \exists a (\varphi \& \psi) \) – this is easily established as a modal consequence of the contrapositive of (104.5). So it follows that \( \Diamond \neg \exists H(ExtensionOf(a,H) \& Hy) \). Hence, by definition (312) and a Rule of Substitution (160.2), it follows that \( \Diamond \neg \forall z (ExtensionOf(a,H) \land Hy) \). Hence, by definition (312) and a Rule of Substitution (160.2), it follows that \( \Diamond \neg y \in a \), i.e., \( \neg \Box y \in a \). \( \triangledown \)

**313.2** Assume \( y \in x \). Then \( \exists F(ExtensionOf(x,F) \& Fy) \). Suppose \( P \) is such a property, so that we know both \( ExtensionOf(x,P) \) and \( Py \). From the first it follows a fortiori from definition (307.1) that:

\[
(\forall F (xF \equiv \forall z (Fz \equiv Pz)))
\]

Hence, \( xP \), and so \( \Box xP \). Now by (219.4), we independently know that, for some property \( G, P \) is equivalent to \( G \) but might not have been. So suppose \( Q \) is such a property, so that we know both \( \forall x (Px \equiv Qx) \) and \( \Diamond \neg \forall x (Px \equiv Qx) \). The first and (8) imply \( xQ \), and so \( \Box xQ \). But by now familiar reasoning from (158.16), \( \Box xP, \Box xQ \) and \( \Diamond \neg \forall x (Px \equiv Qx) \) imply:

\[
\Diamond (xP \& xQ \& \neg \forall x (Px \equiv Qx))
\]

But by applying \( RM \Diamond \) to the relevant instance of (309.3), we know:

\[
\Diamond (xP \& xQ \& \neg \forall x (Px \equiv Qx) \rightarrow \Diamond \neg Class(x))
\]

Hence, \( \Diamond \neg Class(x) \), and so by definition (307.2) and a Rule of Substitution, \( \Diamond \neg \exists F(ExtensionOf(x,F)) \). It follows a fortiori, that \( \Diamond \neg \exists F(ExtensionOf(x,F) \& Fy) \), by reasoning from a modal consequence of the contrapositive of (104.5), which we also used at the end of (313.1). Hence \( \Diamond \neg y \in x \), i.e., \( \neg \Box y \in x \). \( \triangledown \)

**314** Assume \( ExtensionOf(x,H) \). Then, by definition (307.1) it follows that:

\[
\forall F (xF \equiv \forall z (Fz \equiv Hz))
\]

We want to show \( \forall y (y \in x \equiv Hy) \). Since \( y \) isn’t free in our assumption, it suffices by GEN to show \( y \in x \equiv Hy \).

(→) Assume \( y \in x \). Then by definition of membership (312), it follows that \( \exists G(ExtensionOf(x,G) \& Gy) \). Suppose \( P \) is an arbitrary such property, so that we know \( ExtensionOf(x,P) \& Py \). Note independently that it follows from pre-Basic Law V (309.1) that:

\[
(\forall P (ExtensionOf(x,P) \& ExtensionOf(x,H)) \rightarrow (x=x \equiv \forall z (Pz \equiv Hz)))
\]

But we know both conjuncts of the antecedent. So we may infer from (8) that \( x=x \equiv \forall z (Pz \equiv Hz) \). By the reflexivity of identity, (118.1), it follows that \( \forall z (Pz \equiv Hz) \). But since we also know \( Py \), it follows that \( Hy \).
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(←) Assume \( H_y \). But given our initial assumption, we have \( \text{ExtensionOf}(x, H) \& H_y \). Hence, by definition of membership (312), \( y \in x \).

(315) By (310.1), we know \( \exists x \text{ExtensionOf}(x, F) \). Let \( a \) be an arbitrary such object, so that we know \( \text{ExtensionOf}(a, F) \). Hence, \( \exists G \text{ExtensionOf}(a, G) \), and so by definition (307.2), \( \text{Class}(a) \). But also follows from \( \text{ExtensionOf}(a, F) \), by (314), that \( \forall y (y \in a \equiv F y) \). Hence, we may conjoin our results to conclude \( \text{Class}(a, F) \& \forall y (y \in x \equiv F y) \). Since we derived this from no assumptions, it follows by GEN that \( \forall F \exists x (\text{Class}(x, F) \& \forall y (y \in x \equiv F y)) \).

(317.1) Let \( \Pi \) be any 1-place relation term in which \( x \) doesn’t occur free. Then, to prove our theorem, we first establish the following Lemma:

Lemma: \( \neg \Pi \downarrow \vdash \neg \exists ! x \text{ExtensionOf}(x, \Pi) \)

Proof. Assume \( \neg \Pi \downarrow \). Then given that \( \neg \varphi \rightarrow \neg (\psi \& \varphi \& \chi) \), we know:

\[
\neg (\exists ! x \& \Pi \downarrow \& \forall F (x F \equiv \forall z (F z \equiv \Pi z)))
\]

Hence, by definition of \( \text{ExtensionOf}(x, G) \) (307.1), \( \neg \text{ExtensionOf}(x, \Pi) \). By hypothesis, \( x \) isn’t free in \( \Pi \), and so it isn’t free in our assumption. By GEN it follows that \( \forall x \neg \text{ExtensionOf}(x, \Pi) \), i.e., \( \neg \exists x \text{ExtensionOf}(x, \Pi) \). So by the definition of the uniqueness quantifier, \( \neg \exists ! x \text{ExtensionOf}(x, \Pi) \). Since we’ve established \( \neg \Pi \downarrow \rightarrow \neg \exists ! x \text{ExtensionOf}(x, \Pi) \) by conditional proof, our Lemma follows by (64.10).

We then prove our theorem as follows: Assume \( \neg \Pi \downarrow \). Then by (107.2), it follows that \( \Box \neg \Pi \downarrow \). So by (132), \( \neg \Pi \downarrow \). But it follows from our Lemma by Rule RA that: \( \neg \Pi \downarrow \vdash \neg \exists ! x \text{ExtensionOf}(x, \Pi) \). Hence \( \neg \exists ! x \text{ExtensionOf}(x, \Pi) \). So by axiom (44.1), \( \neg \exists ! x \text{ExtensionOf}(x, \Pi) \). Hence, by (174.1):

\( \neg \exists ! x \text{ExtensionOf}(x, \Pi) \)

So by (174.2), \( \neg \exists ! x \text{ExtensionOf}(x, \Pi) \downarrow \).

(317.2) Assume \( \neg \Pi \downarrow \). Without loss of generality, pick some variable, say \( x \), that doesn’t occur free in \( \Pi \). Then by (317.1), we have \( \neg \exists ! x \text{ExtensionOf}(x, \Pi) \downarrow \). Now the definition of \( \epsilon G \) (316) and the Rule of Definition by Identity (74), we know that:

\[
(\exists ! x \text{ExtensionOf}(x, \Pi) \downarrow \rightarrow \epsilon \Pi = \exists ! x \text{ExtensionOf}(x, \Pi) \&
(\neg \exists ! x \text{ExtensionOf}(x, \Pi) \downarrow \rightarrow \neg \epsilon \Pi \downarrow)
\]

It therefore follows from \( \neg \exists ! x \text{ExtensionOf}(x, \Pi) \downarrow \) and the second conjunct that \( \neg \epsilon \Pi \downarrow \).

(318) By (310.3), we know:
(A) $\text{ixExtensionOf}(x, G)$

So, by definition (316) and the Rule of Identity by Definition (121.1):

(B) $\epsilon G = \text{ixExtensionOf}(x, G)$

Now, independently, definition (307.1) and the $\vdash \Box$ version of the Rule of Equivalence by Definition (91.1) jointly imply that the following is a modally strict theorem:

$\text{ExtensionOf}(x, G) \equiv A!x & \forall F(x F \equiv \forall z(F z \equiv G z))$

By Rule $\equiv S$ of Biconditional Simplification, the following is therefore a modally strict theorem:

$\text{ExtensionOf}(x, G) \equiv A!x & \forall F(x F \equiv \forall z(F z \equiv G z))$

So by GEN and RN:

(C) $\Box \forall x(\text{ExtensionOf}(x, G) \equiv A!x & \forall F(x F \equiv \forall z(F z \equiv G z)))$

It follows from (A) and (C) by theorem (149.3) that:

(D) $\text{ixExtensionOf}(x, G) = \text{ix}(A!x & \forall F(x F \equiv \forall z(F z \equiv G z)))$

Since all of the terms in question are significant, it follows by (B), (D), and the transitivity of identity that:

$\epsilon G = \text{ix}(A!x & \forall F(x F \equiv \forall z(F z \equiv G z)))$

(319) Theorem (219.1) is $\exists F \exists G(\forall z(F z \equiv G z) & \Diamond \neg \forall z(F z \equiv G z))$. Let $P$ and $Q$ be such properties, so that we know:

$\forall z(P z \equiv Q z) & \Diamond \neg \forall z(P z \equiv Q z)$

Hence, by the $T \Diamond$ schema (163.1):

$\Diamond(\forall z(P z \equiv Q z) & \Diamond \neg \forall z(P z \equiv Q z))$

So by two applications of $\exists I$:

$\exists G \exists F(\forall z(F z \equiv G z) & \Diamond \neg \forall z(F z \equiv G z))$

(321.1) By definition (316), we know $\epsilon G = \text{ixExtensionOf}(x, G)$. This in turn implies $\epsilon G \downarrow$. So by (145.2)$\quad 16$, $\text{ExtensionOf}(\epsilon G, G)$. $\Rightarrow$

(321.2) By (321.1)$\quad 16$, $\text{ExtensionOf}(\epsilon G, G)$. When we expand this by the definition of $\text{ExtensionOf}$ (307.1), our theorem, $\forall F(\epsilon G F \equiv \forall z(F z \equiv G z))$, is the third conjunct. $\Rightarrow$

(321.3) By instantiating (321.2)$\quad 16$ to $G$, it follows that:
\[ eG = \forall z(Gz \equiv Gz) \]

But the right side is easily established by GEN from the tautology \( Gz \equiv Gz \).

(321.4) By theorem (141) and GEN, we know:

(8) \( \forall x(x = x) \equiv \forall z(\text{ExtensionOf}(x, G) \equiv z = x) \)

But by (310.3), \( \text{ExtensionOf}(x, G) \downarrow \). So by definition (316), \( eG \downarrow \). If we instantiate (8) to \( eG \), we obtain:

\[ eG = \forall x(x = x) \equiv \forall z(\text{ExtensionOf}(z, G) \equiv z \equiv eG) \]

So, by definition (316) and biconditional syllogism, it follows that:

\[ \forall z(\text{ExtensionOf}(z, G) \equiv z \equiv eG) \]

By instantiating this last result to \( x \), and we have:

\[ \text{ExtensionOf}(x, G) \equiv x \equiv eG \]

(322) Since \( eG \downarrow \) and \( eG \downarrow \) exist, we can instantiate \( eF \) and \( eG \) into pre-Basic Law V (309.1). Substituting \( eF \) for \( x \), \( F \) for \( G \), \( eG \) for \( y \), and \( G \) for \( H \), we obtain:

\[ (\text{ExtensionOf}(eF, F) & \text{ExtensionOf}(eG, G)) \rightarrow (eF \equiv eG \equiv \forall z(Fz \equiv Gz)) \]

But we also know by (321) that \( \text{ExtensionOf}(eF, F) \) and \( \text{ExtensionOf}(eG, G) \). Hence, \( eF \equiv eG \equiv \forall z(Fz \equiv Gz) \).

(325) Suppose, for reductio, that \( [\lambda x \exists G(x = eG \& \neg Gx)] \downarrow \). Let’s abbreviate this \( \lambda \)-expression as \( K \), so that our reductio assumption becomes \( K \downarrow \). Then by (310.3), \( \text{ExtensionOf}(z, K) \downarrow \). So by definition (316) and Rule =df (121.2.b), \( eK \downarrow \). Then to obtain our contradiction, we show: \( K \equiv eK \equiv \neg eK \), i.e., that \( eK \) exemplifies \( K \) if and only if it does not. (\( \rightarrow \)) Assume \( KeK \). Then by Rule =C (182.1.a), it follows that \( \exists G(eK = eG \& \neg GeK) \). Suppose \( P \) is such a property, so that we know \( eK = eP \& \neg PeK \). Now, independently, we know by (321.3)

\[ eG \equiv \forall z(Gz \equiv Gz) \]

But the right side is easily established by GEN from the tautology \( Gz \equiv Gz \).

(321.4) By theorem (141) and GEN, we know:

(8) \( \forall x(x = x) \equiv \forall z(\text{ExtensionOf}(x, G) \equiv z = x) \)

But by (310.3), \( \text{ExtensionOf}(x, G) \downarrow \). So by definition (316), \( eG \downarrow \). If we instantiate (8) to \( eG \), we obtain:

\[ eG = \forall x(x = x) \equiv \forall z(\text{ExtensionOf}(z, G) \equiv z \equiv eG) \]

So, by definition (316) and biconditional syllogism, it follows that:

\[ \forall z(\text{ExtensionOf}(z, G) \equiv z \equiv eG) \]

By instantiating this last result to \( x \), and we have:

\[ \text{ExtensionOf}(x, G) \equiv x \equiv eG \]

(322) Since \( eF \downarrow \) and \( eG \downarrow \) exist, we can instantiate \( eF \) and \( eG \) into pre-Basic Law V (309.1). Substituting \( eF \) for \( x \), \( F \) for \( G \), \( eG \) for \( y \), and \( G \) for \( H \), we obtain:

\[ (\text{ExtensionOf}(eF, F) & \text{ExtensionOf}(eG, G)) \rightarrow (eF = eG = \forall z(Fz = Gz)) \]

But we also know by (321) that \( \text{ExtensionOf}(eF, F) \) and \( \text{ExtensionOf}(eG, G) \). Hence, \( eF = eG = \forall z(Fz = Gz) \).

(325) Suppose, for reductio, that \( [\lambda x \exists G(x = eG & \neg Gx)] \downarrow \). Let’s abbreviate this \( \lambda \)-expression as \( K \), so that our reductio assumption becomes \( K \downarrow \). Then by (310.3), \( \text{ExtensionOf}(z, K) \downarrow \). So by definition (316) and Rule =df (121.2.b), \( eK \downarrow \). Then to obtain our contradiction, we show: \( KeK \equiv \neg KeK \), i.e., that \( eK \) exemplifies \( K \) if and only if it does not. (\( \rightarrow \)) Assume \( KeK \). Then by Rule =C (182.1.a), it follows that \( \exists G(eK = eG \& \neg GeK) \). Suppose \( P \) is such a property, so that we know \( eK = eP \& \neg PeK \). Now, independently, we know by (321.3)
However, to give the conjunctive interpretation to each formula in our strict derivability relation:

Now we leave it as an exercise to show that the following equivalences govern:

\[ \square \psi \text{ iff } \forall \mathbf{x} (\forall \mathbf{x} \in \mathbf{K}) \]

Hence we may validly factor out \[ \psi \text{ into its components.} \]

So assume:

It therefore suffices to show that the following metarule is justified:

\[ (335.1.a) \text{ We want to show that the following metarule is justified:} \]

If \( \Gamma(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n) \vdash \chi(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n) \), then \( \square \Gamma(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n) \vdash \square \chi(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n) \)

Our strategy is to show that when we apply our conventions for restricted variables, this abbreviates a metarule justified by RN. Now to see what our metatheorem abbreviates, give the conjunctive interpretation to each formula in \( \Gamma(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n) \) and \( \square \Gamma(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n) \), and the give the conditional interpretation to \( \psi(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n) \) and \( \square \psi(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n) \). As noted in the discussion in the text, the latter is easy:

\[ \psi(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n) \text{ abbreviates } (\psi_1 \& \ldots \& \psi_n) \]

However, to give the conjunctive interpretation to each formula in \( \Gamma(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_j) \), we follow the indication in footnote 220:

interpret each \( \chi(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n) \) in \( \Gamma(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n) \) as \( \psi_1 \& \ldots \& \psi_n \& \chi \)
interpret each \( \square \chi(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n) \) in \( \square \Gamma(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n) \) as \( \psi_1 \& \ldots \& \psi_n \& \square \chi \)

Now we leave it as an exercise to show that the following equivalences govern our strict derivability relation:

\[ \psi_1 \& \ldots \& \psi_n \& \chi \vdash \square \psi \text{ if and only if } \psi_1 \ldots \& \psi_n \& \chi \vdash \square \psi \]

\[ \Gamma \vdash (\psi_1 \& \ldots \& \psi_n) \rightarrow \psi \text{ if and only if } \psi_1 \& \ldots \& \psi_n \Gamma \vdash \square \psi \]

Hence we may validly factor out all of the \( \psi \)'s (a) from all the premises in \( \Gamma \) and \( \square \Gamma \) and (b) from the conclusions (\( \psi_1 \& \ldots \& \psi_n \rightarrow \square \psi \) and (\( \psi_1 \& \ldots \& \psi_n \rightarrow \square \psi \)).

It therefore suffices to show that the following metarule is justified:

If \( \psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n, \Gamma \vdash \square \psi \), then \( \psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n, \square \Gamma \vdash \square \psi \), where \( \psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n \) are rigid restriction conditions.

So assume:
We want to show:

$$\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n, \Box \Gamma \vdash \Box \Box \phi$$

Note first that it follows from our assumption by RN that:

$$\Box \psi_1, \ldots, \Box \psi_n, \Box \Gamma \vdash \Box \Box \phi$$

Now we leave it as an exercise to show that

$$\chi_1, \ldots, \chi_n, \Gamma \vdash \Box \phi$$

if and only if

$$\chi_1 \land \ldots \land \chi_n, \Gamma \vdash \Box \phi$$

Given this principle, it follows from our last displayed result that:

$$(\vartheta) \Box \psi_1 \land \ldots \land \Box \psi_n, \Box \Gamma \vdash \Box \Box \phi$$

Independently, since $$\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n$$ are, by hypothesis, rigid restriction conditions, we know all of the following:

$$\vdash \Box \forall \alpha (\psi_1 \rightarrow \Box \psi_1)$$

$$\vdash \Box \forall \alpha (\psi_n \rightarrow \Box \psi_n)$$

Hence, by $$\forall E$$:

$$\vdash \psi_1 \rightarrow \Box \psi_1$$

$$\vdash \psi_n \rightarrow \Box \psi_n$$

So by (64.10), we know:

$$\psi_1 \vdash \Box \psi_1$$

$$\vdash \psi_1 \rightarrow \Box \psi_1$$

$$\vdash \psi_n \rightarrow \Box \psi_n$$

By enough applications of (87.1), it follows from this last sequence of results that:

$$(\xi) \psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n \vdash \Box \psi_k \land \ldots \land \Box \psi_m$$

Thus, from ($$\xi$$) and ($$\vartheta$$) it follows by (64.8) that:

$$\psi_k, \ldots, \psi_m, \Box \Gamma \vdash \Box \Box \phi$$

(335.1.b) By the reasoning at the outset of (335.1.a), it suffices to show that the following metarule is justified:
If $\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n, \Gamma \vdash \varphi$, then $\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n, \forall \Gamma \vdash \forall \varphi$, where $\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n$ are rigid restriction conditions.

So assume:

$\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n, \Gamma \vdash \varphi$

We want to show:

$\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n, \forall \Gamma \vdash \forall \varphi$

Note first that it follows from our assumption by RA that:

$\forall \psi_1, \ldots, \forall \psi_n, \forall \Gamma \vdash \forall \varphi$

Now we leave it as an exercise to show that $\chi_1, \ldots, \chi_n, \Gamma \vdash \varphi$ if and only if $\chi_1 \& \ldots \& \chi_n, \Gamma \vdash \varphi$. Given this principle, it follows from our last displayed result that:

$(\forall) \forall \psi_1 \& \ldots \& \forall \psi_n, \forall \Gamma \vdash \forall \varphi$

Independently, since (a) $\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n$ are, by hypothesis, rigid restriction conditions, and (b) modally strict theorems are theorems (63.2), we know all of the following:

$\vdash \forall \alpha (\psi_1 \rightarrow \Box \psi_1)$

$\vdash \forall \alpha (\psi_n \rightarrow \Box \psi_n)$

Hence, by $\forall E$:

$\vdash \psi_1 \rightarrow \Box \psi_1$

$\vdash \psi_n \rightarrow \Box \psi_n$

So by (64.10), we know:

$\psi_1 \vdash \Box \psi_1$

$\vdash \psi_n \rightarrow \Box \psi_n$

By enough applications of (87.1), it follows from this last sequence of results that:

$(\xi) \psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n \vdash \Box \psi_k \& \ldots \& \Box \psi_m$

It is also easy to establish, by theorem (132) and the rules for $\&$, that (exercise):
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(ζ) $\square \psi_k \& \ldots \& \square \psi_m \vdash \varphi \psi_k \& \ldots \& \varphi \psi_m$

From (ξ) and (ζ), it follows that (exercise):

$\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n \vdash A \psi_k \& \ldots \& A \psi_m$

Thus, from this last result and (δ) it follows by (64.8) that:

$\psi_k, \ldots, \psi_m, \varphi \Gamma \vdash \varphi \psi$

(337) If we eliminate all the restricted variables, then the theorem to be proved is:

$\forall x \forall y ((\text{Class}(x) \& \text{Class}(y)) \rightarrow (x=y \equiv \forall z(z \in x \equiv z \in y)))$

So by GEN, it suffices to show:

$(\text{Class}(x) \& \text{Class}(y)) \rightarrow (x=y \equiv \forall z(z \in x \equiv z \in y))$

Assume $\text{Class}(x) \& \text{Class}(y)$. (→) Exercise. (←) Assume:

(a) $\forall z(z \in x \equiv z \in y)$

By definition (307.2), $\text{Class}(x)$ and $\text{Class}(y)$ imply $\exists F(\text{ExtensionOf}(x,F))$ and $\exists G(\text{ExtensionOf}(y,G))$. Let $P$ and $Q$ be such properties, so that $\text{ExtensionOf}(x,P)$ and $\text{ExtensionOf}(y,Q)$, respectively. But by theorem (314), it follows from the first that $\forall z(z \in x \equiv Pz)$, which is equivalent to:

(b) $\forall z(Pz \equiv z \in x)$

And it follows from the second that:

(c) $\forall z(z \in y \equiv Qy)$

From (b) and (a), it follows by (100.10) that $\forall z(Pz \equiv z \in y)$, and from this and (c) it follows, also by (100.10), that $\forall z(Pz \equiv Qz)$. Now, independently, the following is an instance of pre-Basic Law V (309):

$(\text{ExtensionOf}(x,P) \& \text{ExtensionOf}(y,Q)) \rightarrow (x=y \equiv \forall z(Pz \equiv Qz))$

Since both conjuncts of the antecedent are known, it follows that:

$x=y \equiv \forall z(Pz \equiv Qz)$

Since we've established the right side of the above biconditional, it follows that $x=y$. ⊥

(339.1) By our convention (331.2) for bound restricted variables, we have to show:
(8) \( \exists x (\text{Class}(x) \& \text{Empty}(x)) \)

Moreover, by our convention (331.1) for definitions-by-equivalence with free restricted variables, (338) is an abbreviation of:

\[
\text{Empty}(x) \equiv_{df} \text{Class}(x) \& \neg \exists y (y \in x)
\]

By a Rule of Substitution (160.2), we can exchange the definiens and definendum when they occur as subformulas, so to show (8) it suffices to show:

\( \exists x (\text{Class}(x) \& \text{Class}(x) \& \neg \exists y (y \in x)) \)

But given the otiose conjunct, it suffices by the idempotence of \& (86.6) to show:

\( (\xi) \exists x (\text{Class}(x) \& \neg \exists y (y \in x)) \)

Consider the impossible property \( L \), where \( L \) was defined as \( \lambda x E!x \rightarrow E!x \) (201) and \( \bar{F} \) was defined as \( \lambda y \neg Fy \) (194). Then by the Fundamental Theorem for Natural Classes and Logical Sets (315), we know:

\( \exists x (\text{Class}(x) \& \forall y (y \in x \equiv \bar{L}y)) \)

Suppose \( a \) is an arbitrary such object, so that we know:

\( (\zeta) \text{Class}(a) \& \forall y (y \in a \equiv \bar{L}y) \)

It now suffices to show that \( a \) is a witness to (\( \xi \)). And given the first conjunct of (\( \zeta \)), it remains to show \( \neg \exists y (y \in a) \). Suppose, for reductio, that \( \exists y (y \in a) \). Let \( b \) be an arbitrary such object, so that we know \( b \in a \). Then by the second conjunct of (8), it follows that \( \bar{L}b \). But recall that in the proof of (201.2), we developed a (modally-strict) proof of \( \forall x \neg \bar{L}x \). So \( \neg \bar{L}b \). Contradiction. \( \Box \)

(339.2) Eliminating the restricted variables, we have to show:

\( \exists x (\text{Class}(x) \& \text{Empty}(x) \& \forall z ((\text{Class}(z) \& \text{Empty}(z)) \rightarrow z = x)) \)

By (339.1), we already know \( \exists x (\text{Class}(x) \& \text{Empty}(x)) \). So suppose \( a \) is an arbitrary such object, so that \( \text{Class}(a) \& \text{Empty}(a) \). So to conclude that \( a \) is the needed witness, it remains to show \( \forall z ((\text{Class}(z) \& \text{Empty}(z)) \rightarrow z = a) \). Since \( z \) isn’t free in our assumption, it suffices by GEN to show \( (\text{Class}(z) \& \text{Empty}(z)) \rightarrow z = a \). So assume \( \text{Class}(z) \& \text{Empty}(z) \). By our conventions for free restricted variables in definition-by-\( \equiv \) (332.1), definition (338) implies:

\[
\text{Empty}(a) \equiv \text{Class}(a) \& \neg \exists y (y \in a)
\]

\[
\text{Empty}(z) \equiv \text{Class}(z) \& \neg \exists y (y \in z)
\]
Given what we’ve established, it follows that \(\neg \exists y (y \in a)\) and \(\neg \exists y (y \in z)\). So by (104.9), \(\forall x(x \in z \equiv x \in a)\), i.e., that \(z\) and \(a\) have the same members. Hence, by the principle of extensionality (337), it follows that \(z = a\). \(\triangleright\)

**339.3** By (174.2), we know:

\((\theta) \ x(x(\text{Class}(x) \& \text{Empty}(x)) \equiv \exists! x(\text{Class}(x) \& \text{Empty}(x))\)

But theorem (339.2) is \(\exists! x \text{Empty}(x)\), i.e., \(\exists! x(\text{Class}(x) \& \text{Empty}(x))\). So by the Rule of Actualization, \(\exists! x(\text{Class}(x) \& \text{Empty}(x))\). From this and \((\theta)\), it follows that \(x(\text{Class}(x) \& \text{Empty}(x)) \equiv\). So by our conventions for restricted variables bound by term-forming operators (331.3), \(x(\text{Empty}(c)) \equiv\). \(\triangleright\)

**341.1** (Exercise)

**341.2** By eliminating the restricted variable in definition (340), we know:

\(\emptyset = x(\text{Class}(x) \& \text{Empty}(x))\)

Since all the terms involved are significant, it suffices, by the transitivity of identity, to show:

\(x(\text{Class}(x) \& \text{Empty}(x)) = x(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \neg \exists zFz))\)

We show this by way of theorem (149.3). Given theorem (339.3), it remains only to establish:

\((\theta) \square \forall x((\text{Class}(x) \& \text{Empty}(x)) \equiv (A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \neg \exists zFz)))\)

By GEN and RN, it suffices to show:

\((\text{Class}(x) \& \text{Empty}(x)) \equiv (A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \neg \exists zFz))\)

\((\rightarrow)\) Assume both \(\text{Class}(x)\) and \(\text{Empty}(x)\). The latter implies by definition (338) that \(\neg \exists y (y \in x)\). The former implies \(\exists G(\text{ExtensionOf}(x, G))\), by (307.2). Suppose \(F\) is such a property, so that we know \(\text{ExtensionOf}(x, P)\). Hence, by definition (307.1), we know both \(A!x\) and:

\((\zeta) \ \forall F(xF \equiv \forall z(Fz \equiv Pz))\)

And \(\text{ExtensionOf}(x, P)\) also implies, by (314):

\((\xi) \ \forall y(y \in x \equiv Py)\)

Now since we’ve established \(A!x\), it remains to show \(\forall F(xF \equiv \neg \exists zFz)\) and, by GEN, that \(xF \equiv \neg \exists zFz\). \((\rightarrow)\) Assume \(xF\). Then by \((\zeta)\), \(\forall z(Fz \equiv Pz)\). Independently, from our hypothesis that \(\neg \exists y (y \in x)\) and \((\xi)\) it follows that \(\neg \exists y Py\). But we’ve established that \(F\) is materially equivalent to \(P\). So \(\neg \exists zFz\). \((\rightarrow)\) Assume \(\neg \exists zFz\). But we know, \(\neg \exists y (y \in x)\). Then by \((\xi)\), \(\neg \exists y Py\). Since \(F\) and \(P\) are both unexemplified, they are materially equivalent (104.9), i.e., \(\forall z(Fz \equiv Pz)\). Hence \(xF\), by \((\zeta)\).

\((\leftarrow)\) Assume \(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \neg \exists zFz)\). We have to show:
(A) \textit{Class}(x)

and, by definition (338), show:

(B) \neg \exists y (y \in x)

(A) By (307.2), we want to show that \exists G(ExtensionOf(x, G)). To find a witness, consider the necessarily unexemplified property \( L \), which we defined previously as the negation (194) of \( L \), which in turn was defined as \( [\lambda x E!x \rightarrow E!x] \) (201). By definition (307.1) and \exists I, we need only show:

(C) \( A!x \& T \downarrow \& \forall F (xF \equiv \forall z(Fz \equiv Tz)) \)

But \( A!x \) is already known. \( T \downarrow \) is also known, given the definition of \( T \). Now given our assumption \( \forall F (xF \equiv \neg \exists zFz) \), to show the third conjunct of (C) we need only show:

\( \forall z(Fz \equiv \forall z(Fz \equiv Tz)) \), by properties of quantified biconditionals (100.10). So, by GEN, we show \( \neg \exists zFz \equiv \forall z(Fz \equiv Tz) \). This is easy:

(\( \rightarrow \)) Assume \( \neg \exists zFz \). From this and the fact (exercise) that \( \neg \exists \exists \), it follows by (104.9) that \( \forall z(Fz \equiv Tz) \).

(\( \leftarrow \)) Assume \( \forall z(Fz \equiv Tz) \). For reductio, assume \( \exists zFz \) and suppose \( a \) is such an individual, so that we know \( Fa \). Then since our local assumption implies \( Fa \equiv Ta \), it follows that \( Ta \), which contradicts the fact that \( \neg \exists zTz \).

(B) In the proof of (A) we established that \( ExtensionOf(x, T) \). This implies, by (314), that:

(\( \xi \)) \( \forall y (y \in x \equiv Ty) \)

But \( T \) is an impossible property, and so we know \( \neg \exists yTy \). Hence, \( \neg \exists y(y \in x) \).

(343.1) Consider the necessary property \( L \), which we defined previously as \( [\lambda x E!x \rightarrow E!x] \) (201). Then by the Fundamental Theorem for Natural Classes and Logical Sets (315), we know:

\( \exists x(\text{Class}(x) \& \forall y(y \in x \equiv Ly)) \)

Suppose \( a \) is an arbitrary such class, so that we know:

(\( \delta \)) \( \forall y(y \in a \equiv Ly) \)

So if \( a \) is to be our witness, it remains, by the definition of a universal’ class (342), only to show \( \forall y(y \in a) \). By GEN, we show \( y \in a \). Since the second conjunct of (\( \delta \)) implies \( y \in a \equiv Ly \), it suffices to show \( Ly \). But by definition of \( L \), \( \beta \)-Conversion, and the fact that \( L \downarrow \), we know \( Ly \equiv (E!y \rightarrow E!y) \). Since the right side of this biconditional is a tautology, \( Ly \).

(343.2) (Exercise)

(345.1) By our conventions for restricted variables, we have to show:
∀x∀y((Class(x) & Class(y)) → ∃z(Class(z) & UnionOf(z,x,y)))

So by GEN, we have to show:

(Class(x) & Class(y)) → ∃z(Class(z) & UnionOf(z,x,y))

So assume Class(x) & Class(y). By definition of UnionOf (344) and eliminating the otiose conjuncts from the definiens, we have to show:

∃z(Class(z) & ∀w(∀w(w ∈ z ⇒ w ∈ x ∨ w ∈ y)))

To find our witness, note that since x and y are classes, it follows by (307.2) that there are properties P and Q such that ExtensionOf(x,P) and ExtensionOf(y,Q).

So by (314), we know both:

(δ) ∀w(w ∈ x ⇒ Pw)
(ξ) ∀w(w ∈ y ⇒ Qw)

Now consider the property [λz Pz ∨ Qz]. By (39.2), [λz Pz ∨ Qz]↓. Then by the Fundamental Theorem for Natural Classes and Logical Sets (315), we know:

∃x(Class(x) & ∀y(y ∈ x ≡ [λz Pz ∨ Qz]y))

Let b be an arbitrary such object, so that we know Class(b):

(ζ) ∀y(y ∈ b ≡ [λz Pz ∨ Qz]y)

Now if we can show ∀w(w ∈ b ≡ (w ∈ x ∨ w ∈ y)), then b is the desired witness and we’re done. By GEN, it suffices to show w ∈ b ≡ (w ∈ x ∨ w ∈ y). This is established by the following chain of biconditionals, all of which are consequences of what we have established so far:

w ∈ b ≡ [λz Pz ∨ Qz]w by (ζ)
≡ Pw ∨ Qw by [λz Pz ∨ Qz]↓ and Rule \(\beta\) C (182.1.a)
≡ w ∈ x ∨ Qw by (δ) and (89.8.h)
≡ w ∈ x ∨ w ∈ y by (ξ), and (89.8.g) ⇔

(345.2) By our conventions for restricted variables and GEN, we have to show:

(Class(x) & Class(y)) → ∃z(Class(z) & UnionOf(z,x,y) & ∀w(Class(w) & UnionOf(w,x,y) → w = z))

So assume Class(x) & Class(y). We may therefore instantiate x and y into by (345.1), and conclude:

∃z(Class(z) & UnionOf(z,x,y))
Assume \( a \) is an arbitrary such class, so that \( \text{Class}(a) \) and \( \text{UnionOf}(a,x,y) \). By GEN, \&I, and \( \exists I \), it remains to show \( \text{Class}(w) \& \text{UnionOf}(w,x,y) \rightarrow w = a \). So assume both \( \text{Class}(w) \) and \( \text{UnionOf}(w,x,y) \). Then, by definition of \( \text{UnionOf} \) (344), it follows that:

\[
\begin{align*}
\vartheta & \; \forall z \; (z \in w \equiv (z \in x \lor z \in y)) \\
(\xi) & \; \forall z (z \in a \equiv (z \in x \lor z \in y))
\end{align*}
\]

Now since \( \text{UnionOf}(a,x,y) \), we know by definition (344) that:

\[
\begin{align*}
\xi & \; \forall z (z \in a \equiv (z \in x \lor z \in y))
\end{align*}
\]

So by the logic of quantified biconditionals, \( \vartheta \) and \( \xi \) jointly imply \( \forall z (z \in w \equiv z \in a) \). It follows by the principle of extensionality (337) that \( w = a \). \( \triangledown \)

(346.1) By eliminating the restricted variables and applying the Rule of Actualization to theorem (345.2), it follows that:

\[
\text{\&} \forall x \forall y ((\text{Class}(x) \& \text{Class}(y)) \rightarrow \exists! z (\text{Class}(z) \& \text{UnionOf}(z,x,y)))
\]

Note that this is equivalent to:

\[
(\vartheta) \; \text{\&} \forall x (\text{Class}(x) \rightarrow \forall y (\text{Class}(y) \rightarrow \exists! z (\text{Class}(z) \& \text{UnionOf}(z,x,y))))
\]

Now in footnote 217, in the discussion in Remark (334), we saw that it is a \( \star \)-theorem that \( \text{\&} \forall x (\psi \rightarrow \varphi) \rightarrow \forall x (\psi \rightarrow \text{\&} \varphi) \). Hence (\( \vartheta \)) implies:

\[
\forall x (\text{Class}(x) \rightarrow \exists! z (\text{Class}(z) \& \text{UnionOf}(z,x,y)))
\]

So by \( \forall E \):

\[
\text{Class}(x) \rightarrow \exists! z (\text{Class}(z) \& \text{UnionOf}(z,x,y))
\]

Now, for conditional proof, assume \( \text{Class}(x) \). Hence:

\[
\exists! z (\text{Class}(z) \& \text{UnionOf}(z,x,y))
\]

We now repeat this sequence of reasoning. By the \( \star \)-theorem in footnote 217:

\[
\forall y (\text{Class}(y) \rightarrow \exists! z (\text{Class}(z) \& \text{UnionOf}(z,x,y)))
\]

And, again by \( \forall E \):

\[
\text{Class}(y) \rightarrow \exists! z (\text{Class}(z) \& \text{UnionOf}(z,x,y))
\]

And, again, for conditional proof, assume \( \text{Class}(y) \). Hence:

\[
\exists! z (\text{Class}(z) \& \text{UnionOf}(z,x,y))
\]

So, by theorem (174.2), it follows that \( \exists! z (\text{Class}(z) \& \text{UnionOf}(z,x,y)) \downarrow \). Hence, by conditional proof, we've established:
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\[(\text{Class}(x) \land \text{Class}(y)) \rightarrow iz(\text{Class}(z) \land \text{UnionOf}(z, x, y))\]

Since \(x\) and \(y\) aren’t free in any undischarged assumption, it follows by GEN that:

\[\forall x\forall y((\text{Class}(x) \land \text{Class}(y)) \rightarrow iz(\text{Class}(z) \land \text{UnionOf}(z, x, y)))\]

So by our conventions for restricted variables, \(\forall c'\forall c''(iz(\text{UnionOf}(c, c', c''))\).

(346.2)\* If we eliminate the restricted variables, we have to show:

\[\neg \Box(\forall x\forall y((\text{Class}(x) \land \text{Class}(y)) \rightarrow iz(\text{Class}(z) \land \text{UnionOf}(z, x, y))))\]

Suppose this were necessary, for reductio. Then by CBF (167.2):

(8) \(\forall x\forall y((\text{Class}(x) \land \text{Class}(y)) \rightarrow iz(\text{Class}(z) \land \text{UnionOf}(z, x, y)))\)

Now independently, note that by standard modal reasoning, theorem (311.3) is equivalent to:

\[\Diamond\exists x(\text{Class}(x) \land \neg a\text{Class}(x))\]

So by BF\(\Diamond\) (167.3):

\[\exists x(\text{Class}(x) \land \neg a\text{Class}(x))\]

Now suppose \(a\) is such an object, so that we know:

\[\Diamond(\text{Class}(a) \land \neg a\text{Class}(a))\]

Hence, by (162.3):

(\(\xi\)) \(\Diamond\text{Class}(a) \land \Diamond\neg a\text{Class}(a)\)

But the second conjunct of (\(\xi\)) is equivalent to \(\Diamond\neg a\text{Class}(a)\), by the necessary axiom (44.1) and a Rule of Substitution. Hence by (164.4), \(\neg a\text{Class}(a)\), and so by (43)\*, \(\neg a\text{Class}(a)\). But this last result implies (exercise):

\[\neg \exists z(\text{Class}(z) \land \text{Class}(a) \land a\text{Class}(a) \land \forall y(y \in z \equiv (y \in a \lor y \in a)))\]

So by adding an otiose conjunct, it follows, by definition (344) and a Rule of Substitution:

\[\neg \exists z(\text{Class}(z) \land \text{UnionOf}(z, a, a))\]

Hence, \(\neg \exists !z(\text{Class}(z) \land \text{UnionOf}(z, a, a))\) and so by (144.1)\*:

\[\neg iz(\text{Class}(z) \land \text{UnionOf}(z, a, a))\]

But if we instantiate \(a\) twice into (8), we obtain:

\[\Box((\text{Class}(a) \land \text{Class}(a)) \rightarrow iz(\text{Class}(z) \land \text{UnionOf}(z, a, a)))\]
By the K◊ principle, this implies:

\((ζ) \diamond (\text{Class}(a) & \text{Class}(a)) \rightarrow \diamond \text{iz}(\text{Class}(z) & \text{UnionOf}(z, a, a)) \downarrow\)

But \(\diamond \varphi \rightarrow \diamond (\varphi & \varphi)\) (exercise), and so the first conjunct of \((ζ)\) follows from the first conjunct of \((ξ)\). Hence, \(\diamond \text{iz}(\text{Class}(z) & \text{UnionOf}(z, a, a)) \downarrow\). But by theorem \((169.1)\), \(\diamond \tau \downarrow \rightarrow \tau \downarrow\). Hence \(\text{iz}(\text{Class}(z) & \text{UnionOf}(z, a, a)) \downarrow\). Contradiction. \(\Rightarrow\)

\((347)\) To prove our theorem, we begin as we did in the previous proof, eliminating the restricted variables. Thus, we have to show:

\(-\Box x \forall y ((\text{Class}(x) & \text{Class}(y)) \rightarrow \text{iz}(\text{Class}(z) & \text{UnionOf}(z, x, y)) \downarrow)\)

Suppose this were necessary, for reductio. Then by CBF \((167.2)\):

\((8) \forall x \forall y \Box ((\text{Class}(x) & \text{Class}(y)) \rightarrow \text{iz}(\text{Class}(z) & \text{UnionOf}(z, x, y)) \downarrow)\)

Now independently, note that by standard modal reasoning, theorem \((311.3)\) is equivalent to:

\(\Box \exists x (\text{Class}(x) & \neg \Box \text{Class}(x))\)

So by BF:\(\Box (167.3)\):

\(\exists x \Box (\text{Class}(x) & \neg \Box \text{Class}(x))\)

Now suppose \(a\) is such an object, so that we know:

\(\Box (\text{Class}(a) & \neg \Box \text{Class}(a))\)

Hence, by \((162.3)\):

\((ξ) \Box \text{Class}(a) & \Box \neg \Box \text{Class}(a)\)

But the second conjunct of \((ξ)\) is equivalent to \(\Box \neg \Box \text{Class}(a)\), by the necessary axiom \((44.1)\) and a Rule of Substitution. Hence by \((164.4)\), \(\Box \neg \Box \text{Class}(a)\), and so by axiom \((44.1)\), \(\neg \Box \text{Class}(a)\). Hence (exercise):

\(-\exists z \Box (\text{Class}(z) & \text{Class}(a) & \text{Class}(a) & \forall y (y \in z \equiv (y \in a \lor y \in a)))\)

So by adding an otiose conjunct and applying definition \((344)\) and a Rule of Substitution:

\(-\exists z \Box (\text{Class}(z) & \text{UnionOf}(z, a, a))\)

\(A\) fortiori,

\(-\exists ! z \Box (\text{Class}(z) & \text{UnionOf}(z, a, a))\)

So by theorem \((152.1)\):
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¬iz(Class(z & UnionOf(z, a, a))\downarrow

But if we instantiate \(a\) twice into (\(\vartheta\)), we obtain:

\[\Box((\text{Class}(a) & \text{Class}(a)) \rightarrow iz(Class(z & UnionOf(z, a, a))\downarrow)\]

By the \(K\Diamond\) principle, this implies:

\[(\zeta) \Diamond(\text{Class}(a) & \text{Class}(a)) \rightarrow \Diamond iz(Class(z & UnionOf(z, a, a))\downarrow)\]

But \(\Diamond \varphi \rightarrow \Diamond(\varphi \& \varphi)\) (exercise), and so the first conjunct of (\(\zeta\)) follows from the first conjunct of (\(\xi\)). Hence, \(\Diamond iz(Class(z & UnionOf(z, a, a))\downarrow\). But by theorem (169.1), \(\Diamond \tau \downarrow \rightarrow \tau \downarrow\). Hence \(iz(Class(z & UnionOf(z, a, a))\downarrow\). Contradiction. \(\Rightarrow\)

(349)\(\star\) We want to show:

\[\forall x \forall y((\text{Class}(x) \& \text{Class}(y)) \rightarrow \forall z(z \in x \cup y \equiv (z \in x \lor z \in y)))\]

So by GEN, it suffices to show:

\[(\text{Class}(x) \& \text{Class}(y)) \rightarrow \forall z(z \in x \cup y \equiv (z \in x \lor z \in y))\]

Assume \(\text{Class}(x) \& \text{Class}(y)\). By our conventions for free restricted variables in definitions-by-\(\equiv\) (333.3), definition of \(\cup\) (348) abbreviates:

(\(\vartheta\) \(x \cup y \equiv af\) \(iz(Class(z) & Class(x) & Class(y) & UnionOf(z, x, y))\))

Independently, since \(\text{Class}(x) \& \text{Class}(y)\), it follows from (346.1)\(\star\) that:

\[(\xi) iz(Class(z) & UnionOf(z, x, y))\downarrow\]

Similarly, by our conventions for free restricted variables in definitions-by-\(\equiv\) (332.2), the definition of \(\text{UnionOf}\) (344) abbreviates:

\(\text{UnionOf}(z, x, y) \equiv af\ Class(z) \& Class(x) \& Class(y) \& \forall w(z \equiv w \in x \lor w \in y)\)

Since the definiens of \(\text{UnionOf}(z, x, y)\) includes the conjuncts \(\text{Class}(x)\) and \(\text{Class}(y)\), it follows that (exercise):

\[\Box \forall z((\text{Class}(z) \& \text{UnionOf}(z, x, y)) \equiv (\text{Class}(z) \& \text{Class}(x) \& \text{Class}(y) \& \text{UnionOf}(z, x, y)))\]

From this last result and (\(\xi\)), it follows by (149.3) that:

\[iz(Class(z) \& Class(x) \& Class(y) \& UnionOf(z, x, y))\downarrow\]

So by definition (\(\vartheta\) and the theories of definition and identity, \((x \cup y)\downarrow\). Hence by theorem (145.2)\(\star\):

\[\text{Class}(x \cup y) \& \text{Class}(x) \& \text{Class}(y) \& \text{UnionOf}(x \cup y, x, y)\]

So by definition of \(\text{UnionOf}\) (344), the last conjunct implies:
∀z(x ∈ y ≡ (z ∈ x v z ∈ y))

\textbf{(351.1)} If we eliminate the restricted variables, then by GEN, we have to show:

Class(x) → ∃y(Class(y) & ComplementOf(y, x))

Assume Class(x), to find a witness to the consequent. By theorem (307.2), there is a property, say P, such that ExtensionOf(x, P). So consider the property P, i.e., \([λz −Pz]\), which we know exists by (39.2). Then by the Fundamental Theorem for Natural Classes and Logical Sets (315), we know:

∃y(Class(y) & ∀z(z ∈ y ≡ Pz))

Suppose \(a\) is an arbitrary such object, so that we know Class(\(a\)) and:

(8) ∀z(z ∈ a ≡ Pz)

To see \(a\) that is our witness, it remains only to show ∀z(z ∈ a ≡ z \(\notin\) x), by definition (350). Since \(z\) isn’t free in any assumption, it suffices by GEN to show z ∈ a ≡ z \(\notin\) x. We do this as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
z ∈ a & \equiv Pz & & \text{by (8)} \\
& \equiv [λz −Pz]z & & \text{by definition } P, \text{ Rule } =_d I, \text{ and Rule } =_d E \\
& \equiv −Pz & & \text{by Rule } − → C (182.1.a) \text{ and (182.1.b)} \\
& \equiv −z ∈ x & & \text{by (314), ExtensionOf(x, P)} \\
& \equiv z \notin x & & \text{by convention for } \notin
\end{align*}
\]

\textbf{(351.2)} By definition of the uniqueness quantifier, our theorem asserts:

∀c∃c′(ComplementOf(c', c) & ∀c''(ComplementOf(c'', c) → c'' = c'))

Eliminating the restricted variables:

∀x(Class(x) → ∃y(Class(y) & ComplementOf(y, x) &
∀z(Class(z) & ComplementOf(z, x) → z = y)))

By GEN, we assume Class(x), and find a witness to the consequent. But we know, by (351.1), that since Class(x), ∃y(Class(y) & ComplementOf(y, x)). Suppose \(a\) is such an object so that we know Class(\(a\)) and, by definition of ComplementOf (350):

(8) ∀w(w ∈ a ≡ w ∈ x)

To see that \(a\) is our witness, it remains to show Class(z) & ComplementOf(z, x) → z = a, by GEN. So assume Class(z) and ComplementOf(z, x). Then again by definition of ComplementOf (350):

(ξ) ∀w(w ∈ z ≡ w ∈ x)
Hence by properties of the biconditional, (θ) and (ξ) imply \( \forall w (w \in z \equiv w \in a) \). So by the principle of extensionality (337), \( z = a \). 

(352)\* If we eliminate the restricted variables and apply the Rule of Actualization to theorem (351.1), we know:

\[ \forall x (\text{Class}(x) \rightarrow \exists y (\text{Class}(y) \& \text{ComplementOf}(y, x))) \]

By the \*\-theorem established at the beginning of footnote 217, it follows that:

\[ \forall x (\text{Class}(x) \rightarrow \exists y (\text{Class}(y) \& \text{ComplementOf}(y, x))) \]

By \( \forall E \), it follows that:

\[ \text{Class}(x) \rightarrow \exists y (\text{Class}(y) \& \text{ComplementOf}(y, x)) \]

Now assume \( \text{Class}(x) \), for conditional proof. Then:

\[ \exists y (\text{Class}(y) \& \text{ComplementOf}(y, x)) \]

So by theorem (174.2), it follows that \( \exists y (\text{Class}(y) \& \text{ComplementOf}(y, x)) \downarrow \). Hence, by conditional proof:

\[ \text{Class}(x) \rightarrow \exists y (\text{Class}(y) \& \text{ComplementOf}(y, x)) \downarrow \]

Since \( x \) isn’t free in any undischarged assumptions, it follows by \( \forall E \) that:

\[ \forall x (\text{Class}(x) \rightarrow \exists y (\text{Class}(y) \& \text{ComplementOf}(y, x))) \downarrow \]

So by our conventions for restricted variables, \( \forall c (\text{ComplementOf}(c', c)) \downarrow \). 

(354.1) By eliminating our restricted variables and \( \forall E \), we want to show:

\[ (\text{Class}(x) \& \text{Class}(y)) \rightarrow \exists z \text{IntersectionOf}(z, x, y) \]

Assume \( \text{Class}(x) \& \text{Class}(y) \), to find a witness to the consequent. Since \( x \) and \( y \) are classes, there are, by (307.2), properties \( P \) and \( Q \) such that \( \text{ExtensionOf}(x, P) \) and \( \text{ExtensionOf}(y, Q) \). Now consider the property \( [\lambda z Pz \& Qz] \), which we know exists by (39.2). By the Fundamental Theorem for Natural Classes and Logical Sets (315), we know:

\[ \exists x (\text{Class}(x) \& \forall w (w \in x \equiv [\lambda z Pz \& Qz]w)) \]

Suppose \( a \) is an arbitrary such object, so that we know \( \text{Class}(a) \) and \( \forall w (w \in a \equiv [\lambda z Pz \& Qz]w) \). Then to see that \( a \) is our desired witness, it remains to show, By definition (353):

\[ \forall w (w \in a \equiv (w \in x \& w \in y)) \]
We leave this as an exercise. ≃

(354.2) (Exercise)

(355)★ (Exercise)

(357)★ By our conventions for restricted variables and GEN, we want to show:

\[(\text{Class}(x) \land \text{Class}(y)) \rightarrow \forall z (z \in x \land y \equiv (z \in x \land z \in y))\]

Assume \(\text{Class}(x) \land \text{Class}(y)\). By our conventions for free restricted variables in definitions-by-\(=\) (333.3), definition of \(\cap\) (356) abbreviates:

\[(\varphi) (x \land y =_{df} \text{iz}(\text{Class}(z) \land \text{Class}(x) \land \text{Class}(y) \land \text{IntersectionOf}(z,x,y)))\]

Independently, since \(\text{Class}(x) \land \text{Class}(y)\), it follows from (355)★ that:

\[(\xi) \text{iz}(\text{Class}(z) \land \text{IntersectionOf}(z,x,y))]\]

Similarly, by our conventions for free restricted variables in definitions-by-\(\equiv\) (332.2), the definition of \(\text{IntersectionOf}\) (353) abbreviates:

\[\text{IntersectionOf}(z,x,y) \equiv_{df} \text{Class}(z) \land \text{Class}(x) \land \text{Class}(y) \land \forall w (w \in z \equiv w \in x \lor w \in y)\]

Since the definiens of \(\text{IntersectionOf}(z,x,y)\) includes the conjuncts \(\text{Class}(x)\) and \(\text{Class}(y)\), it follows that (exercise):

\[\Box \forall z ((\text{Class}(z) \land \text{IntersectionOf}(z,x,y)) \equiv (\text{Class}(z) \land \text{Class}(x) \land \text{Class}(y) \land \text{IntersectionOf}(z,x,y)))\]

From this last result and (\(\xi\)), it follows by (149.3) that:

\[\text{iz}(\text{Class}(z) \land \text{Class}(x) \land \text{Class}(y) \land \text{IntersectionOf}(z,x,y))\]

So by definition (\(\varphi\)) and the theories of definition and identity, \((x \land y)\). Hence by theorem (145.2)★:

\[\text{Class}(x \land y) \land \text{Class}(x) \land \text{Class}(y) \land \text{IntersectionOf}(x \land y, x, y)\]

So by definition of \(\text{IntersectionOf}\) (344), the last conjunct implies:

\[\forall z (z \in x \cup y \equiv (z \in x \land z \in y))\]

(358.1) When we eliminate the restricted variable, our theorem becomes:

\[\lambda x \varphi \downarrow \rightarrow \exists z (\text{Class}(z) \land \forall y (y \in z \equiv \varphi^z_x)), \text{ provided } \varphi \text{ has no free occurrences of } z \text{ and } y, \text{ and } y \text{ is substitutable for } x \text{ in } \varphi\]

Assume \(\lambda x \varphi \downarrow\), where neither \(z\) nor \(y\) occur free in \(\varphi\) and \(y\) is substitutable for \(x\) in \(\varphi\). We want to find a witness to the consequent. Now consider the following alphabetic variant of the Fundamental Theorem for Natural Classes and Logical Sets (315):
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\[ \forall F \exists z (\text{Class}(z) \land \forall y (y \in z \equiv F y)) \]

Since \[\lambda x \varphi\] exists and \(\varphi\) doesn’t have \(z\) or \(y\) free, we can instantiate \([\lambda x \varphi]\) into the above to obtain:

\[ \exists z (\text{Class}(z) \land \forall y (y \in z \equiv [\lambda x \varphi] y)) \]

Suppose \(a\) is such an object, so that we know \(\text{Class}(a)\) and:

\[(\vartheta) \quad \forall y (y \in a \equiv [\lambda x \varphi] y)\]

To show \(a\) is the desired witness, it remains only to show \(\forall y (y \in a \equiv \varphi_y x)\). But since \(y\) doesn’t occur free in \(\varphi\) and is substitutable for \(x\) in \(\varphi\), it follows by a consequence of strengthened \(\beta\)-Conversion, namely (181.2), that \(\forall y ([\lambda x \varphi] y \equiv \varphi_y x)\). From \((\vartheta)\) this last result follows by (100.10) that \(\forall y (y \in a \equiv \varphi_y x)\), \(\bowtie\)

(358.2) (Exercise)

(358.3) When we eliminate the restricted variable, our theorem becomes:

\[ [\lambda x \varphi] \downarrow \rightarrow \exists ! z (\text{Class}(z) \land \forall y (y \in z \equiv \varphi^y_x)) \]

Assume \([\lambda x \varphi] \downarrow\), that \(z\) and \(y\) don’t occur free in \(\varphi\), and that \(y\) is substitutable for \(x\) in \(\varphi\). Then by the necessity of logical existence (107), \(\Box [\lambda x \varphi] \downarrow\), and since necessity implies actuality (132):

\[(\vartheta) \quad \exists ! [\lambda x \varphi] \downarrow\]

Now, independently, if we apply the Rule of Actualization to theorem (358.2), we obtain:

\[ \exists ! [\lambda x \varphi] \downarrow \rightarrow \exists ! z (\text{Class}(z) \land \forall y (y \in z \equiv \varphi^y_x)) \]

This implies, by theorem (131):

\[(\xi) \quad \exists ! [\lambda x \varphi] \downarrow \rightarrow \exists ! z (\text{Class}(z) \land \forall y (y \in z \equiv \varphi^y_x)) \]

It follows from \((\xi)\) and \((\vartheta)\) that:

\[ \exists ! z (\text{Class}(z) \land \forall y (y \in z \equiv \varphi^y_x)) \]

So by (174.2):

\[ \exists ! (\text{Class}(z) \land \forall y (y \in z \equiv \varphi^y_x)) \downarrow \]

By our convention for restricted variables, \(\nu \forall y (y \in c \equiv \varphi^y_x) \downarrow\). \(\bowtie\)

(362.1) \(\star\) Let \(\varphi[y]\) be any \(y\)-predicable formula (359). Then if \(x\) doesn’t occur free in \(\varphi\), we may eliminate the restricted variables in the version of (358.3) formulated with our conventions in (359), to obtain:
conclude ϕ modal strictness of the proof. The following proof is lengthy, in part because it avoids (362.2) by our Rule of Definition by Identity: in Remark (361), we know that definitions (360) and (316) imply, respectively, choose a variable, say ☐ of Extensionality. Since both ☐ is substitutable for ☐ (without loss of generality), and use the alphabetic variant of (☐) with z replacing x as the bound variable in what follows. So by definition (360) and the Rule of Identity by Definition (121.1), we obtain:

(☐) \{y \mid \varphi[y]\} = \downarrow \left( \text{Class}(x) \land \forall y(x \equiv \varphi[y]) \right)

Since this implies \{y \mid \varphi[y]\} 1, we may instantiate \{y \mid \varphi[y]\} into (145.2)\* to produce the following instance:

(ξ) \{y \mid \varphi[y]\} = \downarrow \left( \text{Class}(x) \land \forall y(x \equiv \varphi[y]) \right) \rightarrow 

Class(\{y \mid \varphi[y]\}) \land \forall y(y \equiv \varphi[y])

Hence, (☐) and (ξ) imply:

∀ y(y \equiv \varphi[y])

which suffices for the proof of our theorem by Rule ∀E. \*\*

(362.2)\* Let \varphi[y] be any y-predicable formula (359) in which z is substitutable for y. By applying GEN to (362.1)\*, we know:

(☐) \forall y(y \equiv \varphi[y])

Since z is substitutable for y in \varphi[y], it is substitutable for y in \forall y(y \equiv \varphi[y]) \equiv \varphi[y]. Moreover, all free occurrences of y in \varphi[y] become bound occurrences in \forall y(y \equiv \varphi[y]). So if we instantiate (☐) to z, we obtain:

z \equiv \varphi[y] \equiv \varphi[y] 2 y

by the definition of substitutions (14). \*\*

(363.1) 407 Let \varphi[y] be any y-predicable formula (359), so that \{\lambda y \varphi[y]\} 1. Now choose a variable, say x, that doesn’t occur free in \varphi[y]. Then, by the discussion in Remark (361), we know that definitions (360) and (316) imply, respectively, by our Rule of Definition by Identity:

\{y \mid \varphi[y]\} = \downarrow \left( \text{Class}(x) \land \forall y(x \equiv \varphi[y]) \right)

\epsilon(\lambda y \varphi[y]) = \downarrow \text{ExtensionOf}(x, [\lambda y \varphi[y]])

Then to show \{y \mid \varphi[y]\} = \epsilon(\lambda y \varphi[y]), it suffices to show:

\*\*

407 There is an easier, non-modally strict proof of this theorem that goes by way of the Principle of Extensionality. Since both \{y \mid \varphi[y]\} and \epsilon(\lambda y \varphi[y]) are classes, it suffices to show z \equiv \varphi[y] \equiv \epsilon(\lambda y \varphi[y]). But, for the → direction, if we assume z \equiv \varphi[y], we’d have to use (362.2)\* to conclude \varphi[y] 2 y, and then go on to show z \equiv \epsilon(\lambda y \varphi[y]). But the appeal to (362.2)\* undermines the modal strictness of the proof. The following proof is lengthy, in part because it avoids (362.2)\*.
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To establish (A), we make use of theorem (149.3), which asserts:

\[\forall x(\forall y(y \in x \equiv \varphi[y]) \equiv \text{ExtensionOf}(x, [\lambda y \varphi[y]]) \]

Now if we let \( \varphi \) be \( \text{Class}(x) \& \forall y(y \in x \equiv \varphi[y]) \) and \( \chi \) be \( \text{ExtensionOf}(x, [\lambda y \varphi[y]]) \), then to establish (A), we have to show:

\[(B) \exists \exists(x, [\lambda y \varphi[y]]) \]

But (B) has already been established as theorem, by (358.3) and our conventions in (359). So it remains to show (C). By RN and GEN, it suffices to show:

\[(D) \forall x(\forall y(y \in x \equiv \varphi[y]) \equiv \text{ExtensionOf}(x, [\lambda y \varphi[y]]) \]

\[(\rightarrow) \text{Assume:} \]

\[(E) \forall x(\forall y(y \in x \equiv \varphi[y]) \]

Then from the first conjunct of (E) it follows by definition (307.2) that:

\[(F) \exists G(\text{ExtensionOf}(x, G)) \]

Suppose \( P \) is such a property, so that we know:

\[(G) \text{ExtensionOf}(x, P) \]

Then by (314), (G) implies:

\[(H) \forall y(y \in x \equiv \varphi[y]) \]

But the second conjunct of (E) and the fact that \( [\lambda y \varphi[y]] \downarrow \) imply, by the relevant instance of \( \beta \)-Conversion (namely, \( [\lambda y \varphi[y]]y \equiv \varphi[y] \)) and the Rule of Substitution (160.1), that:

\[(I) \forall y(y \in x \equiv [\lambda y \varphi[y]][y]) \]

So, from (H) and (I) we may conclude either of the following:

\[(J) \forall y(Py \equiv [\lambda y \varphi[y]][y]) \]

One final preliminary fact is that by (307.1), (G) implies:

\[(K) \forall x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \forall y(Fy \equiv Py)) \]

Now we want to show \( \text{ExtensionOf}(x, [\lambda y \varphi[y]]) \), i.e., by definition (307.1):

\[\forall x \& [\lambda y \varphi[y]] \downarrow \& \forall F(xF \equiv \forall y(Fy \equiv [\lambda y \varphi[y]][y])) \]
$A!x$ is the first conjunct of (K). $\lambda y \varphi[y] \downarrow$ is already known. So by GEN, it remains to show $xF \equiv \forall y(Fy \equiv [\lambda y \varphi[y]]y)$:

($\rightarrow$) Assume $xF$. From this and the second conjunct of (K), it follows that $\forall y(Fy \equiv Py)$. But this last result and (J) jointly imply $\forall y(Fy \equiv [\lambda y \varphi[y]]y)$.

($\leftarrow$) Assume $\forall y(Fy \equiv [\lambda y \varphi[y]]y)$. From this and (J) it follows that $\forall y(Fy \equiv Py)$.

But then by (K), we may conclude $xF$.

($\leftarrow$) Assume $\text{ExtensionOf}(x,[\lambda y \varphi[y]])$. We have to show both (a) $\text{Class}(x)$ and (b) $\forall y(y \in x \equiv \varphi[y])$. (a) Our assumption implies $\exists G(\text{ExtensionOf}(x,G))$, and so by theorem (307.2), $\text{Class}(x)$. (b) By (314), our assumption implies $\forall y(y \in x \equiv [\lambda y \varphi[y]])y$. But since $[\lambda y \varphi[y]]y \downarrow$, this implies $\forall y(y \in x \equiv \varphi[y])$ by $\beta$-Conversion and the Rule of Substitution.$\triangleleft$

(363.2) $Gy$ is a $y$-predicable formula (359), since $[\lambda y Gy] \downarrow$ is an axiom and hence a theorem. So, as an instance of (363.1), we know that $[y|Gy] = \epsilon[\lambda y Gy]$. Now by $\eta$-Conversion (48.3), $[\lambda y Gy] = G$. Hence, by Rule $\rightarrow E$, $[y|Gy] = \epsilon G$. $\triangleleft$

(364.1) By hypothesis, $\varphi[y]$ is $y$-predicable formula, and so it is a theorem that the property $[\lambda y \varphi[y]]$ exists. If we eliminate the restricted variables from our theorem, then we want to show, by GEN:

Class $(x) \rightarrow \exists z(\text{Class}(z) \& \forall y(y \in z \equiv y \in x \& \varphi[y]),$

provided $\varphi[y]$ has no free occurrences of $z$

Assume $\text{Class}(x)$, to find a witness to the consequent. Then there exists a property, say $P$, such that $\text{ExtensionOf}(x,P)$, by (307.2). So by (314), we know the following:

(8) $\forall y(y \in x \equiv Py)$

Now pick some variable, say $w$, that doesn’t occur free in $\varphi[y]$ and consider the property $[\lambda w Pw \& [\lambda y \varphi[y]]w]$. To see that this property exists, note that by (39.2), $[\lambda w Pw \& Fw] \downarrow$, for every property $F$. So, since $[\lambda y \varphi[y]]$ exists, we can instantiate it for $F$ to obtain $[\lambda w Pw \& [\lambda y \varphi[y]]w] \downarrow$. Then by the Fundamental Theorem for Natural Classes and Logical Sets (315), we therefore know:

$\exists z(\text{Class}(z) \& \forall y(y \in z \equiv [\lambda w Pw \& [\lambda y \varphi[y]]w]y)$

Suppose $a$ is such an object, so that we know $\text{Class}(a)$ and:

(A) $\forall y(y \in a \equiv [\lambda w Pw \& [\lambda y \varphi[y]]w]y)$

To confirm that $a$ is our desired witness, it remains only to show:

(B) $\forall y(y \in a \equiv y \in x \& \varphi[y])$

Since $[\lambda w Pw \& [\lambda y \varphi[y]]w] \downarrow$, $\beta$-Conversion yields the modally strict fact that:
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(C) \[ \lambda w Pw \land [\lambda y \varphi[y]]y \equiv Py \land [\lambda y \varphi[y]]y \]

Then by a Rule of Substitution, (A) and (C) imply:

(D) \[ \forall y(y \in a \equiv Py \land [\lambda y \varphi[y]]y) \]

But [\lambda y \varphi[y]] also exists, and so \( \beta \)-Conversion also yields the modally strict fact:

(E) \[ [\lambda y \varphi[y]]y \equiv \varphi[y] \]

So by a Rule of Substitution, (D) and (E) imply:

(F) \[ \forall y(y \in a \equiv Py \land \varphi[y]) \]

But now to show (B), it suffices to show:

(G) \[ \forall y(Py \land \varphi[y] \equiv y \in x \land \varphi[y]) \]

since (F) and (G) imply (B) by the properties of the quantified biconditional (100.10). So by GEN, we need to show:

\[ Py \land \varphi[y] \equiv y \in x \land \varphi[y] \]

But this follows easily from a consequence of (\( \vartheta \)), namely \( Py \equiv y \in x \), by (89.4.e).

(364.2) (Exercise)

(365)* (Exercise)

(367)* Let \( \varphi[y] \) be any \( y \)-predicable formula in which \( z \) is substitutable for \( y \).

If we eliminate the restricted variable from our theorem, then we have to show, by GEN:

\[ Class(x) \rightarrow \forall z(z \in \{ y \mid y \in x \land \varphi[y]\} \equiv (z \in x \land \varphi[y])_w) \]

Assume \( Class(x) \), to find a witness to the consequent. Since \( x \) is a class, we may instantiate it into (365)*, and if we eliminate the restricted variable in the result by choosing some variable, say \( w \), that doesn’t occur free in \( \varphi[y] \), we know:

\[ rw(Class(w) \land \forall y(y \in w \equiv y \in x \land \varphi[y])) \downarrow \]

Hence, by definition (366) and the Rule of Identity by Definition (121.1):

\[ \{ y \mid y \in x \land \varphi[y] \} = rw(Class(w) \land \forall y(y \in w \equiv y \in x \land \varphi[y])) \]

Since this implies that the class abstract is significant, it follows by (145)* that:

(\( \vartheta \)) \[ Class([y \mid y \in x \land \varphi]) \land \forall y(y \in [y \mid y \in x \land \varphi[y]] \equiv (y \in x \land \varphi[y])) \]
By hypothesis, $z$ is substitutable for $y$ in $\varphi[y]$. Hence it is substitutable for $y$ in the matrix of the second conjunct of $(\vartheta)$. So as an alphabetic variant of the second conjunct of $(\vartheta)$, we have:

$\forall z (z \in \{y \mid y \in x \& \varphi[y]\} \equiv (z \in x \& \varphi[y]))$

(368) By hypothesis, $\varphi[y]$ is a $y$-predicable formula. Assume $\text{Class}(x)$. Then we have to show:

$\{y \mid y \in x \& \varphi[y]\} = x \cap \{y \mid \varphi[y]\}$

Definitions (366), (356), and (353) imply that we have to show:

$\exists z (\text{Class}(z) \& \forall y (y \in z \equiv y \in x \& \varphi[y])) = \exists x (\text{Class}(z) \& \forall y (y \in z \equiv y \in x \& y \in \{y \mid \varphi[y]\}))$

Our strategy for proving this is to use theorem (149.2), which asserts:

$\exists z \chi \downarrow \& \exists \forall z (\chi \equiv \psi) \rightarrow \exists z \chi = \exists z \psi$

So setting $\chi$ and $\psi$ appropriately, it suffices to show:

(A) $\exists z (\text{Class}(z) \& \forall y (y \in z \equiv y \in x \& \varphi[y])) \downarrow$

(B) $\exists \forall z ((\text{Class}(z) \& \forall y (y \in z \equiv y \in x \& \varphi[y])) \equiv (\text{Class}(z) \& \forall y (y \in z \equiv y \in x \& y \in \{y \mid \varphi[y]\})))$

Since $x$ is a class, (A) follows from (365). To show (B), it suffices by (44.3) to show:

$\forall z (\exists (\text{Class}(z) \& \forall y (y \in z \equiv y \in x \& \varphi[y])) \equiv (\text{Class}(z) \& \forall y (y \in z \equiv y \in x \& y \in \{y \mid \varphi[y]\})))$

So by GEN, we have to show:

$\exists (\text{Class}(z) \& \forall y (y \in z \equiv y \in x \& \varphi[y])) \equiv (\text{Class}(z) \& \forall y (y \in z \equiv y \in x \& y \in \{y \mid \varphi[y]\})))$

And by the right-to-left direction of (139.5), it suffices to show:

$\exists (\text{Class}(z) \& \forall y (y \in z \equiv y \in x \& \varphi[y])) \equiv \exists (\text{Class}(z) \& \forall y (y \in z \equiv y \in x \& y \in \{y \mid \varphi[y]\})))$

(→) Assume $\exists (\text{Class}(z) \& \forall y (y \in z \equiv y \in x \& \varphi[y]))$. Then by (139.2):

(8) $\exists \text{Class}(z) \& \exists \forall y (y \in z \equiv y \in x \& \varphi[y]))$

To show $\exists (\text{Class}(z) \& \forall y (y \in z \equiv y \in x \& y \in \{y \mid \varphi[y]\})))$, it suffices by the right-to-left direction of (139.2) to show $\exists \text{Class}(z)$ and $\exists \forall y (y \in z \equiv y \in x \& y \in \{y \mid \varphi[y]\})))$. But we already know the former, and so it remains to show the latter. By (44.3),
it suffices to show \( \forall y \forall (y \in z \equiv y \in x \& y \in \{y | q[y]\}) \), and so by GEN, we need only show \( \forall (y \in z \equiv y \in x \& y \in \{y | q[y]\}) \). Now if we apply (44.3) and \( \forall E \) to the second conjunct of (8), then we know \( \forall (y \in z \equiv y \in x \& y \in \{y | q[y]\}) \). So we know something of the form \( \forall (y \equiv x) \) and we want to show something of the form \( \forall (y \equiv \theta) \). Hence, by the logic of actuality (exercise), it remains to show \( \forall (y \equiv \chi) \), i.e., to show:

\[
\forall (y \in x \& q[y]) \equiv (y \in x \& y \in \{y | q[y]\})
\]

But since \( y \in x \) is a conjunct of both the left and right side of the embedded biconditional, it suffices by the logic of actuality (exercise) to show:

\[
\forall (q[y]) \equiv y \in \{y | q[y]\}
\]

But this is a consequence of commuting the biconditional in theorem (362.1)\( \star \) and applying Rule RA.

