The Logic of Identity

Examples

For convenience, we reproduce the following items from Principia Metaphysica: Language/Object Identity, Language/Relation Identity, and Logic/Logic of Identity: In this tutorial, we explain the definitions, give some examples of the logical axiom, and then draw out some consequences.

Explanation of the Definitions

The definition of object identity tells us: objects x and y are identical if and only if they are both ordinary objects and necessarily exemplify the same properties or they are both abstract objects and necessarily encode the same properties. Since every object is either ordinary or abstract, and no object is both ordinary and abstract, we have a completely general definition of object identity. Let us see how to evaluate this definition. Consider President Clinton. In this world, he didn't inhale when smoking marijuana. But he might have inhaled---in some other possible world, Clinton did inhale. Of course, we are considering a world where, by stipulation, it is Clinton himself who inhaled the marijuana smoke. So we already know that the Clinton in this alternative possible world (call him `Clinton*') is identical with the Clinton of our world. But what is it we know from a theoretical point of view when we know that Clinton and Clinton* are the same object? Well, since they are both ordinary objects, we know that they necessarily exemplify the same properties. But this just amounts to the following: Clinton and Clinton* exemplify the samme properties at w_1, Clinton and Clinton* exemplify the same properties at w_2, Clinton and Clinton* exemplify the same properties at w_3, and so on, for every possible world w. This is perfectly consistent with the fact that Clinton exemplifies the property not having inhaled in our world and fails to exemplify this property in one of these other possible worlds, for since Clinton and Clinton* are identical, these same facts apply to Clinton*.

Similarly, abstract objects x and y are said to be identical if and only if at every possible world, they encode the same properties. Notice that this definition is consistent with the existence of two distinct abstract objects which exemplify the same properties.

Relation identity is defined in terms of the identity of properties. Properties F and G are identical just in case necessarily, they are encoded by the same objects. For n > 1, n-place relations F and G are identical iff for each way of plugging n - 1 objects in the same order into F and G, the resulting 1-place properties are identical. For n = 0, propositions p and q are identical if and only if the properties being such that p and being such that q are identical. It is important to remember that these definitions do not tell us `how to find out' whether two apparently distinct relations are in fact the same. Rather, they tell us what we know from a theoretical point of view when we judge that two apparently distinct relations are the same or in fact distinct. And they tell us what we have to prove if we believe that, in some theoretical context, we can prove that two relations are identical or distinct.

Examples of the Logical Axiom

The single logical axiom governing our defined notions of identity asserts basically two things: (a) if objects x and y are identical, then any truth concerning x is a truth concerning y, and (b) if n-place relations F and G are identical, any truth concerning F is a truth concerning G. Here are some examples: Careful consideration of these examples reveals that there are no restrictions on the kinds of contexts in which terms denoting identical objects or properties may be substituted for one another. Of course, one cannot replace one term by another in a situation where the second term is not substitutable for the first. Even if we know that x = a, we may not replace a by the variable x in the statement: b exemplifies the property: being an x such that Rxa. Such a substitution would alter the significance of the sentence. From the fact that b exemplifies the property of being an x such that x bears R to a, it does not follow that b exemplifies the property of being an x such that x bears R to x (at least, not unless we have the additional fact that a = b).

Some Consequences:

Logical Theorems:

This tells us: (a) when x is any object variable, it is a theorem that x = x, and (b) when F is any n-place relation variable, it is a theorem that F = F. To see that (a) is true, pick an arbitrary object variable x. By the definition of ordinary and abstract, we know that either O!x or A!x. Suppose O!x. By the usual methods of proof, we may derive the following theorem of sentential logic: Fx iff Fx. So, by GEN, it is a theorem that: for every F, Fx iff Fx. And by RN, it is a theorem that: Necessarily, for every F, Fx iff Fx. So, given our supposition, we have proved that: O!x & O!x & Necessarily, for every F, Fx iff Fx. So by the definition of identity for objects (see the definition at the top of this tutorial page), we have proved: x = x. But suppose that A!x. Then, again, by the usual methods of proof, we may derive the following logical theorem of sentential logic: xF iff xF. So by GEN, it is a theorem that: for every F, xF iff xF. So by RN, it is a theorem that: Necessarily, for every F, xF iff xF. So, given our assumption, we have proved: A!x & A!x & Necessarily, for every F, xF iff xF. Thus, by the definition of identity for objects, we have proved x = x. So by the rule of disjunctive syllogism, we have established that x = x is a theorem.

To see that (b) is true, we argue by cases. First, pick an arbitrary 1-place relation variable F. Then, by the usual methods of proof for sentential logic, the following is a theorem: xF iff xF. So by GEN, the following is a theorem: for every x, xF iff xF. Now by RN, so is the following: Necessarily, for every x, xF iff xF. So by the definition of identity for 1-place relations (see the definition at the top of this tutorial page), it follows that F = F. Second, pick an arbitrary n-place relation variable F, for n > 0. Exercise: Show that F = F. Third, pick an arbitrary 0-place relation variable p. By our reasoning in the first case, we already know that the following is a theorem: the property being such that p = the property being such that p. So, by the definition of identity for 0-place relations (see the definition at the top of this tutorial page), the following is a theorem: p = p.

Logical Theorem:

derive x=x \rightarrow \Box x=x derive alpha = alpha \rightarrow \Box alpha = alpha

Logical Theorem:

derive A!x and A!y and .... \rightarrow x=y O!x O!y and .....\rightarrow x=y