(\( \leftarrow \)) By analogous reasoning. \( \Rightarrow \)

(369) Eliminating the restricted variable, our theorem asserts:

\[
\forall Rx((\text{Class}(x) \rightarrow \exists z(\text{Class}(z) \& \forall y (y \in z \equiv \exists w (w \in x \& W_y))))))
\]

By GEN, we assume \( \text{Class}(x) \), to find a witness. Then \( \text{ExtensionOf}(x, P) \), for some \( P \). Hence by (314), it follows that:

(8) \( \forall y (y \in x \equiv P y) \)

Now consider the property \( [\lambda x \exists w (P w \& R w x)] \), which we know exists by (39.2).

By the Fundamental Theorem for Natural Classes:

\[
\exists x(\text{Class}(x) \& \forall y (y \in x \equiv [\lambda x \exists w (P w \& R w x)] y))
\]

Suppose \( a \) is such an object, so that we know \( \text{Class}(a) \) and:

(A) \( \forall y (y \in a \equiv [\lambda x \exists w (P w \& R w x)] y) \)

To see \( a \) is our desired witness, it remains only to show:

(B) \( \forall y (y \in a \equiv \exists w (w \in x \& R w y)) \)

Since \( [\lambda x \exists w (P w \& R w x)] \downarrow \), \( \beta \)-Conversion yields the modally strict fact that:

(C) \( [\lambda x \exists w (P w \& R w x)] y \equiv \exists w (P w \& R w y) \)

Then by a Rule of Substitution, (A) and (C) imply:

(D) \( \forall y (y \in a \equiv \exists w (P w \& R w y)) \)

But to show (B), it suffices to show:
∀y(∃w(Pw & Rwy) ≡ ∃w(w ∈ x & Rwy))

since (D) and (E) imply (B) by the properties of the quantified biconditional (100.10). So by GEN, we need to show:

∃w(Pw & Rwy) ≡ ∃w(w ∈ x & Rwy)

(→) Assume ∃w(Pw & Rwy). Suppose b such an individual, so that we know Pb & Rby. Instantiating b to (ϑ), we know b ∈ x ≡ Pb, i.e., Pb ≡ b ∈ x. Hence, by (89.4.e), it follows that b ∈ x & Rby. So ∃w(w ∈ x & Rwy).

(←) Assume ∃w(w ∈ x & Rwy). Suppose b is such an individual, so that we know b ∈ x & Rby. Again, instantiating to (ϑ), we know b ∈ x ≡ Pb. Hence by (89.4.e), it follows that Pb & Rby. Hence, ∃w(Pw & Rwy).

(371.1) Eliminating the restricted variable, we have to show:

∃z(Class(z) & ∀y(y ∈ z ≡ y = E x))

But this is a theorem; since y =E x is a y-predicable formula and has no free occurrences of z, the above is an instance of class comprehension, as derived in (358.1) but expressed using our conventions in (359). Strictly speaking, however, the proof starts with the fact that [λy y =E x] ↓, by (39.2). Then the claim displayed above follows by (358.1).

(371.2) (Exercise)

(371.3) By (371.2), we know:

∃!z(Class(z) & ∀y(y ∈ z ≡ y = E x))

So by the Rule of Actualization:

∃!z(Class(z) & ∀y(y ∈ z ≡ y = E x))

Hence by (174.2):

iz(Class(z) & ∀y(y ∈ z ≡ y = E x)) ↓

So by our conventions for restricted variables, ic ∀y(y ∈ c ≡ y = E x)) ↓. ⊳

(371.4) (Exercise)

(373.1) Assume A!z. We want to show |z|E = ∅. We know both objects exist: |z|E exists by (372) and (371.4), and ∅ exists by (340) and (339.3). So by definitions (372) and (340), respectively, we have to show:

{y | y =E z} = ix(Class(x) & Empty(x))

By definition (360), we have to show:
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\( \text{ix}(\text{Class}(x) \& \forall y(y \equiv x = E z)) = \text{ix}(\text{Class}(x) \& \text{Empty}(x)) \)

To prove this by modally strict means, our proof strategy is to derive the above from an appropriate instance of (149.2), which says that if \( \text{ix} \varphi \downarrow \& \text{ix} \forall x(\varphi \equiv \psi) \rightarrow \text{ix} \varphi = \text{ix} \psi \). So if we set:

\( \varphi = \text{Class}(x) \& \forall y(y \equiv x \equiv y = E z) \)

\( \psi = \text{Class}(x) \& \text{Empty}(x) \)

then since \( \text{ix} \varphi \downarrow \) is already known, it remains only to show that we can derive:

\( \text{ix} \forall x(\varphi \equiv \psi) \)

from our assumption that \( A!z \). By Rule CP, it suffices to show:

\( A!z \vdash \text{ix} \forall x(\varphi \equiv \psi) \)

Note that the following is an instance of the Rule of Actualization (RA):

If \( A!z, \varphi \vdash \psi \), then \( A!z, \text{ix} \varphi \vdash \text{ix} \psi \)

Moreover, as an instance of Rule CP (76), we know:

If \( A!z, \varphi \vdash \text{ix} \psi \), then \( A!z \vdash \text{ix} \varphi \rightarrow \text{ix} \psi \)

So, combining these two facts, the following is a valid form of reasoning:

(A) If \( A!z, \varphi \vdash \psi \), then \( A!z \vdash \text{ix} \varphi \rightarrow \text{ix} \psi \)

Our strategy now is as follows:

(B) Show both \( A!z, \varphi \vdash \psi \) and \( A!z, \psi \vdash \varphi \).

(C) Infer \( A!z \vdash \text{ix} \varphi \equiv \text{ix} \psi \), from (B), (A), \&I and the definition of \equiv.

(D) Infer \( A!z \vdash \text{ix} (\varphi \equiv \psi) \) from (C), by the right-to-left direction of (139.5).

(E) Infer \( A!z \vdash A!z \vdash A!z \vdash \text{ix} (\varphi \equiv \psi) \), from (D) and \( A!z \vdash A!z \), which is immediate from the left-to-right direction of (178.8) and (64.10).

(F) Infer \( A!z \vdash \forall x \text{ix} (\varphi \equiv \psi) \), by GEN, from (E), since \( x \) isn’t free in the assumption \( A!z \).

(G) Conclude \( A!z \vdash \text{ix} \forall x (\varphi \equiv \psi) \), from (F) and axiom (44.3).

Since steps (C) – (G) are straightforward if not explicit, it remains only to establish (B):
• Assume $A!z$ and $\psi$, i.e., $\text{Class}(x) \& \forall y(y \in x \equiv y =_E z)$. To show $\psi$, it suffices to show $\text{Empty}(x)$, and by definition (338), it suffices to show $\neg \exists y(y \in x)$. Assume, for reductio, $\exists y(y \in x)$. Suppose $a$ is such an object, so that we know $a \in x$. Then $a =_E z$. It follows a fortiori by (230.1) that $O!z$, which contradicts $A!z$, by (220.2).

• Assume $A!z$ and $\psi$, i.e., $\text{Class}(x) \& \text{Empty}(x)$. To show $\phi$, it suffices to show $\text{Empty}(x)$, and by definition (338), it suffices to show $\neg \exists y(y \in x)$. Assume, for reductio, $\exists y(y \in x)$. Suppose $a$ is such an object, so that we know $a \in x$. Then $a =_E z$. It follows a fortiori by (230.1) that $O!z$, which contradicts $A!z$, by (220.2).

(373.2) Assume, for reductio, $\forall x \forall z(x \neq z \rightarrow \{x\} \neq \{z\})$. Now consider the objects $a_\emptyset$ (the null object) and $a_V$ (the universal object), as these were defined in (262). In (263.5) we established that $a_\emptyset \neq a_V$. Then by our reductio assumption, $[a_\emptyset]_E \neq [a_V]_E$. But in the proof of (263.5), we also established $A!a_\emptyset$ and $A!a_V$. By (373.1), these last two facts imply, respectively, that $[a_\emptyset]_E = \emptyset$ and $[a_V]_E = \emptyset$. Hence, $[a_\emptyset]_E = [a_V]_E$. Contradiction.

(373.3) Assume $O!z$. For reductio, suppose $[z]_E = \emptyset$. We know independently, by definitions (372), (360) and (340), that:

(δ) $[z]_E = ix(\text{Class}(x) \& \forall y(y \in x \equiv y =_E z))$

(ξ) $\emptyset = ix(\text{Class}(x) \& \text{Empty}(x))$

From (δ), it follows by theorem (152.3) that:

$sA(\text{Class([z]}_E) \& \forall y(y \in [z] \equiv y =_E z))$

So given our reductio hypothesis:

$sA(\text{Class(\emptyset)} \& \forall y(y \in \emptyset \equiv y =_E z))$

If we distribute the actuality operator over the conjunction and commute the operators of the second conjunct, it follows that:

$\forall y sA(y \in \emptyset \equiv y =_E z)$

Hence:

$sA(z \in \emptyset \equiv z =_E z)$

But it follows from our initial assumption that $z =_E z$, and so by (235.1), $sA z =_E z$. So by (139.5):

(ζ) $sA z \in \emptyset$
But this can’t be. From (ξ), it follows that $\vDash (\text{Class}(\emptyset) \& \text{Empty}(\emptyset))$, by theorem (152.3). By distributing the actuality operator, it follows that $\vDash \text{Empty}(\emptyset)$. By definition (338) and the Rule of Substitution (160.1), this implies $\vDash \neg \exists y(y \in \emptyset)$, i.e., $\vDash \forall y \neg (y \in \emptyset)$. Hence $\vDash \neg (z \in \emptyset)$, which by (44.1) implies $\vDash z \in \emptyset$. This contradicts (ζ). ⊢

(373.4) Assume $O!y, O!z$, and $x \neq z$. Note that $x \neq z$ implies $\neg (x =_E z)$, by (24) and (230.2). Now for reductio, suppose $[x]_E = [z]_E$. By applying definitions, we know:

(δ) $[x]_E = \text{tw}(\text{Class}(w) \& \forall y(y \in w \equiv y =_E x))$

(ξ) $[z]_E = \text{tw}(\text{Class}(w') \& \forall y(y \in w' \equiv y =_E z))$

From (ξ), it follows by theorem (152.3) that:

$\vDash (\text{Class}([z]_E) \& \forall y(y \in [z]_E \equiv y =_E z))$

If we distribute the actuality operator over the conjunction and commute the operators of the second conjunct, it follows that:

$\forall y \vDash (y \in [z]_E \equiv y =_E z)$

Hence:

$\vDash (z \in [z]_E \equiv z =_E z)$

But from $O!z$, it follows that $z =_E z$, and so by (235.1), $\vDash z =_E z$. From this and our last displayed result, it follows by (139.5) that:

(ζ) $\vDash z \in [z]_E$

Put (ζ) aside for the moment and note that (δ) implies, by theorem (152.3), that:

$\vDash (\text{Class}([x]_E) \& \forall y(y \in [x] \equiv y =_E x))$

Given our reductio hypothesis, this implies:

$\vDash (\text{Class}([z]_E) \& \forall y(y \in [z] \equiv y =_E x))$

By now familiar reasoning, we can therefore conclude:

$\vDash (z \in [z]_E \equiv z =_E x)$

From this and (ζ), it follows that $\vDash z =_E x$. But this implies, by (235.1), that $z =_E x$, which by (236.2), implies $x =_E z$. Contradiction. ⊢

(374) If we eliminate the restricted variables, then by GEN, we have to show $O!x \rightarrow \forall y(y \in [x] \equiv y = x)$. So assume $O!x$. By GEN, we show $y \in [x] \equiv y = x$. 


(→) Assume \( y \in \{x\} \). By (371.4) we know \( \{y | y =_E x\} \downarrow \), and so the definition of \( \{x\} \) in (372) holds. Thus, \( y \in \{y | y =_E x\} \). So by (362.1)\( \star \) and the fact that \( y =_E x \) is \( y \)-predicable, \( y =_E x \). And by (230.2), \( y = x \). (→) Assume \( y = x \). From \( OI \langle x \rangle \) and this last result, it follows by (237.1) and the \( T \) schema that \( y =_E x \). Hence, by (362.1)\( \star \) and the fact that \( y =_E x \) is \( y \)-predicable, \( y \in \{y | y =_E x\} \). \( \Rightarrow \)

(375.1) If we eliminate the restricted variable, then the theorem to be proved is \( \exists w (\text{Class}(w) \& \forall y (y \in w \equiv y =_E x \lor y =_E z)) \).\(^{408}\) To find our witness, consider the property \( [\lambda y P_y \lor y =_E x] \). This property exists by (39.2). Call this property \( P \). Then by the Fundamental Theorem, \( \exists w (\text{Class}(w) \& \forall y (y \in w \equiv P_y)) \). Suppose \( a \) is an arbitrary such class. Then by now familiar reasoning, it remains to show \( y \in a \equiv y =_E x \lor y =_E z \). (Exercise) \( \Rightarrow \)

(375.2) (Exercise)

(376.1) If we eliminate the restricted variables, then we have to show:

\[ \forall z (\text{Class}(z) \rightarrow \exists w (\text{Class}(w) \& \forall y (y \in w \equiv y \in z \lor y =_E x))) \]

By GEN, assume \( \text{Class}(z) \), to find a witness to the consequent. Then there is some property, say \( P \), such that \( \text{ExtensionOf}(z,P) \).\(^{409}\) Now consider the property \( [\lambda y P_y \lor y =_E x] \). This property clearly exists. Then by the Fundamental Theorem:

\[ \exists w (\text{Class}(w) \& \forall y (y \in w \equiv [\lambda y P_y \lor y =_E x]y)) \]

Suppose \( a \) is an arbitrary such class. By now familiar reasoning, to show \( a \) is our witness, it remains to show \( y \in a \equiv y \in z \lor y =_E x \). (Exercise) \( \Rightarrow \)

(376.2) (Exercise)

(380.1) – (380.4) (Exercises)

(382.1)\( \star \) – (382.2)\( \star \) (Exercises)

(384) By hypothesis, \( \| \) is an equivalence relation with respect to lines. Then if we eliminate the restricted variables, we have to show:

\[ \forall x \forall x' ((Lx \& Lx') \rightarrow (\forall z ([\lambda y L_y \& y \| x]z \equiv [\lambda y L_y \& y \| x']z) \equiv x \| x')) \]

\(^{408}\)An easy, but non-modally strict proof of this theorem is at hand: just consider \( \{y | y =_E x \lor y =_E z\} \), which is an instance of \( \{y | \phi(y)\} \), defined in (360). By (362.1)\( \star \), we know \( y \in \{y | y =_E x \lor y =_E z\} \equiv (y =_E x \lor y =_E z) \). Hence by GEN, \( \forall y (y \in \{y | y =_E x \lor y =_E z\}) \equiv (y =_E x \lor y =_E z) \). Since \( \{y | y =_E x \lor y =_E z\} \) is a class, it follows by \( \exists ! \), using restricted variables, that \( \exists ! y (y \in \{y | y =_E x \lor y =_E z\}) \).

\(^{409}\)It is tempting, at this point, to consider the class \( \{P \lor y =_E x\} \) and then show it is a witness that proves the theorem. But, then, we would have to argue by way of (362.1)\( \star \), which provides us with the fact::

\( \theta \) \( y \in \{y | P \lor y =_E x\} \equiv (P \lor y =_E x) \)

Though we could subsequently prove that \( y \in \{y | P \lor y =_E x\} \equiv y \in z \lor y =_E x \), which by GEN and \( \exists ! \), yields the desired conclusion. But the resulting proof wouldn’t be modally strict.
Proofs of Theorems and Metarules

By GEN, assume \(Lx\) and \(Lx'\). \((\rightarrow)\) Assume:

\[\forall z([\lambda y Ly \& y \parallel x]z \equiv [\lambda y Ly \& y \parallel x']z)\]

Then, instantiating to \(x\):

\[[\lambda y Ly \& y \parallel x]x \equiv [\lambda y Ly \& y \parallel x']x\]

Since both \([\lambda y Ly \& y \parallel x]\) and \([\lambda y Ly \& y \parallel x']\) exist, we can reduce both the left and right conditions by strengthened \(\beta\)-Conversion and a Rule of Substitution:

\((Lx \& x \parallel x) \equiv (Lx \& x \parallel x')\)

But this is equivalent to (89.8.e):

\[Lx \rightarrow (x \parallel x \equiv x \parallel x')\]

Since \(Lx\) by assumption, it follows that \(x \parallel x \equiv x \parallel x'\). And since \(\parallel\) is, by hypothesis, an equivalence relation, we know \(x \parallel x\). Hence \(x \parallel x'\).

\((\leftarrow)\) Assume \(x \parallel x'\) assumption. We want to show:

\[\forall z([\lambda y Ly \& y \parallel x]z \equiv [\lambda y Ly \& y \parallel x']z)\]

By GEN, it suffices to show:

\[[\lambda y Ly \& y \parallel x]z \equiv [\lambda y Ly \& y \parallel x']z\]

We prove directions:

\((\rightarrow)\) Assume \([\lambda y Ly \& y \parallel x]z\). Then Rule \(\beta\)C yields both \(Lz\) and \(z \parallel x\). From the latter, our assumption that \(x \parallel x'\), and the transitivity of \(\parallel\), it follows that \(z \parallel x'\). Since \([\lambda y Ly \& y \parallel x']\) exists and \(Lz\), Rule \(\beta\)C yields \([\lambda y Ly \& y \parallel x']z\).

\((\leftarrow)\) Assume \([\lambda y Ly \& y \parallel x']z\). So by Rule \(\beta\)C, we know both \(Lz\) and \(z \parallel x'\). Independently, by the symmetry of \(\parallel\), our assumption \(x \parallel x'\) implies that \(x' \parallel x\). Hence, by the transitivity of \(\parallel\), \(z \parallel x\). So from the existence of the terms in question and the fact that \(Lz\), it follows that \([\lambda y Ly \& y \parallel x]z\), by Rule \(\beta\)C.

(386.1) Eliminating the restricted variables, we have to show:

\[\forall y(Ly \rightarrow \exists x \text{DirectionOf}(x, y))\]

So by GEN, assume \(Ly\). By definition (385), we have to find a witness to:

\[\exists x(Ly \& \text{ExtensionOf}(x, [\lambda z Lz \& z \parallel y]))\]

Clearly, \([\lambda z Lz \& z \parallel y]\) exists. So \(\exists x \text{ExtensionOf}(x, [\lambda z Lz \& z \parallel y])\), by (310.1). Let \(a\) be such an object, so that we have \(\text{ExtensionOf}(a, [\lambda z Lz \& z \parallel y])\). Hence:
\[ Ly \& \text{ExtensionOf}(a, [\lambda z Lz \& z \parallel y]) \]

Then \( a \) is our witness. \( \Rightarrow \)

(\textbf{386.2}) (Exercise)

(\textbf{387})\( \star \) If we eliminate the restricted variables and apply the Rule of Actu-

alization to theorem (\textbf{386.2}), we know \( \forall y (Ly \rightarrow \exists x \text{DirectionOf}(x, y)) \). By

the \( \star \)-theorem established at the beginning of footnote 217, it follows that

\[ \forall y (Ly \rightarrow \exists x \text{DirectionOf}(x, y)) \]

So by \( \forall E, Ly \rightarrow \exists x \text{DirectionOf}(x, y) \). Now assume \( Ly \), for conditional proof. Then \( \exists x \text{DirectionOf}(x, y) \). So by (174.2),

\[ \text{DirectionOf}(x, y) \downarrow \]. Hence by conditional proof, \( Ly \rightarrow \text{DirectionOf}(x, y) \downarrow \).

Since \( y \) isn’t free in any assumption, it follows by GEN that:

\[ \forall y (Ly \rightarrow \exists x \text{DirectionOf}(x, y)) \]

So employing our conventions for restricted variables, \( \forall u (\exists x \text{DirectionOf}(x, y)) \).

\( \Rightarrow \)

(\textbf{389})\( \star \) Eliminating the restricted variables, we want to show:

\[ \forall y \forall z ((Ly \& Lz) \rightarrow (\vec{y} = \vec{z} \equiv y \parallel z)) \]

By GEN, assume \( Lx \) and \( Ly \). By definition (\textbf{388}), we know both:

\[ \vec{y} = \exists x (Ly \& \text{DirectionOf}(x, y)) \]

\[ \vec{z} = \exists x (Lz \& \text{DirectionOf}(x, z)) \]

Since \( \vec{y} \) and \( \vec{z} \) both exist, it follows by (145.2)\( \star \), respectively, that:

\[ Ly \& \text{DirectionOf}(\vec{y}, y) \]

\[ Ly \& \text{DirectionOf}(\vec{z}, z) \]

But since both \([\lambda w Lw \& w \parallel y]\) and \([\lambda w Lw \& w \parallel z]\) exist, it follows from the

second conjunct of the last two results, respectively, by definition (\textbf{385}), that:

\[ \text{ExtensionOf}(\vec{y}, [\lambda w Lw \& w \parallel y]) \]

\[ \text{ExtensionOf}(\vec{z}, [\lambda w Lw \& w \parallel z]) \]

Hence, by (321.4)\( \star \), respectively:

(\( \theta \)) \[ \vec{y} = e[\lambda w Lw \& w \parallel y] \]

(\( \xi \)) \[ \vec{z} = e[\lambda w Lw \& w \parallel z] \]

So we may now reason as follows:
Proofs of Theorems and Metarules

\[ \vec{y} = \vec{z} \equiv e[\lambda w Lw & w \| y] = e[\lambda w Lw & w \| z] \quad \text{by (}\delta, (}\xi), \text{Rule =E (}\times 2) \]
\[ \equiv \forall x[\lambda w Lw & w \| y]|x \equiv [\lambda w Lw & w \| z]|x \quad \text{by Basic Law V (322)} \star \]
\[ \equiv y \| z \quad \text{by (384)} \quad \Rightarrow \]

(391) (Exercise)

(393) (Exercise)

(395.1) – (395.2) (Exercises)

(396) (Exercise)

(398) (Exercise)

(400) (Exercise)

(402) (Exercise)

(403.1) By \exists I, from (402) and the fact \([\lambda x y \forall F(Fx \equiv Fy)]\downarrow. \Rightarrow \]

(403.2) Let \(\Pi\) be any 2-place relation term. Assume Equivalence(\(\Pi\)). Then it follows from definition (401) that \(\Pi\) is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive. By reflexivity, \(\forall \Pi \Pi x x\). Then \(\Pi x x\), by \(\forall E\). Hence \(\Pi \downarrow\), by axiom (39.5.a). \(\Rightarrow \)

(404.1) If we eliminate the restricted variable, then by GEN, we have to show:

Equivalence(F) \(\rightarrow (\forall w([\lambda z Fzx] w \equiv [\lambda z Fzy] w) \equiv Fxy)\)

So assume Equivalence(F). (\(\rightarrow\)) Assume \(\forall w([\lambda z Fzx] w \equiv [\lambda z Fzy] w)\). Instantiating to \(x\), it follows that \([\lambda z Fzx] x \equiv [\lambda z Fzy] x\). Since both \([\lambda z Fzx]\) and \([\lambda z Fzy]\) exist, we can reduce both the left and right conditions by \(\beta\)-Conversion. Hence we may conclude \(Fxx \equiv Fxy\). But \(F\) is, by hypothesis, an equivalence relation, and so \(Fxx\). Hence, \(Fxy. \Rightarrow \)

(\(\leftarrow\)) Let \(Fxy\) be our global assumption. We want to show \(\forall w([\lambda z Fzx] w \equiv [\lambda z Fzy] w)\). By GEN, it suffices to show \([\lambda z Fzx] w \equiv [\lambda z Fzy] w\):

(\(\rightarrow\)) Assume \([\lambda z Fzx] w\). So by Rule \(\overset{\beta}{C}, Fwx\). Since \(F\) is a transitive relation, this last result and our global assumption imply \(Fwy\). Since \([\lambda z Fzy]\) and \(w\) exist, it follows by Rule \(\overset{\beta}{C}\) that \([\lambda z Fzy] w\).

(\(\leftarrow\)) Assume \([\lambda z Fzy] w\). So by Rule \(\overset{\beta}{C}, Fwy\). Independently, by the symmetry of \(F\), our global assumption \(Fxy\) implies that \(Fyx\). Hence \(Fwx\), by the transitivity of \(F\). So by Rule \(\overset{\beta}{C}, [\lambda z Fzx] w\).

(404.2) – (404.3) (Exercises)

(406.1) – (406.3) (Exercises)

(408) If we eliminate the restricted variable, then by GEN, we have to show:
Equivalence($F$) $\rightarrow$ ($\hat{x}_F = \hat{y}_F \equiv F_{xy}$)

We reason by analogy with (389)★. By definition (407) and our conventions for restricted variables, we know both:

\[
\hat{x}_F = \hat{w}(\text{Equivalence}(F) \& F\text{-AbstractionOf}(w,x))
\]

\[
\hat{y}_F = \hat{w}(\text{Equivalence}(F) \& F\text{-AbstractionOf}(w,y))
\]

Since $\hat{x}_F$ and $\hat{y}_F$ both exist, it follows by (145.2)★, respectively, that:

\[
\text{Equivalence}(F) \& F\text{-AbstractionOf}(\hat{x}_F, x)
\]

\[
\text{Equivalence}(F) \& F\text{-AbstractionOf}(\hat{y}_F, y)
\]

But since both $[\lambda z Fzx]$ and $[\lambda z Fzy]$ exist, the second conjuncts of each of the above respectively imply, by definition (405), that:

\[
\text{ExtensionOf}(\hat{x}_F, [\lambda z Fzx])
\]

\[
\text{ExtensionOf}(\hat{y}_F, [\lambda z Fzy])
\]

Hence, by (321.4)★, respectively:

(8) $\hat{x}_F = \epsilon [\lambda z Fzx]$

(ξ) $\hat{y}_F = \epsilon [\lambda z Fzy]$

So we may now reason as follows:

\[
\hat{x}_F = \hat{y}_F \equiv \epsilon [\lambda z Fzx] = \epsilon [\lambda z Fzy] \quad \text{by (8), (ξ), Rule } =E
\]

\[
\equiv \forall w([\lambda z Fzx]w \equiv [\lambda z Fzy]w) \quad \text{by Basic Law V (322)★}
\]

\[
\equiv F_{xy} \quad \text{by (404.1) } \Rightarrow
\]

(411.1) – (411.3) (Exercises)

(413) (Exercise) [Hint: The proof is analogous to the proofs of theorems (286) and (318)].

(414) By GEN, it suffices to show: $F = G \rightarrow □F = G$. But this is just an instance of the necessity of identity (126.1). (This argument reprises the one in Remark (259), in the discussion of Example (b).) ⇔

(415.1) By (413), we know $a_G$ is the abstract object that encodes just $G$:

$\ a_G = 1x(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv F = G))$

Hence $a_G \downarrow$. Moreover, we know by (414) that $F = G$ is a rigid condition on properties. So by (258.2):

\[A!a_G \& \forall F(a_G F \equiv F = G) \quad \Rightarrow\]
Definition (410) implies:

\[
\text{ThinFormOf}(a, G) \equiv A!a \land G \downarrow \land \forall F (a \equiv F \equiv G)
\]

By Rule \(\equiv S\) of Biconditional Simplification and the fact that \(G \downarrow\) is an axiom, it follows that:

\[
\text{ThinFormOf}(a, G) \equiv A!a \land \forall F (a \equiv F \equiv G)
\]

Hence, by (415.1), \(\text{ThinFormOf}(a, G)\). \(\Box\)

(416) Assume \(\text{ThinFormOf}(x, G)\). Then by definition of \(\text{ThinFormOf} (410)\), it follows \textit{a fortiori} that \(\forall F (x \equiv F \equiv G)\). Instantiating to \(G\), we have \(x \equiv G \equiv G\).

But the right side is known, by the special case of Rule \(=I\) (119.2). Hence \(xG\). \(\Box\)

(418) Assume \(\text{ThinFormOf}(x, G)\). By GEN, we show \(Gy \equiv \text{ParticipatesIn}(y, x)\).

\((-\rightarrow)\) Assume \(Gy\). Then by conjoining our two assumptions and applying \(\exists I\), it follows that \(\exists F (\text{ThinFormOf}(x, F) \land Fy)\). So by the definition of \(\text{ParticipatesIn} (417)\), it follows that \(\text{ParticipatesIn}(y, x)\). \((-\rightarrow)\) Assume \(\text{ParticipatesIn}(y, x)\). By definition of \(\text{ParticipatesIn} (417)\), it follows that \(\exists F (\text{ThinFormOf}(x, F) \land Fy)\). Assume \(P\) is an arbitrary such property, so that we know both (a) \(\text{ThinFormOf}(x, P)\) and (b) \(Py\). From (a), it follows that \(xP\), by (416). But our global assumption is \(\text{ThinFormOf}(x, G)\), from which it follows by definition of \(\text{ThinFormOf} (410)\) that \(\forall F (xF \equiv F \equiv G)\). Hence \(xP \equiv P \equiv G\). Since we’ve established \(xP\), it follows that \(P \equiv G\). So from (b) it follows that \(Gy\), by Rule \(=E\). \(\Box\)

(419) Since \(a \equiv G\) exists, we can instantiate (418) to obtain:

\[
\text{ThinFormOf}(a, G) \rightarrow \forall y (Gy \equiv \text{ParticipatesIn}(y, a))
\]

But we know the antecedent by (415.2). Hence:

\[
\forall y (Gy \equiv \text{ParticipatesIn}(y, a))
\]

By \(\forall E\), \(Gx \equiv \text{ParticipatesIn}(x, a)\). \(\Box\)

(420) Assume \(Gx \& Gy \& x \neq y\). Since \(a \equiv G\) exists, it follows by Rule \(=I\) (119.1) that \(a \equiv G\). Independently, it follows from the first conjunct of our assumption and (419) that \(\text{Participates}(x, a)\). By similar reasoning from the second conjunct of our assumption, we can derive \(\text{Participates}(y, a)\). Hence, we have established that:

\[
a \equiv G \land \text{Participates}(x, a) \land \text{Participates}(y, a)
\]

Hence, \(\exists z (z \equiv a \& \text{ParticipatesIn}(x, z) \& \text{ParticipatesIn}(y, z))\). \(\Box\)

(421.1) – (421.2) (Exercises)
(422.1) By (415.2), (416), and the fact that \( a_G \) exists. 

(422.2) By the second conjunct of (415.1), we know \( \forall F(a_G F \equiv F = G) \). Hence \( \exists H \forall F(a_G F \equiv F = H) \), i.e., \( \exists H a_G H \), by (128.2). 

(425) (Exercise)

(427.1) Assume \textit{ThinForm}(x). Then by definition (424.1), \( \exists F(\textit{ThinFormOf}(x, F)) \). Assume \( P \) is an arbitrary such property, so that we know \( \textit{ThinFormOf}(x, P) \). Then by applying definition (410), it follows that \( A \downarrow x \). 

(427.2) Assume \( \Box \forall y(A' y \rightarrow F y) \) and \textit{ThinForm}(x). Then by (427.1), it follows from our two assumptions that \( F x \). By (419), it follows that \( \textit{ParticipatesIn}(x, a_{A'}) \). 

(427.3) By instantiating \( A \downarrow \) for \( G \) in the left conjunct of (415.1). 

(427.4) Assume \textit{ThinForm}(x). Then by (427.1), it follows that \( A \downarrow x \). But then by (419), it follows that \( \textit{ParticipatesIn}(x, a_{A'}) \). 

(427.5) Assume \( \Box \forall y(A' y \rightarrow F y) \) and \textit{ThinForm}(x). Then by (427.2), it follows from our two assumptions that \( F x \). By (419), it follows that \( \textit{ParticipatesIn}(x, a_{F'}) \). 

(428.1) By (425), \textit{ThinForm}(a_{A'}). So by (427.4), \( \textit{ParticipatesIn}(a_{A'}, a_{A'}) \). By \&I and \exists I, we’re done. 

(428.2) By (425), \textit{ThinForm}(a_{O'}). So by (419), \( \forall y(O' y \equiv \textit{ParticipatesIn}(y, a_{O'})) \). Instantiating to \( a_{O'} \), we have: \( O'(a_{O'}) \equiv \textit{ParticipatesIn}(a_{O'}, a_{O'}) \). But by (421.2), we know \( \neg O'(a_{O'}) \). Hence, \( \neg \textit{ParticipatesIn}(a_{O'}, a_{O'}) \). By \&I and \exists I, we’re done. 

(432.1) – (432.2) (Exercise)

(432.3) (\rightarrow) Assume \( G \Leftrightarrow F \). By definitions (431.1) and (431.2), we know \textit{a fortiori}:

(a) \( \Box \forall x(G x \rightarrow F x) \)

(b) \( \Box \forall x(F x \rightarrow G x) \)

Since \( H \) doesn’t have a free occurrence in our assumption, it suffices by GEN to show \( G \Rightarrow H \equiv F \Rightarrow H \):

(\rightarrow) Assume \( G \Rightarrow H \). By (431.1), we know \textit{a fortiori} that \( H \downarrow \) and \( \Box \forall x(G x \rightarrow H x) \). So from (b) and this latter conclusion, it follows that \( \Box \forall x(F x \rightarrow H x) \), by (168.5). Since \( F \downarrow \) is axiomatic, it follows that \( F \Rightarrow H \) by definition (431.1).

(\leftarrow) By analogous reasoning using (a).
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(←) Assume \( \forall H(G \Rightarrow H \equiv F \Rightarrow H) \). By definition of \( \equiv \) (431), we have to show both (a) \( G \Rightarrow F \) and (b) \( F \Rightarrow G \). To show (a), instantiate \( G \) into our assumption, to obtain \( G \Rightarrow G \equiv F \Rightarrow G \). The left condition follows from the fact that \( \equiv \) is an equivalence condition and so reflexive (432.2.a). Hence, \( F \Rightarrow G \). To show (b), reason analogously by instantiating our assumption to \( F \).

(432.4) (Exercise)

(432.5) Before we begin, note two things. First that by Rule \( \equiv S \) of Biconditional Simplification and definition (431.1), we know the following is a modally strict theorem:

\[ (A) \quad F \Rightarrow H \equiv \Box \forall x(Fx \rightarrow Hx) \]

Second, the following lemma holds:

\[ (B) \quad \Box \forall x \neg Fx \rightarrow F \Rightarrow H \]

Proof:

1. \( \neg Fx \rightarrow (Fx \rightarrow Hx) \) instance of (78.3)
2. \( \forall x(\neg Fx \rightarrow (Fx \rightarrow Hx)) \) from 1, by GEN
3. \( \forall x \neg Fx \rightarrow \forall x(Fx \rightarrow Hx) \) from 2, by axiom (39.3)
4. \( \Box(\forall x \neg Fx \rightarrow \forall x(Fx \rightarrow Hx)) \) from 3, by RN
5. \( \Box \forall x \neg Fx \rightarrow \Box \forall x(Fx \rightarrow Hx) \) from 4, by K (45.1)
6. \( \Box \forall x \neg Fx \rightarrow F \Rightarrow H \) from 5, by (A) and substitution

Now to prove our theorem, assume \( \text{Impossible}(G) \) & \( \text{Impossible}(F) \). Hence, we know:

\[ (C) \quad \Box \forall x \neg Gx \]

\[ (D) \quad \Box \forall x \neg Fx \]

Now by (432.3) and GEN, it suffices to show \( G \Rightarrow H \equiv F \Rightarrow H \). (\( \rightarrow \)) From (B) and (D), it follows that \( F \Rightarrow H \). Hence, \( G \Rightarrow H \rightarrow F \Rightarrow H \), by axiom (38.1). (\( \rightarrow \)) Since \( F \) and \( H \) are free in (B), the latter implies, \( VFVH(\Box \forall x \neg Fx \rightarrow F \Rightarrow H) \), by GEN. Hence instantiating to \( G \) and \( H \), we obtain \( \Box \forall x \neg Gx \rightarrow G \Rightarrow H \). From this and (C), it follows that \( G \Rightarrow H \). Hence \( F \Rightarrow H \rightarrow G \Rightarrow H \), by axiom (38.1). \( \Rightarrow \)

(434.1) – (434.3) (Exercises)

(436) (Exercise)

(437) By GEN and RN, it suffices to show \( G \Rightarrow F \rightarrow \Box G \Rightarrow F \). So assume \( G \Rightarrow F \). Independently, from definition (431.1) and the facts that \( G \downarrow \) and \( F \downarrow \), the following is a modally strict theorem, by Rule \( \equiv S \) of Biconditional Simplification that:
(8) \( G \Rightarrow F \equiv \Box \forall x(Gx \rightarrow Fx) \)

Hence. \( \Box \forall x(Gx \rightarrow Fx) \). So by the 4 schema, \( \Box \Box \forall x(Gx \rightarrow Fx) \). Hence from (8) and a Rule of Substitution (160.1), it follows that \( \Box G \Rightarrow F \).

(438.1) By (437) and (257.1), we know that \( G \Rightarrow F \) is a rigid condition on properties. So the following is an instance of (258.2):

\[
y = \tau x(\alpha x \& \forall F(xF \equiv G \Rightarrow F)) \rightarrow (\alpha y \& \forall F(yF \equiv G \Rightarrow F))
\]

By GEN, the fact that \( \Phi_G \downarrow \), and \( \forall E \), it follows that:

\[
\Phi_G = \tau x(\alpha x \& \forall F(xF \equiv G \Rightarrow F)) \rightarrow (\alpha \Phi_G \& \forall F(\Phi_GF \equiv G \Rightarrow F))
\]

So by definition (412), \( \alpha \Phi_G \& \forall F(\Phi_GF \equiv G \Rightarrow F) \).

(438.2) From (438.1) and the fact that \( G \downarrow \), by definition (433).

(441.1) Assume \( \text{FormOf}(x, G) \). By GEN, it suffices to show:

\[ Gy \equiv \text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{PTA}}(y, x) \]

(\( \rightarrow \)) Assume \( Gy \). Then by conjoining our two assumptions and applying \( \exists I \), it follows that \( \exists F \text{(FormOf}(x, F) \& Fy) \). So by the definition of \( \text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{PTA}}(440.1) \), it follows that \( \text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{PTA}}(y, x) \).

(\( \leftarrow \)) Assume \( \text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{PTA}}(y, x) \). By definition of \( \text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{PTA}}(440.1) \), it follows that \( \exists F \text{(FormOf}(x, F) \& Fy) \).

Assume \( P \) is an arbitrary such property, so that we know both (a) \( \text{FormOf}(x, P) \) and (b) \( Py \). From (a), it follows \( \alpha \) by definition (433) that \( \forall F(xF \equiv P \Rightarrow F) \). But we also know \( \text{FormOf}(x, G) \), from which it also follows by (433) that \( \forall F(xF \equiv G \Rightarrow F) \). By the laws of quantified biconditional, (100.11) and (100.10), it thus follows that \( \forall F(P \Rightarrow F \equiv G \Rightarrow F) \). But by a fact about necessary implication (432.3), it follows that \( P \subseteq G \), i.e., by (432.1), that \( \Box \forall x(Px \equiv Gx) \).

By the T schema, \( \forall x(Px \Rightarrow Gx) \), and by \( \forall E \), \( Py \Rightarrow Gy \). But \( Py \) is already known. Hence \( Gy \).

(441.2) Assume \( \text{FormOf}(x, G) \). By GEN, it suffices to show:

\[ yG \rightarrow \text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{PTA}}(y, x) \]

So assume \( yG \). Then by conjoining our two assumptions and applying \( \exists I \), it follows that \( \exists F \text{(FormOf}(x, F) \& yF) \). So by the definition of \( \text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{PTA}}(440.2) \), it follows that \( \text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{PTA}}(y, x) \).

(443.1) Instantiate \( \Phi_G \) into (441.1) to obtain:

\[ \text{FormOf}(\Phi_G, G) \rightarrow \forall y(Gy \equiv \text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{PTA}}(y, \Phi_G)) \]

Then by (438.2), it follows that \( \forall y(Gy \equiv \text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{PTA}}(y, \Phi_G)) \). Instantiate this result to \( x \) and we obtain: \( Gx \equiv \text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{PTA}}(x, \Phi_G) \).

(443.2) Instantiate \( \Phi_G \) into (441.2) to obtain:
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\[ \text{FormOf}(\Phi_G, G) \rightarrow \forall y(G \rightarrow \text{ParticipatesIn}_v(y, \Phi_G)) \]

Then by (438.2), it follows that, \( \forall y(G \rightarrow \text{ParticipatesIn}_v(y, \Phi_G)) \). Instantiate this result to \( x \) and we obtain: \( xG \rightarrow \text{ParticipatesIn}_v(x, \Phi_G) \). \( \bowtie \)

(444) Assume \( \text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{pta}}(y, x) \). Then \( \exists F(\text{FormOf}(x, F) \& Fy), \) by (440.1). Suppose \( P \) is an arbitrary such property, so that we know both \( \text{FormOf}(x, P) \) and \( Py \). By GEN, it suffices to show \( xF \rightarrow Fy \). So assume \( xF \). Then \( P \Rightarrow F \), by the established fact that \( \text{FormOf}(x, P) \) and definition (433). So \( \Box \forall y(Py \rightarrow Fy) \), by (431.1). Since \( Py \) is already known, it follows by now familiar reasoning that \( Fy \). \( \bowtie \)

(445.1) Assume \( Gx \& Gy \& x \neq y \). Since \( \Phi_G \) exists, it follows by Rule =I (119.1) that \( \Phi_G = \Phi_G \). Independently, it follows from the first conjunct of our assumption and (443.1) that \( \text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{pta}}(x, \Phi_G) \). By similar reasoning from the second conjunct of our assumption, we can derive \( \text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{pta}}(y, \Phi_G) \). Hence, we have established that:

\[ \Phi_G = \Phi_G \& \text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{pta}}(x, \Phi_G) \& \text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{pta}}(y, \Phi_G) \]

By \( \exists I \), we’re done. \( \bowtie \)

(445.2) (Exercise)

(446.1) By reasoning analogous to the proof of (421.1).

(446.2) By reasoning analogous to the proof of (421.2).

(446.3) (Exercise)

(447) By instantiating \( G \) into the second conjunct of (438.1), it follows that \( \Phi_G G \equiv G \Rightarrow G \). But the right-hand side, by definition (431.1), is just \( \Box \forall x(Gx \rightarrow Gx) \), which is easily derivable by applying GEN and then RN to the tautology \( Gx \rightarrow Gx \). So \( \Phi_G G \). \( \bowtie \)

(449.1) – (449.3) (Exercises)

(450.1) Instantiate the first conjunct of (438.1) to \( A ! \). \( \bowtie \)

(450.2) By (450.1), we know \( A ! \Phi_{A !} \). It follows that \( \text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{pta}}(\Phi_{A !}, \Phi_{A !}) \), by (443.1). \( \bowtie \)

(450.3) By (449.1), we know \( \text{Form}(\Phi_{A !}) \). Conjoin this with (450.2) and existentially generalize. \( \bowtie \)

(450.4) Assume \( A ! \Rightarrow H \). Since \( G \) isn’t free in our assumption, it suffices by GEN to show \( H \Phi_G \). By definition (431), it follows from our assumption that \( \Box \forall x(A ! x \rightarrow H x) \), and by the T schema, that \( \forall x(A ! x \rightarrow H x) \). By the first conjunct of (438.1), we know \( A ! \Phi_G \). Hence \( H \Phi_G \). \( \bowtie \)
(450.5) (Exercise)

(450.6) Assume $A! \Rightarrow \overline{H}$. By GEN, it suffices to show $\neg \overline{H}$. By (450.4), it follows from our assumption that $\forall G (\overline{H} \Phi_G)$, and hence $\overline{H} \Phi_G$. By theorem (197.1), it follows that $\neg \overline{H} \Phi_G$. $\triangledown \Leftarrow$

(450.7) (Exercise)

(451.1) Assume $A! \Rightarrow H$. Then by (450.4), it follows that $\forall G (H \Phi_G)$. But since theorem (443.1) is modally strict, there is a modally strict proof of its instance $H \Phi_G \equiv \text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{pta}}(\Phi_G, \Phi_H)$. Hence, by the Rule of Substitution (160.1), $\forall G (\text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{pta}}(\Phi_G, \Phi_H))$. $\triangledown \Leftarrow$

(451.2) Assume $G \Rightarrow H$. Then by the second conjunct of (438.1), it follows that $\Phi_G H$. So by an appropriate instance of (443.1), obtained by substituting $\Phi_G$ for $x$ and $H$ for $G$, it follows that $\text{ParticipatesIn}_{\text{pta}}(\Phi_G, \Phi_H)$. $\triangledown \Leftarrow$

(456) Assume $\text{TruthValue}(x)$. Then by (293), $\exists p (\text{TruthValueOf}(x, p))$. Let $p_1$ be such a proposition, so that we know $\text{TruthValueOf}(x, p_1)$. Hence by (281), it follows that:

$$(\delta) \ A! x \& \forall F (xF \equiv \exists q ((q \equiv p_1) \& F = [\lambda y q]))$$

Now since the first conjunct of $(\delta)$ is that $A! x$, it remains to show, by definition (455), that $\forall F (xF \rightarrow \text{Propositional}(F))$. By GEN, it suffices to show $xF \rightarrow \text{Propositional}(F)$. So assume $xF$. Then by the second conjunct of $(\delta)$ it follows that:

$$\exists q ((q \equiv p_1) \& F = [\lambda y q])$$

Let $q_1$ be an arbitrary such proposition, so that we know $(q_1 \equiv p_1) \& F = [\lambda y q_1]$. It follows from the second conjunct that $\exists p (F = [\lambda y p])$. So $\text{Propositional}(F)$, by definition (270). $\triangledown \Leftarrow$

(457.1) ($\rightarrow$) Suppose $\text{Situation}(x)$. Then, by the definition of $\text{Situation}$ (455), we know:

$$(\delta) \ A! x \& \forall F (xF \rightarrow \exists p (F = [\lambda y p]))$$

To show $(\triangledown \delta)$, it suffices to show that both conjuncts of $(\delta)$ are necessary, by right-to-left direction of theorem (158.3), i.e., by the fact that $(\Box \phi \& \Box \psi) \rightarrow \Box (\phi \& \psi)$. But the first conjunct of $(\delta)$, i.e., $A! x$, implies $\Box A! x$, by (178.2). And the second conjunct of $(\delta)$ also implies its own necessity, by (276.2). ($\leftarrow$) Exercise. $\triangledown \Leftarrow$

(457.2) – (457.3) (Exercises)

(457.4) ($\rightarrow$) Assume $\sim \text{Situation}(x)$. Independently, since the left-to-right direction of (457.1) is $\text{Situation}(x) \rightarrow \Box \text{Situation}(x)$, it follows by RA that:
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\( \forall (\text{Situation}(x) \rightarrow \Box \text{Situation}(x)) \)

So by theorem (131):

\( \forall \text{Situation}(x) \rightarrow \forall \Box \text{Situation}(x) \)

Hence, \( \forall \Box \text{Situation}(x) \), given our assumption. So \( \Box \text{Situation}(x) \), by (46.2). And thus \( \text{Situation}(x) \), by the T schema. \( \langle \rightarrow \rangle \) Assume \( \text{Situation}(x) \). Then by (457.1), \( \Box \text{Situation}(x) \). So by (132), \( \forall \text{Situation}(x) \). ▷

(459) Assume \( \text{Situation}(x) \). \( \langle \rightarrow \rangle \) Assume \( x \models p \). Then it follows a fortiori from definition (458) that \( x \Sigma p \). From this it follows a fortiori from definition (289) that \( x[\lambda y p] \). \( \langle \leftarrow \rangle \) Assume \( x[\lambda y p] \). Note independently that from the definition of \( x \Sigma p \) (289), it follows by the \( \tau \) version of Rule \( \equiv \text{Df} \) of Equivalence-by-Definition (91.1) that the following is a (modally strict) theorem:

\[ (\theta) \quad x \Sigma p \equiv x \downarrow \& x[\lambda y p] \]

Since \( x \downarrow \) is an axiom, it follows from (\( \theta \)) by Rule \( \equiv \text{S} \) of Biconditional Simplification (92.1) that the following is a (modally strict) theorem:

\[ x \Sigma p \equiv x[\lambda y p] \]

So from this and our local assumption it follows that \( x \Sigma p \). From our global assumption that \( \text{Situation}(x) \) and this last result, it follows, by definition (458), that \( x \models p \). ▷

(461.1) If we eliminate the restricted variable, we have to prove: \( \text{Situation}(x) \rightarrow (x \models p \equiv \Box x \models p) \). So assume \( \text{Situation}(x) \). \( \langle \rightarrow \rangle \) Assume \( x \models p \). Then by (459), it follows that \( x[\lambda y p] \). Since this is an encoding formula, axiom (51) applies and yields:

\[ (\theta) \quad \Box x[\lambda y p] \]

But note also that theorem (459) is modally strict, and so by Rule RM, it implies:

\[ \Box \text{Situation}(x) \rightarrow \Box((x \models p) \equiv x[\lambda y p]) \]

But our global assumption is that \( \text{Situation}(x) \), which implies \( \Box \text{Situation}(x) \), by (457.1). Hence:

\[ (\xi) \quad \Box((x \models p) \equiv x[\lambda y p]) \]

But from (\( \xi \)) and (\( \theta \)), it follows that \( \Box x \models p \), by a version of (158.6). ▷

Note: In light of Remark (460), and our previous discussions of reasoning with restricted variables in (334) and (335), we may use restricted variables to simplify the previous proof, as follows. \( \langle \rightarrow \rangle \) Assume \( s \models p \). Then by (459), \( s[\lambda y p] \).
So by axiom (51), $\square s[\lambda y p]$. But since the antecedent of (459) is, by (457.1), necessarily true if true, we can independently derive, using restricted variables, $\square((s \models p) \equiv s[\lambda y p])$ (exercise). Hence $\square s \models p$. $\blacksquare$ (Exercise) $\blacksquare$

(461.2) – (461.4) (Exercises)

(461.5) Theorem (461.2) is that $\diamondsuit s \models p \equiv s \models p$. So by a classical tautology (89.4.b), $\neg \diamondsuit s \models p \equiv \neg s \models p$. Independently, as an instance of (162.1), we know $\square \neg s \models p \equiv \neg \square s \models p$. So by transitivity, $\square \neg s \models p \equiv \neg s \models p$, and by commutativity, $\neg s \models p \equiv \square \neg s \models p$. $\blacksquare$

(462) $\rightarrow$ Exercise. $\leftarrow$ Assume $\forall p(s \models p \equiv s' \models p)$. Since both $s$ and $s'$ are situations, it follows that they are abstract objects, by definition (455). By (242.1), it suffices to show that $s$ and $s'$ encode the same properties:

$\leftarrow$ Assume $sF$. Then since $s$ is a situation, it follows that $\exists p(F = [\lambda y p])$, by definitions (455) and (270). Suppose $p_1$ is an arbitrary such proposition, so that we know $F = [\lambda y p_1]$. So $s[\lambda y p_1]$ and by (459), $s \models p_1$. But our initial hypothesis is that the same propositions are true in $s$ and $s'$. So $s' \models p_1$. Hence by (459), $s'[\lambda y p_1]$. So $s'F$.

$\rightarrow$ By analogous reasoning. $\blacksquare$

(464.1) (Exercise)

(464.2) Assume $s \not\subseteq s'$ and $s \neq s'$. For reductio, assume $s' \not\subseteq s$. From the assumption that $s \not\subseteq s'$, it follows that $\forall p(s \models p \rightarrow s' \models p)$, by definition (463). Similarly, from the reductio assumption, it follows that $\forall p(s' \models p \rightarrow s \models p)$. Hence, $\forall p(s \models p \equiv s' \models p)$. So by theorem (462), $s = s'$. Contradiction. $\blacksquare$

(464.3) Assume (a) $s \not\subseteq s'$ and (b) $s' \not\subseteq s''$. To show $s \not\subseteq s''$, assume $s \models p$. From this and (a), it follows by definition of $\not\subseteq$ (463) that $s' \models p$. From this and (b), it follows by (463) that $s'' \models p$. $\blacksquare$

(465.1) $\rightarrow$ Exercise. $\leftarrow$ By exportation (89.7.a), the anti-symmetry of $\not\subseteq$ (464.2) becomes $s \not\subseteq s' \rightarrow (s \neq s' \rightarrow \neg(s' \not\subseteq s))$. By contraposition of the consequent, we get $s \not\subseteq s' \rightarrow (s' \not\subseteq s \rightarrow s = s')$. So by importation (89.7.b), $(s \not\subseteq s' \& s' \not\subseteq s) \rightarrow s = s'$. $\blacksquare$

(465.2) $\rightarrow$ Exercise. $\leftarrow$ We take $\forall s''(s'' \not\subseteq s \equiv s'' \not\subseteq s')$ as a global assumption. Given theorem (462), it suffices to show $\forall p(s \models p \equiv s' \models p)$:

$\leftarrow$ Assume $s \models p$. By instantiating our global assumption to $s$, we know $s \not\subseteq s \equiv s \not\subseteq s'$. But by (464.1), we know $s \not\subseteq s$. Hence $s \not\subseteq s'$. So by definition of $\not\subseteq$ (463), it follows that $s' \models p$. $\blacksquare$
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(←) Assume \(s' \models p\). Then \(s \models p\) follows by analogous reasoning once we instantiate our global assumption to \(s'\) and let our instance of (464.1) be \(s' \preceq s'\).

\((467)\) (Exercise)

(469.1) By the Comprehension Principle for Abstract Objects (53), we know:

\[ \exists x (A! x \& \forall F (xF \equiv F \lambda F)) \]

Suppose \(a\) is an arbitrary such object, so that we know:

\((\xi)\) \(A! a \& \forall F (aF \equiv F \lambda F)\)

Now given the definition of \(NullSituation(x)\) (468.1), it suffices to show both:

(a) \(Situation(a) \& \neg \exists p (a \models p)\)

(b) \(\forall y ((Situation(y) \& \neg \exists p (y \models p)) \rightarrow y = a)\)

(a) To show the first conjunct, we show both \(A! a\) and \(\forall F (aF \rightarrow \exists p (F = [\lambda y p])\), by the definition of situation. But \(A! a\) is known by the first conjunct of \((\xi)\). By GEN, it remains to show \(aF \rightarrow \exists p (F = [\lambda y p])\). But if we can show \(\neg aF\), then by failure of the antecedent, it follows that \(aF \rightarrow \exists p (F = [\lambda y p])\). So, for reductio, assume \(aF\). Then by the second conjunct of \((\xi)\), \(F \neq F\), which contradicts \(F = F\). So we’ve established \(Situation(a)\). Now for the second conjunct of (a), suppose for reductio that some proposition, say \(q_1\), is such that \(a \models q_1\). Then, since \(a\) is a situation, we can apply (459) and conclude \(a[\lambda y q_1]\). So, by the second conjunct of \((\xi)\), it follows that \([\lambda y q_1] \neq [\lambda y q_1]\), which contradicts the fact that \([\lambda y q_1] = [\lambda y q_1]\).

(b) Assume \(Situation(y) \& \neg \exists p (y \models p)\). Since we now know both \(\neg \exists p (y \models p)\), by assumption, and \(\neg \exists p (a \models p)\), by (a), it follows that \(\forall p (y \models p \equiv a \models p)\), by (104.9). Since both \(y\) and \(a\) are situations, it follows by (462) that \(y = a\). \(\bowtie\)

\((469.2)\) (Exercise)

(469.3) By the Rule of Actualization, (469.1) implies \(\forall \exists! x NullSituation(x)\). So by the right-to-left direction of (174.2), it follows that \(\forall x NullSituation(x)\). \(\bowtie\)

(469.4) (Exercise)

(471.1) Assume \(NullSituation(x)\). Then, by definition (468.1), we know both (a) \(Situation(x)\) and (b) \(\neg \exists p (x \models p)\). Now to show \(\Box NullSituation(x)\), we have to show \(\Box (Situation(x) \& \neg \exists p (x \models p))\). By &I and (158.3), it suffices to show \(\Box Situation(x)\) and \(\Box \neg \exists p (x \models p)\). By the left to right direction of (457.1), (a) implies \(\Box Situation(x)\). So it remains to \(\Box \neg \exists p (x \models p)\). Suppose not, for reductio. Then by definition (18.5), \(\Box \exists p (x \models p)\). So by BF\(\Box\) (167.3), \(\exists p \Box x \models p\). Suppose
$p_1$ is an arbitrary such proposition, so that we know $\diamond x \models p_1$. Then by the left-to-right direction of (461.2), it follows that $x \models p_1$. But then, $\exists p(x \models p)$, by $\exists I$, which contradicts (b). $\Rightarrow$

(471.2) (Exercise)

(471.3) Let $\psi$ be the formula $NullSituation(x)$. Then as an instance of (153.2), we know:

$$\forall x(\psi \rightarrow \square \psi) \rightarrow (\exists! x \psi \rightarrow \forall y(\gamma = ix\psi \rightarrow \psi^x_\gamma))$$

By applying GEN to (471.1), we know $\forall x(\psi \rightarrow \square \psi)$. Hence:

$$\exists! x \psi \rightarrow \forall y(\gamma = ix\psi \rightarrow \psi^x_\gamma)$$

But (469.1) is $\exists! x \psi$. Hence:

$$\forall y(\gamma = ix\psi \rightarrow \psi^x_\gamma)$$

Since $s_\emptyset \downarrow$, it follows that:

$$s_\emptyset = ix\psi \rightarrow \psi^x_\emptyset$$

Hence by definition (470.1), $\psi^x_\emptyset$, i.e., $NullSituation(s_\emptyset)$. $\Rightarrow$

(471.4) (Exercise)

(472.1) (Exercise)

(472.2) By GEN and the Rule of Actualization, (472.1) implies:

$$\forall x(NullSituation(x) \equiv Null(x))$$

So by (149.1), it follows that:

$$\forall x(x = ix NullSituation(x) \equiv x = ix Null(x))$$

Since $s_\emptyset \downarrow$, it follows that:

$$s_\emptyset = ix NullSituation(x) \equiv s_\emptyset = ix Null(x)$$

By definition (470.1), it follows that:

$$s_\emptyset = ix Null(x)$$

Hence, by definition (262.1), $s_\emptyset = a_\emptyset$. $\Rightarrow$

(472.3) Before we begin, note that by theorem (263.4), we know $Universal(a_V)$, and so by definition (260.2), that:

$$\forall a_V \& \forall F a_V F$$
Furthermore, by theorem (471.4), we know Trivial Situation($s_V$), and so by definition (468.2), that:

\( (c) \text{ Situation}(s_V) \& \forall p(s_V \models p) \)

Since the first conjunct of \((c)\) implies \(A!s_V\), we've established that \(a_V\) and \(s_V\) are abstract. Hence, to establish our theorem, it suffices to show:

\[ \exists F(a_V F \& \neg s_V F) \]

by (242.1). So we have to find a witness to this existential claim. If we take the witness to be \(A!\), we have to show:

\[ a_V A! \& \neg s_V A! \]

Now the first conjunct follows immediately by instantiating the second conjunct of \((c)\) to \(A!\). So it remains to show the second conjunct. For reductio, suppose \(s_V A!\). Now since \(s_V\) is a situation, every property it encodes is a propositional property. So \(\exists p(A! = [\lambda y p])\). Let \(p_1\) be an arbitrary such proposition, so that we know \(A! = [\lambda y p_1]\). Independently, it is clear that \(\exists xA!x \& \exists x\neg A!x\):

\(\exists xA!x\) follows from the Comprehension Principle for Abstract Objects. To show \(\exists x\neg A!x\), it suffices, by the modally strict fact (220.2) and the Rule of Substitution (160.1), to show \(\exists xO!x\). But this follows from (225.1), by the T schema (45.2).

So from \(\exists xA!x \& \exists x\neg A!x\) and our identity \(A! = [\lambda y p_1]\), it follows that

\[ \exists x([\lambda y p_1]x) \& \exists x(\neg[\lambda y p_1]x) \]

But this yields a contradiction, for suppose \(b\) and \(c\) are arbitrary such objects, so that we know both \([\lambda y p_1]b\) and \(\neg[\lambda y p_1]c\). Now, clearly, \([\lambda y p_1]\downarrow\). So by \(\beta\)-Conversion, it follows from \([\lambda y p_1]b\) that \(p_1\) and from \(\neg[\lambda y p_1]c\) that \(\neg p_1\). Contradiction. \(\Rightarrow\)

(474) Suppose \(\varphi\) is a condition on propositional properties. Then by (473), we know there is a modally strict proof of:

\( (\delta) \forall H(\varphi^H \rightarrow \text{Propositional}(H)) \)

Now if we let \(\theta\) be \(\text{Situation}(x)\), \(\psi\) be \(\forall F(xF \equiv \varphi)\), and \(\chi\) be \(A!x\), then the theorem we have to prove has the form:

\[ (\theta \& \psi) \equiv (\chi \& \psi) \]

So in light of the right-to-left direction of the tautology (89.8.f):

\[ ((\theta \& \psi) \equiv (\chi \& \psi)) \equiv (\psi \rightarrow (\theta \equiv \chi)) \]
it suffices to show \( \psi \rightarrow (\theta \equiv \chi) \), i.e., \( \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi) \rightarrow (\text{Situation}(x) \equiv A!x) \). So assume:

\[(\zeta) \ \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi)\]

(\(\rightarrow\)) Assume \( \text{Situation}(x) \). But \( A!x \) follows immediately by definition \((455)\) of \( \text{Situation} \).

(\(\leftarrow\)) Assume \( A!x \). In virtue of the definition \((455)\) of \( \text{Situation} \), it remains only to show \( \forall F(xF \rightarrow \text{Propositional}(F)) \). By GEN, we need only show: \( xF \rightarrow \text{Propositional}(F) \). So assume \( xF \). Then by \((\zeta)\), it follows that \( \varphi \). But if we instantiate \((\delta)\) to \( F \), it follows that \( \varphi \rightarrow \text{Propositional}(F) \). Hence, \( \text{Propositional}(F) \).

\((475.1)\) Suppose \( \varphi \) is a condition on propositional properties in which \( x \) doesn’t occur free. Since \( x \) doesn’t occur free in \( \varphi \), it follows by the Comprehension Principle for Abstract Objects \((53)\) that:

\[\exists x(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi))\]

Since \( \varphi \) is a condition on propositional properties, it follows from the modally strict theorem \((474)\) and the Rule of Substitution \((160.1)\) that:

\[\exists x(\text{Situation}(x) \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi))\]

\((476.1)\) Let \( \varphi \) be a condition on propositional properties in which \( x \) doesn’t occur free. Then by \((475.2)\), it follows that:

\[\exists! x(\text{Situation}(x) \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi))\]

If apply the Rule of Actualization and then use the right-to-left direction of \((174.2)\), it follows that:

\[\exists x(\text{Situation}(x) \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi))\]

\((476.2)\) Let \( \varphi \) be a condition on propositional properties in which \( x \) doesn’t occur free. Now by applying GEN and RN to \((474)\), we know:

\[(\delta) \Box \forall x((\text{Situation}(x) \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi)) \equiv (A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi)))\]

Consequently, our theorem follows from \((476.1)\) and \((\delta)\) by theorem \((149.3)\).

\((477)\) Suppose \( \varphi \) is a rigid condition on propositional properties in which \( x \) isn’t free. Given our conventions for interpreting bound restricted variables, we have to show:

\[y = \exists x(\text{Situation}(x) \& \forall F(xF \equiv \varphi)) \rightarrow \forall F(yF \equiv \varphi))\]
So assume:

\[ (\delta) \quad \varphi = \forall x (\text{Situation}(x) \land \forall F (x F \equiv \varphi)) \]

Since \( \varphi \) is, by hypothesis, a condition on propositional properties in which \( x \) doesn’t occur free, we may appeal to the identity (476.2) and infer from (\( \delta \)) that:

\[ (\xi) \quad \varphi = \forall \forall \forall \forall F (x F \equiv \varphi) \]

But since \( \varphi \) is also, by hypothesis, a rigid condition on properties in which \( x \) doesn’t occur free, it follows from (\( \xi \)) by (258.2) that:

\[ \forall \forall \forall \forall \forall F (y F \equiv \varphi) \]

A fortiori, \( \forall \forall \forall \forall \forall F (y F \equiv \varphi) \).

(481) Theorem (215.1) tells us that there are contingently true propositions. So, by definition (211), we know \( \exists p (p \land \neg \neg p) \). Suppose \( q_1 \) is such a proposition, so that we know:

\[ (\delta) \quad q_1 \land \neg q_1 \]

Now clearly \( [\lambda y q_1] \) and since the formula \( F = [\lambda y q_1] \) is clearly a condition on propositional properties, we know the following is an instance of Comprehension for Situations (475.1):

\[ \exists s \forall F (s F \equiv F = [\lambda y q_1]) \]

Suppose \( s_1 \) is such a situation, so that we know:

\[ (\xi) \quad \forall F (s_1 F \equiv F = [\lambda y q_1]) \]

We now show that \( s_1 \) is a witness that proves our theorem by establishing:

(A) \( \text{Actual}(s_1) \)

(B) \( \Diamond \neg \text{Actual}(s_1) \)

(A) To show \( \text{Actual}(s_1) \), we have to show \( \forall p (s_1 \models p \rightarrow p) \). So by GEN, assume \( s_1 \models p \). Then by theorem (459), \( s_1 [\lambda y p] \). Hence by (\( \xi \)), it follows that \( [\lambda y p] = [\lambda y q_1] \). So by the theorem governing proposition identity (117.3), \( p = q_1 \). But by (\( \delta \)), we know \( q_1 \). Hence \( p \).

(B) Assume, for reductio, that \( \neg \Diamond \neg \text{Actual}(s_1) \). Then, by (158.12), \( \Box \text{Actual}(s_1) \), and so \( \Box F (s_1 \models p \rightarrow p) \), by definition of Actual (480) and a rule of substitution (160.2). By CBF (167.2), it follows that \( \forall p \Box (s_1 \models p \rightarrow p) \). So, in particular:

\[ (\zeta) \quad \Box (s_1 \models q_1 \rightarrow q_1) \]
But by (ξ), we know \( s_1[\lambda y q_1] \equiv [\lambda y q_1] = [\lambda y q_1] \). Since the right side is true by the laws of identity, it follows that \( s_1[\lambda y q_1] \). Since \( s_1 \) is a situation, it follows by (459) that \( s_1 \models q_1 \). So by the rigidity of truth in a situation (461.1), \( \Box s_1 \models q_1 \). But by the K axiom, this last conclusion and (ξ) together imply \( \Box q_1 \), i.e., \( \neg \Diamond \neg q_1 \), which contradicts the second conjunct of (θ). \( \therefore \)

(483.1) There are a number of ways to prove this theorem. Consider, for example, the null situation \( s_\emptyset \). Since no propositions are true in \( s_\emptyset \), by (471.3) and (468.1), it follows, by failure of the antecedent, that every proposition \( s_\emptyset \) encodes is true.

But we can also show that there is an non-null actual situation that is actual. Consider the following instance of situation comprehension (475.1):

\[ \exists s \forall F (sF \equiv F = [\lambda y \forall q (q \rightarrow q)]) \]

Let \( s_2 \) be an arbitrary such situation, so that we know:

(θ) \( \forall F (s_2 F \equiv F = [\lambda y \forall q (q \rightarrow q)]) \)

Now to show Actual(\( s_2 \)), it suffices by GEN to show \( (s_2 \models p) \rightarrow p \). So assume \( s_2 \models p \). Then by (459), \( s_2[\lambda y p] \). By (θ), it follows that \( [\lambda y p] = [\lambda y \forall q (q \rightarrow q)] \). Hence by the theorem governing proposition identity (117.3), it follows that \( p = \forall q (q \rightarrow q) \). But it is a theorem that \( \forall q (q \rightarrow q) \), by (75) and GEN. Hence, by Rule =E, \( p \). \( \therefore \)

(483.2) As a witness to prove this claim, consider the trivial situation \( s_V \). By theorem (472.2) and definition (468.2), every proposition is true in \( s_V \). Hence, \( s_V \models (p \& \neg p) \), where \( p \) is any proposition you please. For reductio, suppose Actual(\( s_V \)). Then by definition of Actual, \( p \& \neg p \). Contradiction. Hence \( \neg \)Actual(\( s_V \)). \( \therefore \)

(483.3) Consider the (necessarily) false proposition \( \exists q (q \& \neg q) \), which we know exists. It suffices to show that this is a witness to our theorem. And by GEN, it suffices to show Actual(\( s \)) \( \rightarrow s \models \exists q (q \& \neg q) \). So assume Actual(\( s \)). Then, by definition (480):

(θ) \( \forall p (s \models p \rightarrow p) \)

Now suppose, for reductio, that \( s \models \exists q (q \& \neg q) \). Then by (θ), it follows that \( \exists q (q \& \neg q) \). Contradiction. \( \therefore \)

(484) Let \( \varphi \) be the formula \( s'F \lor s''F \). Then any property \( H \) such that \( \varphi \) is encoded by a situation, and so every property \( H \) such that \( \varphi \) is propositional. Since \( \varphi \) is therefore a condition on propositional properties, the following in an instance of Comprehension for Situations (475.1):

\[ \exists s \forall F (sF \equiv s'F \lor s''F) \]
Let $s_3$ be an arbitrary such situation, so that we know:

(8) $\forall F(s_3F \equiv s'F \lor s''F)$

If we can show that both (a) $s' \sqsubseteq s_3$ and (b) $s'' \sqsubseteq s_3$, then by $\exists I$, we're done.

(a) Assume $s' \models p$. Then by (459), $s'[\lambda y p]$. Hence by $\forall I, s'[\lambda y p] \lor s''[\lambda y p]$. So by (8), $s_3[\lambda y p]$. Since $s_3$ is a situation, by hypothesis, it follows by (459) that $s_3 \models p$. So by CP, $s' \models p \rightarrow s_3 \models p$, and by GEN, $\forall p(s' \models p \rightarrow s_3 \models p)$. Hence, by definition (463), $s' \leq s_3$. (b) By analogous reasoning. $\Box$

(485.1) Assume $\text{Actual}(s)$ and $s \models p$. By definition of $\text{Actual}$ (480), it follows that $p$ is true. Note independently that since $[\lambda y p] \downarrow$, we know by $\beta$-Conversion that $[\lambda y p]x \equiv p$. Since this last fact is a theorem, it follows by GEN that $\forall x([\lambda y p]x \equiv p)$. In particular, $[\lambda y p]s \equiv p$. But since we’ve established $p$, it follows that $[\lambda y p]s$. $\Box$

(485.2) (Exercise) [Hint: Use (484).]

(488) Assume $\text{Actual}(s)$. Then by definition (480):

(8) $\forall p(s \models p \rightarrow p)$

Now suppose, for reductio, that $\neg \text{Consistent}(s)$. So by Rule $\neg\neg E$ (79.2) and the definition of $\text{Consistent}$ (486), there is a proposition $q_1$, say $q_1$, such that both $s \models q_1$ and $s \models \neg q_1$. Then, it follows from the first and (8) that $q_1$ and it follows from the second and (8) that $\neg q_1$. Contradiction. $\Box$

(489.1) (→) Assume $\neg \text{Consistent}(s)$. By definition (486) and Rule $\neg\neg E$ (79.2), it follows that $\exists p(s \models p \& s \models \neg p)$. Let $q_1$ be an arbitrary such proposition, so that we know:

(8) $s \models q_1 \& s \models \neg q_1$

Then by (461.1), it follows that both $\Box s \models q_1$ and $\Box s \models \neg q_1$. But a conjunction of necessities is equivalent to a necessary conjunction (158.3), and so it follows that $\Box(s \models q_1 \& s \models \neg q_1)$. Hence, by $\exists I, \exists p\Box(s \models p \& s \models \neg p)$, and this conclusion remains once we discharge (8) by $\exists E$. Thus, by the Buridan formula (168.1), it follows that $\Box \exists p(s \models p \& s \models \neg p)$. But we may apply the relevant instance of the modally-strict theorem that $\varphi \equiv \neg\neg \varphi$ and a Rule of Substitution (160.1) to obtain:

$\Box \neg\neg \exists p(s \models p \& s \models \neg p)$

Hence, by definition of $\text{Consistent}$ (486) and a Rule of Substitution (160.2), it follows that $\Box \neg \text{Consistent}(s)$. (←) Exercise. $\Box$

(489.2) (Exercise)

(491.1) (Exercise)
(491.2) Assume \( \exists p (s \models p & \neg \Diamond p) \). Suppose \( p_1 \) is such a proposition, so that we know (a) \( s \models p_1 \) and (b) \( \neg \Diamond p_1 \). By definitions (490) and (480), we have to show \( \neg \Diamond \forall q (s \models q \rightarrow q) \). By (162.1), it suffices to show \( \Box \neg \forall q (s \models q \rightarrow q) \). But since there is a modally strict proof of the equivalence of \( \neg \forall q (s \models q \rightarrow q) \) and \( \exists q (s \models q & \neg q) \) (exercise), it suffices by the Rule of Substitution (160.1) to show \( \Box \exists q (s \models q & \neg q) \). Now from (a) we know \( \Box s \models p_1 \) by (461.1), and from (b) we know \( \Box \neg p_1 \) by (162.1). So by \&I and (158.3), we know \( \Box (s \models p_1 & \neg p_1) \). By \exists I, it follows that \( \exists q (s \models q & \neg q) \). But by the Buridan formula (168.1), it follows that \( \Box \exists q (s \models q & \neg q) \). ⊢

(492.1) Assume \( \text{Possible}(s) \). Then by definition (490),

(\( \diamond \)) \( \Diamond \text{Actual}(s) \)

Note independently that (488) is a theorem, and since the free restricted variable is rigid, we can apply expanded RN (335.1.a) to obtain:

(\( \xi \)) \( \Box (\text{Actual}(s) \rightarrow \text{Consistent}(s)) \)

Hence by an instance of the K\( \diamond \) schema (158.13), it follows from (\( \diamond \)) and (\( \xi \)) that \( \Diamond \text{Consistent}(s) \). But then, by (489.2), \( \text{Consistent}(s) \). ⊢

(492.2) [The following proof rehearses some of the discussion in Remark (487).] Let \( q_1 \) be any proposition and \( s_1 \) be the situation:

\( s \forall F (F \equiv F \equiv [\lambda y q_1 & \neg q_1]) \)

We leave it as an exercise to show \( s_1 \) is identical to a strictly canonical situation, i.e., to show, when \( \varphi \) is the formula \( F \equiv [\lambda y q_1 & \neg q_1] \), that there are modally strict proofs of \( \forall F (\varphi \rightarrow \text{Propositional}(F)) \) and \( \forall F (\varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi) \). Hence by (477), it follows by definition of \( s_1 \) that:

\( \forall F (s_1 F \equiv F \equiv [\lambda y q_1 & \neg q_1]) \)

So we know both that \( s_1 [\lambda y q_1 & \neg q_1] \) and that \( s_1 \) encodes no other properties. Hence, we know both that \( s_1 \models (q_1 & \neg q_1) \) and that no other proposition is true in \( s_1 \). Consequently, there is no proposition \( p \) such that both \( p \) and \( \neg p \) are true in \( s_1 \). Hence \( \text{Consistent}(s_1) \), by definition (486). It remains to show \( \neg \text{Possible}(s_1) \). Assume, for reductio, that \( \text{Actual}(s_1) \). Then by definition of \( \text{Actual} (480) \), it follows that \( q_1 & \neg q_1 \), which is a contradiction. Hence, \( \neg \text{Actual}(s_1) \). Since this is a modally strict theorem, we may apply RN to obtain: \( \Box \neg \text{Actual}(s_1) \), i.e., \( \neg \Diamond \text{Actual}(s_1) \). So, by definition (490), \( \neg \text{Possible}(s_1) \). ⊢

(493.1) Assume \( \forall p (s \models p \equiv p) \). By GEN, it suffices to show \( (s \models q) \equiv \neg s \models q \).

Now the following are instances of our assumption:

(\( \theta \)) \( s \models q \equiv q \)
So by (q), s ⊧ q. Since truth-in-s is rigid (461.1), □s ⊧ q. ∗

(493.4) Assume ∀p(s ⊧ p ≡ p). By GEN, we have to show (s ⊧ □q) → (□s ⊧ q). Note that the following are instances of our assumption:

(θ) s ⊧ q ≡ q

(ξ) s ⊧ □q ≡ □q

To complete our proof, assume s ⊧ □q. Then by (ξ), □q, and by the T schema, q. So by (θ), s ⊧ q. Since truth-in-s is rigid (461.1), □s ⊧ q. ∗

By two applications of GEN, it suffices to show s ⊧ (q → r) ≡ ((s ⊧ q) → (s ⊧ r)).

(→) Assume both s ⊧ (q → r) and s ⊧ q, to show s ⊧ ψ. By the first and (ζ), q → r. By the second and (θ), q. Hence, r. But from r and (ξ), it follows that s ⊧ r.

(←) Assume (s ⊧ q) → (s ⊧ r). For reductio, assume ¬s ⊧ (q → r).

Since we’re under the global assumption ∀p(s ⊧ p ≡ p), it follows from our reductio assumption that s ⊧ ¬(q → r), by (493.1). But this implies, by our global assumption and the fact that ¬(q → r) ↓ (105.2), that ¬(q → r). So we know both q and ¬r. By (θ), the former implies s ⊧ q, and this implies, by our local assumption, that s ⊧ r. Hence, by (ξ), r. Contradiction. ∗

(493.3) Assume ∀p(s ⊧ p ≡ p). Since both q ↓ and (∇αq) ↓ (105.2), we may instantiate them for p in our assumption to obtain:

(θ) s ⊧ q ≡ q

(ξ) s ⊧ (∇αq) ≡ (∇αq)

(→) Assume s ⊧ (∇αq). But this implies, by (ξ), that ∇αq. Hence q, by the Variant of ∀E (94.3). So, by (θ), s ⊧ q. Since α is not free in any assumption, it follows by GEN that ∇α(s ⊧ q).

(←) Assume ∇α(s ⊧ q). Then by the Variant of ∀E (94.3), s ⊧ q. So by (θ), q. Since α is not free in any assumption, it follows by GEN that ∇αq. Hence, by (ξ), s ⊧ ∇αq. ∗

(493.2) Assume ∀p(s ⊧ p ≡ p). Now the following are instances of our assumption:

(θ) s ⊧ q ≡ q

(ξ) s ⊧ r ≡ r

(ζ) (s ⊧ (q → r)) ≡ (q → r)

It follows from (θ) by (89.4.b) that ¬s ⊧ q ≡ ¬q, i.e., ¬q ≡ ¬s ⊧ q. Hence from (ξ) and this conclusion it follows that (s ⊧ ¬q) ≡ ¬s ⊧ q. ∗

(ξ) s ⊧ ¬q ≡ ¬q

Proofs of Theorems and Metarules
Assume $\forall p (s | p \equiv p)$. Then since we know there are contingently true propositions (215.1), let $r$ be an arbitrary such proposition, so that we know by (211.1) that:

(A) $r$

(B) $\Diamond \neg r$, i.e., $\neg \Box r$

Since $r \downarrow$, (A) and our assumption imply $s | r$. So by the rigidity of truth-in-s (461.1):

(C) $\Box s | r$

But, clearly, $(\neg \Box r) \downarrow$, and so (B) and our assumption imply $s | \neg \Box r$. Hence, by (493.1), $\neg s | \neg \Box r$. So by (C) and this last result: $\exists q (s | q) \& \neg (s | \Box q)$. \iffalse

(493.6) To find our witness, note that the $\exists q (q & F = [\lambda y q])$ is a condition on propositional properties in which $s$ doesn’t occur free. So the following is an instance of Comprehension for Situations (475.1):

$$\exists s \forall F (sF \equiv \exists q (q \& F = [\lambda y q]))$$

Let $s_0$ be such a situation, so that we know:

(8) $\forall F (s_0 F \equiv \exists q (q \& F = [\lambda y q]))$

By GEN, we need only show $s_0 | p \equiv p$. (→) Assume $s | p$. Then by (459), $s[\lambda y p]$. So by (8), $\exists q (q \& [\lambda y p] = [\lambda y q])$. Suppose $q_0$ is such a propositions, so that we know both $q_0 \equiv q$ and $[\lambda y q_0] = [\lambda y q]$. By the latter and the definition of proposition identity, it follows that $p = q_0$. Hence, $p$ is true. (←) Assume $p$. Then since $[\lambda y p] = [\lambda y p]$, we have $p \& [\lambda y p] = [\lambda y q]$, and so $\exists q (q \& [\lambda y p] = [\lambda y q])$. Hence, by (8), $s_0[\lambda y p]$. Since $s_0$ is a situation, it follows by (459) that $s_0 | p$. \fi

(496.1) We prove only the left-to-right direction since the right-to-left direction is just an instance of the T schema. (→) Assume $\text{PossibleWorld}(x)$. By definition (495), we know:

(8) $\text{Situation}(x) \& \Diamond \forall p (s | p \equiv p)$

By (457.1), the first conjunct of (8) implies:

(ξ) $\Box \text{Situation}(x)$

Moreover, by the 5 schema (45.3), the second conjunct of (8) implies:

(ζ) $\Box \Diamond \forall p (s | p \equiv p)$

Hence, by the right-to-left direction of (158.3), the conjunction of (ξ) and (ζ) implies:
proofs of theorems and metarules

\[ \Box(Situation(x) \& \Diamond \forall p(s \models p \equiv p)) \]

So by the definition of possible world (495), \( \Box \text{PossibleWorld}(x) \). \( \Rightarrow \)

(496.2) (\( \rightarrow \)) It follows a fortiori from (496.1) that:

\[ \text{PossibleWorld}(x) \rightarrow \Box \text{PossibleWorld}(x) \]

Since this result is a modally strict theorem, it follows by Rule (166.2) that
\( \Diamond \text{PossibleWorld}(x) \rightarrow \Box \text{PossibleWorld}(x) \). (\( \Leftarrow \)) (Exercise) \( \Rightarrow \)

(496.3) (Exercise)

(496.4) (\( \rightarrow \)) Assume \( \forall \text{PossibleWorld}(x) \). Independently, it is a consequence of (496.1) that \( \text{PossibleWorld}(x) \rightarrow \Box \text{PossibleWorld}(x) \). So by RA:

\[ \forall(\text{PossibleWorld}(x) \rightarrow \Box \text{PossibleWorld}(x)) \]

So by theorem (131):

\[ \forall \text{PossibleWorld}(x) \rightarrow \forall \Box \text{PossibleWorld}(x) \]

Since the antecedent holds by assumption, it follows that \( \forall \Box \text{PossibleWorld}(x) \). So by (46.2), \( \Box \text{PossibleWorld}(x) \). Hence by the T schema, \( \Box \text{PossibleWorld}(x) \). (\( \Leftarrow \)) Assume \( \Box \text{PossibleWorld}(x) \). Then by (496.1), \( \Box \text{PossibleWorld}(x) \). So by (132), \( \forall \Box \text{PossibleWorld}(x) \). \( \Rightarrow \)

(499) By the conventions for our restricted variable \( w \) (335.2) and the definition of \( \text{PossibleWorld} \) (495), we may assume that \( \Diamond \forall p(w \models p \equiv p) \). A fortiori (exercise), \( \Diamond \forall p(w \models p \rightarrow p) \). So by the definition of \( \text{Actual} \) (480), \( \Diamond \text{Actual}(w) \). By the definition of \( \text{Possible} \) (490), \( \text{Possible}(w) \). \( \Rightarrow \)

(500.1) By the previous theorem (499), \( \text{Possible}(w) \). So by (492.1), \( \text{Consistent}(w) \). \( \Rightarrow \)

(500.2) (Exercise)

(501.1) – (501.5) (Exercises) [Cf. (461.1) – (461.5)]

(503) Since \( w \) is a possible world, it follows by definition (495) that:

(8) \( \Diamond \forall p(w \models p \equiv p) \)

To show \( \text{Maximal}(w) \) (502), we have to show \( \forall q(s \models q \lor s \models \neg q) \). So, by GEN, it suffices to show, \( w \models q \lor w \models \neg q \). Our proof strategy will be to:

(a) show that \( \Diamond(w \models q \lor w \models \neg q) \), and then

(b) appeal to various modal facts, including the rigidity of truth at (501.2), to derive that \( w \models q \lor w \models \neg q \) from (a).
For (a), our proof strategy is to:

(i) show \( \Box(p \rightarrow \psi) \), where \( \psi \) is \( \forall p (w \models p \equiv p) \) and \( \psi \) is \( w \models q \lor w \models \neg q \), and

(ii) use the modal law \( \Box(p \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (\Diamond q \rightarrow \Diamond \psi) \) (158.13) to conclude \( \Diamond \psi \) from (i) and (8), i.e., from \( \Box(p \rightarrow \psi) \) and \( \Diamond \psi \).

For (i), assume \( \forall p (w \models p \equiv p) \). Then both \( w \models q \equiv q \) and \( w \models \neg q \equiv \neg q \). Since \( q \lor \neg q \), it follows by disjunctive syllogism (90.1) that \( w \models q \lor w \models \neg q \). Since we've now established, by conditional proof, that \( \forall p (w \models p \equiv p) \rightarrow (w \models q \lor w \models \neg q) \) is a modally strict theorem, it follows by the fact that the free restricted variables are rigid and expanded RN (335.1.a) that:

\[
(\xi) \; \Box(\forall p (w \models p \equiv p) \rightarrow (w \models q \lor w \models \neg q))
\]

Now for (ii), it follows from (\( \xi \)) and (8) by the modal law (158.13) that:

\[
(\zeta) \; \Diamond (w \models q \lor w \models \neg q)
\]

Now for (b), if we apply to (\( \zeta \)) the modal law (162.2), which asserts that possibility distributes over a disjunction, it follows that:

\[
\Diamond w \models q \lor \Diamond w \models \neg q
\]

But by (501.2), the left disjunct is equivalent to \( w \models q \) and the right is equivalent to \( w \models \neg q \). So, by disjunctive syllogism (90.1), it follows that \( w \models q \lor w \models \neg q \).

\( \Rightarrow \)

(504.1) Assume \( \text{Maximal}(s) \). Then by definition of \( \text{Maximal} \) (502):

\[
(\delta) \; \forall p (s \models p \lor s \models \neg p)
\]

We want to show \( \Box \forall p (s \models p \lor s \models \neg p) \). By the Barcan Formula (167.1), it suffices to show \( \forall p \Box (s \models p \lor s \models \neg p) \). By GEN, it suffices to show \( \Box (s \models p \lor s \models \neg p) \). Now from (\( \delta \)), it follows by \( \forall E \) that \( s \models p \lor s \models \neg p \). But by (461.1), the first disjunct implies \( \Box s \models p \) and the second disjunct implies \( \Box s \models \neg p \). Hence, by disjunctive syllogism, \( \Box s \models p \lor \Box s \models \neg p \). So by (158.15), \( \Box (s \models p \lor s \models \neg p) \).

(504.2) \( \Rightarrow \) By (503) and (499). \( \Leftarrow \) Before we begin, we establish a few facts needed for the proof, the first of which is:

\[ \text{Maximal}(s) \rightarrow (\forall p (s \models p \rightarrow p) \rightarrow \forall p (s \models p \equiv p)) \]

Proof. Assume (a) \( \text{Maximal}(s) \) and (b) \( \forall p (s \models p \rightarrow p) \). To show \( \forall p (s \models p \equiv p) \) it suffices, by GEN, to show \( s \models p \equiv p \). (\( \Rightarrow \)) This direction is immediate by instantiating (b) to \( p \). (\( \Leftarrow \)) Assume \( p \). Now assume, for reductio, that \( \neg s \models p \). Then by (a) and the definition of maximality (502), it follows that \( s \models \neg p \). But we know, as an instance of (b) that \( s \models \neg p \rightarrow \neg p \). Hence, \( \neg p \).

Contradiction.
Since this first fact is a modally strict theorem and the free restricted variables are rigid, it follows by expanded RN (335.1.a) that:

$$\Box[\text{Maximal}(s) \rightarrow (\forall p(s \models p \rightarrow p) \rightarrow \forall p(s \models p \equiv p))]$$

So by the K axiom, we know:

$$(\vartheta) \Box\text{Maximal}(s) \rightarrow \Box(\forall p(s \models p \rightarrow p) \rightarrow \forall p(s \models p \equiv p))$$

Now to establish our theorem, assume $\text{Maximal}(s) \& \text{Possible}(s)$. Then from $\text{Maximal}(s)$ and the previous theorem (504.1), it follows that $\Box\text{Maximal}(s)$. From this and ($\vartheta$) it follows that:

$$\Box(\forall p(s \models p \rightarrow p) \rightarrow \forall p(s \models p \equiv p))$$

From this, it follows by theorem (158.13) that:

$$(\xi) \Diamond \forall p(s \models p \rightarrow p) \rightarrow \Diamond \forall p(s \models p \equiv p)$$

But $\text{Possible}(s)$ by assumption, from which it follows by definition of $\text{Possible}$ that $\Diamond \text{Actual}(s)$, and by definition of $\text{Actual}$ that $\Diamond \forall p(s \models p \rightarrow p)$ But from this last fact and ($\xi$), it follows that $\Diamond \forall p(s \models p \equiv p)$, i.e., $\text{PossibleWorld}(s)$. \(\Rightarrow\)

(507) (Exercise)

(508.1) For conditional proof, assume both:

$$(\delta) s \models p_1 \& \ldots \& s \models p_n \& ((p_1 \& \ldots \& p_n) \rightarrow q)$$

$$(\xi) \forall p(s \models p \equiv p)$$

Then instantiate each of $p_1, \ldots, p_n$ into ($\xi$), to obtain:

$$s \models p_1 \equiv p_1$$
$$\vdots$$
$$s \models p_n \equiv p_n$$

But each left-side condition in the above biconditionals is one of the first $n$ conjuncts in ($\delta$), and so it follows that $p_1 \& \ldots \& p_n$. Hence, by the last conjunct in ($\delta$), it follows that $q$. But now instantiate $q$ into ($\xi$), and we obtain $s \models q \equiv q$. Hence $s \models q$. \(\Rightarrow\)

(508.2) Since the free restricted variables in (508.1) are rigid, we can apply expanded RN (335.1.a) to obtain:

$$(\delta) \Box((s \models p_1 \& \ldots \& s \models p_n \& (p_1 \& \ldots \& p_n \rightarrow q)) \rightarrow (\forall p(s \models p \equiv p) \rightarrow s \models q))$$

If we:
let $\varphi_1$ be the formula $s \models p_1$

let $\varphi_n$ be the formula $s \models p_n$

let $\psi$ be the formula $p_1 \& \ldots \& p_n \rightarrow q$

let $\chi$ be the formula $\forall p (s \models p \equiv p)$

let $\theta$ be the formula $s \models q$

then ($\delta$) has the form:

$$\Box((\varphi_1 \& \ldots \& q_n \& \psi) \rightarrow (\chi \rightarrow \theta))$$

By the $K$ axiom (45.1), it follows that:

$$\Box(\varphi_1 \& \ldots \& q_n \& \psi) \rightarrow \Box(\chi \rightarrow \theta)$$

But since it is a modally strict fact that a necessary conjunction is equivalent to a conjunction of necessary truths (158.3), we may use the Rule of Substitution (160.1) to infer:

$$((\xi) \rightarrow \Box(\chi \rightarrow \theta))$$

But if we replace the metavariables in ($\xi$) with the formulas that they represent, we obtain:

$$((\zeta) \rightarrow \Box((\forall p (s \models p \equiv p)) \rightarrow s \models q))$$

By (506.1), we know that it is a modally strict theorem that $\Box(p_1 \& \ldots \& p_n \rightarrow q)$ is equivalent to $(p_1 \& \ldots \& p_n) \Rightarrow q$. So by a Rule of Substitution, it follows from ($\zeta$) that:

$$((\Box s \models p_1 \& \ldots \& p_n \rightarrow q)) \rightarrow \Box(\forall p (s \models p \equiv p) \rightarrow s \models q)$$

(510) By the definition of PossibleWorld, we know:

$$\Diamond p(w \models p \equiv p)$$

To show that $\text{ModallyClosed}(w)$, assume:

$$((\xi) \rightarrow w \models p_1 \& \ldots \& w \models p_n \& ((p_1 \& \ldots \& p_n) \Rightarrow q))$$

By (501.1), we can infer the necessitation of each of the first $n$ conjuncts of ($\xi$), and so by $\&I$, we have:

$$\Box w \models p_1 \& \ldots \& \Box w \models p_n$$

Conjoining this result with the last conjunct of ($\xi$), we have:
□w |= p_1 & ... & □w |= p_n & ((p_1 & ... & p_n) ⇒ q)

Hence, by (508.2), it follows that:

(ζ) □(∀p(w |= p ≡ p) → w |= q)

From (ζ) and (ϑ), it follows that: ◊w |= q, by (158.13). But by (501.2), it follows that w |= q. So we have established, by conditional proof:

(w |= p_1 & ... & w |= p_n & ((p_1 & ... & p_n) ⇒ q)) → w |= q

This conclusion rests on no assumptions and so the variables p_1,...,p_n and q do not free in any assumption. So our theorem follows by n + 1 applications of GEN.

(511.1) We’ve already established Maximal(w) and Consistent(w), by (503) and (500.1), respectively. So, by definitions (502) and (486), we know, respectively, the following:

(δ) ∀q(w |= q ∨ w |= ¬q)

(ζ) ¬∃q(w |= q & w |= ¬q)

Now to prove our theorem, we prove both directions:

(→) Assume w |= ¬p. For reductio, suppose w |= p. Then w |= p & w |= ¬p, and so ∀q(w |= q & w |= ¬q), contradicting (ζ).

(←) Assume ¬¬w |= p. Then by (δ), w |= ¬p.

(511.2) By applying GEN to (511.1), we know:

(δ) ∀p(w |= ¬p ≡ ¬w |= p)


(513.1) To find our witness to this existential claim, note that by theorem (493.6), we know ∃s∀p(s |= p ≡ p). Let s_0 be such a situation, so that we know:

(δ) ∀p(s_0 |= p ≡ p)

Then by the T◊ schema (163.1), ◊∀p(s_0 |= p ≡ p). Hence, by definition (495), s_0 is a possible world. Conjoining this last result with (δ) and then generalizing, we have:

∃s(PossibleWorld(s) & ∀p(s |= p ≡ p))
Using our restricted variable \(w\), this becomes
\[
\exists w \forall p (w \models p \equiv p).
\]

(513.2) By the definition of uniqueness, we have to show:
\[
\exists w (\text{Actual}(w) \& \forall w' (\text{Actual}(w') \rightarrow w' = w))
\]

Now to find our witness to this existential claim, note that by theorem (513.1), we know \(\exists w \forall p (s \models p \equiv p)\). Let \(w_0\) be such a world, so that we know:
\[
(\emptyset) \forall p (w_0 \models p \equiv p)
\]

By &I and \(\exists I\), it suffices to show:

(A) \(\text{Actual}(w_0)\)

(B) \(\forall w (\text{Actual}(w) \rightarrow w = w_0)\)

To show (A), we have to show, by (480), that \(\forall p (w_0 \models p \rightarrow p)\). But this follows \textit{a fortiori} from (\emptyset).

To show (B), it suffices to show \(\text{Actual}(w) \rightarrow w = w_0\), by GEN. Assume \(\text{Actual}(w)\) and suppose, for reductio, \(w \neq w_0\). Since \(w\) and \(w_0\) are distinct situations, it follows by (462) that there is a proposition, say \(r\), true in one but not in the other. Without loss of generality, assume that \(w \models r\) and \(\neg w_0 \models r\). Since we know by (A) above that \(w_0\) is a possible world, it follows by theorem (503) that it is maximal. So \(w_0 \models \neg r\). But \(w\) is actual by hypothesis and \(w_0\) is actual by (B) above. Hence, by definition of \(\text{Actual}\) (480), \(r\) and \(\neg r\) are both true. Contradiction.

(515) By applying the Rule of Actualization to theorem (513.2), we may conclude:
\[
s \exists \exists ! w \text{Actual}(w)
\]

So by (174.2), it follows that:
\[
\downarrow w \text{Actual}(w)
\]

(517.1)\(\star\) We begin by first proving some useful facts about \(w_\alpha\) and \(\top\). By definition (516), we know:
\[
w_\alpha = \downarrow w \text{Actual}(w)
\]

If we use one of the methods described in Remark (497) for eliminating the restricted variable \(w\) in the definite description, this identity becomes:
\[
w_\alpha = \downarrow x (\text{PossibleWorld}(x) \& \text{Actual}(x))
\]

Since \(w_\alpha \downarrow\), it follows by (145.2)\(\star\) that:
(8) \( \text{PossibleWorld}(w_a) \& \text{Actual}(w_a) \)

Moreover, from the facts that truth-values are situations (456) and \( \top \) is a truth-value (297.1\(*\)), it follows that:

(ξ) \( \text{Situation}(\top) \)

With facts (8) and (ξ) in hand, we can now show \( w_a = \top \). From (8) it follows by the definition of \( \text{PossibleWorld} \) that \( \text{Situation}(w_a) \). From this and (ξ), we know \( w_a \) and \( \top \) are situations, and so it suffices, in virtue of a fact about the identity of situations (462), to show \( \forall p(\top \models p \equiv w_a \models p) \). And by GEN, it suffices to show \( \top \models p \equiv w_a \models p \).

(→) Assume \( \top \models p \). By the definition of \( \models (458) \), it follows that \( \top \Sigma p \). So by theorem (300.3\(*\)), it follows that \( p \). Now assume, for reductio, that \( \neg w_a \models p \). Then, since \( w_a \) is a possible world, it is maximal (503). Hence by the definition of \( \text{Maximal} \), \( w_a \models \neg p \). But since \( w_a \) is actual, it follows that \( \neg p \). Contradiction.

(←) Assume \( w_a \models p \). Now by the second conjunct of (8), we know that \( \text{Actual}(w_a) \). Hence, by the definition of \( \text{Actual} (480) \), it follows that \( p \). But theorem (300.3\(*\)) tells us that \( p \equiv \top \Sigma p \). Hence \( \top \Sigma p \). But since \( \top \) is a situation, it follows by (458) that \( \top \models p \). ⊳

(517.2)\(*\) (Exercise)

(518)\(*\) By (300.3\(*\)), we know \( p \equiv \top \Sigma p \). But by a previous theorem (517.1\(*\)), we know \( \top = w_a \). Hence, \( p \equiv w_a \Sigma p \). But since \( w_a \) is a situation, we know \( w_a \Sigma p \equiv w_a \models p \), by definition (458) and Rule \( \equiv \Sigma \). Hence, \( p \equiv w_a \models p \). ⊳

(519.1) By definition (516) and the method of eliminating restricted \( w \) variables noted in Remark (497), we know:

\[ w_a = \text{tx}(\text{PossibleWorld}(x) \& \text{Actual}(x)) \]

Since \( w_a \downarrow \), it follows from the relevant instance of (152.3) that:

\[ \therefore (\text{PossibleWorld}(w_a) \& \text{Actual}(w_a)) \]

By (139.2), it follows that:

\[ \therefore A(\text{PossibleWorld}(w_a) \& \text{Actual}(w_a)) \]

So by (496.4), the first conjunct implies \( \text{PossibleWorld}(w_a) \). ⊳

(519.2) By (519.1) we know \( \text{PossibleWorld}(w_a) \). Hence by (503), \( \text{Maximal}(w_a) \). ⊳

(520) (→) Assume \( w_a \models p \). Since \( w_a \) is a possible world (519.1), it follows by the right-to-left direction of theorem (501.4) that:

(8) \( A w_a \models p \)
Now, in the reasoning for (519.1), we independently established \( s \mathcal{A}ctual(w_a) \).
It follows from the latter, by definition (480), that \( s \forall q(w_a \vDash q \rightarrow q) \). Hence by axiom (44.3), \( \forall q \forall \mathcal{A}(w_a \vDash q \rightarrow q) \).instantiating to \( p \) yields \( s \mathcal{A}(w_a \vDash p \rightarrow p) \). So by theorem (131), it follows that:

\[
(\xi) \ (s \mathcal{A}w_a \vDash p) \rightarrow s \mathcal{A}p
\]

Hence from (8) and (ξ), it follows that \( s \mathcal{A}p \). (←) Assume \( s \mathcal{A}p \). For reductio, suppose \( \neg w_a \vDash p \). By (519.2), we know \( w_a \) is maximal. Hence, by definition of maximality, \( w_a \vDash \neg p \). But as an instance of the left-to-right direction of the present theorem, we know \( w_a \vDash \neg p \rightarrow s \mathcal{A}\neg p \). Hence, \( s \mathcal{A}\neg p \). But it follows from this by axiom (44.1) that \( \neg s \mathcal{A}p \), which contradicts our assumption.\footnote{I’m indebted to Uri Nodelman for suggesting the proof strategy of the right-to-left direction.}

(521) Assume \( w \neq w_a \) but suppose, for reductio, that \( Actual(w) \). Since \( w \) and \( w_a \) are distinct and both situations, it follows by (462) that there is a proposition \( q \) true in one but not in the other. Without loss of generality, suppose \( w \vDash q \) and \( \neg w_a \vDash q \). From the actuality of \( w \) and \( w \vDash q \), it follows that \( q \). But by (518) and \( \neg w_a \vDash q \), it follows that \( \neg q \). Contradiction. \( \Rightarrow \)

(522) Assume \( Actual(s) \). To show \( s \models w_a \), it suffices, by definition (463) and GEN, to show: \( s \models p \rightarrow w_a \models p \). So assume \( s \models p \). Since \( s \) is actual, \( p \) is true. But by (518)\( \star \), all and only true propositions are true at \( w_a \). Hence, \( w_a \vDash p \).

(←) Assume \( s \not\models w_a \). To show \( Actual(s) \), it suffices by definition (480) and GEN to show: \( s \models p \rightarrow p \). So assume \( s \models p \). Then it follows from \( s \not\models w_a \) and the definition of \( \not\models \) (463) that \( w_a \vDash p \). But we know by (518)\( \star \) that all and only true propositions are true in \( w_a \). Hence, \( p \) is true. \( \Rightarrow \)

(523.1) Suppose \( p \). Then since \( \lceil \lambda y \, p \rceil \downarrow \), Rule \( \overline{\beta}C \) implies \( p \) is true. So, by (518)\( \star \), \( w_a \vDash p \). \( \Rightarrow \)

(523.2) As an instance of theorem (158.13), we know:

\[
\square(p \rightarrow \exists w(w \vDash p)) \rightarrow (\Diamond p \rightarrow \Diamond \exists w(w \vDash p))
\]
So to show the consequent $\diamond p \rightarrow \diamond \exists w (w \models p)$, it suffices to show the antecedent $\Box (p \rightarrow \exists w (w \models p))$. But by RN, it suffices to give a modally strict proof of $p \rightarrow \exists w (w \models p)$. So assume $p$ and, for reductio, $\neg \exists w (w \models p)$, i.e., $\forall w \neg (w \models p)$.

Now we know, independently by (513.1), that:

$$\exists w \forall q (w | q \equiv q)$$

Suppose $w_0$ is an arbitrary such possible world, so that we know:

$$(\theta) \forall q (w_0 | q \equiv q)$$

Since $w_0$ is, by hypothesis, a possible world, it follows from our reductio assumption that $\neg w_0 \models p$. It also follows that $w_0$ is maximal (503). Hence, by (\theta), it follows that $\neg p$, which contradicts our assumption that $\neg p$.

By BF$^\Box(167.3)$, it follows from our assumption that:

$$\exists x (\text{PossibleWorld}(x) \land x \models p)$$

Let $b$ be an arbitrary such object, yielding $\diamond (\text{PossibleWorld}(b) \& b \models p)$. Since the conjuncts of a possibly true conjunction are possible (162.3), it follows that:

$$\xi\text{PossibleWorld}(b) \& b \models p$$

Now by lemma (496.2), the first conjunct of ($\xi$) implies PossibleWorld($b$). Since PossibleWorld($b$), the facts (501) about the rigidity of truth at a possible world apply. So by (501.2), the second conjunct of ($\xi$) implies $b \models p$. Since we've established that PossibleWorld($b$) & $b \models p$, it follows that $\exists x (\text{PossibleWorld}(x) \land x \models p)$, i.e., $\exists w (w \models p)$. $\Rightarrow$

(524.2) Our assumption is $\diamond \exists w (w \models p)$ and we want to show $\exists w (w \models p)$. If we treat the restricted variable $w$ in our assumption as singly restricted, our assumption becomes:

$$\diamond \exists x (\text{PossibleWorld}(x) \land x \models p)$$

By GEN, it suffices to show $\forall q (s \models q \equiv q) \rightarrow s \models p$. So assume $\forall q (s \models q \equiv q)$. As an instance of this latter assumption, we know $s \models p \equiv p$. Hence $s \models p$. $\Rightarrow$

(524.3) Assume $p$. By GEN, it suffices to show $\forall q (s \models q \equiv q) \rightarrow s \models p$. So assume $\forall q (s \models q \equiv q)$. As an instance of this latter assumption, we know $s \models p \equiv p$. Hence $s \models p$. $\Rightarrow$

(524.4) Since (524.3) is modally strict, it follows by RN that:

$$\Box (p \rightarrow \forall_s (\forall q (s \models q \equiv q) \rightarrow s \models p))$$

Hence by the K axiom (45.1), it follows that $\Box p \rightarrow \Box \forall_s (\forall q (s \models q \equiv q) \rightarrow s \models p)$. $\Rightarrow$

(524.5) To show $\Box \forall s q \rightarrow \forall s \Box q$, we may assume that $q$ has one or more free occurrences of the variable $x$ and that the formulas $\Box \forall s q$ and $\forall s \Box q$ are really shorthand for the formulas $\Box \forall s q_x$ and $\forall s \Box q_x$, respectively. Then, eliminating the restricted variables, we have to show:
\[ \Box \forall x(Situation(x) \rightarrow \varphi) \rightarrow \forall x(Situation(x) \rightarrow \Box \varphi) \]

So assume \( \Box \forall x(Situation(x) \rightarrow \varphi) \). By the Converse Barcan Formula (167.2), it follows that:

(\( \delta \)) \( \forall x(\Box Situation(x) \rightarrow \varphi) \)

Now to show \( \forall x(Situation(x) \rightarrow \Box \varphi) \), it suffices by GEN to show \( Situation(x) \rightarrow \Box \varphi \). So assume \( Situation(x) \). By the rigidity of the notion of situation (457.1), it follows that:

(\( \xi \)) \( \Box Situation(x) \)

Moreover, it follows by applying \( \forall E \) to (\( \vartheta \)) that:

(\( \zeta \)) \( \Box (Situation(x) \rightarrow \varphi) \)

Hence, from (\( \xi \)) and (\( \zeta \)) it follows that \( \Box \varphi \), by the relevant instance of the K axiom (45.1).

(524.6) Assume \( \forall w(w \models p) \), i.e., \( \forall x(\text{PossibleWorld}(x) \rightarrow x \models p) \). For reductio, assume, \( \neg \Box \forall w(w \models p) \), i.e., \( \Diamond \neg \forall w(w \models p) \). Eliminating the restricted variable, our reductio assumption implies:

\( \Diamond \neg \forall x(\text{PossibleWorld}(x) \rightarrow x \models p) \)

By modally strict theorems of quantification theory and the Rule of Substitution (160.1), it follows that:

\( \Diamond \exists x(\text{PossibleWorld}(x) \& \neg x \models p) \)

By the BF\( \Diamond \) schema (167.3), we therefore know:

\( \exists x(\Diamond (\text{PossibleWorld}(x) \& \neg x \models p)) \)

So let \( b \) be an arbitrary such object, so that we know:

\( \Diamond (\text{PossibleWorld}(b) \& \neg b \models p) \)

Since each conjunct of a possibly true conjunction is possibly true (162.3), it follows that:

(\( \xi \)) \( \Diamond \text{PossibleWorld}(b) \& \Diamond \neg b \models p \)

But by a previous lemma (496.2), we know that the first conjunct of (\( \xi \)) implies \( \text{PossibleWorld}(b) \). Since our initial assumption was that \( \forall x(\text{PossibleWorld}(x) \rightarrow x \models p) \), it follows that \( b \models p \). Since \( \text{PossibleWorld}(b) \), the facts about the rigidity of truth at a world apply. Hence by (501.1), it follows that \( \Box b \models p \). But the second conjunct of (\( \xi \)) is equivalent to \( \neg \Box b \models p \). Contradiction.

(524.7) By the K axiom, it suffices to show \( \Box (\forall w(w \models p) \rightarrow p) \). And by RN, it suffices to show \( \forall w(w \models p) \rightarrow p \) by a modally strict proof. So assume \( \forall w(w \models p) \).

If we eliminate the restricted variable from our assumption, we know:
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(8) \( \forall x (\text{PossibleWorld}(x) \rightarrow x \models p) \)

Now by (513.2), we know a fortiori that \( \exists x (\text{PossibleWorld}(x) \& \text{Actual}(x)) \). Suppose \( a \) is an arbitrary such object, so that we know:

(\( \xi \)) \( \text{PossibleWorld}(a) \& \text{Actual}(a) \)

From (8) and the first conjunct of (\( \xi \)), it follows that \( a \models p \). From this and the second conjunct of (\( \xi \)), it follows by the definition of Actual that \( p \). \( \Rightarrow \)

(525.1) (\( \rightarrow \)) By hypothetical syllogism from (524.1) and (524.2). (\( \leftarrow \)) Assume \( \exists w (w \models p) \). Suppose \( w_1 \) is such a possible world, so that we know:\n
(\( \chi \)) \( \text{PossibleWorld}(w_1) \& \text{Actual}(w_1) \). Suppose \( a \) is an arbitrary such object, so that we know:

(\( \chi \)) \( \text{PossibleWorld}(a) \& \text{Actual}(a) \)

From (\( \chi \)) and the first conjunct of (\( \xi \)), it follows that \( a \models p \). From this and the second conjunct of (\( \chi \)), it follows by the definition of Actual that \( p \). \( \Rightarrow \)

(525.2) The following proof uses (524.4) – (524.7). However, after the proof, we provide an alternative, simpler proof below that appeals to (525.1) instead. (\( \rightarrow \)) Assume \( \square p \). It follows from this and (524.4) that:

\( \square \forall s (\forall q (s \models q \equiv q) \rightarrow s \models p) \)

From this last fact and the version of the Converse Barcan Formula restricted to situations (524.5), it follows that:

(\( \xi \)) \( \forall s \square (\forall q (s \models q \equiv q) \rightarrow s \models p) \)

Now we want to show: \( \forall w (w \models p) \), i.e., \( \forall s (\text{PossibleWorld}(s) \rightarrow s \models p) \) (treating \( w \) as doubly-restricted). By GEN, it suffices to show: \( \text{PossibleWorld}(s) \rightarrow s \models p \). So assume \( \text{PossibleWorld}(s) \). By the rigidity of truth at (461.2) for situations, it suffices to show \( \diamond s \models p \). By definition of PossibleWorld (495), we know:

\( \diamond \forall q (s \models q \equiv q) \)

But since (\( \xi \)) holds for every situation, it follows from (\( \xi \)) in particular that:

\( \square (\forall q (s \models q \equiv q) \rightarrow s \models p) \)

But then, from our last two results it follows that \( \diamond s \models p \), by K\( \diamond \) (158.13).

(\( \leftarrow \)) By hypothetical syllogism from (524.6) and (524.7). \( \Rightarrow \)

(525.2) (Alternative) By (511.1) and GEN, we know \( \forall w (w \models \neg q) \equiv \neg (w \models q)) \). But it is an simple exercise show that \( \forall \alpha (\varphi \equiv \psi) \rightarrow (\exists \alpha \varphi \equiv \exists \alpha \psi) \). Hence it follows that:

(8) \( \exists w (w \models \neg q) \equiv \exists w (w \models q) \)
Then we may reason as follows:

1. \( \Diamond \neg q \equiv \exists w (w \models \neg q) \)  
   Instance of (525.1)
2. \( \Diamond \neg q \equiv \exists w \neg (w \models q) \)  
   From 1 and (\( \emptyset \))
3. \( \neg \Diamond \neg q \equiv \neg \exists w \neg (w \models q) \)  
   From 2 and (89.4.b)
4. \( \Box q \equiv \neg \exists w \neg (w \models q) \)  
   From 3 and Df (158.12)
5. \( \Box q \equiv \forall w (w \models q) \)  
   From 4 and (104.3)

\( \vdash \)

By the (165.2), \( \Box p \equiv \Diamond \Box p \). But by (525.1), \( \Diamond \Box p \equiv \exists w (w \models \Box p) \). Hence \( \Box p \equiv \exists w (w \models \Box p) \).

\( \vdash \)

By the (165.6), \( \Box p \equiv \Box \Box p \). But by (525.2), \( \Box \Box p \equiv \forall w (w \models \Box p) \). Hence \( \Box p \equiv \forall w (w \models \Box p) \).

\( (525.3) \) – (526.4) (Exercises)

\( (527.1) \) \( \rightarrow \) Assume \( w \models (p \& q) \). Since \( w \) is by (510) modally closed, we know that the following 1-place instances of the definition (509) of modal closure obtain:

\[ \forall r_1 \forall r_2 ((w \models r_1 \& (r_1 \Rightarrow r_2)) \rightarrow w \models r_2) \]

Substituting \( p \& q \) for \( r_1 \) and \( p \) for \( r_2 \), we obtain:

\[ (w \models (p \& q) \& ((p \& q) \Rightarrow p)) \rightarrow w \models p \]

And substituting \( p \& q \) for \( r_1 \) and \( q \) for \( r_2 \), we obtain:

\[ (w \models (p \& q) \& ((p \& q) \Rightarrow q)) \rightarrow w \models q \]

Since the first conjunct of each antecedent is just our assumption and the second conjunct of each antecedent follows by an easily proved fact (exercise), we can derive, respectively, \( w \models p \) and \( w \models q \). Hence \( (w \models p) \& (w \models q) \).

\( \leftarrow \) Assume \( (w \models p) \& (w \models q) \). Since \( w \) is by (510) modally closed, we know that the following 2-place instance of the definition (509) of modal closure obtains:

\[ \forall r_1 \forall r_2 \forall r_3 ((w \models r_1 \& w \models r_2 \& ((r_1 \& r_2) \Rightarrow r_3)) \rightarrow w \models r_3) \]

Substituting \( p \) for \( r_1 \), \( q \) for \( r_2 \), and \( p \& q \) for \( r_3 \), we obtain:

\[ (w \models p \& w \models q \& ((p \& q) \Rightarrow (p \& q))) \rightarrow w \models (p \& q) \]

Now the first two conjuncts of the antecedent follow from our initial assumption, and the third conjunct of the antecedent is easily established (exercise). It follows that \( w \models (p \& q) \). \( \vdash \)
(527.2) \((\rightarrow)\) Assume both \(w \models (p \rightarrow q)\) and \(w \models p\). Clearly, it is a modally strict theorem that \(((p \rightarrow q) \& p) \rightarrow q\). Hence by RN and the definition of necessary implication, \(((p \rightarrow q) \& p) \Rightarrow q\). So by the relevant instance of the fact that possible worlds are modally closed, it follows that \(w \models q\).

(\(\leftarrow\)) Assume \((w \models p) \rightarrow (w \models q)\). Assume, for reductio, that \(-w \models (p \rightarrow q)\). Then by (511.1), \(w \models -(p \rightarrow q)\). But since it is a modally strict theorem that \(- (p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow (p \& -q)\) (89.1.b), it follows by RN and the definition of \(\Rightarrow\) (506.1) that \(- (p \rightarrow q) \Rightarrow (p \& -q)\). Hence \(w \models (p \& -q)\), by the fact that possible worlds are modally closed (510). So by (527.1):

(\(\$\)) \((w \models p) \& (w \models -q)\)

The first conjunct of (\(\$\)) and our initial assumption jointly imply \(w \models q\). But the second conjunct of (\(\$\)) implies \(-w \models q\), by (511.1). Contradiction. \(\text{\(\blacksquare\)}\)

(527.3) In what follows, we use \(w \not\models p\) to abbreviate \(-w \models p\).

(\(\rightarrow\)) For conditional proof, assume:

(a) \(w \models (p \lor q)\)

Suppose, for reductio, that \(-w \models p \lor w \models q\), i.e.,

(b) \((w \not\models p) \& (w \not\models q)\)

Then, by (511.1), it follows from the first conjunct of (b) that:

(c) \(w \models -p\)

Independently, starting with disjunctive syllogism (87.4.b), we may derive \(((p \lor q) \& -p) \rightarrow q\) by a modally strict proof. Hence, by RN:

(d) \(\Box((p \lor q) \& -p) \rightarrow q)\)

By definition of \(\Rightarrow\) (506), (d) implies:

(e) \(((p \lor q) \& -p) \Rightarrow q)\)

But by the fact that worlds are closed under necessary implication (510), it follows from (a), (c), and (e) that \(w \models q\). But this contradicts the second conjunct of (b).

(\(\leftarrow\)) (Exercise) \(\text{\(\blacksquare\)}\)

(527.4) (Exercise)

(527.5) If we eliminate the restricted variable, then the theorem to be proved is: \(\text{PossibleWorld}(s) \rightarrow ((s \models \forall a \varphi) \equiv \forall a(s \models \varphi))\). Our proof strategy is:411

411I’m indebted to Daniel Kirchner, who developed the following proof sketch in one of our working sessions on object theory.
(A) Establish $\Box((\forall p(\models p \equiv p) \rightarrow ((\exists \models \forall \alpha \varphi) \equiv \forall \alpha(\models \varphi))))$, by applying our expanded RN (335.1.a) and the fact that the free restricted variables are rigid to (493.3).

(B) Infer from (A) that $\Diamond \forall p(\models p \equiv p) \rightarrow \Diamond((\exists \models \forall \alpha \varphi) \equiv \forall \alpha(\models \varphi))$, by the relevant instance of K$^\Diamond$(158.13).

(C) Conclude from (B) that $\text{PossibleWorld}(s) \rightarrow \Diamond((\exists \models \forall \alpha \varphi) \equiv \forall \alpha(\models \varphi))$ by definition (495).

(D) Independently show that $\Diamond((s \models \forall \alpha \varphi) \equiv \forall \alpha(s \models \varphi)) \rightarrow \Box((s \models \forall \alpha \varphi) \equiv \forall \alpha(s \models \varphi))$.

(E) Our theorem then follows by hypothetical syllogism from (C) and (D).

It remains only to show (D). But to show (D), it suffices, by metarule (166.2) when $\Gamma$ is empty, to show that the following is a modally strict theorem:

(F) $((s \models \forall \alpha \varphi) \equiv \forall \alpha(s \models \varphi)) \rightarrow \Box((s \models \forall \alpha \varphi) \equiv \forall \alpha(s \models \varphi))$

Note that we can prove that (F) by modally strict means if we establish that the two formulas $s \models \forall \alpha \varphi$ and $\forall \alpha(s \models \varphi)$ both exhibit modal collapse, i.e., that:

$\Diamond((s \models \forall \alpha \varphi) \equiv \forall \alpha(s \models \varphi)) \rightarrow \Box(s \models \forall \alpha \varphi)$

$\Box((\forall \alpha(s \models \varphi) \rightarrow \Box \forall \alpha(s \models \varphi))$

For then, the relevant instance of (171.5) implies that (F) is a theorem. So it remains to show (\$\$) and (\$\$).

(\$\$) Assume $s \models \forall \alpha \varphi$. Then, by (461.1), $\Box s \models \forall \alpha \varphi$. So, by conditional proof, it is a modally strict theorem that $(s \models \forall \alpha \varphi) \rightarrow \Box s \models \forall \alpha \varphi$. Since the free restricted variables are rigid, we can apply expanded RN (335.1.a) to conclude $\Box((s \models \forall \alpha \varphi) \rightarrow \Box s \models \forall \alpha \varphi)$.

(\$\$) Assume $\forall \alpha(s \models \varphi)$. Then by $\forall E$, $s \models \varphi$. So again by (461.1), $\Box s \models \varphi$. Since $\alpha$ isn’t free in our assumption, it follows by GEN that $\forall \alpha s \models \varphi$. Hence by BF (167.1), $\Box \forall \alpha(s \models \varphi)$. So, by conditional proof, it is a modally strict theorem that $\forall \alpha(s \models \varphi) \rightarrow \Box \forall \alpha(s \models \varphi)$. Since the free restricted variables are rigid, we can apply expanded RN (335.1.a) to conclude $\Box(\forall \alpha(s \models \varphi) \rightarrow \Box \forall \alpha(s \models \varphi))$. $\Box$

(527.6) (Exercise)

(527.7) Assume $w \models \Box p$. Since $\Box p \rightarrow p$ is an instance of the T schema axiom, we may conclude by RN that $\Box(\Box p \rightarrow p)$. Since possible worlds are modally closed, it follows that $w \models p$. So by (501.1), $\Box w \models p$. $\Box$

(527.8) See footnote 267.
Proofs of Theorems and Metarules

(527.9) Assume $\Diamond w \models p$. Assume, for reductio, that $\neg w \models \Diamond p$. By the coherency of possible worlds (511.1), it follows that $w \models \neg \Diamond p$. But since worlds are modally closed and $\neg \Diamond p$ is necessarily equivalent to $\Box \neg p$, it follows that $w \models \Box \neg p$. Hence, by (527.7), $\Box w \models \neg p$. Since the coherency of possible worlds is a modally strict theorem, it follows by a Rule of Substitution that $\Box \neg w \models p$. But this is equivalent to $\neg \Diamond w \models p$. Contradiction. $\Rightarrow$

(527.10) Since there are contingently false propositions (215.2), let $r$ be such a proposition, so that we know by (211.1) that $\neg r \land \Diamond r$. By the $T \Diamond$ schema, it follows that $\Diamond (\neg r \land \Diamond r)$. So by a fundamental theorem of possible world theory (525.1), $\exists w (w \models (\neg r \land \Diamond r))$. Let $w_1$ be such a possible world, so that we know $w_1 \models (\neg r \land \Diamond r)$. Then by (527.1), it follows that:

$(\vartheta) \quad w_1 \models \neg r$

$(\xi) \quad w_1 \models \Diamond r$

From $(\vartheta)$ and the coherence of possible worlds, it follows that $\neg w_1 \models r$. Hence by (501.5), $\Box \neg w_1 \models r$, which implies $\neg \Diamond w_1 \models r$. Conjoining $(\xi)$ with this last result yields $(w_1 \models \Diamond r) \land \neg \Diamond w_1 \models r$. Hence, $\exists w \exists p ((w \models \Diamond p) \land \neg \Diamond w \models p)$. $\Rightarrow$

(529.1) Assume $\exists ! w \text{ContingentlyTrue}(p)$. Let $p_1$ be an arbitrary such proposition, so that, by definition, we know both $p_1$ and $\Diamond \neg p_1$. Now if we instantiate a Fundamental Theorem of Possible World Theory (525.1) to $\neg p_1$, we know $\Diamond \neg p_1 \equiv \exists w (w \models \neg p_1)$. So from this and the second conjunct of our assumption, it follows that $\exists w (w \models \neg p_1)$. Let $w_1$ be such a possible world, so that we know $w_1 \models \neg p_1$. Now suppose, for reductio, that $\text{Actual}(w_1)$. Then by definition of Actual, every proposition true at $w_1$ is true. Hence $\neg p_1$, which is a contradiction. So $\neg \text{Actual}(w_1)$ and, hence, $\exists w \neg \text{Actual}(w)$. $\Rightarrow$

(529.2) (Exercise)

(529.3) (The proof is given in the text.)

(529.4) Since $\exists ! w \text{Actual}(w)$ (513.2), suppose $w_1$ is such a possible world, so that we know $\text{Actual}(w_1)$, among other things. Independently, by (529.3), we know $\exists w \neg \text{Actual}(w)$. Let $w_2$ be such a possible world, so that we know $\neg \text{Actual}(w_2)$. Since $w_1$ is actual and $w_2$ is not, it follows that $w_1 \neq w_2$. Hence $\exists w \exists w'(w \neq w')$. $\Rightarrow$

(532) From the fact that $[\lambda y p] \downarrow (39.2)$ and $\beta$-Conversion, we know that $[\lambda y p]x \equiv p$ is a modally strict theorem. Hence, by RN, $\Box ([\lambda y p]x \equiv p)$, and by (158.4), $\Box ([\lambda y p]x \rightarrow p)$ and $\Box (p \rightarrow [\lambda y p]x)$. Hence by definition of $\Rightarrow$ (506), we know both:

$(\vartheta) \quad [\lambda y p]x \Rightarrow p$
We now establish our theorem by arguing for both directions. \((\rightarrow)\) Assume \(w \models p\). Then by \((\zeta)\), the fact that possible worlds are modally closed \((510)\), and the definition of modal closure \((509)\), it follows that \(w \models [\lambda y p]x\). \((\leftarrow)\) By analogous reasoning, from \((\delta)\).

\((533.1)\) Assume, for reductio, \(\exists w \exists p (w \models (p \& \neg p))\). Let \(w_1\) and \(p_1\) be an arbitrary such world and proposition, respectively, so that we know \(w_1 \models (p_1 \& \neg p_1)\). Hence, \(\exists w (w \models (p_1 \& \neg p_1))\). Then by fundamental theorem \((525.1)\), it follows that \(\Diamond (p_1 \& \neg p_1)\), contradicting the fact, provable from \((85)\), \(RN\), and \((162.1)\), that \(\neg \Diamond (p_1 \& \neg p_1)\).

\((533.2)\) By \((533.1)\), we know that \(\neg \exists w \exists p (w \models (p \& \neg p))\). This is equivalent to \(\forall w \neg \exists p (w \models (p \& \neg p))\), and so by \(\forall E\), \(\neg \exists p (w \models (p \& \neg p))\). Hence, by \((78.3)\), \(\exists p (w \models (p \& \neg p)) \rightarrow \forall q (w \models q)\).

\((534)\) (Exercise)

\((537.1)\) – \((537.2)\) (Exercises)

\((539.1)\) (Exercise)

\((539.2)\) Let \(\varphi\) be \(\exists q (w \models (q \equiv p) \& F = [\lambda y q])\). We want to show:

\[\forall F (\varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi)\]

By GEN, it suffices to show: \(\varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi\). So assume \(\varphi\), i.e.,

\[\exists q (w \models (q \equiv p) \& F = [\lambda y q])\]

Let \(q_1\) be an arbitrary such proposition, so that we know:

\((\delta)\) \(w \models (q_1 \equiv p) \& F = [\lambda y q_1]\)

Now recall that we are trying to show:

\[\Box \exists q (w \models (q \equiv p) \& F = [\lambda y q])\]

By the Buridan schema \((168.1)\), it suffices to show:

\[\exists q (w \models (q \equiv p) \& F = [\lambda y q])\]

By \(\exists I\), it suffices to show \(\Box (w \models (q_1 \equiv p) \& F = [\lambda y q_1])\). Finally, by \((158.3)\), it suffices to show: \(\Box w \models (q_1 \equiv p) \& \Box F = [\lambda y q_1]\). But this is easy: from the first conjunct of \((\delta)\) it follows by the rigidity of truth at a world \((501.1)\) that \(\Box w \models (q_1 \equiv p)\), and from the second conjunct of \((\delta)\), it follows by the necessity of identity \((126.2)\) that \(\Box F = [\lambda y q_1]\).
By definition of $\circ w_\mathcal{P}$ (536), theorem (258.2), and the fact that the formula $\exists q(w \models (q \equiv p) & F = [\lambda y q])$ is a rigid condition on properties (539.2).

(539.4) (Exercise)

Since $\Box (p \equiv p)$ is a theorem, it follows by a Fundamental Theorem of Possible World Theory that $\forall w(w \models (p \equiv p))$. Hence $w \models (p \equiv p)$, and so by Rule =I and &I, $w \models (p \equiv p) \& [\lambda y p] = [\lambda y q]$. Hence, by $\exists$I:

$$\exists q(w \models (q \equiv p) \& [\lambda y p] = [\lambda y q])$$

Then by the right conjunct of (539.3), it follows that:

$$\circ_w p[\lambda y p]$$

But $\circ_w p \downarrow$, and so it follows that $\circ_w p \Sigma p$, by (289).

(541.1) By reasoning analogous to (539.2). Let $\varphi$ be $\exists q(w \models q \& F = [\lambda y q])$. We want to show:

$$\forall F(\varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi)$$

By GEN, it suffices to show: $\varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi$. So assume $\varphi$, i.e.,

$$\exists q(w \models q \& F = [\lambda y q])$$

Let $q_1$ be an arbitrary such proposition, so that we know:

(δ) $w \models q_1 \& F = [\lambda y q_1]$}

Now we have to show:

$$\Box \exists q(w \models q \& F = [\lambda y q])$$

By the Buridan schema (168.1), it suffices to show:

$$\exists q \Box (w \models q \& F = [\lambda y q])$$

By $\exists$I, it suffices to show $\Box (w \models q_1 \& F = [\lambda y q_1])$. Finally, by (158.3), it suffices to show: $\Box w \models q_1 \& \Box F = [\lambda y q_1]$. But this is easy: from the first conjunct of (δ) it follows by the rigidity of truth at a world (501.1) that $\Box w \models q_1$, and from the second conjunct of (δ), it follows by the necessity of identity (126.2) that $\Box F = [\lambda y q_1]$.

(541.2) – (541.4) (Exercises)

(542.1) By (541.3), we know both that $\tau_w$ is abstract and:

$$\forall F(\tau_w F \equiv \exists q(w \models q \& F = [\lambda y q]))$$
If we instantiate this to $[\lambda y\ p]$, we obtain:

$$\top_w[\lambda y\ p] \equiv \exists q(w \models q \& [\lambda y\ p] = [\lambda y\ q])$$

Since $\top_w$ exists, it follows from definition (289) by Rule $\equiv S$ that $\top_w \Sigma p \equiv \top_w[\lambda y p]$. Hence:

$$(\delta) \ \top_w \Sigma p \equiv \exists q(w \models q \& [\lambda y\ p] = [\lambda y\ q])$$

We now prove both directions of our theorem.

$(\to)$ Assume $\top_w \Sigma p$. Then by $(\delta)$,

$$\exists q(w \models q \& [\lambda y\ p] = [\lambda y\ q])$$

Suppose $q_1$ is an arbitrary such proposition, so that we know:

$$w \models q_1 \& [\lambda y\ p] = [\lambda y\ q_1]$$

The right conjunct, by the definition of proposition identity, ensures $p = q_1$. Hence, the left conjunct implies $w \models p$.

$(\leftarrow)$ Assume $w \models p$. Then, $w \models p \& [\lambda y\ p] = [\lambda y\ p]$. So $\exists q(w \models q \& [\lambda y\ p] = [\lambda y\ q])$. So by $(\delta)$, $\top_w \Sigma p$. $\Rightarrow$

(542.2) (Exercise)

(542.3) By (542.1), we already know:

$$(\delta) \ \top_w \Sigma p \equiv w \models p$$

We leave it as an exercise to show, using (541.3), that $\top_w$ is a situation. So by applying Rule $\equiv S$ of Biconditional Simplification to definition (458), we know that:

$$(\zeta) \ \top_w \models p \equiv \top_w \Sigma p$$

Hence from $(\zeta)$ and $(\delta)$, it follows that $\top_w \models p \equiv w \models p$. So by GEN:

$$\forall p(\top_w \models p \equiv w \models p)$$

But since $w$ is also a situation (exercise), it follows by definition of situation identity (462) that $\top_w = w$. $\Rightarrow$

(543.1) By (539.3), we know:

$$(\delta) \ A! o_w p \& \forall F(o_w p F \equiv \exists q(w \models (q \equiv p) \& F = [\lambda y\ q]))$$

Moreover, theorem (541.3) is:

$$(\xi) \ A! \top_w \& \forall F(\top_w F \equiv \exists q(w \models q \& F = [\lambda y\ q]))$$
We now prove both directions of our biconditional theorem.

\((\rightarrow)\) Assume \(w \models p\). By prior exercises, \((\delta)\) and \((\xi)\) both imply that \(o_w p\) and \(\Theta_w\) are situations. So to show they are identical, it suffices by \((462)\) to show \(\forall r (o_w p \models r \equiv \Theta_w \models r)\). By GEN, it suffices to show \(o_w p \models r \iff \Theta_w \models r\).

\((\rightarrow)\) Assume \(o_w p \models r\). Then by \((459)\), \(o_w p [\lambda y \ r]\). Hence by the right conjunct of \((\delta)\), it follows that \(\exists q (w \models (q \equiv p) \land [\lambda y \ r] = [\lambda y \ q])\). Let \(q_1\) be an arbitrary such proposition, so that we know \(w \models (q_1 \equiv p) \land [\lambda y \ r] = [\lambda y \ q_1]\). The second conjunct implies \(r \equiv q_1\), by the definition of proposition identity, and so the first conjunct implies \(w \models (r \equiv p)\), by Rule \(=\text{E}\). But from this last fact, our assumption that \(w \models p\), and the easily established fact that \((r \equiv p) \land p \Rightarrow r\), it follows that \(w \models r\), by the modal closure of possible worlds \((510)\). Hence, by \((542.1)\), \(\Theta_w \Sigma r\), which implies \(\Theta_w \models r\), by \((458)\) and the fact that \(\Theta_w\) is a situation.

\((\leftarrow)\) Assume \(\Theta_w \models r\). Then by \((542.1)\), \(w \models r\). But from this last fact, our assumption that \(w \models p\), and the easily established fact that \((r \land p) \Rightarrow (r \equiv p)\), it follows that \(w \models p\), by the modal closure of possible worlds. Hence \(w \models (r \equiv p) \land [\lambda y \ r] = [\lambda y \ q]\). So by \(\exists! q \ (w \models (q \equiv p) \land [\lambda y \ r] = [\lambda y \ q])\). It follows by the right conjunct of \((\delta)\) that \(o_w p [\lambda y \ r]\). Since \(o_w p\) is a situation, \((459)\) then implies \(o_w p \models r\).

\((\leftarrow)\) Assume \(o_w p = \Theta_w\). Independently, by \((539.5)\), we know \(o_w p \Sigma p\). And we also know that \(o_w p\) is a situation, by an exercise earlier in the proof. So by \((458)\), it follows that \(o_w p \models p\). Hence, by applying Rule \(=\text{E}\) to this and our initial assumption, it follows that \(\Theta_w \models p\). But then by \((542.1)\), \(w \models p\).

\((543.2)\) (Exercise)

\((544.1)\) By applying GEN to theorem \((543.1)\), we know:

\[\forall w (w \models p \equiv o_w p = \Theta_w)\]

It follows from this, by a law of quantification theory \((100.3)\), that:

\((\delta)\) \(\forall w (w \models p) \equiv \forall w (o_w p = \Theta_w)\)

But it is a Fundamental Theorem of Possible World Theory \((525.2)\) that:

\[\Box p \equiv \forall w (w \models p)\]

From this and \((\delta)\), it follows that \(\Box p \equiv \forall w (o_w p = \Theta_w)\).  

\((544.2) - (544.4)\) (Exercises)

\((546.1) - (546.2)\) (Exercises)

\((548.1)\) (Exercise)
(548.2) By GEN, it suffices to show \( \varphi \rightarrow \Box \varphi \). So assume \( \varphi \), that is, \( w \models \forall y(Fy \equiv Gy) \). Then by the rigidity of truth at a world (501.1), it follows that \( \Box w \models \forall y(Fy \equiv Gy) \), i.e., \( \Box \varphi \).

(548.3) By definition of \( e_w \mathcal{G} \), (545), theorem (258.2) and the fact (548.2) that \( w \models \forall y(Fy \equiv Gy) \) is a rigid condition on properties.

(548.4) – (548.5) (Exercises)

(549.1) Assume \( \text{ExtensionAtOf}(x, w, \mathcal{G}) \) and \( \text{ExtensionAtOf}(y, w, \mathcal{H}) \). By the definition of \( \text{ExtensionAtOf} \) (545), we therefore know:

(a) \( A!x \& \mathcal{G} \downarrow \& \forall F(xF \equiv w \models \forall z(Fz \equiv Gz)) \)

(b) \( A!y \& \mathcal{H} \downarrow \& \forall F(yF \equiv w \models \forall z(Fz \equiv Hz)) \)

(\( \rightarrow \)) Assume \( x = y \). Then by Rule \( \Rightarrow \), it follows from (a) that:

(c) \( A!y \& \mathcal{G} \downarrow \& \forall F(yF \equiv w \models \forall z(Fz \equiv Gz)) \)

Hence, by (100.11) and (100.10), the third conjuncts of (b) and (c) imply:

(d) \( \forall F[w \models \forall z(Fz \equiv Hz) \equiv w \models \forall z(Fz \equiv Gz)] \)

Now if we instantiate (d) to \( \mathcal{G} \), we know:

(e) \( w \models \forall z(Gz \equiv Hz) \equiv w \models \forall z(Gz \equiv Gz) \)

But the right side of (e) is easily derived: from the tautology \( Gz \equiv Gz \), we obtain \( \forall z(Gz \equiv Gz) \), by GEN. Since this is a modally strict theorem, we obtain \( \Box \forall z(Gz \equiv Gz) \). So by a Fundamental Theorem of Possible World Theory (525.2), it follows that \( \forall w'(w' \models \forall z(Gz \equiv Gz)) \). Instantiating to \( w \), we obtain the right side of (e). So the left side of (e), \( w \models \forall z(Gz \equiv Hz) \), follows by biconditional syllogism.

(\( \leftarrow \)) Assume:

(f) \( w \models \forall z(Gz \equiv Hz) \)

Since we know \( A!x \) and \( A!y \) by the left conjuncts of (a) and (b), it suffices by theorem (242.1) to show \( \forall F(xF \equiv yF) \), and by GEN, that \( xF \equiv yF \):

(\( \rightarrow \)) Assume \( xF \). Then by the right conjunct of (a), it follows that

(g) \( w \models \forall z(Fz \equiv Gz) \)

Now, independently, if we apply RN to the modally strict theorem (100.10) and apply the definition \( \Rightarrow \) (506), then we know:

(h) \( (\forall z(Fz \equiv Gz) \& \forall z(Gz \equiv Hz)) \Rightarrow \forall z(Fz \equiv Hz) \)
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Hence, from (g), (f), and (h), it follows by the modal closure of possible worlds \((510)\) that \(w \models \forall z(Fz \equiv Hz)\). Hence, by the right conjunct of (b), \(yF\).

\((-\rightarrow)\) (Exercise)

\((549.2)\) Since \(\epsilon_w F \downarrow\) and \(\epsilon_w G \downarrow\), we can instantiate \(\epsilon_w F\) and \(\epsilon_w G\) into world-relativized pre-Law V \((549.1)\). Simultaneously substituting \(\epsilon_w F\) for \(x, F\) for \(G, \epsilon_w G\) for \(y,\) and \(G\) for \(H,\) we obtain:

\[(ExtensionAtOf(\epsilon_w F, w, F) \& ExtensionAtOf(\epsilon_w G, w, G)) \rightarrow (\epsilon_w F = \epsilon_w G \equiv w \models \forall z(Fz \equiv Gz))\]

But we also know both conjuncts of the antecedent, by \((548.4)\). Hence, \(\epsilon_w F = \epsilon_w G \equiv w \models \forall z(Fz \equiv Gz)\).

\((551.1)\) Without loss of generality, suppose that \(y\) doesn’t occur free in \(\varphi\); if \(\varphi\) is a formula in which \(y\) occurs free, then we can still establish our theorem by appealing to alphabetic variants of the principles used below. Our strategy is to prove the theorem by conditional proof, i.e., assume \(\lceil \lambda x \varphi \rceil \downarrow\) and show \(\lceil \lambda w \models \varphi \equiv \varphi x \rceil \downarrow\), where \(w\) is some fixed but arbitrary possible world. Before we begin the proof, we first establish a Lemma about our fixed but arbitrary world \(w\):

**Lemma:** \(\Box[\lambda x \varphi] \downarrow \rightarrow \Box \forall x \forall y(\forall F(Fx \equiv Fy) \rightarrow (w \models \varphi \equiv w \models \varphi x))\)

**Proof.** By Rule RM, it suffices to show the following by a modally strict proof:

\(\lceil \lambda x \varphi \rceil \downarrow \rightarrow \forall x \forall y(\forall F(Fx \equiv Fy) \rightarrow (w \models \varphi \equiv w \models \varphi x))\)

So assume \(\lceil \lambda x \varphi \rceil \downarrow\). Then by the Corollary to Kirchner’s Theorem \((269)\), it follows that:

\(\forall x \forall y(\forall F(Fx \equiv Fy) \rightarrow \Box(\varphi \equiv \varphi x))\)

Hence, by \(\forall E:\)

\((\delta)\) \(\forall F(Fx \equiv Fy) \rightarrow \Box(\varphi \equiv \varphi x)\)

But it is a fact about the consequent that:

\((\xi)\) \(\Box(\varphi \equiv \varphi x) \rightarrow (w \models \varphi \equiv w \models \varphi x)\)

This is established by the following hypothetical syllogism chain:

\(\Box(\varphi \equiv \varphi x) \rightarrow \forall w'(w' \models (\varphi \equiv \varphi x))\) by \((525.2)\)

\(\rightarrow w \models (\varphi \equiv \varphi x)\) by \(\forall E\)

\(\rightarrow w \models \varphi \equiv w \models \varphi x\) by \((527.4)\)
So from (θ) and (ξ) if follows that:
\[ \forall F (Fx \equiv Fy) \rightarrow (w \models \varphi \equiv w \models \varphi^y_x) \]

Since \( x \) and \( y \) are not free in our assumption, it follows by GEN that:
\[ \forall x \forall y (\forall F (Fx \equiv Fy) \rightarrow (w \models \varphi \equiv w \models \varphi^y_x)) \]

Now using this Lemma, we prove our theorem. Assume \( \lambda x \varphi \downarrow \). Then by (107), \( \Box[\lambda x \varphi] \downarrow \). So by our Lemma:
\[ \Box \forall x \forall y (\forall F (Fx \equiv Fy) \rightarrow (w \models \varphi \equiv w \models \varphi^y_x)) \]

But \( w \models \varphi^y_x \) is the same formula as \( (w \models \varphi)_y^x \). Hence:
\[ \Box \forall x \forall y (\forall F (Fx \equiv Fy) \rightarrow (w \models \varphi \equiv (w \models \varphi)_y^x)) \]

So, by an instance of the right-to-left direction of Kirchner’s Theorem (268), in which we set \( \varphi \) in Kirchner’s Theorem to \( w \models \varphi \), it follows that \( \lambda x w \models \varphi \downarrow \).  

\((551.2)\) The proof is by cases:

- \( n = 0 \). By (39.2), \( \lambda w \models \varphi \downarrow \). Hence, \( \lambda \varphi \downarrow \rightarrow [\lambda w \models \varphi] \)
- \( n = 1 \). By (551.1).
- \( n \geq 2 \). (Exercise)

\((551.3)\) We prove this for the cases \( n \geq 1 \) and \( n = 0 \).

**Case** \( n \geq 1 \). By axiom (39.2), \( [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n F^n x_1 \ldots x_n] \downarrow \). So by (551.1), \( [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n w \models F^n x_1 \ldots x_n] \downarrow \).

**Case** \( n = 0 \). \( [\lambda w \models F^n x_1 \ldots x_n] \downarrow \) is an instance of (39.2), since the \( \lambda \) doesn’t bind any variables in any encoding formula subterms.

\((554.1)\) We prove this for the cases \( n \geq 1 \) and \( n = 0 \).

**Case** \( n \geq 1 \). By (551.3), \( [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n w \models F^n x_1 \ldots x_n] \downarrow \). So we may reason with this relation as follows:
\[ F^n_{u_1} x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n w \models F^n x_1 \ldots x_n]_{x_1 \ldots x_n} \] by (552), Rules =df \( E, =df \) I
\[ \equiv w \models F^n x_1 \ldots x_n \] by \( \beta \)-Conversion

**Case** \( n = 0 \). (Exercise) \( \Rightarrow \)

\((554.2)\) We prove this for the cases \( n \geq 1 \) and \( n = 0 \).

**Case** \( n \geq 1 \). By the definition of rigid (553.1), we have to show:

(A) \( G^n_{u_1} \downarrow \)

(B) \( \Box \forall x_1 \ldots x_n [G^n_{u_1} x_1 \ldots x_n \rightarrow \Box G^n_{u_1} x_1 \ldots x_n] \)
(A) This follows from theorem (551.3) and the definition of $G^n_w$ (552), by our theory of definition.

(B) By RN and GEN, we have to show: $G^n_w x_1 \ldots x_n \rightarrow \Box G^n_w x_1 \ldots x_n$. So assume $G^n_w x_1 \ldots x_n$. Then by (554.1), $w \vDash G^n x_1 \ldots x_n$. But possible worlds necessarily encode any propositions true at them; i.e., $w \vDash p \rightarrow \Box w \vDash p$ is the left-to-right direction of theorem (501.1). Hence $\Box w \vDash G^n x_1 \ldots x_n$. But by a Rule of Substitution and the fact that (554.1) is a modally strict theorem, it follows that $\Box G^n_w x_1 \ldots x_n$.

Case $n = 0$. (Exercise) ⇔

(554.3) We give two proofs; the second (somewhat simpler) proof was contributed by Daniel Kirchner. But both are of interest, since they approach the problem in two completely different ways.

First proof: by cases $n \geq 1$ and $n = 0$.

Case $n \geq 1$. By the T schema, it suffices to prove the stronger claim:

$$\Box \exists F^n (Rigidifies(F^n, G^n))$$

By (525.2), it suffices to show:

$$\forall w (w \vDash \exists F^n (Rigidifies(F^n, G^n)))$$

By GEN, it suffices to show:

$$w \vDash \exists F^n (Rigidifies(F^n, G^n))$$

By (527.6), it suffices to show:

$$\exists F^n (w \vDash Rigidifies(F^n, G^n))$$

Let’s then show that $G^n_w$ is a witness to this existential claim, i.e., that:

$$\vartheta \quad w \vDash Rigidifies(G^n_w, G^n)$$

Note that the definition of $Rigidifies$ (553.2) yields the necessary equivalence:

$$\Box (Rigidifies(G^n_w, G^n) \equiv (Rigid(G^n_w) \& \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n (G^n_w x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv G^n x_1 \ldots x_n)))$$

So since worlds are modally closed (510), we can establish $\vartheta$ if we can show: \footnote{We have to appeal to the modal closure of possible worlds here, since one can’t validly substitute necessarily equivalent properties for one another in this context. Given that possible worlds are situations and, hence, abstract, $\vartheta$ becomes, by definition, necessarily equivalent to an encoding claim of the form $x[\lambda y, \varphi]$, where $y$ isn’t free in $\varphi$. If $\psi$ is necessarily equivalent to $\varphi$, we can’t validly substitute $\psi$ for $\varphi$ in $x[\lambda y, \varphi]$ to conclude $x[\lambda y, \psi]$. It’s crucial here that we’re dealing with possible worlds. For then we know that $w \vDash \varphi$ implies $w \vDash \psi$ when $\varphi$ and $\psi$ are necessarily equivalent, by applying (510).}

$$w \vDash (Rigid(G^n_w) \& \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n (G^n_w x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv G^n x_1 \ldots x_n))$$
So by (527.1), it suffices to show:

(A) \( w \models Rigid(G^n_w) \)

(B) \( w \models \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n(G^n_w x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv G^n x_1 \ldots x_n) \)

(A) Theorem (554.1) is modally strict. Since the free restricted variable is rigid, it follows by expanded RN (335.1.a) that \( \Box Rigid(G^n_w) \). A fundamental theorem of world theory (525.2) then implies \( \forall w'(w' \models Rigid(G^n_w)) \). Instantiating to \( w \), we have \( w \models Rigid(G^n_w) \).

(B) By (527.5), it suffices to show:

\[ \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n(w \models (G^n_w x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv G^n x_1 \ldots x_n)) \]

So by GEN, we need only show:

\[ w \models (G^n_w x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv G^n x_1 \ldots x_n) \]

And by (527.4), it suffices to show:

\[(\zeta) \ w \models G^n_w x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv w \models G^n x_1 \ldots x_n \]

To prove this, we use the following modally strict theorem and its Corollary:

**Lemma:** \( G^n_w x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv \Box G^n_w x_1 \ldots x_n \)

**Proof.** \((\rightarrow)\) If \( G^n_w x_1 \ldots x_n \), then since \( G^n_w \) is rigid (554.2), it follows by the definition of rigidity (553.1) that \( \Box G^n_w x_1 \ldots x_n \). \((\leftarrow)\) This is an instance of the T schema.

**Corollary:** \( \Diamond G^n_w x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv G^n x_1 \ldots x_n \)

**Proof.** \((\rightarrow)\) Since \( G^n_w x_1 \ldots x_n \rightarrow \Box G^n_w x_1 \ldots x_n \) is a modally strict theorem implied by our Lemma, it follows by Rule (166.2) that \( \Diamond G^n_w x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv G^n x_1 \ldots x_n \). \((\leftarrow)\) This is an instance of the \( T \Diamond \) schema.

With this Lemma, we can prove both directions of \((\zeta)\).

\((\rightarrow)\) Assume \( w \models G^n_w x_1 \ldots x_n \). Hence \( \exists w(w \models G^n_w x_1 \ldots x_n) \), and so by a fundamental theorem of world theory (525.1), \( \Diamond G^n_w x_1 \ldots x_n \). Hence, by the Corollary to the Lemma, \( G^n_w x_1 \ldots x_n \). So by (554.1), \( w \models G^n x_1 \ldots x_n \).

\((\leftarrow)\) Assume \( w \models G^n x_1 \ldots x_n \). Then by (554.1), \( G^n_w x_1 \ldots x_n \). So by our Lemma, \( \Box G^n_w x_1 \ldots x_n \), and by a fundamental theorem (525.2), \( \forall w'(w' \models G^n_w x_1 \ldots x_n) \). Instantiating to \( w \), we have \( w \models G^n_w x_1 \ldots x_n \).

**Case** \( n = 0 \). (Exercise) \( \triangleright \)

**Second Proof:** by cases \( n \geq 1 \) and \( n = 0 \).

**Case** \( n \geq 1 \). We know \( \exists w \forall p(w \models p \equiv p) \), by (513.1). Let \( w_0 \) be such a possible world, so that we know:
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Now consider $G^w_n$. To establish our theorem by showing that $G^w_n$ is a witness, we have to show, by definition (553.2):

(A) $\text{Rigid}(G^w_n)$

(B) $\forall x_1 \ldots x_n (G^w_n x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv G x_1 \ldots x_n)$

Proof of (A). By (553.1), we have to show:

(C) $G^w_n \downarrow$

(D) $\square \forall x_1 \ldots x_n (G^w_n x_1 \ldots x_n \rightarrow \square G^w_n x_1 \ldots x_n)$

Proof of (C). By theorem (551.3), $[\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n w_0 \vdash G^w_n x_1 \ldots x_n] \downarrow$. So by definition (552) and our theory of definition, it follows that $G^w_n \downarrow$.

Proof of (D). By RN and GEN, it suffices to show $G^w_n x_1 \ldots x_n \rightarrow \square G^w_n x_1 \ldots x_n$. So assume $G^w_n x_1 \ldots x_n$. Then by (554.1), $w_0 \vdash G^w_n x_1 \ldots x_n$. Hence by (501.1), $\square w_0 \vdash G^w_n x_1 \ldots x_n$. But since (554.1) is a modally strict biconditional, it follows by a Rule of Substitution that $\square G^w_n x_1 \ldots x_n$.

Proof of (B). By GEN, it suffices to show:

$G^w_n x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv G x_1 \ldots x_n$

But if we substitute $G^w_n x_1 \ldots x_n$ into (§), then we know that:

(ξ) $w_0 \vdash G^w_n x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv G^w_n x_1 \ldots x_n$

So we may reason as follows:

$G^w_n x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n w_0 \vdash G^w_n x_1 \ldots x_n] x_1 \ldots x_n$ by df (552), Rules $=d_I, =d_E$

$\equiv w_0 \vdash G^w_n x_1 \ldots x_n$ by β-Conversion

$\equiv G^w_n x_1 \ldots x_n$ by (ξ) $\Leftarrow$

Case $n = 0$. (Exercise) $\Leftarrow$

(555.1) We prove this by cases.

Case 1: $n = 0$. Then our theorem asserts $\square(p \rightarrow \square p) \equiv (\Diamond p \rightarrow \square p)$. But this is just an instance of (171.1).

Case 2: $n \geq 1$. By an instance of (171.1), we know:

$\square(F x_1 \ldots x_n \rightarrow \square F x_1 \ldots x_n) \equiv (\Diamond F x_1 \ldots x_n \rightarrow \square F x_1 \ldots x_n)$

So by $n$ applications of GEN:

$\forall x_1 \ldots x_n (\square(F x_1 \ldots x_n \rightarrow \square F x_1 \ldots x_n) \equiv (\Diamond F x_1 \ldots x_n \rightarrow \square F x_1 \ldots x_n))$

So by $n$ applications of (100.3):
∀x₁...∀xₙ(∀x₁...∀xₙ(□Fx₁...xₙ → □Fx₁...xₙ)) ≡ ∀x₁...∀xₙ(∀x₁...∀xₙ(♦Fx₁...xₙ → □Fx₁...xₙ))

By n applications of BF and the Rule of Substitution (160.1):

□∀x₁...∀xₙ(Fx₁...xₙ → □Fx₁...xₙ) ≡ ∀x₁...∀xₙ(♦Fx₁...xₙ → □Fx₁...xₙ)

(555.2) We prove this by cases.

Case 1: n = 0. Then our theorem asserts □(p → □p) ≡ □p ∨ □¬p. This is established by the following sequence of equivalences:

□(p → □p) ≡ ♦p → □p (171.1) or (555.1)
≡ ¬♦p ∨ □p (89.1.c)
≡ □¬p ∨ □p (162.1), (159.3)
≡ □p ∨ □¬p (89.2.c)

Case 2: Exercise. ⊢

(555.3) (Exercise)

(560) (Exercise)

(561) It follows from (471.4) and (468.2) that:

(8) ∀p(sᵥ |= p)

Since sᵥ is known to be a situation, we have to show: (a) sᵥ is maximal and (b) sᵥ fails to be possible. But clearly, if every proposition is true in sᵥ, then for every proposition q, either q is true in sᵥ or ¬q is true in sᵥ. So (a) holds, by definition of Maximal (502). And just as clearly, if every proposition is true in sᵥ, then for every (and hence, for some) proposition q, both q is true in sᵥ and ¬q is true in sᵥ. So by definition (486), ¬Consistent(sᵥ), and by theorem (492.1), it follows that (b).

(562) Our theorem requires us to show:

(a) Situation(⊥)
(b) Maximal(⊥)
(c) ¬Possible(⊥)
(d) ¬TrivialSituation(⊥)

To see precisely how these arguments for (a) and (b) can be made precise, we can reason as follows. (a) To show maximality, we have to show ∀p(sᵥ |= p ∨ sᵥ |= ¬p), and so, by GEN, that sᵥ |= p ∨ sᵥ |= ¬p. But by VE, the first disjunct follows from (8) and by ∀L, sᵥ |= p ∨ sᵥ |= ¬p.

(b) Let p₁ be any proposition. Then by (105.2), (p₁ & ¬p₁) ⊥. So we can instantiate the 0-place relation term p₁ & ¬p₁ in (8) and obtain sᵥ |= (p₁ & ¬p₁). But, it is a theorem that ¬♦(p₁ & ¬p₁), by (85), RN, and (162.1). Hence by an appropriate instance of (491.2), it follows that ¬Possible(sᵥ).
(a) follows from the facts that \( \bot \) is a truth-value (297.2)\( \star \) and that truth-values are situations (456).

(b) By GEN and the definition of maximality, we have to show \( \bot \models p \lor \bot \models \neg p \). We reason by cases from the tautology that \( p \lor \neg p \). (i) If \( p \), then \( \neg \neg p \) and so by (300.5)\( \star \), \( \bot \Sigma \neg p \). Since \( \bot \) is a situation, it follows that \( \bot \models \neg p \). Hence, \( \bot \models p \lor \bot \models \neg p \). (ii) If \( \neg p \), then by (300.5)\( \star \), it follows that \( \bot \Sigma p \), i.e., \( \bot \models p \). So \( \bot \models p \lor \bot \models \neg p \).

(c) Consider any proposition \( q \). Since \( \neg (q \land \neg q) \), it follows by an appropriate instance of (300.5)\( \star \), that \( \bot \Sigma (q \land \neg q) \). Since \( \bot \) is a situation, the last fact implies \( \bot \models (q \land \neg q) \). Independently, it is also a theorem that \( \neg \exists q (\bot \models p \land \neg \exists q) \) (exercise).

(d) To see that \( \bot \) isn’t a trivial situation, consider the proposition \( p_0 \), which was defined in (206) as \( \forall x (E!x \rightarrow E!x) \). \( p_0 \) is clearly a theorem, and so known to be true. Hence, by (300.4)\( \star \), \( \neg \Sigma p_0 \), and so from the fact that \( \bot \) is a situation, \( \neg \bot \models p_0 \). Consequently, \( \exists q (\bot \models p_0) \). So by definition (468.2), \( \neg \text{TrivialSituation}(\bot) \).

(563) The formula \( \exists q (\neg q \land F = [\lambda y q]) \) is easily established as a condition on propositional properties (exercise). So by the Comprehension for Situations (475.1), there is a situation that encodes all and only those propositional properties \( [\lambda y q] \) constructed from some false proposition \( q \):

\[
\exists s \forall F (sF \equiv \exists q (\neg q \land F = [\lambda y q]))
\]

Let \( s_1 \) be an arbitrary such object, so that we know:

\[(\delta) \forall F (s_1F \equiv \exists q (\neg q \land F = [\lambda y q]))\]

Since \( s_1 \) is, by definition, a situation, it remains to show that:

(a) \( \text{Maximal}(s_1) \)

(b) \( \neg \text{Possible}(s_1) \)

(c) \( \neg \text{TrivialSituation}(s_1) \)

Before we begin, we establish the following fact about \( s_1 \):

\[\text{Fact. } \forall p (s_1 \models p \equiv \neg p)\]

\[\text{Proof. } \text{By GEN, it suffices to show } s_1 \models p \equiv \neg p. \text{ (\( \rightarrow \)) Assume } s_1 \models p. \text{ Then by (459), } s_1[\lambda y p]. \text{ So by (\( \delta \)), } \exists q (\neg q \land [\lambda y p] = [\lambda y q]). \text{ Suppose } q_1 \text{ is an arbitrary such proposition, so that we know both that } \neg q_1 \text{ and that } [\lambda y p] = [\lambda y q_1]. \text{ Then by definition of proposition identity, } p = q_1. \text{ Hence } \neg p, \text{ since } \neg q_1. \text{ (\( \neg \)) Assume } \neg p. \text{ Then } \neg p \land [\lambda y p] = [\lambda y p]. \text{ So } \exists q (\neg q \land [\lambda y p] = [\lambda y q]). \text{ So by (\( \delta \)), } s_1[\lambda y p], \text{ and by (459), } s_1 \models p.\]
Now we can establish (a), (b), and (c).

(a) By GEN and the definition of maximality, we have to show \( s_1 \models p \lor s_1 \models \neg p \). We reason by cases from the tautology that \( p \lor \neg p \). (i) Suppose \( p \). Then \( \neg \neg p \) and so by the above Fact, \( s_1 \models \neg p \). So \( s_1 \models p \lor s_1 \models \neg p \). (ii) Suppose \( \neg p \). Then by the above Fact, it follows that \( s_1 \models p \). So \( s_1 \models p \lor s_1 \models \neg p \).

(b) Consider any proposition \( q \). Then we know that \( \neg(q \land \neg q) \). Hence, by the above Fact, \( s_1 \models (q \land \neg q) \). It is also a theorem that \( \neg\Diamond(q \land \neg q) \). Since \( (q \land \neg q) \downarrow \), we have established \( \exists p((s_1 \models p) \land \neg\Diamond p) \). So it follows from an appropriate instance of (491.2) that \( \neg Possible(s_1) \).

(c) To see that \( s_1 \) isn’t a trivial situation, consider the proposition \( p_0 \), which was defined in (206) as \( \forall x(E!x \rightarrow E!x) \). \( p_0 \) is clearly a theorem, and so known to be true. Hence, by the above Fact, \( \neg s_1 \models p_0 \). Consequently, \( \exists q(\neg(s_1 \models q)) \), i.e., \( \neg\forall q(s_1 \models q) \). So, by definition (468.2), \( \neg TrivialSituation(s_1) \).

(564) We begin by following the proof of the previous theorem: the Comprehension for Situations (475.1) asserts that there is a situation, say \( s_1 \), that encodes all and only those propositional properties \( \lambda y q \) constructed from some false proposition \( q \). We showed that \( s_1 \) is governed by:

\[
\text{Fact. } \forall p(s_1 \models p \equiv \neg p)
\]

For the present theorem, however, we have to show:

(a) \( \text{Maximal}(s_1) \)

(b) \( \neg \text{Possible}(s_1) \)

(c) \( \neg \text{ModallyClosed}(s_1) \)

(a) and (b) have been established by prior reasoning, in the proof of theorem (563). For (c), it suffices to show, by definition (509), that there exist propositions \( p \) and \( q \) such that \( s_1 \models p \), \( p \Rightarrow q \), and \( \neg s_1 \models q \). Let our witness for \( p \) be \( p_0 \land \neg p_0 \), where \( p_0 \) is \( \forall x(E!x \rightarrow E!x) \), and let our witness for \( q \) be \( p_0 \). So we have to show:

(i) \( s_1 \models (p_0 \land \neg p_0) \)

(ii) \( (p_0 \land \neg p_0) \Rightarrow p_0 \)

(iii) \( \neg s_1 \models p_0 \)

(i) Since \( p_0 \land \neg p_0 \) is a contradiction, we know \( \neg(p_0 \land \neg p_0) \) is a theorem (85). Hence, by the Fact proved in the previous theorem, it follows that \( s_1 \models (p_0 \land \neg p_0) \).

(ii) By (86.1), \( (p_0 \land \neg p_0) \Rightarrow p_0 \). Since this is a modally strict theorem, it follows by RN that \( \Box((p_0 \land \neg p_0) \Rightarrow p_0) \). So by definition of \( \Rightarrow \) (431.1), it follows that \( (p_0 \land \neg p_0) \Rightarrow p_0 \).
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(iii) It follows from our previously established Fact that $s_1 \models p_0 \equiv \neg p_0$. But $p_0$ is a easy theorem and so $\neg p_0$. Hence, $\neg s_1 \models p_0$. $\Rightarrow$

**Proof**

(566.1) By GEN, it suffices to show $q \rightarrow \Box q$. So assume $q$, i.e.,

$$sF \lor F = [\lambda y p]$$

Note that both disjuncts imply their own necessity: $sF$ implies $\Box sF$ by (461.1), and $F = [\lambda y p]$ implies $\Box F = [\lambda y p]$ by (126.2). Hence, by disjunctive syllogism:

$$\Box sF \lor \Box F = [\lambda y p]$$

But by (158.15), it follows that $\Box (sF \lor F) = [\lambda y p]$. $\Rightarrow$

(566.2) (Exercise)

(566.3) Assume $s \models q$. Then $s[\lambda y q]$, by (459). Hence by $\forall I$, $s[\lambda y q] \lor [\lambda y q] = [\lambda y p]$. So by (566.2), it follows that $s^p[\lambda y q]$. Since $s$ is both abstract and a situation, it follows that $s^p \models q$, by now familiar reasoning. $\Rightarrow$

(566.4) (Exercise)

(566.5) By GEN, it suffices to show $s^p \models q \equiv (s \models q \lor q = p)$. (→) Assume $s^p \models q$. Then it follows from (459) that $s^p[\lambda y q]$. But by (566.2), we know:

$$\forall F(s^p F \equiv sF \lor F = [\lambda y p])$$

It follows that $s[\lambda y q] \lor [\lambda y q] = [\lambda y p]$. If the former, then by (459), $s \models q$. If the latter, then it follows by the definition of proposition identity that $q = p$. So, by disjunctive syllogism, $s \models q \lor q = p$. (←) Assume $s \models q \lor q = p$. If $s \models q$, then by (566.3), $s^p \models q$. If $q = p$, then since $s^p \models p$ (566.4), $s^p \models q$. $\Rightarrow$

(567) By theorem (513.1), we know $\exists w \forall q(w \models q \equiv q)$. Let $w_0$ be an arbitrary such possible world, so that we know:

$$\forall q(w_0 \models q \equiv q)$$

Note that, by definition, $w_0$ is a situation. Now to establish the present theorem by conditional proof, assume $\neg \Diamond p$. Then consider the $p$-extension of $w_0$, i.e., $w_0^p$, as this is defined in (565). Clearly, $w_0^p$ is a situation (exercise). Since both $w_0$ and $w_0^p$ are situations, it follows from (566.4) that $w_0^p \models p$. So to show that $w_0^p \models p$ is a witness to $\exists i(\neg \text{TrivialSituation}(i) \& i \models p)$, it remains, by the definition of an impossible world (558), $\& I$, and $\exists I$, to show:

(a) $\text{Maximal}(w_0^p)$

(b) $\neg \text{Possible}(w_0^p)$

(c) $\neg \text{TrivialSituation}(w_0^p)$
(a) Since \( w_0 \) is a possible world, we know that it is maximal (503). But by (566.3) and the fact that possible worlds are situations, we know that every proposition true at \( w_0 \) is true at \( w_0^+p \). Hence \( w_0^+p \) is maximal, by disjunctive syllogism from the maximality of \( w_0 \).

(b) It follows from our initial assumption that \( \Box \neg p \). So by a fundamental theorem (525.2) of possible world theory. Hence \( w_0 \models \neg p \). So by (566.3) and the fact that possible worlds are situations, \( w_0^+p \models \neg p \). But we already know \( w_0^+p \models p \). By conjoining our last two results in reverse order and generalizing, we have \( \exists q (w_0^+p \models q \& w_0^+p \models \neg q) \). Hence, by definition, \( \neg \text{Consistent}(w_0^+p) \). Thus, by (492.1), \( \neg \text{Possible}(w_0^+p) \).

(c) To show that \( \neg \text{TrivialSituation}(w_0^+p) \), we have to show \( \exists q (w_0^+p \models q) \), i.e., find a proposition that isn’t true at \( w_0^+p \).\(^{414}\) If we choose our witness to be a contingent falsehood, then we can show that such a proposition is provably distinct from \( p \) and fails to be true in \( w_0^+p \), as follows. By (215.2), we know that there are contingently false propositions. So let \( q_1 \) be such a proposition. Since \( q_1 \) is false, it follows from (\&) that \( \neg w_0 \models q_1 \). Moreover, since \( q_1 \) is contingently false and \( p \) is impossible, it follows by (212.6) that \( q_1 \neq p \). Hence \( \neg (w_0 \models q_1 \lor q_1 = p) \). So by (566.5), \( \neg(w_0^+p \models q_1) \). Hence \( \exists q (w_0^+p \models q) \).

\(^{414}\)The witness can’t be a true proposition, for by (\&), all and only true propositions are true in \( w_0 \) and so the propositions true in \( w_0 \) are true in \( w_0^+p \) (566.3). Nor can the witness be an arbitrary falsehood, since the arbitrary choice might be \( p \) itself, which is true in \( w_0^+p \) despite being necessarily false. The witness can’t be some necessary falsehood distinct from \( p \) because we haven’t established that there is such a falsehood. Though our system allows us to assert, without contradiction, that there are distinct necessary falsehoods, our axioms thus far don’t guarantee that there are such. See the discussion in footnote 284.
Moreover, by reasoning analogous to part (c) of the proof of (567), there is a contingently false proposition, say \( q_1 \), that fails to be true at \( w_0^{+\overline{p_0}} \). Hence, there is an impossible world \( i \) and there are propositions \( p (= \overline{p_0}) \) and \( q (= q_1) \) such that \( p \) and \( \neg p \) are both true at \( i \) while \( q \) fails to be true at \( i \). ⊥

(569) By (513.1), we know that there is a possible world that makes true all and only the true propositions. Let \( w_0 \) be such a world, so that we know:

\[(8) \: \forall p ((w_0 \models p) \equiv p)\]

Let \( p_0 \) be \( \forall x (E!x \rightarrow E!x) \), so that \( \overline{p_0} \) is the negation of \( p_0 \). Now consider \( w_0^{+\overline{p_0}} \), i.e., \( w_0 \) extended with necessary falsehood \( \overline{p_0} \). So by reasoning analogous to that in (568.2), it can be established that \( w_0^{+\overline{p_0}} \) is an impossible world (exercise). Finally, by theorem (215.2), there is a contingently false proposition, say \( r_0 \).

With these facts in hand, it suffices by &I and \( \exists I \) to prove the following to establish our theorem:

(a) \( w_0^{+\overline{p_0}} \models (p_0 \lor r_0) \)

(b) \( w_0^{+\overline{p_0}} \models \neg p_0 \)

(c) \( \neg w_0^{+\overline{p_0}} \models r_0 \)

To prove these claims, we shall, on occasion, rehearse some of the steps in the proof of (567).

(a) Since \( p_0 \) is a necessary truth, it follows by a Fundamental Theorem of Possible World Theory (525.2) that \( \forall w (w \models p_0) \). Hence \( w_0 \models p_0 \). Since possible worlds are modally closed (510), it follows that \( w_0 \models (p_0 \lor r_0) \). But since \( w_0 \) is a situation, we know, by (566.3), that every proposition true in \( w_0 \) is true in \( w_0^{+\overline{p_0}} \). Hence \( w_0^{+\overline{p_0}} \models (p_0 \lor r_0) \).

(b) As as instance of (568.3), we know \( w_0^{+\overline{p_0}} \models \overline{p_0} \). But by theorem (197.7), \( \overline{p_0} = \neg p_0 \). Hence, \( w_0^{+\overline{p_0}} \models \neg p_0 \).

(c) The proof of \( \neg w_0^{+\overline{p_0}} \models r_0 \) involves reasoning analogous to part (c) of the proof of (567) and will appeal to the following instance of (566.5):

\[\forall q (w_0^{+\overline{p_0}} \models q \equiv w_0 \models q \lor q = \overline{p_0})\]

The cases are analogous because: (1) \( w_0^{+\overline{p_0}} \) in (567) and \( w_0^{+\overline{p_0}} \) in the present theorem are both impossible worlds constructed by extending \( w_0 \) with a necessary falsehood, and (2) in part (c) of the proof of (567), it was established that in such impossible worlds, contingently false propositions fail to be true. So we leave the rest of the proof as an exercise. ⊥

(574) Assume \( \forall y (\exists x Axy \rightarrow \diamond \neg \exists x Axy) \). By GEN, it suffices to show \( Story(z) \rightarrow \neg \Box Story(z) \). So assume \( Story(z) \). Then, by definition of a story (573.1), it follows
a fortiori that $\exists xAxz$. So it follows from our assumption that $\Diamond \neg \exists xAxz$, i.e., $\neg \Box \exists xAxz$. Now, for reductio, assume $\Box Story(z)$. Then, by the definition of a story and a Rule of Substitution, it follows that:

$$\Box (\text{Situation}(z) \& \exists p(z[\lambda y \, p]) \& \exists xAxz)$$

A fortiori, $\Box \exists xAxz$. Contradiction. $\Rightarrow$

(576) By GEN, it suffices to show:

$$\exists p(s \models p \& F = [\lambda z \, p]) \rightarrow \Box \exists p(s \models p \& F = [\lambda z \, p])$$

So assume $\exists p(s \models p \& F = [\lambda z \, p])$. Suppose $q_1$ is such a proposition, so that we know $s \models q_1 \& F = [\lambda z \, q_1]$. But both conjuncts are necessary: by (461.1), the first conjunct implies $\Box s \models q_1$, and by the necessity of identity (126.2), the second conjunct implies $\Box F = [\lambda z \, q_1]$. Since a conjunction of necessary truths is a necessary conjunction (158.3), it follows that $\Box (s \models q_1 \& F = [\lambda z \, q_1])$. So by $\exists I$, $\exists p(s \models p \& F = [\lambda z \, p])$. Hence, by the Buridan formula (168.1), $\exists p(s \models p \& F = [\lambda z \, p])$. $\Rightarrow$

(577) Eliminating the restricted variable, we want to show:

$$\forall y (y [\text{Story}(y) \rightarrow (y = \lambda x(A!x \& \forall F(x F \equiv \exists p(y \models p \& F = [\lambda z \, p])))])$$

So by GEN, assume $\text{Story}(y)$, to show the consequent. Since we’re trying to establish the identity of abstract objects, it suffices to show, for an arbitrary property $G$, that:

$$y G \equiv \lambda x(A!x \& \forall F(x F \equiv \exists p(y \models p \& F = [\lambda z \, p])))G$$

(→) Assume $y G$. Since a story $y$ is, by definition (573.1), a non-null situation, it follows from the definition of a situation that $\exists p(G = [\lambda z \, p])$. Suppose $q_1$ is such a proposition, so that we know $G = [\lambda z \, q_1]$. Hence $y [\lambda z \, q_1]$, i.e., $y \models q_1$. So we’ve established $y \models q_1 \& G = [\lambda z \, q_1]$, which implies $\exists p(y \models p \& G = [\lambda z \, p])$. So where $\varphi$ is the formula $\exists p(y \models p \& F = [\lambda z \, p])$, we’ve established $\varphi^G$. Hence by (258.3) and the fact that the description is strictly canonical (576), it follows that $\lambda x(A!x \& \forall F(x F \equiv \exists p(y \models p \& F = [\lambda z \, p])))G$.

(←) Assume $\lambda x(A!x \& \forall F(x F \equiv \exists p(y \models p \& F = [\lambda z \, p])))G$. Since the description is strictly canonical (576), it follows by (258.3) that $\exists p(y \models p \& G = [\lambda z \, p])$. Suppose $q_2$ is such a proposition. Then $y \models q_2 \& G = [\lambda z \, q_2]$. By definition, the first conjunct implies $y [\lambda y \, q_2]$, and so by the second conjunct, $y G$. $\Rightarrow$

(581) (Exercise)

(587) (Exercises)

(588.1) Assume both $s \models Dh_z$ and $\text{OriginalCharacterOf}(h_z, s)$ as premises. The second implies, by axiom (580), that:
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By theorem (581), we know the formula $s \models Fh_s$ is a rigid condition on properties. Hence (8) and (258.2) imply $A!h_s$ and $\forall F(h_sF \equiv s \models Fh_s)$. So by our first premise, it follows that $h_sD$. ⊢

(588.2) Assume (where $F$ denotes the relation $x$ fought $y$):

(A) $i \models Fa_ih_i$

(B) $OriginalCharacterOf(a_i, i)$

(C) $OriginalCharacterOf(h_i, i)$

Since our background assumption is that $\beta$-Conversion holds under the scope of the story operator, (A) implies both:

(D) $i \models [\lambda x Fxh_i]a_i$

(E) $i \models [\lambda x Fa_i]xh_i$

Hence by the reasoning in (588.1), it follows both at $a_i[\lambda x Fxh_i]$ and $h_i[\lambda x Fa_i]$. But, as an instance of axiom (50), we know:

$$a_ih_iF \equiv (a_i[\lambda x Fxh_i] & h_i[\lambda x Fa_i])$$

Hence, it follows that $a_ih_iF$. ⊢

(592) (Exercise)

(593.1) – (593.4) (Exercises)

(595.1) – (595.3) (Exercises)

(597.1) – (597.3) (Exercises)

(599.1) (Exercise)

(599.2) By GEN, it suffices to show $(dF \lor eF) \rightarrow \Box(dF \lor eF)$. So assume $dF \lor eF$. Since axiom (51) applies to every individual whatsoever, it applies to concepts and so each disjunct of our assumption implies its own necessitation. Hence, by disjunctive syllogism, $\Box dF \lor \Box eF$. By (158.15), it follows that $\Box (dF \lor eF)$. ⊢

(599.3) Let $\varphi$ be the formula $dF \lor eF$. Then by (599.2), it is a rigid condition on properties. So by (258.2), we know:

$$y = \lambda x(A!x & \forall F(xF \equiv dF \lor eF)) \rightarrow (A!y & \forall F(yF \equiv dF \lor eF))$$

From the identity (593.4), it follows by Rule =E that:

$$y = \lambda x(C!x & \forall F(xF \equiv dF \lor eF)) \rightarrow (A!y & \forall F(yF \equiv dF \lor eF))$$
Moreover, by definition of $C!$ (591), it follows from this last result by Rule $\equiv E$ that:

$$y = i(x(C!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv dF \vee eF)) \rightarrow (C!y \& \forall F(yF \equiv dF \vee eF))$$

Furthermore, by our conventions for restricted variables, this previous result can be expressed as:

$$y = ic\forall F(cF \equiv dF \vee eF) \rightarrow (C!y \& \forall F(yF \equiv dF \vee eF))$$

So by GEN, the fact that $(d \oplus e)\downarrow$, and Rule $\equiv E$, it follows that:

$$d \oplus e = ic\forall F(cF \equiv dF \vee eF) \rightarrow C!d \oplus e \& \forall F(d \oplus eF \equiv dF \vee eF)$$

Hence, by definition of $d \oplus e$ (598) it follows that:

$$C!d \oplus e \& \forall F(d \oplus eF \equiv dF \vee eF)$$

$(599.4)$ (Exercise)

$(600.1)$ Given that $(c \odot c)\downarrow$, that $c \odot c$ and $c$ are both concepts (599.3), and that both are abstract (591), it suffices by (242.1) to show $c \odot c$ and $c$ encode the same properties. So, by GEN, we show $c \odot cF \equiv cF$, as follows:

$$c \odot cF \equiv cF \vee cF \hspace{1em} \text{by (599.3)}$$

$$\equiv cF \hspace{1em} \text{by idempotence of } \vee \text{ (86.7)}$$

$(600.2)$ (Exercise)

$(600.3)$ [In the following proof, we sometimes assert unary encoding formulas of the form $\kappa\Pi$ in which $\kappa$ is either $(c \odot d) \oplus e$ or $c \odot (d \oplus e)$ and $\Pi$ is $F$.] Since $(c \odot d) \oplus e$ and $(c \odot (d \oplus e))\downarrow$, and both $(c \odot d) \oplus e$ and $c \odot (d \oplus e)$ are abstract objects, it suffices by (242.1) to show they encode the same properties. So, by GEN, we show $(c \odot d) \oplus eF \equiv c \odot (d \oplus e)F$ as follows:

$$(c \odot d) \oplus eF \equiv c \odot dF \vee eF \hspace{1em} \text{by (599.3)}$$

$$\equiv (cF \vee dF) \vee eF \hspace{1em} \text{by (599.3) and (89.8.h)}$$

$$\equiv cF \vee (dF \vee eF) \hspace{1em} \text{by associativity of } \vee \text{ (89.2.d)}$$

$$\equiv cF \vee d \oplus eF \hspace{1em} \text{by (599.3) and (89.8.g)}$$

$$\equiv c \odot (d \oplus e)F \hspace{1em} \text{by (599.3)}$$

$(602.1)$ – $(602.2)$ (Exercises)

$(604.1)$ (Exercise)

$(604.2)$ Suppose $c \preceq d$ and $c \npreceq d$. To show that $d \npreceq c$, we must establish that there is a property that $d$ encodes but which $c$ doesn't encode. Now since $c$ and $d$ are both concepts, they are both abstract objects. Since they are distinct,
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it follows by (242.1) that either there is a property \( c \) encodes that \( d \) doesn't, or there is a property \( d \) encodes that \( c \) doesn't. But, since \( c \leq d \) it follows by definition of \( \leq \) (603.1) that it must be the latter. \( \Rightarrow \)

(604.3) (Exercise)

(605.1) (Exercise)

(605.2) (\( \to \)) Exercise. (\( \leftarrow \)) Assume \( \forall e \left( e \leq c \equiv e \leq d \right) \), to show that \( c = d \). Since concepts are abstract objects, it suffices by GEN to show \( cF \equiv dF \):

(\( \to \)) Assume \( cF \) and, for reductio, assume \( \neg dF \). So \( c \not\leq d \). But it follows from our initial hypothesis that \( c \leq c \equiv c \leq d \). Hence \( c \not\leq c \), which contradicts the reflexivity of concept inclusion (604.1).

(\( \leftarrow \)) By analogous reasoning.

(605.3) (\( \to \)) Exercise. (\( \leftarrow \)) Assume \( \forall e \left( c \leq e \equiv d \leq e \right) \). By now familiar reasoning, it suffices to show that \( cF \equiv dF \):

(\( \to \)) Assume \( cF \) and, for reductio, assume \( \neg dF \). So \( c \not\leq d \). But it follows from our initial hypothesis that \( c \leq d \equiv d \leq d \). Hence \( d \not\leq d \), which contradicts the reflexivity of concept inclusion (604.1).

(\( \leftarrow \)) By analogous reasoning.

(606.1) - (606.3) (Exercises)

(606.4) (\( \to \)) Assume \( c \oplus d \leq e \). To show \( c \leq e \), we have to show \( \forall F \left( cF \rightarrow eF \right) \). So assume \( cF \). Then \( cF \lor dF \). So by the second conjunct of the modally-strict theorem (599.3) about sums, it follows that \( c \oplus dF \). But by definition of \( \leq \), our initial assumption implies \( \forall F \left( c \oplus dF \rightarrow eF \right) \). Hence \( eF \). One can show \( d \leq e \) by analogous reasoning.

(\( \leftarrow \)) Assume \( c \leq e \& d \leq e \). To show \( c \oplus d \leq e \), it suffices by GEN to show: \( c \oplus dF \rightarrow eF \). Assume \( c \oplus dF \). Then by the second conjunct of the modally-strict theorem (599.3) about sums, it follows that \( cF \lor dF \). Reasoning by cases: if \( cF \), then by the first conjunct of our initial assumption, it follows that \( eF \), and if \( dF \), then by the second conjunct of our initial assumption, it follows that \( eF \). Hence, \( eF \).

(606.5) (Exercise)

(607) (\( \to \)) Assume \( c \leq d \). We prove \( \exists e \left( c \oplus e = d \right) \) by cases, with the two cases being: (a) \( c = d \) and (b) \( c \neq d \). (a) Suppose \( c = d \). By the idempotency of \( \oplus \), \( c \oplus c = c \), in which case, \( c \oplus c = d \). Therefore, \( \exists e \left( c \oplus e = d \right) \). (b) Suppose \( c \neq d \). Then since \( c \leq d \), it follows that \( d \not\leq c \) (604.2), and so we know there
must be one or more properties encoded by \( d \) which are not encoded by \( c \). By Comprehension for Concepts (593.1), we know there exists a concept that encodes those properties \( F \) that \( d \) encodes and \( c \) doesn’t:

\[
\exists c' \forall F (c'F \equiv dF & \neg cF)
\]

Let \( c_1 \) be an arbitrary such concept, so that we know:

\[(\vartheta) \ \forall F (c_1F \equiv dF & \neg cF)\]

To complete the proof of (b), it suffices by \( \exists I \) to show \( c \oplus c_1 = d \), i.e., that \( c \oplus c_1 \) and \( d \) encode the same properties:

\[
(\rightarrow) \text{Assume } c \oplus c_1 G \text{ (to show: } dG). \text{ By (599.3), it follows that } cG \lor c_1 G. \text{ Reasoning by cases: if } cG, \text{ then by the fact that } c \leq d, \text{ it follows that } dG; \text{ if } c_1 G, \text{ then by (}\vartheta\text{), it follows that } dG & \neg cG, \text{ and hence } dG.
\]

\[
(\leftarrow) \text{Assume } dG \text{ (to show } c \oplus c_1 G). \text{ This time our proof by cases begins from } cG \lor \neg cG. \text{ If } cG, \text{ then } cG \lor c_1 G, \text{ so by (599.3), } c \oplus c_1 G. \text{ Alternatively, if } \neg cG, \text{ then we have } dG \& \neg cG. \text{ So by (}\vartheta\text{), } c_1 G, \text{ and hence } cG \lor c_1 G. \text{ So by (599.3), it follows that } c \oplus c_1 G.
\]

\[
(\leftarrow) \text{Assume } \exists e (c \oplus e = d). \text{ Let } c_2 \text{ be an arbitrary such concept, so that we know } c \oplus c_2 = d. \text{ To show } c \leq d, \text{ assume } cG (\text{to show } dG). \text{ Then, } cG \lor c_2 G, \text{ which by (599.3) entails that } c \oplus c_2 G. \text{ But by hypothesis, } c \oplus c_2 = d. \text{ So } dG. \\ni
\]

\[
(608) \ (\rightarrow) \text{Assume } c \leq d. \text{ So } \forall F (cF \rightarrow dF). \text{ To show that } c \oplus d = d, \text{ it suffices, by now familiar reasoning, to show that } c \oplus d \text{ and } d \text{ encode the same properties:}
\]

\[
(\rightarrow) \text{Assume } c \oplus d G. \text{ Then, by (599.3), } cG \lor dG. \text{ If we reason by cases from the two disjuncts to the conclusion } dG, \text{ then it suffices to show } cG \rightarrow dG. \text{ But the assumption that } cG \text{ implies } dG, \text{ by the fact that } c \leq d.
\]

\[
(\leftarrow) \text{Assume } dG. \text{ Then } cG \lor dG. \text{ So by (599.3), } c \oplus dG.
\]

\[
(\leftarrow) \text{Assume that } c \oplus d = d. \text{ It follows that } \exists e (c \oplus e = d). \text{ So by (607), } c \leq d. \\ni
\]

\[
(609.1) \text{Assume } (c \nleq d) \& (d \nleq c). \text{ We show that } c \oplus d \text{ is a witness to } \exists e (e \neq c & e \neq d \& c \oplus e = c \oplus d). \text{ We leave it as an exercise to show that } c \oplus d \neq c \text{ and } c \oplus d \neq d. \text{ To show } c \oplus (c \oplus d) = c \oplus d, \text{ we may reason as follows:}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
c \oplus (c \oplus d) & = c \oplus (c \oplus d) & \text{Rule =I} \\
& = (c \oplus c) \oplus d & \text{by associativity (600.3)} \\
& = c \oplus d & \text{by idempotence (600.1)} \ \ni
\end{align*}
\]

\[
(609.2) \ (\rightarrow) \text{Assume } c \leq d \text{ and } d \nleq c. \text{ By Comprehension for Concepts (593.1), we know:}
\]
\(\exists c' \forall F(c' F \equiv dF \& \neg cF)\)

Let \(e_1\) be such a concept, so that we know:

\((\delta)\) \(\forall F(e_1 F \equiv dF \& \neg cF)\)

Now by \&I and \&E, we want to show (a) \(e_1 \notin c\), and (b) \(c \oplus e_1 = d\):

(a) Since \(d \notin c\) by assumption, \(\exists F(dF \& \neg cF)\). Let \(P\) be an arbitrary such property, so that we know \(dP \& \neg cP\). Then by \((\delta)\), it follows that \(e_1 P\). Hence, we’ve established \(e_1 P \& \neg cP\). So \(e_1 \notin c\).

(b) Since concepts are abstract objects, it suffices by \((242.1)\) and GEN to show \(c \oplus e_1 G \equiv dG\). \((\rightarrow)\) Assume \(c \oplus e_1 G\). Then \(cG \lor e_1 G\). So we may reason by cases. If \(cG\), then since \(c \leq d\), \(dG\). If \(e_1 G\), then by \((\delta)\), it follows that \(dG \& \neg cG\). A fortiori, \(dG\). \((\leftarrow)\) Assume \(dG\). Now we reason by cases from the tautology \(cG \lor \neg cG\). If \(cG\), then \(cG \lor e_1 G\), and hence \(c \oplus e_1 G\). If \(\neg cG\), then \(dG \& \neg cG\), and hence, by \((\delta)\), \(e_1 G\). Therefore, \(cG \lor e_1 G\), and so \(c \oplus e_1 G\).

\((\leftarrow)\) Assume \(\exists e (e \notin c \& c \oplus e = d)\). Let \(e_2\) be such a concept, so that we know:

\((\xi)\) \(e_2 \notin c \& c \oplus e_2 = d\)

The right conjunct of \((\xi)\) implies \(\exists e (c \oplus e = d)\). So by \((607)\), \(c \leq d\). Hence it remains to show \(d \notin c\), i.e., that \(\exists F(dF \& \neg cF)\). Note that the first conjunct of \((\xi)\) implies \(\exists F(e_2 F \& \neg cF)\). Suppose \(Q\) is such a property, so that we know both \(e_2 Q\) and \(\neg cQ\). From the former, it follows that \(cQ \lor e_2 Q\) and hence that \(c \oplus e_2 Q\), by the second conjunct of \((599.3)\). So by the second conjunct of \((\xi)\) and Rule \(\equiv\), it follows that \(dQ\). So we have established \(dQ \& \neg cQ\). Hence \(\exists F(dF \& \neg cF)\).

\((611.1) - (611.3)\) (Exercises)

\((613.1) - (613.4)\) (Exercises)

\((614.1) - (614.3)\) (Exercises)

\((615.1)\) It suffices to show \(c \oplus (c \otimes d)F \equiv cF\). \((\rightarrow)\) Assume \(c \oplus (c \otimes d)F\). Then by \((599.3)\), we know \(cF \lor c \otimes dF\). Reasoning by cases, it remains only to show \(c \otimes dF \rightarrow cF\). So assume \(c \otimes dF\). Then by \((613.3)\), both \(cF \& dF\). A fortiori, \(cF\). \((\leftarrow)\) Assume \(cF\). Then \(cF \lor c \otimes dF\). Hence, by \((599.3)\), \(c \oplus (c \otimes d)F\). \(\Rightarrow\)

\((615.2)\) (Exercise)

\((616.1)\) It suffices to show that \(c \oplus a \varnothing F \equiv cF\). \((\rightarrow)\) Assume \(c \oplus a \varnothing F\). Then, by theorem \((599.3)\), \(cF \lor a \varnothing F\). But by theorem \((263.3)\) and definition \((260.1)\), we know \(a \varnothing\) doesn’t encode any properties and so \(\neg a \varnothing F\). Hence \(cF\). \((\leftarrow)\) Assume \(cF\). Then \(cF \lor a \varnothing F\). Hence, by theorem \((599.3)\), \(c \oplus a \varnothing F\). \(\Rightarrow\)
It suffices to show that \( c \otimes a \triangledown F \equiv c F \). (\( \rightarrow \)) Assume \( c \otimes a \triangledown F \). Then, by theorem (613.3), \( c F \& a \triangledown F \). *A fortiori*, \( c F \). Hence \( c F \& a \triangledown F \). So by (613.3), \( c \otimes a \triangledown F \). ⊢

(616.3) – (616.4) (Exercises)

(618.1) It suffices to show that \( c \otimes (d \otimes e) F \equiv (c \otimes d) \otimes (c \otimes e) F \):

\[
\begin{align*}
c \otimes (d \otimes e) F & \equiv c F \lor d \otimes e F \\
& \equiv c F \lor (d F \& e F) \quad \text{by (613.3) and (89.8.g)} \\
& \equiv (c F \lor d F) \& (c F \lor e F) \quad \text{by (89.6.b)} \\
& \equiv (c \otimes d F) \& (c F \lor e F) \quad \text{by (599.3) and (89.4.e)} \\
& \equiv (c \otimes d) \otimes (c \otimes e) F \quad \text{by (613.3)}
\end{align*}
\]

(618.2) (Exercise)

(620.1) – (620.3) (Exercises)

(622.1) (Exercise)

(622.2) By GEN and RN, it suffices to show \( \neg d F \rightarrow \Box \neg d F \). But as an instance of theorem (177.7), we know \( \neg d F \equiv \Box \neg d F \). *A fortiori*, \( \neg d F \rightarrow \Box \neg d F \). ⊢

(622.3) – (622.4) (Exercises)

(623.1) Theorem (263.4) is that \( \text{Universal}(a \triangledown) \). By definition (260.2), it follows that \( \forall F(a \triangledown F) \). So to show \( c \oplus c \) and \( a \triangledown \) are identical, i.e., encode the same properties, it suffices to show that \( \forall F(c \oplus c F) \) and, by GEN, that \( c \oplus c F \). Now it is a tautology that \( c F \lor \neg c F \). Since \( \neg c F \equiv \neg c F \) is a consequence of the second conjunct of (622.3), it follows by (89.8.g) that \( c F \lor \neg c F \). But from this it follows by (599.3) that \( c \oplus c F \). ⊢

(623.2) (Exercise)

(624.1) It suffices to show \( \neg \neg c \) and \( c \) encode the same properties. Before we prove this, note that by the second conjunct of (622.3), we know:

(8) \( \forall F(\neg c F \equiv \neg c F) \)

Since it is a modally strict theorem that a biconditional is equivalent to the result of negating both sides, we know \( (\neg c F \equiv \neg c F) \equiv (\neg c F \equiv \neg \neg c F) \). So by the Rule of Substitution (160.1), it follows from (8) that:

(ξ) \( \forall F(\neg \neg c F \equiv \neg \neg c F) \)

So we may prove our theorem as follows:
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\[ \neg cF \equiv \neg \neg cF \text{ by (622.3), } \neg \text{ substituted for } d \]
\[ \equiv \neg \neg cF \text{ by (\xi)} \]
\[ \equiv cF \text{ by } \neg \neg E \text{ (79.2)} \]

(624.2) It suffices to show \( \neg c \oplus \neg d \) encodes \( F \) if and only if \( \neg (c \otimes d) \) encodes \( F \):

\[ \neg c \oplus \neg dF \equiv \neg cF \lor \neg dF \text{ by (599.3)} \]
\[ \equiv \neg cF \lor \neg dF \text{ by (622.3) and (89.8.h)} \]
\[ \equiv \neg (cF \& dF) \text{ by (89.5.c)} \]
\[ \equiv \neg (c \otimes d)F \text{ by (613.3) and (89.4.b)} \]
\[ \equiv \neg (c \otimes d)F \text{ by (622.3)} \]

(624.3) (Exercise)

(629.1) Assume for reductio that \( c < c \). Then by definition of \( < \) (628), it follows that \( c \leq c \) and \( c \neq c \). But by Rule =I, \( c = c \). Contradiction. \( \Rightarrow \)

(629.2) Assume \( c < d \) and \( d < e \). By (628), it follows from these two assumptions, respectively, that:

(\( \theta \)) \( c \leq d \& c \neq d \)

(\( \xi \)) \( d \leq e \& d \neq e \)

Now to show \( c < e \), we have to show \( c \leq e \& c \neq e \), by (628). The first conjuncts of (\( \theta \)) and (\( \xi \)) jointly imply \( c \leq e \), by the transitivity of \( \leq \) (604.3). So it remains to show \( c \neq e \). Assume, for reductio, that \( c = e \). Then substituting \( e \) for \( c \) into the first conjunct of (\( \theta \)), it follows that \( e \leq d \). But from this and the first conjunct of (\( \xi \)), it follows that \( e = d \), by the right-to-left direction of (605.1). But by the symmetry of identity, this contradicts the second conjunct of (\( \xi \)). \( \Rightarrow \)

(629.3) Assume \( c < d \). For reductio, assume \( d < c \). Then by (629.2), \( c < c \), contradicting (629.1). \( \Rightarrow \)

(631.1) By definition (630.1), we have to show \( \forall d (a_\emptyset \leq d) \). It suffices, by GEN, to show \( a_\emptyset \leq d \), and so by definition (603.1), we must show \( \forall F (a_\emptyset F \rightarrow dF) \). Again, by GEN, we show \( a_\emptyset F \rightarrow dF \). But independently, by theorem (263.3) and definition (260.1), we know \( \neg \exists F a_\emptyset F \), i.e., \( \forall F \neg a_\emptyset F \). Instantiating to \( F \), it follows that \( \neg a_\emptyset F \). Hence \( a_\emptyset F \rightarrow dF \), by failure of the antecedent. \( \Rightarrow \)

(631.2) Since we know \( \text{Bottom}(a_\emptyset) \), it remains only to show \( \forall c (\text{Bottom}(c) \rightarrow c = a_\emptyset) \), since our theorem will then follow by &I, \( \exists I \), and the definition of the unique existence quantifier. By GEN, it suffices to show \( \text{Bottom}(c) \rightarrow c = a_\emptyset \). So assume \( \text{Bottom}(c) \). Since \( c \) and \( a_\emptyset \) are both abstract, we must show \( \forall F (cF \equiv a_\emptyset F) \). Now, by theorem (263.3) and definition (260.1), we know \( \neg \exists F a_\emptyset F \). So
by (104.9), we need only show \( \neg \exists FcF \). For reductio, assume \( \exists FcF \). Let \( P \) be an arbitrary such property, so that we know \( cP \). But \( c \) is, by hypothesis, a bottom concept, and so \( \forall d(c \leq d) \). Since \( a_\emptyset \) is a concept, it follows that \( c \leq a_\emptyset \). Hence, \( \forall F(cF \rightarrow a_\emptyset F) \). So \( a_\emptyset P \), given that \( cP \), and thus \( \exists F a_\emptyset F \). Contradiction. \( \Box \)

(631.3) (Exercise)

(631.4) Since the previous theorem is that \( a_\emptyset < a_G \), the present theorem will follow by \&I, \( \exists I \), and the definition of the unique existence quantifier if we can establish that \( \forall c(c < a_G \rightarrow c = a_\emptyset) \). So, by GEN, assume \( c < a_G \) and, for reductio, suppose \( c \neq a_\emptyset \). Since \( a_\emptyset \) encodes no properties, \( c \neq a_\emptyset \) implies \( \exists F(cF & \neg a_\emptyset F) \). Suppose \( P \) is an arbitrary such property, so that we know \( cP \) and \( \neg a_\emptyset P \). Since \( c < a_G \) by assumption, it follows by definition of < (628) both that:

(8) \( c \leq a_G \)

(ξ) \( c \neq a_G \)

From (8) and \( cP \), it follows that \( a_G P \), and so \( P = G \), by the right conjunct of (415.1). Hence,

(ζ) \( \neg cG \)

But (8) and (ξ) jointly imply that there is a property that \( a_G \) encodes that \( c \) fails to encode. Suppose \( Q \) is such that (i) \( a_G Q \) and (ii) \( \neg cQ \). Then from (i) and the right conjunct of (415.1), we know \( Q = G \), and so from (ii), it follows that \( \neg cG \), which contradicts (ζ). \( \Box \)

(631.5) Assume \( \text{Bottom}(c) \). So by definition (630.1),

(8) \( \forall d(c \leq d) \)

To show \( \text{Atom}(c) \), we have to show \( \neg \exists d(d < c) \), by (630.2). For reductio, assume \( \exists d(d < c) \). Suppose \( d_1 \) is an arbitrary such concept, so that we know \( d_1 < c \).

Then by definition of < (628), it follows that (a) \( d_1 \leq c \) and (b) \( d_1 \neq c \). But if we instantiate \( d_1 \) into (8), it follows that \( c \leq d_1 \). But from (a) and this last fact, it follows by (605.1) that \( d_1 = c \), contradicting (b). \( \Box \)

(631.6) (Exercise)

(631.7) Given a proof of \( \text{Atom}(a_\emptyset) \) (631.6), it suffices, by \&I, \( \exists I \), and the definition of the unique existence quantifier, to show \( \forall c(\text{Atom}(c) \rightarrow c = a_\emptyset) \). By GEN, it suffices to show \( \text{Atom}(c) \rightarrow c = a_\emptyset \). So assume \( \text{Atom}(c) \) and, for reductio, assume \( c \neq a_\emptyset \). From the atomicity of \( c \), it follows that:

(8) \( \neg \exists d(d < c) \)
Now \( a_\varnothing \) is a bottom concept (631.1), and so \( \forall d (a_\varnothing \leq d) \), by definition (630.1). In particular, \( a_\varnothing \leq c \). But from our reductio assumption, we also know \( a_\varnothing \neq c \), by symmetry of identity. Hence, \( a_\varnothing < c \), and so \( \exists d (d < c) \), which contradicts (\( \varnothing \)). \( \Rightarrow \)

(633.1) Assume Overlap\((c, d)\). Then by (632.1), \( \exists F(cF \& dF) \). Assume \( P \) is such a property, so that we know \( cP \& dP \). Now to show Overlap\(^*\)(c, d), we have to show \( \exists e (e \leq c \& e \leq d) \). Let’s show that Thin Form of \( P \), namely \( a_P \), is a witness, so that it suffices to show both \( a_P \leq c \) and \( a_P \leq d \). To show that \( a_P \leq c \), we have to show \( \forall F (a_P F \rightarrow cF) \), and by GEN, \( a_P F \rightarrow cF \). So assume \( a_P F \). Then by the second conjunct of (415.1), it follows that \( F = P \). Since \( cP \), it follows that \( cF \). By analogous reasoning, \( a_P \leq d \). \( \Rightarrow \)

(633.2) Let’s choose our witnesses to be, respectively, the null concept, \( a_\varnothing \), and the Thin Form of \( P \), \( a_P \), where \( P \) is any arbitrarily chosen property. Then it suffices to show (a) Overlap\(^*\)(\( a_\varnothing \), \( a_P \)), and (b) \( \neg \text{Overlap}(a_\varnothing, a_P) \). (a) By (604.1), we know \( a_\varnothing \leq a_P \), and by (631.3), we know \( a_\varnothing \leq a_P \). Hence, by \&I and \( \exists \), \( \exists e (e \leq a_\varnothing \& e \leq a_P) \), i.e., Overlap\(^*\)(\( a_\varnothing \), \( a_P \)). (b) By now familiar reasoning, \( \neg \exists F a_\varnothing F \). Hence, \( \neg \exists F(a_\varnothing F \& a_P F) \). So \( \neg \text{Overlap}(a_\varnothing, a_P) \). \( \Rightarrow \)

(633.3) – (633.7) (Exercises)

(633.8) By GEN, it suffices to show Overlap\(^*\)(\( c, d \)). Since Bottom\((a_\varnothing)\) by (631.1), it follows by definition (630.1) that \( a_\varnothing \) is a part of every concept. Hence, we know both \( a_\varnothing \leq c \) and \( a_\varnothing \leq d \), for any concepts \( c \) and \( d \). So, \( \exists e (e \leq c \& e \leq d) \). Thus, Overlap\(^*\)(\( c, d \)), by definition (632.2). \( \Rightarrow \)

(633.9) We can show \( a_\varnothing \) is a witness by showing:

(a) \( a_\varnothing \leq d \)

(b) \( \neg \text{Overlap}(a_\varnothing, c) \)

(a) follows immediately from the fact that \( a_\varnothing \) is a bottom concept, and so is a part of every concept, by (631.1) and (630.1). For (b), we know that \( \neg \exists F a_\varnothing F \). Hence, it follows \( \text{a fortiori} \) that \( \neg \exists F(a_\varnothing F \& cF) \). So \( \neg \text{Overlap}(a_\varnothing, c) \). \( \Rightarrow \)

Alternatively, \( d \odot c \) is a witness.\(^{415}\) Recall that \( d \odot c \) was defined in (625.5) (as part of Exercise 1) as \( \text{i.e} \text{DifferenceOf}(e, d, c) \), where \( \text{DifferenceOf}(e, d, c) \) was defined in (625.1) as \( \forall F(eF \equiv dF \& \neg cF) \). By \&I and \( \exists \), it suffices to show:

(a) \( d \odot c \leq d \)

(b) \( \neg \text{Overlap}(d \odot c, c) \)

\(^{415}\)Note that if \( d \leq c \), then \( d \odot c \) is \( a_\varnothing \), and so the proof reduces to the previous one.
For (a), we need to show \( d \ominus cF \rightarrow dF \). So assume \( d \ominus cF \). Then by Exercise (625.6), it follows that \( dF \land \neg cF \). So \( dF \). For (b), proceed by reductio. Assume \( \text{Overlap}(d \ominus c, c) \). Then by Exercise (625.6), it follows that \( dF \land \neg cF \). So \( dF \). For \( \neg cF \). Contradiction. □

(633.10) (Complete the proof sketched in the text.)

(634.1) - (634.2) (Exercises)

(634.3) Assume \( c < d \). Then, to show that \( a_\varnothing \) is a witness to \( \exists e(e < d \land \neg \text{Overlap}(e, c)) \), we show both (a) \( a_\varnothing < d \) and (b) \( \neg \text{Overlap}(a_\varnothing, c) \):

(a) By definition, we have to show both \( a_\varnothing \leq d \) and \( a_\varnothing \neq d \). The former is a simple consequence of the fact that \( a_\varnothing \) is a bottom concept (631.1) and thus by definition (630.1) a part of every concept. For the latter, it suffices to show that \( d \) encodes a property, since we know, by theorem (263.3) and definition (260.1), that \( a_\varnothing \) doesn’t. Note that from our initial hypothesis, it follows that \( c \preceq d \) and \( c, d \). But since the former implies \( \forall F(cF \rightarrow dF) \) and the latter implies that one of \( c \) and \( d \) encodes a property the other fails to encode, it follows that \( \exists F(dF \land \neg cF) \). A fortiori, \( \exists FdF \).

(b) By now familiar reasoning, \( a_\varnothing \) encodes no properties. A fortiori, there is no property that both \( a_\varnothing \) encodes and \( c \) encodes. Hence \( \neg \text{Overlap}(a_\varnothing, c) \). □

(636.1) - (636.2) (Exercises)

(639) By GEN, assume \( \text{Concept}^+(x) \). Then by definition, \( C!x \) and \( \exists !xF \). But from the former it follows that \( \Box C!x \) (exercise). Now assume \( P \) is a witness to \( \exists !xF \), so that we know \( xP \). The \( \Box xP \). Hence, \( \exists !xF \). So by the Buridan formula (168.1), \( \Box \exists !xF \). Hence, we’ve established \( \Box C!x \land \Box \exists !xF \). So, \( \Box (C!x \land \exists !xF) \). Hence \( \Box \text{Concept}^+(x) \). □

(641.1) Clearly, since \( a_\varnothing \) fails to be a non-null concept, it fails to be a non-null bottom. □

(641.2) Suppose, for reductio, that \( \exists ! \text{Bottom}^+(\xi) \). Let \( \xi_1 \) be such a non-null concept, so that we know \( \text{Bottom}^+(\xi_1) \), i.e., by (640), that \( \forall d(\xi_1 \leq d) \), i.e., that:

\[ (\delta) \forall d \forall !F(\xi_1 F \rightarrow dF) \]

Since \( \xi_1 \) is non-null, \( \exists !F\xi_1 F \). Suppose \( \xi_1 P \). Then consider \( a_\tau \), i.e., the Thin Form of \( \overline{P} \), which we know exists. Since \( A!a_\tau \) (415.1), \( C!a_\tau \) (591), and by (415.2), \( a_\tau \overline{P} \). So \( a_\tau \) is non-null concept. Hence \( (\delta) \) implies \( \forall F(\xi_1 F \rightarrow a_\tau F) \). So since \( \xi_1 P \), it follows that \( a_\tau P \). But \( P \not\in \overline{P} \) (197.5), and so it follows from the second conjunct of (415.1) that \( \neg a_\tau P \). Contradiction. □
(643.1) Clearly, \( a_G \) is a non-null concept. So, we have to show, by the definition of a non-null atom (642), that \(-\exists d (d < a_G)\). We do this with the help of a lemma, namely, if a non-null concept is a part of \( a_G \), it fails to be a proper part of \( a_G \):

\(\forall d (d \leq a_G \rightarrow \neg d < a_G)\)

**Proof.** By GEN, we need to show \( d \leq a_G \rightarrow \neg d < a_G \). Assume \( d \leq a_G \). For reductio, assume \( d < a_G \). Then by definition (628), we also know that \( d \not= a_G \). So \( d \) and \( a_G \) must differ by one of their encoded properties. But since our first assumption implies \( \forall F (d F \rightarrow a_G F) \), it must be that \( a_G \) encodes a property \( d \) doesn’t encode, i.e., \( \exists F (a_G F \& \neg d F) \). Suppose \( P \) is such a property, so that we know \( a_G P \) and \( \neg d P \). Since the former implies \( P = G \) (415.1), it follows from the latter that \( \neg d G \). But \( d \) is, by hypothesis, non-null, and so \( \exists F d F \). Suppose \( Q \) is such a property, so that we know \( d Q \). Then since \( d \leq a_G \), it follows that \( a_G Q \) and, by now familiar reasoning, \( G = Q \). So it follows from the previously established fact \( \neg d G \) that \( \neg d Q \). Contradiction.

Now, for reductio, suppose that \( \exists ! d (d \prec a_G) \). Let \( d_1 \) be such a non-null concept, so that we know \( d_1 \prec a_G \). Then the definition of \( \prec \) implies \( d_1 \leq a_G \). But then by (6), \( \neg d_1 < a_G \). Contradiction. \(\Rightarrow\)

(643.2) For reductio, assume \( \exists d (d < c) \). By definition of the unique existence quantifier, it follows that \( \exists d (d < c \& \forall e (e < c \rightarrow e = d)) \). Suppose \( d_1 \) is such a non-null concept, so that we know:

\(\forall d (d \leq c \& \forall e (e < c \rightarrow e = d))\)

By definition of \(<\), the first conjunct of (6) implies:

\(\neg d_1 < c \& \exists e (e < c \rightarrow e = d_1)\)

By now familiar reasoning, (6) implies \( \exists F (e F \& \neg d_1 F) \). Suppose \( P \) is such a property, so that we know both \( e P \) and \( \neg d_1 P \). Now consider the Thin Form of \( P, a_p \). Since \( a_p P \) (422.1) and \( \neg d_1 P \), it follows that:

\( a_p \not= d_1 \)

Now if we can establish that \( a_p < c \), then we will have reached our contradiction, since this would imply, by the second conjunct of (6), that \( a_p = d_1 \), contradicting (6). So it remains show (a) \( a_p \leq c \) and (b) \( a_p \not= c \):

(a) Assume \( a_p F \). Then by (415.1), \( F = P \). But we already know \( e P \). So \( e F \).

(b) Assume, for reductio, \( a_p = c \). From this and the first conjunct of (6), it follows that \( d_1 < a_p \). So \( \exists d (d < a_p) \). But by definition (642), this contradicts the atomicity\(" of \( a_p \) (643.1). \(\Rightarrow\)
Assume \( \text{Atom}^+(\xi) \). Then, by definition:

\[(\xi) \quad \exists d (d < \xi)\]

Assume \( \xi F \& \xi G \) and, for reductio, \( F \neq G \). Consider, then, the Thin Form of \( F \), \( a_F \). Clearly, \( a_F \) is a non-null concept. Our strategy is to establish both that

(a) \( a_F \preceq \xi \) and (b) \( a_F \not\equiv \xi \), for then it follows by definition (628) that \( a_F < \xi \) and thus \( \exists d (d < \xi) \), contradicting (\( \xi \)):

(a) We have to show \( \forall H (a_F H \rightarrow \xi H) \). So by GEN, assume \( a_F H \). Then by now familiar reasoning, it follows that \( F = H \). Since we know \( \xi F \), it follows that \( \xi H \).

(b) By (415.1), we know \( a_F G \equiv G = F \). So it follows from our assumption that \( F \neq G \) that \( \neg a_F G \). Since \( \xi G \) by assumption, it follows that \( a_F \not\equiv \xi \).  

\((643.4)\) (Exercise)

\((644)\) (\(\rightarrow\)) Assume \( \text{Overlap}(\xi, d) \), i.e., that \( \exists F (\xi F \& d F) \). Suppose \( P \) is such a property, so that we know both \( \xi P \) and \( d P \). Then choose our witness for \( e \) to be the Thin Form of \( P \), i.e., \( a_P \), which is clearly a non-null concept. Since \( a_P \) encodes the single property \( P \), it follows that both \( a_P \preceq \xi \) and \( a_P \preceq d \). Consequently, \( \exists e (e \preceq \xi \& e \preceq d) \). (\(\leftarrow\)) Assume \( \exists e (e \preceq \xi \& e \preceq d) \). Let \( e_1 \) be such a concept, so that we know both \( e_1 \preceq \xi \) and \( e_1 \preceq d \). Since \( \xi \) is non-null, \( \exists F e_1 F \). Suppose \( P \) is such a property, so that \( e_1 P \). Then since both \( e_1 \preceq \xi \) and \( e_1 \preceq d \), it follows from each, respectively, that \( \xi P \) and \( d P \). So \( \exists F (\xi F \& d F) \).  

\((646.1)\) We leave the proof of the first conjunct as an exercise. To prove the second conjunct, let \( P \) and \( Q \) be any two distinct properties and consider the Thin Forms of \( P \) and \( Q \), \( a_P \) and \( a_Q \). Since both encode a property, both are non-null concepts. But there is no property that they both encode. Hence \( \neg \text{Overlap}(a_P, a_Q) \). So \( \exists \exists d \neg \text{Overlap}(\xi, d) \).  

\((646.2)\) – (646.3) (Exercises)

\((646.4)\) Consider any three, pairwise distinct properties \( P \), \( Q \), and \( R \). We know there are such by a previous theorem. Now consider the following three concepts: the Thin Form of \( P \), i.e., \( a_P \); the (strictly canonical) concept that encodes just the two properties \( P \) and \( Q \); and the (strictly canonical) concept that encodes just the two properties \( Q \) and \( R \). Call the latter two concepts \( c_1 \) and \( c_2 \), respectively:

\[ c_1 = \text{iC\forall F (F \equiv F \equiv P \lor F \equiv Q)} \]

\[ c_2 = \text{iC\forall F (F \equiv F \equiv Q \lor F \equiv R)} \]

Clearly, \( a_P \), \( c_1 \), and \( c_2 \) are all non-null concepts. So it suffices by \( \& I \) and \( \exists I \) to establish:
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(a) \(\text{Overlap}(a_P, c_1)\)

(b) \(\text{Overlap}(c_1, c_2)\)

(c) \(\neg \text{Overlap}(a_P, c_2)\)

(a) Since \(a_P\) encodes just the property \(P\) and \(c_1\) encodes just \(P\) and \(Q\), there is a property they both encode, and so \(\text{Overlap}(a_P, c_1)\). (b) Since \(c_1\) and \(c_2\) both encode \(Q\), \(\text{Overlap}(c_1, c_2)\). (c) Since \(a_P\) encodes just \(P\) and \(c_2\) encodes just \(Q\) and \(R\), then there is no property they encode in common. Hence \(\neg \text{Overlap}(a_P, c_2)\).

\(\Rightarrow\)

(646.5) By classical quantificational reasoning, the claim we want to prove is equivalent to:

\(\exists \varphi \exists d \forall e (e \leq d \rightarrow \text{Overlap}(e, \varphi))\)

So we show, where \(G\) is any property, that \(a_G\) is a witness to both existential claims. Clearly, \(a_G\) is a non-null concept. So we have to show:

\[\forall e (e \leq a_G \rightarrow \text{Overlap}(e, a_G))\]

By GEN, it suffices to show \(e \leq a_G \rightarrow \text{Overlap}(e, a_G)\). So assume \(e \leq a_G\). Now to show \(\text{Overlap}(e, a_G)\), we have to show \(\exists F (eF \& a_GF)\). But \(G\) is a witness, as can be seen from the following reasoning. \(a_GG\) follows immediately (415.2). So it remains to show \(eG\). Since \(e\) is non-null, \(\exists F eF\). Let \(H\) be such a property, so that we know \(eH\). But since \(e\) is by hypothesis a part of \(a_G\), it follows that \(a_GH\). But then \(H = G\) (415.1). So \(eG\).

\(\Rightarrow\)

(646.6) (The proof was sketched in the text.)

(647.1) Assume \(e < d\). Then \(e \leq d \& e \not= d\). So \(\exists F (dF \& \neg eF)\). Let \(P\) be such a property, so that we know \(dP \& \neg eP\). Then as our witness to \(\exists e (e \leq d \& \neg \text{Overlap}(e, \varphi))\), consider the Thin Form of \(P, a_P\), which is clearly a non-null concept. It suffices to show \(a_P \leq d\) and \(\neg \text{Overlap}(a_P, \varphi)\). Since \(a_P\) encodes only \(P\) and \(d\) encodes \(P\), \(d\) encodes every property \(a_P\) encodes. Hence, \(a_P \leq d\). Moreover, since \(a_P\) encodes just \(P\) and \(e\) doesn’t encode \(P\), there is no property that they encode in common. Hence \(\neg \text{Overlap}(a_P, \varphi)\).

\(\Rightarrow\)

(647.2) Assume \(d \not= e\). Then \(\exists F (dF \& \neg eF)\) and our proof now reduces to that of the previous theorem.

\(\Rightarrow\)

(647.3) Assume \(e < d\). Then \(e \leq d \& e \not= d\). So \(\exists F (dF \& \neg eF)\). Let \(P\) be such a property, so that we know \(dP \& \neg eP\). Now, in the proof of (647.1), we established that, under the same assumptions, the Thin Form of \(P, a_P\) is a witness to \(\exists e (e \leq d \& \neg \text{Overlap}(e, \varphi))\) by showing that both \(a_P \leq d\) and \(\neg \text{Overlap}(a_P, \varphi)\). So to show that \(a_P\) is a witness to \(\exists e (e < d \& \neg \text{Overlap}(e, \varphi))\), it suffices to show
only $a_P \neq d$. For reductio, suppose $a_P = d$. Then from our initial assumption, it follows that $\xi < a_P$. Hence $\exists \xi (\xi < a_P)$. But by theorem (643.1), we know that $\text{Atom}^+(a_P)$. Hence, by the definition of a non-null atom (642), it follows that $\neg \exists \xi (\xi < a_P)$.

(650.1) – (650.3) (Exercises)

(652) (Exercise)

(653.1) – (653.2) (Exercises)

(654) We want to show $c_G \oplus c_H = c_1$, where $c_1$ is the following canonical concept:

$$c_1 = \forall F (cF \equiv G \Rightarrow F \lor H \Rightarrow F)$$

Let $\varphi$ be the condition $G \Rightarrow F \lor H \Rightarrow F$. Then we leave it as a simple exercise to show that $\varphi$ is a rigid condition on properties and, hence, that $c_1$ is strictly canonical. From this, it follows by theorem (258.2) that:

$$\forall F (c_1 F \equiv G \Rightarrow F \lor H \Rightarrow F)$$

Now to see $c_G \oplus c_H$ and $c_1$ encode the same properties, we establish $c_G \oplus c_H F \equiv c_1 F$:

$$
\begin{align*}
c_G \oplus c_H F & \equiv c_G F \lor c_H F & \text{by (599.3)} \\
& \equiv G \Rightarrow F \lor c_H F & \text{by (653.1), (89.8.h)} \\
& \equiv G \Rightarrow F \lor H \Rightarrow F & \text{by (653.1), (89.8.g)} \\
& \equiv c_1 F & \text{by (8)}
\end{align*}
$$

(655.1) – (655.2) (Exercises)

(657) (Exercise)

(659.1) – (659.3) (Exercises)

(661) Our theorem is implied by theorem (203.1), i.e., $\Diamond \exists x (E!x \& \Diamond \neg E!x)$, as follows:

$$
\begin{align*}
\Diamond \exists x (E!x \& \Diamond \neg E!x) & \rightarrow \exists x (E!x \& \Diamond \neg E!x) & \text{by BF} \\
& \rightarrow \exists x (\Diamond E!x \& \Diamond \neg E!x) & \text{by (165.11) and (160.1)} \\
& \rightarrow \exists u (\Diamond E!u \& \Diamond \neg E!u) & \text{(exercise)} \\
& \rightarrow \exists u (\Diamond E!u \& \Diamond \neg E!u) & \text{by (165.11) and (160.1)} \\
& \rightarrow \exists F \exists u (F u \& \Diamond \neg F u) & \text{by } \exists ! \\
& \rightarrow \exists u \exists F (F u \& \Diamond \neg F u) & \text{(exercise)}
\end{align*}
$$

Exercise. Under the assumption that $c < d$, show that $d \oplus \xi$ is also a witness to $\exists \xi (\xi < d \& \neg \text{Overlap}(\xi, \xi))$. 

\(^{416}\)
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(663.1) By (660) and (659.3), we know \(c_u\) exists. So as an instance of (145.2), we know:

\[ c_u = \text{icConceptOf}(c,u) \rightarrow \text{ConceptOf}(c_u,u) \]

The antecedent holds by definition (660). So \(\text{ConceptOf}(c_u,u)\). But it follows from definition (658) that:

\[ \text{ConceptOf}(c_u,u) \equiv \forall F(c_uF \equiv Fu) \]

(See footnote 306.) Hence, \(\forall F(c_uF \equiv Fu)\), from which it follows that \(c_uG \equiv Gu\).

(663.2) Assume \(c_uG\). By definition of \(\succeq\), we need to show \(c_G \succeq c_u\), and by definition of \(\preceq\), show \(\forall F(c_GF \rightarrow c_uF)\). So assume \(c_GF\). Then by (653.1), we know \(\Box\forall(xG \rightarrow Fx)\). By the T schema, \(\forall(xG \rightarrow Fx)\) it follows that \(Fu\). So, again by (653.1), it follows that \(c_uF\).

(65) To avoid clash of variables, we write theorem to be proved as \(\forall G(c_uG \vee c_u\overline{G})\). So by GEN, it suffices to show \(c_uG \vee c_u\overline{G}\). Independently, we know \(\sTa \vee \neg \sTa\). So by (44.1) and a Rule of Substitution:

\[ (\delta) \quad \sTa \vee \neg \sTa \]

Since \([\lambda y \neg Gy], \beta\)-Conversion implies \([\lambda y \neg Gy]u \equiv \neg Gu\), i.e., \(\neg Gu \equiv [\lambda y \neg Gy]u\). Since this is a modally strict theorem, a Rule of Substitution allows us to substitute \([\lambda y \neg Gy]u\) for \(\neg Gu\) in the logical truth \(\sTa \equiv \sTa \equiv \sT[\lambda y \neg Gy]u\). So by the definition of relation negation (194) and the Rule of Substitution for Defined Subformulas (160.2), it follows that \(\sTa \equiv \sT\overline{G}u\) is a modally strict theorem. Hence, it follows from (\(\delta\)) by a Rule of Substitution that:

\[ (\xi) \quad \sT\overline{G}u \]

So we may reason by disjunctive syllogism from (\(\xi\)). If \(\sT\overline{G}u\), then by Actualized Abstraction (255), it follows that \(\forall x(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv Fu))G\), i.e., by the identity noted in Remark (662), \(c_uG\). If \(\sT\overline{G}u\), then by Actualized Abstraction (255), it follows that \(\forall x(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv Fu))\overline{G}\), i.e., by the identity noted in Remark (662), \(c_u\overline{G}\). Hence, \(c_uG \vee c_u\overline{G}\).

(668.1) Assume \(c_uG\). By the definitions of \(\succeq\) and \(\preceq\), we have to show \(\forall H(c_uH \rightarrow c_{uG}H)\). So, by GEN, assume \(c_uH\), to show \(c_{uG}H\). By (668.1), we
have to show $\forall x(Gx \rightarrow Hx)$. But from $c_f H$, we know by (653.1) that $F \Rightarrow H$, from which it follows by definition of $\Rightarrow$ and the T schema that $\forall x(Fx \rightarrow Hx)$. But our initial assumption implies, by now familiar reasoning, $\forall x(Gx \rightarrow Fx)$. By predicate logic, it then follows that $\forall x(Gx \rightarrow Hx)$. (\textit{\textbullet}) Assume $c_{IG} \geq c_f$. By the definitions of $\geq$ and $\leq$, this implies $\forall H(c_f H \rightarrow c_{IG} H)$. As an instance of this latter, we know $c_f F \rightarrow c_{fG} F$, from which it follows, by (653.2), that $c_{fG} F$. $\Rightarrow$

\textbf{(668.4)\bigstar (\rightarrow) Assume $c_{3G} F$.} By the definitions of $\geq$ and $\leq$, we have to show $\forall H(c_f H \rightarrow c_{3G} H)$. So assume $c_f H$, to show $c_{3G} H$. By (668.2)\bigstar, we have to show $\exists x(Gx & Hx)$. But from $c_f H$, we know by (653.1) that $F \Rightarrow H$, from which it follows by the definition of $\Rightarrow$ and the T schema that $\forall x(Fx \rightarrow Hx)$. But our initial assumption implies, by now familiar reasoning, $\exists x(Gx & Fx)$. By predicate logic, it then follows that $\exists x(Gx & Hx)$. (\textit{\textbullet}) Assume $c_{3G} \geq c_f$. By the definitions of $\geq$ and $\leq$, our assumption implies $\forall H(c_f H \rightarrow c_{3G} H)$. As an instance of this latter, we know $c_f F \rightarrow c_{3G} F$, from which it follows, by (653.2), that $c_{3G} F$. $\Rightarrow$

\textbf{(669.1)\bigstar By the commutativity of the biconditional, it follows from (663.1)\bigstar that $Gu \equiv c_u G$.} But from this and (663.2)\bigstar, and it follows that $Gu \equiv c_u \geq c_G$ by a biconditional syllogism. $\Rightarrow$

\textbf{(669.2)\bigstar – (669.3)\bigstar (Exercises)}

\textbf{(676.1) Assume the antecedent and let $a$ and $w_1$ be such an ordinary object and possible world, so that we know $\text{RealizesAt}(a, c, w_1)$ and $\text{RealizesAt}(a, d, w_1)$. Then, by the definition of realization (674), we know both $\forall F(w_1 \models Fa \equiv c F)$ and $\forall F(w_1 \models Fa \equiv d F)$. So, by the laws of quantified biconditionals, it follows that $\forall F(c F \equiv d F)$. Since $c$ and $d$ are concepts, they are abstract (591). So, by theorem (242.1), $c = d$. $\Rightarrow$

\textbf{(676.2) Assume the antecedent and let $c_1$ and $w_1$ be such a concept and possible world, so that we know $\text{RealizesAt}(u, c_1, w_1)$ and $\text{RealizesAt}(v, c_1, w_1)$. Then, by the definition of realization (674), we know both $\forall F(w_1 \models Fu \equiv c_1 F)$ and $\forall F(w_1 \models Fv \equiv c_1 F)$. So by the laws of quantified biconditionals, we know: $\forall F(w_1 \models Fu \equiv w_1 \models Fv)$. Instantiate this to the property $[\lambda y \ u \equiv_E y]$, to yield the following fact:

\begin{equation}
\phi \ w_1 \models [\lambda y \ u \equiv_E y] u \equiv w_1 \models [\lambda y \ u \equiv_E y] u
\end{equation}

Now, independently, by the facts that E-identity is an equivalence relation on ordinary objects (236.1) and that $u$ is ordinary, we know $u \equiv_E u$. From this it follows that $\square u \equiv_E u$, by the necessity of E-identity (231.1). Now, independently, since $[\lambda y \ u \equiv_E y]$ exists, it follows from $\beta$-Conversion that $[\lambda y \ u \equiv_E y] u \equiv u =_E u$. Since this last fact is a modally strict theorem and the restricted variables
are rigid, it follows by expanded RN (335.1.a) that □(\[\lambda y \ u =_E y\]|u \equiv u =_E u). So by (158.6) and the previous established fact that □(u =_E u), it follows that □(\[\lambda y \ u =_E y\]|u). Then by a fundamental theorem of possible world theory (525.2), it follows that ∀w'(w' \models [\lambda y \ u =_E y]|u). In particular, w_1 \models [\lambda y \ u =_E y]|u. So it follows from \((\delta)\) that:

\((\xi)\) \ w_1 \models [\lambda y \ u =_E y]|v

Note separately that by now well-known reasoning, it follows from β-Conversion and expanded RN (335.1.a) that □([\lambda y \ u =_E y]|v \equiv u =_E v). A fortiori:

\((\zeta)\) □([\lambda y \ u =_E y]|v \rightarrow u =_E v)

Since possible worlds are modally closed (510), it follows from \((\xi)\) and \((\zeta)\) that \ w_1 \models u =_E v, and, hence, ∃w(w \models u =_E v). So by a Fundamental Theorem of Possible World Theory (525.1), it follows that □u =_E v. Hence u =_E v, by theorem (231.2). And by the definition of identity (23.1), u = v. \(\approx\)

\((676.3)\) Assume the antecedent and suppose that a and c_1 are such an ordinary object and concept, so that we know RealizesAt(a,c_1,w) and RealizesAt(a,c_1,w'). So we know, by the definition of realization (674), that ∀F(w \models Fa \equiv c_1F) and ∀F(w' \models Fa \equiv c_1F). So, by the laws of quantified biconditionals, we know:

\((\delta)\) ∀F(w \models Fa \equiv w' \models Fa)

Suppose, for reductio, that w \neq w'. Then, since w and w' are possible worlds, and hence situations, we know by (462) that there must be a proposition, say q_1, true at one and not at the other. Without loss of generality, assume w \models q_1

and w' \not\models q_1. From the former, it follows by a useful fact about possible worlds (532), that w \models [\lambda y \ q_1]|a. So, by \((\delta)\), w' \models [\lambda y \ q_1]|a. So again by (532), w' \models q_1. Contradiction. \(\approx\)

\((678)\) Assume AppearsAt(c, w). By the definition of appearance (677), it follows that some ordinary individual, say a, is such that RealizesAt(a,c,w). It therefore remains to show uniqueness, i.e., that ∀v(RealizesAt(v,c,w) \rightarrow v = a). So, by GEN, assume RealizesAt(v,c,w). Then the antecedent of \((676.2)\) holds and we can conclude v = a. \(\approx\)

\((679)\) Assume AppearsAt(c, w). By the definition of appearance (677), it follows that some ordinary individual, say a, is such that RealizesAt(a,c,w). So, by definition (674):

\((\delta)\) ∀F(w \models Fa \equiv cF)

Since we know O!a, we therefore know □O!a, by (178.1). Hence by a fundamental theorem of world theory (525.2), ∀w'(w' \models O!a). In particular, w \models O!a. Hence, by \((\delta)\), cO!a. \(\approx\)
(681) Suppose \( \text{AppearsAt}(c, w) \). So some ordinary object, say \( a \), realizes \( c \) at \( w \), i.e.,

\[
(\vartheta) \quad \forall F (w \models Fa \equiv cF)
\]

By (680) and GEN, we have to show that \( c \Sigma p \equiv w \models p \).  

(\( \rightarrow \)) Assume \( c \Sigma p \). Then by (289), \( c[\lambda y \ p] \). So by (\( \vartheta \)), \( w \models [\lambda y \ p]a \). Hence, by (532), \( w \models [\lambda y \ p]a \). Hence by (\( \vartheta \)), \( c[\lambda y \ p] \). But \( c \) exists by hypothesis, (289) now implies \( c \Sigma p \).

(682) Assume the antecedent and suppose \( c_1 \) is such a concept, so that we know \( \text{AppearsAt}(c_1, w) \) and \( \text{AppearsAt}(c_1, w') \). Then by (681), it follows, respectively, that \( \text{Mirrors}(c_1, w) \) and \( \text{Mirrors}(c_1, w') \). We may infer from these, respectively, by the definition of mirroring (680), that \( \forall p (c_1 \Sigma p \equiv w \models p) \) and \( \forall p (c_1 \Sigma p \equiv w' \models p) \). So by the laws of quantified biconditionals, we know \( \forall p (w \models p \equiv w' \models p) \). But since \( w \) and \( w' \) are both possible worlds, and hence situations, it follows by a fact about the identity of situations (462), that \( w = w' \).

(683) We prove only the left-to-right direction, since the right-to-left direction is an instance of the T schema. To simplify the proof of the right-to-left direction, we first establish the following lemma:

\[
(\xi) \quad (w \models Fu \equiv cF) \equiv \Box(w \models Fu \equiv cF)
\]

Proof. By axiom (51), we know both \( w[\lambda y Fu] \rightarrow \Box w[\lambda y Fu] \) and \( cF \rightarrow \Box cF \) are modally strict theorems. Hence by expanded RN (335.1.a) and &I, it follows that:

\[
\Box (w[\lambda y Fu] \rightarrow \Box w[\lambda y Fu]) \& \Box (cF \rightarrow \Box cF)
\]

Hence by theorem (171.5), it follows that:

\[
(w[\lambda y Fu] \equiv cF) \rightarrow \Box (w[\lambda y Fu] \equiv cF)
\]

But since the converse of the above holds by the T schema, we may infer:

\[
(\xi) \quad (w[\lambda y Fu] \equiv cF) \equiv \Box (w[\lambda y Fu] \equiv cF)
\]

Now given the discussion in Remark (498), it is a modally strict fact that \( w[\lambda y Fu] \equiv w \models Fu \). So (\( \vartheta \)) follows from (\( \xi \)) by a Rule of Substitution.

Since the (\( \vartheta \)) is a modally strict theorem, a Rule of Substitution allows one to substitute instances of the right condition for the corresponding instances of the left condition whenever the left condition occurs as a subformula, and vice versa. Hence we may reason as follows:
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AppearsAt(c, w) → ∃uRealizesAt(u, c, w) By df (677)

RealizesAt(a, c, w) 'a' arbitrary and ordinary

∀F(w ⊩ Fa ≡ cF) by df (674)

∀F(w ⊩ Fa ≡ cF) by BF (167.1)

□∀F(w ⊩ Fa ≡ cF) by BF (168.1)

□AppearsAt(c, w) by df (677)

(684) Assume the antecedent and suppose c₁ is such a concept, so that we know both RealizesAt(u, c₁, w) and RealizesAt(v, c₁, w'). Hence w = w', by (682). From this and RealizesAt(v, c₁, w'), we know RealizesAt(v, c₁, w). From this and RealizesAt(u, c₁, w), it follows, by (676.2), that u = v. ⊢

(685.1)⋆ By the commutativity of the biconditional, (518)⋆ implies wₐ ⊩ Fu ≡ Fu. Also by the commutativity of the biconditional, (663.1)⋆ implies Fu ≡ cₐF. Hence, wₐ ⊩ Fu ≡ cₐF. By GEN, it follows that ∀F(wₐ ⊩ Fu ≡ cₐF). So by definition of realization (674), Realizes(u, cₐ, wₐ). ⊢

(685.2)⋆ – (685.3)⋆ (Exercises)

(687) Assume ∃uConceptOf(c, u). Suppose a is such an ordinary object, so that we know ConceptOf(c, a). Then by definition (658), it follows that:

(8) ∀F(cF ≡ Fa)

By (686), we have to show ∃wAppearsAt(c, w). So by (677), we have to show ∃u∃uRealizesAt(u, c, w), and so by (674), we have to show: ∃u∃u∀F(w ⊩ Fa ≡ cF). Thus, if we can find witnesses to both existential quantifiers in this last claim, we're done.

By Comprehension for Situations (475), there is a situation that encodes all and only the propositional properties that a exemplifies:

∃sVF(sF ≡ ∃p(F = [λy p] & Fa))

Let sₐ be such a situation, so that we know:

(ξ) ∀F(sₐF ≡ ∃p(F = [λy p] & Fa))

If we can show (a) sₐ is a possible world, and (b) ∀F(sₐ ⊩ Fa ≡ cF), then sₐ and a are the two witnesses we need.

(a) Since sₐ is a situation, all we have to do to show sₐ is a possible world is to show □∀q(sₐ ⊩ q ≡ q). By the T□ schema, it suffices to show ∀q(sₐ ⊩ q ≡ q).

By GEN, it suffices to show sₐ ⊩ q ≡ q. (→) Assume sₐ ⊩ q. Then by now
familiar reasoning, we know $s_a[\lambda y q]$. Hence by $(\xi)$, $\exists p ([\lambda y q] = [\lambda y p] & [\lambda y q] a)$. Suppose $p_1$ is such a proposition, so that we know $[\lambda y q] = [\lambda y p_1] & [\lambda y q] a$. Then by $\&E$, $[\lambda y q] a$, and since $[\lambda y q] \downarrow$, it follows that $q$, by $\beta$-Conversion. $(\neg\neg)$

Suppose $p_1$ is such a proposition, so that we know $[\lambda y q] = [\lambda y p_1] & [\lambda y q] a$. Then by $\&E$, $[\lambda y q] a$, and since $[\lambda y q] \downarrow$, it follows that $q$, by $\beta$-Conversion. $(\leftarrow)$

Assume $q$. Then since $[\lambda y q] \downarrow$, $[\lambda y q] a$, by $\beta$-Conversion. And by Rule =I and $\&I$, $[\lambda y q] a$. Hence $\exists p ([\lambda y q] = [\lambda y p] & [\lambda y q] a)$. So by $(\xi)$, $s_a[\lambda y q]$, and by now familiar reasoning, $s_a [\lambda y q] = q$.

(b) By GEN, we have to show $s_a [Fa \equiv cF]$. To do this, we begin by noting that as part of (a), we established $\forall q (s_a [q] \equiv q)$. If we instantiate this to the term $Fa$, it follows that $s_a [Fa] \equiv Fa$. So by GEN, $\forall F (s_a [Fa] \equiv Fa)$. But $(\varphi)$ is equivalent to $\forall F (Fa \equiv cF)$. So by the laws of quantified biconditionals, $\forall F (s_a [Fa] \equiv cF)$.

$(688) \ast$ By $(145.2) \ast$ and the definition of $c_u$ (660) as $icConceptOf(c,u)$, it follows that $ConceptOf(c_u,u)$. Once we apply $\exists I$ to the free variable $u$ (which we can do since we know that ordinary objects exist), it follows by theorem (687) that $IndividualConcept(c_u)$.

$(689)$ We know by (225.1) and the T schema that ordinary objects exist. So (659.1) implies $\exists u \exists cConceptOf(c,u)$. By (104.11), $\exists c \exists u ConceptOf(c,u)$. Suppose $c_1$ is such a concept, so that we have $\exists u ConceptOf(c_1,u)$. Then, by (687), $IndividualConcept(c_1)$. So $\exists IndividualConcept(c)$. $(\Rightarrow)$

$(690)$ By GEN, assume $IndividualConcept(x)$. Then by definition (686):

$(\varphi) \ C!x \& \exists y (PossibleWorld(y) \& AppearsAt(x,y))$

We want to show $\Box IndividualConcept(x)$, i.e.,

$\Box (C!x \& \exists y (PossibleWorld(y) \& AppearsAt(x,y)))$

So by (158.3), it suffices to show:

$\Box C!x \& \exists y (PossibleWorld(y) \& AppearsAt(x,y))$

But $\Box C!x$ follows from the first conjunct of $(\varphi)$ (exercise). So by the Buridan formula (168.1), it remains and suffices to show:

$(\xi) \exists y \Box (PossibleWorld(y) \& AppearsAt(x,y))$

Now let $a$ be a witness to the second conjunct of $(\varphi)$, so that we know both $PossibleWorld(a)$ and $AppearsAt(x,a)$. Then we establish $(\xi)$ by showing $a$ is a witness. So by (158.3), we have to show:

$\Box PossibleWorld(a)$

$\Box AppearsAt(x,a)$

$\Box PossibleWorld(a)$ follows from $PossibleWorld(a)$ by (496). To show that the latter follows from $AppearsAt(x,a)$, note that this is defined in terms of restricted variables and so when we expand definitions (677) and (674), we have:
AppearsAt(x, a) ≡ df C!x & PossibleWorld(a) & ∃z(O!z & RealizesAt(z, x, a))
RealizesAt(z, x, a) ≡ df O!z & C!x & PossibleWorld(a) & ∀F((a ⊨ Fz) ≡xF)

Hence, AppearsAt(x, a) implies, once we've expanded it by definition and simplified:

(ζ) C!x & PossibleWorld(a) & ∃z(O!z & ∀F((a ⊨ Fz) ≡xF))

Since we know the first two conjuncts are necessary, to prove that the entire claim is necessary, it remains only to show the following, by (158.3):

□ ∃z(O!z & ∀F((a ⊨ Fz) ≡xF))

Again, by the Buridan formula (168.1), it suffices to show:

(ω) ∃□(O!z & ∀F((a ⊨ Fz) ≡xF))

Now let b be a witness to the third conjunct of (ζ), so that we know O!b and ∀F((a ⊨ Fb) ≡xF). So to see that b is the needed witness to (ω), it suffices, again by (158.3), to show □O!b and □∀F((a ⊨ Fb) ≡xF). But □O!b follows from O!b (178.1). To show the latter, it suffices, by the Barcan Formula (167.1), to show ∀F□((a ⊨ Fb) ≡xF). But from ∀F((a ⊨ Fb) ≡xF) it follows that (a ⊨ Fb) ≡xF.

The left condition is, by definitions (458) and (289), a[λz Fb]. So a[λz Fb] ≡xF. Hence by (177.6), □(a[λz Fb] ≡xF). Since F isn't free in any assumption, it follows that ∀F□(a[λz Fb] ≡xF).

(691.1) Consider any individual concept ˆc. Then by definition (686), there is some possible world, say w₁, such that AppearsAt(ˆc, w₁). It therefore remains to show that ∀w(AppearsAt(ˆc, w) → w = w₁), and by GEN, that AppearsAt(ˆc, w) → w = w₁. So assume that AppearsAt(ˆc, w). Then by a fact about appearance (682), it follows that w = w₁.

(691.2) By theorem (683), we know:

AppearsAt(c, w) ≡ □AppearsAt(c, w)

Since this holds for arbitrary concepts, it holds for individual concepts:

AppearsAt(ˆc, w) ≡ □AppearsAt(ˆc, w)

Since this is a modally strict equivalence, it follows from the previous theorem (691.1) by a Rule of Substitution that:

∃w □AppearsAt(ˆc, w)

[Alternatively, AppearsAt(c, w) → □AppearsAt(c, w) follows a fortiori from theorem (683). A fortiori, AppearsAt(ˆc, w) → □AppearsAt(ˆc, w). So by GEN, it follows]
that \( \forall w (\text{AppearsAt}(\hat{c}, w) \rightarrow □\text{AppearsAt}(\hat{c}, w)) \). From this result and the previous theorem (691.1), it follows by theorem (130) that \( \exists w □\text{AppearsAt}(\hat{c}, w) \).

(691.3) (Exercise)

(693.1) As an instance of (153.1), we know:

\[ \exists w □\text{AppearsAt}(\hat{c}, w) \rightarrow ∀y(y = \text{rw}(\text{AppearsAt}(\hat{c}, w)) \rightarrow \text{AppearsAt}(\hat{c}, y)) \]

So by (691.2), it follows that:

\[ ∀y(y = \text{rw}(\text{AppearsAt}(\hat{c}, w)) \rightarrow \text{AppearsAt}(\hat{c}, y)) \]

We may instantiate this to \( w_ı \) since we know it exists, to obtain:

\[ w_ı = \text{rw}(\text{AppearsAt}(\hat{c}, w)) \rightarrow \text{AppearsAt}(\hat{c}, w_ı) \]

But then by definition (692), it follows that \( \text{AppearsAt}(\hat{c}, w_ı) \).

(693.2) By (693.1) and (681).

(693.3) By the definitions of \( ≥ \) (603.2) and \( ≤ \) (603.1), and GEN, we have to show: \( w_ı F \rightarrow \hat{c} F \). So assume \( w_ı F \). Since \( w_ı \) is a situation, every property that it encodes is a propositional property, and so for some proposition, say \( q_ı \), \( F = [\lambda y q_ı] \). Hence, \( w_ı [\lambda y q_ı] \). By definition of \( \models \), this implies that \( w_ı \models q_ı \).

Now, independently, we know by (693.2) that \( \text{Mirrors}(\hat{c}, w_ı) \). So by definition of mirroring, \( ∀p(\hat{c} Σ p ≡ w_ı \models p) \). Since we’ve established \( w_ı \models q_ı \), it follows that \( \hat{c} Σ q_ı \). By definition of \( Σ \), this implies \( \hat{c} [\lambda y q_ı] \), i.e., \( \hat{c} F \).

(694) \( (→) \) Assume \( \hat{c} G \). Before we show \( \hat{c} ≥ c_G \), note that since \( \hat{c} \) is an individual concept, it follows by definition (686) that for some possible world, say \( w_ı \), \( \text{AppearsAt}(\hat{c}, w_ı) \). Further, by the definition of appearance (677), for some ordinary object, say \( a \), we know \( \text{RealizesAt}(a, \hat{c}, w_ı) \). So by definition (674), this implies:

\[ ∀H(w_ı \models Ha \equiv \hat{c} H) \]

Now by the definition of \( ≥ \) (603.2) and \( ≤ \) (603.1), to show \( \hat{c} ≥ c_G \), we have to show \( ∀F(c_G F \rightarrow \hat{c} F) \). So, by GEN, assume \( c_G F \). It then follows that \( □∀x(Gx \rightarrow Fx) \), by (653.1) and (431). So by a Fundamental Theorem of Possible World Theory (525.2), we have \( ∃w(w \models ∀x(Gx \rightarrow Fx)) \) and, in particular, \( w_ı \models ∀x(Gx \rightarrow Fx) \). But since \( \hat{c} G \) is our global assumption, it follows from (8) that \( w_ı \models Ga \).

Since the conjunction of \( ∀x(Gx \rightarrow Fx) \) and \( Ga \) necessarily implies \( Fa \), and possible worlds are closed under necessary implication (510), it follows that \( w_ı \models Fa \). Hence, by (8), it follows that \( \hat{c} F \).

(←) Assume \( \hat{c} ≥ c_G \). Then, by now well-known reasoning, \( ∀F(c_G F \rightarrow \hat{c} F) \). But we also know \( c_G G \) (653.2). So \( \hat{c} G \).
Before we begin the proof proper, we establish two preliminary facts. This first fact concerns arbitrary witnesses to existential quantifiers. If $\check{c}$ is an individual concept, then by definition of (686), we know that $\exists w \text{AppearsAt}(\check{c}, w)$. Suppose $w_1$ is such a world, so that we know $\text{AppearsAt}(\check{c}, w_1)$. Then, by definition of appears at (677), $\exists u \text{RealizesAt}(u, \check{c}, w_1)$, and by definition of realizes at (674), $\exists u \forall F(w_1 \models Fu \equiv \check{c}F)$. Suppose $a$ is such an ordinary object. So it is a fact about arbitrary witnesses $w_1$ and $a$ that:

\[(\vartheta) \quad \forall F(w_1 \models Fa \equiv \check{c}F)\]

Our second preliminary fact is obtained by first observing that it is a modally strict theorem that $Ga \equiv \neg \neg Ga$, by commuting an appropriate instance of (197.2). Hence, by RN, $\Box (Ga \equiv \neg \neg Ga)$. So by theorem (507):

\[(\xi) \quad Ga \iff \neg \neg Ga\]

With $(\vartheta)$ and $(\xi)$, we may reason as follows:

\[\check{c}G \equiv w_1 \models Ga \quad \text{by (}\vartheta\text{)} \quad \text{and commutativity of} \equiv \]

\[\equiv w_1 \models \neg \neg Ga \quad \text{by (}\xi\text{)} \quad \text{and the modal closure of} \quad w_1 \quad \text{(509)} \]

\[\equiv \neg w_1 \models \neg Ga \quad \text{by (511.1)} \]

\[\equiv \neg \check{c}G \quad \text{by (}\vartheta\text{)} \]

Since $w_1$ and $a$ were arbitrarily chosen witnesses, the conclusion $\check{c}G \equiv \neg \neg \check{c}G$ follows from $\exists w \text{AppearsAt}(\check{c}, w)$. $\Rightarrow$

(695.2) (Exercise)

(695.3) By (694), we know both:

\[(\vartheta) \quad \check{c}G \equiv \check{c} \geq c_G\]

\[(\xi) \quad \check{c}G \equiv \check{c} \geq c_G\]

So we may reason as follows:

\[\check{c} \geq c_G \equiv \check{c}G \quad \text{by (}\vartheta\text{)} \quad \text{and commutativity of} \equiv \]

\[\equiv \neg \check{c}G \quad \text{by (695.1)} \]

\[\equiv \check{c} \not\geq c_G \quad \text{by (}\xi\text{)} \quad \not\Rightarrow\]

(695.4) (Exercise)

(696) By the definition of completeness (664) and GEN, we have to show $\check{c}F \lor \check{c}F$. Since $\check{c}$ is an individual concept, we know by the definitions of Individual-Concept (686) and AppearsAt (677) that some ordinary object, say $a$, realizes $\check{c}$ at some possible world, say $w_1$. So by definition of RealizesAt (674), we know:

\[(\vartheta) \quad \forall F(w_1 \models Fa \equiv \check{c}G)\]
Now, independently, note that from the easily-proved theorem \( \Box(Fa \lor \neg Fa) \) and the instance \( \overline{Fa} \equiv \neg Fa \) of the modally strict theorem (197.1), it follows by the Rule of Substitution (160.1) that \( \Box(Fa \lor \overline{Fa}) \). Then by a Fundamental Theorem of Possible World Theory (525.2), it follows that \( w_1 \models (Fa \lor \overline{Fa}) \). But then by (527.3), it follows that:

\[ (\xi) \quad w_1 \models Fa \lor w_1 \models \overline{Fa} \]

So, we may reason by disjunctive syllogism from the disjuncts of \((\xi)\): if \( w_1 \models Fa \), then by \((\sigma)\), then \( \exists F, \) and if \( w_1 \models \overline{Fa} \), then by \((\sigma)\), \( \exists \overline{F} \). Hence, \( \exists F \lor \exists \overline{F} \). \( \bowtie \)

\((698)\) (\( \rightarrow \)) Assume \( \check{c} \) and \( \check{e} \) are compossible individual concepts. Then by definition (697), there is a possible world, say \( w_1 \), such that both \( \text{AppearsAt}(\check{c}, w_1) \) and \( \text{AppearsAt}(\check{e}, w_1) \). But we also know, by (693.1), that \( \text{AppearsAt}(\check{c}, w_\check{c}) \) and \( \text{AppearsAt}(\check{e}, w_\check{e}) \). Since individual concepts appear at a unique possible world (691.1), it follows, respectively, that \( w_1 = w_\check{c} \) and \( w_1 = w_\check{e} \). Hence \( w_\check{c} = w_\check{e} \). (\( \leftarrow \)) Assume \( w_\check{c} = w_\check{e} \). Independently, by (693.1), we know both \( \text{AppearsAt}(\check{c}, w_\check{c}) \) and \( \text{AppearsAt}(\check{e}, w_\check{e}) \). But from our assumption and the second of these, it follows that \( \text{AppearsAt}(\check{e}, w_\check{c}) \). But then, there is a world, namely \( w_\check{c} \), where both \( \check{c} \) and \( \check{e} \) appear. So \( \text{Compossible}(\check{c}, \check{e}) \). \( \bowtie \)

\((699.1)\) By the definition of an individual concept (686), \( \exists w (\text{Appear}(\check{c}, w)) \). Let \( w_1 \) be such a world, so that we know \( \text{Appear}(\check{c}, w_1) \). By the idempotence of conjunction (86.6), \( \text{Appear}(\check{c}, w_1) \& \text{Appear}(\check{c}, w_1) \). Hence by \( \exists \exists \), \( \exists w (\text{Appear}(\check{c}, w) \& \text{Appear}(\check{c}, w)) \). So by the definition of compossibility (697), \( \text{Compossible}(\check{c}, \check{c}) \). \( \bowtie \)

\((699.2)\) Suppose \( \text{Compossible}(\check{c}, \check{c}) \). Then, by definition (697):

\[ \exists w (\text{Appear}(\check{c}, w) \& \text{Appear}(\check{c}, w)) \]

So, by the logic of quantification and the commutativity of conjunction (89.2.a):

\[ \exists w (\text{Appear}(\check{c}, w) \& \text{Appear}(\check{c}, w)) \]

Hence, \( \text{Compossible}(\check{c}, \check{c}) \), again by the definition of compossibility (697). \( \bowtie \)

\((699.3)\) Suppose \( \text{Compossible}(\check{c}, \check{d}) \) and \( \text{Compossible}(\check{d}, \check{c}) \). Then, by a previous theorem (698), \( w_\check{c} = w_\check{d} \) and \( w_\check{d} = w_\check{c} \). So, by transitivity of identity, \( w_\check{c} = w_\check{c} \). Hence, again by (698), \( \text{Compossible}(\check{c}, \check{c}) \). \( \bowtie \)

\((701.1) \) – \((701.3)\) (Exercises)

\((703.1) \) – \((703.3)\) (Exercises)

\((704.1)\) By the second conjunct of \((703.3)\), we know \( \forall \text{F}(\exists^n_u \text{F} \equiv w \models \text{Fu}) \). So, by the commutativity of the biconditional, \( \forall \text{F}(w \models \text{Fu} \equiv \exists^n_u \text{F}) \). Hence, by the definition of realization (674), it follows that \( \text{RealizesAt}(u, \exists^n_u \text{F}, w) \). \( \bowtie \)
(704.2) By applying GEN to (704.1), we know that \( \forall u \text{RealizesAt}(u, c^w_u, w) \). But we also know that there are ordinary objects, by (225.1) and the T schema. Hence \( \exists u \text{RealizesAt}(u, c^w_u, w) \). So, by the definition of appearance (677), it follows that \( \text{AppearsAt}(c^w_u, w) \). \( \Rightarrow \)

(704.3) By applying GEN to (704.2), we know \( \forall w \text{AppearsAt}(c^w_u, w) \). But we know that there are possible worlds. Hence \( \exists w \text{AppearsAt}(c^w_u, w) \). So by definition (686), \( \text{IndividualConcept}(c^w_u) \). \( \Rightarrow \)

(704.4) This follows immediately from (704.2) and (681). \( \Rightarrow \)

(705.1) We may reason biconditionally as follows:

\[
\text{IndividualConcept}(c) \equiv \exists w \text{AppearsAt}(c, w) \quad \text{by definition (686)}
\]

\[
\equiv \exists w \exists u \text{RealizesAt}(u, c, w) \quad \text{by definition (677)}
\]

\[
\equiv \exists u \exists w \text{RealizesAt}(u, c, w) \quad \text{by theorem (104.11)}
\]

\[
\equiv \exists u \exists w \forall F (w \models F = Fb) \quad \text{by definition (674)}
\]

\[
\equiv \exists u \exists w \forall F (cF \equiv w \models Fb) \quad (89.2.e) \text{ and (159.3)}
\]

\[
\equiv \exists u \exists w \text{ConceptOfAt}(c, u, w) \quad \text{by definition (700)} \quad \Rightarrow
\]

(705.2) \( \rightarrow \) Assume \( \text{IndividualConcept}(c) \). Then by the definition of individual concepts (686), we know:

\[
\exists w \text{AppearsAt}(c, w)
\]

Suppose \( w_1 \) is an arbitrary such world, so that we know \( \text{AppearsAt}(c, w_1) \). By the definition of appearance (677), some ordinary individual, say \( b \), is such that \( \text{RealizesAt}(b, c, w_1) \). So \( \forall F (w_1 \models Fb \equiv cF) \), by the definition of realization (674). Now the second conjunct of (703.3) tells us that \( \forall F (c^w_{b_1} F \equiv w_1 \models Fb) \). So by the logic of quantified biconditionals, we know: \( \forall F (cF \equiv c^w_{b_1} F) \). Since both \( c \) and \( c^w_{b_1} \) are concepts and, hence, abstract, it follows that \( c = c^w_{b_1} \). So by \( \exists I \), \( \exists u \exists w (c = c^w_u) \).

(\( \leftarrow \)) Assume \( \exists u \exists w (c = c^w_u) \), to show \( \text{IndividualConcept}(c) \). So \( c = c^w_{b_1} \), for some arbitrary ordinary object \( b \) and possible world \( w_1 \). Now we independently know that \( \text{IndividualConcept}(c^w_{b_1}) \), by (704.3). So \( \text{IndividualConcept}(c) \). \( \Rightarrow \)

(706) In Remark (662), we noted that:

\[ c_w = ix(A!x \& \forall F (xF \equiv Fu)) \]

Moreover, as an instance of Actualized Abstraction (255), we know:

\[ ix(A!x \& \forall F (xF \equiv Fu)) G \equiv \forall Gu \]

From these two results, it follows that:
\(c_u G \equiv \exists G u\)

But as an instance of (520), we know:

\(\exists G u \equiv w_n \models G u\)

Our last two results yield \(c_u G \equiv w_n \models G u\), which by the commutativity of the biconditional leaves us with:

(8) \(w_n \models G u \equiv c_u G\)

Now, independently, since \(w_n\) is a possible world (519.1), it follows from the second conjunct of (703.3) that:

\((\zeta) c_{w_n}^{w_n} G \equiv w_n \models G u\)

(\(\zeta\)) and (8) imply \(c_{w_n}^{w_n} G \equiv c_u G\). So by GEN, \(\forall G (c_{w_n}^{w_n} G \equiv c_u G)\). Since both \(c_{w_n}^{w_n}\) and \(c_u\) are abstract, it follows that \(c_{w_n}^{w_n} = c_u\). ⊳

\((707.1)\) By (704.3) \(c_{w_n}^{w_n}\) is an individual concept. So by (694), it follows that \(c_{w_n}^{w_n} G \equiv c_{w_n}^{w_n} \geq c_G\). ⊳

\((707.2)\) From the second conjunct of (703.3), it follows that \(c_{w_n}^{w_n} G \equiv w_n \models G u\), and so by commutativity of the biconditional, \((w_n \models G u) \equiv c_{w_n}^{w_n} G\). But we just established (707.1) that \(c_{w_n}^{w_n} G \equiv c_{w_n}^{w_n} \geq c_G\). Hence, \((w_n \models G u) \equiv c_{w_n}^{w_n} \geq c_G\). ⊳

\((707.3)\) Assume \(c_{w_n}^{w_n} = c_{w_n}^{w_n}\). Independently, we know both \(\text{RealizesAt}(u, c_{w_n}^{w_n}, w)\) and \(\text{RealizesAt}(v, c_{w_n}^{w_n}, w)\), by (704.1). So we may substitute \(c_{w_n}^{w_n}\) for \(c_{w_n}^{w_n}\) in the latter, to obtain \(\text{RealizesAt}(v, c_{w_n}^{w_n}, w)\). But from \(\text{RealizesAt}(u, c_{w_n}^{w_n}, w)\) and \(\text{RealizesAt}(v, c_{w_n}^{w_n}, w)\), it follows from a fact about realization (676.2), that \(u = v\). ⊳

\((707.4)\) Assume \(c_{w_n}^{w_n} = c_{w_n}^{w_n}\). Independently, we know both \(\text{RealizesAt}(u, c_{w_n}^{w_n}, w)\) and \(\text{RealizesAt}(u, c_{w_n}^{w_n}, w')\), by (704.1). So we may substitute \(c_{w_n}^{w_n}\) for \(c_{w_n}^{w_n}\) in the latter, to infer \(\text{RealizesAt}(u, c_{w_n}^{w_n}, w')\). But from \(\text{RealizesAt}(u, c_{w_n}^{w_n}, w)\) and \(\text{RealizesAt}(u, c_{w_n}^{w_n}, w')\), it follows from a fact about realization (676.3), that \(w = w'\). ⊳

\((707.5)\) (Exercise)

\((708)\) From a fact about world-relative concepts of individuals (704.1), we know both \(\text{RealizesAt}(u, c_{w_n}^{w_n}, w)\) and \(\text{RealizesAt}(v, c_{w_n}^{w_n}, w)\). Since ordinary objects exist, by (225.1) and the T schema, we may infer, respectively:

\(\exists u \text{RealizesAt}(u, c_{w_n}^{w_n}, w)\)
\(\exists v \text{RealizesAt}(v, c_{w_n}^{w_n}, w)\)

So, by definition (677), it follows, respectively, that:

\(\text{AppearsAt}(c_{w_n}^{w_n}, w)\)
\(\text{AppearsAt}(c_{w_n}^{w_n}, w)\)
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By conjoining these results and quantifying:

\[ \exists w' (\text{AppearsAt}(c_{w''}^w, w') \& \text{AppearsAt}(c_{w''}^w, w')) \]

So by the definition of compossibility (697), Compossible\((c_{w''}^w, c_{w''}^w)\).

(712.1) Since \( \hat{c} \) is an individual concept, we know, by the definitions of individual concept (686) and appearance (677), that there is an ordinary individual, say \( b \), and a possible world, say \( w_1 \), such that RealizesAt\((b, \hat{c}, w_1)\). So, by the idempotence of \& (86.6), RealizesAt\((b, \hat{c}, w_1) \& \text{RealizesAt}(b, \hat{c}, w_1)\). By three applications of \( \exists I \), we have \( \exists u \exists w' \exists w' (\text{RealizesAt}(u, \hat{c}, w') \& \text{RealizesAt}(u, \hat{c}, w')) \). So, by the definition of counterpart (711), CounterpartOf\((\hat{c}, \hat{c})\).

(712.2) Assume CounterpartOf\((\hat{e}, \hat{c})\). Then, by applying definitions, we know there is an ordinary object, say \( b \), and there are possible worlds, say \( w_1 \) and \( w_2 \), such that RealizesAt\((b, \hat{c}, w_1) \& \text{RealizesAt}(b, \hat{c}, w_2)\). By the commutativity of \& (89.2.a), RealizesAt\((b, \hat{e}, w_2) \& \text{RealizesAt}(b, \hat{c}, w_1)\). It follows that:

\[ \exists u \exists w' (\text{RealizesAt}(u, \hat{e}, w) \& \text{RealizesAt}(u, \hat{c}, w')) \]

So by the definition of counterparts (711), CounterpartOf\((\hat{e}, \hat{c})\).

(712.3) Assume CounterpartOf\((\hat{d}, \hat{c})\) and CounterpartOf\((\hat{d}, \hat{e})\). Then by the first conjunct we know that there is an ordinary object, say \( a \), and there are possible worlds, say \( w_1 \) and \( w_2 \), such that:

(\( \varphi \)) RealizesAt\((a, \hat{d}, w_1) \& \text{RealizesAt}(a, \hat{e}, w_2)\)

And by the second conjunct of our assumption we know that there is an ordinary object, say \( b \), and there are possible worlds, say \( w_3 \) and \( w_4 \), such that:

(\( \xi \)) RealizesAt\((b, \hat{c}, w_3) \& \text{RealizesAt}(b, \hat{d}, w_4)\)

Then, from the first conjunct of (\( \varphi \)) and the second conjunct (\( \xi \)), it follows by a fact about realization (684) that \( w_1 = w_4 \) and \( a = b \). So after substituting \( a \) for \( b \) in the first conjunct of (\( \xi \)), we may conjoin the result with the second conjunct of (\( \varphi \)) to obtain: RealizesAt\((a, \hat{c}, w_3) \& \text{RealizesAt}(a, \hat{e}, w_2)\). It therefore follows that:

\[ \exists u \exists w' \exists w' (\text{RealizesAt}(u, \hat{e}, w) \& \text{RealizesAt}(u, \hat{c}, w')) \]

So by definition (711), CounterpartOf\((\hat{e}, \hat{c})\).

(713) \( \rightarrow \) Assume CounterpartOf\((\hat{e}, \hat{c})\). Then by the definition of counterpart (711), there is an ordinary object, say \( a \), and there are possible worlds, say \( w_1 \) and \( w_2 \), such that:

(\( \varphi \)) RealizesAt\((a, \hat{c}, w_1) \& \text{RealizesAt}(a, \hat{e}, w_2)\)
By &I, ∃I, and the definition of the uniqueness quantifier, it remains only to establish:

∀u((RealizesAt(u, ᵇ, w₁) & RealizesAt(u, ᵇ, w₂)) → u = a)

So by GEN, assume:

(ξ) RealizesAt(u, ᵇ, w₁) & RealizesAt(u, ᵇ, w₂)

But if we conjoin the first conjunct of (ξ) with the first conjunct of (ϑ), we have

RealizesAt(u, ᵇ, w₁) & RealizesAt(a, ᵇ, w₁). So u = a, by a fact about realization (676.2).

(←) Exercise.

(714.1) By (704.1), we know both RealizesAt(u, cʷu, w) and RealizesAt(u, cʷu, w'), which we may conjoin. Since the restricted variables u, w, and w' all range over non-empty domains, we obtain by ∃I:

∃w∃w'(RealizesAt(u, cʷu, w) & RealizesAt(u, cʷu, w'))

So, by the definition of counterparts (711), it follows that CounterpartOf(cʷu, cʷu).

(714.2) (Exercise)

(715.1)★ Assume:

(ϑ) Fu & ◇¬Fu

The first conjunct and theorem (669.1)★, which asserts Gu ≡ c_u ≥ c_G, together imply c_u ≥ c_F. So it remains show:

(ξ) ∃(CounterpartOf(ᵦ, cᵦ) & ᵇ ≠ c_F & ∃w(w ≠ wᵦ & AppearsAt(ᵦ, w)))

Note that from the second conjunct of (ϑ) and a Fundamental Theorem of Possible World Theory (525.1), it follows that ∃w(w ⊨ ¬Fu). So, let w₁ be an arbitrary such possible world, so that we know w₁ ⊨ ¬Fu. Now consider the concept of u at w₁, i.e., cʷu₁. We know by (704.3) that IndividualConcept(cʷu₁). So to show (ξ), it suffices by &I and ∃I to show:

(a) CounterpartOf(cʷu₁, c_u)

(b) cʷu₁ ≠ c_F

(c) ∃w(w ≠ wᵦ & AppearsAt(cʷu₁, w))

(a) If we instantiate theorem (714.1) to worlds w₁ and wᵦ, it follows that:

CounterpartOf(cʷu₁, cʷuᵦ)
But by (706), we know \( c_u^{\omega} = c_u \). So it follows that \( \text{CounterpartOf}(c_u^{\omega}, c_u) \).

(b) Since we know \( w_1 \models \neg Fu \), it follows by (511.1) that \( \neg w_1 \models Fu \). So by the second conjunct of (703.3), it follows that \( \neg c_u^{\omega} F \). But since \( c_u^{\omega} \) is known to be an individual concept, it then follows from (707.1) that \( c_u^{\omega} \notin c_\ell \).

(c) By \&I and \|I, it suffices to show both \( w_1 \not= w_\alpha \) and \( \text{AppearsAt}(c_u^{\omega}, w_1) \). Note that by a theorem of possible world theory (518)*, the first conjunct of (\( \delta \)) is equivalent to \( w_\alpha \models Fu \). But given this last fact and the previously established fact that \( \neg w_1 \models Fu \), there is a proposition, namely \( Fu \), that is true at \( w_\alpha \) but not true at \( w_1 \). Since worlds are situations, it follows by (462) that \( w_1 \not= w_\alpha \). So it remains to show \( \text{AppearsAt}(c_u^{\omega}, w_1) \). But this is immediate from a fact about appearance and world-relative concepts of individuals (704.2). \( \therefore \)

(715.2)\( \star \) (Exercise)

(716.1)\( \star \) (\( \rightarrow \)) This direction follows a fortiori from the left-to-right direction of (715.1)\( \star \). (\( \leftarrow \)) Assume the antecedent:

\[
c_u \ge c_\ell \& \exists \alpha(\text{CounterpartOf}(\ell, c_u) \& \ell \not\in c_\ell)
\]

From the first conjunct and (669.1)\( \star \), it follows that \( Fu \). So it remains to show \( \diamond \neg Fu \). By a fundamental theorem of possible worlds (525.1), it suffices to show \( \exists w(w \models \neg Fu) \). So our proof strategy is to find a witness to this latter claim.

Suppose \( \ell_1 \) is an individual concept that witnesses the second conjunct of our assumption, so that we know:

(\( \delta \)) \( \text{CounterpartOf}(\ell_1, c_u) \& \ell_1 \not\in c_\ell \)

Now the first conjunct of (\( \delta \)) implies by definition (711) that:

\[
\exists v \exists w \exists w' (\text{RealizesAt}(v, c_u, w) \& \text{RealizesAt}(v, \ell_1, w'))
\]

Assume ordinary object \( b \) and possible worlds \( w_1 \) and \( w_2 \) are witnesses to this existential claim. Then we know:

(\( \xi \)) \( \text{RealizesAt}(b, c_u, w_1) \& \text{RealizesAt}(b, \ell_1, w_2) \)

Now independently by (685.1)\( \star \), we know \( \text{RealizesAt}(u, c_u, w_\alpha) \). This and the first conjunct of (\( \xi \)) imply, by (684), that \( w_1 = w_\alpha \) and \( b = u \). From the latter and the second conjunct of (\( \xi \)) it follows that \( \text{RealizesAt}(u, \ell_1, w_2) \). By definition (674), this implies \( \forall G(w_2 \models Gu \equiv \ell_1 G) \). So, in particular, \( w_2 \models Fu \equiv \ell_1 F \). Now assume, for reductio, that \( w_2 \models Fu \). Then \( \ell_1 F \). But this implies \( \ell_1 \ge c_\ell \), by (694), which contradicts the second conjunct of (\( \delta \)). Hence \( \neg(w_2 \models Fu) \), and so by the coherence of truth at a world (511.1), it follows that \( w_2 \models \neg Fu \). Thus, \( w_2 \) is a witness to \( \exists w(w \models \neg Fu) \), which is what we had to find. \( \therefore \)

(716.2)\( \star \) (Exercise)

(717.1) Assume \( w \models (Fu \& \diamond \neg Fu) \). Then since the laws of conjunction hold with respect to truth at a possible world (527.1), it follows that:
\((\vartheta)\)  \(w \models Fu \& w \models \Diamond \neg Fu\)

Now the first conjunct of \((\vartheta)\) and the second conjunct of theorem (703.3), which asserts \(\forall G (c^w_u G \equiv w \models Gu)\), together imply \(c^w_u F\). This implies, by (707.1), that \(c^w_u \succeq c_F\). We’ve therefore established the first conjunct of our desired conclusion. So it remains show:

\((\xi)\)  \(\exists \hat{c} (\text{CounterpartOf}(\hat{c}, c^w_u) \& \hat{c} \not\succeq c_F \& \exists w'(w' \neq w \& \text{AppearsAt}(\hat{c}, w')))\)

Note that from the second conjunct of \((\vartheta)\), it follows that \(\exists w'(w' \models \Diamond \neg Fu)\). So by a Fundamental Theorem of Possible World Theory (525.1), it follows that \(\neg c^w_u F\). This implies, by (165.7), that \(\neg Fu\). So by the same Fundamental Theorem, \(\exists w'(w' \models \neg Fu)\). Now let \(w_1\) be an arbitrary such possible world, so that we know \(w_1 \models \neg Fu\), and consider the concept of \(u\) at \(w_1\), i.e., \(c^{w_1}_u\). We know by (704.3) that \(\text{IndividualConcept}(c^{w_1}_u)\). So to show \((\xi)\), it suffices by &I and \(\exists I\) to show:

(a)  \(\text{CounterpartOf}(c^{w_1}_u, c^w_u)\)

(b)  \(c^{w_1}_u \not\succeq c_F\)

(c)  \(\exists w'(w' \neq w \& \text{AppearsAt}(c^{w_1}_u, w'))\)

(a) This is an instance of theorem (714.1).

(b) Since we know \(w_1 \models \neg Fu\), it follows by (511.1) that \(\neg c^w_u F\). But since \(c^w_u\) is known to be an individual concept, it then follows from (707.1) that \(c^{w_1}_u \not\succeq c_F\).

(c) By &I and \(\exists I\), it suffices to show both \(w_1 \neq w\) and \(\text{AppearsAt}(c^{w_1}_u, w_1)\). By the first conjunct of \((\vartheta)\), we know \(w \models Fu\). But we’ve previously established \(\neg w_1 \models Fu\). So there is a proposition, namely \(Fu\), that is true at \(w\) but not true at \(w_1\). Since worlds are situations, it follows by (462) that \(w_1 \neq w\). So it remains to show \(\text{AppearsAt}(c^{w_1}_u, w_1)\). But this is an instance of a fact about appearance and world-relative concepts of individuals (704.2).

(717.2) (Exercise)

(717.3) \((\rightarrow)\) This direction follows a fortiori from the left-to-right direction of (717.1). \((\leftarrow)\) Assume the antecedent:

\(c^w_u \succeq c_F \& \exists \hat{c} (\text{CounterpartOf}(\hat{c}, c^w_u) \& \hat{c} \not\succeq c_F)\)

To show \(w \models (Fu \& \Diamond \neg Fu)\), it suffices to show both \(w \models Fu\) and \(w \models \Diamond \neg Fu\), in virtue of the right-to-left condition of (527.1). But from the first conjunct of our assumption and (707.2), it follows that \(w \models Fu\). So it remains to show \(w \models \Diamond \neg Fu\). Suppose \(\hat{c}_1\) is a witness to the second conjunct of our assumption, so that we know:
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(8) $\text{CounterpartOf}(\hat{c}_1, c^w_u) \& \hat{c}_1 \not\subseteq c_F$

Now the first conjunct of (8) implies by definition (711) that:

$\exists v \exists w' \exists w'' (\text{RealizesAt}(v, c^w_u, w') \& \text{RealizesAt}(v, \hat{c}_1, w''))$

Assume ordinary object $b$ and possible worlds $w_1$ and $w_2$ are witnesses to this existential claim. Then we know:

(\xi) $\text{RealizesAt}(b, c^w_u, w_1) \& \text{RealizesAt}(b, \hat{c}_1, w_2)$

Now independently by (704.1), we know $\text{RealizesAt}(u, c^w_u, w)$. This and the first conjunct of (\xi) imply, by (684), that $w_1 = w$ and $b = u$. From the latter and the second conjunct of (\xi) it follows that $\text{RealizesAt}(u, \hat{c}_1, w_2)$. By definition (674), this implies $\forall G(w_2 \models G u \equiv \hat{c}_1 G)$. So, in particular, $w_2 \models F u \equiv \hat{c}_1 F$. Now assume, for reductio, that $w_2 \models \neg F u$. Then $\hat{c}_1 F$. But this implies $\hat{c}_1 \not\subseteq c_F$, by (694), which contradicts the second conjunct of (8). Hence $\neg(w_2 \models F u)$, and so by the coherence of truth at a world (511.1), it follows that $w_2 \models \neg F u$. So $\exists w (w \models \neg F u)$. Hence, by a fundamental theorem of possible worlds (525.1), $\diamond \neg F u$. Then by the 5 schema (45.3), $\Box \diamond \neg F u$, and so by another fundamental theorem of possible worlds (525.2), $\forall w' (w' \models \diamond \neg F u)$. But then $w \models \diamond \neg F u$.

(717.4) (Exercise)

(723) In the usual manner, we need not concern ourselves with the existence clauses in the definientia of the notions involved. We are citing only definitions instanced to variables, and these instances imply biconditionals between a definiendum and its definiens without the existence claims.

(\rightarrow) Assume $R : F \longleftrightarrow G$. Then by (720) we know both:

(A) $\forall x(Fx \rightarrow \exists y(Gy \& Rxy))$
(B) $\forall y(Gy \rightarrow \exists x(Fx \& Rxy))$

By (722.4), we have to show both:

(a) $R : F \xrightarrow{1-1} G$
(b) $R : F \xrightarrow{\text{onto}} G$

(a) By (722.2), we have to show both:

$R : F \rightarrow G$

$\forall x \forall y \forall z((Fx \& Fy \& Gz) \rightarrow (Rxz \& Ryz \rightarrow x = y))$
By (722.1), the first just means \( \forall x(Fx \rightarrow \exists y(Gy & Rx y)) \), which is just (A). So it remains to show the second. Assume \( Fx \& Fy \& Gz \). And further assume \( Rxz \& Ryz \). Then from \( Gz \) and (B), it follows that there is a unique \( F \) that bears \( R \) to \( z \). Then from \( Fx, Fy, Rxz, \) and \( Ryz \) it follows that \( x = y \), on pain of contradiction.

(b) By (722.3), we have to show both:

\[
R \triangleright F \rightarrow G
\]
\[
\forall y(Gy \rightarrow \exists x(Fx \& Rx y))
\]

But we've seen that the first is already known. And the second follows \textit{a fortiori} from (B).

\((\leftarrow)\) Assume \( R \triangleright F \rightarrow G \). After applying definitions (722.4), (722.2), and (722.3), and then simplifying, we know:

(C) \( R \triangleright F \rightarrow G \)

(D) \( \forall x \forall y \forall z((Fx \& Fy \& Gz) \rightarrow (Rxz \& Ryz \rightarrow x = y)) \)

(E) \( \forall y(Gy \rightarrow \exists x(Fx \& Rx y)) \)

We have to show:

(c) \( \forall x(Fx \rightarrow \exists y(Gy \& Rx y)) \)

(d) \( \forall y(Gy \rightarrow \exists x(Fx \& Rx y)) \)

(c) This follows from (C) and definition (722.1).

(d) By GEN, it suffices to show \( Gy \rightarrow \exists x(Fx \& Rx y) \). So assume \( Gy \). By (E), it follows that \( \exists x(Fx \& Rx y) \). So suppose \( a \) is such an object, so that we know \( Fa \) and \( Ray \). Then by \&I, \( \exists \)I and the definition of the uniqueness quantifier, it remains only to show \( \forall z(Fz \& Ryz \rightarrow z = a) \). So assume \( Fz \& Rzy \). But since we now know \( Fz, Fa, Gy, Rzy \), and \( Ray \), we may infer \( z = a \) by (D). \( \blacklozenge \)

(727.1) Given Rule \( \equiv S \) and the facts that \( R \downarrow, F \downarrow, \) and \( G \downarrow \), it suffices by definitions (726.3) and (726.2) to show that:

\[
\exists R[\forall u(Fu \rightarrow \exists ! v(Fv \& Ruv)) \& \forall v(Fv \rightarrow \exists ! u(Fu \& Ruv))]
\]

If we propose \( \equiv E \) as our witness, then we have to show:

(a) \( \forall u(Fu \rightarrow \exists ! v(Fv \& u \equiv E v)) \)

(b) \( \forall v(Fv \rightarrow \exists ! u(Fu \& u \equiv E v)) \)
In what follows, we take advantage of the fact that formulas of the form $\exists!u \phi$ and $\exists!v \phi$ (i.e., unique existence claims involving the restricted variables $u$ and $v$) are defined in (726.1) using existential quantifiers and $=_{E}$ instead of $=.$

(a) By GEN, it suffices to show $Fu \rightarrow \exists!v(Fv \& u =_{E} v).$ So assume $Fu.$ We have to show, by the definition of the unique existence quantifier for ordinary objects (726.1):

$$\exists v(Fv \& u =_{E} v \& \forall v'((Fv' \& u =_{E} v') \rightarrow v' =_{E} u))$$

But if we propose that $u$ is a witness to this claim, then we have to show:

$$Fu \& u =_{E} u \& \forall v'((Fv' \& u =_{E} v') \rightarrow v' =_{E} u)$$

We know $Fu$ by assumption, and $u =_{E} u$ is a theorem. So it remains only to show:

$$\forall v'((Fv' \& u =_{E} v') \rightarrow v' =_{E} u)$$

But this is trivial, by the symmetry of $=_{E}.$

(b) Note that the following is an alphabetic variant of what we have to show:

$$\forall u(Fu \rightarrow \exists!v(Fv \& v =_{E} u))$$

We leave it as an exercise to show that this follows from (a) by a modally strict derivation that appeals to the symmetry of $=_{E}$ (236.2).

(727.2) To show that equinumerosity $=_{E}$ is symmetric, assume that $F \approx_{E} G$ and suppose $R$ is a witness to this fact. Then by Rule $\equiv S$ and the facts that $R \downarrow, F \downarrow,$ and $G \downarrow,$ it follows by definitions (726.3) and (726.2) that:

$$\forall u(Fu \rightarrow \exists!v(Gv \& Ru)) \& \forall v(Gv \rightarrow \exists!u(Fu \& Ru))$$

Now we want to show, for some $R'$, that $R': G \leftrightarrow F.$ Consider the converse of $R,$ namely $[\lambda xy R_{xy}].$ Clearly, $[\lambda xy R_{xy}] \downarrow,$ by (39.2). So let us call this property $R^{-1}.$ Clearly, $R^{-1} \downarrow.$ By Rule $\equiv S,$ the facts that $R \downarrow, F \downarrow,$ and $G \downarrow,$ and definitions (726.3) and (726.2), we need to show:

(a) $\forall u(Gu \rightarrow \exists!v(Fv \& R^{-1}uv))$

(b) $\forall v(Fv \rightarrow \exists!u(Gu \& R^{-1}vu))$

(a) Assume $Gu,$ by GEN. To avoid clash of variables, note that the second conjunct of (8) is equivalent to the following alphabetic variant:

$$\forall v(Gv \rightarrow \exists!u'(Fu' \& Ru'v))$$
So, if instantiate \( u \) into this claim, we can, given our assumption \( Gu \), detach the consequent from the result, to conclude \( \exists!u'(Fu' & Ru'u) \), i.e., again by alphabetic variance, \( \exists!v(Fv & Rvu) \). Now, independently, since we know that \( R^{-1} \downarrow \) by definition, \( \beta \)-Conversion and the definition of \( R^{-1} \) imply the following modally strict equivalence:

\[
R^{-1}uv \equiv Rvu
\]

So, by the Rule of Substitution (160.1), \( \exists!v(Fv & R^{-1}uv) \).

(b) By analogous reasoning.

(727.3) To show that equinumerosity \( E \) is transitive, assume both that \( F \approx_E G \) and \( G \approx_E H \). Suppose \( R_1 \) and \( R_2 \) are relations that bear witness to these facts, respectively. Then by Rule \( \equiv \)S and the facts that \( R_1 \downarrow \), \( F \downarrow \), and \( G \downarrow \), it follows from definitions (726.3) and (726.2) that:

\[
\begin{align*}
(\Delta) & \quad \forall u(Fu \rightarrow \exists!v(Gv & R_1uv)) \land \forall v(Gv \rightarrow \exists!u(Fu & R_1uv)) \\
(\Xi) & \quad \forall u(Gu \rightarrow \exists!v(Hv & R_2uv)) \land \forall v(Hv \rightarrow \exists!u(Gu & R_2uv))
\end{align*}
\]

Now let \( r \) and \( s \) be additional restricted variables ranging over ordinary objects and consider the relation:

\[
[\lambda rs \exists v(Gv & R_1rv & R_2vs)]
\]

Clearly, \( [\lambda rs \exists v(Gv & R_1rv & R_2vs)] \downarrow \), so let us call it \( R_4 \). By now familiar reasoning and definitions (726.3) and (726.2), to show that \( R_4 : F \leftrightarrow H \), we must show:

\[
\begin{align*}
(a) & \quad \forall u(Fu \rightarrow \exists!v(Hv & Ruv)) \\
(b) & \quad \forall v(Hv \rightarrow \exists!u(Fu & Ruv))
\end{align*}
\]

To show (a), assume \( Fu \), by GEN. By the first conjunct of (\( \Delta \)) and (726.1), there is an ordinary object, say \( b \), such that both:

\[
\begin{align*}
(c) & \quad Gb \land R_1ub \\
(d) & \quad \forall v((Gv & R_1uv) \rightarrow v =_E b)
\end{align*}
\]

Then, after instantiating \( b \) into the first conjunct of (\( \Xi \)), we know, given the first conjunct of (c), that there is an ordinary object, say \( c \), such that both:

\footnote{By our conventions for bound occurrences of restricted variables, the \( \lambda \)-expression \( R \) abbreviates in turn abbreviates:

\[
[\lambda xy Ox & Oy \& \exists (O!z & Gz \& R_1xz & R_2zy)]
\]

By (331.4), the above eliminates bound occurrences of \( r \) and \( s \) with bound occurrences of \( x \) and \( y \), and by (331.2), the above eliminates bound occurrences of \( v \) with bound occurrences of \( z \).}
(e) $Hc \& R_2bc$

(f) $\forall v((Hv \& R_2bv) \rightarrow v =_E c)$

Now to prove $\exists v(Hv \& Ru)$, we choose $c$ as our witness. It then suffices, by $\exists I$, the definition of the uniqueness quantifier for ordinary objects (726.1), and the fact that $c$ is ordinary, to show that:

(g) $Hc \& Ruc$

(h) $\forall v((Hv \& Ru) \rightarrow v =_E c)$

To show (g), note that $Hc$ is the first conjunct of (e). Now by the fact that $R \downarrow$, the definition of $R$ and $\beta$-Conversion, we know $Ruc$ iff $\exists v(Gv \& R_1uv \& R_2vc)$. But (c) and (e) above establish that $b$ is witness to the existence claim. To show (h), assume $Hv \& Ru$, to show $v =_E c$. Since $Ru$, we know, by the existence and definition of $R$ and $\beta$-Conversion, that there is an ordinary object, say $e$, such that $Ge \& R_1ue \& R_2ev$. But the first two conjuncts imply, by (d), that $e =_E b$. So, $e = b$, by (230.2). This last fact and $R_2ev$ imply $R_2bv$. So we know $Hv \& R_2bv$. Then by (f), it follows that $v =_E c$.

To show (b), assume $Hv$. Then by the 2nd conjunct of (ξ), we know, for some ordinary object, say $c$:

(i) $Gc \& R_2cv \& \forall u((Gu \& R_2uv) \rightarrow u =_E d)$

Now if we instantiate $c$ into the second conjunct of (δ), then from the first conjunct of (i), we know that for some ordinary object, say $d$:

(j) $Fd \& R_1dc \& \forall u((Fu \& R_1uc) \rightarrow u =_E d)$

To complete the proof of (b), it suffices, by $\exists I$ and the definition of the uniqueness quantifier, to show:

$$Fd \& Rdv \& \forall u((Fu \& Ruv) \rightarrow u =_E d)$$

$Fd$ is the first conjunct of (j). Moreover, by $\beta$-Conversion and the definition and existence of $R$, we know $Rdv$, since there is an ordinary object, namely $c$, such that $Ge$, $R_1dc$, and $R_2cv$, by (i) and (j). Since it now remains only to show $\forall u((Fu \& Ruv) \rightarrow u =_E d)$, assume $Fu \& Ruv$. From $Ruv$ and the definition of $R$, it follows that some ordinary object, say $e$, is such that $Ge \& R_1ue \& R_2ev$. From $Ge$, $R_2ev$, and the third conjunct of (i), it follows that $e =_E c$ and, by (230.2), $e = c$. But then the third conjunct of (j) implies $\forall u((Fu \& R_1ue) \rightarrow u =_E d)$. So by $\forall E$, $(Fu \& R_1ue) \rightarrow u =_E d$. But we already know both $Fu$ and $R_1ue$. Hence $u =_E d$. $\therefore$

(727.4) $\rightarrow$ Assume $F \approx_E G$. Then by GEN, it suffices to show $H \approx_E F \equiv H \approx_E G$:
Assume $H \approx E F$, then by transitivity (727.3), $H \approx E G$.

Assume $H \approx E G$. Then, by symmetry (727.2), our initial assumption implies $G \approx F$. So by transitivity, $H \approx E F$.

Assume $\forall H (H \approx E F \equiv H \approx E G)$. By instantiating to $F$ we obtain: $F \approx E F \equiv F \approx E G$. So by reflexivity (727.1), $F \approx E G$. ⊥

(727.5) Assume $F \approx E G$. Then by (727.4), we know:

(8) $\forall H (H \approx E F \equiv H \approx E G)$

But by (39.2), $[\lambda y \not\in H y] F \downarrow$ and, moreover, this term is substitutable for $H$ in the matrix of (8). Hence:

$[\lambda y \not\in H y] \approx E F \equiv [\lambda y \not\in H y] \approx E G$

But then, by GEN, $\forall H ([\lambda y \not\in H y] \approx E F \equiv [\lambda y \not\in H y] \approx E G)$. ⊥

(729) (Exercise)

(731.1) – (731.2) (Exercises)

(732.1) Assume $\neg \exists u F u$ and $\neg \exists v H v$. Then pick any relation $R$ you please. By failures of the antecedent, we know both:

$F u \rightarrow \exists ! v (H v \& R v u)$

$H v \rightarrow \exists ! u (F u \& R v u)$

So by GEN:

$\forall u (F u \rightarrow \exists ! v (H v \& R v u))$

$\forall v (H v \rightarrow \exists ! u (F u \& R v u))$

Hence, by &I and definition (726.2) (as simplified by Rule $\equiv S$ and the facts that $R \downarrow$, $F \downarrow$, and $H \downarrow$), it follows $R \vdash F \rightarrow H$. So by $\exists I$ and definition (726.3), $F \approx E H$. ⊥

(732.2) Assume $\exists u F u$ and $\neg \exists v H v$. Given the former, suppose $b$ is such an ordinary object, so that we know $F b$. Now assume, for reductio, that $F \approx E H$. Then by definitions (726.3) and (726.2), as simplified by Rule $\equiv S$ and the facts that $R \downarrow$, $F \downarrow$, and $H \downarrow$, it follows that:

(8) $\exists R [\forall u (F u \rightarrow \exists ! v (H v \& R v u)) \& \forall v (H v \rightarrow \exists ! u (F u \& R v u))]$

Suppose $R_1$ is such an $R$. Then from the first conjunct of (8) and $F b$, it follows that $\exists ! v (H v \& R v u)$. A fortiori, $\exists v H v$. Contradiction. ⊥

(734) Since the following proof is conducted entirely using variables and constants, all of which are significant, we may omit any existence clauses that
would otherwise be required by the definitions of the notions involved. Let us use \( r, s, \) and \( t \) as additional restricted variables for ordinary objects, so that \( r, s, t, u, v \) all range over ordinary objects. Assume that \( F \cong E, Fu, \) and \( Gv \). The first assumption implies, by definition (726.3), that some relation, say \( R \), correlates \( F \) and \( G \) one-to-one, i.e., by definition (726.2):

**Fact 1:** \( \forall r (Fr \rightarrow \exists s (Gs \land Rs)) \) \& \( \forall s (Gs \rightarrow \exists !r (Fr \land Rs)) \)

Moreover, by (729), it follows that \( R \) maps \( E F \) onto \( G \) one-to-one. By definition (728.2), the one-to-one character of \( R \) entails:

**Fact 2:** \( \forall r \forall s \forall t ((Fr \land Fs \land Gt) \rightarrow (Rt \land Rst \rightarrow r \equiv s)) \)

Now we want to show that \( F ^{−u} \cong E G^{−u} \). By definitions (726.3) and (726.2), we have to show:

**Claim:** There is a relation \( R' \) such that:

(A) \( \forall r (F^{−u} r \rightarrow \exists ! s (G^{−v} s \land Rs)) \)

(B) \( \forall s (G^{−v} s \rightarrow \exists ! r (F^{−u} r \land Rs)) \)

We proceed by showing that if \( Ru v \) (Case 1), then \( R \) itself is the witness to the Claim and if \( \neg Ru v \) (Case 2), then there exists a relation that can be defined in terms of \( R \) that serves as a witness to the Claim.

**Case 1:** \( Ru v \). Then we show \( R \) itself is the witness to the Claim, i.e., that both (A) and (B) hold with respect to \( R \). In what follows, we use \( a, b, c, d \) as constants for ordinary objects.

(A) By GEN, suppose \( F^{−u} r \), to show \( \exists ! s (G^{−v} s \land Rs) \). Then \( Fr \) and \( r \not\equiv E u \), by the definition of \( F^{−u} \) (733). But since \( Fr \), the first conjunct of Fact 1 implies \( \exists ! s (Gs \land Rs) \). Let \( b \) be such an object, so that we know:

(\( \zeta \)) \( Gb \land Rrb \) \& \( \forall t (Gt \land Rrt \rightarrow t \equiv b) \)

We can now show, using \( b \) as a witness, that \( \exists ! s (G^{−v} s \land Rs) \). Since we now know \( Fr, Fu, Gb, Rrb, Ru v, \) and \( r \not\equiv E u \), it follows by Fact 2 that \( b \not\equiv v \), on pain of contradiction. Hence \( b \not\equiv E v \), by (230.2). Since we have that \( Gb \) and \( b \not\equiv E v \), it follows that \( G^{−v} b \). Since we’ve established \( G^{−v} b \) and \( Rrb \), it remains to show uniqueness. By GEN, it suffices to show \( (G^{−v} t \land Rrt) \rightarrow t \equiv b \). So suppose \( G^{−v} t \) and \( Rrt \). Then by definition of \( G^{−v} \), it follows that \( Gt \). But then \( t \equiv E b \), by the last conjunct of (\( \zeta \)).

(B) By GEN, it suffices to show \( G^{−v} s \rightarrow \exists ! r (F^{−u} r \land Rs) \). So assume \( G^{−v} s \). Then, by definition of \( G^{−v} \) (733), we know \( Gs \) and \( s \not\equiv E v \). From \( Gs \) and the second conjunct of Fact 1, we know \( \exists ! r (Fr \land Rs) \). So suppose \( a \) is such an object, so that we know:
We can now show, using \( a \) as a witness, that \( \exists! r(F_{-u}r & Rrs) \). Since we now know \( Fa, Gs, Gv, Ras, Ruv, \) and \( s \neq E v \), it follows from the fact that \( R \) maps \( E F \) to \( G \) (i.e., the first conjunct of \( \text{Fact 1} \)), that \( a \neq u \), on pain of contradiction (if \( a \) were identical to \( u \), we would have \( Ras, Rav, \) and \( s \neq E v \), which would contradict the fact that \( R \) relates \( a \) to a unique ordinary object exemplifying \( G \)). Hence \( a \neq E v \) by \( \text{(230.2)} \) and, given we know \( Fa \), we have \( F^{-u}a \). So we have established \( F^{-u}a \) and \( Ras \). It then remains to prove uniqueness. By GEN, it suffices to show \( (F_{-u}t & Rts) \rightarrow t = E a \). So suppose \( F^{-u}t \) and \( Rts \). Then \( Ft \), by definition of \( F^{-u} \).

**Case 2:** \( \neg Ruv \). Since we've assumed \( Fu \) and \( Gv \), we therefore know by \( \text{Fact 1} \) both:

\[ \exists! (Gs & Rus), \text{i.e., there is a unique ordinary object that exemplifies } G \text{ to which } u \text{ bears } R, \text{ and} \]
\[ \exists! r(Fr & Rrv), \text{i.e., there is a unique ordinary object that exemplifies } F \text{ and that bears } R \text{ to } v. \]

Let \( b \) be a witness to the first and \( a \) be a witness to the second. Now let \( R_1 \) be the relation:

\[ [Ars (r \neq E u & s \neq E v & Rrs) \lor (r = E a & s = E b) \lor (r = E u & s = E v)] \]

Since this is a \( \lambda \)-predicate with a matrix free of encoding formula subterms, we know \( R_1 \) exists by \( \text{(39.2)} \). So it remains to show that \( R_1 \) is a witness to our \( \text{Claim} \) by showing both \( (A) \) and \( (B) \) hold with respect to \( R_1 \).

However, we can simplify our task by showing both \( R_1 uv \) and that \( R_1 \) correlates \( E \) one-to-one \( F \) and \( G \). For if so, then we have reduced this problem to the reasoning in \( \text{Case 1} \).

Clearly, \( R_1 uv \), by the third disjunct of \( R_1 \). So to show that \( R_1 \) correlates \( E \) one-to-one \( F \) and \( G \), it suffices to note that \( R_1 \) is identical to \( R \) except that it maps \( a \) uniquely to \( b \) (by the first and second disjuncts of \( R_1 \)) and \( u \) uniquely to \( v \) (by the first and third disjuncts of \( R_1 \)). Hence, by the reasoning in \( \text{Case 1} \), \( R_1 \) correlates \( E \) one-to-one \( F^{-u} \) and \( G^{-v} \). \( \Rightarrow \)

**Case 1:** \( \neg Ruv \). Since we've assumed \( Fu \) and \( Gv \), we therefore know by \( \text{Fact 1} \) both:

\[ \exists! (Gs & Rus), \text{i.e., there is a unique ordinary object that exemplifies } G \text{ to which } u \text{ bears } R, \text{ and} \]
\[ \exists! r(Fr & Rrv), \text{i.e., there is a unique ordinary object that exemplifies } F \text{ and that bears } R \text{ to } v. \]

Let \( b \) be a witness to the first and \( a \) be a witness to the second. Now let \( R_1 \) be the relation:

\[ [Ars (r \neq E u & s \neq E v & Rrs) \lor (r = E a & s = E b) \lor (r = E u & s = E v)] \]

Since this is a \( \lambda \)-predicate with a matrix free of encoding formula subterms, we know \( R_1 \) exists by \( \text{(39.2)} \). So it remains to show that \( R_1 \) is a witness to our \( \text{Claim} \) by showing both \( (A) \) and \( (B) \) hold with respect to \( R_1 \).

However, we can simplify our task by showing both \( R_1 uv \) and that \( R_1 \) correlates \( E \) one-to-one \( F \) and \( G \). For if so, then we have reduced this problem to the reasoning in \( \text{Case 1} \).

Clearly, \( R_1 uv \), by the third disjunct of \( R_1 \). So to show that \( R_1 \) correlates \( E \) one-to-one \( F \) and \( G \), it suffices to note that \( R_1 \) is identical to \( R \) except that it maps \( a \) uniquely to \( b \) (by the first and second disjuncts of \( R_1 \)) and \( u \) uniquely to \( v \) (by the first and third disjuncts of \( R_1 \)). Hence, by the reasoning in \( \text{Case 1} \), \( R_1 \) correlates \( E \) one-to-one \( F^{-u} \) and \( G^{-v} \). \( \Rightarrow \)
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Fact 1: ∀r (F −r u → ∃!s (G −v s & Rrs)) & ∀s (G −w s → ∃!r (F −v r & Rrs))

Now by (729), it also follows that R maps F −u onto G −v one-to-one. By definition (728.2), the one-to-one character of R entails:

Fact 2: ∀r ∀s ∀t ((F −u r & F −u s & G −v t) → (Rrt & Rst → r ≡ E s))

We want to show F ≈ E G, i.e., by definitions (726.3) and (726.2):

Claim: There is a relation R′ such that:

(A) ∀r (Fr → ∃!s (Gs & R′rs))
(B) ∀s (Gs → ∃!r (Fr & R′rs))

Consider the following relation R2:

[λxy (F −ux & G −vy & Rxy) ∨ (x ≡ E u & y ≡ E v)]

Since this is a λ-predicate with a matrix free of encoding formula subterms, we know R2 exists by (39.2). It remains to establish that R2 is a witness to the Claim. But clearly, for any F-object a other than u, the first disjunct of R2 guarantees that there is a unique G-object b other than v such that R2ab, and vice versa. And by the second disjunct, R2 uniquely maps u to v. Hence, R2 correlates F and G one-to-one.

(736.1)⋆ By definition (730), we have to show ∀u ([λz ⊤Fz]u ≡ Fu). But this follows, a fortiori, from ∀x ([λz ⊤Fz]x ≡Fx). So, by GEN, we need only show [λz ⊤Fz]x ≡Fx. Clearly, by (39.2), [λz ⊤Fz]↓. So by β-Conversion, [λz ⊤Fz]x ≡ ⊤Fx. But by (43)⋆, ⊤Fx ≡ Fx. Hence, [λz ⊤Fz]x ≡ Fx. □

(736.2)⋆ (Exercise)

(737.1) We prove our theorem by showing that the following two properties are witnesses:

L: [λx E!x → E!x]

P: [λx E!x & ⊤¬dE!x]

Before we begin the proof proper, we note some facts about these two properties. Clearly L is an impossible property, i.e., ⊢¬∃xLx. Now as to P, recall that by theorem (209.1), we know Contingent(q0), where q0 is ∃x(E!x & ¬dE!x). Hence by theorem (205.2), we know:

□q0 & □¬q0

i.e.,

(α) □∃x(E!x & ¬dE!x) & □¬∃x(E!x & ¬dE!x)
Clearly, since \( P \downarrow \), it follows by \( \beta \)-Conversion that \( P x \equiv E x & \neg \exists x E x. \) From this modally strict fact it follows from (\( \omega \)) by the Rule of Substitution (160.1) that:

\[
\diamond \exists x P x \& \diamond \exists x P x
\]

Now to show that \( L \) and \( P \) are witnesses, we have to show \( \diamond (L \equiv_E P \& \diamond \neg L \equiv_E P) \).

But by (165.11), it suffices to show \( \diamond \neg E P \& \diamond \neg L \equiv_E P \):

- \( \diamond \neg L \equiv_E P \). We first establish \( \neg \exists x P x \rightarrow \neg L \equiv_E P \). So assume \( \neg \exists x P x \). A fortiori, \( \neg \exists u Pu \). So we may invoke (732.1) to conclude \( P \equiv_E L \), which by the symmetry of \( \equiv_E (727.3) \), yields \( L \equiv_E P \). So by Conditional Proof, \( \neg \exists x P x \rightarrow \neg L \equiv_E P \), and since this is a modally strict result, it follows by RM\( \diamond (157.2) \) that \( \neg \exists x P x \rightarrow \diamond \neg L \equiv_E P \). But we know \( \diamond \neg x P x \), by (8). Hence \( \diamond \neg L \equiv_E P \).

\( \diamond \neg L \equiv_E P \). We begin by first proving \( \exists u Pu \rightarrow \neg L \equiv_E P \). So assume \( \exists u Pu \). But we also know \( \neg \exists x L x \), which implies, a fortiori, \( \neg \exists u Lu \). So we may invoke (732.2) to conclude \( \neg P \equiv_L \neg L \), which by symmetry yields \( \neg L \equiv_E P \). Hence, \( \exists u Pu \rightarrow \neg L \equiv_E P \). Since this is a modally strict result, it follows by RM\( \diamond (157.2) \) that implies \( \exists u Pu \rightarrow \diamond \neg L \equiv_E P \). But we know \( \diamond \exists x P x \), by (8). But if \( \diamond \exists x P x \), then \( \diamond \exists u Pu \) (exercise). Hence \( \diamond \neg L \equiv_E P \).

\( 737.2 \) We prove our theorem by again showing that the following two properties are witnesses:

\[
L: [\lambda x E x \rightarrow E x]
\]

\[
P: [\lambda x E x & \neg \exists x E x]
\]

But this time we have to show:

\[
\diamond ([\lambda z \exists z L z] \equiv_E P \& \diamond \neg [\lambda z \exists z L z] \equiv_E P)
\]

When \( P \) is \( [\lambda x E x \& \neg \exists x E x] \) and \( L \) is the negation of \( [\lambda x E x \rightarrow E x] \), then the reasoning in (737.1) established both:

\[
\diamond L \equiv_E P
\]

\[
\diamond \neg L \equiv_E P
\]

However, the property \( [\lambda z \exists z L z] \) is, like \( L \), an impossible property, i.e., it is not hard to show \( \Box \neg \exists x [\lambda z \exists z L z] x \):

\[\text{Proof.}\] Assume otherwise, for reductio, i.e., that \( \Box \exists x [\lambda z \exists z L z] x \). Then by BF\( \Box \exists x [\lambda z \exists L z] x \). Suppose \( b \) is such an object, so that we know \( \Box [\lambda z \exists z L z] b \). But since \( [\lambda z \exists z L z] \downarrow \), then \( \beta \)-Conversion implies \( [\lambda z \exists z L z] b \equiv
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...\[A\] \[\lambda z A L z\] \[b\] \[A L b\], and since this is a modally strict theorem, \(\Box([\lambda z A L z] b \rightarrow A L b)\). So it follows that \(\Box A L b\), by K\(\diamond\). Hence, by (164.4), \(A L b\). But, by definition of \(L\), we know \(\Box \neg L b\). Hence \(\Box \neg \neg L b\), by (132). So by axiom (44.1), \(\neg A L b\). Contradiction.

Consequently, by reasoning analogous to that use in (737.1), it follows that:

\((\vartheta)\) \(\Box [\lambda z A L z] \approx E P\)

\((\zeta)\) \(\Box [\lambda z A L z] \approx E P\)

(738.1) Assume \(\forall x (F x \rightarrow \Box F x)\). By (726.3) and (726.2), we have to show:

\[\exists R (\forall u (F u \rightarrow \exists ! v ([\lambda z A F z] v & R u v)) \& \forall v ([\lambda z A F z] v \rightarrow \exists ! u (F u & R u v)))\]

Since \([\lambda z A F z] b\], it follows by \(\beta\)-Conversion and a Rule of Substitution that we have to show:

\[\exists R (\forall u (F u \rightarrow \exists ! v (A F v & R u v)) \& \forall v (A F v \rightarrow \exists ! u (F u & R u v)))\]

This can be established if we take our witness to be \(=E\). For then we have to show:

\[\forall u (F u \rightarrow \exists ! v (A F v & u = E v)) \& \forall v (A F v \rightarrow \exists ! u (F u & u = E v))\]

Without loss of generality, it suffices to show the first conjunct, and by GEN, it suffices to show: \(F u \rightarrow \exists ! v (A F v & u = E v)\). So assume \(F u\). We want to show:

\[\exists ! v (A F v & u = E v \& \forall v' (A F v' & u = E v' \rightarrow v' = E v))\]

But \(u\) is a witness to this claim, i.e., we can show that:

\((\delta)\) \(A F u & u = E v' \& \forall v' (A F v' & u = E v' \rightarrow v' = E v)\)

The first conjunct of \((\delta)\) follows from our local assumption that \(F u\), our global assumption that \(\forall x (F x \rightarrow \Box F x)\), and the fact that \(\Box F u \rightarrow A F u\) (132). The second conjunct of \((\delta)\) is theorem (236.1). So, to show the third and final conjunct of \((\delta)\), it suffices by GEN, to show \((A F v' & u = E v') \rightarrow v' = E u\). So assume \(A F v' & u = E v'\). Then by symmetry of \(=E\) (236.2), it follows that \(v' = E u\).

(738.2) Let \(\varphi\) and \(\psi\) be as follows:

\[\varphi = \Box \forall x (F x \rightarrow \Box F x) \& \Box \forall x (G x \rightarrow \Box G x)\]

\[\psi = F \approx E G \rightarrow \Box F \approx E G\]

Then we have to show \(\varphi \rightarrow \Box \psi\). Our proof strategy is as follows:

(i) Show that there is a modally strict proof of \(\varphi \rightarrow \psi\).
(ii) Conclude by RM that □ϕ → □ψ.

(iii) Show that ϕ → □ϕ.

(iv) Conclude that ϕ → □ψ by hypothetical syllogism from (iii) and (ii).

Now step (iii) is straightforward. Assume ϕ. Then ϕ has the form □χ₁ & □χ₂. By the 4 and T schemas we know both that □χ₁ ≡ □□χ₁ and that □χ₂ ≡ □□χ₂. Since these are modally strict, it follows from ϕ by a Rule of Substitution that □□χ₁ & □□χ₂. Hence □(□χ₁ & □χ₂), by the right-to-left direction of (158.3). But this is just □ϕ.

So it remains to show (i). Assume ϕ, i.e.,

(A) □∀x(Fx → □Fx), i.e., by (555.1)
   ∀x(□Fx → □Fx)

(B) □∀x(Gx → □Gx), i.e., by (555.1)
   ∀x(□Gx → □Gx)

Now further assume F ≈ E. Then, by (726.3) and (726.2):

∃R(∀u(Fu → ∃!v(Gv & Ruv)) & ∀v(Gv → ∃!u(Fu & Ruv)))

Suppose R₁ is such a relation, so that we know:

(C) ∀u(Fu → ∃!v(Gv & R₁uv)) & ∀v(Gv → ∃!u(Fu & R₁uv))

Now our goal is to show □F ≈ E G, and so by (726.3) and (726.2), we have to show:

□∃R(∀u(Fu → ∃!v(Gv & R₁uv)) & ∀v(Gv → ∃!u(Fu & R₁uv)))

By the Buridan schema (168.1), it suffices to show:

∃R(∀u(Fu → ∃!v(Gv & R₁uv)) & ∀v(Gv → ∃!u(Fu & R₁uv)))

So we need to find a relation that is provably a witness to this claim. By theorem (554.3), we know that there is relation, say R₂, such that Rigidifies(R₂, R₁), i.e., by definition (553.2):

Rigid(R₂) & ∀x∀y(R₂xy ≡ R₁xy)

i.e., by definition (553.1) and &E:

(D) □∀x∀y(R₂xy → □R₂xy), i.e., by (555.1)
   ∀x∀y(□R₂xy → □R₂xy)

(E) ∀x∀y(R₂xy ≡ R₁xy)

To show that R₂ is the needed witness, we have to show:
\(\square(\forall u (Fu \rightarrow \exists !v(Gv & R_2 uv)) \land \forall v(Gv \rightarrow \exists !u(Fu & R_2 uv)))\)

Now by the right-to-left direction of (158.3), it suffices to show both \(\square \forall u (Fu \rightarrow \exists !v(Gv & R_2 uv))\) and \(\square \forall v(Gv \rightarrow \exists !u(Fu & R_2 uv))\). Without loss of generality, we show only the first. We leave it as an exercise to show that BF (167.1) holds for our restricted variable, i.e., we leave it as an exercise to show that it suffices to prove \(\forall u \square(Fu \rightarrow \exists !v(Gv & R_2 uv))\), and so by GEN, to show \(\square(Fu \rightarrow \exists !v(Gv & R_2 uv))\). Assume not, i.e., \(\Diamond \neg(Fu \rightarrow \exists !v(Gv & R_2 uv))\), i.e., \(\Diamond(Fu \land \neg \exists !v(Gv & R_2 uv))\). Then, by (162.3):

(F) \(\Diamond Fu \land \Diamond \neg \exists !v(Gv & R_2 uv)\)

Now our strategy is to use the first conjunct of (F) to show the negation of the second conjunct, yielding our contradiction. From the first conjunct of (F) and the second line of (A), it follows that \(\square Fu\). Hence, \(Fu\) and so it follows from the first conjunct of (C) that \(\exists !v(Gv & R_1 uv)\). Suppose \(a\) is such an object, so that by the definition of the uniqueness quantifier, we know:

(G) \(Ga \land R_1 ua \land \forall v'(Gv' \land R_2 uv' \rightarrow v' = a)\)

Recall that our strategy is to show the negation of the second conjunct of (F). So we have to show \(\square \exists !v(Gv & R_2 uv)\). That is, we have to show:

\(\square \exists !v(Gv \land R_2 uv \land \forall v'(Gv' \land R_2 uv' \rightarrow v' = v))\)

We now claim (exercise) that, by the Buridan formula (168.1), it suffices to show:

\(\exists v \square(Gv \land R_2 uv \land \forall v'(Gv' \land R_2 uv' \rightarrow v' = v))\)

We now show that \(a\) is a witness to this claim, which means we have to show:

\(\square(Ga \land R_2 ua \land \forall v'(Gv' \land R_2 uv' \rightarrow v' = a))\)

By now familiar reasoning, it suffices to show:

(a) \(\square Ga\)

(b) \(\square R_2 ua\)

(c) \(\square \forall v'(Gv' \land R_2 uv' \rightarrow v' = a)\)

But (a) follows from (b) and the first conjunct of (G). To show (b), note that (E) and the second conjunct of (G) yield \(R_2 ua\). But this result and (D) imply (b). Note that to show (c), it suffices to show \(\forall v' \square(Gv' \land R_2 uv' \rightarrow v' = a)\), and by GEN, show \(\square(Gv' \land R_2 uv' \rightarrow v' = a)\). For reductio, suppose not, i.e., \(\Diamond \neg(Gv' \land R_2 uv' \rightarrow v' = a)\), i.e., \(\Diamond(Gv' \land R_2 uv' \land v' \neq a)\). Then:

(H) \(\Diamond Gv' \land \Diamond R_2 uv' \land v' \neq a\)
But the first conjunct of (H) implies, by the second line of (B), that □Gv’ and, hence, Gv’. And the second conjunct of (H) implies, by the second line of (D), □R2uv’, and so R2uv’. From this latter, (E) implies R1uv’. Since we’ve established Gv’ and R1uv’, it follows from the third conjunct of (G) that v’ = a. Then by the necessity of identity, □v’ = a, i.e., ¬□¬v’ = a, which contradicts the third conjunct of (H). ∞

(740.1) By axiom (44.4), $\forall z Fx \equiv \forall z Fx$. Hence, by (139.5), $\forall z Fx \equiv \forall z Fx$. Since $[\lambda z \forall z Fx] \downarrow$, it follows by $\beta$-conversion and a Rule of Substitution that $\forall z Fx \equiv [\lambda z \forall z Fx]$. So by GEN, $\forall x \forall z Fx \equiv [\lambda z \forall z Fx]$. By (44.3), $\forall \forall x \forall z Fx \equiv [\lambda z \forall z Fx]$. A fortiori, $\forall \forall u (Fu \equiv [\lambda z \forall z Fx] u)$. Then by (730), $\forall F \equiv [\lambda z \forall z Fx]$. So by (731.1) and a Rule of Substitution, $\forall F \equiv [\lambda z \forall z Fx]$. ∞

(740.2) Assume $[\lambda z \forall z Fx] x$. Then since $[\lambda z \forall z Fx] \downarrow$, $\beta$-Conversion implies $\forall z Fx$. So by axiom (46.1), $\forall \forall z Fx$. Since $[\lambda z \forall z Fx] \downarrow$, it follows by $\beta$-Conversion that $[\lambda z \forall z Fx] x$. So by conditional proof, $[\lambda z \forall z Fx] x \rightarrow [\lambda z \forall z Fx] x$. So by GEN, $\forall x ([\lambda z \forall z Fx] x \rightarrow [\lambda z \forall z Fx] x)$. Since this result was proved by modally strict means, it follows by RN that $\forall \forall x ([\lambda z \forall z Fx] x \rightarrow [\lambda z \forall z Fx] x)$. ∞

(742.1) Since the theorem is given in terms of variables and constants, Rule $\equiv S$ allows us to ignore existence clauses and work with simplified definitions. Assume $G \equiv E H$. We need to show $\Numbers(x, G) \equiv \Numbers(x, H)$.

(→) Assume $\Numbers(x, G)$. Then, by definition (741), we know both $\forall x$ and:

(8) $\forall F (xF \equiv [\lambda z \forall z Fx] \equiv E G)$

To show $\Numbers(x, H)$, it suffices by GEN to show $xF \equiv [\lambda z \forall z Fx] \equiv E H$. Now (8) implies $xF \equiv [\lambda z \forall z Fx] \equiv E G$. Independently, our first assumption, $G \equiv E H$, implies, by (727.4), that $[\lambda z \forall z Fx] \equiv E G \equiv [\lambda z \forall z Fx] \equiv E H$. So, $xF \equiv [\lambda z \forall z Fx] \equiv E H$.

(←) By analogous reasoning. ∞

(742.2) Assume $\Numbers(x, G)$ and $\Numbers(x, H)$. Then by definition (741), these imply, respectively:

$\forall F (xF \equiv [\lambda z \forall z Fx] \equiv E G)$

$\forall F (xF \equiv [\lambda z \forall z Fx] \equiv E H)$

Hence, by (100.11) and (100.10), it follows that:

$\forall F ([\lambda z \forall z Fx] \equiv E G \equiv [\lambda z \forall z Fx] \equiv E H)$

Since the theorem is given in terms of variables and constants, Rule $\equiv S$ allows us to ignore existence clauses and work with simplified definitions. So by (727.5), $G \equiv E H$. ∞

(742.3) Assume $G \equiv E H$. Then, by (731.1), $G \equiv E H$. Hence, our conclusion follows by (742.1). ∞
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(743) Assume both Numbers\((x, G)\) and Numbers\((y, H)\). \(\rightarrow\) Assume \(x = y\). Then Numbers\((x, H)\). Hence by (742.2), \(G \approx_E H\). \(\leftarrow\) Assume \(G \approx_E H\). Since the theorem is given in terms of variables and constants, Rule \(\equiv_S\) allows us to ignore existence clauses and work with simplified definitions. So we may take our global assumptions to imply, respectively:

\(\chi\) \(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv [\lambda z \forall Fz] \approx_E G)\)

\(\psi\) \(A!y \& \forall F(yF \equiv [\lambda z \forall Fz] \approx_E H)\)

Since \(A!x\) and \(A!y\), it suffices by theorem (242.1) to show \(\forall F(xF \equiv yF)\), and by GEN, that \(xF \equiv yF\):

\(\rightarrow\) Assume \(xF\). Then the right conjunct of \(\chi\) implies \([\lambda z \forall Fz] \approx_E G\). But from this and our local assumption, it follows that \([\lambda z \forall Fz] \approx_E H\), by the transitivity of \(\approx_E\) (727.3) and the existence of \([\lambda z \forall Fz]\). Hence, by the right conjunct of \(\psi\), it follows that \(yF\).

\(\leftarrow\) Assume \(yF\). Then the right conjunct of \(\psi\) implies \([\lambda z \forall Fz] \approx_E H\). Now since \(\approx_E\) is symmetric (727.2), our local assumption implies that \(H \approx_E G\). But then by transitivity of \(\approx_E\), it follows that \([\lambda z \forall Fz] \approx_E G\). So by the right conjunct of \(\chi\), \(xF\).

(745) Assume \(\exists u \forall v (u \neq v)\). Let \(c\) and \(d\) be such ordinary objects, so that we know \(c \neq d\) and, hence, \(c \neq_E d\) (230.2). Then consider the properties \([\lambda x x =_E c]\) and \([\lambda x x =_E d]\), both of which exist (exercise). By Comprehension for Abstract Objects (53), we know that both:

\[\exists x(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv [\lambda z \forall Fz] \approx_E [\lambda x x =_E c]))\]

\[\exists x(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv [\lambda z \forall Fz] \approx_E [\lambda x x =_E d]))\]

Let \(a\) and \(b\) be such objects, so that we know, respectively:

\(A!a \& \forall F(aF \equiv [\lambda z \forall Fz] \approx_E [\lambda x x =_E c])\)

\(A!b \& \forall F(bF \equiv [\lambda z \forall Fz] \approx_E [\lambda x x =_E d])\)

Since all the terms used above exist, Rule \(\equiv_S\) allows us to ignore existence clauses and work with simplified definitions. Hence by (741), we know, respectively:

\(\theta\) Numbers\((a, [\lambda x x =_E c])\)

\(\xi\) Numbers\((b, [\lambda x x =_E d])\)

Our first goal is to show \(a = b\). But by the Conditional Underlying Hume's Principle (743), it now follows from \(\theta\) and \(\xi\) that:
\[ a = b \equiv [\lambda x x =_E c] \approx_E [\lambda x x =_E d] \]

But, clearly, \([\lambda x x =_E c] \approx_E [\lambda x x =_E d]\): the relation \([\lambda y z y =_E c \& z =_E d]\), which clearly exists, correlates the ordinary objects exemplifying \([\lambda x x =_E c]\) and the ordinary objects exemplifying \([\lambda x x =_E d]\) one-to-one (exercise). Hence \(a = b\), and so it follows from \((\xi)\) that:

\((\zeta)\) \(\text{Numbers}(a, [\lambda x x =_E d])\)

So, given \((\delta)\) and \((\zeta)\), it remains, by \(\exists I\), to show \(\neg [\lambda x x =_E c] \equiv_E [\lambda x x =_E d]\). So we have to show that some ordinary object exemplifies one but not the other. We leave it as an exercise to show either that \(c\) exemplifies \([\lambda x x =_E c]\) but not \([\lambda x x =_E d]\), or that \(d\) exemplifies \([\lambda x x =_E d]\) but not \([\lambda x x =_E c]\). \(\Box\)

\((746.1) - (746.2)\) (Exercises)

\((747.1)\) By \((737.2)\), we know \(\exists F \exists G \Diamond [(\lambda z \vdash Fz) =_E G \& \Diamond \neg [\lambda z \vdash Fz] =_E G]\). Suppose \(P\) and \(Q\) are such properties, so that we know:

\[ \Diamond ([\lambda z \vdash Pz] =_E Q \& \Diamond \neg [\lambda z \vdash Pz] =_E Q) \]

By \((165.11)\), it follows that:

\((\delta)\) \(\Diamond [\lambda z \vdash Pz] =_E Q\)

\((\zeta)\) \(\Diamond \neg [\lambda z \vdash Pz] =_E Q\)

Now, by \((746.1)\), we know \(\exists x \text{Numbers}(x, Q)\). Then suppose \(a\) is such an object, so that we know \(\text{Numbers}(a, Q)\). By \&I and two applications of \(\exists I\), it remains to show \(\neg \Box \text{Numbers}(a, Q)\). For reductio, assume \(\Box \text{Numbers}(a, Q)\). Then by definition \((741)\), \(\Box (A! a \& Q \downarrow \& \forall F (aF \equiv [\lambda z \vdash Pz] =_E Q))\). By \((158.3)\), \(\Box A! a\) and \(\Box Q\) and \(\Box \forall F (aF \equiv [\lambda z \vdash Pz] =_E Q)\). By CBF \((167.2)\), the latter implies \(\forall F \Box (aF \equiv [\lambda z \vdash Pz] =_E Q)\). Instantiating to \(P\), we then know \(\Box (aP \equiv [\lambda z \vdash Pz] =_E Q)\). By \((158.4)\), this implies both:

(A) \(\Box (aP \rightarrow [\lambda z \vdash Pz] =_E Q)\),

(B) \(\Box ([\lambda z \vdash Pz] =_E Q \rightarrow aP)\)

By the modally strict laws of contraposition and the Rule of Substitution, (A) implies (C):

(C) \(\Box (\neg [\lambda z \vdash Pz] =_E Q \rightarrow \neg aP)\)

But, then (C) and \((\zeta)\) imply \(\Diamond \neg aP\), by \((158.13)\). So \(\neg aP\), by \((177.8)\). Analogously, (B) and \((\delta)\) imply \(\Diamond aP\), by \((158.13)\). So \(aP\), by \((177.3)\). Contradiction. \(\Box\)

\((747.2)\) Assume \(\Box \forall z (Gz \rightarrow Gz)\) and assume \(\text{Numbers}(x, G)\). Then, by definition, \(A! x, G\downarrow\), and:
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Now we want to show □ Numbers(x, G), i.e.,

□(A!x & G ↓ & ∀F(xF ≡ [λz A Fz] ≈ E G))

Since □ ϕ & □ ψ & □ χ implies □(ϕ & ψ & χ), it suffices to show:

□ A!x

□ G ↓

□ ∀F(xF ≡ [λz A Fz] ≈ E G)

But the first follows from the fact that A!x by (178.2) and the second is axiomatic (it is the modal closure of G ↓). So it remains to show the third. By BF, it suffices to show: ∀F □(xF ≡ [λz A Fz] ≈ E G). By GEN, it suffices to show □(xF ≡ [λz A Fz] ≈ E G). But we already know by (8) that xF ≡ [λz A Fz] ≈ E G. And we know that □(xF → □xF). So by theorem (171.5), it remains only to show:

(ζ) □([λz A Fz] ≈ E G → □([λz A Fz] ≈ E G))

But we know [λz A Fz] and G are both modally collapsed properties: the first by (740.2) and the second by hypothesis. So by a relevant instance of (738), it follows that (ζ). □

(747.3) (Exercise)

(748) (Exercise)

(750.1) By (748), we know:

(8) ix Numbers(x, G) ↓

Independently, given that G ↓ is axiomatic, we know that definition (741) implies the following, simplified biconditional:

Numbers(x, G) ≡ (A!x & ∀F(xF ≡ [λz A Fz] ≈ E G))

Since this is a modally strict theorem, it follows by GEN and RN that:

(ξ) □∀x(Numbers(x, G) ≡ A!x & ∀F(xF ≡ [λz A Fz] ≈ E G))

So from (8) and (ξ), it follows by (149.3) that:

(ζ) ix Numbers(x, G) = ix(A!x & ∀F(xF ≡ [λz A Fz] ≈ E G))

Since all of the terms in question are significant, it follows by definition (749), (ζ), and the transitivity of identity that:
\[ G = \lambda x \& \forall F (xF \equiv [\lambda z \& Fz] \approx E G) \]

(750.2) Since we just established:
\[ G = \lambda x \& \forall F (xF \equiv [\lambda z \& Fz] \approx E G) \]
it follows that the description is significant. Thus, to establish our theorem, it suffices by the transitivity of identity and (149.2) to show the following identity:
\[ \forall x ((A!x \& \forall F (xF \equiv [\lambda z \& Fz] \approx E G)) \equiv (A!x \& \forall F (xF \equiv F \approx E G))) \]
So by an axiom governing the logic of actuality (44.3) and GEN, we have to show:
\[ \forall x ((A!x \& \forall F (xF \equiv [\lambda z \& Fz] \approx E G)) \equiv (A!x \& \forall F (xF \equiv F \approx E G))) \]
So by (139.5) and (139.2), we have to show:
\[ (A!x \& \forall F (xF \equiv [\lambda z \& Fz] \approx E G)) \equiv (A!x \& \forall F (xF \equiv F \approx E G)) \]
Simplifying (i.e., removing A!x from both sides), we have to show:
\[ \forall F (xF \equiv [\lambda z \& Fz] \approx E G) \equiv \forall F (xF \equiv F \approx E G) \]
Again, by (44.3) and GEN, it suffices to show:
\[ \forall F (xF \equiv [\lambda z \& Fz] \approx E G) \equiv \forall F (xF \equiv F \approx E G) \]
Again, by (139.5), we have to show:
\[ (\forall F (xF \equiv [\lambda z \& Fz] \approx E G)) \equiv (\forall F (xF \equiv F \approx E G)) \]
Since it is a theorem of propositional logic that \(((\varphi \equiv \psi) \equiv (\varphi \equiv \chi)) \equiv (\psi \equiv \chi)\), we simply need to show:
\[ (\forall F (xF \equiv [\lambda z \& Fz] \approx E G)) \equiv (\forall F \approx E G) \]
Again, by (139.5), we have to show:
\[ (\forall F (xF \equiv [\lambda z \& Fz] \approx E G)) \equiv (\forall F \equiv E G) \]
Now, consider the following consequence of (727.4):
\[ \forall H ([\lambda z \& Fz] \approx E F) \equiv (H \approx E [\lambda z \& Fz] \equiv H \approx E F) \]
From this, it follows that:
\[ ([\lambda z \& Fz] \approx E F) \equiv (G \approx E [\lambda z \& Fz] \equiv G \approx E F) \]
By the commutativity of \(\equiv\) and substituting given the modally strict symmetry of \(\approx E\):
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\[ (\lambda z \alpha Fz) \approx E \equiv F \equiv E (\lambda z \alpha Fz) \]

By RA and (139.5):

\[ \alpha (\lambda z \alpha Fz) \equiv G \equiv F \approx E G \equiv F \approx E G \]

Given the above, to show (\theta), we now need only show:

\[ \alpha (F \equiv E (\lambda z \alpha Fz)) \]

But this is just (740.1).

(753) Assume \textit{NaturalCardinal}(x). Then by definition (752), \exists (x = \#G). Suppose P is such a property, so that we know x = \#P. It follows by the necessity of identity (126.2) that \Box (x = \#P). Hence, by \exists I, \exists G \Box (x = \#G). But then by the Buridan formula (168.1), \Box (x = \#G). Hence by definition (752), \Box (\textit{NaturalCardinal}(x)). \star

(754.1) It follows from (743) by several applications of GEN that:

\[ \forall G \forall H \forall y ([\textit{Numbers}(x,G) \& \textit{Numbers}(y,H)] \rightarrow (x = y \equiv G \approx E H)) \]

If instantiate \forall G to F, \forall H to G, \forall x to \#F, and \forall y to \#G, we obtain:

\[ (\textit{Numbers}(\#F,F) \& \textit{Numbers}(\#G,G)) \rightarrow (\#F = \#G \equiv F \approx E G) \]

By definition (749) and theorem (145.2), we know both \textit{Numbers}(\#F,F) and \textit{Numbers}(\#G,G). So by \&I and MP, \#F = \#G \equiv F \approx E G. \star

(754.2) Assume F \equiv E G. Then F \equiv E G, by (731.1). So \#F = \#G, by (754.1). \star

(755) (\rightarrow) Assume \exists x ([\textit{Numbers}(x,F) \& \textit{Numbers}(x,G))}. Suppose a is such an object, so that by the definition of the uniqueness quantifier, it follows, among other things, that Numbers(a,F) \& Numbers(a,G). Then F \equiv E G, by (742.2).

(\leftarrow) Assume F \approx E G. Now by (746.1), we know \exists x Numbers(x,F). Suppose b is such an object, so that we know Numbers(b,F). Our assumption and this last fact imply, by (742.1), Numbers(b,G). So it remains to show, by GEN, Numbers(y,F) \& Numbers(y,G) \rightarrow y = b. So assume both Numbers(y,F) and Numbers(y,G). But by (746.2), we know \exists x Numbers(x,F). Hence by (129), the facts that Numbers(y,F) and Numbers(b,F) imply that y = b. \star

(756) (Exercise)

(758) By definition (757), 0 = \# [\lambda u u \pi F u]. Since [\lambda u u \pi F u] ↓, it follows that \exists G (0 = \#G). Hence, by definition (752), \textit{NaturalCardinal}(0). \star

(759.1) We begin with some preliminary results that prepare the ground for our reasoning. If we apply RN and then GEN (2x) to the modally strict theorem (755) and then instantiate the result to G and \[\lambda z \alpha Gz\], we know:
□ (∃!x(Numbers(x, G) & Numbers(x, [λz Gz])) \equiv G \equiv E [λz Gz])

So by (132), it follows that:

(A) \satisfies(∃!x(Numbers(x, G) & Numbers(x, [λz Gz])) \equiv G \equiv E [λz Gz])

Now by (740.1), we know \satisfies(G \equiv E [λz Gz]). Hence from this fact and (A) it follows by the relevant instance of (139.5) that:

\satisfies(∃!x(Numbers(x, G) & Numbers(x, [λz Gz]))

From this it follows by (174.1) that:

∃!x(\satisfies(Numbers(x, G) & Numbers(x, [λz Gz]))

Since it is a modally strict fact that the actuality operator distributes over a conjunction (139.2), it follows by a Rule of Substitution that:

(B) ∃!x(\satisfies(Numbers(x, G) & Numbers(x, [λz Gz])))

Now by applying CBF (167.2) to (747.3) and instantiating the result to x, we know that Numbers(x, [λz Gz]) is modally collapsed, i.e., that:

□(Numbers(x, [λz Gz]) \rightarrow □Numbers(x, [λz Gz]))

This implies, by (172.2), that \satisfies(Numbers(x, [λz Gz]) \equiv Numbers(x, [λz Gz])) is a modally strict theorem. From (B) and this last fact, we use a Rule of Substitution to infer:

∃!x(\satisfies(Numbers(x, G) & Numbers(x, [λz Gz]))

So let a be such an object, so that we know:

C) \satisfies(Numbers(a, G) & Numbers(a, [λz Gz]) & ∀y(\satisfies(Numbers(y, G) & Numbers(y, [λz Gz]) \rightarrow y = a)

Then we may prove our theorem as follows: (→) Suppose \satisfies(Numbers(x, G). Now since (746.2) is a theorem, we may apply the Rule of Actualization to infer \satisfies(∃!yNumbers(y, G). So by (174.1), \satisfies(∃!yNumbers(y, G). Hence, our assumption and the first conjunct of (C) imply a = x. So by the second conjunct of (C), Numbers(x, [λz Gz]). (←) Suppose Numbers(x, [λz Gz]). But (746.2) ensures Numbers(x, [λz Gz]). So our assumption and the second conjunct of (C) imply a = x. So by first conjunct of (C), \satisfies(Numbers(x, G), ⊳)

(759.2) Since y is a variable substitutable for x in Numbers(x, G) and doesn’t occur free in Numbers(x, G), we have the following alphabetic variant of an instance of axiom (47), where φ in that theorem is set to Numbers(x, G):

x = 1xNumbers(x, G) \equiv ∀y(\satisfies(Numbers (y, G) \equiv y = x)
But by (759.1), \( sN \equiv Numbers(y, G) \) is a modally strict theorem. Hence by a Rule of Substitution, it follows from our first displayed line that:

\[
x = 1xNumbers(x, G) \equiv \forall y(Numbers(y, [\lambda z sGz]) \equiv y = x)
\]

Since this is a theorem, it follows by GEN that:

\[\forall x(x = 1xNumbers(x, G) \equiv \forall y(Numbers(y, [\lambda z sGz]) \equiv y = x))\]

But by (748.3), \( sN \downarrow \). Hence by definition (749) and Rule \( =E \), we know \( \#G \downarrow \). From this last result and (\( \vartheta \)), it follows by Rule \( \forall E \) (94.1) Variant that:

\[
\#G = 1xNumbers(x, G) \equiv \forall y(Numbers(y, [\lambda z sGz]) \equiv y = \#G)
\]

So, by definition (749) and biconditional syllogism, it follows that:

\[
\forall y(Numbers(y, [\lambda z sGz]) \equiv y = \#G)
\]

By instantiating this last result to \( x \), and we have:

\[
Numbers(x, [\lambda z sGz]) \equiv x = \#G
\]

(759.3) – (759.5) (Exercises)

(759.6) Assume \( Numbers(x, G) \). Note that theorem (554.3) assert \( \exists FRigidifies(F, G) \).

Let \( P \) be such an property, so that we know \( Rig \equiv Numbers(P, G) \). Then, by definition (553.2) and (553.1), we know:

\[\square \forall x(Px \rightarrow \square Px) \& \forall x(Px \equiv Gx)\]

Since the second conjunct of (\( \vartheta \)) implies that \( P \) and \( G \) are materially equivalent \( E \) (i.e., implies \( P \equiv E G \)), it follows that \( Numbers(x, P) \), by (742.3). Independently, the first conjunct of (\( \vartheta \)) and theorem (738.1) imply that \( P \equiv E [\lambda z sPz] \). It follows that \( Numbers(x, [\lambda z sPz]) \), by (742.1). So, by (759.2) we have \( x = \#P \).

Hence, \( \exists F(x = \#F) \), and so \( NaturalCardinal(x) \), by definition (752).

(760) Assume \( NaturalCardinal(x) \). So \( \exists G(x = \#G) \), by (752). Let \( P \) be such a property, so that we know \( x = \#P \).

Hence, by (759.2):

\[\forall x(Numbers(x, [\lambda z sPz]) \equiv x = \#G)\]

By GEN, we have to show \( xF \equiv x = \#F \). If we substitute \( P \) for \( G \) in (759.4), then we independently know:

\[\#PF \equiv [\lambda z sFz] \equiv E [\lambda z sPz]\]

Hence:
(ξ) \( xF \equiv [\lambda z \vDash Fz] \approx_E [\lambda z \vDash Pz] \)

Next, we leave it as an exercise to show that as a matter of propositional logic, the following is a theorem:

\[ (\zeta) \chi \rightarrow ((\varphi \equiv (\psi \equiv \chi)) \equiv (\varphi \equiv \psi)) \]

Hence, we may reason as follows:

\[
xF \equiv [\lambda z \vDash Fz] \approx_E E [\lambda z \vDash A \vDash Pz] \quad \text{by (ξ)}
\]

\[
\equiv Numbers(x, [\lambda z \vDash Fz]) \equiv Numbers(x, [\lambda z \vDash Pz]) \quad \text{by (742.1)}
\]

\[
\equiv Numbers(x, [\lambda z \vDash Fz]) \quad \text{given (ϑ) and (ζ)}
\]

\[
\equiv x = \#F \quad \text{by (759.2)}
\]

(761) (→) Assume \( \neg \exists u Fu \). Note that \( \neg \exists v ([\lambda u \vDash u \vDash xE] u) \) is an easily established theorem:

Clearly, since \( v \vDash \neg \square !x \rightarrow \square !x \), the variable \( v \) ranges over objects satisfying a rigid condition. Hence we can apply expanded RN (335.1.a) and conclude \( \neg \square (v \vDash \neg \neg \vDash (x \vDash E)) \) and by (132), \( \vDash \neg \neg (v \vDash E) \) and hence by (44.1), \( \vDash \neg \neg (v \vDash E) \).

But then by Rule \( \neg \neg \neg \beta C \), \( \neg [\lambda u \vDash u \vDash xE] u \). So \( \forall v \neg [\lambda u \vDash u \vDash xE] u \), by GEN, i.e., \( \neg \exists v [\lambda u \vDash u \vDash xE] u \).

From this and our hypothesis that \( \neg \exists u Fu \), it follows that \( [\lambda u \vDash u \vDash xE] u \approx_F ] \) by (732.1). By (742.1), it follows that \( Numbers(0, [\lambda u \vDash u \vDash xE] u) \equiv Numbers(0, F) \).

So it remains only to show: \( Numbers(0, [\lambda u \vDash u \vDash xE] u) \). But 0 \( = \# [\lambda u \vDash u \vDash xE] u \), by definition. So by (759.3), \( Numbers(0, [\lambda y \vDash \lambda u \vDash u \vDash xE] u] y \).

We now leave it as an exercise to show that \( Numbers(0, [\lambda u \vDash u \vDash xE] u) \). (In completing the exercise you might show that if \( Numbers(0, [\lambda y \vDash \varphi] \), then \( Numbers(0, [\lambda u \vDash u \vDash xE] u) \).)

(←) Assume \( Numbers(0, F) \). By reasoning given above, we already know that \( Numbers(0, [\lambda u \vDash u \vDash xE] u) \). So, by (742.2), we have \( F \approx_E [\lambda u \vDash u \vDash xE] u \). We also know, by reasoning given above, that \( \neg \exists v [\lambda u \vDash \lambda u \vDash u \vDash xE] u \). Now, suppose for reductio, that \( \exists u Fu \). Then, by (732.2), it follows that \( F \not\approx_E [\lambda u \vDash u \vDash xE] u \). Contradiction. \( \therefore \)

(762.1)\( \star \) Assume \( NaturalCardinal(x) \). It suffices to show \( xF \equiv Numbers(x, F) \), by GEN. By (760), it follows from our assumption that:

\[ \forall F(xF \equiv x = \#F) \]

So in particular, \( xF \equiv x = \#F \). But by definition of \( \#F \), this implies:

\[ (\delta) xF \equiv x = \#y(Numbers(y, F)) \]

But by (145.2)\( \star \), we know:
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\[ x = \forall y (\text{Numbers}(y, F) \rightarrow \text{Numbers}(x, F)) \]

Moreover, we leave it as an exercise, using (746.2), to show that \( \text{Numbers}(x, F) \rightarrow x = \forall y (\text{Numbers}(y, F)) \). Hence:

\[ (\xi) \quad x = \forall y (\text{Numbers}(y, F) \equiv \text{Numbers}(x, F)) \]

So from (8) and (\xi), \( xF \equiv \text{Numbers}(x, F) \).  

\[ (762.2) \star \quad \text{We know NaturalCardinal}(0). \quad \text{So, by (762.1)\star, } 0F \equiv \text{Numbers}(0, F). \quad \text{But, by (761), it follows that } 0F \equiv \neg \exists u Fu. \quad \star \]

\[ (762.3) \star \quad \text{By (762.2)\star and the symmetry of } \equiv, \text{ we know that } \neg \exists u Fu \equiv 0F. \quad \text{But by (760), } 0F \equiv 0 = \#F. \quad \text{It follows that } \neg \exists u Fu \equiv \#F = 0. \quad \star \]

\[ (763.2) \quad \text{This is an instance of axiom (39.2). The } \lambda \text{ in the expression:} \]

\[ [\lambda xy \forall F(\forall z(Rxz \rightarrow Fz) \& \text{Hereditary}(F, R)) \rightarrow Fy] \]

doesn’t bind any variables in any encoding formula subterms. Note that there are encoding formula subterms in the above \( \lambda \)-expression. The subterm \text{Hereditary}(F, R) \]

has encoding formula subterms because its definiens does, but \( x \) and \( y \) are not free in those subterms. Just to confirm, \text{Hereditary}(F, R) \]

is defined as (763.1):

\[ R \downarrow \& F \downarrow \& \forall x \forall y (Rxy \rightarrow (Fx \rightarrow Fy)) \]

where \( R \downarrow \) and \( F \downarrow \) are defined as (20.2), respectively:

\[ \exists x_1 (x_1 F) \]

\[ \exists x_1 \exists x_2 (x_1 x_2 R) \]

Though the encoding formula subterms \( x_1 F \) and \( x_1 x_2 R \) occur in \text{Hereditary}(F, R), both \( x_1 \) and \( x_2 \) are bound by operators other than \( \lambda \) in the target \( \lambda \)-expression.

\[ (765) \quad \text{(Exercise)} \]

\[ (766.1) \quad \text{Assume } Rxy. \quad \text{By (765) and GEN, we have to show:} \]

\[ (\forall z(Rxz \rightarrow Fz) \& \text{Hereditary}(F, R)) \rightarrow Fy \]

So assume \( \forall z(Rxz \rightarrow Fz) \) and \text{Hereditary}(F, R). Instantiate the first of these to \( y \), to obtain \( Rxy \rightarrow Fy. \) But then by our first assumption, \( Fy. \quad \star \]

\[ (766.2) \quad \text{Assume } R’xy, \forall z(Rxz \rightarrow Fz), \text{ and } \text{Hereditary}(F, R). \quad \text{Then by the first assumption and the fundamental fact about } R’ (765), \text{ we know:} \]

\[ \forall G[(\forall z(Rxz \rightarrow Gz) \& \text{Hereditary}(G, R)) \rightarrow Gy] \]

But we may instantiate this to \( F \) to obtain:
\[(\forall z (Rxz \rightarrow Fz) \& \text{Hereditary}(F, R)) \rightarrow Fy\]

But both conjuncts of the antecedent hold by assumption. \(\Rightarrow\)

(766.3) Assume \(Fx, R'xy,\) and that \(\text{Hereditary}(F, R).\) Then by (766.2), it suffices to show only \(\forall z (Rxz \rightarrow Fz).\) So assume \(Rxz.\) Since \(F\) is \(R\)-hereditary, we know by definition (763.1) that \(\forall x \forall y (Rxy \rightarrow (Fx \rightarrow Fy)).\) In particular, \(Rxz \rightarrow (Fx \rightarrow Fz).\) But both \(Rxz\) and \(Fx\) both hold by assumption. \(\Rightleftharpoons\)

(766.4) Assume \(Rxy\) and \(R'yz.\) To prove \(R'xz,\) further assume \(\forall z (Rxz \rightarrow Fz)\) and \(\text{Hereditary}(F, R).\) Our first and third assumptions imply \(Fy.\) But from this, \(R'yz,\) and \(\text{Hereditary}(F, R),\) it follows that \(Fz,\) by (766.3). \(\Rightarrow\)

(766.5) Assume \(R'xy.\) Now, by (766.2) and GEN, we know:

\[\forall F[(R'xy \& \forall z (Rxz \rightarrow Fz) \& \text{Hereditary}(F, R)) \rightarrow Fy]\]

Instantiate to \([\lambda y' \exists x'Rx'y']\) (which we know exists) and we obtain:

\[(R'xy \& \forall z (Rxz \rightarrow [\lambda y' \exists x'Rx'y']z) \& \text{Hereditary}([\lambda y' \exists x'Rx'y'], R)) \rightarrow [\lambda y' \exists x'Rx'y']y\]

Since \([\lambda y' \exists x'Rx'y']\) exists, \(\beta\)-Conversion (179) and the Rule of Substitution (160.1) allow us to reduce this to:

\[\forall F[(R'xy \& \exists x'Rxz) \& \text{Hereditary}([\lambda y' \exists x'Rx'y'], R)) \rightarrow \exists x'Rx'y']\]

The consequent of (8), \(\exists x'Rx'y',\) is an alphabetic variant of what we have to show. So since \(R'xy\) by assumption, it remains to show the second and third conjuncts of (8). But these are quickly obtained. For the second conjunct, assume \(Rxz,\) by GEN. Then \(\exists x'Rxz,\) by \(\forall I.\) For the third conjunct, we have to show, by (763.1):

\[\forall z \forall z'(Rzz' \rightarrow ([\lambda y' \exists x'Rx'y']z \rightarrow [\lambda y' \exists x'Rx'y'](z'))\]

Since \([\lambda y' \exists x'Rx'y']\) exists, it suffices to show, by \(\beta\)-Conversion and the Rule of Substitution (160.1):

\[\forall z \forall z'(Rzz' \rightarrow (\exists x'Rxz \rightarrow \exists x'Rxz'))\]

By GEN, it suffices to show \(Rzz' \rightarrow (\exists x'Rxz \rightarrow \exists x'Rxz').\) So assume \(Rzz'\) and \(\exists x'Rxz.\) But the first of these assumptions yields \(\exists x'Rxz'.\) \(\Leftarrow\)

(766.6) Assume \(R'xy\) and \(R'yz.\) Then by theorem (765), it follows that:

\[(\forall F[(\forall z (Rxz \rightarrow Fz) \& \text{Hereditary}(F, R)) \rightarrow Fy]\]

\[(\exists) \forall F[(\forall z (Ryz \rightarrow Fz) \& \text{Hereditary}(F, R)) \rightarrow Fz]\]

To show \(R'xz,\) we have to show, by GEN:
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\((\forall z'(Rxz' \rightarrow Fz') \& \text{Hereditary}(F,R)) \rightarrow Fz\)

So assume:

\((\zeta) \ \forall z'(Rxz' \rightarrow Fz') \& \text{Hereditary}(F,R)\)

to show \(Fz\). Now with the second conjunct of \((\zeta)\) in hand, we need only to show \(\forall z'(Ryz' \rightarrow Fz')\), for then by \((\zeta)\), we can infer \(Fz\). So, by GEN, assume \(Ryz'\), to show \(Fz'\). Now, independently, \((\delta)\) and \((\zeta)\) jointly imply \(Fy\). But from \(Ryz'\) and \(Fy\), it follows by the definition of \(\text{Hereditary}(F,R)\) (763.1) that \(Fz'\). ⊢

(768.3) (Exercise)
(770.1) (Exercise)
(770.2) (Exercise)

(770.3) Assume \(x =_R y\). It then follows by theorem (770.1) that:

\((\delta) \ \exists z(Rxz \& Ryz)\)

Suppose \(a\) is a witness to \((\delta)\), so that we know \(Rxa\) and \(Rya\). Then since \(R\) is rigid one-to-one relation by hypothesis, it is one-to-one (768.2) and so \(x = y\) (768.1). ⊢

(770.4) Assume that either \(\text{InDomainOf}(x, R)\) or \(\text{InDomainOf}(y, R)\). \((\rightarrow)\) Then \(x =_R y \rightarrow x = y\) is already theorem (770.3). \((\leftarrow)\) Assume \(x = y\). We reason by cases from our initial assumption, which is that either \(\text{InDomainOf}(x, R)\) or \(\text{InDomainOf}(y, R)\):

Assume \(\text{InDomainOf}(x, R)\). By theorem (770.1), we have show \(\exists z(Rxz \& Ryz)\). Since we know \(\text{InDomainOf}(x, R)\), it follows by definition (768.4) that \(\exists zRxz\). Suppose \(a\) is such an object, so that we know \(Rxa\). But since \(x = y\), \(Rya\). Hence, from \(Rxa \& Rya\) it follows that \(\exists z(Rxz \& Ryz)\).

Assume \(\text{InDomainOf}(y, R)\). Then our conclusion follows by analogous reasoning. ⊢

(770.5) Assume \(\text{InDomainOf}(x, R)\), i.e., by (768.4), that \(\exists yRxy\). Suppose \(a\) is such an object, so that we know \(Rxa\). If we conjoin the latter with itself and generalize, we know \(\exists z(Rxz \& Rxz)\). Hence by (770.1), \(x =_R x\). ⊢

(770.6) – (770.7) (Exercises)
(772) (Exercise)

(773.1) Assume \(Rxy\). Then by (766.1), which holds for any strong ancestral, including that of rigid one-to-one relations, \(R^+xy\). But then by \(\forall I\), \(R^+xy \lor x =_R y\). Hence, \(R^+xy\), by (772). ⊢
(773.2) Assume $Fx$, $R^+xy$, and Hereditary($F,R$). The second assumption implies, by theorem (772), that either $R^+xy$ or $x =_R y$. If the former, then $Fy$, by the first and third assumptions and (766.3), which holds for any strong ancestral, including that of rigid one-to-one relations. If the latter, then by theorem (770.3), $x = y$. So it follows from the first assumption, $Fx$, that $Fy$. ⊢

(773.3) Assume $R^+xy$ & $Ryz$. Then, by theorem (772), ($R^+xy$ʌ$y =_R y$) & $Ryz$. So by a variant of (89.6.a), we know either $R^+xy$ & $Ryz$ or $x =_R y$ & $Ryz$. We show $R^+xz$ holds in both cases:

Case 1: $R^+xy$ and $Ryz$. To show $R^+xz$, assume by GEN that $\forall z'(Rxz' \rightarrow Fz')$ and Hereditary($F,R$), to show $Fz$. From these assumptions and the fact that $R^+xy$ in the present case, it follows that $Fy$, by the fundamental fact governing $R^+$ (765). But since $Ryz$ also holds in the present case, the result $Fy$ and the assumption Hereditary($F,R$) jointly imply that $Fz$, by definition (763.1).

Case 2: $x =_R y$ and $Ryz$. The former implies $x = y$, by (770.3). Then from $Ryz$ we know $Rxz$. So by (766.1), which holds for any strong ancestral, including that of rigid one-to-one relations, it follows that $R^+xz$. ⊢

(773.4) Assume $R^+xy$ and $Ryz$. Then from the first assumption, it follows by $\forall \mathbf{l}$ that $R^+xy$ & $x =_R y$. So by theorem (772), $R^+xy$. From this and our second assumption, it follows by (773.3) that $R^+xz$. So, again by $\forall \mathbf{l}$, $R^+xz$ & $x =_R z$, and hence $R^+xz$, by definition (772). ⊢

(773.5) Assume $Rxy$ and $R^+yz$. By the latter and theorem (772), either $R^+yz$ & $y =_R z$. We reason by cases from the two disjuncts. From the first disjunct and our first assumption, it follows that $R^+xz$, by (766.4), which holds for any strong ancestral, including that of rigid one-to-one relations. From the second disjunct it follows that $y = z$, by (770.3). So from the first assumption, it follows that $Rxz$, in which case, $R^+xz$, by (766.1) (which also holds for any strong ancestral, including that of rigid one-to-one relations). ⊢

(773.6) Assume $R^+xy$ and $R^+yz$. We reason to the conclusion $R^+xz$ by cases: $x =_R y$ and $x \not\equiv_R y$.

Case 1. $x =_R y$. Then $x = y$, by (770.3). So from our initial assumption that $R^+yz$, it follows that $R^+xz$.

Case 2. $x \not\equiv_R y$. We reason to the conclusion $R^+xz$ by cases: $y =_R z$ and $y \not\equiv_R z$:

Case A. $y =_R z$. Then $y = z$, by now familiar reasoning. So from our assumption that $R^+xy$, it follows that $R^+xz$.

Case B. $y \not\equiv_R z$. Then since $R^+yz$ by assumption, it follows by the basic fact about $R^+$ (772) that $R^+yz$. Analogously, since we also know both $x \not\equiv_R y$
Case 2) and \( R^+ xy \) (by assumption), it follows that \( R^+ xy \). Now the strong ancestral \( R^+ \) is transitive for any \( R \) (766.6). So the strong ancestral of our rigid one-to-one relation, i.e., \( R^+ \), is transitive. Hence, \( R^+ xz \). So by the main fact about the weak ancestral for rigid one-to-one relations (772), \( R^+ xz \).

(773.7) To avoid clash of variables, we prove \( R^+ ab \rightarrow \exists x(R^+ ax & Rxb) \), where \( a \) and \( b \) are any arbitrarily chosen objects. So assume \( R^+ ab \). Note that the following is an instance of (766.2) with respect to our rigid one-to-one relation:

\[
(R^+ ab & \forall z(Raz \rightarrow Fz) & \text{Hereditary}(F,R)) \rightarrow Fb
\]

Instantiate \( F \) in the above to the well-defined property \([\lambda y \exists x(R^+ ax & Rxy)]\) to obtain:

\[
(R^+ ab & \forall z(Raz \rightarrow [\lambda y \exists x(R^+ ax & Rxy)]z) & \text{Hereditary}([\lambda y \exists x(R^+ ax & Rxy)],R) \rightarrow [\lambda y \exists x(R^+ ax & Rxy)]b
\]

Since \([\lambda y \exists x(R^+ ax & Rxy)]\), applications of \( \beta \)-Conversion and the Rule of Substitution (160.1), reduce the above to:

\[
(R^+ ab & \forall z(Raz \rightarrow \exists x(R^+ ax & Rxz))) & \text{Hereditary}([\lambda y \exists x(R^+ ax & Rxy)],R) \rightarrow \exists x(R^+ ax & Rxb)
\]

By applying the definition of hereditary (763.1), \( \beta \)-Conversion, and a Rule of Substitution to the result, this becomes:

\[
[R^+ ab & \forall z(Raz \rightarrow \exists x(R^+ ax & Rxz)) & \forall y \forall z(Ryz \rightarrow (\exists x(R^+ ax & Rxy) \rightarrow \exists x(R^+ ax & Rxz))] \rightarrow \exists x(R^+ ax & Rxb)
\]

Since the consequent is the desired conclusion, it remains only to show the three conjuncts of the antecedent. The first is true by assumption. For the second, assume \( Raz \), by GEN. Then \( \exists y Ray \) and \( \text{InDomainOf}(a,R) \), i.e., \( a \) is in the domain of \( R \), by (768.4). So by (770.5), \( a =_R a \). Hence by fact (772), \( R^+ aa \). So, from \( R^+ aa & Raz \), it follows that \( \exists x(R^+ ax & Rxz) \). For the third conjunct, assume \( Ryz \) and \( \exists x(R^+ ax & Rxy) \), by GEN. Suppose \( c \) is a witness to the second assumption, so that we know \( R^+ ac & Rcy \). Then by (773.3), it follows that \( R^+ ay \). Thus, by \( \forall \), \( R^+ ay \Rightarrow a =_R y \). So \( R^+ ay \), by the main fact about \( R^+ \) (772). Hence we know \( R^+ ay & Ryz \). So by \( \exists \), \( \exists x(R^+ ax & Rxz) \). \( \Rightarrow \)

(774.1) Assume \( Rxy \) and \( R^+ zy \). By the latter and (773.7), it follows that there is some object, say \( a \), such that \( R^+ za \) and \( Ray \). Since \( R \) is a rigid one-to-one relation by hypothesis, it is one-to-one (768.2) and so \( x = a \) (768.1). So \( R^+ zx \). \( \Rightarrow \)

(774.2) We want to show \( Rxy \rightarrow (\neg R^+ xx \rightarrow \neg R^+ yy) \). So assume \( Rxy \). We'll prove the contrapositive, so further assume \( R^+ yy \). Now, independently, we know that the following is an instance (774.1) by setting \( z \) in that theorem to \( y \):
(Rxy & R' yy) \rightarrow R' yx

So, R' yx. Similarly, we know that the following is an instance of (773.5) if we set z in that theorem to x:

(Rxy & R' yx) \rightarrow R' xx

Hence R' xx. △

(774.3) Assume both ~R' xx and R' xy. Now independently, since [\lambda z \neg R' zz]↓, we can instantiate F in (773.2) to [\lambda z \neg R' zz] and apply \beta-Conversion and the Rule of Substitution (160.1) to obtain:

(\neg R' xx & R' xy & Hereditary([\lambda z \neg R' zz], R)) \rightarrow \neg R' yy

Since the consequent is what we want to show, we establish the antecedent. The first two conjuncts of the antecedent are true by assumption. So by definition (763.1), \beta-Conversion and the Rule of Substitution (160.1), it remains to show:

\forall x \forall y (Rxy \rightarrow (\neg R' xx \rightarrow \neg R' yy))

But this follows from theorem (774.2) by two applications of GEN. △

(774.4) By definition (768.4), we have to show R' xy \rightarrow \exists z Rxz. To minimize clash of variables, we prove R' ab \rightarrow \exists y Ray, where a and b are any arbitrarily chosen objects. So assume R' ab. Note that the following is an instance of (766.2) with respect to our rigid one-to-one relation:

(R' ab & \forall z (Raz \rightarrow Fz) & Hereditary(F, R)) \rightarrow Fb

Instantiatate F in the above to the well-defined property [\lambda x R' ax \rightarrow \exists y Ray] to obtain:

(R' ab & \forall z(Raz \rightarrow [\lambda x R' ax \rightarrow \exists y Ray]z) & Hereditary([\lambda x R' ax \rightarrow \exists y Ray], R)) \rightarrow [\lambda x R' ax \rightarrow \exists y Ray]b

Since the \lambda-expressions are significant, we can apply \beta-Conversion and the Rule of Substitution (160.1) so that the above becomes:

(R' ab & \forall z(Raz \rightarrow (R' az \rightarrow \exists y Ray)) & Hereditary([\lambda x R' ax \rightarrow \exists y Ray], R)) \rightarrow (R' ab \rightarrow \exists y Ray)

By applying the definition of Hereditary and now familiar reasoning, this becomes:

(R' ab & \forall z(Raz \rightarrow (R' az \rightarrow \exists y Ray)) & \forall x \forall x' (Rxx' \rightarrow ((R' ax \rightarrow \exists y Ray) \rightarrow (R' ax' \rightarrow \exists y Ray)))) \rightarrow (R' ab \rightarrow \exists y Ray)
Now if we establish the antecedent of this conditional, it follows that $R^*ab \rightarrow \exists yRay$, and since we know $R^*ab$ by assumption, it follows that $\exists yRay$, which is our desired conclusion. So it remains only to show the three conjuncts of the antecedent. The first is true by assumption. For the second, assume by GEN that $Raz$ and $R^*az$, to show $\exists yRay$. But the first of these assumptions implies $\exists yRay$, by $\exists$I. So it remains to show the third:

$$\forall x\forall x'(Rxx' \rightarrow ((R^*ax \rightarrow \exists yRay) \rightarrow (R^*ax' \rightarrow \exists yRay)))$$

So by GEN and conditional proof, assume:

(a) $Rxx'$

(b) $R^*ax \rightarrow \exists yRay$

(c) $R^*ax'$

to show $\exists yRay$. Now (a) and (c) imply $R^*ax$, by (774.1). This latter implies $R^*ax \lor a =_R x$, by theorem (772). So we reason by cases to show $\exists yRay$. If $R^*ax$, then by (b), $\exists yRay$. If $a =_R x$, then by (a), $Rax'$. So $\exists yRay$. $\bowtie$

(774.5) Assume $R^+xy$. Then by theorem (772), $R^+xy \lor x =_R y$. So reason by cases. If $R^+xy$, then by the previous theorem, $InDomainOf(x,R)$. If $x =_R y$, then it follows from (770.2), a fortiori, that $InDomainOf(x,R)$. $\bowtie$

(775) Consider any rigid one-to-one relation $R$ and assume the antecedent of what we have to prove:

$$Fz \& \forall x\forall y((R^+zx \& R^+zy) \rightarrow (Rxy \rightarrow (Fx \rightarrow Fy)))$$

The consequence of what we have to prove is $R^+zx \rightarrow Fx$. So our strategy is, by GEN and conditional proof, to assume $R^+zx$, to show $Fx$. We do this by appeal to lemma (773.2). Instantiate the variable $F$ in this lemma to $[\lambda y Fy \& R^+zy]$ (the significance of which we leave as an exercise) and instantiate the variables $x$ and $y$ in the lemma to $z$ and $x$, respectively. So, by now familiar reasoning, this yields:

$$[Fz \& R^+zx \& R^+zx \& Hereditary([\lambda y Fy \& R^+zy],R)] \rightarrow (Fx \& R^+zx)$$

So if we can establish the antecedent of $(\xi)$, our desired conclusion, $Fx$, follows a fortiori from the consequent of $(\xi)$. We know the first conjunct of the antecedent of $(\xi)$ is true by the first conjunct of our assumption $(\delta)$. We know that the second conjunct of the antecedent of $(\xi)$ is true, by the reflexivity of $R^+$, which immediately follows from theorem (772). We know that the third conjunct of the antecedent is true, by further assumption. So if we can establish:

Hereditary($[\lambda y Fy \& R^+zy],R$),
we are done. By the definition of *Hereditary* and familiar reasoning, we have to show:

$$\forall x \forall x' (Rx'x' \rightarrow ((Fx & R^*zx) \rightarrow (F'x' & R^*zx'))$$

To prove this claim, we assume $Rx'x'$, $Fx$, and $R^*zx$, to show $F'x' & R^*zx'$. The second conjunct $R^*zx'$ follows easily: from the facts that $R^*zx$ and $Rx'x'$, it follows from (773.3) that $R^*zx'$, which implies $R^*zx'$, by the theorem (772). So it remains to show $Fx'$. Since we now have $R^*zx$, $R^*zx'$, $Rx'x'$, and $Fx$, it follows from the second conjunct of (8) that $Fx'$. ⊢

(780.2) (Exercise)

(781.1) Suppose, for reductio, that something, say $a$, is such that $P^a0$. Then, by the theorem governing $P$ (779.2), it follows that there is a property, say $Q$, and an ordinary object, say $b$, such that:

$$Qb & Numbers(0, Q) & Numbers(a, Q^-a)$$

From $Qb$ it follows that $\exists u Qu$. But from $Numbers(0, Q)$, it follows by (761) that $\neg \exists u Qu$. Contradiction. ⊢

(781.2) Assume, for reductio, $\exists x P^x0$. Suppose $a$ is such an object, so that we know $P^a0$. By (766.5), it follows that $\exists x P^x0$. But this contradicts (781.1). ⊢

(781.3) (Exercise)

(782.1) Assume $Pxy$. Then by theorem (779.2):

$(8) \exists F \forall u (Fu & Numbers(y, F) & Numbers(x, F-^u))$

To show that this is necessary, it suffices, by two applications of the Buridan formula (168.1), to show:

$$\exists F \forall u \Box (Fu & Numbers(y, F) & Numbers(x, F^-u))$$

To find our witnesses, consider (8) and let $Q$ and $a$ be such a property and ordinary object, so that we know:

$$Qa & Numbers(y, Q) & Numbers(x, Q^-a)$$

Since theorem (554.3) yields $\exists G(Rigidifies(G, Q))$, then let $S$ be such a property, so that we know $Rigidifies(S, Q)$. Hence, we know, by (553.2) and (553.1), that:

$(\xi) \ \Box \forall x (Sx \rightarrow \Box Sx)$

$(\zeta) \ \forall x (Sx \equiv Qx)$

Our strategy is then to show:

(a) $\Box Sa$
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(b) \( \square \text{Numbers}(y, S) \)

(c) \( \square \text{Numbers}(x, S^{-a}) \)

To show (a): since we know \( Qa \), (\( \zeta \)) implies \( Sa \) and so by (\( \xi \)), \( \square Sa \).

To show (b), it suffices by (747.2) and (\( \xi \)), to show \( \text{Numbers}(y, S) \). But this, in turn, follows from (742.3) using (\( \zeta \)) and the fact that \( \text{Numbers}(y, Q) \).

To show (c), it suffices to show, by analogous reasoning, that \( \text{Rigidifies}(S^{-a}, Q^{-a}) \), i.e., or more precisely, we need only show:

(\( \xi' \)) \( \square \forall x(S^{-a}x \rightarrow \square S^{-a}x) \)

(\( \zeta' \)) \( \forall x(S^{-a}x \equiv Q^{-a}x) \)

(Exercise.) ☐

(782.2) (Exercise)

(782.3) Clearly, \( \mathcal{P} \downarrow \). So by (768.1) and GEN, we have to show:

\[ \mathcal{P}xz \& \mathcal{P}yz \rightarrow x = y \]

So assume both \( \mathcal{P}xz \) and \( \mathcal{P}yz \). Then by theorem (779.2), it follows that there are properties and ordinary objects, say \( R, Q, a, b \), such that:

(\( \delta \)) \( Qa \& \text{Numbers}(z, Q) \& \text{Numbers}(x, Q^{-a}) \)

(\( \xi \)) \( Rb \& \text{Numbers}(z, R) \& \text{Numbers}(y, R^{-b}) \)

The second conjuncts of (\( \delta \)) and (\( \xi \)) jointly yield \( Q \equiv_E R \), by (742.2). Since we also know \( Qa \) and \( Rb \), it follows by lemma (734) that \( Q^{-a} \equiv_E R^{-b} \). But, separately, the third conjuncts of (\( \delta \)) and (\( \xi \)) jointly imply \( x = y \equiv Q^{-a} \equiv_E R^{-b} \), by the Conditional Underlying Hume’s Principle (743). Hence \( x = y \). ☐

(782.4) (Exercise)

(783.2) (Exercise)

(783.4) (Exercise)

(784.2) (Exercise)

(785) (Exercise)

(786.1) If we substitute \( [\lambda x \square Nx] \) for \( F \), 0 for \( z \), and the rigid one-to-one relation \( \mathcal{P} \) for \( R \) in the principle of Generalized Induction (775), and then simplify the result in various places by \( \beta \)-Conversion, we know:

\[ [\square \forall x(\mathcal{P}^*0x \& \mathcal{P}^*0y \rightarrow (\mathcal{P}xy \rightarrow (\square Nx \rightarrow \square Ny)))] \rightarrow \]

\[ \forall x(\mathcal{P}^*0x \rightarrow \square Nx) \]
This simplifies, by definition of $\mathbb{N}$, $\beta$-Conversion, and the Rule of Substitution (160.1), to:

\[(A) [\Box \mathbb{N}0 \& \forall x \forall y (\mathbb{N}x \& \mathbb{N}y \rightarrow (Pxy \rightarrow (\Box \mathbb{N}x \rightarrow \Box \mathbb{N}y)))] \rightarrow \forall x (\mathbb{N}x \rightarrow \Box \mathbb{N}x)\]

Since our theorem, $\mathbb{N}x \rightarrow \Box \mathbb{N}x$, follows by $\forall E$ from the consequent of (A), it suffices to show:

(B) $\Box \mathbb{N}0$, i.e., the first conjunct of the antecedent of (A), and

(C) $Pxy \rightarrow (\Box \mathbb{N}x \rightarrow \Box \mathbb{N}y)$, which by classical predicate logic implies the second conjunct of the antecedent of (A)

(B) Since $\mathbb{N}0$ is a modally strict theorem (785), it follows by RN that $\Box \mathbb{N}0$.

(C) Assume $Pxy$ and $\Box \mathbb{N}x$. The first assumption implies:

(8) $\Box Pxy$

by (782.1). The second assumption implies, by definition of $\mathbb{N}$, $\beta$-Conversion, and the Rule of Substitution (160.1):

(ξ) $\Box P^+0x$

But note the following Lemma:

Lemma: $\Box Pxy \rightarrow (\Box P^+0x \rightarrow \Box P^+0y)$

Proof. By (773.3) with the rigid one-to-one relation $P$ substituted for $R$, 0 substituted for $x$, and a change of variables, we have $(P^+0x \& Pxy) \rightarrow P^+0y$. By classical predicate logic, we have $Pxy \rightarrow (P^+0x \rightarrow P^+0y)$. And since, a fortiori, $P^+0y \rightarrow P^+0y$, it follows that:

\[Pxy \rightarrow (P^+0x \rightarrow P^+0y)\]

Since we proved the above by modally strict means from no assumptions, we can conclude, by RN, that:

\[\Box Pxy \rightarrow (\Box P^+0x \rightarrow \Box P^+0y)\]

From this Lemma, (8), and (ξ), it follows that $\Box P^+0y$. Hence, by definition of $\mathbb{N}$, $\beta$-Conversion, and the Rule of Substitution (160.1), $\Box \mathbb{N}y$.

(786.2) (Exercise)

(787) By (781.1), nothing is a predecessor of Zero. A fortiori, no natural number is a predecessor of Zero.

(788) Though the proof given in the text prior to the statement of the theorem is perfectly adequate, those interested in system implementation will note that the following is required. By the one-to-one character of $P$ (782.3), we know:
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$P_{xz} \land P_{yz} \rightarrow x = y$

A fortiori:

$(N_{x} \land N_{y} \land N_{z}) \rightarrow (P_{xz} \land P_{yz} \rightarrow x = y)$

So by GEN,

$\forall x \forall y \forall z ((N_{x} \land N_{y} \land N_{z}) \rightarrow (P_{xz} \land P_{yz} \rightarrow x = y))$

Hence, by the conventions for restricted variables, this becomes:

$\forall n \forall m \forall k ( (P_{nk} \land P_{mk} \rightarrow n = m) \Rightarrow )$

(789.1) By hypothesis, $n$ is a natural number. So we know by (784.2) that $P^*0n$. Now assume the antecedent, $P_{nx}$. Independently, since $P$ is a rigid one-to-one relation, we can instantiate for $R$ in (773.3) to produce the following instance:

$(P^*0n \land P_{nx}) \rightarrow P^*0x$

So $P^*0x$. Hence, by $\forall I$ and theorem (783.4), it follows that $P^*0x$. So $N_{x}$, by (784.2). $\Rightarrow$

(789.2) For convenience, we prove $P^{*}ny \rightarrow N_{y}$. So assume $P^{*}ny$. Then by the main theorem governing the ancestral of predecessor (780.2):

$\forall F ((\forall z (P_{nz} \rightarrow Fz) \land \forall x \forall x' (P_{xx'} \rightarrow (Fx \rightarrow Fx'))) \rightarrow Fy)$

If we instantiate this to $N$, then we know:

$(\delta) (\forall z (P_{nz} \rightarrow N_{z}) \land \forall x \forall x' (P_{xx'} \rightarrow (N_{x} \rightarrow N_{x'}))) \rightarrow N_{y}$

Since we're trying to show $N_{y}$, we simply have to establish both conjuncts of the antecedent of $(\delta)$. For the first conjunct, assume $P_{nx}$. But then $N_{x}$ follows by (789.1). So it remains to show the second conjunct of $(\delta)$. By GEN and conditional proof, assume $P_{xx'}$ and $N_{x}$, to show $N_{x'}$. but these two assumptions imply $N_{x'}$, also by (789.1). $\Rightarrow$

(789.3) Assume $P^{*}ny$. Then by theorem (783.4), it follows that $P^{*}ny \land n =_{P} y$. Reason by cases from this disjunction. If $P^{*}ny$, then by (789.2), $N_{y}$. If $n =_{P} y$, then by (770.3) and the fact that $P$ is a rigid one-to-one relation (782.4), $n = y$. Since $N_{n}$ by hypothesis, $N_{y}$. $\Rightarrow$

(790) Assume $P_{xn}$. Since $n$ is by hypothesis a natural number, we know by theorem (784.2) that $P^{*}0n$. Hence $P^*0n \lor 0 =_{P} n$, by theorem (783.4). Suppose, for reductio, that $0 =_{P} n$. Then by (783.2), $\exists z (P_{0z} \land P_{nz})$. Suppose $a$ is such an object, so that we know $P_{0a} \land P_{na}$. Then by the fact that $P$ is a one-to-one relation (782.3) and the definition of one-to-one relation (768.1), it follows
that \( 0 = n \). Hence, from our assumption \( Pxn \), it follows that \( Px0 \). This implies \( \exists x Px0 \) and so contradicts (781.1). So \( \neg(0 = n) \). Then \( P0n \), by disjunctive syllogism. Hence, by (773.7) and the fact that \( P \) is a rigid one-to-one relation, \( \exists z(Pz0 & Pzn) \). Suppose \( b \) is such an object, so that we know both \( P^*0b \) and \( Pb0 \). \( P^*0b \) implies \( Nb \), by (784.2). \( Pb0 \) conjoined with \( Pxn \) implies \( x = b \), by the rigid one-to-one character of \( P \) (782.4) and (768.1). Hence \( \neg(0 = n) \).

(791) Assume \( \exists x Pxn \). Then, by (784.2), \( P^*0x \). By the main theorem governing \( P^* \) (783.4), it follows that either \( P^*0x \) or \( 0 = Px \). We now reason by cases from this disjunction.

Suppose \( P^*0x \). Then there is an object, say \( a \), such that \( Pa0 \), by (766.5). So by theorem (779.2), it follows that there is a property, say \( Q \), and an ordinary object, say \( b \), such that:

\[
Qb & Numbers(x, Q) & Numbers(a, Q^b)
\]

The second conjunct implies, by (759.6), that \( x \) is a natural cardinal.

Alternatively, suppose \( 0 = Px \). Independently, since we know that \( P \) is a rigid one-to-one relation (782.4), then \( x = P y \) is an instance of (770.3). So \( 0 = x \). But theorem (758) asserts that Zero is a natural cardinal. Hence \( x \) is a natural cardinal. \( \exists x \)

(792.1) Assume both \( Pxy \) and \( Pxz \). Then by the theorem governing \textit{predecessor} (779.2), it follows that there are properties and ordinary objects, say \( Q, R, a, b \), such that:

\[
(\vartheta) \quad Qa & Numbers(y, Q) & Numbers(x, Q^a)
\]

\[
(\xi) \quad Rb & Numbers(z, R) & Numbers(x, R^b)
\]

Now the third conjuncts of (\( \vartheta \)) and (\( \xi \)) jointly imply \( Q^a \equiv R^b \), by (742.2). Since we also know \( Qa \) and \( Rb \), it follows by lemma (735) that \( Q \equiv R \). But independently, the second conjuncts of (\( \vartheta \)) and (\( \xi \)) jointly imply \( y = z \equiv Q \equiv R \), by the Conditional Underlying Hume's Principle (743). Hence \( y = z \). \( \exists x \)

(792.2) (Exercise)

(795) Before we begin the proof proper, we establish some preliminary facts. First note that we’ll be working with restricted variables \( u \) and \( v \) for ordinary objects. But these are \textit{rigid} restricted variables, as defined in (334). So we may use Rule RN as noted in (335.1.a). Second, note that from the premise that \( \forall u (aGu \rightarrow u \pi_E v) \rightarrow u \pi_E v \). That is, it is a fact that:

\[
\forall u (aGu \rightarrow u \pi_E v) \rightarrow u \pi_E v
\]

\textit{Proof}. Assume \( aGu \). For conditional proof, assume \( \forall u (aGu \rightarrow u \pi_E v) \). Then \( aGu \rightarrow u \pi_E v \), by Rule \( \forall E \) (94.3). But then \( u \pi_E v \), by MP.
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Hence it follows by RN that:

(\theta) \Box \exists! G v \vdash (\forall u (\exists! G v \rightarrow u \not\in v) \rightarrow u \not\in v)

Now for the proof proper, assume:

(a) \Diamond \forall u (\exists! G v \rightarrow u \not\in v)

We want to show \forall u (\exists! G v \rightarrow u \not\in v). So by GEN, assume:

(b) \exists! G v

From (b) and theorem (139.6), it follows that \Box \exists! G v. Hence, by (\theta):

\Box (\forall u (\exists! G v \rightarrow u \not\in v) \rightarrow u \not\in v)

But from this and (a) it follows by K \Diamond (158.13) that \Diamond u \not\in v. But this implies u \not\in v, by theorem (234.2).

(796) By GEN, we show \exists! \ exists. It then suffices, in virtue of (792.2), to show that \exists! \ exists. Furthermore, in virtue of (789.1), it suffices to show that \exists! \ exists. Now by hypothesis, \exists! n. Moreover \exists! n also implies NaturalCardinal(n), by (791). The latter, by definition (752), implies \exists G (n = \# G). Let Q be such a property, so that we know n = \# Q. Since we have now established both \exists! n and n = \# Q, it follows that:

\exists x (\exists! x \& x = \# Q)

Our modal axiom (793) therefore implies:

\Diamond \exists! y (\exists! y \& \forall u (\exists! Qu \rightarrow u \not\in y))

By BF \Diamond (167.3), this implies:

\exists! y (\exists! y \& \forall u (\exists! Qu \rightarrow u \not\in y))

Let a be such an object, so that we know:

\exists a (a = \# Q)

The following, alternative proof, based on possible world theory, was proposed by Jonas Raab. Assume \Diamond \forall u (\exists! G v \rightarrow u \not\in v). Then by a fundamental theorem of possible world theory (525.1), it follows that: \exists w (w \models \forall u (\exists! G v \rightarrow u \not\in v)). Suppose w_1 is such a world, so that we know:

(\theta) w_1 \models \forall u (\exists! G v \rightarrow u \not\in v)

Now we want to show \forall w (\exists! G v \rightarrow u \not\in v). So, by GEN, assume \exists! G v. Then by theorem (139.6), \Box \exists! G v. So by a fundamental theorem of world theory, \forall w (w \models \exists! G v), and so:

(\xi) w_1 \models \exists! G v

that possible worlds are modally closed, (\theta) and (\xi) imply w_1 \models u \not\in v. Hence \exists w (w \models u \not\in v), and by a fundamental theorem, \Diamond u \not\in v. Hence u \not\in v, by (234.2).

419 To see why, suppose we do indeed establish \exists! \ exists. Then let m_1 be such a natural number, so that we know \exists! m_1 = k = m_1. By GEN, it suffices to show \exists! n \ exists. Then let n_1 be such a natural number, so that we know \exists! n_1 = k = m_1. By GEN, it suffices to show \exists! n_1 \ exists. Then given both \exists! n_1 and \exists! m_1, it follows by (792.2) that k = m_1.
\[ \Diamond (E!a \& \forall u (\#Qu \rightarrow u \neq_E a)) \]

By (162.4), it follows that:
\[ \Diamond E!a \& \Diamond \forall u (\#Qu \rightarrow u \neq_E a) \]

From the first conjunct of this last result, it follows that \( O!a \). Since \( a \) is ordinary, the second conjunct becomes an instance of the antecedent of Lemma (795) and so we may conclude:
\[ (\delta) \forall u (\#Qu \rightarrow u \neq_E a) \]

Now consider the property \( Q_\alpha = [\lambda z \#Qz] \). Then note that \( Q_\alpha^a = [\lambda z Q_\alpha z \vee z =_E a] \), which we know exists by (39.2). By (746.1), we know that something numbers \( Q_\alpha^a \). So suppose \( b \) is such an object, so that we know \( \text{Numbers}(b, Q_\alpha^a) \).

To see that \( Q_\alpha^a \) and \( a \) are witnesses to the above, it remains to show:
(i) \( Q_\alpha^a a \)

(ii) \( \text{Numbers}(b, Q_\alpha^a) \)

(iii) \( \text{Numbers}(n, Q_\alpha^{a-n}) \)

(i) We’ve established that \( a \) is ordinary. Hence \( a =_E a \), by (236.1). So by \( \forall I \), it follows that \( Q_\alpha a \vee a =_E a \). By \( \beta \)-Conversion, \( [\lambda z Q_\alpha z \vee z =_E a]a \). Hence, by the definition of \( Q_\alpha^a \), it follows that \( Q_\alpha^a a \).

(ii) \( \text{Numbers}(b, Q_\alpha^a) \) is already known.

(iii) Since we know \( n = \#Q \), it follows that \( \text{Numbers}(n, Q_\alpha) \), by (759.2). It suffices to show \( Q_\alpha \equiv_E Q_\alpha^{a-n} \), for by (742.1), these facts imply \( \text{Numbers}(n, Q_\alpha^{a-n}) \).

Now to show \( Q_\alpha \equiv_E Q_\alpha^{a-n} \), it suffices by (731.1) to show \( Q_\alpha \equiv_E Q_\alpha^{a-n} \). By the definition of \( F^{-n} \) (733), this means we have to show:
\[ Q_\alpha \equiv_E [\lambda z Q_\alpha^a z \& z \neq_E a] \]

By definition of \( \equiv_E \) (730) and GEN, we have to show:
\[ Q_\alpha v \equiv [\lambda z Q_\alpha^a z \& z \neq_E a]v \]

We argue both directions. \( \rightarrow \) Assume \( Q_\alpha v \). By \&I and \( \beta \)-Conversion, it suffices to show both (1) \( Q_\alpha^a v \) and (2) \( v \neq_E a \). (1) By definition of \( Q_\alpha^a \), we have to show \( [\lambda z Q_\alpha z \vee z =_E a]v \), and so by \( \beta \)-Conversion, show \( Q_\alpha v \vee v =_E a \). But we know \( Q_\alpha v \) by hypothesis. Hence \( Q_\alpha v \vee v =_E a \). (2) Since we’re still under the assumption that \( Q_\alpha v \), it follows by definition of \( Q_\alpha \) and \( \beta \)-Conversion that \( \#Qv \). So by (\( \delta \)), it follows that \( v \neq_E a \). \( \leftarrow \) Assume \( [\lambda z Q_\alpha^a z \& z \neq_E a]v \). Then by
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\(\beta\)-Conversion and \&E, \(Q_{\alpha}v\) and \(v \equiv a\). By definition of \(Q_{\alpha}^a\), the first of these implies \([\forall z \ Q_{\alpha} z \lor z \equiv a] \vdash v\). So by \(\beta\)-Conversion, \(Q_{\alpha} v \lor v \equiv a\). But the second, \(v \equiv a\), allows us to conclude, by disjunctive syllogism, that \(Q_{\alpha} v\).

(798) By GEN, it suffices to show \(F_0 \& \forall n \forall m (P_{nm} \rightarrow (F_n \rightarrow F_m)) \rightarrow \forall n F_n\). Now since \(P\) is a rigid one-to-one relation, we can instantiate it for \(R\) in the Principle of Generalized Induction (775). If we do so and simultaneously substitute Zero for \(z\), we obtain the following instance:

\([F_0 \& \forall x \forall y ((P^0 x \& P^0 y) \rightarrow (P x y \rightarrow (F x \rightarrow F y)))] \rightarrow \forall x (P^0 x \rightarrow F x)\)

By the main theorem governing \(\mathbb{N}\) (784.2) and the Rule of Substitution, this reduces to:

\([F_0 \& \forall x \forall y ((\mathbb{N} x \& \mathbb{N} y) \rightarrow (P x y \rightarrow (F x \rightarrow F y)))] \rightarrow \forall x (\mathbb{N} x \rightarrow F x)\)

By employing our restricted variables \(n\) and \(m\), this can be written:

\([F_0 \& \forall n \forall m (P_{nm} \rightarrow (F_n \rightarrow F_m))] \rightarrow \forall n F_n\)

(801) From (796), we know \(\exists! m P_{nm}\), i.e.,

\(\exists! x (\mathbb{N} x \& P_{nx})\)

Hence by Rule RA,

\(\forall \exists! x (\mathbb{N} x \& P_{nx})\)

and so by (174.2):

(8) \(\forall x (\mathbb{N} x \& P_{nx})\)

Now assume \(n = m\). Then, \(\Box n = m\), since the necessity of identity (126) holds universally. From this and the necessitation of the axiom for the substitution of identicals, it follows, by the K axiom, that:

\(\Box (\mathbb{N} x \& P_{nx}) \equiv (\mathbb{N} x \& P_{mx})\)

\(\Box (\mathbb{N} x \& P_{mx}) \equiv (\mathbb{N} x \& P_{nx})\).

Hence by (158.4):

\(\Box (\mathbb{N} x \& P_{nx}) \equiv (\mathbb{N} x \& P_{mx})\)

Since this holds for any \(x\), it follows by GEN that:

\(\forall x \Box (\mathbb{N} x \& P_{nx}) \equiv (\mathbb{N} x \& P_{mx})\)

So by the Barcan Formula (167.1):
(ξ) □∀x((Nx & Pnx) ≡ (Nx & Pmx))

Hence from (δ) and (ξ) it follows by (149.3) that:

ix(Nx & Pnx) = ix(Nx & Pmx)

If we use $k$ as a restricted variable ranging over numbers, the above becomes:

$ikPnk = ikPmk$

So by definition (800), $n' = m'$.

(802) If we eliminate the restricted variable $m$, our theorem asserts:

$\forall x ((N x \land P x) \rightarrow (x = 0 \lor \exists n (x = n')))$

So assume $\forall x$. By theorem (784.2), $P'0x$. Hence, by theorem (783.4), $P'0x \lor 0 =_P x$. We then reason to our conclusion by cases, starting with the latter case. Suppose $0 =_P x$. Then by theorem (783.2), $\exists z(P0z \land Pzx)$. Suppose $a$ is such an object, so that we know $P0a \land Pxa$. Then by the fact that $P$ is a one-to-one relation (782.3) and the definition of one-to-one relation (768.1), it follows that $0 = x$, i.e., $x = 0$. So by $\forall l, x = 0 \lor \exists n(x = n')$.

Alternatively, suppose $P'0x$. To show $\exists n(x = n')$, the definition of our successor notation (800) requires us to show $\exists n(x = imPnm)$. Again, if we eliminate the restricted variable $m$, then we have to show: $\exists n(x = ix(Nx \land Pmx))$. Finally, eliminating the restricted variable $n$, we have to show:

(A) $\exists y(Ny \land x = iy(Nx \land Pyx))$

To find a witness to (A), note that from our assumption that $P'0x$ and the fact that $P$ is a rigid one-to-one relation (782.4), it follows by (773.7) that $\exists z(P'0z \land Pxz)$. So let $b$ be such an object, so that we know both:

(δ) $P'0b$

(ξ) $Pbx$

We conclude the proof by showing that $b$ is a witness to (A). $\forall b$ follows from (δ), by theorem (784.2). So it remains to show $x = ix(Nx \land Pbx)$. By the modally strict version of Hintikka's schema (148), it therefore suffices to show the following:

(B) $a! (Nx \land Pbx)$

(C) $\forall z(a!(Nz \land Pbz) \rightarrow z = x)$

But $Nx$ is true by assumption. Hence by (786.1), $\square Nx$, which in turn implies $a!Nx$. Moreover, $Pbx$ is just (ξ). Hence by (782.1), $\square Pbx$, which in turn implies $a!Pbx$. So by (139.2), $a!(Nx \land Pbx)$. Now, finally, assume $a!(Nz \land Pbz)$. Then
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A \mathcal{P} b z and A \mathcal{P} b x. But by (172.2), these imply, given (782.1), \mathcal{P} b z and \mathcal{P} b x. So it follows by the functionality of \mathcal{P} (792.1), that z = x. ⊿

(803) (Exercise) [Hint: The key theorem is an instance of (153.2), but to make proper use of this instance, one needs to appeal to the rigidity of \mathcal{P} (782.2), the uniqueness of successor (796), and the description that defines successor notation (800).]

(805.n) (Exercises)

(806.n) (Exercises)

(808) (Exercise) [Hint: The easiest proof may be by reductio.]

(810.1) (→) We may reason in this direction as follows:

\[ x < y \equiv \mathcal{P}^*_{N} xy \quad \text{by definition (809.1)} \]
\[ \equiv [\lambda xy \; \mathcal{N} x & \mathcal{P}^* xy]xy \quad \text{by definition (807.1)} \]
\[ \equiv \mathcal{N} x \& \mathcal{P}^* xy \quad \text{by } \beta \text{-Conversion, given } [\lambda xy \; \mathcal{N} x & \mathcal{P}^* xy] \]
\[ \rightarrow \mathcal{N} y \quad \text{by theorem (789.2)} \]

(←) Assume \mathcal{N} x, \mathcal{N} y, and \mathcal{P}^* xy. Conjoining the first and third, we have \mathcal{N} x \& \mathcal{P}^* xy. It follows by \beta \text{-Conversion that } [\lambda xy \; \mathcal{N} x & \mathcal{P}^* xy]xy, given that the \lambda-expression is significant. By definition (807.1), \mathcal{P}^*_{N} xy. Hence, by (809.1), x < y. ⊿

(810.2) (→) We may reason in this direction as follows:

\[ x \leq y \equiv \mathcal{P}^*_{N} xy \quad \text{by definition (809.2)} \]
\[ \equiv [\lambda xy \; \mathcal{N} x & \mathcal{P}^* xy]xy \quad \text{by definition (807.1)} \]
\[ \equiv \mathcal{N} x \& \mathcal{P}^* xy \quad \text{by } \beta \text{-Conversion, given } [\lambda xy \; \mathcal{N} x & \mathcal{P}^* xy] \]
\[ \rightarrow \mathcal{N} y \quad \text{by theorem (789.3)} \]

(←) Assume \mathcal{N} x, \mathcal{N} y, and \mathcal{P}^* xy. Conjoining the first and third, we have \mathcal{N} x \& \mathcal{P}^* xy. It follows by \beta \text{-Conversion that } [\lambda xy \; \mathcal{N} x & \mathcal{P}^* xy]xy, given that the \lambda-expression is significant. By definition (807.1), \mathcal{P}^*_{N} xy. Hence, by (809.2), x \leq y. ⊿

(811.1) – (811.4) (Exercises)

(812.1) Assume \mathcal{P} nm. Then by a fact about \mathcal{P}^* (766.1), it follows that \mathcal{P}^* nm. So by (811.1), n < m. ⊿

(812.2) (Exercise)

(812.3) Assume n < m. Then by (811.1), \mathcal{P}^* nm. So by \forall \mathcal{P}^* \mathcal{N} m \lor n = \mathcal{P} m. Hence \mathcal{P}^* nm, by theorem (783.4). So by (811.2), n \leq m. ⊿

(812.4) Assume n \leq m and n \neq m. From the former, it follows by theorem (811.2) that \mathcal{P}^* nm. Now, independently, since \mathcal{P} is a rigid one-to-one relation,
we know, as an instance of theorem (770.3), that \( n =_m m \rightarrow n = m \). Hence, from \( n \neq m \), it follows that \( n \neq m \). So by theorem (783.4), \( P^n m \). And by theorem (811.1), \( n < m \).  

(812.5) Assume \( n < m \) and \( m < k \), so that we know, by theorem (811.1) that \( P^n m \) and \( P^m k \). But \( P \) is a relation and so by the transitivity of its strong ancestral \( P^* \) (766.6), it follows that \( P^n k \). So by (811.1), \( n < k \).  

(812.6) Assume \( n \leq m \) and \( m \leq k \). Then by (811.2), we know both \( P^n m \) and \( P^m k \). But \( P \) is a rigid one-to-one relation and so its weak ancestral \( P^+ \) is transitive (773.6). Hence \( P^+ nk \), and so by (811.2), \( n \leq k \).  

(812.7) Assume \( n < m \) and \( m \leq k \). We reason by cases. If \( m = k \), then \( n < k \). If \( m \neq k \), then by (812.4), \( m < k \). So by transitivity of \(< \) (812.5), \( n < k \).  

(812.8) (Exercise)  

(813.1) By theorem (803), we know \( Pnn' \). So by theorem (766.1), \( P^nn' \). Hence, by (811.1), \( n < n' \).  

(813.2) (Exercise)  

(813.3) Assume \( 1 \leq n \). We also know \( 0 < 0' \), by (813.1). It follows from this last fact by definition of One (804.1), that \( 0 < 1 \). So by (812.7), \( 0 < n \).  

(813.4) Assume \( m' \leq n \). By theorem (803), we know \( Pnn' \). Hence by (812.1), \( m < n' \). But from this and our assumption, it follows by (812.7), that \( m < n \).  

(814.n) (Exercises)  

(816.1) Since we know \( Rigid_{1,1}(P) \) by theorem (782.4), we have as an instance of (774.3): 

\[-P^*00 \rightarrow (P^+0n \rightarrow \neg P^*nn)\]

By theorem (781.3), we know \( \neg P^*00 \). Hence: 

(8) \( P^+0n \rightarrow \neg P^*nn \)

But \( n \) is, by hypothesis, a natural number. So by (784.2), \( P^+0n \). So by (8), \( \neg P^*nn \). Consequently, by (812.1), we have \( \neg(n < n) \).  

(816.2) By (816.1), \( n \neq n \). So by (812.1), \( \neg P^*nn \). So by (766.1), \( \neg Pnn \).  

(816.3) By (803), we know \( Pnn' \). For reduction, suppose \( n = n' \). Then \( Pnn \), which contradicts (816.2).  

(817) Assume \( N x \) and \( x =_P y \). Then it follows from the latter by theorem (783.2) that \( \exists z (Pzx \& Pyz) \). Suppose \( a \) is such an object, so that we know \( Pxa \& Pya \). But we know \( P \) is a one-to-one relation (782.3). Hence by definition
and the fact that $P \downarrow$, it follows that $x = y$. So, it follows from our first assumption that $N_y$.  

(818.2) ($\rightarrow$) We may reason in this direction as follows, given that the $\lambda$-expression is significant:

\[
\begin{align*}
x \downarrow y & \equiv x = P | N y \quad \text{by definition (818.1)} \\
& \equiv [\lambda xy N x \& x = P y]xy \quad \text{by definition (807.1)} \\
& \equiv N x \& x = P y \quad \text{by $\beta$-Conversion} \\
& \rightarrow N y \quad \text{by lemma (817)}
\end{align*}
\]

($\leftarrow$) Assume $N_x, N_y$, and $x = P y$. Conjoining the first and third, we have $N x \& x = P y$. Since $[\lambda xy N x \& x = P y]xy$ exists, it follows by $\beta$-Conversion that $[\lambda xy N x \& x = P y]xy$. By definition (807.1), $x = P | N y$. Hence, by (818.1), $x \downarrow y$.  

(819.1) Assume $x \downarrow y$. Then by (818.2), we know $N x, N y,$ and $x = P y$. But by an instance of (770.3) with the rigid one-to-one relation $P$ substituted for $R$, the last of these consequences implies $x = y$.  

(819.2) Assume $N x \lor N y$. ($\rightarrow$) Then $x \downarrow y \rightarrow x = y$ is already theorem (819.1). ($\leftarrow$) Assume $x = y$. To show $x \downarrow y$, we have to show, by (818.2):

\[
N x \& N y \& x = P y
\]

To do this we reason by cases from our initial assumption $N x \lor N y$:

Suppose $N x$. Since we’ve assumed $x = y$, it follows that $N y$. So it remains to show $x = P y$. Now from $N x$ and $N y$, we know a fortiori and respectively from (796) that both $x$ and $y$ each precede some number. Suppose $a$ and $b$ are such that $Px a$ and $Py b$. But since $x = y$, the former implies $Py a$. But by the fact that $P$ is a functional relation (792), $Py a$ and $Py b$ imply $a = b$. Hence $Px b$. So conjoining $Px b$ and $Py b$ and generalizing, we’ve established $\exists z(P x z \& Py z)$. So by by an instance of theorem (770.1) with the rigid one-to-one $P$ substituted for $R$, it follows that $x = P y$.

Suppose $N y$. Then our conclusion follows by analogous reasoning.  

(819.3) – (819.6) (Exercises)

(819.7) We can reason as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
n \leq m & \equiv P^+ n m \quad (811.2) \\
& \equiv P^+ n m \lor n = P m \quad (783.4) \\
& \equiv n < m \lor n = P m \quad (811.1) \\
& \equiv n < m \lor n = m \quad (818.2), (819.2)
\end{align*}
\]
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(820.2) (Exercise)

(821.1) By (820.2), we have to show \( \mathbb{N} 1 \) and \( \neg(1 \not= 0) \). We already know \( \mathbb{N} 1 \), by (806.1). Moreover, by (816.3), we know \( 0 \not= 0' \), i.e., by definition of 1 (804.1), \( 0 \not= 1 \). Hence, \( \neg(0 \not= 1) \), by (819.1).

(821.2) Assume \( 1 \leq n \). Independently, we know from a previous theorem (814.1) that \( 0 < 1 \). So by (812.7), \( 0 < n \). But we know that \( n \not= n \) (816.1). So \( 0 \not= n \). Hence, by symmetry of identity and (819.1), it follows that \( \neg(n \not= 0) \). Since \( n \) is by hypothesis a natural number, it follows by (820.2) that \( \mathbb{N}, n \). \( \therefore \)

(822) Assume \( \exists x \mathbb{N} x \). Then by (820), \( \exists x \mathbb{N} x \) and \( \neg(x \not= 0) \). The latter implies, by (818.2), that \( \neg\exists x \mathbb{N} 0 \) or \( \neg(x \not= 0) \). Since we already know \( \exists x \mathbb{N} x \), and \( \mathbb{N} 0 \) is a theorem (785), it follows that \( \neg(x \not= 0) \). Now \( \exists x \mathbb{N} x \) also implies \( \mathbb{P}^0 x \), by (784.2). So by (783.4), either \( \mathbb{P}^0 x = 0 \) or \( 0 \not= x \). Hence, \( \mathbb{P}^0 x \). So by (766.5), \( \exists x \mathbb{P}^2 x \).

Let \( a \) be such an object, so that we know \( \mathbb{P}^a x \). We then reach our conclusion \( \exists a \exists x \mathbb{N} x \), i.e., \( \exists a (\exists x \mathbb{N} x \& \mathbb{P}^a x) \), by showing that \( a \) is a witness. Since \( \mathbb{P}^a x \) and \( \mathbb{N} x \), it follows from (790) that \( \mathbb{N} a \). Since we now know \( \mathbb{N} a \) and \( \mathbb{P}^a x \), it remains only to show uniqueness. So, by GEN, assume \( \exists x \mathbb{N} x \) \( \& \mathbb{P}^a x \) (to show \( z = a \)). Then by the one-to-one character of \( \mathbb{P}^a x \) (782.3) and (768.1), it follows from the facts that \( \mathbb{P}^a x \) and \( \mathbb{P}^a x \) that \( z = a \). \( \therefore \)

(824.1) We reason biconditionally as follows, where \( t \) is used as an additional variable ranging over ordinary objects and the \( \lambda \)-expression mentioned is known to be significant:

\[
\exists t \mathbb{P}^a t \equiv \exists u (\exists v \mathbb{P}^a v) \quad \text{by (823.2)}
\]

\[
\equiv \exists u (\exists v \mathbb{P}^a v) \quad \text{by (823.1)}
\]

\[
\equiv \exists u (\exists v[\exists t(Ft \& t \not= z) v]) \quad \text{df } \mathbb{P}^a v \quad \text{by } \beta\text{-Conversion}
\]

\[
\equiv \exists u (\exists v(Fv \rightarrow v \not= z)) \quad \text{by predicate logic}
\]

\[
\equiv \exists u \mathbb{P}^{a'} u \quad \text{by } (237.1), (160.1)
\]

\[
\equiv \exists u \mathbb{P}^a_u u \quad \text{by } (128.1)
\]

(824.2) (Exercise) [Hint: If we take (824.1) to be the base case, then it remains to show that the theorem holds for \( n' \) under the inductive hypothesis that it holds for \( n \).]

(825.1) Assume \( \mathbb{P}(n, n', \mathbb{P}(n, F^{a'})) \). Independently, we know \( \mathbb{P}(n, n', \mathbb{P}(n, F^{a'})) \), by (803). So by theorem (779.2), \( \exists G \exists u (Gu \& \mathbb{P}^{(n', G)} \& \mathbb{P}(n, G^{a'})) \). So let \( Q \) be such a property and ordinary object, so that we know \( Qb \& \mathbb{P}^{b'} \& \mathbb{P}^{(n', Q)} \& \mathbb{P}(n, Q^{b'}) \). Since \( \mathbb{P}(n, F^{a'}) \) and \( \mathbb{P}(n, Q^{b'}) \), it follows that \( F^{a'} \equiv_{E} Q^{b'} \), by (742.1). Hence, by Lemma (735), \( F \equiv_{E} Q \). So since \( \mathbb{P}(n', Q) \), it follows by (742.1) that \( \mathbb{P}(n', F) \). \( \therefore \)

(825.2) Assume \( \mathbb{P}(n', F) \). We want to show \( \exists u (\mathbb{P}(n', F^{a'})) \). Now, independently, we know \( \mathbb{P}(n, n', \mathbb{P}(n, F^{a'})) \), by (803). So by theorem (779.2):
∃G∃u(Gu & Numbers(n’, G) & Numbers(n, G<sup>-u</sup>))

Let Q and b be such a property and ordinary object, so that we know:

Qb & Numbers(n’, Q) & Numbers(n, Q<sup>-b</sup>)

Since Numbers(n’, F) and Numbers(n’, Q), it follows by (742.2) that \( F \approx_E Q \) and, by symmetry, \( Q \approx_E F \). Hence, by definition (726.3), there is a relation R that witnesses this equinumerosity, i.e.,

\[ \exists R \mid Q \leftrightarrow^1 E F \]

Pick an arbitrary such R. Then, by (726.2), \( \forall u (Qu \rightarrow \exists ! v(Fv \& Ruv)) \).

So, in particular, \( \forall u (Qb \rightarrow \exists ! v(Fv \& Rbv)) \). Since \( Qb \) and \( \forall v(Fv \& Rbv) \), it follows by (742.1) that \( Numbers(n, F^-c) \). Hence we now have \( Fc \) and \( Numbers(n, F^-c) \). So \( \exists u(Fu \& Numbers(n, F^-c)) \). \( \therefore \)

(826.1) We prove this by induction.

Base Case: By definition (823.1), we have to show: \( \neg \exists uFu \equiv Numbers(0, F) \). But this is just (761).

Inductive Case: Our IH is: \( \exists n uFu \equiv Numbers(n, F) \). We want to show \( \exists n’ uFu \equiv Numbers(n’, F) \). By definition (823.2), we have to show:

\[ \exists u(Fu \& \exists n vF^-u v) \equiv Numbers(n’, F) \]

(\( \rightarrow \)) Assume \( \exists u(Fu \& \exists n vF^-u v) \). Let a be such an object, so that we know Fa and \( \exists n vF^-a v \). By IH, the latter implies \( Numbers(n, F^-a) \). So by (825.1), \( Numbers(n’, F) \).

(\( \leftarrow \)) Assume \( Numbers(n’, F) \). We’re need to show \( \exists n’ uFu \). By definition (823.2), we therefore have to show: \( \exists u(Fu \& \exists n vF^-u v) \). But by the IH and a rule of substitution, it suffices to show: \( \exists u(Fu \& Numbers(n, F^-u)) \). This is easy, since it follows directly from \( Numbers(n’, F) \) by (825.2). \( \therefore \)

(826.2) Since it is clear that the two individuals asserted to be identical are abstract, it suffices to show they encode the same properties, i.e., to show:

\[ nG \equiv \forall x(A!x \& \forall F(xF \equiv \exists n uFu))G \]

But by (255), it suffices to show:

(\( \delta \)) \[ nG \equiv \exists x n uGu \]

Now if we apply Rule RA to (826.1) and distribute the actuality operator over the biconditional, then we know:
(ξ) ∃n uGn ≡ sNNumbers(n, G)

And independently, it is provable that:

(ζ) sNNumbers(n, G) ≡ nG

Proof: By (791), we know NaturalCardinal(n), so the antecedent of (760) is satisfied and it follows that:

(A) nG ≡ n = #G

We can now show both directions of (ζ). (→) Assume sNNumbers(n, G). So by theorem (759.1), it follows that Numbers(n, [λz sGz]). And so by (759.1), n = #G. So by (A), nG. (←) Assume nG. By (A), n = #G. So by (749), n = ixNumbers(x, G). Hence, sNNumbers(n, G), by (148).

Hence, by (ζ) and (ξ) it follows that (ϑ). ⊢

(830.1) – (830.4) (Exercises)

(831.1) By definition (828.1), we have to show:

∀x∃y [λxy Dx & y = 0] xy

From the fact that the λ-expression is significant, β-Conversion, and a Rule of Substitution, we have to show:

∀x∃y (Dx & y = 0)

By GEN, we have to show:

∃y (Dx & y = 0)

We can establish this if we choose Zero to be our witness. By the uniqueness quantifier, we have to show:

(A) Dx & 0 = 0

(B) ∀z (Dx & z = 0) → z = 0

(A) Dx is an instance of (830.3). Since ∃N0 is a theorem (785), it follows by (819.3) that 0 = 0.

(B) By GEN, it suffices to show Dx & z = 0 → z = 0. So assume Dx and z = 0. Then, again, since ∃N0 is a theorem, it follows from the second assumption by (819.2) that z = 0. ⊢

(831.2) (Exercise)

(831.3) Although the theorem is a special case of (831.2), we give a proof without assuming that theorem. Since [λy y = 0] clearly exists, we have to show, by definition (828.3), β-Conversion, and a Rule of Substitution, ∃!y (y = 0). If we choose Zero to be our witness, then by the definition of the uniqueness quantifier, we have to show:
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(A) \( 0 \dot{=} 0 \)

(B) \( \forall z (z \dot{=} 0 \rightarrow z = 0) \)

(A) Since \( \mathbb{N}0 \) is a theorem (785), it follows by (819.3) that \( 0 \dot{=} 0 \). (B) By GEN, it suffices to show \( z \dot{=} 0 \rightarrow z = 0 \). So assume \( z \dot{=} 0 \). Then since \( \mathbb{N}0 \) is a theorem, it follows by (819.2) that \( z = 0 \).

(832.1) By theorem (225.1) and the T schema, it is a theorem that there are ordinary objects, i.e., \( \exists x \mathcal{O}!x \). So assume \( a \) is such an object, i.e., \( \mathcal{O}!a \). Then we show that the 2-place relation being an \( x \) and \( y \) such that \( x \) exemplifies \( D \) and \( y \) is identical to \( a \), i.e., \( [\lambda xy D x \& y =_E a] \), is a witness to our existential claim, i.e.,

(ξ) Function\(^1([\lambda xy D x \& y =_E a])\)

(Note: we could have used the 2-place relation \([\lambda xy y =_E a]\) as a witness instead. We leave the proof as an exercise.) By definition (828.1), we have to show:

\[ \forall x \exists y [\lambda xy D x \& y =_E a]xy \]

where \( a \) is an ordinary object. Given \( \beta \)-Conversion, the fact that the \( \lambda \)-expression is significant, and a Rule of Substitution, we have to show:

\[ \forall x \exists y (D x \& y =_E a) \]

By GEN, we have to show:

\[ \exists y (D x \& y =_E a) \]

So pick our witness to be \( a \). Then by the definition of the uniqueness quantifier and \( \exists \), we have to show both:

(δ) \( D x \& a =_E a \)

(ζ) \( \forall z ((D x \& z =_E a) \rightarrow z = a) \)

But for (δ), we know \( D x \) by theorem (830.3), and we know \( a =_E a \) from (236.1) and the assumption that \( a \) is ordinary. For (ζ), assume, by GEN, \( D x \& z =_E a \). Then it follows from the second conjunct that \( z = a \), by (230.2). We’ve therefore established everything required to establish (ξ). It then follows from (ξ) that:

\[ \exists R \text{Function}^1(R) \]

So we have shown thus far:

\( \mathcal{O}!a \vdash \exists R \text{Function}^1(R) \)

Hence, by \( \exists \! E \):

\( \exists x \mathcal{O}!x \vdash \exists R \text{Function}^1(R) \)
So, by the Deduction Theorem, $\exists x O! x \rightarrow \exists R Function^1(R)$. But since $\exists x O! x$ is a theorem, $\exists R Function^1(R)$.

(832.2) (Exercise)

(834.1) – (834.2) (Exercises)

(834.3) We show how to turn the proof of (832.1) into a proof of the present theorem. But first, note that as an instance of theorem (178.1), we know: $O! a \rightarrow \Box O! a$. So by (64.10):

(ξ) $O! a \vdash \Box O! a$

Put this aside for the moment and return to the reasoning at the beginning of (832.1): by (225.1) and the T schema, it is a theorem that there are ordinary objects, i.e., $\exists x O! x$. So assume $a$ is such an object, i.e., $O! a$. Then, in the proof of (832.1), we derived, from this assumption, the fact that the 2-place relation $[\lambda x y . D x \& y = E a]$, called $f_1$ in the text below, is a total function. That is, in the proof of (832.1), we established:

$O! a \vdash Function^1(f_1)$

Hence, by RN:

(θ) $\Box O! a \vdash \Box Function^1(f_1)$

So from (ξ) and (θ), it follows by (64.8) that:

(ζ) $O! a \vdash \Box Function^1(f_1)$

But notice that Rule $\exists I$ (102.2) [Variant] tells us that since $f_1$ has a matrix that is free of encoding formula subterms:

(ω) $\Box Function^1(f_1) \vdash \exists R \Box Function^1(R)$

So from (ζ) and (ω), it also follows by (64.8) that:

$O! a \vdash \exists R \Box Function^1(R)$

Since $a$ was arbitrary, it follows by $\exists E$ that:

$\exists x O! x \vdash \exists R \Box Function^1(R)$

But it follows from this last fact and now familiar reasoning that $\exists R \Box Function^1(R)$.

(834.4) (Exercise)
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(835.1) We prove only the case for \( n = 1 \). By (215.1), there are contingently true propositions. Assume \( p_1 \) is such a proposition, so that we know \( p_1 \& \Diamond \neg p_1 \). Our proof strategy is as follows. First we derive our theorem from the assumption \( p_1 \& \Diamond \neg p_1 \); i.e., we show:

(A) \( p_1 \& \Diamond \neg p_1 \vdash \exists R (\text{Function}(R) \& \Diamond \neg \text{Function}(R)) \)

Then we conclude, by an application of \( \exists E \):

(B) \( \exists p (p \& \Diamond \neg p) \vdash \exists R (\text{Function}(R) \& \Diamond \neg \text{Function}(R)) \)

Then by an applications of the Deduction Theorem, we conclude:

(C) \( \vdash \exists p (p \& \Diamond \neg p) \rightarrow (\exists R (\text{Function}(R) \& \Diamond \neg \text{Function}(R))) \)

But since \( \exists p (p \& \Diamond \neg p) \) is a theorem, we can conclude, by an application of (64.5), that:

(D) \( \vdash \exists R (\text{Function}(R) \& \Diamond \neg \text{Function}(R)) \)

Since the inferences from (A) to (B), (B) to (C) and (C) to (D) are easy, it remains only to show (A). So given our assumption \( p_1 \& \Diamond \neg p_1 \), consider the relation \( f_1 \):

\[ \lambda xy p_1 \& Dx \& y = 0 \]  \( (f_1) \)

To show \( \exists R (\text{Function}(R) \& \Diamond \neg \text{Function}(R)) \), it suffices by \&I and \( \exists I \) to show:

(E) \( \text{Function}(f_1) \)

(F) \( \Diamond \neg \text{Function}(f_1) \)

(E) To show \( f_1 \) is a total function, we have to show (828.1):

\[ \forall x \exists y [\lambda xy p_1 \& Dx \& y = 0]xy \]

Given that the \( \lambda \)-expression is significant, \( \beta \)-Conversion, and a Rule of Substitution, we have to show:

\[ \forall x \exists y (p_1 \& Dx \& y = 0) \]

By GEN, we have to show:

\( \exists y (p_1 \& Dx \& y = 0) \)

So pick our witness to be 0. Then by the definition of the uniqueness quantifier and \( \exists I \), we have to show both:

\[ \lambda xy p_1 \& Dx \& y = 0 \]

We’ve noted on prior occasions why reasoning of the kind used in the remainder of this proof is modally strict notwithstanding the appeal to an assumption that isn’t necessarily true. In this particular case, the assumption plays a role in two places in the proof. In what follows, note that (a) RN is correctly applied, and (b) the assumption is ultimately discharged in both places. See again the discussion in Remark (71), Remark (216), and the proof of theorem (219.1).
\( (\vartheta) \ p_1 & Dx & 0 \doteq 0 \)

\( (\zeta) \ \forall z((p_1 & Dx & z \doteq 0) \rightarrow z = 0) \)

To show \( (\vartheta) \), we note: \( p_1 \) is true by hypothesis; \( Dx \) is a theorem, by \((830.3)\); and since \( \mathbb{N}0 \) is a theorem \((785)\), \( 0 \doteq 0 \), by \((819.3)\). To show \( (\zeta) \), assume, by GEN, \( p_1 & Dx & z \doteq 0 \). Then it follows from the theorem \( \mathbb{N}0 \) and the third conjunct that \( z = 0 \), by \((819.2)\).

\( (F) \) To show \( f_1 \) possibly fails to be a total function, we use the following proof strategy. We'll first prove the following conditional by modally strict means:

\[ (G) \neg p_1 \rightarrow \neg \text{Function}(f_1) \]

By Rule RM\( ^\diamond \) \((157.2)\), it then follows that:

\[ (H) \Box \neg p_1 \rightarrow \Box \neg \text{Function}(f_1) \]

But since \( \Box \neg p_1 \) is true by hypothesis, it follows that:

\[ (I) \Box \neg \text{Function}(f_1) \]

Now since the reasoning in the steps from \( (G) \) to \( (H) \) and from \( (H) \) to \( (I) \) is straightforward, it remains only to show \( (G) \). So assume \( \neg p_1 \), for conditional proof. (This assumption and the reasoning that follows, is independent of our earlier assumption that \( p_1 & \Box \neg p_1 \).) Then \( \neg (p_1 & Dx & y \doteq 0) \), for if a formula \( \chi \) is false, then no conjunction containing \( \chi \) as a conjunct is true. Hence, by the fact that the \( \lambda \)-expression is significant and \( \beta \)-Conversion:

\[ \neg[\lambda x y p_1 & Dx & y \doteq 0]xy \]

I.e., \( \neg f_1 xy \). Since the free occurrences of \( y \) in the above don’t occur free in any hypothesis, we may use GEN to infer \( \forall y \neg f_1 xy \). Hence, by quantifier negation, \( \neg \exists ! y f_1 xy \). So, existentially generalizing on \( x \), we have \( \exists ! x \neg \exists ! y f_1 xy \). And again by quantifier negation, \( \neg \forall x \exists ! y f_1 xy \). So \( \neg \text{Function}(f_1) \). Thus, if we discharge our assumption \( \neg p_1 \) by conditional proof, we have derived \( \neg p_1 \rightarrow \neg \text{Function}(f_1) \). This conditional doesn’t depend on \( \neg p_1 \) and doesn’t depend on our assumption \( p_1 & \Box \neg p_1 \). Since it was derived by modally strict means from no assumptions, we may apply RN and continue reasoning by way of the remaining simple steps in the proof strategy outlined above. \( \Box \)

\( (835.2) \) (Exercise)

\( (835) \) (Exercise 7) We prove only the case for \( n = 1 \). By \((215.1)\), there are contingently true propositions. Assume \( p_1 \) is such a proposition, so that we know \( p_1 & \Box \neg p_1 \). By now familiar reasoning, we also know \( \exists x ! 0 x \) is a theorem. So assume \( a \) is such an object, i.e., \( ! 0 a \). Our proof strategy is as follows. First we derive our theorem from the assumptions \( p_1 & \Box \neg p_1 \) and \( ! 0 a \), i.e., we show:
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(A) \( p_1 & \Box \neg p_1, O!a \vdash \exists R(Function(R) & \Box \neg Function(R)) \)

Then we conclude, by two applications of \( \exists E \):

(B) \( \exists p (p & \Box \neg p), \exists x O!x \vdash \exists R(Function(R) & \Box \neg Function(R)) \)

Then by two applications of the Deduction Theorem, we conclude:

(C) \( \vdash \exists p (p & \Box \neg p) \rightarrow (\exists x O!x \rightarrow \exists R(Function(R) & \Box \neg Function(R))) \)

But since both \( \exists p (p & \Box \neg p) \) and \( \exists x O!x \) are theorems, we can conclude, by two applications of (64.5), that:

(D) \( \vdash \exists R(Function(R) & \Box \neg Function(R)) \)

Since the inferences from (A) to (B), (B) to (C) and (C) to (D) are easy, it remains only to show (A). So given our assumptions \( p_1 & \Box \neg p_1 \) and \( O!a \), consider the relation \( f_2 \):

\[
[\lambda xy p_1 & Dx & y =_E a]
\]

(f2)

To show \( \exists R(Function(R) & \Box \neg Function(R)) \), it suffices by &I and \( \exists I \) to show:

(E) \( Function(f_2) \)

(F) \( \Box \neg Function(f_2) \)

(E) To show \( f_2 \) is a total function, we have to show (828.1):

\[
\forall x \exists y [\lambda xy p_1 & Dx & y =_E a]xy
\]

Given the fact that the \( \lambda \)-expression is significant, \( \beta \)-Conversion, and a Rule of Substitution, we have to show:

\[
\forall x \exists y (p_1 & Dx & y =_E a)
\]

By GEN, we have to show:

\[
\exists y (p_1 & Dx & y =_E a)
\]

So pick our witness to be \( a \). Then by the definition of the uniqueness quantifier and \( \exists I \), we have to show both:

(\( \delta \)) \( p_1 & Dx & a =_E a \)

(\( \zeta \)) \( \forall z ((p_1 & Dx & z =_E a) \rightarrow z = a) \)

To show (\( \delta \)), we note: \( p_1 \) is true by hypothesis; \( Dx \) is a theorem, by (830.3); and \( a =_E a \) follows from (236.1) and our hypothesis that \( a \) is ordinary. To show (\( \zeta \)), assume, by GEN, \( p_1 & Dx & z =_E a \). Then it follows from the third conjunct that \( z = a \), by (230.2).
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(F) To show $f_2$ possibly fails to be a total function, we will appeal to the modal theorem $\Box(\neg \varphi \rightarrow \neg \psi) \rightarrow (\Diamond \neg \varphi \rightarrow \Diamond \neg \psi)$, which is an instance of the K$\Diamond$ schema (158.13). Here is the proof strategy. We’ll first prove the following conditional by modally strict means:

(G) $\neg p_1 \rightarrow \neg \text{Function}(f_2)$

Hence by Rule $\text{RM}$ (157.2), it follows that:

(H) $\Diamond \neg p_1 \rightarrow \Diamond \neg \text{Function}(f_2)$

But since $\Diamond \neg p_1$ is true by hypothesis, it follows that:

(I) $\Diamond \neg \text{Function}(f_2)$

Now since the reasoning in the steps from (G) to (H) and from (H) to (I) is straightforward, it remains only to show (G). So assume $\neg p_1$, for conditional proof. (This assumption and the reasoning that follows, is independent of our earlier assumption that $p_1 \& \Diamond \neg p_1$.) Then $\neg (p_1 \& Dx \& y =_{E} a)$, for if a formula $\chi$ is false, then no conjunction containing $\chi$ as a conjunct is true. Since the $\lambda$-expression is significant we may infer by $\beta$-Conversion that:

$\neg \lambda xy p_1 \& Dx \& y =_{E} a \chi$

I.e., $\neg f_2 xy$. Since the free occurrences of $y$ in the above don’t occur free in any hypothesis, we may use GEN to infer $\forall y \neg f_2 xy$. Hence, by quantifier negation, $\exists y f_2 xy$. A fortiori, $\exists! y f_2 xy$. So, existentially generalizing on $x$, we have $\exists x \neg \exists! y f_2 xy$. And again by quantifier negation, $\forall x \exists! y f_2 xy$. So $\neg \text{Function}(f_2)$.

Thus, if we discharge our assumption $\neg p_1$ by conditional proof, we have derived $\neg p_1 \rightarrow \neg \text{Function}(f_2)$. This conditional doesn’t depend on $\neg p_1$, doesn’t depend on our assumption $p_1 \& \Diamond \neg p_1$, and doesn’t depend on the assumption $O! a$. Since it was derived by modally strict means from no assumptions, we may apply RN and continue reasoning by way of the remaining simple steps in the proof strategy outlined above. $\Rightarrow$

(837)$\star$ ($\rightarrow$) Assume $f(x_1, \ldots, x_n) = y$. Then by definition of $f(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ (836), it follows that:

$\exists z f x_1 \ldots x_n z = y$

So by the symmetry of identity and (145.2)$\star$, $f x_1 \ldots x_n y$.

($\leftarrow$) Assume $f x_1 \ldots x_n y$. Now since $f$ is a total function, we know by definition (828.2) that $f$ relates $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ to a unique object. So it follows that $\forall z (f x_1 \ldots x_n z \rightarrow z = y)$. Thus, we have:

$f x_1 \ldots x_n y \& \forall z (f x_1 \ldots x_n z \rightarrow z = y)$
Hence, by the right-to-left direction of Hintikka’s schema (142)*, it follows that 
\( y = \nu yfx_1 \ldots x_n y \). Hence by definition (836), 
\( y = f(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \). So \( f(x_1, \ldots, x_n) = y \),
by the symmetry of identity. \( \star \)

(838)* Without loss of generality, we prove only the case for \( n = 1 \). Assume 
\( \forall x \forall y(fxy \equiv hxy) \). Then by two applications of \( \forall E \):

(8) \( fxy \equiv hxy \)

We may then conclude \( f(x) = y \equiv h(x) = y \) by the following biconditional rea-
soning:

\[
\begin{align*}
f(x) = y & \equiv fxy \quad \text{by (837)*} \\
& \equiv hxy \quad \text{by (8)} \\
& \equiv h(x) = y \quad \text{by (837)*}
\end{align*}
\]

Since the variable \( y \) doesn’t occur free in the only assumption we’ve made to
derive \( f(x) = y \equiv h(x) = y \), we may apply GEN to conclude:

\( \forall y(f(x) = y \equiv h(x) = y) \)

Hence, by the right-to-left direction of (118.4) it follows that \( f(x) = h(x) \). By
the necessity of identity (126.2), it follows that \( \Box(f(x) = h(x)) \). Now since \( x \)
doesn’t occur free in the only assumption we’ve made to derive our last result,
it follows by GEN that \( \forall x \Box(f(x) = h(x)) \). Hence by the Barcan Formula (167.1),
it follows that \( \Box \forall x(f(x) = h(x)) \). \( \star \)

(840.1)* Again, by (225.1) and the T schema, it is a theorem that there are
ordinary objects, i.e., \( \exists xO!x \). So assume \( a \) is such an object, i.e., \( O!a \). Now
theorem (830.2), we know \( Dx \) is a theorem. So it is a straightforward exercise
to show that the equivalence holds:

(8) \( (Dx \& y =_E a) \equiv y =_E a \)

Hence we can establish:

\[
\begin{align*}
[\lambda xyDx \& y =_E a]xy & \equiv [\lambda xy y =_E a]xy \\
\end{align*}
\]
by the following biconditional chain of reasoning and the fact that the two
\( \lambda \)-expressions are significant (39.2):

\[
\begin{align*}
[\lambda xyDx \& y =_E a]xy & \equiv Dx \& y =_E a \quad \text{by } \beta \text{-Conversion} \\
& \equiv y =_E a \quad \text{by (8)} \\
& \equiv [\lambda xy y =_E a]xy \quad \text{by } \beta \text{-Conversion}
\end{align*}
\]

So using the abbreviations \( f_1 \) and \( h_1 \) introduced in the text, we have estab-
lished:

(\( \zeta \)) \( f_1 xy \equiv h_1 xy \)
And since \( x \) and \( y \) are not free in the one assumption we've made, it follows by GEN that \( \forall x \forall y (f_1xy \equiv h_1xy) \). So we have shown:

\[
O!a \vdash \forall x \forall y (f_1xy \equiv h_1xy)
\]

So by \( \exists i \):

\[
\exists x O!x \vdash \forall x \forall y (f_1xy \equiv h_1xy)
\]

By now familiar reasoning, it follows that \( \forall x \forall y (f_1xy \equiv h_1xy) \). \( \Box \)

(840.2)\( ^\ast \) We show how to convert the proof of (840.1)\( ^\ast \) into a proof of the present theorem. Given the theorem \( \exists !x O!x \) derived at the outset of (840.1)\( ^\ast \), we assumed \( O!a \), and so the arbitrary names \( a, f_1, \) and \( h_1 \) are to be understood as before.

Now as an instance of theorem (178.1), we know: \( O!a \rightarrow \Box O!a \). So by (64.10):

\( (\xi) \ O!a \vdash \Box O!a \)

Moreover, as part of the proof of (840.1)\( ^\ast \), we established that:

\[
O!a \vdash \forall x \forall y (f_1xy \equiv h_1xy)
\]

Hence by RN, we know:

\( (\delta) \ \Box O!a \vdash \Box \forall x \forall y (f_1xy \equiv h_1xy) \)

Hence, as an intermediate conclusion, we may combine \( (\xi) \) and \( (\delta) \) by (64.8) to conclude:

\( (\zeta) \ O!a \vdash \Box \forall x \forall y (f_1xy \equiv h_1xy) \)

But we also know, by \( \exists i \):

\( (\omega) \ \Box \forall x \forall y (f_1xy \equiv h_1xy) \vdash \exists f \exists h \Box \forall x \forall y (fxy \equiv hxy) \)

Hence again by (64.8), we may infer the following from \( (\zeta) \) and \( (\omega) \):

\[
O!a \vdash \exists f \exists h \Box \forall x \forall y (fxy \equiv hxy)
\]

Since \( a \) was arbitrary, it follows by \( \exists \! e \) that:

\[
\exists x O!x \vdash \exists f \exists h \Box \forall x \forall y (fxy \equiv hxy)
\]

By now familiar reasoning, it follows that \( \exists f \exists h \Box \forall x \forall y (fxy \equiv hxy) \). \( \Box \)

(844.1) By definition (843.1), we have to show:

\[
\forall x_1 \forall x_2 ([\lambda xy Dx \& O!y]x_1x_2 \rightarrow \exists w (O!w \& [\lambda x y z Dz \& y = z]x_1x_2w))
\]
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To avoid clash of variables we prove this by \( \forall I \) instead of by GEN. So, where \( a \) and \( b \) are arbitrary, assume \( \lambda xy \, Dx \, & \, O!y \, ab \), to show \( \exists w (O!w \, & \, [\lambda xyz \, Dx \, & \, y =_E z]abw) \). Since the \( \lambda \)-expression is significant, \( \beta \)-Conversion transforms our assumption into:

\[
(\delta) \quad Da \, & \, O!b
\]

Moreover, \( \beta \)-Conversion yields the modally strict that \( [\lambda xyz \, Dx \, & \, y =_E z]abw \equiv Da \, & \, b =_E w \). So, to establish our conclusion, it suffices by a Rule of Substitution to show:

\[
\exists w ((O!w \, & \, Da \, & \, b =_E w) \, & \, \forall z ((O!z \, & \, Da \, & \, b =_E z) \rightarrow z = w))
\]

But we can prove this if we choose \( b \) as our witness. We need to show:

\[
O!b \, & \, Da \, & \, b =_E w \, & \, \forall z ((O!z \, & \, Da \, & \, b =_E z) \rightarrow z = b)
\]

\( O!b \) is known by \((\delta)\). We also know \( \forall x Dx \), by theorem \((830.3)\). So \( Da \). Moreover, since \( O!b \), it follows by \((236.1)\) that \( b =_E b \). So it remains to show uniqueness. By GEN, it suffices to show \( (O!z \, & \, Da \, & \, b =_E z) \rightarrow z = b \). So assume \( O!z \, & \, Da \, & \, b =_E z \). But the third conjunct implies \( b = z \) by \((230.2)\), which in turn yields \( z = b \), by the symmetry of identity.

\begin{equation}
(844.2)
\end{equation}

By definition \((722.1)\), we have to show:

\[
\forall x ((Nx \rightarrow \exists !y (Ny \, & \, x \rightleftharpoons y))
\]

So, by GEN, assume \( Nx \). By definition of the uniqueness quantifier, we have to show:

\[
\exists y ((Ny \, & \, x \rightleftharpoons y) \, & \, \forall z ((Nz \, & \, x \rightleftharpoons z) \rightarrow z = y))
\]

But we can prove this if we let \( x \) be our witness. For then we have to show:

\[
Nx \, & \, x \rightleftharpoons x \, & \, \forall z ((Nz \, & \, x \rightleftharpoons z) \rightarrow z = x)
\]

Now we have \( Nx \) by assumption. So we may apply \((819.3)\) to conclude \( x \rightleftharpoons x \). It then remains to show uniqueness. Assume \( Nz \, & \, x \rightleftharpoons z \). Then by \((819.2)\), it follows that \( x = z \). So \( z = x \) by symmetry of identity.

\begin{equation}
(844.3)
\end{equation}

(Exercise)

(845) Theorem \((796)\) is \( \forall n \exists !m \, Pnm \). By expanding our restricted variables, this becomes:

\[
\forall x ((Nx \rightarrow \exists !y (Ny \, & \, Pxy))
\]

Hence, by definition \((722.1)\), \( P : \, \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \).}

(846.1) – (846.2) (Exercises)

(846.3) (Although this theorem is a special case of \((846.2)\), we give an independent proof.) Assume \( R : \, p \rightarrow G \). Then by \((843.2)\):
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(8)  \( p \rightarrow \exists! y(Gy \& Ry) \)

To show \( R|_p : p \rightarrow G \), we have to show, by (843.2):

\[
p \rightarrow \exists! y(Gy \& \overset{\downarrow}{p}_{|_p} y)\]

Since \( R|_p \) is defined as \( [\lambda y p \& Ry] \) (807.3), which clearly exists, we have to show, by \( \beta \)-Conversion and a Rule of Substitution:

(A)  \( p \rightarrow \exists! y(Gy \& \overset{\downarrow}{p}_{|_p} y) \)

So assume \( p \). Then by (8), \( \exists! y(Gy \& Ry) \). Suppose \( a \) is such an object, so that by the definition of the uniqueness quantifier, we know:

(ξ)  \( Ga \& Ra \& \forall z(Gz \& Rz \rightarrow z = a) \)

To show the consequent of (A), we choose \( a \) as our witness and show:

\[
Ga \& p \& Ra \& \forall z(Gz \& p \& Rz \rightarrow z = a)
\]

Since we already know \( Ga (ξ) \), \( p \) (by assumption), and \( Ra (ξ) \), it remains to show uniqueness. So assume \( Gz \& p \& Rz \). Then the first and third conjuncts imply, by the third conjunct of (ξ), that \( z = a \). ⊞

(848) We have to show:

(A) \( \lambda xy Dx \& Dy \& (N\overset{\downarrow}{x}_{|_p} y \rightarrow x = y) : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \)

(B) \( \forall x \forall y(N\overset{\downarrow}{x}_{|_p} y \& [\lambda xy Dx \& Dy \& (N\overset{\downarrow}{x}_{|_p} y \rightarrow x = y)]xy \rightarrow N\overset{\downarrow}{y}_{|_p}) \)

(A) By GEN, definition (722.1), \( \beta \)-Conversion, and a Rule of Substitution, we have to show:

\[
N\overset{\downarrow}{x} \rightarrow \exists! y(N\overset{\downarrow}{y} \& Dx \& Dy \& (N\overset{\downarrow}{x}_{|_p} y \rightarrow x = y))
\]

So assume the antecedent \( N\overset{\downarrow}{x} \). Then, we leave it as an exercise to show that \( x \) is a witness to the consequent.

(B) (Exercise). ⊞

(849) We have to show:

(A) \( P : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \)

(B) \( \forall x \overset{\downarrow}{p}_{|_p} y(N\overset{\downarrow}{x} \& \overset{\downarrow}{p}_{|_p} xy \rightarrow N\overset{\downarrow}{y}) \)

(A) was established as theorem (845). For (B), assume by GEN that \( N\overset{\downarrow}{x} \& \overset{\downarrow}{p}_{|_p} xy \). Then by (789.1), \( N\overset{\downarrow}{y} \). ⊞

(851.1) Assume \( R \overset{\downarrow}{F} \rightarrow G \). Then by definitions (847) and (722.1), we know:

(8) \( \forall x(F\overset{\downarrow}{x} \rightarrow \exists! y(Gy \& Rxy)) \)
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To show $\text{FunctionalOn}(R,F)$, we have to show, by (850):

$$\forall x (Fx \rightarrow \forall y \forall z (Rxy \& Rxz \rightarrow y=z))$$

So, by GEN, assume $Fx$. And again by GEN, assume $Rxy$ and $Rxz$. Then, by our three assumptions, it follows from (ξ) both that $Gy$ and $Gz$. But our assumption $Fx$, by (ϑ), implies that $x$ bears $R$ to a unique $G$-object. Hence, $y=z$. ⊢

(851.2) (Exercise)

(851.3) (Although this theorem is a special case of (851.2), we give an independent proof.) Assume $R \not\leftrightarrow p \rightarrow G$. Then by definitions (847) and (843.2), we know:

(ϑ) $p \rightarrow \exists! y (Gy \& Ry)$

(ξ) $\forall y (p \& Ry \rightarrow Gy)$

To show $\text{FunctionalOn}(R,p)$, we have to show, by (850):

$$p \rightarrow \forall y \forall z (Ry \& Rz \rightarrow y=z)$$

So, by GEN, assume $p$. And again by GEN, assume $Ry$ and $Rz$. Then, by our three assumptions, it follows from (ξ) both that $Gy$ and $Gz$. But our assumption $p$, by (ϑ), implies that there is a unique object that is both $G$ and $R$. Hence, $y=z$. ⊢

(856.1) – (856.5) (Exercises)

(856.6) (Although this theorem is a special case of (856.5), we give an independent proof.) Assume $R \not\leftrightarrow p \rightarrow G$. Then by (847.3), we know first that $R |: p \rightarrow G$, i.e., by (843.2):

(ϑ) $p \rightarrow \exists! y (Gy \& R_{p}y)$

and second that:

(ξ) $\forall y (p \& Ry \rightarrow Gy)$

Now to show $R_{p} : p \rightarrow G$, we have to show, by (856.3), that:

(A) $p \rightarrow \exists! y (Gy \& R_{p}y)$

(B) $\forall y (p \& R_{p}y \rightarrow Gy)$

(C) $p \equiv \exists y R_{p}y$
(A) Assume \( p \). Then by (\( \delta \)), \( \exists y(Gy \& Ry) \). Hence \( \exists y(Gy \& p \& Ry) \). But by the definition of \( R_{\mathbb{P}} (807.3) \) and \( \beta \)-Conversion, it is a modally strict theorem that \( R_{\mathbb{P}} y \equiv p \& Ry \). Hence \( \exists y(Gy \& R_{\mathbb{P}} y) \), by a Rule of Substitution.

(B) By GEN, we show \( p \& R_{\mathbb{P}} y \rightarrow Gy \). So assume both \( p \) and \( R_{\mathbb{P}} y \). The latter, by the definition of \( R_{\mathbb{P}} \) as \( [\lambda y \ p \& Ry] (807.3) \), implies \( Ry \ a \ fortiori \). Hence, by (\( \xi \)), \( Gy \).

(C) By definition of \( R_{\mathbb{P}} , \beta \)-Conversion and a Rule of Substitution, we need only show \( p \equiv \exists y(p \& Ry) \). (\( \rightarrow \)) Assume \( p \). Then by (\( \delta \)), \( \exists y(Gy \& Ry) \). Suppose \( a \) is such an object so that we know \( a \ a \ fortiori \) from the definition of the uniqueness quantifier that \( Ra \). So \( p \& Ra \). Hence, \( \exists y(p \& Ry) \). (\( \leftarrow \)) Assume \( \exists y(p \& Ry) \). Then it follows \( a \ a \ fortiori \) that \( p \). \( \sharp \sharp \)

(856)/Exercise 13 (\( \rightarrow \)) Assume \( R \) is a function on domain \( F \), i.e., that \( \exists G(R : F \rightarrow G) \). Suppose \( P \) is a witness, so that we know \( R : F \rightarrow P \). Then by definition (855.1), it follows both that \( R \upharpoonright F \rightarrow P \) and \( HasDomain(R,F) \). So it remains to show \( FunctionalOn(R,F) \). But this follows from \( R \upharpoonright F \rightarrow P \) by (851.1). (\( \leftarrow \)) Assume \( FunctionalOn(R,F) \) and \( HasDomain(R,F) \). It follows from these two assumptions, by (850.1) and (853.1), respectively, that:

(\( \delta \) ) \( \forall x(Fx \rightarrow \forall y\forall z(Rxy \& Rxz \rightarrow y=z)) \)

(\( \xi \) ) \( \forall x(Fx \equiv \exists yRxz) \)

Now to show \( \exists G(R : F \rightarrow G) \), we pick \( [\lambda y \exists xRxy] \) as our witness. Then by (856.1), it suffices to show:

(A) \( \forall x(Fx \rightarrow \exists y([\lambda y \exists xRxy] \& Rxy)) \)

(B) \( \forall x\forall y(Fx \& Rxy \rightarrow [\lambda y \exists xRxy]y) \)

(C) \( \forall x(Fx \equiv \exists yRxz) \)

Since (C) follows by definition (853.1) from the assumption \( HasDomain(R,F) \), it remains only to show (A) and (B).

(A) By GEN, we have to show \( Fx \rightarrow \exists y([\lambda y \exists xRxy] \& Rxy) \). By \( \beta \)-Conversion and a Rule of Substitution, it suffices to show \( Fx \rightarrow \exists y(\exists xRxy \& Rxy) \). So assume \( Fx \). Then by (\( \xi \)), we know \( \exists yRxz \). So, suppose \( b \) is such an object, so that we know \( Rxb \). Now to show \( \exists y(\exists xRxy \& Rxy) \), we have to show:

\( \exists y(\exists xRxy \& Rxy \& \forall z(3xRxz \& Rxz \rightarrow z=y)) \)

It suffices to show \( b \) is the witness. We already know \( Rxb \), and it follows from this that \( \exists xRxb \). So it remains to show \( \forall z(\exists xRxz \& Rxz \rightarrow z=y) \). By GEN, it suffices to show \( 3xRxz \& Rxz \rightarrow z=b \). So assume \( 3xRxz \) and \( Rxz \). From the latter and \( Rxb \) it follows from (\( \delta \)) and our assumption \( Fx \) that \( z=b \).
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(B) By GEN, we have to show $Fx \& Rxy \rightarrow [\lambda y \exists x Rxy]y$. So assume $Fx$ and $Rxy$.

But the latter implies $\exists x Rxy$. So by $\beta$-Conversion, $[\lambda y \exists x Rxy]y.$ ∎

(857.1) By (855.2), we have to show:

(A) $[\lambda xyz Dx \& y =_E z] \vdash [\lambda xy Dx \& O!]y \rightarrow O!$.

(B) $\text{HasDomain}([\lambda xyz Dx \& y =_E z],[\lambda xy Dx \& O!]y])$

(A) By (847.2), we have to show both:

$[\lambda xyz Dx \& y =_E z] \vdash [\lambda xy Dx \& O!]y \rightarrow O!$

$\forall x \forall y \forall z ([\lambda x_1 y_1 Dx_1 \& O!]y_1 x_1 y \& [\lambda x_1 y_1 z_1 Dx_1 \& y_1 =_E z_1]xyz \rightarrow O!z)$

But the first was established as (844.1). For the second, we have to show, by $\beta$-Conversion and a Rule of Substitution:

$\forall x \forall y \forall z((Dx \& O!y \& Dx \& y =_E z) \rightarrow O!z)$

By GEN, and simplifying, assume: $Dx$, $O!y$, and $y =_E z$. Then from the latter, by definition of $=_E$ (227), $O!z$.

(B) By (853.3), we have to show:

$\forall x \forall y ([\lambda x_1 y_1 Dx_1 \& O!]y_1 x_1 y \equiv \exists z([\lambda x_1 y_1 z_1 Dx_1 \& y_1 = E z_1]xyz))$

By $\beta$-Conversion and a Rule of Substitution, we have to show:

$\forall x \forall y ((Dx \& O!]y) \equiv \exists z(Dx \& y =_E z))$

By GEN, we have to show:

(8) $(Dx \& O!]y) \equiv \exists z(Dx \& y =_E z)$

($\rightarrow$) Assume $Dx \& O!]y$. Then choose our witness to the right-side of (8) to be $y$.

So by $\exists I$, we have to show $Dx \& y =_E y$. But $Dx$ is true by the first conjunct of our assumption, and $y =_E y$ follows from the second conjunct by (236.1).

($\leftarrow$) Assume $\exists z(Dx \& y =_E z)$. Suppose that $c$ is such an object, so that we know $Dx \& y =_E c$. Then it remains only to show $O!y$. But this follows from $y =_E c$, by definition of $=_E$ (227). ∎

(857.2) By (855.1), we have to show:

(A) $\vdash \models \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$

(B) $\text{HasDomain}(\models, \mathbb{N})$

(A) By (847.1), we have to show:

$\vdash \models \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$
∀x∀y(∀x & x = y → ∀y)

But the first is just (844.2). For the second, assume ∀x and x = y. By the latter and theorem (818.2), it follows that ∀y.

(B) By (853.1), we have to show:

∀x(∀x ⇒ y)

and by GEN, that ∀x = y. (→) Assume ∀x. Then by (819.3), x = y. Hence ∃y(x ∈ y). (←) Assume ∃y(x ∈ y). Suppose a is such an object, so that we know x = a. But by theorem (818.2), ∈y.

(857.3) By definition (829), D = [λP0]y, i.e., by (112.1), p0, where p0 is the proposition ∀x(∀x → x), by a convention in (206). So by (856.3), we have to show:

(A) p0 → ∃y([λn P0n]y & [λn n = 1]y)

(B) ∀y(p0 & [λn n = 1]y → [λn P0n]y)

(C) p0 = ∀y[λn n = 1]y

(A) By the first axiom of propositional logic (38.1), it suffices to show the consequent. By elimination of the restricted variables, β-Conversion, and a Rule of Substitution, we have to show:

∃y(∀x & P0y & ∀y & y = 1)

By simplifying (i.e., removing the otiose third conjunct), the definition of the uniqueness quantifier requires us to show:

∃y(∀x & P0y & y = 1 & ∀z((∀z & P0z & z = 1) → z = y)

But this is easy to show if we let One be our witness. For we know ⊆1 (806.1), and ⊆01 (805.1). The former implies 1 = 1, by (819.3). So it remains to show uniqueness. By now familiar reasoning, assume ⊆1 & ⊆0 & z = 1. Then the third conjunct yields z = 1, by (819.1).

(B) Assume p0 and [λn n = 1]y, i.e., y & y = 1. But by (819.1), y = 1 implies y = 1. Now we also know ⊆01, by (805.1). Since 1 (806.1), it follows by β-Conversion that [λn P0n]1, i.e., [λn P0n]y.

(C) By β-Conversion, a Rule of Substitution, and eliminating the restricted variables, we have to show:

p0 = ∃y(∀y & y = 1)
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By propositional logic, it suffices to show $\exists y(Ny \& y \equiv 1)$. But this is easy if we let One be our witness, since $\mathbb{N}1$ is a theorem (806.1), and hence, so is $1 \equiv 1$ (819.3). So by $\&I$ and $\exists I$, $\exists y(Ny \& y \equiv 1)$. (→) $p_0$ is a theorem. So $\exists y(Ny \& y \equiv 1) \rightarrow p_0$. □

(858.1) Assume:

(δ) $R : F \rightarrow G$

(ζ) $\forall x(Fx \equiv Hx)$

To show $R : H \rightarrow G$, it suffices to show, by (856.1):

(A) $\forall x(Hx \rightarrow \exists !y(Gy \& Rxy))$

(B) $\forall x \forall y(Hx \& Rxy \rightarrow Gy)$

(C) $HasDomain(R,H)$

(A) By GEN, we need only show the embedded conditional. So assume $Hx$. Then $Fx$, by (ζ). Since it follows from (δ) by (856.1) a fortiori that $R |: F \rightarrow G$, i.e., that $\forall x(Fx \rightarrow \exists !y(Gy \& Rxy))$, we can conclude $\exists !y(Gy \& Rxy)$.

(B) By two applications of GEN, we need only show the embedded conditional. So assume $Hx$ and $Rxy$. But from $Hx$, it follows that $Fx$, by (ζ). Yet (δ) implies by (856.1) a fortiori that $\forall x \forall y(Fx \& Rxy \rightarrow Gy)$. Since we have $Fx$ and $Rxy$, it follows that $Gy$.

(C) Now (δ) implies by (856.1) a fortiori that $\forall x(Fx \equiv \exists yRxy)$. But from this and (ζ) it follows that $\forall x(Hx \equiv \exists yRxy)$. Hence $HasDomain(R,H)$. □

(858.2) (Exercise)

(858.3) Assume:

(δ) $R : p \rightarrow G$

(ζ) $p \equiv q$

To show $R : p \rightarrow G$, it suffices to show, by (856.1):

(A) $q \rightarrow \exists !y(Gy \& Ry)$

(B) $\forall y(q \& Ry \rightarrow Gy)$

(C) $HasDomain(R,q)$

(A) Assume $q$. Then $p$, by (ζ). Since it follows from (δ) by (856.1) a fortiori that $R |: p \rightarrow G$, i.e., that $p \rightarrow \exists !y(Gy \& Ry))$, we can conclude $\exists !y(Gy \& Ry)$. □
(B) By GEN, we show the embedded conditional. So assume \( q \) and \( Ry \). But from \( q \), it follows that \( p \), by (\( \zeta \)). Yet (\( \vartheta \)) implies by (856.1) \textit{a fortiori} that \( \forall y(p \& Ry \rightarrow Gy) \). Since we have \( p \) and \( Ry \), it follows that \( Gy \).

(C) Now (\( \vartheta \)) implies by (856.1) \textit{a fortiori} that \( p \equiv \exists yRy \). But from this and (\( \zeta \)) it follows that \( q \equiv \exists yRy \). Hence \( \text{HasDomain}(R,q) \). \( \Rightarrow \)

\((859.1)\) Assume:

(\( \vartheta \)) \( R : F \rightarrow G \)

(\( \zeta \)) \( \forall x(Gx \rightarrow Hx) \)

To show \( R : F \rightarrow H \), we have to show, by (856.1):

(A) \( \forall x(Fx \rightarrow \exists ! y(Hy \& Rxy)) \)

(B) \( \forall x \forall y(Fx \& Rxy \rightarrow Hy) \)

(C) \( \forall x(Fx \equiv \exists y Rxy) \)

(A) By GEN, we show the embedded conditional. So assume \( Fx \). Note that it follows from (\( \vartheta \)) by (856.1) \textit{a fortiori} that \( \forall x(Fx \rightarrow \exists ! y(Gy \& Rxy)) \). This and our assumption \( Fx \) imply \( \exists ! y(Gy \& Rxy) \), i.e., by the definition of the uniqueness quantifier:

\[ \exists ! y(Gy \& Rxy \& \forall z(Gz \& Rxz \rightarrow z = y)) \]

Let \( a \) be such an object, so that we know:

(\( \xi \)) \( Ga \& Rxa \& \forall z(Gz \& Rxz \rightarrow z = a) \)

Now we have to show, by definition of the uniqueness quantifier:

\[ \exists ! y(Hy \& Rxy \& \forall z(Hz \& Rxz \rightarrow z = y)) \]

But we can show this if we choose \( a \) as our witness; by \&I and \( \exists ! I \), we have to show: \( Ha, Rxa, \) and \( \forall z(Hz \& Rxz \rightarrow z = a) \). From the first conjunct of (\( \xi \)) and (\( \zeta \)), it follows that \( Ha \). \( Rxa \) is also known – it’s the second conjunct of (\( \xi \)). So, finally, assume \( Hz \) and \( Rxz \) (to show \( z = a) \). Then since we know \( Fx \) by assumption, we have:

\( Fx \& Rxz \)

But from (\( \vartheta \)) it follows \textit{a fortiori} by (856.1) that \( \forall x \forall y(Fx \& Rxy \rightarrow Gy) \). Hence from \( Fx \& Rxz \) it follows that \( Gz \). But from this and \( Rxz \), it follows from the third conjunct of (\( \xi \)) that \( z = a \).

(B) By GEN, we show the embedded conditional. So assume \( Fx \) and \( Rxy \). Now we just established that we know \( \forall x \forall y(Fx \& Rxy \rightarrow Gy) \). Hence \( Gy \). So by (\( \zeta \)), \( Hy \).
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(C) This is already known, since it follows from (8) by (856.1) a fortiori. ⊳

(859.2) – (859.3) (Exercises)

(860) We show the first conjunct $P \upharpoonright \mathbb{N} : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$, and then the second conjunct $\text{HasRange}(P \upharpoonright \mathbb{N}, \mathbb{N}+)$. For the first conjunct, we have to show, by definition (855.1):

(A) $P \upharpoonright \mathbb{N} \not\equiv \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$

(B) $\forall x (\mathbb{N} x \equiv \exists y P \upharpoonright \mathbb{N} xy)$

(A) By definition (847.1), we have to show both: $P \upharpoonright \mathbb{N} \mid \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \forall x \forall y (\mathbb{N} x \& P \upharpoonright \mathbb{N} xy \rightarrow \mathbb{N} y)$

For the first, we can’t just cite (845), since that only tells us that $P \mid \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$. But from this fact and (846.1), it follows that $P \mid \mathbb{N} : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$. For the second, assume, by GEN, $\mathbb{N} x$ and $P \upharpoonright \mathbb{N} xy$. The latter, by definition of $P \upharpoonright \mathbb{N}$ (807.1) and $\beta$-Conversion, implies both $\mathbb{N} x$ and $P xy$. So by (789.1), $\mathbb{N} y$.

(B) By GEN, we have to show $\mathbb{N} x \equiv \exists y P \upharpoonright \mathbb{N} xy$:

(→) Assume $\mathbb{N} x$. Then by (796), it follows a fortiori that $\exists y P xy$. Suppose $a$ is such an object, so that we know $Pxa$. Then we know:

$\mathbb{N} x \& P xa$

Hence, by $\beta$-Conversion,

$[\lambda xy \mathbb{N} x \& P xy]xa$

So by definition (807.1), $P \mid \mathbb{N} xa$. Hence, $\exists y P \upharpoonright \mathbb{N} xy$.

(←) Assume $\exists y P \upharpoonright \mathbb{N} xy$. Suppose $a$ is such an object, so that we know $P \mid \mathbb{N} xa$. Then by definition of $P \mid \mathbb{N}$ (807.1) and $\beta$-Conversion, it follows a fortiori that $\mathbb{N} x$.

Finally, we show the second conjunct $\text{HasRange}(P \upharpoonright \mathbb{N}, \mathbb{N}+)$. By definition (853), we have to show:

(8) $\forall y (\mathbb{N}+, y \equiv \exists x P \mid \mathbb{N} xy)$

So by GEN, we have to show $\mathbb{N}+, y \equiv \exists x P \mid \mathbb{N} xy$.

(→) Assume $\mathbb{N}+, y$. Then by (822), it follows a fortiori that $\exists x (\mathbb{N} x \& P xy)$. Let $a$ be such an object, so that we know $\mathbb{N} a \& P ay$. It follows by $\beta$-Conversion that $[\lambda xy \mathbb{N} x \& P xy]ya$. So by definition (807.1), $P \mid \mathbb{N} ay$, and by $\exists I$, $\exists x P \upharpoonright \mathbb{N} xy$. 


Assume $\exists x P_{\downarrow N}xy$. Suppose $a$ is such an object, so that we know $\downarrow N a$ and $P_{\downarrow N} ay$. Now to show $\downarrow N y$, we have to show, by (820.2), both that $N y$ and $\neg (y \neq 0)$. But $\neg N y$ follows from $\downarrow N a$ and $P_{\downarrow N} ay$ by (789.1). So it remains to show $\neg (y \neq 0)$. Suppose, for reductio, $y = 0$. Then by (819.1), $y = 0$. Then since $P_{\downarrow N} ay$ by hypothesis, it follows that $P_{\downarrow N} a 0$. By definition of $P_{\downarrow N}$ (807.1) and $\beta$-Conversion, it follows a fortiori that $P a 0$, and hence $\exists x P 0$, which contradicts (781.1). ⊿ ◁

(861.1) We begin by first establishing a preliminary fact. By theorem (830.3), we know that $\forall x Dx$ is a theorem. So $D y$ is a theorem. Consequently, if $Rxy$, then $D y \& Rxy$, and if $D y \& Rxy$, then $Rxy$. Hence, by definition of $\equiv$ and GEN, the following quantified biconditional is a modally strict theorem:

(δ) $\forall x\forall y (Rxy \equiv (Dy \& Rxy))$

(→) Now suppose Function¹(R). Then by definition (828.1), we know:

(ζ) $\forall x\exists ! y Rxy$

Now by (856.1), we have to show:

(A) $\forall x (Dx \to \exists ! y(Dy \& Rxy))$

(B) $\forall x\forall y (Dx \& Rxy \to Dy)$

(C) $\forall x (Dx \equiv \exists ! y Rxy)$

(A) Note that from (ζ) and (δ), it follows by a Rule of Substitution that $\forall x \exists ! y(Dy \& Rxy)$. Moreover, by quantifier law (100.12), we know $\forall a \varphi \to \forall a (\psi \to \varphi)$. Hence $\forall x (Dx \to \exists ! y(Dy \& Rxy))$.

(B) Assume $Dx \& Rxy$. But $Rxy$ alone implies $Dy$, by (δ).

(C) By GEN, we have to show $Dx \equiv \exists ! y Rxy$. (→) It follows from (ζ) a fortiori that $\exists ! y Rxy$. Hence $Dx \to \exists ! y Rxy$. (←) We know $Dx$ is a theorem (830.3). Hence $\exists ! y Rxy \to Dx$. ⊿ ◁

(→−) Assume $R : D \to D$. Then by definition (847.1), it follows a fortiori that $R [:D \to D$, which by (722.1), means:

(ξ) $\forall x (Dx \to \exists ! y(Dy \& Rxy))$

Now we have to show $\forall x \exists ! y Rxy$, so by GEN, we have to show $\exists ! y Rxy$. Now by (ξ), we know $Dx \to \exists ! y(Dy \& Rxy)$, and by theorem (830.3), we know $Dx$. Hence $\exists ! y(Dy \& Rxy)$. But by the modally-strict (δ) and a Rule of Substitution, it follows that $\exists ! y Rxy$. ⊿ ◁

(861.2) (Exercise)
(861.3) (Although this theorem is a special case of (861.2), we give an independent proof.) We begin with a preliminary fact. Since we know \( \forall x D_x \) (830.3), it follows that \( Dy \) and so we can reason as follows: if \( Ry \), then \( Dy & Ry \), and if \( Dy & Ry \), then \( Ry \). Hence, by the definition of \( \equiv \) and GEN, we know the following is a modally strict theorem:

(8) \( \forall y (Ry \equiv (Dy & Ry)) \)

Now we argue both directions of our theorem.

(\( \rightarrow \)) Assume \( \text{Function}^0(R) \), i.e., \( R \) is a nullary total function. By definition (828.3), this implies \( \exists ! y Ry \). Now by (856.3), it suffices to show:

(A) \( D^0 \rightarrow \exists ! y (Dy & Ry) \)

(B) \( \forall y (D^0 & Ry \rightarrow Dy) \)

(C) \( D^0 \equiv \exists y Ry \)

(A) We know \( \exists ! y Ry \), and so by (8) and a Rule of Substitution, \( \exists ! y (Dy & Ry) \). Hence \( D^0 \rightarrow \exists ! y (Dy & Ry) \).

(B) Assume \( D^0 \) and \( Ry \). But \( Ry \) alone implies \( Dy \), by (8).

(C) We know \( D^0 \) is true (830.2) and it follows \textit{a fortiori} from \( \exists ! y Ry \) that \( \exists y Ry \). Hence \( D^0 \equiv \exists y Ry \).

(\( \leftarrow \)) Assume \( R : D^0 \rightarrow D \). Then by summary fact (856.3), it follows \textit{a fortiori} that:

\[ D^0 \rightarrow \exists ! y (Dy & Ry) \]

Now by (828.3), we have to show \( \exists ! y Ry \). But \( D^0 \) is true (830.2). So \( \exists ! y (Dy & Ry) \). But then by the modally strict fact (8) and a Rule of Substitution, \( \exists ! y Ry \).

\( \triangleright \)

(861.4) Assume \( \text{Function}^0(R) \). Then by (861.3), we know that \( R : D^0 \rightarrow D \). Hence, by definition (855.3), it follows \textit{a fortiori} that \( \text{HasDomain}(R,D^0) \). So by definition (853.5):

(8) \( D^0 \equiv \exists y Ry \)

Now we have to show \( \forall p (p \equiv \text{HasDomain}(R,p)) \). So by GEN, we show \( p \equiv \text{HasDomain}(R,p) \). (\( \rightarrow \)) Assume \( p \). Then since both \( p \) is true (by hypothesis) and \( D^0 \) is true (830.2), \( p \equiv D^0 \). But from this and (8), it follows that \( p \equiv \exists y Ry \). Hence by definition (853.5), \( \text{HasDomain}(R,p) \). (\( \leftarrow \)) Assume \( \text{HasDomain}(R,p) \). Then by definition (853.5), \( p \equiv \exists y Ry \). But from this and (8) it follows that \( D^0 \equiv p \). Since \( D^0 \) is true (830.2), it follows that \( p \).

\( \triangleright \)

(863.1) Assume \( R : F \rightarrow G \). Then by (862.4), we know both:
To show $\text{HasRange}(R,G)$, we have to show, by (853.2) $\forall y(Gy \equiv \exists xRxy)$. Given (853.2), it remains only to show $\forall y(\exists xRxy \rightarrow Gy)$. So, by GEN, assume $\exists xRxy$. Let $b$ be such an object, so that we know $Rby$. Then by $\exists I$, $\exists yRby$. But from (8) and its definition (855.1), we know that $\text{HasDomain}(R,F)$, i.e., by (853.1), $\forall x(Fx \equiv \exists yRxy)$. Hence $Fb$. But from (8) and the summary fact (856.1), we know a fortiori that $\forall x(Fx \& Rxy \rightarrow Gy)$. Since we’ve established $Fb$ and know $Rby$ by assumption, it follows that $Gy$. ⊢

(863.2) (Exercise)

(863.3) (Although this theorem is a special case of (863.2), we give an independent proof.) Assume $R : p \rightarrow G$. Then by definition (862.6), we know:

(8) $R : p \rightarrow G$

(ξ) $\forall y(Gy \rightarrow R y)$

To show $\text{HasRange}(R,G)$, we have to show, by (853.6) $\forall y(Gy \equiv \exists xRxy)$. Given (ξ), it remains to show $\forall y(\exists xRxy \rightarrow Gy)$. So, by GEN, assume $\exists xRxy$. Let $b$ be such an object, so that we know $Rby$. Then by $\exists I$, $\exists yRby$. But from (8) and its definition (855.1), we know that $\text{HasDomain}(R,F)$, i.e., by (853.1), $\forall x(Fx \equiv \exists yRxy)$. Hence $Fb$. But from (8) and the summary fact (856.1), we know a fortiori that $\forall x(Fx \& Rxy \rightarrow Gy)$. Since we’ve established $Fb$ and know $Rby$ by assumption, it follows that $Gy$. ⊢

(866.1) (→) Assume $\mathcal{R}$-function$^1(R)$. So by definition (865.1), $\exists F \exists G(R : F \rightarrow G \& \neg \text{Function}^1(R))$. Let $P$ and $Q$ be such properties, so that we know both:

(8) $R : P \rightarrow Q$

(ζ) $\neg \text{Function}^1(R)$

Given (8), it remains only show $\neg \forall x(Px \equiv Dx)$, by &I and $\exists I$. For reductio, assume $\forall x(Px \equiv Dx)$. From this assumption, (8), and (858.1), it follows that $R : D \rightarrow Q$. Moreover, since we know $\forall xDx$, we also know that $\neg \forall x(Qx \rightarrow Dx)$. Hence by (859.1), $R : D \rightarrow D$. So by (861.1), $\text{Function}^1(R)$, which contradicts (ζ).

(←) Assume $\exists F \exists G(R : F \rightarrow G \& \neg \forall x(Fx \equiv Dx))$. Suppose $P$ and $Q$ are such properties, so that we know both:

(ξ) $R : P \rightarrow Q$

(ω) $\neg \forall x(Px \equiv Dx)$

To show $\mathcal{R}$-function$^1(R)$, we have to show, by (865):
Proofs of Theorems and Metarules

\[ \exists F \exists G (R : F \rightarrow G \& \neg Function^1(R)) \]

If we pick our witnesses to be \( P \) and \( Q \), it remains only to show \( \neg Function^1(R) \). Assume, for reductio, \( Function^1(R) \). Then by (861.1), \( R : D \rightarrow D \). This implies, by (855.1), \( HasDomain(R,D) \), i.e., by (853.1):

(A) \( \forall x(Dx \equiv \exists yRxy) \)

But from (ξ), it also follows by (855.1) that \( HasDomain(R,P) \), i.e., by (853.1):

(B) \( \forall x(Px \equiv \exists yRxy) \)

From (A) and (B) it follows that \( \forall x(Px \equiv Dx) \), which contradicts (ω). ⊢

(866.2) (Exercise)

(866.3) (Although this theorem is a special case of theorem (866.2), we give an independent proof.) (→) Suppose \( \neg \text{has function}^0(R) \). Then by definition (865.3):

\[ \exists p \exists G (R : p \rightarrow G \& \neg \text{Function}^0(R)) \]

Suppose \( q_1 \) and \( P \) are such a proposition and property, so that we know:

(δ) \( R : q_1 \rightarrow P \& \neg \text{Function}^0(R) \)

Given the first conjunct of (δ), it remains only to show \( q_1 \not\equiv D^0 \), by \&I and \( \exists \). For reductio, suppose \( q_1 \equiv D^0 \). Then from this assumption, the first conjunct of (δ) and (858.3), it follows that \( R : D^0 \rightarrow P \). Now since we know \( \forall xDx \), we also know \( \forall x(Px \rightarrow Dx) \). Hence by (859.3), \( R : D^0 \rightarrow D \). So by (861.3), \( Function^0(R) \), which contradicts the second conjunct of (δ).

(←) Suppose \( \exists p \exists G (R : p \rightarrow G \& \neg p \equiv D^0) \). Let \( q_1 \) and \( P \) be such a proposition and property, so that we know:

(ξ) \( R : q_1 \rightarrow P \& q_1 \not\equiv D^0 \)

By the definition of a restricted function (865.3), it remains only to show that \( R \) is not a total function, i.e., by (828.3), \( \neg \exists yRy \). From the second conjunct of (ξ) and the truth of \( D^0 \) (830.2), we know \( \neg q_1 \). Separately, from the first conjunct of (ξ), it follows from (855.3) that \( HasDomain(R,q_1) \). Hence by definition (853.5), it follows that \( \neg \exists yRy \). But if nothing exemplifies \( R \), nothing uniquely exemplifies \( R \), i.e., \( \neg \exists yRy \). ⊢

(866.4) (→) Assume \( \neg \text{has function}^0(R) \). Then by (866.3), \( \exists p \exists G (R : p \rightarrow G \& p \not\equiv D^0) \). Let \( q_1 \) and \( P \) be such a proposition and property, so that we know \( R : q_1 \rightarrow P \& q_1 \not\equiv D^0 \). Since \( q_1 \) is not equivalent to the known truth \( D^0 \) (830.2), it follows that \( \neg q_1 \). Since \( R : q_1 \rightarrow P \) implies \( R \) has \( q_1 \) as a domain (855.3), it follows by definition of \( HasDomain(R,q_1) \) (853.5) that \( q_1 \equiv \exists yRy \). Hence \( \neg \exists yRy \).

(←) Assume \( \neg \exists yRy \). Let \( p \) be any false proposition, say \( p_0 \); and let \( G \) be any property whatsoever. Then if we can show both:
(A) $R : p \rightarrow G$

(B) $p \not\equiv D^0$

then by $\&I$ and $\exists I$, it follows that $\exists p \exists G(R : p \rightarrow G \& p \not\equiv D^0)$, which by (866.3) establishes that $\uparrow$-function$^0(R)$.

(A) By (856.1), we have to show:

(i) $p \rightarrow \exists y(Gy \& Ry)$

(ii) $\forall y(p \& Ry \rightarrow Gy)$

(iii) $p \equiv \exists yRy$

(i) Since we know $\neg p$ by hypothesis, it follows by failure of the antecedent that $p \rightarrow \exists y(Gy \& Ry)$.

(ii) Since we know $\neg p$ by hypothesis, it follows that $p \& Ry \rightarrow Gy$, again by failure of the antecedent. So by GEN, $\forall y(p \& Ry \rightarrow Gy)$.

(iii) We know both $\neg p$ and $\neg \exists y Ry$ by hypothesis. So $p$ and $\exists y Ry$ have the same truth value, i.e., $p \equiv \exists y Ry$.

(B) We know both $\neg p$ by hypothesis and $D^0$ by theorem (830.2). Hence $p$ and $D^0$ have different truth values, i.e., $p \not\equiv D^0$. ⇔

(867.1) Let $R$ be the relation:

$$\lambda x y!x \& y = 0$$

To show $\uparrow$-function($R$), it suffices to show, by (866.2), that:

$$\exists F \exists G(R : F \rightarrow G \& \neg \forall x(Fx \equiv Dx))$$

If we choose $F$ to be $O!$ and $G$ to be $\mathbb{N}$, then by $\&I$ and $\exists I$, it suffices to show:

(A) $R : O! \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$

(B) $\neg \forall x(O!x \equiv Dx)$

(A) By (856.1), we have to show:

(i) $\forall x(O!x \rightarrow \exists y(\mathbb{N}y \& Rxy))$

(ii) $\forall x \forall y(O!x \& Rxy \rightarrow \mathbb{N}y)$

(iii) $\forall x(O!x \equiv \exists yRxy)$

(i) By GEN, we show the embedded conditional. So assume $O!x$. Then we pick Zero to be our witness. By the definition of the uniqueness quantifier and $\exists I$, we have to show:
\[ \mathbb{N}0 \& Rx0 \& \forall z(\mathbb{N}z \& Rxz \rightarrow z = 0) \]

But \( \mathbb{N}0 \) is a theorem, and implies \( 0 \models 0 \), by (819.3). Hence, conjoining some facts we have established, we obtain:

\[ O!x \& 0 \models 0 \]

But this is all we need to show \( Rx0 \), by \( \beta \)-Conversion and definition of \( R \). It remains therefore to show \( \forall z(\mathbb{N}z \& Rxz \rightarrow z = 0) \). By GEN, we show the embedded conditional. So assume \( \mathbb{N}z \& Rxz \). The second conjunct implies, by definition of \( R \) and \( \beta \)-Conversion, that \( O!x \& z \models 0 \). But then \( z \models 0 \) implies \( z = 0 \), by (819.1).

(ii) By two applications of GEN, we need only show the embedded conditional. So assume \( O!x \) and \( Rxy \). Then by the latter, it follows from the definition of \( R \) and \( \beta \)-Conversion that:

\[ O!x \& y \models 0 \]

The second conjunct implies \( y = 0 \), by now familiar reasoning. So from the fact that \( \mathbb{N}0 \), it follows that \( \mathbb{N}y \).

(iii) By GEN, we have to show \( O!x \equiv \exists yRx y \):

\[ \rightarrow \) Assume \( O!x \). Independently, we know \( \mathbb{N}0 \) and consequently that \( 0 \models 0 \). So, we have established \( O!x \& 0 \models 0 \). So by \( \beta \)-Conversion and definition of \( R, Rx0 \). Hence, \( \exists yRx y \).

\[ \leftarrow \) Assume \( \exists yRx y \). Let \( a \) be the witness, so that we know \( Rxa \). Then by definition of \( R \) and \( \beta \)-Conversion, it follows a fortiori that \( O!x \).

(B) Since there are abstract objects, let \( b \) be one, so that we know \( A!b \). Hence, by (220.3) \( \neg O!b \). But we know \( D b \), by (830.3). So \( \neg (O!b \equiv D b) \). Hence, \( \exists x \neg (O!x \equiv Dx) \). \( \Rightarrow \)

(867.2) We prove this for the case \( n \geq 1 \), and prove the case \( n = 0 \) in (867.3). Let \( R \) be the relation:

\[ [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n y O!x_1 \& \ldots \& O!x_n \& y \models 0] \]

To show \( \vdash \text{function}(R) \), it suffices to show, by (866.2), that:

\[ \exists S^n \exists G(R : S^n \rightarrow G \& \neg \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n (S^n x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv D^n x_1 \ldots x_n)) \]

If we choose \( S^n \) to be \( O^!x^n \) and \( G \) to be \( \mathbb{N} \), then by \&I and \( \exists I \), it suffices to show:

(A) \( R : O^!x^n \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \)

(B) \( \neg \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n (O^!x^n x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv D^n x_1 \ldots x_n) \)

(A) By (856.2), we have to show:
(i) \( \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n (\Omega x_1 \ldots x_n \rightarrow \exists ! y (N y \& R x_1 \ldots x_n y)) \)

(ii) \( \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n \forall y (\Omega x_1 \ldots x_n \& R x_1 \ldots x_n y \rightarrow N y) \)

(iii) \( \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n (\Omega x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv \exists y R x_1 \ldots x_n y) \)

(i) By \( n \) applications of GEN, we show only the embedded conditional. Assume \( \Omega x_1 \ldots x_n \). Then we pick Zero to be our witness. By the definition of the uniqueness quantifier and \( \exists ! \), we have to show:

\[
\forall z (N z \& R x_1 \ldots x_n z \rightarrow z = 0)
\]

But \( N 0 \) is a theorem, and implies \( 0 \equiv 0 \), by (819.3). Now our assumption \( \Omega x_1 \ldots x_n \) implies, by definition (864.2) and \( \beta \)-Conversion:

\[
\Omega x_1 \& \ldots \& \Omega x_n
\]

Hence, conjoining some facts we have established, we obtain:

\[
\Omega x_1 \& \ldots \& \Omega x_n \& 0 \equiv 0
\]

But this is all we need to show \( R x_1 \ldots x_n 0 \), by \( \beta \)-Conversion and definition of \( R \). It remains therefore to show \( \forall z (N z \& R x_1 \ldots x_n z \rightarrow z = 0) \) and, by GEN, the embedded conditional. So assume \( N z \& R x_1 \ldots x_n z \). The second conjunct implies, by definition of \( R \) and \( \beta \)-Conversion, that \( \Omega x_1 \& \ldots \& \Omega x_n \& z = 0 \). But then the last conjunct implies \( z = 0 \), by (819.1).

(ii) By GEN, we show the embedded conditional. Assume \( \Omega x_1 \ldots x_n \) and \( R x_1 \ldots x_n y \). Then by the latter, it follows from the definition of \( R \) and \( \beta \)-Conversion that:

\[
\Omega x_1 \& \ldots \& \Omega x_n \& y \equiv 0
\]

The last conjunct implies \( y = 0 \), by now familiar reasoning. So from the fact that \( N 0 \), it follows that \( N y \).

(iii) By GEN, we have to show:

\[
\Omega x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv \exists y R x_1 \ldots x_n y
\]

\((\rightarrow)\) Assume \( \Omega x_1 \ldots x_n \). Then it follows by definition (864.2) and \( \beta \)-Conversion that \( \Omega x_1 \& \ldots \& \Omega x_n \), independently, we know \( N 0 \) and consequently that \( 0 \equiv 0 \).

So, conjoining some things we know:

\[
\Omega x_1 \& \ldots \& \Omega x_n \& 0 \equiv 0
\]

So by \( \beta \)-Conversion and definition of \( R, R x_1 \ldots x_n 0 \). Hence, \( \exists y R x_1 \ldots x_n y \).

\((\leftarrow)\) Assume \( \exists y R x_1 \ldots x_n y \). Let \( a \) be the witness, so that we know \( R x_1 \ldots x_n a \). Then by definition of \( R \) and \( \beta \)-Conversion, it follows \textit{a fortiori} that \( \Omega x_1 \& \ldots \& \Omega x_n \). So by definition (864.2) and \( \beta \)-Conversion, \( \Omega x_1 \ldots x_n \).
(B) Since there are abstract objects, let $a$ be one. Then we know $A!a \& \ldots \& A!a$. Hence, by (220.3) $\neg O!a \& \ldots \& \neg O!a$. *A fortiori*, $\neg(O!a \& \ldots \& O!a)$, i.e., by $\beta$-Conversion and definition (864.2), $\neg(O^{x^n}a \ldots a)$. But we know $D^n a \ldots a$, by (830.3) So:

$$\neg(O^{x^n}a \ldots a \equiv D^n a \ldots a)$$

Hence,

$$\exists x_1 \ldots \exists x_n \neg(O^{x^n}x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv D^n x_1 \ldots x_n)$$

I.e.,

$$\forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n (O^{x^n}x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv D^n x_1 \ldots x_n)$$

(867.3) Let $R$ be any unexemplified property. Then by (866.4), \textit{\Lg}_0(R).

(868.1) – (868.4) (Exercises)

(869.1) Assume $\textit{\Lg}_0(R)$. Then by (866.3), $\exists p \exists G (R : p \rightarrow G \& p \not\equiv D^0)$. Let $q_1$ and $P$ be such a proposition and property, so that we know:

$$(\delta) \ R : q_1 \rightarrow P \& q_1 \not\equiv D^0$$

By GEN, we have to show $\text{HasDomain}(R, p) \equiv \neg p. (\rightarrow) \text{Assume HasDomain}(R, p).$ Then by definition (853.5), $p \equiv \exists y R_y$. But by (866.4), $\neg \exists y R_y$. Hence $\neg p. (\leftarrow)$ Assume $\neg p$. But we know $\neg q_1$, since the second conjunct of ($\delta$) asserts that $q_1$ fails to be equivalent to the truth $D^0$. So $p \equiv q_1$.

From this fact and the first conjunct of ($\delta$), it follows by (858.3) that $R : p \rightarrow P$. Hence, by definition (855.3), $\text{HasDomain}(R, p)$. ⇨

(869.2) Assume $\textit{\Lg}_0(R)$. Then by (866.3), $\exists p \exists G (R : p \rightarrow G \& p \not\equiv D^0)$. Let $q_1$ and $P$ be such a proposition and property, so that we know:

$$(\delta) \ R : q_1 \rightarrow P \& q_1 \not\equiv D^0$$

By GEN, we have to show $\text{HasRange}(R, H) \equiv \neg \exists y H_y$.

(\rightarrow) Assume $\text{HasRange}(R, H)$, i.e., by definition (853.6), $\forall y(H_y \equiv R_y)$. But the fact that $R$ is a nullary restricted function implies $\neg \exists y R_y$, by theorem (866.4). Hence $\neg \exists y H_y$.

(\leftarrow) Assume $\neg \exists y H_y$. To show $\text{HasRange}(R, H)$, we have to show, by GEN, $H_y \equiv R_y$:

$$(\rightarrow) \text{By our assumption } \neg \exists y H_y, \text{we know } \forall y \neg H_y. \text{Hence } \neg H_y. \text{So } H_y \rightarrow R_y, \text{by failure of the antecedent.}$$
Since \( R \) is a nullary restricted function, we know \( \neg \exists y R y \), by theorem (866.4). So \( \forall y \neg R y \) and, hence, \( \neg R y \). So by failure of the antecedent, \( R y \rightarrow H y \).

(871) (Exercise)

(872) Assume \( f \) is any \( n \)-ary function such that \( \exists y fx_1 \ldots x_n y \). Now by (871), we know that \( f \) is either total or restricted. If \( f \) is total, then by (828.2), it follows immediately that \( \exists ! y fx_1 \ldots x_n y \). If \( f \) is a nullary restricted function, then the result follows immediately by failure of the antecedent. If \( f \) is a restricted function with \( n \geq 1 \), then by (870), \( \exists S_n \exists G (f : S_n \rightarrow G) \). Suppose \( A^n \) and \( Q \) are such a relation and property, so that we know \( f : A^n \rightarrow Q \). Hence, by (856.2), it follows a fortiori that:

\[
\forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n (A^n x_1 \ldots x_n \rightarrow \exists ! y (Q y & fx_1 \ldots x_n y))
\]

\[
\forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n \forall y (A^n x_1 \ldots x_n & fx_1 \ldots x_n y \rightarrow Q y)
\]

\[
\forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n (A^n x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv \exists y fx_1 \ldots x_n y)
\]

Our assumption \( \exists y fx_1 \ldots x_n y \) implies \( A^n x_1 \ldots x_n \) by (\( \theta_3 \)). From this and (\( \theta_1 \)), it follows that \( \exists ! (Q y & fx_1 \ldots x_n y) \), i.e.,

\[
\exists y (Q y & fx_1 \ldots x_n y & \forall z (Q z & fx_1 \ldots x_n z \rightarrow z = a))
\]

Suppose \( a \) is such an object, so that we know:

\[
Q a & fx_1 \ldots x_n a & \forall z (Q z & fx_1 \ldots x_n z \rightarrow z = a)
\]

Since the second conjunct is \( fx_1 \ldots x_n a \), it remains only to show \( \forall z (fx_1 \ldots x_n z \rightarrow z = a) \), since from the conjunction of these two, it follows by \( \exists ! \) and the definition of the uniqueness quantifier that \( \exists ! y fx_1 \ldots x_n y \). So assume \( fx_1 \ldots x_n z \). Then from the previously established fact that \( A^n x_1 \ldots x_n \), it follows from (\( \theta_2 \)) that \( Q z \). But then \( Q z \) and \( fx_1 \ldots x_n z \) imply, by the third conjunct of (\( \zeta \)) that \( z = a \). \( \Rightarrow \)

(874.2) (Exercise)

(876.1) (Exercise)

(876.3) (Exercise)

(877.2) Fix \( n \) and \( m \). By definition, we have to show:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(A)} & \quad \text{Rigid}(C^n_m') \\
\text{(B)} & \quad C^n_m' : \mathbb{N}^{\times m} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}
\end{align*}
\]

(A) Clearly \( C^n_m' \) exists, by definition and the fact that its definiens doesn’t bind any variables in encoding formula subterms. So it remains so show:
\[ \Box \forall x_1 \ldots x_n \forall y (C^u_m x_1 \ldots x_n y \rightarrow \Box C^u_m x_1 \ldots x_n y) \]

By GEN and RN, it suffices to show \( C^u_m x_1 \ldots x_n y \rightarrow \Box C^u_m x_1 \ldots x_n y \). So assume \( C^u_m x_1 \ldots x_n y \). Then by definition of \( C^u_m \) and \( \lambda \)-Conversion, \( \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n \) \( \gamma \equiv m \).

But \( \forall x_i \) implies \( \Box \forall x_i \) (1 \( \leq i \leq n \)), by (876.1). And since \( \diamond \) is an operation (876.1), it follows by definition (874.1) that it is rigid. So \( \Box \gamma \equiv m \). Conjoining our results, we have \( \Box (\forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n \gamma \equiv m) \). So by \( \lambda \)-Conversion:

\[ \Box [\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \forall y \Box \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n \gamma \equiv m \forall y] x_1 \ldots x_n y \]

i.e., \( \Box C^u_m x_1 \ldots x_n y \), by Rule =dfI.

(B) (exercise). \( \Rightarrow \)

(878.4) (Exercise)

(879.1) We prove this by cases. Case 1 \((n \geq 1)\). Assume \( Op^n(R) \), so that by (874.1) we know \( R : \mathbb{N}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \). Hence, by (856.2), we know a fortiori:

(8) \( \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n \forall y (\mathbb{N}^n x_1 \ldots x_n \& Rx_1 \ldots x_n y \rightarrow \mathbb{N} y) \)

(ξ) \( \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n (\mathbb{N}^n x_1 \ldots x_n \equiv \exists y Rx_1 \ldots x_n y) \)

Now assume \( Rx_1 \ldots x_n y \). Hence \( \exists y Rx_1 \ldots x_n y \). Then by (ξ), it follows that:

(ç) \( \mathbb{N}^n x_1 \ldots x_n \)

So by definition of the Cartesian product (864.2) and \( \beta \)-Conversion, it follows that \( \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n \gamma \equiv m \). Moreover, it follows from (ç) and our assumption \( Rx_1 \ldots x_n y \) that \( \mathbb{N} y \), by (8).

Case 2 \((n = 0)\). We want to show:

\[ Op^0(R) \rightarrow \forall y (R y \rightarrow \mathbb{N} y) \]

So, assume \( Op^0(R) \). By (874.1), \( Rigid(R) \& R : \mathbb{N}^0 \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \). Then by (863.3), \( HasRange(R, \mathbb{N}) \). And by (853.6), this implies that \( \forall y (\mathbb{N} y \equiv R y) \). A fortiori, \( \forall y (R y \rightarrow \mathbb{N} y) \).

(879.2) Assume \( Op^n(R) \), so that by (874.1) we know both that \( R \) is rigid and that \( R : \mathbb{N}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \). If \( n \geq 1 \), then \( \exists^S \exists G(R : S^n \rightarrow G) \); if \( n = 0 \), \( \exists p \exists G (R : p \rightarrow G) \). So function\(^n\)(R), by (870). By GEN, we prove both directions of the biconditional. (→) Assume \( Rx_1 \ldots x_n y \). Now by (872), any such \( y \) is unique. Hence, we know:

\[ Rx_1 \ldots x_n y \& \forall z (Rx_1 \ldots x_n z \rightarrow z = y) \]

Since \( R \) is rigid, it follows by (172.2) that:

\[ sRx_1 \ldots x_n y \& \forall z (sRx_1 \ldots x_n z \rightarrow z = y) \]
Hence by an alphabetic variant of of the modally strict version of Hintikka's
schema (148) that:
\[ y = i y R x_1 \ldots x_n y \]

\[ \leftarrow \text{By reversing the reasoning.} \]

\[ (879.3) \text{ We prove this by cases. Case 1 } (n \geq 1). \text{ Assume } Op^n(R). \text{ By eliminating our restricted variables, we have to show:} \]
\[ \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n ((\exists x_1 \& \ldots \& \exists x_n) \rightarrow \exists! y (\exists y & R x_1 \ldots x_n y)) \]
So assume \( \exists x_1 \& \ldots \& \exists x_n. \) Since \( Op^n(R) \), we know by (856.1)  a fortiori that:
\[ \forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n (\exists x_1 \ldots x_n \rightarrow \exists! y (\exists y & R x_1 \ldots x_n y)) \]

Instantiating to \( x_1, \ldots, x_n \), it follows that:
\[ \exists y (\exists y & R x_1 \ldots x_n y) \]

But our assumption \( \exists x_1 \& \ldots \& \exists x_n \) implies the antecedent, by (864.2) and \( \beta \)-Conversion. Hence \( \exists! y (\exists y & R x_1 \ldots x_n y). \)

Case 2 \( (n = 0) \). We have to show:
\[ Op^0(R) \rightarrow \exists! k R k \]

So assume \( Op^0(R). \) Then by (874.1), \( R : \mathbb{N}^{x^0} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}. \) By (864.3), \( \mathbb{N}^{x^0} = D_0. \) By (856.3), \( D_0 \rightarrow \exists! y (\exists y & R y). \) But since \( D_0 \) is necessarily true, it follows that \( \exists! k R k. \)

\[ (881.1) \text{ Assume } Op^1(H) \text{ and } Op^1(G). \text{ Then let } R \text{ abbreviate } [G(H)], \text{ where the latter was defined in (880.1) as } [\lambda y \exists z (H x z & G z)]. \text{ As noted in (880), then } R \text{ exists, since its definiens exists by axiom (39.2) – its matrix is free of encoding formulas and so the initial } \lambda \text{ doesn’t bind an variables in encoding formula subterms. We have to show:} \]

(A) \( Op^1(R) \)

(B) \( \forall x (R(x) = G(H(x))) \)

Proof of (A). By (874.1), we have to show:

(C) \( \text{Rigid}(R) \)

(D) \( R : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \)

To show (C), suppose not, for reductio. Then since \( R \) exists, it follows by the definition of rigidity (553.1) and modal reasoning, \( \diamond \exists x \psi (R x y & \neg \square R x y). \) So, by CBF and further modal reasoning, \( \exists x \psi \diamond (R x y & \diamond \neg R x y). \) Then let \( a \) and \( b \) be such objects so that we know \( \diamond (R a b & \diamond \neg R a b). \) The \( \diamond \) distributes over a conjunction but since \( \diamond \diamond \phi \rightarrow \diamond \phi (4\diamond) \), it follows that:
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(8) \( \diamond Rab \)

(ξ) \( \diamond \neg Rab \)

Now we know, independently by \( \beta \)-Conversion and the existence of \( R \), the following is a modally strict theorem:

(ζ) \( Rab \equiv \exists z (Haz \& Gzb) \)

From this and \( \diamond Rab \), it follows by a Rule of Substitution that \( \diamond \exists z (Haz \& Gzb) \). Hence, by BF\( \diamond \), \( \exists \diamond (Haz \& Gzb) \). Let \( c \) be witness so that we know \( \diamond (Hac \& Gcb) \). Hence \( \diamond Hac \& \diamond Gcb \), by (162.3). But since \( H \) and \( G \) are both operations, they are rigid (874.1), and so both \( \Box (Hac \rightarrow \Box Hac) \) and \( \Box (Gcb \rightarrow \Box Gcb) \). So it follows respectively by \( K \) that both that \( \Box Hac \) and \( \Box Gcb \). But then by (165.2), it follows respectively that \( \Box Hac \& \Box Gcb \). Hence \( \Box (Hac \& Gcb) \). By the Buridan formula (168.1), it follows that \( \Box \exists z (Haz \& Gzb) \).

To show (D), we have to show, by (855.2):

(E) \( R \not\vdash \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \)

(F) \( \text{HasDomain}(R, \mathbb{N}) \)

To show (E), we have to show, by (847.1):

(E.1) \( R \upharpoonright \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \).

Proof. By (843), we have to show \( \forall x (\mathbb{N} x \rightarrow \exists! y (\mathbb{N} y \& Rxy)) \). So by GEN, assume \( \mathbb{N} x \). Since both \( Op^1 (H) \) and \( Op^1 (G) \), let \( d \) be the unique number such that \( Hxd \) and let \( e \) be the unique number such that \( Gde \). Since \( e \) is therefore the unique number such that \( Hxd \& Gde \), it follows not only that \( Rxe \), but also that \( e \) is the unique number such that \( Rxe \). Thus \( e \) is the witness to \( \exists! y (\mathbb{N} y \& Rxy) \)

(E.2) \( \forall x \forall y (\mathbb{N} x \& Rxy \rightarrow \mathbb{N} y) \).

Proof. By GEN, assume \( \mathbb{N} x \& Rxy \). From the second conjunct, it follows by \( \beta \)-Conversion that \( \exists z (Hxz \& Gzy) \). But since \( G \) is an operation, it maps any witness to this last claim to a number. So \( \mathbb{N} y \).

To show (F), we have to show, by (853.1):

\( \forall x (\mathbb{N} x \equiv \exists y Rxy) \)

Proof. (\( \rightarrow \)) Assume \( \mathbb{N} x \). But then \( \exists y Rxy \) follows a fortiori from the reasoning used to establish (E.1). (\( \leftarrow \)) Assume \( \exists y Rxy \). But then \( \mathbb{N} x \) follows a fortiori from the reasoning used to establish (E.2).
Proof of (B). By Rule \( \forall \), it suffices to show, for an arbitrary number \( k \), that \( R(k) = G(H(k)) \). Since we now know \( R \) is a unary operation, there is a unique \( j \) such that \( Rkj \). So by \( \beta \)-conversion, we have \( \exists z(Hkz \& Gzj) \). Let \( i \) be a witness, so \( Hki \& Gij \). By (879.2) and (873), \( i = H(k) \) and \( j = G(i) \) and \( j = R(k) \). By substitution of identicals, \( j = G(H(k)) \). So \( R(k) = G(H(k)) \).

(881.2) Assume \( Op^n(H_1), \ldots, Op^n(H_m) \), and \( Op^m(G) \). Then let \( R \) abbreviate the defined notation \( [G(H_1, \ldots, H_m)] \), where this was defined in (880.2) to be the relation:

\[
[\lambda x_1 \ldots x_n \exists z_1 \ldots \exists z_m (H_1 x_1 \ldots x_n z_1 \& \ldots \& H_m x_1 \ldots x_n z_m \& Gz_1 \ldots z_m y)].
\]

Then since the proof is a generalization of that used for the previous theorem, we leave it as an exercise. \( \lhd \)

(884.1.b) By (876.1), we know \( Op^1(\hat{=}) \). So by the definition (.1.a), \( Op^1(A_0) \). \( \Rightarrow \)

(884.2.a) Assume \( Op^1(A_m) \). By (876.3), we know that \( Op^1(S) \). Then by (881.1), that \( Op^1([S(A_m)]) \). \( \Rightarrow \)

(884.3) We prove this by induction. The base case, \( Op^1(A_0) \) established by (881.2.b). For the inductive case, our I.H. is that \( Op^1(A_m) \). Then, by (881.2.b), \( Op^1(A_{m+1}) \). \( \Rightarrow \)

(884.5) By the definition of a binary operation (874), we have to show:

(A) \( \text{Rigid}(A) \)

(B) \( A : N^>^2 \to N \)

(A) Suppose, for reductio, \( A \) isn’t rigid. Then if we apply standard modal reasoning to the definition of rigidity, it follows that there are numbers \( a, b, c \) such that:

\( (\zeta) \; \Diamond Aabc \& \Diamond \neg Aabc \)

But now consider the fact that \( Op^1 A_b (884.3) \), which implies \( \text{Rigid} A_b (874.1) \). Then by (879.3) there must be a unique number, say \( d \), such that \( A_{b-ad} \) and by (553.1) \( \Box A_{b-ad} \). Hence, by definition (884.4), \( \beta \)-Conversion, and the fact that \( n = m \equiv n = m \), it follows that \( \Box A_{abd} \). If \( c = d \) we have a contradiction with the second conjunct of \( (\zeta) \) and, otherwise, we have a contradiction with the first conjunct of \( (\zeta) \).

(B) Suppose, for reductio, that it is not the case that \( A : N^>^2 \to N \). Then by (856.2) one of the following must hold:

- there are numbers \( a \) and \( b \) for which \( A \) doesn’t yield a unique number, or
- there are numbers \( a \) and \( b \) for which \( A \) yields something other than a number, or
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There are numbers \(a\) and \(b\) for which \(A\), for which \(A\) yields nothing.

By (884.4), each of these cases implies that \(A_b(a)\) is not a number. But this contradicts \(Op^1(A_b)\) (884.3).

(884.6.a) This follows from (884.1.a) directly.

(884.6.b) The fact that \(A(n,m') = [S(A)(n,m)]\) follows from 884.2.b) via (884.4) directly. The result then follows immediately.

(887.1.b) (Exercise)

(887.2.a) Assume \(Op^1(F_m)\), where \(m\) is any natural number. By (878.4), we know that \(Op^1(\pi^1)\). By (877.2), we know that \(Op^1(C^2)\). Then by (881.2), it follows that \(Op^1([G(\pi^1,C^2,F_m)])\).

(887.3) We prove this by induction. The base case, \(Op^1(F_0)\) is established by (887.1.b). For the inductive case, our IH is that \(Op^1(F_m)\). Then, by (887.2.a), \(Op^1([G(\pi^1,C^2,F_m)])\). So by definition of \(F_m\) (887.2.b), \(Op^1(F_m')\).

(887.5) We prove our theorem by showing:

(A) Rigid(\(F\))

(B) \(F : \mathbb{N}^{\times 2} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}\).

(A) Suppose, for reductio, \(F\) isn’t rigid. Then if we apply standard modal reasoning to the definition of rigidity, it follows that there are numbers \(a, b, c\) such that:

(\(\zeta\)) \(\Diamond F_{abc} \& \neg F_{abc}\).

But now consider the fact that \(Op^1(F_b)\) (887.3), which implies Rigid(\(F_b\)) (874.1). Then by (879.3) there must be a unique number, say \(d\), such that \(F_{\bar{d}f}\) and by (553.1) \(\Box F_{\bar{d}f}\). Hence, by definition (887.4), \(\beta\)-Conversion, and the fact that \(n = m \equiv n \equiv m\), it follows that \(\Box F_{\bar{d}f}\). If \(c = d\) we have a contradiction with the second conjunct of \((\zeta)\) and, otherwise, we have a contradiction with the first conjunct of \((\zeta)\).

(B) Suppose, for reductio, that it is not the case that \(F : \mathbb{N}^{\times 2} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}\). Then by (856.2) one of the following must hold:

- there are numbers \(a\) and \(b\) for which \(F\) doesn’t yield a unique number, or
- there are numbers \(a\) and \(b\) for which \(F\) yields something other than a number, or
- there are numbers \(a\) and \(b\) for which \(F\) yields nothing.
By (887.4), each of these cases implies that $F_b(a)$ is not a number. But this contradicts $\text{Op}^1(F_b)$ (887.3).

(887.6.a) $F(n, 0) = F_0(n) = H(n)$ by (887.4), $\beta$-Conversion, and (887.1.a).

(887.6.b) We may reason as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
F(n, m') &= F_m(n) & \text{by (887.4)} \\
&= [G(\pi_1^2, C_m^2, F_m)](n) & \text{by (887.2.b)} \\
&= [G(\pi_1^3, \pi_2^3, F)](n, m) & \text{by (878.2), (877.1), (887.4)} \\
&= G(n, m, F(n, m)) & \text{by (878.2), (881.2)}
\end{align*}
\]

(888) Assume $\text{Op}^1(H) \& \text{Op}^3(G)$. Then it suffices to show that $F$, as defined in (887.4), is a witness to:

$$\exists F(\text{Op}^2(F) \& F(n, 0) = H(n) \& F(n, m') = G(n, m, F(n, m))$$

But by (887.5), it follows that $\text{Op}^2(F)$. By (887.6.a), it follows that $F(n, 0) = H(n)$. And by (887.6.b), $F(n, m') = G(n, m, F(n, m))$.

(889.1.b) (Exercise)

(889.2.a) Assume $\text{Op}^i(F_m)$, where $m$ is any natural number. By (878.4), we know that for all $k$, $\text{Op}^i(\pi_k^i)$. By (877.2), we know that $\text{Op}^1(C_m^i)$. Then by (881.2), it follows that $\text{Op}^i([G(\pi_1^i, \ldots, \pi_i^i, C_m^i, F_m)])$. Note that when $i = 0$, this still holds, though there are no projection functions in the composition.

(889.3) We prove this by induction. The base case, $\text{Op}^i(F_0)$ is established by (889.1.b). For the inductive case, our IH is that $\text{Op}^i(F_m)$. Then, by (889.2.a), $\text{Op}^i([G(\pi_1^i, \ldots, \pi_i^i, C_m^i, F_m)])$. So by definition of $F_m$ (889.2.b), $\text{Op}^i(F_m)$.

(889.5) We prove our theorem by showing:

(A) $\text{Rigid}(F)$

(B) $F : \mathbb{N}^{n(i+1)} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$

(A) Suppose, for reductio, $F$ isn’t rigid. Then if we apply standard modal reasoning to the definition of rigidity, it follows that there are numbers $a_1, \ldots, a_i$, $b$, and $c$ such that:

$$\text{(C)} \quad \Diamond F a_1 \ldots a_i b c \& \neg \Diamond F a_1 \ldots a_i b c.$$  

But now consider the fact that $\text{Op}^i(F_b)$ (889.3), which implies $\text{Rigid}(F_b)$ (874.1). Then by (879.3) there must be a unique number, say $d$, such that $F_b a_1 \ldots a_i d$ and by (553.1) $\Box F a_1 \ldots a_i d$. Hence, by definition (889.4), $\beta$-Conversion, and the fact that $n = m \equiv n \equiv m$, it follows that $\Box F a_1 \ldots a_i b d$. If $c = d$ we have a contradiction with the second conjunct of (C) and, otherwise, we have a contradiction.
with the first conjunct of (C). Note that when \( i = 0 \), this still holds, though no numbers \( a_1, \ldots, a_i \) are used.

(B) Suppose, for reductio, that it is not the case that \( F : \mathbb{N}^{x(i+1)} \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \). Then by (856.2) one of the following must hold:

- there are numbers \( a_1, \ldots, a_i \), and \( b \) for which \( F \) doesn’t yield a unique number, or
- there are numbers \( a_1, \ldots, a_i \), and \( b \) for which \( F \) yields something other than a number, or
- there are numbers \( a_1, \ldots, a_i \), and \( b \) for which \( F \) yields nothing.

By (889.4), each of these cases implies that \( F_b(a_1, \ldots, a_i) \) is not a number. But this contradicts \( \text{Op}_i(F) \) (889.3). Note that when \( i = 0 \), this still holds, though no numbers \( a_1, \ldots, a_i \) are used and \( F_b \) is nullary.

(889.6.a) \( F(n_1, \ldots, n_i, 0) = F_0(n_1, \ldots, n_i) = H(n_1, \ldots, n_i) \), by (889.4), \( \beta \)-Conversion, and (889.1.a).

(889.6.b) We may reason as follows, where \( i \geq 0 \):

\[
F(n_1, \ldots, n_i, m') = F_{m'}(n_1, \ldots, n_i) \tag{889.4}
\]

\[
= [G(n_1^{\prime'}, \ldots, n_i^{\prime'}, c_{m'}^n, F_m)](n_1, \ldots, n_i) \tag{889.2.b}
\]

\[
= [G(n_1^{\prime''}, \ldots, n_i^{\prime''}, n_i^{\prime''}, F)(n_1, \ldots, n_i, m) \tag{887.2}, (877.1), (889.4)
\]

\[
= G(n_1, \ldots, n_i, m, F(n_1, \ldots, n_i, m)) \tag{887.2}, (881.2)
\]

Note that when \( i = 0 \), this still holds, though no variables \( n_1, \ldots, n_i \) are used and \( F_{m'} \) is nullary.

(890) Assume Op\(^i\)(H) & Op\(^{n''}\)(G), where \( i \geq 0 \). Then it suffices to show that \( F \), as defined in (889.4), is a witness to:

\[
\exists F(\text{Op}_i(F) \& F(n_1, \ldots, n_i, 0) = H(n_1, \ldots, n_i) \& F(n_1, \ldots, n_i, m) = G(n_1, \ldots, n_i, m, F(n_1, \ldots, n_i, m)))
\]

By (889.5), it follows that Op\(^i\)(F). By (889.6.a), \( F(n_1, \ldots, n_i, 0) = H(n_1, \ldots, n_i) \). And by (889.6.b), \( F(n_1, \ldots, n_i, m') = G(n_1, \ldots, n_i, m, F(n_1, \ldots, n_i, m)) \). Note that when \( i = 0 \), this still holds, though no variables \( n_1, \ldots, n_i \) are used and \( H \) is nullary.

(893) We show each axiom in turn is a theorem.

- \( n' = 0 \). By theorems (787) and (800).
- \( m' = n' \rightarrow m = n \). By theorem (788) and (800).
- \( m + 0 = m \). By theorem (891.1).
- \( m + n' = (m + n)' \). By theorem (891.1).
\[ m \times 0 = 0. \] By theorem (891.2).

\[ m \times n' = (m \times n) + m. \] By theorem (891.2).

\[ \neg (m < 0). \] By theorems (781.2) and (800).

\[ m < n' \equiv (m < n \lor m = n). \] Assume \( m < n' \). By (774.1), we know \((Rxy \land R'zy) \rightarrow R^*zx\). Substituting \( R \) for \( R \), \( n \) for \( x \), \( n' \) for \( y \), and \( m \) for \( z \), we obtain: \((Pmn' \land P'mn') \rightarrow P'mn\). Since \( Pmn' \) is a theorem, and our assumption \( m < n' \) implies \( P'mn' \) (811.1), it follows that \( P'mn \), i.e., by (811.2), \( m \leq n \), i.e., by (819.7), \( m < n \lor m = n \).

- Induction Axiom:

\[ \forall n(Fn \rightarrow Fn') \rightarrow \forall nFn \]

By theorems (798) and (800).

- Comprehension Scheme:

\[ \exists \forall n(Fn \equiv \varphi^*), \] where \( \varphi^* \) is the translation of \( \varphi \) and \( F \) doesn't occur free in \( \varphi^* \)

**Proof.** It suffices to show that \([\lambda n \varphi^*] \] exists and is a witness to the existential claim. Note that we can expand the restricted variable by choosing an unrestricted variable, say \( y \), that doesn’t occur free in \( \varphi^*(n) \). Then it suffices to show that \([\lambda y \exists y \varphi^*] \) and is a witness to the existential claim. But since there are no encoding formulas in the translations of the atomic formulas of 2nd order PA, and the translations of the complex formulas don’t introduce any encoding formulas, there are no encoding formula subterms in \( \varphi^* \). Hence, \([\lambda y \exists y \varphi^*] \), by (39.2). So by GEN, it remains to show \([\lambda y \exists y \varphi^*]n \equiv \varphi^* \), which we do by the following biconditional chain:

\[
\begin{align*}
\left[\lambda y \exists y \varphi^*\right]n &\equiv n = n \land \left[\lambda y \exists y \varphi^*\right]n \\
&\equiv x = n \land \left[\lambda y \exists y \varphi^*\right]x \\
&\equiv x = n \land (\exists x \rightarrow \varphi^*_n) \\
&\equiv x = n \land \exists x \land (\exists x \rightarrow \varphi^*_n) \\
&\equiv x = n \land \varphi^*_n \\
&\equiv \varphi^* \\
\end{align*}
\]

(895.1) (Exercise)

(895.2) By (894.2), we have to show \( \neg \text{Finite}(!0) \). By definition (894.1), we have to show \( \neg \exists n \# 0 \). For reductio, assume \( \exists n \# 0 \). Independently, by applying GEN and RN to (178.1), it follows that \( \Box \forall x (O!x \rightarrow \Box O!x) \). From this and (738.1), it follows that \( O! \equiv \forall \Box x (O!x \rightarrow \Box O!x) \). So by (742.1), \( \text{Numbers}(x, O!) \equiv \text{Numbers}(x, [\lambda z \exists 0!z]) \). But by (759.3), we know \( \text{Numbers}(\# 0!,[\lambda y \exists 0!y]) \). Hence our last two results imply \( \text{Numbers}(\# 0!\# 0!) \). Since \( \exists n \# 0! \) and \( \# 0! \# 0! \), it follows by modal axiom (793) that \( \Box \forall y (E!y \land \forall u (\exists 0!u \rightarrow u \equiv y)) \). By BF...
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(167.3), \( \exists y \Diamond (E ! y \& \forall u (sO ! u \rightarrow u \not= E y)) \). So let \( b \) be such an object, so that we know \( \Diamond (E ! b \& \forall u (sO ! u \rightarrow u \not= E b)) \). Hence:

(\( \delta \)) \( \Diamond E ! b \& \Diamond \forall u (sO ! u \rightarrow u \not= E b) \)

The first conjunct of (\( \delta \)) implies \( sO ! b \). But \( sO ! \) is rigid (178.1), and so \( \Box sO ! b \), and hence \( sO ! b \), by (132). The second conjunct of (\( \delta \)) implies, by our modal lemma (795), that \( \forall u (sO ! u \rightarrow u \not= E b) \). Instantiating to \( b \) yields \( sO ! b \rightarrow b \not= E b \). But since we’ve established \( sO ! b \), it follows that \( b \not= E b \), which contradicts \( b = E b \) (236.1). \( \Rightarrow \)

(895.3) (Exercise)

(897.1) – (897.5) (Exercises)

(897.6) For reductio, assume some natural number, say \( n \), is such that \( \mathbb{P} n \mathbb{N}_{O!} \). Then by (789.1), \( \mathbb{N} \mathbb{N}_{O!} \). But this contradicts (897.4). \( \Rightarrow \)

(900) To establish our claim we have to show \( \exists x \exists G (\text{InfiniteClassOf}(x, G)) \), by definition (899.2) and a Rule of Substitution. And by definition (899.2) and a Rule of Substitution, we have to show:

(\( \delta \)) \( \exists x \exists G (G \downarrow \& \text{ClassOf}(x, G) \& \exists \kappa (\text{Infinite}(\kappa) \& \text{Numbers}(\kappa, G))) \)

But consider \( [\lambda z sO ! z] \), which clearly exists. By (310.1) \( \exists x \text{ClassOf}(x, [\lambda z sO ! z]) \). Suppose \( a \) is such an object, so that we know \( \text{ClassOf}(a, [\lambda z sO ! z]) \). Then we may prove our theorem by showing that \( a \) and \( [\lambda z sO ! z] \) are witnesses to (\( \delta \)). And given what we’ve established thus far and the fact that \( \#O! \) is a natural cardinal (895.1), it remains, by \&I and \exists I, only to show \( \text{Infinite}(\#O!) \) and \( \text{Numbers}(\#O!, [\lambda z sO !]) \). But these follow by (895.2) and (759.3), respectively. \( \Rightarrow \)
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